The Lega Nord at a cross road – reflections on

leadership, succession and the future of the party

Antonella Seddone, University of Turin (asedd@tiscali.it)

Arianna Giovannini, Leeds Metropolitan University (a.giovannini@leedsmet.ac.uk)

THIS IS A PRELIMINARY DRAFT. PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT THE AUTHORS’ PERMISSION

Paper presented at the PSA Annual Conference, Cardiff, 25th-27th March 2013 within the panel “The Party’s Over? Parties, Power and Idiosyncrasies of the Berlusconi Era and the

Future Political Landscape of Italy”

 

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Introduction

The Northern League (NL) is one of the most long-lived parties within the Italian political system. As Diamanti (1996) aptly underlines, the NL is the only party that survived the end if the so called First Republic without changing its identity and, crucially, its leader. However, following the collapse of the latest Berlusconi government, the party has undergone a number of critical changes within its ranks. Firstly, the wave of scandals which have recently invested the NL has undermined its public image, especially as an ‘anti-establishment’ party. Secondly, the resignation of its historical leader and founding father Umberto Bossi has prompted a systemic reconfiguration of the NL – including the selection of a new leader (Roberto Maroni) coupled with an attempt at re-establishing the (public and internal) image of the party, so as to avoid loosing ground on the political stage, and maintaining electoral consensus in view of the February 2013 general election.

Ostensibly, one of the most distinctive traits of the NL lies in the key and tight relationship present between the leader and the militants/supporters of the party. This bond has long provided the main communicative resource for the NL. Hence, throwing light on such relationship can offer interesting insights on the phase of change that the NL is undergoing. This is the aim of this paper.

To achieve this, we have developed a reflection on the future of the NL, based firstly on a reconstruction of the ‘history’ of the NL (so as to understand its roots), and then on an empirical analysis of the front-pages of La Padania, the party’s official newspaper. We have collected data on the last 30 days of electoral campaign in three different elections: 2006, 2008 (when Bossi was the NL leader) and 2013 (with Maroni at the helm of the party). The focus of the analysis is on two dimensions: the choice of content of the newspaper (i.e. the issues tackled in the front-pages) and the way in which the leaders are described and portrayed. In a charismatic party such as the NL, both the leader and the key issues have a symbolic value – because they are able to mobilise members, sympathisers and electoral support. Based on this argument, in this paper we seek to understand the main changes in the NL’s strategies in the crucial passage from one leadership to the other. Umberto Bossi represented a paradigmatic example of charismatic leader – his peculiar rhetoric style, the choice of issues linked to his personality and the linguistic code associated with the leader have profoundly influenced the approach of the NL in electoral mobilisation. Inevitably, the change of leadership, which took place in 2012, had a significant impact on the electoral strategies of the NL. Such change was even more momentous considering who was selected as the new leader. Maroni carved out for himself a political profile also outside the purely partisan dimension of the NL, holding important institutional roles and adopting a political style markedly different from the one of Bossi.

The purpose of this paper is precisely that of understanding such differences between one leadership and the other, so as to assess what is the role of the leader now, in a party that seems to be no longer a purely charismatic one.

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The Roots

The party that we know today as the Lega Nord has to be understood as the result of a diverse set of experiences of local autonomy movements (Cedroni, 2007) which emerged in the late 1970s in the north of Italy. The territorial dimension has always been a key feature of such movements, which have their roots in the regions of Piemonte and Veneto, and that subsequently also expanded onto to Lombardia. Within this scenario, the Liga Veneta, which started to gain political relevance in the 1979 European election and then won two seats at the general election of 1985, can be seen as the forerunner of these autonomist regional movements. The resonance, as well as the territorial span, of these latter expanded with the movement Unolpa (North-West Lombardy union for autonomy) – founded by Umberto Bossi in 1980 with the aim of gaining autonomy for the provinces of Varese and Como. The Unolpa became the Lega Autonomista Lombarda in 1982, and was then reconfigured into the Lega Lombarda in 1984 under the same leadership. In 1985, the Lega Lombarda won its first seats at the local elections of Varese and Gallarate (two medium size-cities located in the northern part of Lombardia) and two years later Umberto Bossi gained a seat at the Senate in the general election.

In the same period, a number of local and provincial formations (known as the Autonomist Leagues) flourished in the north of Italy, and in particular in Veneto – drawing on political void left by the crisis of consensus which invested the areas traditionally loyal to the Christian Democracy Party (DC) (Cedroni, 2007). During this phase, ethno-regionalist claims provided the backbone of the Leagues’ political proposals. However, it is towards the end of the 1980s that something started to change within these movements. More specifically, between 1987 and 1989 the territorial heartland of the Leagues started to shift from its original fulcrum (Piemonte and Veneto) towards Lombardia – where the Lega Lombarda led by Bossi consolidated its consensus and started ‘driving’ the political agenda of the autonomist movements. As Diamanti (1996) and Cedroni (2007) remind us, this was a critical conjuncture, in that it was in this phase that the autonomist movements in general, and the Lega Lombarda in particular, started to distance themselves from the initial radical ethnic themes, and set off to convey a new ‘notion of region’, which resembled more and more the traits of a community of shared interests.

The years between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 90s were crucial in shaping the image and structure of the autonomist movements. This phase culminated with the creation of the Lega Nord, as a federation of the various local autonomist Leagues which had mushroomed from Tuscany northwards. The birth of the NL signalled also a crucial shift in the shared values and political themes of the movement – with a partial dismissal of the ethnic/xenophobe themes, in favour of a stronger emphasis on anti-establishment stances and political antagonism (focussed against the political system and its institutions).

Hence, the NL emerged on the Italian political stage at the beginning of the 1990s as a party “di lotta” (‘fighting’; see Albertazzi, McDonnell and Newell, 2011) – embracing radical antagonism, and making its leader (Umberto Bossi) the voice of the many ‘diseases’ affecting the north of Italy. In this sense, it can be argued that the NL gained prominence drawing on the flaking of the Italian political system in general, and the end of the so-called ‘First-Republic’ in particular – intercepting the growing discontent of the north towards a political class increasingly perceived as corrupted and distant, and framing this stance

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within the powerful metaphor of the north-south territorial cleavage. Put simply, the success of the NL in the early 1990s (but also afterwards) was linked to its ability to represent the interests of a specific, local, model of economic development at a time when the DC was not able anymore to carry out such task (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001).

The first victories of the NL were therefore linked to its ability to intercept the political voice of the new, emerging social stratum of the north and to represent their interest by channelling their voice and protest (Cedroni, 2007). As Diamanti (1996) aptly suggests, in this way the NL managed to juxtapose the “Questione Leghista” (the NL Question) with the “Questione Settentrionale” (the Northern Question) – managing in this way to attract and reproduce the expectations of a very wide (and composite) slice of the northern society, drawing on post-ideological modalities of collective identification (Cedroni, 2007).

Interestingly, after this phase of radical antagonism and of ‘fighting’, the NL shed its political skin, and joined the Berlusconi government in 1994. Between 1992 and 1994 the NL repositioned itself on the political spectrum, adopting a strategy “di lotta e di governo” (fighting and in government) (Albertazzi, McDonnell and Newell, 20011). If, on the one hand, in this period the NL strengthened its organisation and redefined its objective not only at local but also at national level (focussing on the interests of the north, and developing a critique of the centralist state and the mainstream parties), on the other the Lega also started to develop a connection with Berlusconi and his personal party Forza Italia. After the 1994 general election the NL joined the centre-right coalition government led by Berlusconi. However, the NL ‘fighting’ identity soon started to clash with that of the coalition, bringing the party to cause the sudden collapse of the government in 1996.

In the subsequent years, the NL went through a phase of decline (seen its vote going from about 15% in 1992, to 7% in 1994) and, in order to avoid isolation, the party attempted a variety of political strategies, i.e. flirted with the left; went back to radical antagonism (Diamanti, 1996); recovered the original populist and separatist model, founding a new ‘home/heart-land’ (Padania) and fighting for its independence; then re-adapted its focus, and introduced devolution as its new flagship policy and ‘motto’; and finally became again a key ally of Berlusconi, joining its government between 2001 and 2006, and then once more between 2008 and 2011, and, despite many controversies, renewed again its support to the People of Freedom party also in the 2013 general election.

This short excursus through the ‘history’ of the NL aimed at showing how the movement led by Umberto Bossi evolved throughout time managing to maintain a dual role within the Italian political system – being an outsider by nature and an insider by necessity and virtue (e.g. allying with Berlusconi and becoming part of its governments, eventually managing to gain key ministries, whilst overtly opposing its fellow junior coalition partners). By combining its outsider character with an ability to influence policy (Albertazzi, McDonnell, Newell, 2011), the party has shed its political skin cyclically – yet without compromising its identity and maintaining the ‘us vs. them’ populist dichotomy and its specific territorial focus at the heart of its very (distinctive) ideology.

The key point here is that in spite of its erratic path and its self-imposed character of distinctiveness and isolation, the Northern League has managed to maintain the centre of the Italian political scene for the past two decades – forcing the other political actors and the

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public opinion to confront themselves with the themes elaborated and proposed by the party throughout time (Diamanti, 1996). Within this scenario, the charismatic figure of the party leader and founding father Umberto Bossi has always been instrumental to the success of the Northern League.

These recognitions lie at the basis of the aim of this paper, and prompts for an appraisal of the party definition, its main motifs, its organisation, its membership and the role of the leader.

The Party – a definition of the Northern League

As emerged in the analysis developed so far, the NL can be seen as one of the most idiosyncratic political actors on the Italian political scene. Born to federate and conjoint the plethora of autonomist movements that had flourished in the north of Italy starting from the late 1970s, the Northern League has evolved into a more structured, and yet in many respects sui generis, political party – with no counterpart on the Italian political scene.

Precisely because the NL does not resemble the characteristics of any other political actor in Italy, it is worth trying to define in more specific terms what kind of party is the Lega Nord.

Interestingly, as McDonnell (2006) aptly observes, within the relevant literature there seems to be a descriptive and interpretative lack of clarity surrounding the many definitions that have been offered to identify the Northern League. Most commonly, the NL has been categorised as a ‘radical right party’ (Zaslove, 2004), as an ‘extreme-right wing populist party’ (Rydgren, 2005) or, more generally, as an ‘anti-political new force’ (Mastropaolo, 2005) and as part of the ‘radical right’ (Norris, 2005). However, in our view, the most convincing definition has been provided by Duncan McDonnell – who, drawing on the seminal work of Biorcio (1991), argues that the NL is best understood as a regionalist populist party (McDonnell, 2006). Such view captures the key characteristic of the party – namely its privileged linkage with the territorial dimension, and its relationships with its people, which the NL (through the voice of its leader) claims to ‘defend’ against the corrupt political establishment and institutions.

As previously explained, and as suggested by its very name, the Northern League represents the interests of a specific part of the country – the North. Although this is a rather shifting territorial entity (and, indeed, its boundaries have cyclically shrunk and expanded), the idea of the North has come to be associated with the party in an intrinsic manner. Over time, this territorial dimension has taken the shape of a real motherland – Padania, the homeland of the people of the North, which, in the political discourse developed by the NL, have been long exploited by ‘Roma Ladrona’ (‘Rome the Thief’ – a suggestive slogan epitomising the central government maladministration).

As many authors (see Diamanti, 1996; Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001; McDonnell, 2006) have underlined, it is impossible to understand the NL without highlighting its regional character and its linkage to its (no matter how symbolic/symbolised) homeland.

Crucially, the party elaborates its key themes with reference to the territorial context of his heartland (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001), draws on its core values (i.e. the hard-

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working, down-to-earth, honest, simple-living character of the ‘people of the north’ or ‘popolo padano’) to gain support and, as a result, “frames the problems of the north as a centre-periphery question within a ‘people’ vs. ‘the elite’ populist discourse” (McDonnell, 2006, p. 126).

Hence, McDonnell’s definition of the NL as a regionalist populist party seems to capture in full the two tightly interrelated core characteristics of the party: its homeland, and its people – both of which the Northern League ‘fights for’.

Since its inception, and in line with its populist discourse, much of the success of the NL has been linked to the role of its founding leader, Umberto Bossi – a ‘true northerner’, speaking the language of the people, and giving direct voice to its needs, instinct and temperament. Consistent with typically populists discourses, the NL has successfully built its political identity on the view that the virtuous and unified people of its heartland (Padania) is prey to a series of powerful enemies who endanger the very nature and virtues of the popolo padano (McDonnell, 2006). The foes and friends of the ‘people of the north’ have certainly shifted over time and have even been interchangeable (e.g. Berlusconi, ‘Roma ladrona’, the political establishment, the Euro and/or Europe, immigrants, Muslim religion, etc.) but what has never changed in the discourse of the NL “is the juxtaposition (…) of a corrupt, self-interested elite with an ‘under threat’ people whose interests, values, security and identity can only be safeguarded by the actions of the party and the superior vision of the leader, Umberto Bossi” (McDonnell, 2006, p. 127, italic added). Hence, the NL and its charismatic leader are cast as the very incarnation of the people of Padania (McDonnell, 2006), and the party owes much of its success to this primary and osmotic relationship between territory, antagonism and leadership.

Accordingly, as Cedroni (2007) aptly observes, the only real communicative resource of the NL has long been based on the relationship that its leader developed with militants and party members.

This impacts also on the organisation of the NL, which is not very structured and, again, revolves around the leader, with an osmotic linkage to the territory. This is a verticist and personalised structure, where power is in the hands of few actors, all closely related to the man at the head of the party. From the bottom, the real strength of the NL is based on a widespread participation throughout its homeland – rooted on such principles as a strong sense of belonging, an aptitude for militancy, and an unconditional loyalty to the leader and the organisation (Diamanti, 1996). In particular, from 1996 onwards the NL has reinforced even further its relationship with the territory, becoming more and more embedded in its heartland, especially through the creation of an extensive and articulated network of ancillary associations (Cedroni, 2007). These include trade unions, business, cultural, students and recreational associations (Sarubbi, 1995) and its own media outlets (including a newspaper - La Padania – as well as a radio and a TV channel) – occupying, in this way, most of the spheres of the social fabric that the NL represents.

As a result of the key role given to its leadership, internally the NL presents very low levels of democracy. This is demonstrated by the presence of a scarce circulation of party elites, a very limited turnover, and a marked persistence throughout time of the political entourage of the leader – who is surrounded by few, but very loyal, figures, covering the highest positions within the party (Cedroni, 2007).

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Initially, and until the late 1990s, following the will of its founding father Bossi, who aimed at maintaining unconditional control over the party policy and agenda, the NL could not count on a clearly defined political class within its ranks (Cedroni, 2007). It is only from the early 2000s that such trend started to be reversed. Since then, a new class of politicians, with a clear and strong profile, started to emerged – representing the NL even in the absence of its leader (Cedroni, 2007). Among these stand Roberto Maroni, Roberto Castelli, Roberto Calderoli, and the maverick Mario Borghezio (then MEP). Since 2001, these NL politicians have gained relevance both on the local and on the national stage, playing a key role in maintaining and projecting the dual identity ‘di lotta e di governo’ of the party – e.g. holding key ministries (such as Justice, Welfare, Interior, Institutional Reforms) when the Lega entered the two coalition governments with Berlusconi in 2001 and 2008, whilst (ostensibly) fighting for the ‘people of Padania’ from within the system.

If, in general terms, this is the structure that the NL has developed over time, it should be noted that in recent years the solidity of these bases and mechanisms has been undermined from many angles. In the first place, the charismatic leadership of Bossi was put under threat by his deteriorating physical conditions. Following a stroke in 2004, Bossi disappeared from the political scene for almost two years – coming back in 2006 weakened in the appearance but not in his spirit. Interestingly, the fact that the NL could count on a stronger, growing political elite within its ranks tamed the negative effects of the absence of Bossi in this period. More recently, the party underwent another profound challenge. In particular, a number of scandals concerning the party’s management of public funds, as well as some allegations regarding the role of the Bossi family within the party, led the historical leader of the NL to resign in April 2012. This opened a new, turbulent phase for the NL. As with any party headed by a charismatic leadership, many commentators (as well as party members) argued (or feared) that the loss of Bossi could have been a crucial hit to the credibility and identity of the NL. Since the very inception of the Lega project, Bossi had dominated the organisation and the communication strategies of the party, and had been a key, leading figure for the ‘people of Padania’. As a consequence, the debate on Bossi’s succession was animated and polarised – both within the party itself, and in the media. Eventually, in July 2012 Roberto Maroni, on of the closest and long-standing allies of Bossi, was selected by the NL congress as his successor.

Arguably, this change in leadership has opened the way for a major transformation of the image of the NL, and possibly of its identity. In the following, we will shed further light on this crucial aspect, analysing how the change of leadership has impacted on the image of the party, and on its success.

A clash of leadership

As noted in the opening section of this paper, the NL is a very peculiar political actor. Its organisational evolution does not follow the patterns of other traditional parties. In this sense, the NL can be seen as a ‘chameleonic’ and composite party (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2012). As previously mentioned, the Northern League emerged out of a merger of local movements experiences – these latter found in Bossi the ‘political entrepreneur’ able to favour the union and to strengthen the cohesion of such experiences (Diamanti, 1996).

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Hence, within the NL the leader is in many respects the centre of the party – but not only in organisational and normative terms. Above all, the leader represents the symbolic core of the party.

The NL has certainly changed over time, altering its political proposals so as to adapt them to the current context of the Italian political market. Along this erratic path, continuity was guaranteed by the guiding role of the leader and by the coalition of loyal party members surrounding him (the so-called ‘cerchio magico’, i.e. the magic circle), and supporting and legitimising his political line.

Thus, the distinctively charismatic image of Bossi has always been able to galvanise the NL supporters, especially through the use of a direct, straightforward and often vulgar language – based on a register completely detached from the standards of traditional politics. To the outside, he was able to adopt a rhetoric approach very close to that of the ‘ordinary man’, and the choice of language was often and deliberately radical (e.g. using swearwords) so as to exacerbate the messages sent to the electorate. The support of its ‘magic circle’ also allowed the leader to manage internal tensions and to avoid the proliferation of antagonist factions within the party ranks. Moreover, the ‘expulsion option’, granted to the leader by the party statute, have allowed him to discourage any potential attempt at challenging its leadership over time.

Hence, during the Bossi era, the leader was the symbolic centre of the party, and epitomised cohesion and continuity. It is precisely for these reasons that the resignation of Bossi and the establishment of Maroni as the new party leader have produced a radical redefinition of the party – both in terms of organisation and of political communication. Such acknowledgement prompts a consideration of the contingencies that brought to this momentous change within the party.

Looking at the events leading to Bossi’s resignations, it is interesting to notice how these latter were prompted not only by the scandals on electoral funds which were brought to light in the winter 2012 and caught much of the attention of the media. Although such scandals certainly played a key part in compromising the image of the leader and founding father of the NL, it should be also noted that at the time Bossi’s leadership had already being challenged from many angles.

Firstly, the worsening of the economic crisis aggravated the tensions present within the centre-right government of which the NL was part. Furthermore, Berlusconi’s sexual scandals undermined his international credibility and impinged, at least in part, also on its political leadership, creating potential negative effects on all his political allies. This exacerbated even further the already difficult terms of the coexistence of the People of Freedom (PDL) and the NL in government. Within this scenario, a faction of the NL became explicitly critical of the close relationship between Bossi and Berlusconi. In particular, some local leaders feared that the failure of Berlusconi’s government could have had negative effects on Bossi and the NL, compromising in this way the credibility of the party in front of an electorate susceptible to (and possibly familiar with) antiparty and antipolitical rhetoric. In short, the crisis that invested Berlusconi’s government was perceived as likely to exacerbate among the public the view of political parties as self-referential mechanisms, unable to address the economic crisis and to bring the country ‘back on track’.

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In this sense, the resignation of Berlusconi in November 2011, and the ensuing technocratic government led by Mario Monti, gave the NL the opportunity to distance itself from the experience of the previous government. The strategy endorsed by the NL was simple: an overt lack of support towards Monti’s government, which allowed the party to strengthen its communication styles, by going back to its rhetoric ‘di lotta’ – especially by overtly challenging and opposing Monti’s austerity measures.

However, such scenario changed again, and worsened, in winter 2012 – with the involvement of the party in the investigation concerning inappropriate use of electoral funds opened by the Public Prosecutor in Milan. This was a turning point for the NL – because the party that made its outcry against Roma Ladona (Rome the thief) one of its major mottos was now being prosecuted for causes very similar to those which invested the much blamed parties of the First Republic. The scandals involved in particular Bossi and its family (accused of having used money from the public purse to buy properties and pay private expenses) – compromising in this way the image of the leader and, as a consequence, that of the party. In this sense, the scandals triggered and organizational reshuffle within the party, prompting a change of leadership. Within this scenario, two opposing fronts emerged. On the one hand, stood the faction headed by Roberto Maroni who, strong of his long-term experience in office (i.e. holding key ministries), was seen as an influential figure, able to develop a respectable institutional profile for himself also outside the party. On the other, stood the powerful ‘cerchio magico’, made of the party members closer and most loyal to Bossi.

Overall, the approach chosen by the NL to face this momentous re-organization was consistent with its political style – whereby the party has never been prone to display to the public its internal divergences. Hence, it can be argued that Bossi’s resignation ushered in a period of transition, in which the leadership of the NL was entrusted to the Calderoli-Maroni-Dal Lago triumvirate until the summer of 2012, when the new leader was eventually selected.

By July 2012, Maroni had become the uncontested candidate to take up the leadership of the NL. Although the party statute details the procedures and methods for the selection of its leader, Maroni was selected by ‘informal approval’ – an approach, this, more in line with the NL’s traditional rituals than with formal practices. In this context, the choice of Maroni as the new party leader did not arise as an explicit rupture with the previous leadership. And yet, until 2012 Bossi had been the only uncontested charismatic leader of the party – hence, although less radical than expected, such a change inevitably redefined the public image of the NL.

In our view, the effects and the meaning of this shift within the highest echelons of the NL can be observed by looking the role of the two party leaders in the context of the most recent electoral campaigns. To achieve this, the ensuing sections will focus on La Padania (the official newspaper of the NL) so as to analyse the communication approach of the party, and how this has changed over time, from one leadership to the other. More specifically, we will look at how campaign issues and leaders have been defined in the newspaper’s main headings. Firstly, we will unpack the choice of content in the campaigns’ discourses as showed on La Padania. Then, we will assess in more specific terms the way in which the role and images of the two leaders have been portrayed in the newspaper. Hence,

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in the following we develop an analysis of the front-pages of La Padania during the last 30 days of electoral campaign in 2006, 2008 (when the party was led by Bossi) and in 2013 (under the new leadership of Maroni). In 2006 the NL came from a five-year experience in government, and this precedent had a distinctive impact on the image that the party was trying to expose to the public. On the other side, in 2008 the NL was portraying itself again as in opposition, re-establishing its image ‘di lotta’. The same was the case also in 2013 – but this time with a new leadership, and with a shift also in the territorial focus of the campaign, which was centred on the regional contest (i.e. the election of the Lombardia regional government) than on the general election. Crucially, in 2013 the candidacy of the new party leader Maroni for the elections in Lombardia left the national competition in the background, signalling a clear change in comparison with the traditional approach of the NL to electoral competitions.

The NL in the trenches – an analysis of the contents of La Padania in the electoral campaigns

Although, as noted above, the NL has often shifted its rhetoric as well as its political strategies over time, some elements of continuity have also been maintained. More specifically, it can be claimed that the key themes of the NL’s communicative system have always been based on two pillars. On the one hand, an innate antagonism, towards immigrants in particular and the idea of ‘other’ in general, within a broad ‘us vs. them’ dichotomy; and on the other, the safeguard of its territory or homeland – whose contours have often been remodelled, but have ultimately continued to revolved around the idea of ‘the North’. Within this frame, in its electoral campaigns the NL has always combined these two themes with a communicative rhetoric very distant from the one adopted by the other parties. In this sense, the construction of the NL political messaging is characterised by the adoption of a vivid and radical language, as a means to catalyse the attention of its supporters.

Being the NL’s official newspaper, La Padania plays a crucial role in the construction of the communicative campaigns of the party. In general terms, at times of electoral campaigns, the front pages of La Padania dedicate the main titles and articles to purely political/electoral themes. However, and most interestingly, the newspaper then builds around such opening themes a corollary of news (based on events of local relevance) with provocative tones. For example, on the 7th of April 2006, just a few days ahead of the vote, La Padania front page opened as follows:

“PRODI HA VINTO. Se non volete che questa provocazione si avveri: votate lega e non sbagliate. Ora siamo una repubblica Social-comunista islamica”(PRODI HAS WON! If you don’t want this provocative statement to become true: vote for the NL, and you can’t go wrong. We are now a Social-Communist Islamic republic).

This title is then followed by other articles, overtly supporting the arguments presented in the editorial. For example:

“Pisanu rivela: “sventati attacchi terroristici a Milano e Bologna”(Pisanu reveals: terrorist attacks in Milan and Bologna thwarted”);

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“Le indicazioni di voto dell'Ucoii: “I musulmani votano Diliberto” (Ucoii’s indications on vote intentions: Muslims vote for Diliberto”.

Drawing on these examples shows how an analysis of the front-pages of La Padania can allow us to understand what are the most debated issues in the electoral campaign, and what is the frame associated with these – reconstructing if and how such issues had a symbolic value.  

Looking at the three campaigns that provide the focus of this paper, in 2006, the NL approached the general election coming out of a government experience with Berlusconi’s centre-right coalition. Having held three significant ministries such as Justice (Castelli), Work and Welfare (Maroni) and Institutional Reforms and Devolution (Bossi), the party was placed in a very different position as compared to the past – in that its image ‘di governo’ somewhat seemed to prevail over its identity ‘di lotta’.

Hence, the original NL rhetoric of struggle and its repertoire of anti-establishment claims did not fit in the motifs of an electoral campaign conducted after five years in office. If usually, in electoral competitions, the incumbent candidates can take advantage of their position emphasising the results obtained in the outgoing government, in the 2006 campaign the NL could not adopt such strategy, and had to establish a new profile in front of his electorate, glossing over its role ‘di governo’.

Hence, in 2006, beside the usual negative tones associated with political antagonism, the campaign was also built around the idea of ‘trenches’. In this sense, the NL portrayed itself as being in the trenches, defending citizens, or better ‘its people’, from the threat posed by the left-wing coalition, whose leader was to be held responsible for the introduction of the Euro and, implicitly, for the increase in the living costs. This attitude is epitomised in many of the opening titles found in La Padania in that period, e.g.

“Sst…non svegliatelo. Euro, infrastrutture, extracomunitari: Prodi non ha capito che la gente ne ha le scatole piene delle balle della sinistra” (Shush!…don’t wake him up! Euro, infrastructures, immigrants: Prodi did not understand that people have had enough of the left!)1.

Moreover, the debate on the consequences of the Euro, taxation and tax burdens was exploited to draw a parallel between the left and the so-called ‘vested interests’, for example:

“Romano bifronte coi comunisti e coi padroni” (Two-faced Romano, with the communists and with the masters)2.

Furthermore, in the 2006 campaign, the NL portrayed itself as ‘in the trenches’ also in order to defend a cultural identity. So, in the front-pages of La Padania, we found an extensive use of news stories about crimes committed by immigrants, potential terrorist attacks, violence against women or the much feared proposal to teach the Quran in Italian schools. Here are some examples of titles devoted to such topics:

“Un nuovo pericolo è alle porte. Corano a scuola” (A new threat is at the door. Quran in our schools)3;

1 La Padania, 15 th March 2006. 2 La Padania, 18 th March 2006. 3 La Padania, 11 th March 2006.

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“Video choc: a Cremona ‘studia‘ le Torri Gemelle di New York” (Shocking video: in Cremona a man studies the Twin Towers in New York)4;

L’Islam nella cassetta delle lettere. Un opuscolo arrivato via posta in Emilia e Veneto: vi distruggeremo (Islam in the mail box. A leaflet delivered by mail in Emilia and Veneto: we will destroy you)5.

Another example of such stances can be found in the negative tone adopted in the recurring news about the riots in the suburbs of Paris, designed to confirm and support the League’s rhetoric:

“A Parigi si sta preparando una seconda banlieu” (In Paris a second banlieu is about to come up)6;

“Parigi brucia nel solco del sessantotto guerriglia per le proteste sui contratti di primo impiego: 300 arresti, 92 poliziotti feriti” (Paris is burning in the wake of the protests of the Sixties. Guerrilla warfare prompted by protests on first-work contracts: 300 arrested, 92 police officers injured)7.

Hence, it can be argued that in 2006 La Padania conveyed the image of a cohesive party. The purely political dialectics did not emerge in the titles of the first pages of the party newspaper. Instead, the selection of contents and the rhetoric used in La Padania aimed at ‘enraging’ and ‘provoking’ the NL supporters by providing a series of symbolic issues of strong local resonance, so as to reinforce the vote intention of the party supporters. Interestingly, during the period of the 2006 campaign, the headings of La Padania bear no direct reference to the North. The symbolic issues are proposed within a general frame that transcends the regional dimension. And, as we shall see shortly, it is the party leader (Bossi) who prompts the prominence of such symbolic themes of ‘collective emotive solicitation’. All these points are clearly depicted in the word-cloud of La Padania headings that have been collated in figure 1.

Fig. 1 Wordcloud based on La Padania front pages in the 30 days before 2006 General Election.

4 La Padania, 14 th March 2006. 5 La Padania, 17 th March 2006. 6 La Padania, 17 th March 2006. 7 La Padania, 18 th March 2006.

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By and large, the 2006 campaign has been quite a distinctive one for the NL. The party was coming out from a government experience which had strengthened its relationship with Berlusconi. Moreover, this was also the first general election campaign after Bossi’s illness. In 2004 in fact, the NL leader had suffered a stroke – after this event, he was absent from the political scene for nearly two years. Hence, it is not surprising that the visibility of the leader in the headings of La Padania was on the whole rather marginal. Bossi was mentioned in the newspaper in association with symbolic themes, in articles aimed at soliciting the emotions of the readers/supporters.

Besides the theme of security, in the pages of la Padania particular emphasis is given also to the ‘threat to Christian values’ posed both by Islam and by the proposals put forward by the Left to give civil partnerships rights to homosexual couples. In this sense, it can be argued that in 2006 the NL tried to take over the role of champion of traditional catholic values (especially due to the fact that its stronghold is in the North-East, i.e. the former homeland of the Christian Democracy (DC) in the First Republic).

In many respects, such focus on the catholic dimension can be seen as a by-product of the NL’s government experience. Its role and image ‘di governo’ prompted a mitigation of the NL’s originary secular themes and nearly-pagan approach and of its former direct attacks to the institution of the Church and its powers. Hence, Immigration and the ‘Islamic Question’ gave the NL the possibility to (readapt and) combine one of its traditional themes with catholic motifs. Such approach is illustrated in many of the titles of la Padania, e.g.

“La campagna di Bossi. Il leader della Lega si scaglia contro la sinistra che vuole i matrimoni gay e la mannaia sul risparmio” (Bossi’s Campaing. The NL leader attacks the left that supports gay marriage and slashes savings”8

However, the analysis of the 2006 campaign on LaPadania, shows also the presence of another leader on its titles: Berlusconi. In some respects, Berlusconi and Bossi represent two similar models of party leadership, and it is therefore interesting to see how such aspect were portrayed on the NL’s newspaper. In March 2006, La Padania presented an interview with Berlusconi (emphatically entitled “Bossi and I”), in which the former premier discussed some of his electoral proposals and also his relationship with the NL and its leader. Interestingly, at this stage, the attitude of the NL and its newspaper towards Berlusconi were overtly ambivalent. On the one hand, Berlusconi was associated with titles emphasising his policy strategies and his communication abilities. For example:

“BERLUSCONI: ABOLIREMO L’ICI. PRODI SI INCHINA ALLA CINA. Nel duello TV il premier a sorpresa cal ail suo asso. Il Prof non risponde sulle tasse e e auspica l’ingresso del paese asiatico nel sud”. (“BERLUSCONI: WE WILL ABOLISH ICI. PRODI BOWS TO CHINA. In the TV duel the premier reveals his secret weapon. The Professor does not provide answers on taxation and hopes for the entry of the Asian country in the south”9).

On the other hand, at times LaPadania’s titles seemed to infer the presence of tensions between the NL and Berlusconi, associating him with the antagonist parties craving of their share of power. For instance:

8  La Padania, 8th April 2006.  9  La Padania, 4th April 2006.  

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“STANNO GIA LITIGANDO SULLE POLTRONE. Prodi come Berlusconi vorrebbe tutti i segretari di partito dentro al governo”. (“THEY ARE ALREADY FIGHTING OVER THEIR SEATS. Prodi, just like Berlusconi, would like to have all the party secretaries in the government”)10.

However, in 2006 the NL focused its negative messages especially towards the other parties in the centre-right coalition (e.g.“TOH, ADESSO BERLUSCONI MI E’ DIVENTATO SIMPATICO”, “Look! Now I find Berlusconi pleasant”11, where Fini and Casini are the main target of criticism). Hence, the NL seemed to be willing to create a privileged relationship with Berlusconi, whilst distancing itself from his other allies. This was a strategic choice – whereby Fini represented the southern axis of the coalition and Casini embodied the old Christian Democracy.

Overall, the analysis shows that in 2006 the NL needed to (re)build a communicative profile ‘di lotta’, in the attempt to avoid recalling to its supporters the previous experience in government. Hence, the League ‘in the trenches’ presented itself as a political actor intrinsically different from the other parties – and, for this reason, it endorsed a ‘lateral assault’, predominantly targeted towards Prodi and the Left, but also (if more subtly) against the other allies in the centre-right coalition.

2008’s elections were addressed with a completely different attitude. After two years, the political circumstance were now favourable for NL, because the party was in overt and strong opposition to the centre-left government previously in power. Hence, in 2008 the NL could regain its status ‘di lotta’, and exploited it in the campaign as duly portrayed in the party’s newspaper. At this point in time the NL could also get back to its original territorial symbolic theme: the North. This is well depicted in many headings of La Padania, such as:

“Dal nord compatto un solo grido: Lega! Piemonte, Lombardia e Veneto: è indistruttibile la linea Maginot padana. Il territorio reclama: federalismo unica via per uscire dal tunnel di Roma” (From the whole North a strong outcry: Northern League! Piemonte, Lombardia and Veneto: the Maginot Line of Padania is indestructible. The territory claims: federalism is the only way out from the Romam tunnel)12;

“Insurrezione continua, fino alla libertà del nord” (Uprising! until the freedom of the North is achieved)13.

The events around the Alitalia crisis and its impact on the Varese/Malpensa Airport allowed the NL and its leaders to take ownership of the theme in a symbolic manner –making Malpensa the epitome and the crux of the claims of the North. For example:

“Alitalia regalata, Malpensa muore. L’offerta dei francesi dà ragione alla Lega: l’obiettivo non era acquistare il carrozzone ma affossare l'hub padano. Maroni: “è molto peggio di quanto potessimo immaginare” e Bruxelles avverte: “basta aiuti di stato” (Alitalia sold for peanuts, Malpensa dies. The offer of the French supports the view of the League: the objective was not to buy such an inefficient public body but to sink the

10  La Padania, 10th April 2006.  11  La Padania, March 2006.  12 La Padania, 22 th March 2008. 13 La Padania, 23 th March 2008.

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Padanian hub. Maroni: “It is much worse than we could imagine” and Brussels warns: “state aids have to come to a halt”)14.

Compared to 2006, in 2008 security issues were approached from a different perspective. In the previous electoral campaign, the issue of immigration had been reduced to a purely cultural dimension, emphasising the idea of a ‘threat to western values and culture’ coming from abroad (i.e. immigrants, Islam, etc.), developing a political discourse detached from the idea of territory. Instead, in 2008, the theme of immigration was dealt with in terms of security. For this reason, in La Padania many references are made to ‘urban security’, giving special attention and visibility to crimes committed in some of the northern cities ruled by left-wing governments. For example:

“Torino: un altro rom ubriaco assassino” (Turin: another drunk Gypsy killer)15;

“La Torino di Chiamparino? Tutta furti borseggi e rapine” (Chiamparino’s Turin? It’s all thefts, pick-pocketing and robberies”)16.

Besides, the newspaper’s headings returned emphatically negative references to the centralism of Rome. In this sense, the party continued to adopt a frame of struggle – but with a different focus. In 2008, in fact, the threat was declined within a clear local dimension and the NL portrayed itself as the champion of the Northern community against the interferences of ‘Rome the Thief’. Hence, the theme of ‘Roma Ladrona’ is back on the main headings, e.g.:

“Il carovita ha un nome: Roma ladrona! Bossi a Verona: “I lavoratori e le famiglie non ce la fanno più. Gli anziani sono costretti ad elemosinare il pane. La nostra gente chiede federalismo fiscale. Forza, torneremo al governo! E rifaremo la legge sull’immigrazione” (“The increse in the living costs has a name: Rome the thief! Bossi in Verona: “The workers and their families can’t take this any longer. Elderly people have to beg for bread. Our people claim fiscal federalism. Come on, we will go back in government! And we will make a new immigration law)17.

Thus, it can be claimed that 2008 signalled a return to the classical, original themes of the NL. The party resorted back to its identity ‘di lotta’ – showing how the NL is more at ease in the use of the rhetoric and the language ‘di lotta’ rather than in the adoption of the communicative styles ‘di governo’. The two years spent in opposition allowed the NL to endorse a stronger rhetoric and to develop a tougher criticism towards ‘the enemies of the North’. Hence, the ‘Return of the North’ is the most distinctive theme of this campaign in the front-pages of La Padania:

“Torno a Roma e libero il Nord. Bossi dà il via alla campagna elettorale: stop all'immigrazione clandestina, ripresa economica, federalismo. E avvisa: i criminali dello statalismo non ci sfidino” (I will go back to Rome and I will free the North. Bossi starts the campaign: stop to illegal immigration; economic recovery; federalism. And he warns: the criminals of the state establishment should not dare defying us)18.

14 La Padania, 18 th March 2008. 15 La Padania, 25th March 2008. 16 La Padania, 8 th April 2008. 17 La Padania, 27 th March 2008. 18 La Padania, 16 th March 2008.

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Therefore, in 2008 the North became one of the most relevant themes – and all the issues that had a national dimension were declined in the form of a territorial theme, pertinent to the North. Thus, for instance, the Alitalia affair, which had a national resonance, was deconstructed and presented as a ‘northern issue’, mainly concerning Malpensa airport and its future.

Overall, it can be argued that in 2008 the Northern League returned to the place that suited the party best – his homeland, the North. Hence, the communicative rhetoric was switched back to the classic NL style. The predominant relevance given to issues of security was now declined on a micro-dimension (e.g. La Padania gives space to news stories on crimes perpetrated by immigrants, with the purpose of strengthening the salience of the communicative rhetoric adopted in its front-pages by the party leader or by the newspapers’ columnists).

Territory in general, and the North in particular, can therefore be defined as the most relevant dimensions of the 2008 campaign. For what concerns the political actors included in the journalistic debate, Maroni and Calderoli emerged as the members of the NL who gained most visibility in the press.

Fig. 2 Wordcloud based on La Padania front pages in the 30 days before 2008 General Election.

The 2013 electoral campaign stands in stark contrast with the previous ones analysed in this paper. As previously mentioned, the NL reached the election after a year of internal re-organization and, for the first time since its creation in the early 1990s, with a new leader. The change of leadership and the internal tensions (which now started to be perceived not only inside, but also outside the party) affected the relationship of the NL with

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its heartland. From within the NL machinery, this prompted a distinctive change of direction – so as to re-establish the link between the party and its members and supporters. Interestingly, within this scenario, the theme of the general election was put on the backburner and it was not overtly voiced in the columns of the NL’s newspaper. This novel approach emerged in an incremental manner: it was prompted by the internal pressures coming from some factions of the NL and culminated in 2011, with the “scelta di Pontida” (the “choice of Pontida”) – a political move through which the NL sought to re-establish his identity ‘di lotta’, distancing itself from the left and the right, and from the establishment. In 2013, the NL goes back to its strategy ‘di lotta’ – in opposition, and distancing itself from its historical ally Berlusconi who, is now supporting Monti’s technocratic government (even if not wholeheartedly). In this context, the lack of support to Monti’s government was functional to the construction of a new profile for the NL. And the regional competition gave the party the opportunity to try to win back its electorate.

Crucially, at this stage, the NL needs to regain its territory. In this sense, the legal prosecution of Roberto Formigoni (the People of Freedom governor of the Lombardia region), and his subsequent resignation, offered a new target for the NL. At national level, the League decided to run with the coalition led by Berlusconi – however, its somewhat half-hearted commitment to (or interest in) the national contest is reflected in the reluctances towards the chosen candidate PM, and the NL eventually opts for the former Chancellor of the Exchequers Giulio Tremonti, putting his name in its electoral symbol. Interestingly. at this stage, the party focused all its efforts on the regional elections –presenting its new leader Roberto Maroni as candidate governor for the Lombardia region. As epitomised in the heading of La Padania below:

“Maroni in Lombardia è il vero candidato da Oscar” (Maroni in Lombardia is the true Oscar candidate”)19.

Thus, the party leaves the general election national campaign in the backgroud, in order to concentrate fully on the regional competition, so as to regain its heartland.

Looking at the content of the articles in the front-pages of La Padania, what clearly emerges in 2013 is a strong tendency to describe all national issues from a regional perspective. Hence, the economic crisis is not framed as a national or European problem – instead, it is portrayed only in its effect on the North, i.e. as a phenomenon affecting Northern enterprises. On the same line, the new tax (IMU) introduced by Monti’s technocratic government is scaled down to a northern dimension, as damaging the citizens of the North; e.g.

“La premiata ditta delle tasse punta tutto sull'inciucio (The government of the taxes tips the balance in an ‘deal under-the-table’)20; or

“Sull'IMU il Prof come un battitore d’asta” (On IMU the Professor is like an auctioneer)21.

Overall, in 2013 the titles of La Padania convey a strong, renewed emphasis on the North – however, and most interestingly, the symbolic issues which played a key role under

19 La Padania, 21 th January 2013. 20 La Padania, 8 th February 2013. 21 La Padania, 6 th February 2013.

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Bossi’s leadership are now translated and rescaled into a ‘new narrative’, based on a novel ‘byword’. Hence, the term Padania is now substituted by the word ‘macroregione’ (Macro-region). For example:

“Macroregione, mettono sotto attacco un progetto storico” (Macroregion, they [i.e. the technocrats in government] put under threat a historical project).

In this sense, it can be claimed that the narrative endorsed by the NL and portrayed in its newspaper become now much more technical, and less symbolic or evocative. The new leader is often present in the front-pages and in the main headings of La Padania, and he is substantially the fulcrum of the communication strategy adopted by the newspaper. In 2013, La Padania’s front-pages follows a clear scheme: the main news are conceived around the regional elections; the opening titles usually reports a claim made by Maroni, in which the leader specifies a policy proposal; and this latter is then detailed in the sub-heading, and linked to other policy proposals. Hence, the newspaper gives particular emphasis to the leader (e.g. Maroni is present on 25 out of the 26 front-pages analysed), and to its policy vision. This last point suggests a clear-cut shift in the communicative style of the NL’s new leader, which is very different from the one of its predecessor. Bossi’s had constructed for himself an image of the leader as a symbol of identification – in a sense, he was himself a symbolic value, and the themes associated to him on La Padania are more ‘emotive’, and evocative of the fundamental, originary principles of the NL. Instead, Maronis’s style of communication is much more focused on specific issues and on specific policy proposals. This is clearly reflected in the many articles focused on Maroni’s electoral program, which contain in-depth analysis and detailed descriptions of his policy vision for the region Lombardia and its capital Milan. Such articles usually open the newspaper edition and are focus on several policy fields, e.g.:

“La proposta di Maroni mai   più pignorabile la prima casa. Il candidato governatore salva le abitazioni e lancia altre sfide: “la sanità lombarda è buona, adesso rendiamola ottima”. Agli imprenditori del legno-arredo assicura: interventi decisi e detrazioni per rilanciare il comparto” (Maroni’s proposal: first-homes will never be foreclosed again. The candidate governor saves homes and sets further challenges: “Health care provision in Lombardia is good, now let’s make it great”. He promises decisive action and fiscal deductions for wood-furniture entrepreneurs in order to revive the sector)22;

“Maroni: soldi ai giovani imprenditori di talento. Il candidato governatore: “Costituirò un fondo di 50 milioni per dare contributi fino a 50000 euro a giovani lombardi che fanno impresa. E con me la Lombardia sarà mafia-free. Da Ministero dell’interno io le mafie le ho combattute davvero, da sinistra solo chiacchiere” (“Maroni: funds will be granted to young talented entrepreneurs. The candidate governor claims: “I will set a fund of 50 millions to provide grants for up to 50,000 euro to young people from Lombardis in the business sector. And with me the Lombardia region will be mafia-free. As Ministry of the Interior I really fought the mafias, whilst the left offers only empty talks”)23;

“Maroni, governatore ecologista: farò piantare 5 milioni di alberi. Sinistra ambientalista solo a parole. Noi a Roma per sostenere le regioni del Nord, non per partecipare a

22 La Padania, 13 th February 2013. 23 La Padania, 10 th February 2013.

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governicchi o governoni. Toglierò i rimborsi ai gruppi consiliari”. E rivolto agli imprenditori monzesi e brianzoli: “Monti se ne frega del Nord””. (“Maroni, green governor: I will plant 5 million trees. The Left is environmentalist only in its speeches, but not in practice. We will go to Rome to support the North, and not to take part in fake or big governments. I will abolish reimbursements to partisan groups in the Regional Council”. And talking to the entrepreneurs of Monza and Brianza, he claims: “Monti does not care about the North””)24

Fig. 3 Wordcloud based on La Padania front pages in the 30 days before 2013 General Election.

The 2013 electoral campaign can be therefore defined as a predominantly regional competition for the NL. The general elections are left in the background. National themes play only a marginal part in the headings of La Padania. Moreover, national issues such as the economic crisis, Monti’s government and its austerity measures and the role of the banks are re-framed within a regional dimension. The political antagonist against which the NL overtly fights is Ambrosoli – the candidate governor of the left (emphatically re-named ‘Ambro-sola’!).

The fall of a hero, the end of an era...

The change of leadership within the NL had a relevant impact on its internal organisation, reshaping the whole party structure. Drawing on the data collected from La Padania, we have observed the rhetoric associated with the new party leader in the 2013 campaign. If the previous section has described the choice of content in the campaign

24 La Padania, 2th February 2013.

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discourse, underlining the strategic value of some rhetoric choices, here the aim is to understand the role and image of the leader as portrayed by the party’s newspaper during the last electoral campaign.

Bossi and Maroni embody two very different models of leadership. As discussed in the opening section of this paper, Bossi was the true charismatic leader of the party who, in spite of having held ministerial positions in the central government, has always been more at ease within the purely partisan dimension, and in his homeland of Padania rather than in Rome. At times, he struggled within his roles in government, finding it difficult to justify to the NL people some of the political choices made by the party whilst in Rome, or the failure of the federalist reform of the state. His communication style has always been imbued with evocative images and symbolic rhetoric, lending itself to a form of public speech declined to a frame of ‘struggle’ and ‘defence’ in the name of the people of Padania. Indeed, within his leadership, the head of the party was seen and perceived as the saviour of the community and its homeland – a hero fighting against enemies that have taken, throughout time, many different faces, e.g. immigrants threatening Western values; the centralised state damaging the North; the Left, introducing taxes and responsible for the increase in the living costs. For example, on the 11th of March 2006, the NL newspaper opens with the heading: “Dico no a questo mondo alla rovescia” (I say no to this upside-down world)25. The ensuing article, containing a long interview with Bossi, opened officially the 2006 electoral campaign. Bossi is once again portrayed as the guardian of the values of ‘a just world’, i.e. the world matching the imagery of the people of Padania and its core values and traditions. On the other hand, the ‘upside-down world’ epitomises the evils and the threats posed by the enemies ‘from without’ the heartland of the NL. Interestingly, the theme of the ‘up-side-down world’ returns throughout the whole 2006: “Votiamo contro il mondo alla rovescia” (Let’s vote against the upside-down world)26. Although in 2006 the leader made only few appearances on the front pages of the NL’s newspaper (i.e.13 references out of 30 days), the headings referring to Bossi always evoke the image of the saviour of the party’s homeland (Padania), against the Left and its leader Romano Prodi. For example: “Ici addio. Viene il federalismo fiscale. Bossi: Tassare la casa è come tassare un braccio ad una persona” (Bye bye ICI. Fiscal Federalism is around the corner. Bossi: Taxing homes is like taxing the arm of a person)27. On La Padania, Bossi does not address policy issues and does not use technocratic/high political language. He prefers ‘bread and butter’ narratives, speaking to the heart of the people. And even though he sometime makes reference to specific policy proposals, the meaning of these is always framed within a symbolic dimension.

Interestingly, the rhetoric construction of the image of Bossi as the party leader is very similar to the figure of Alberto da Giussano, the Lombardia hero depicted wearing a suit of armour and a sword in the NL symbol. Whilst in 2006 the leader is portrayed as the champion and guardian of the just and safe world of Padania, in 2008, he becomes the liberator of the North from Roma Ladrona. Hence, 2008 signals the return of the classical and original themes of the NL communicative repertoire, i.e. Roma Ladrona: centralismo (centralist politics and policy); statalismo (the state establishment and its vested interests). For example: 25 La Padania, 11th March 2006. 26 La Padania, 30th March 2006. 27 La Padania, 5th April 2006.

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“Bossi: colpo mortale al centralismo romano sul sagrato della storica Abbazia di Pontida, giurano fedeltà al popolo gli oltre 500 candidati della Lega” (Bossi: fatal strike to the centralism of Rome. In the courtyard of the historic Abbey of Pontida, more than 500 candidates of the League swear loyalty to the people)28;

“Bossi a Bra: noi nel mirino, diamo fastidio a Roma” (Bossi in Bra: we are in the target, we annoy Rome)29.

As in 2006, in 2008 La Padania’s headings still aim to associate the leader with symbolic themes. Bossi does not deal with policy proposals – rather, he represents the symbolic message of the party. He does not need to address any specific course of action, and his public speeches are devoted to building a loyal and faithful support towards the party. Hence, Bossi can gloss over the contents, becoming himself a message, a symbol.

In 2013, the campaign follows a completely different logic. The new leader, Maroni, chooses to address the 2013 competition adopting an overtly territorial (or better regional) perspective. In the rhetoric endorsed by Maroni, the general election does not seem to be the main concern of the NL. The party adopts a change in its strategy, focusing all its efforts on (and catalysing the attention towards) the regional electoral competition in Lombardia. Indeed, here the party attempts at proposing itself as the ‘new alternative’ for the region, after the long experience of government under Formigoni and the People of Freedom. Furthermore, the NL now promotes the idea of a ’winning back’ the whole North, starting from one of the most symbolic and originary places for the party: Lombardia. Hence, the region is portrayed as an emblematic place, and the regional campaign is charged with a strongly symbolic meaning. Lombardia is portrayed as the missing element in a political project that would bring the NL to rule and govern the most important regions in Northern Italy (i.e. Piemonte, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia and Lombardia – the broad area from which the idea of Macro-region stems).

Besides purely electoral strategies, there is also the underlying need to reshape the party without any major shock to the system, and avoiding the exacerbation of tensions. Looking at the front-pages headings of La Padania, it is easy to notice that in 2013 the image of the leader takes a new connotation as compared with the past. In fact, in his depiction and speeches there is a lack of either rhetorical emphasis or the use of terms evoking the symbolic dimension which was associated with Bossi. Thus, the newspaper gives prominence to the purely institutional dimension rather than to the partisan one. Indeed, Maroni’s experience as Minister of the Interior is often recalled. E.g.

“Lombardia sicura, parola di Maroni. No al modello Pisapia. L’ex ministro dell’interno: meno soldi alla politica e più fondi per le Forze dell’ordine. L’agenzia dei beni confiscati alla mafia avrà sede al Pirellone” (Maroni promises a more secure Lombardia. No to the ‘Pisapia model’. The former Minister of the Interior: less money to politics and more money to the police. The institute of the properties confiscated to the Mafia will be located in the Pirellone).30

28 La Padania, 6th April 2008. 29 La Padania, 10th April 2008. 30 La Padania, 15th February 2013.

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Another interesting aspect of the narratives endorsed to portray the new Maroni leadership concerns the dismissal of the dimension ‘di lotta’. The leader now focuses on a purely programmatic dimension and on policy proposals. These are given much space and attention on the front-pages of La Padania. On a daily basis, the newspaper tells to the public the story of a part of Maroni’s programme, focussing the attention on specific themes, as they unfold day by day. Hence, in contrast with 2006 and 2008, in 2013 the linguistic register of the leader shifts to an entirely new register and lexicon. Bossi’s leadership was characterised by the use of popular language (e.g. slang, dialect, swearwords, etc.) which was often at odds with the traditional idiom of politics. This was a deliberate choice, aimed to strengthen his communication and to reiterate a political style ‘close to the people’ – making, in a sense, Bossi the ‘hero of Padania and its people’. Conversely, Maroni has never been portrayed as a hero. He is an administrator; possibly a good administrator – but in the images represented on La Padania front-pages Maroni and his messaging do not carry any evocative or symbolic dimension. So, the focus of his campaign are policy issues:

“Maroni: IMU, giusto restituire il maltolto ma Monti non vuole…e punta sullo spread. Il segretario: la proposta è sostenibile. I mercati hanno loro logiche che non dipendono dalla politica, ma che poi vengono strumentalizzate e sfruttate mediaticamente (Maroni: IMU, it is fair to return what has been stolen, but Monti does not agree...and focuses on spread. The leader: the proposal is sustainable. Markets have their logics, and they do not depend on politics, but then they are manipulated and exploited by the media.)31.

Conclusion

The Party leader plays a crucial role in every political formation – but for a regionalist populist party like the NL his role has been even more vital, and peculiar. From the early days of the Leghe in the early 1990s, until 2012 the NL was in practice identified with its charismatic leader and founding father Umberto Bossi. As claimed throughout this paper, Bossi has long been the voice and the symbol of the party. Consistently, the NL’s newspaper gave to the leader a very precise role – that of addressing and conveying issues from a symbolic perspective. In the front-pages of La Padania Bossi is often described as an hero, defending his community (i.e. the people of Padania) from external threats and enemies. In terms of communication, emphasis is placed on a message able to create a strong, direct and emotional response from the party supporters and members. Although the experiences of 2006 and 2008 are marked by some differences, due to specific contingencies (linked in particular to the two faces, di lotta and di governo, which the NL had to juggle with) – they also show a strong point of continuity for what concerns the role of the leader, as the charismatic guide of the party in its battle to safeguard the people of Padania against (various types of) ‘other’.

The selection of Maroni as the new leader of the NL marks a significant change in the role assigned to the party leader. On the one hand, this could be due to the differences in the character, temperament and personality of Bossi and Maroni. However, such momentous shift could also be interpreted as an attempt at creating a new image for the party. In fact,

31 La Padania, 5 Febbraio 2013.

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Maroni’s leadership seems to be oriented towards a very specific target – very different from the one that characterised the Bossi era. With Maroni, the focus of the political message shifts distinctively towards of the administrative side of the NL issues. Hence, the leader is not anymore a hero – but a good and trustworthy administrator. Indeed, the very critical economic and political Italian situation and the very ambiguous and troubled relationship developed over time with Berlusconi, prompted the NL to change its electoral strategies. In 2013, the party chooses to focus his campaign on the regional level and leaves the general election in the background for two, key reasons – to place itself in a competition that could be won with a landslide (because based in its heartland – maximising the chances of visibility of the party), and also to reconnect and recreate a that tight bond with its homeland that had gone loose.

As a personality, and as a leader, Maroni is not Bossi. But at the same time, in 2011 the Northern League is not anymore the same party that had been led by Bossi for over twenty years. The new leader cannot compete with his predecessor either in terms of ‘charismatic appeal’ or in his ability to evoke and emotionally ‘provoke’ the NL supporters. Within the party, Maroni has always represented the most governmental side of the NL. His distinctive aptitude for public administration and his experience in key ministries can be seen as a sort of surrogate for the charisma of the former leader.

Under the leadership of Maroni, we now see a Lega that wants to be ‘di (buon) governo’ first of all in his home, and not in Rome. The victory of the regional competition in Lombardia has therefore opened the way to a phase of transition, which is not yet completed. The role of the leader has certainly changed – shifting away from the idea of being the charismatic guide for the party. What remains to be seen are the long terms effects and the final outcomes of this momentous phase of internal reorganisation.

References

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