Miguel de Moragas and Miguel Botella, Editors

The Keys to

The social, sporting, economic

and Communications impact of

Barcelona992

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The Keys to SuccessThe Social, Sporting, Economic

and Communication Impactof Barcelona '92

The Keys to SuccessThe Social, Sporting, Economic

and Communication Impactof Barcelona '92

i

The contents of this book cannot be reproduccd,neither ¡n whole ñor in part, wilhout the previouswritten consent of the authors.

© Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'EsportUniversitat Autónoma de BarcelonaEdifici B. 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona, España)

© Universitat Autónoma de BarcelonaServei de PublicacionsEdifici A. 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona, España)

Editors: Miquel de Moragas and Miquel BotellaEditorial coordination: Miquel Gómez, EstherMartí and Nuria GarcíaTranslations: Jcffrcy Swartz, Matlhew TreeCover Design: Josep Maria Trias

First edition: November 1995

Legal Deposit: B. 44.139-1995ISBN 84-490-0450-0Photocomposition: Víctor Igual, S. L.Printing: Dúplex, S. A.Binding: Encuademaciones Maro, S. A.Printed in Spain

Table of Contents

Joan Antoni SamaranchPresiden/ of'the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Olympic C o m m i t t e e . . . 7

PresentationPasqual MaragallPresiden! ofthe COOB '92Mayor of Barcelona 9

IntroductionJosep Miquel AbadCouncillor Delégate ofthe COOB '92A S u m m a r y o f t h e A c t i v i t i e s o f t h e C O O B ' 9 2 . . . . 1 1

O r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e G a n t e sM i q u e l B o t e l l aT h e K e y s t o S u c c e s s o f t h e B a r c e l o n a G a m e s . . . . 18

SportsEnric TrunoBarcelona, City of Sport 43

Manuel LlanosThe Participaron of the Spanish Olympic Committee inthe Success of 1992 57

MÍISS MediaMiquel de Moragas/Nancy Rivenburgh/ Nuria GarcíaTelevisión and the Construction of Identity:Barcelona, Olympic Host 76

Muriel Ladrón de Guevara/Xavier Cóller/ Daniel RomaníThe Image of Barcelona '92 in the International Press . 107

The Paralympic Games of Barcelona '92Fernand LandryParalympic Games and Social Integration 124

PoliticsJoan BotellaThe Política Games: Agents and Strategies in the 1992Barcelona Olympic Games 139

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SocietyFaustino Miguélez/Pilar CarrasquerThe Repercussion of the Olympic Games on Labour . . 149

Andreu ClapésThe Volunteers of Barcelona '92: The Great Festivalof Participation 165

John MacAloonBarcelona '92: the Perspective of Cultural Anthropology. 181

Urban PlanningLluís MilletThe Games of the City 188

EconomicsFerran BrunetAn Economic Analysis of the Barcelona'92 OlympicGames: Resources, Financing, and Impact 203

TechnologyJordi Lópe77Ferran PastorBarcelona '92: Strategies of Technology 238

Josep BertránThe Technological Image of the Barcelona Olympic Games 254

EpilogueFidel SustGeneral Director of Sports of the Generalitat of CatalunyaThe Sports Legacy of the Barcelona Games 261

Bibliography of Barcelona '92Dolors Aparicio 266

AppendixCentre for Olympic and Sport Studies.International Olympic Chair.Barcelona Olympic Foundation 276

ORGANIZATION OF THE GAMES

THE KEYS TO SUCCESS OF THE BARCELONA GAMES

MIQUEL BOTELLA PAHISSA1

Everyone agrees that the real success of the BarcelonaOlympic Games —and the Paralympic Games— was thetransformation which the city underwent, with developmentwhich normally takes decades taking place in only six years.However, I am not going to talk about this subject in thistext; ñor about the opening up to the sea, ñor the ring roads,ñor the airport, ñor telecommunications, ñor the sports ins-tallations that the city and the subsites have and would nothave had today had the Games not been held. It was publiclystated right from the beginning of the candidature that theGames were a pretext —or an opportunity, if you prefer— totransform and relaunch the city. And that is precisely whatthey have been.

However, that the Games were well organized was also agreat success, as much for our image as for our self esteem.There was no doubt of this, neither among the headlines inthe media, ñor in the surveys carried out among athletes,journalists and the foreign visitors who carne to the Gamesas spectators.

In this text I will deal with the reasons for the organiza-tional success. I have to state initially, even if there is no needto, that the following are interpretations of what took placefrom a personal point of view, in this case, what six years ofuninterrupted work in COOB'92 gave me: first, in the field ofplanning; later on, in the management of human and econo-mic resources, in the Main Operations Center during the Ga-mes; and finally, in the writing of the Official Report.

Leaving introductions aside, I will next give the list of re-

1. The author is an economist and has broad professional experience inthe field of public administration.

Director of Planning and Control of COOB'92 (1987-1989); General DeputyDirector of Administration of COOB'92 (1989-1991); Deputy Director GeneralResources of COOB'92 (1991-1993). In the present, he is the New Projects Di-rector of Consorci de la Zona Franca de Barcelona.

The author would like to thank Josep Miquel Abad, Armand Calvo, PedroFontana, Josep Morist, Xavier Mendoza, Miquel de Moragas, Fernando Riba,Carme San Miguel, Josep Maria Vilá and Joaquín Zueras for their criticismsand comments.

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asons, that in my opinión, are fundamental in explaining theorganizational success of the Barcelona'92 Olympic and Pa-ralympic Games. And, naturally, I will attempt to substantia-te them.

I will first refer to the background, the qualitative andquantitative aspects of the resources used and the characte-ristics of the management. Afterwards, I will present thequestions relating to the planning, organization and controlof the Organizing Committee's activities and the institutionalframework and the information environment in which itworked; the factors which had most influence when the Ga-mes were being celebrated, such as the sports results and pu-blic attitudes, will be left to the end.

1. THE LEGACY OF THE CANDIDATURE

The choice of Barcelona, in October 1986, was very com-petitive. Eight years earlier, Los Angeles had been the solécandidate. For the 1988 Games, Seoul only had to competewith Nagoya. In contrast, there- were six candidates for the1992 Games, among them cities of the importance of Paris,Amsterdam and Brisbane.

This competition led to all types of headaches and ten-sions for those in charge of the candidature. And, it also re-quired a lot of work, not only in promotion and internationalpublic relations, but also in the compiling of the Dossierwhich had to show that the candidature was viable and, mo-reover, that it was the best.

In the end, a more than considerable amount of worktook place in the field of strategic planning and was withoutprecedent in the history of Olympism. It need only be saidthat the studies of the territorial implantation of the sportsvenues, the Olympic village and the telecommunications net-work were at a very advanced stage, the technological neces-sities were evaluated and a good approximation of the bud-get was available. There were also 102,000 people availableto generously work as volunteers.

This work led, in the spring of 1987, to the very quick fillingin of the Organizing Committee's planning contení and the be-ginning of regular work from the comfortable position resul-ting from having many of the initial strategies predefined.

Stated in this manner, however, things must be put intoperspective by recalling that many of the proposals were atan initial and provisional stage. Thus, limiting ourselves toinfrastructural matters, which were by far the most develo-

ped, neither the press villages, ñor the hotel plan, ñor the tel-ecommunications towers, ñor the park and ride, ñor even theOlympic port itself were discussed in the Dossier.

2. THE OPPORTUNITIES OF A GRUWINC ECONOMY

Obtaining good economic results was, for the OrganizingCommittee, a necessary condition for success. Up until thattime only Los Angeles had attained this, since it is wellknown that the figures from Seoul —where, in fact, organi-zation was mingled with state administration— were deci-ded upon beforehand. And, from what can be drawn fromwhat is taking place in Atlanta at the moment, this also se-ems to be one of the most problematic points.

In the case of Barcelona, this question was even more im-portan t due to the fact that one of the subjects that was regu-larly brought up in critical considerations directed towardsthe management team, especially at the beginning, was itslack of business experience (despite the fact that the majorityof the team carne from prívate enterprises). Later on, thesecriticisms became less common —especially in the aftermathof the results obtained in the negotiation of the televisiónrights— and, in the end, the situation was turned right aroundto the point that their capacity to negotiate and adminístrate,as well as their integrity, carne to be considered a strong pointof the Committee. This took place while it was being statedthat it was really possible to obtain positive final results.

The aim had been fixed on balancing accounts, which in re-ality meant a final positive resuft of nearly 350 million dollars,which is what would have been achieved had the OrganizingCommittee activated its investments in sports venues ratherthan handing them over without receiving anything in return.2

It managed to raise two billion dollars,3 the final net valuéof the budget. As a point of reference it must be remem-

2. The Organizing Committee's nel investment in social assets was 32,575million pesetas. Most of this sum —25,378 million pesetas— was assigned tothe construction of new sports venues, the remodelling of existing ones andthe urhanization of their surroundings. The remainder went to the permanentadaptations that were carried out .so as to hring the different settings up to therequirements of the Olympic compctilions.

3. The Organizing Committee's revenue sources were: spon.sorship and li-censing contraéis worth 59,686 million pesetas, radio and televisión rights54,164 million pesetas, ¡nterests and collections (lotteries, pools, stamps andcoins) 46,349 million pesetas, accomodation and the provisión of sei"viccs23,847 million pesetas, ticket sales 9,454 million pesetas and the sale of assetsworlh 2,094 million pesetas.

bered that the televisión rights to the Los Angeles Gameswere sold for 288 million dollars and those for Barcelo-na for 635 million dollars. In Seoul the quantity of 407 mi-llion dollars had been obtained. In relation to the revenuefrom sponsorship, which in the end was the main source offinance, the respective figures for Los Angeles and Barcelonaare 191 and 520 million dollars at the current rate of exchan-ge. If furthermore, on this last point, it is remembered thatthe revenue was obtained mainly in the domestic market, itcan readily be seen that the Barcelona Organi/.ing Commit-tee obtained an exceptional result in the área of sponsorship.

Behind these spectacular results there was without doubtgood advertising; I will go on to outline its most definingfeatures. However, it must also be recognized that not eventhe best salesperson, ñor the most accurate strategy, wouldhave obtained these results had it not been for the economiccontext which prevailed at the end of the Eighties, and whichwas marked by a degree of optimism that had not been pro-duced in a long time and that, unfortunately, apparently willtake years to come about again.

In this respect, it must be recalled that the Olympic Char-ter forbids any static advertising in the competition venues,and this makes Olympic sponsorship opérate in a differentmanner than any other type of sports sponsorship. In nation-al Olympic sponsorship hardly any company has prece-dents, ñor reference points, ñor the chance to evalúate im-pact, and for this reason many factors of an intuitive natureenter into the decisión of becoming a sponsor. The very opti-mistic economic context of that time led to many companiesdeceiving themselves about the commercial possibilities thatOlympic sponsorship doubtlessly offers.

In relation to the Organi/.ing Committee's commercialstrategy, the criterium of exclusivity in each product cate-gory, already applied to international sponsorship, was esta-blished for the domestic market; it was decided to have fewsponsors and to ask for large fees. Furthermore, sales beganvery early, when the excitement of hosting the Games wasstill alive on the street.

It also has to be said that the commercial results wouldhave been even better had it been possible to intégrate theADO plan,4 which financed the preparation of the Spanish

4. The Asociación de Deportes Olímpicos (ADO) sponsorship program waspromolcd by the Spanish Olympic Committee, the Consejo Superior de De-portes and Televisión Española and was Ltsed to obtain reources for the prepa-ration of Spanish Olympic sports people.

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Olympic athletes, into the Organizing Committee's commer-cial plan. In this way the confusión created in the market byhaving two Olympic organizations offering rights whichwere difficult to differentiate, in regards to practical applica-tion, would have been avoided.

As has already been indicated at the beginning of section,the ability to negotiate and adminístrate and, to be more spec-ific, to control expenditure, was also decisive in achieving theeconomic results that were obtained. Creating an internalculture which valúes the saving of resources is especially dif-ficult for any company, given the demands by clients (sportspeople, journalists, etc.) who only pay for a very small part ofthe services they receive and the committee's own require-ment to «do the right thing», often stimulated by the en-vironment.

However, in Barcelona control of expenditure was, rightfrom the beginning, an authentic priority of the administra-tion, which was shown especially in matters of minor impor-tance but of large symbolic valué, such as invitations, publicrelations acts or small promotional gifts, which in some ca-ses it could be said did not fit in with Olympic tradition.

The most negative element of the economic policy thatwas applied in those years for the Organizing Committee'sresults was the maintenance of the overvaluation of the pe-seta until November 1992. It need only be remembered that40% of cash revenue, nearly all the televisión rights, were indollars.

It also ought to be remembered that, in the economicfield, the State Government supported the Organizing Com-mittee on two essential points. First of all, the Fiscal Law,which made it possible, among other things, for the invest-ments made by companies in Olympic sponsorship to be de-ductible from taxable revenue. Secondly, the category of aut-hentic commitment which the State gave to previsions madein the initial budget for revenue from lotteries, pools andcommemorative coins (programs run entirely by the CentralAdministration).

3. THE QUALITY AND DEDICATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES

A lot of positive things have been said, as they shouldhave been, about the role of volunteers in the celebration ofthe Olympic Games and even more so in the Paralympics.Everything that has been said is true. Three quarters of thepersonnel who supported the operation —34,548 in the

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Olympic Games and 8,250 in the Paralympics— were volun-teers, and without them the Games simply would not havebeen possible. There were, in contrast to what more than oneperson had forecast, practically no desertions, and the imageof service and dedication, in some cases self-sacrificing, thatthey gave will remain in the public's memory, and luckily inthe newspaper archives, for many years to come.

There has not been as much said about the committee'spersonnel team, the one thousand four hundred people whowere progressively incorporated between April '87 and Fe-bruary '92, and whose task it was to handle all the prepa-rations for the Games and most of the management of theoperation.

The set of problems that affected the subject of personnelwas complex, beginning with a growth totally out of the ordi-nary, which led to a doubling in personnel practically everyyear.5 There was also a need to intégrate many professionalsinto the team who generally worked in specialized fields(journalists, teachers, sports people, doctors, security specia-lists, etc.), who had very different professional cultures andpay levéis and who, in this case, had to particípate in truly in-terdisciplinary work groups. If we add to this the need to in-corpórate thousands of temporary workers and especially vo-lunteers during the operation, it is readily obvious that realconditions existed for all types of problems and grievances.

To round off the scene, all of this must be placed in thecontext of the organizational turbulence of an organizingcommittee. The more than frequent situations of múltipledependence and functional mobility at the heart of the com-mittee, the pressure imbalances between jobs, and also bet-ween the different units, were impossible to avoid during theyears that the planning of the Games took.

As a final consideration, we have to add that it was whenthere are very few weeks left until the breaking up of the or-ganization, at a moment in which people were already fee-ling uncertain about future work, that everyone was asked tomake a final effort; and this was when the most anxious mo-ments of pressure were lived through, due to something thatcould not be postponed in this project: the day when thecompetitions began.

The reality is that personnel response was exceptional:there was a lot of dedication, there were very few desertionsand, in the majority of cases, these were explainable due to

5. The figures corresponding to the end of each year were: 1987, 58 people;1988, 133; 1989, 342; 1990, 669; 1991, 1078.

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problems of fitting into the group or of personal incom-patibility, and hardly ever due to the lure of another profes-sional opportunity. No-one was paid for working extrahours, although at times there was an abundance of extrahours put in. And, in such a turbulent context, conflicts,sanctions and court cases were practically nonexistent.

There are many reasons for all of this. However, the mostimportant was without doubt the initial choice to include pe-ople who were technically prepared, but at the same timeyoung and capable of building up optimism for the project.This choice was facilitated by a question which at the begin-ning seemed to be an inconvenience rather than the advan-tage, that from this point of view, it finally ended up being. 1am referring to the nonexistence of automatic job replace-ment once the Games were over.

The end of the eighties was a period of few offers in the la-bor market, especially for professional staff with few yearsexperience. It should be remembered that two-thirds of theteam who took on the planning of the Games was made up ofuniversity graduates. So, the search for professionals for theCommittee was difficult and there were many people who,during initial contacts and even in the middle of the selectionprocess, upon realizing that they were not guaranteed repla-cement by any of the entities that made up COOB'92),6 decli-ned to continué the conversation.

This initial obstacle turned out to be a big advantage.Only those who were really prepared to take on risks —thealternative of a permanent job was at that time within ever-yone's reach— opted to work on the Organizing Committee.Thus the group of trained personnel who are afraid of takingrisks and make up the majority of teams in companies andadministrations, ruled itself out of participation in the pre-paration and administration of the Games. Those who ac-cepted the risk did so, above all, because they thought thatthey would be able to compénsate it with the thrill of the joband by serving the city and country, and, of course, also forthe experience and the expectations which at that momentwere associated with the fact of having worked in the pre-paration of the Games.

An attempt was also made to guarantee a stable rela-tionship by negotiating a general wages agreement for the to-

6. The Comité Orgartitzador Olimpio Barcelona'92 (COOB'92) was a non-profit making consortium made up of public bodies and a prívale entity. Theformer were the Barcelona City Council, the Catalán Autonomous Govern-ment and the State Administration: the latter was the Spantsh Olympic Com-mittee. It was formed on the 12th of March, 1987.

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tal duration of the project. To strengthen the bond, a finalpayment of 45 days per each year worked was offered. Wetako tried to be generous regarding pay; this ended up beingalmost unavoidable, considering the majority influence thatthe new incorporation had and within the context of thescarcity of job offers and salary increases the market wasproducing, which I have made reference to already.

In some cases, this tendency was strengthened by theneed to even out the pay of some professions which generallyworked in sepárate markets but which worked side by sideand had the same levéis of responsibility within the Organi-zing Committee and which could not be treated in an overlyunequal manner without putting in question the equal treat-ment that every organization has to try to preserve.

In the final stage, when the most turbulence and changein organization took place, the decisión to freeze all pay andnot to accept even a single change in pay arising from varia-tions in responsibility or job, along with what we consider-ed even riskier, distributing the farewell letters before thecelebration of the Games, was a very wise move. It is worthsaying that only the thrill of the new responsibilities whicheveryone was assigned and the degree of commitment to theproject that the majority of the team members as well as, na-turally, the credibility of the administration that undertookthe commitment to apply the rules without making excep-tions, explain the success of these types of measures.

The decisión that was made about which jobs in the opera-tion phase had to be paid and which had to be in the hands ofvolunteers also turned out to be very positive. The responsibi-lity or the level of the job in the hierarchy were not the charac-teristics taken into consideration to sepárate some jobs fromothers. It was above all the length of the dedication requiredwhich was used as the criterion for demarcation (jobs that de-manded continous dedication of more than a month were con-sidered as jobs for paid personnel). This allowed the incorpo-ration of voluntary personnel at all levéis of responsibilitywithout affecting the authority or the efficiency of the teams.

Another piece of personnel policy was the project to helpteam members find job replacements. Unfortunately, the ac-tion of out placement of COOB'92 professionals that took pla-ce in the Spring of 92 clashed with the paralysis of the market,and the companies that were coUaborating in the OrganizingCommittee, and which had been forecast as the possible natu-ral destination of some of these professionals, had enough di-fficulties in reassigning the departments which had been cre-ated within their own organizations to meet their Olympic

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commitments. The general cancellation of new projects whichthe city was forced to carry out reinforced these tendencies.

It has been said, correctly, that from the point of view ofthe replacement of personnel in other jobs, the Games couldnot have taken place at a more untimely moment. From thisperspective, for the majority of professionals working on theGames they were more a parenthesis in their curriculum rat-her than the springboard for professional projection it washoped they would be.

At any rate, it must also be said that, apart from local fac-tors and circumstances, the experience of previous Gamesshows that the staff of committees always come up againstproblems at the moment of reintegration into the labor mar-ket. Naturally, they encounter problems concerning pay le-véis, as well as problems of adapting to jobs whose rhythm,importance and reputation are quite different from those of-fered by the Organizing Committee.

4. LEADERSHIP AND PROTECTION OF THE ORGANIZATION

The activity and results of the work of any organizingcommittee heavily depend on the environment. This depen-dency is a lot more important than that which companiesand the majority of administrations experience. This is due,first of all, to the fact that a lot of the basic resources that areused can neither be obtained from competitive markets or-ganized in the normal fashion, ñor from taxation. The volun-tary workers, the sports and residential installations and thedifferent types of contributions from sponsors are goodexamples of this heavy dependence on external agents andtheir predisposition to collaborate in the project.

It is also necessary, regarding this point, to refer to themore or less continuous tensions and changes that arisefrom the relationship between the Games' protagonists andtheir representatives, which in theory should not be a sourceof conflict since their needs are defined in the Olympic Char-ter, in the federations' rulebooks, in the different contractsand in the Dossier offered by the city itself. In practice, how-ever, the important national Olympic committees, the fe-derations, the International Olympic Committee itself, therepresentatives of the sports people, journalists and broad-casters very often alter or try to alter these requirements,which can end up distorting the content and cost of the pro-jects and the work of the Committee itself.

The tensions that inevitably arise among the different en-

tities that make up the consortium constitute an additionalelement of instability. It must be added that the destabilizingeffect of all these external conditions is magnified by the re-percussions that the tensions generated in this environmenthave on the local mass media.

These agents have very free-flowing relationships with themedia, and relations and discussions with the OrganizingCommittee are often transmitted «through the press». All ofthis inevitably leads, in a local or general manner, to the cons-tant creation of the well-known situations of intensive rumors,tense working atmosphere, and so on, the intensity of whichends up affecting the efficiency of the organization's work.

Furthermore, the intensity of the news is sometimes sogreat that the impression is given that the Organizing Com-mittee is working in a showcase, from where the rules of dis-cretion and confidentiality that belong to all professionalwork end up becoming difficult to respect.

On the other hand, the possibility of this environmentbeing influenced by the Management Committee is slim andthe possibility of «easing», «guiding» or «directing» the ten-sions is very small. Due to this, the duty of any organizationmanagement in directing relations within the environment, isin this case more difficult and the results are more uncertainso that, for this reason, a big effort must be made in the dailytask of influencing professionals who often receive informa-tion through the press, which directly or indirectly affectsthem, before finding out through the internal channel. Thisgives rise to many negative effects —especially demotivation.

For these reasons it was very important that the manage-ment acted as an «umbrella» that allowed internal work to beisolated from the disorder of life outside the organization,fundamentally conditioned by the actions and omissions ofthe different agents. A relative waterproofing was achievedwith difficulty thanks, to a great extent, to the fact that rela-tions with the media were mostly conducted through a spo-kesperson and that the press office, carrying out a very diffi-cult job, acted as a two-way intermediary in all relations withthe news media.

Aside from a protective umbrella, management had to as-sume the role of providing strategic orientation and a dailyimpulse within the organization. The proliferation of newsoften with a sceptical or critical tone, especially in the longpreparatory stage of the Games, did not favor, as has beenstated, the consolidation of the internal leadership that is in-dispensable for an organization that had to grow and facenew challenges each day.

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In this sense, it must be said that the people who held po-litical and executive leadership posts in the Olympic projectwere capable of overcoming these inconveniences and noteven in the most critical moments —for example, one only ne-eds to remember those that (ollowed the opening of the Olym-pic Stadium— was there any doubt from within the organiza-tion about their ability or their commitment. The continuityof their task, which began right from the candidature phase,was another element which contributed in a significant man-ner to the consolidation of the COOB'92 professional team.

Furthermore, the management also had to directly invol-ve itself in other activities. To give some examples, the mostimportant actions were:

— the negotiation of the utmost important televisiónrights and sponsorship contracts,

— the preparation of the ceremonies,— management control, especially in the final phase.

5. THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE WORKAND THE PLANNING OF ACTIVITIES

Personnel on various levéis who are integrated into orga-nizing committees generally do not have previous Olympicexperience. This was also the case in Barcelona. What can belearned from previous experiences is limited, due to the gre-at importance of local conditions, with these four yearsbeing quite a long period in which a lot of things change. Inthe case of Seoul, despite the interlocutors' predisposition tohelp, the differences in organization, financing, politicalcontext and peoples' transfer sensibility were so great thatany transferal was very complex. Furthermore, the culturaldifferences alone already provided a great barrier in establis-hing quick and efficient interpersonal communication.

For this reason the planning and organization of the workwere difficult to tackle, especially six years prior to the Ga-mes which was when the committee was initiated. It is rela-tively easy to formúlate an idea of the final product, the Ga-mes, but it is a lot more difficult to answer the question ofwhat had to be done the next day, the next month and theone after. Uncertainty about the processes is, without doubt,a distinctive feature of Olympic organization and a source oíextraordinary pressure for the managers.

In order to accurately plan any activity, the processes haveto be well known and tested and adjusted by means of succes-sive tests. In the case of the Olympic Games no initial know-

2K

ledge exists and the possibility of testing is always very limitedand partial. This is the reason why so many difficulties comeabout in the planning of organizing committees' activities.

In order to confront this set of problems, in the case ofBarcelona, from the beginning there was the idea that theCommittee would follow a progressive learning process and,for this reason, the internal processes of mutual adaptationwould be as important as the plans. The final result of whattook place was sufficient proof of the correctness of this ap-proach. So then, the problem that aróse was how to give arelevant role to the mutual adaptation processes withoutprovoking organizational chaos or, put in another way, tominimize the disorder.

A flexible planning model was chosen —the Master Plan—that was revised each semester, and each edition containedthe best available forecast of the set of tasks that the Com-mittee had to face up to before the final wind-up of opera-tions and the publication of the report.

The structure of the Master Plan contained projects(more than three hundred) and deadlines that correspondedto the dates on which determined events had to take place(e.g. the approval of requirements, choice of systems, the sig-ning of accords and agreements, the carrying out of tests, orthe initiation and termination of jobs). The deadlines took onan executive nature when they were considered to be certainand permanent; the remainder were considered as prelimi-nary. Those of the current semester were almost totally of anexecutive nature and the further away in the future the event,the more preliminary deadlines there were.

The way in which the plans were elaborated was just asimportant as the model. There was no group of experts spe-cifically dedicated to the planning tasks. The preparation ofthe plans was carried out by an «ad hoc» commission —thePlanning Commission— which was made up of the people incharge of the planning responsibility of each división. Thisway of doing things allowed for and gave credibility to thewhole procedure because there were many interdependentprojects, although priority was often difficult to determine.

This joint work also helped to créate the culture and thedecision-making criteria that a project as peculiar as the Ga-mes needs (e.g. depreciation is of a very different valué in acompany that has an operative Ufe of fifteen days, and itmust be remembered at all times that the majority of thestaff do not get paid). A large part of the criteria on levéis ofdecision-making and administrative circuits were also thefniit of the same elaboration ef fort. It should also be pointed

out that the Master Plan, as well as the corresponding execu-tion reports, were presented and formally approved by theBoard of Directors.

• Of the effort that the elaboration of the Master Plan re-quired, especially in the initial stage, it is important to un-derline these results:

a) Some discussion forums were created (the Manage-ment Committee and the Planning Commission) that madepossible a large amount of interaction and accentuated therole that general consensus had to play in the OrganizingCommittee's first years of work.

b) Emphasis was put on the definition of general strate-gies and the basic periods of the activities. In this sense, itcan be said that the deadlines and the fundamental strategiesof the organization, established in the first two editions ofthe Master Plan, were respected right up to the end. The fo-llowing was established in these strategies: the operation ofthe Games was to be run in a decentralized manner fromeach Operative Unit; during the summer previous to the Ga-mes some tests would be carried out in as general a manneras was possible; some months prior to these tests all the ve-nues would have to be completed; the technological projectsand services would have to be ready and human resourcestrained; the construction work that was the responsibility ofthe Committee had to be begun by the end of 1989, when theprojects and bids had to be ready. The deadlines of the set-upstage were also set: those of the commercial plan, those thatreferred to sites, accords with the federations, the choice ofcorporate symbols, and so on.

c) In the course of the learning process, that had just thenstarted, it was known that some organizational changeswould have to be made, along with reassignments of staffand budget resources, variations in the designating of res-ponsibilities and in the activities calendar. For this reason, itwas very important to build up a culture of change, an atti-tude that valued the positive aspects of the transformationsthat would inevitably take place.

d) A reference element also had to be found that allowedfor the formulation of these changes and thus their defini-tion and their communication in the most precise mannerpossible. The project was chosen because it was consideredthat the work which had to be done was the most inalterableelement of the Committee's life. Thus, all the necessary ac-tions for the preparation and the execution of the Gameswere integrated into some project (e.g. Construction of theEspanya Industrial pavilion, Accreditations, Ceremonies,

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Material Logistics, etc.). Right from the start, budget resour-ces were assigned to projects, the content of the various unitswas defined by the projects which they were in charge of ateach moment, and management control of both resourcesand activities, took the project as a base. In this sense, thefact of having departed from what is the norm in most orga-nizations —the assignment of resources to the units— avoi-ded a lot of conflicts and absence of decisions; this remainedquite clear in comparison with other organizing committees.

A final reflexión on the planning: the affirmation that, inmany ways, there was a large degree of coincidence betweenplanning and reality does not mean that the Committee'smanagement was near perfect. What simply happened wasthat what was planned nearly took place in reality. However,as said at the beginning, the planning of the Games was notguaranteed to be optimum in the sense that is currentlygiven to this term.

For this reason, in retrospect, it is not difficult to identifysome actions that could have had better results or could havebeen carried out with less effort or resources. As an example,we will ñame a few:

— The effort and the activities that were deployed tokeep the volunteers' spirit alive for five years couldhave been considerably simplified.

— With another negotiating strategy it probably wouldhave been possible to have agreed to lower prices withhoteliers.

— To ask for 100% of the price of the tickets a year befo-re the Games, when they were reserved, was probablyexcessive.

— Some services, such as transport, were projected atmínimum cost, which hardly left any margin for chan-ges and unforeseen changes; in others, such as cate-ring, the resources used were excessively large.

— The closing ceremony of the Paralympic Games wasnot up to the standard of the other ceremonies and theofficial film of the Olympic Games did not obtain theexpected results.

— It was impossible to obtain the same degree of organi-zational strictness once the euphoria of the Gameshad passed and it was not possible to carry out the dis-mantling operation with the order that was required.

Unfortunately, or fortunately —as we shall see— in thisbusiness there are no second chances.

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6. THE DECENTRALIZATION OF THE OPERATIVE PHASE

Among the scarce material that the International Olym-pic Committee passed on to the Organizing Committee whenthe Committee began the preparation of the Games, was themodel of managing the operative phase in a decentraliz-ed manner, creating some Operative Units (the venues, thevillages and some others) which had enough autonomy, re-sources and authority to be able to solve the majority of theproblems that they were presented with «in situ».

The workability of this model had been favored in pre-vious Olympic experiences and is based on the need to de-centralize the decisión making processes when operating si-multaneously in many units with relatively specific sets ofproblems.

This organization of the Committee at the moment of ce-lebrating the Games sharply contrasted with the one that pre-vailed during the long period —five years— that the planninglasted. During these years the structure was of a functionalnature (construction, technology, press, marketing, sport,etc.) and each one of these divisions was concerned with thepreparation of the activities of their corresponding áreasfrom a perspective that guaranteed the functional cohesión.

The shift from one organization to the other took place inthe Spring of 92. The Venue Managers, many of whom werevolunteers, received —«keys in hand»— trained personnel inuniform, a fully prepared venue with all the technologicalequipment installed and even a small budget for unforeseenexpenses. This was rounded off with centralized services suchas transport, security, data processing, etc. and with the MainOperations Center, that acted as an information and emer-gency center. The model that was applied to the competitionand accomodation units was based on the same criteria.

The competition units were tested in the Summer of 92,with satisfactory results. It was seen, however, that among ot-her things the venues had to be adapted and prepared withmore time so as to be able to adjust the technological systemsand familiarize the personnel with real working conditions.Looking at this point quickly, it must be said that these testswere very useful in the preparation of the Games. They allo-wed for more realistic planning of the competition units, theytested out the human team —and especially the volunteers—and they contributed to lessen organizational «stage fright».

The experience of application during the Games showedthe extraordinary potential to adapt, and above all to créate, of

the decentralized model. The management of the competitionunits, and to a greater degree of the Olympic villages, knewhow to readapt their premises on their own initiative by bring-ing in volunteers at the last moment, adjusting internal con-trols, finding specific forms of motivating staff and relating tothe local authorities in the subsites, etc. In short, the capacityfor improvising with which we are attributed could be seen inaction, without putting the harmonious nature of the Gamesñor the uniformity that the technology requires in jeopardy.Perhaps what is even more difficult, this was done withoutexhausting the budget for unforeseen expenses.

Seeing things from the Main Operations Center, one cancontémplate the negative side of the aforementioned situa-tion: the great difficulty of applying unitary criteria in verydifferent situations. This was witnessed, for example, in theticket system. When there was confusión in some units, dueto changes in capacity and other circumstances, the solutionsthat carne from the Center turned out to be not very feasible.Each unit's direct experience of the problem led to specific«ad hoc» solutions for each case and a probé, that could haveled to problems, since it affected individual rights, was resol-ved in a friendly manner without further incidents.

Continuing the previous point, it can be stated that themost efficient actions that carne from the Main OperationsCenter involved services or central systems. For example,those that affected the collective transport system for theOlympic Family that during the first days showed seriousproblems of orientation within the renovated Barcelona ur-ban link or the complaints that led to the use of personaltransport. In both cases, in collaboration with the TransportCenter, real support could be given to improve the service.The main effort to regúlate the traffic in the Montjuíc Áreathat carried out should be included in this paragraph, sincethe results obtained here were not as satisfactory.

7. TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS

From the beginning, great importance was given to thetechnological contents of the Games and the BIT'92,7 whichevaluated the technological needs tied in with the Olympic

7. The study «Barcelona Informática i Telecomunicación*» (BIT'92) waspromoted by the Olympic Office. 11 identified all the technological projectsand analyzed the questions concerning systems, televisión and electronics lin-ked to the organization of the Games.

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event, and had already been elaborated at the candidaturestage.

The field of technology was previously prepared for re-sourcefulness. The impact that the Games would have tohave on local industry and the impulse they could give to re-search were examined. Many solutions based on the mostadvanced technology were also proposed to resolve the greatvariety of problems produced in organi/.ing the Games.

At the moment of truth, innovative applications were ca-rried out — such as, for example, the video finish or the com-mentator's terminal— but they were always based on wellproven technologies. This was not just a choice of the Orga-ni/.ing Committee: the sponsoring companies, which alsohad a lot at stake in the Games, had a role to play in this de-cisión. To the credit of the Technology Management, theywere not overawed by the situation and they managed tohave these choices impose themselves by their own weight.

Furthermore, despite the difficulties that creating situa-tions similar to those of the operation during the Games cau-sed, an extraordinary effort was made to test and retest allthe designed applications. Some, such as results manage-ment, were subjected to dozens of laboratory and field testsusing child athletes and amateurs. It was also decided to bevery strict by not accepting any changes once the producthad been approved. The effort to explain to the users how thesystems worked was also one of the keys in the good resultsobtained. The system that was organized to give informationon the use of the different technologies in the Main PressCenter was probably the best example of this effort.

In relation to the subject of innovation, the case of thesmart card serves as an illustration of the difficulty of a goodtechnological choice. I believe that it would be difficult tofind more than a half dozen service projects in which, at onemoment or the other, its use was not proposed. The propo-sals ranged from opening doors in the villages to storing he-alth information and offering financial services.

These proposals were not eccentric because, taking eachone on its own, and with more stable application conditions,they were perfectly viable proposals. Besides, it must be re-membered that the degree of excitement and the commit-ment to doing the right thing, which I referred to earlier, ledmany people in charge to design what, with a hint of irony,we called «the project of a lifetime». For this reason it wasnecessary to be very tactful when touching on this subject.

The solution that was adopted in this case was to maintainthese applications in the Master Plan, under the heading of

Special Projects. This meant that its development depended onthe existence of sufficient resources and time, the factor that inthe final hour proved to be most determinating. Towards theend of 1990 everyone stopped talking about the smart card.

A project such as high definition televisión could be ex-plained in a similar manner. In this case the project was ca-rried out, even if only in a experimental and limited manner,and without involving risks or additional costs for the Orga-nizing Committee.

The reasons that recommended the use of proven techno-logy seem, in retrospect, even more convincing. Among themost important were the impossibility of carrying out testsin real conditions, the impossibility of adaptations and longfinal preparations, the impossibility of repeating or delayingthe event, the long maturing process of the technologicalprojects and their interdependence, and the impossibility ofany complex training process for operators.

These considerations refer to the technology used by theOrganizing Committee, and do not contradict the great inno-vative impact that the Games caused in the city, especially inthe field of telecommunications, and to which I made refe-rence at the beginning.

8. INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION

It is often stated that only on one occasion, in the seven ye-ars of the Organizing Committee's existence, was a majoritydecisión made. On all the other occasions —and the Board ofDirectors adopted dozens—, they were made unanimously.

The representatives of the various institutions and themembers of the management of COOB'92 who made up partof the Board of Directors should be the first to receive creditfor the important valué of this indicator of institutional har-mony. Even more so when, as is well known, the majority ofthe institutions in the consortium belonged to different poli-tical formations and, as is normal in such a long period, allkinds of different moments were lived through.

The initial moments were especially hard. On the onehand, because it was when the distribution of responsibilitiesand visibility in the whole operation got under way, and alsobecause in those moments the number of variables whichcould be affected was greater, beginning with the very identityof those who would have to assume the executive responsibi-lity for the Games. To ¡Ilústrate this, a glance need only be ta-ken at the Barcelona press in the weeks that followed the Se-

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oul Games. Later on, as the executive structure became strong-er and, above all, when the passage of time made many si-tuations irreversible, tensión was reduced. In the end, whenthe closeness of the Games was being felt in the street, this ins-titutional collaboration lived through its best moments.

It must also be said, however, that, in contrast to what isoften believed, the number of political decisions that an or-ganizing committee has to take is not very high. The OlympicGames constitute an event subject to rigidly established ri-tuals that have to be entirely respected, and complicated pro-tocol must be followed even for minor variations.

The decisions in which the political discretion of the Or-ganizing Committe plays an important role are related to thelocation of the competitions —though the majority of thesubsites were already decided upon in the candidature pha-se—, to the choice of corporate image and symbols —whichis precisely where the vote that was referred to earlier tookplace— to the content of the opening and closing ceremo-nies, and in our case the use of the official languages, and tosome other decisions though not many.

The remainder of the decisions that the Board of Direc-tors had to make in reality the acceptance of technical pro-posals that referred to how to transport the sports people,how to look after journalists, how to provide first aid forspectators, how to feed volunteers, how to officiate the litur-gies of the various religions in one place, how to ensure thedollar exchange rate, and dozens more of a similar character.This was one of the reasons, although not the only one, forthe complaints that —in prívate— some members of theBoard of Directors made about not feeling involved enoughin the Committee's decisión making process.

In this sense, it was also a wise move that the OrganizingCommittee was awarded exclusively this very important butdemanding área in the institutional framework that was setup with the celebration of the Games in mind." Otherwise, aset of problems would have been added to the already trou-bled life of the Committee —we could recall the controversy

8. Responsibililies for the lwo fundamental tasks — transforming the cityand organizing the Games — were clearly separated right from the beginning.A group of publie institutions and prívate agents were put in charge of the for-mer, the most important of which was Holding Olímpic (HOLSA). COOB'92was in charge of the organi/ation of the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Thefact that the same Committee assumcd the responsibilily for organizing bothGames was a novelty that, more than of great symbolic valué (use of the samevenues, of the village, integration of the image, etc.), allowed for a great ratio-nali/ation of activities and saving of resources.

about extending the metro to Montjuíc or the discussionsabout the funding of the various pieces of the ringroad— theexact consequences of which were difficult to foresee.

In relation to these issues, it must also be said that thefact that the Games can not be postponed contributes, on theone hand, to the acceleration of the processes and the justifi-cation of urgent action and, on the other hand, to helpingtensions to be overeóme when the very passing of time ma-kes it evident that the item of controversy is beyond the pos-sibilities of the calendar. Obviously the citizens' excitementwhich the project is capable of generating also acts as a veryimportant incentive for institutional collaboration.

Two final remarks about institutional collaboration. Thefírst one refers to the decisive role of the municipal mainte-nance and cleaning services, the Municipal Pólice, the Fire-men and the Municipal Operations Center, which coordina-ted everyone's actions, played a part in the good grade thatthe city obtained in all appraisals.

The second refers to the collaboration in the área of secu-rity that the various administrations with responsibilities inthis área (the State, the Catalán Autonomous Government andthe Town Halls) showed. Without having in —depth knovv-ledge of the subject, one can say that the quality of the plansthat were drawn up and, especially, the model of cooperationbetween the different pólice bodies that was designed andput into action for the Games, responded to strategic andoperative concepts perfectly comparable to those that wereimplemented in the services which were the direct responsi-bility of the Organizing Committee.

The equipment and, especially, the atmosphere that wasfelt on the premises of the Olympic Security Center, whereall the entities involved in the operation worked side by side,made the pioneering character and the excitement that su-irounded this experiment clear. More than satisfactory re-sults were also obtained with the incorporation of more thaneight thousand volunteers in the functions of access control.Previously there had been reasonable doubts about the feasi-bility of this operation.

9. THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE MASS MEDIAIN THE DECISIVE MOMENTS

From the Organizing Committee's perspective, during theyears that the preparation of the Games took, some local me-dia maintained a position marked by scepticism and unwa-

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rranted doubt, while others had attitudes that approachedwhat we could qualify as critical support. All this was despitethe serious efforts and the level of resources that the Com-mittee dedicated to this subject.

However, during the Games, and from the same internalperspective, when the impression of really being scrutinizedby the whole world was felt, the media decided that «dirty li-nen had to be washed at home» and they went on to adoptpositions of unconditional support for the organization. Thistransformation had been secretly hoped for, and contributedto raising the morale of all those involved in the operation. Afirst taste of this had already been had in the final momentsof the candidature, when an exciting image of Barcelonamight well have been decisive in the jury's final decisión.

From the experience of previous Olympic Games it wasknown that the international press specialized in these sub-jects would contémplate the Games from a positive perspec-tive because, for a whole list of reasons which are not worthanalyzing here, there was a real interest in what is called «in-flating the Olympic balloon». This impression was confir-med by the frequent visits that the correspondents of themost influential international media made to Barcelona.

Thus we thought that, unless there were some really se-rious problems, we could count on the benevolent evaluationof the international media. What nobody could have forese-en was the amount of superlatives that were received ...ñorthat people would ask for the Games to be held in Barcelonadefinitively.

The local press' point of inflexión was clearly stated a fewweeks before the Games and took place at the same time asexcitement about the Games was increasing on the street.Thus, the obstacles and incidents that obviously took placeduring the Games were classified as anecdotes. In this waythey contributed to reinforce and make the peculiar atmosp-here of euphoria which the city lived through even more rea-listic and credible. This was reflected both in people's politeattitudes and the decoration of balconies.

10. THE QUALITY OF THE OPENING CEREMONY

It may be difficult to understand, but once the openingceremony was over there were many of us within the organi-zation who believed that half of the work was done. This alsocontributed, in the same manner as has been stated in theprevious point in relation to the media's attitude, to creating

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the «morale of victory» which everyone needs in the decisivemoments. Furthermore, in this case the torch relay had fo-llowed a crescendo which culminated in a tremendous man-ner with its arrival in Barcelona, and this left an undoubtablestamp of good organization everywere.

This is not the moment, ñor do I feel myself able, to makea technical evaluation of the ceremony. Someone has saidthat the televisión coverage did not give the same impressionas seeing the event in the stadium allowed, but all the ver-dicts, and the research carried out later on, give more thanpositive assessments. Furthermore, everyone is quite surethat the final balance of the Games would not have been thesame by a long shot if they had not begun, and ended, in sucha brilliant manner, and if the creative ability that we were at-tributed with had not had the chance to be demonstrated.

11 • THE SPANISH ATHLETES' EXCELLENT RESULTS

I will not say too much on this point either though it oc-cupies a true place in the Olympic chronicles. It only needsto be pointed out that, in this case too, the forecasts of themost optimistic specialist —who predicted about fourteenmedals— were proven totally wrong by the results achieved.Twenty two medals were won, thirteen of which were gold.As a reference, it only need be remembered that in all theprevious Olympics —and the Games were revived almost acentury ago— Spanish athletes had achieved a total oftwenty six medals, only four of which were gold.

And maybe just as important as the number of medalswas the fact that some of them were won in sports that areconsidered to be basic in the Olympic program: athletics andswimming. The gold medal was also won for the first time inteam sports: in soccer and womens' hockey.

The triumph was even more resounding in the Paralym-Pic Games, in which Spanish athletes won 107 medals. Noone doubts that all these results had an important role toplay in the euphoria that was felt in the Summer of 92.

12. TOTAL COLLABORATION

Discussion of the strategy to adopt in carrying out thepreparation of the Olympic venues was especially complex.This is a delicate operation in which it would not be possibleto exelude even the best equipped of the available venues.

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This is because the Olympic Games have requirements thatare above those of any other sports event. Metal detectorshad to be installed at all the access points, a large section ofthe stands had to be converted into work desks for journa-lists, impressive press rooms had to be installed along withresults management centers, anti-doping control centers,apartments and rooms so VIPs could rest, with a'lot of officespace, etc.

In short, work had to be carried out in a wide range ofvenues and, in general, had to be completed in two or threemonths, which was the margin between the end of the regu-lar competitions of the teams who usually use these venuesand the beginning of the Games. This had to be done simul-taneously in fifty or so units in which we operated.

The adaptation projects were already at an advanced sta-ge and it seemed clear that it would be safer and also moreeconomic to know how to deal directly with the final con-tractors —there would have to be more than four hundred ofthem— than leaving this work in the hands of one or morecompanies who would act as main contractors.

Even so, everyone was conscious of the great difficulty ofhaving this work ready in time within the budget available. Itwas known that changes in the projects would take placewhen put into practice, that the venues would not always beavailable at the moment desired and that the integration ofthe different manufacturers would be a lot more complex inpractice than on paper.

COOB'92 had the sword of Damocles hanging overheadon the day that the competitions began and, besides, was acompany that was destined to disappear immediately. Forthis reason everyone knew that it would never commissionany other work. Additional weaknesses were derived fromthe need to adjust many projects and terms on the spot. Itwas also known that the manufacturers would be ladendown with work, and for all these reasons, we saw some verynarrow margins of negotiation. A long list was made with thepossible, and many of them substantiated, causes of unfinish-ed projects and overcost.

So then, at the moment of truth, work was carried outwithin the preestablished limits and cost. Although the Com-mittee had an invaluable team tied up in the work in each ve-nue, it would not be fair to believe that the results obtainedonly derived from their professionality and enthusiasm.

All the obstacles which were foreseen and known of befo-rehand were present, but the reaction of the companies andworkers was not what was expected of a purely business re-

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lationship. On the contrary: they took on changes and ad-justments, they worked the hours that were needed to finishthe work and they respected the price conditions that hadbeen agreed on. Only one company, and what is more a fo-reign one, tried to profit from the situation by extorting theCommittee.

In addition, many of the venue owners, overcoming initialreluctance, ended up authorizing entry to certain strategic zo-nes, such as the Technology Rooms, which considerably faci-litated the task of fitting out the most difficult installations.

This spirit not just of collaboration but of authentic com-rnitment- to the project, which was shown by the contractedcompanies, the administrations, the collaborating compa-nies, the volunteers and their families, the company workersand the committee itself, constituted the decisive element ofsuccess.

Thinking along the same Unes, I remember that, duringthe first working days in the Main Operations Center, theauthentic lack of iñcidents taking place was a reason for sur-prise. It seemed statistically impossible that none of the fore-seen emergency scenes took place: no coach crashes, nomuggings, no pickpocketing, no poisonings, no electric po-wer ñor telephone Communications failures, none of the in-cidents that form part of daily reality in every big city.

At first the tendency was to think that we were blessedwith luck. When the scene became more stable day after day,we agreed that what was happening could not be explainedon its own by good preparation or luck but rather, and abo-ve all, by everyone's eagerness for things to go well.

Maybe we were lucky in that we were able to know aboutthe good weather that accompanied us for the whole compe-tition —although it must also be remembered that the calen-dar was made out after a careful analysis of the meteorologi-cal weather sequences.

I would like to finish up with two personal anecdotes thathelped me realize the importance that the citizens had in thesuccess of the event:

— During the Games, a high-level executive from one ofthe multinational sponsors went into a dry cleaner's at eightin the evening when they were closing with a stained suitthat he needed first thing the next day. The owner, who didnot speak English, upon seeing that he had something to dowith the Games by the accreditation he was wearing, made it-understood to him that, despite the fact that his stáff wereclosing up, he personally would see to the job. And the nextday at eight o'clock in the morning he handed over the clean

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suit. This sponsor enthusiastically told me the anecdote ofthe dry cleaner with precisión a few months after the Games,when his memory of the ceremonies, the medals and the re-cords was already visibly fading.

— The working day was continuous in the Main Opera-tions Center and, if you were not on duty, you would only getout to rest for a few hours. The Games were about to end andall I had been able to see of them was on televisión. Whenthere were only two or three days left to the end, the directorof the Center gave me a night off. I had heard a lot of talkabout the extraordinary atmosphere at night on «l'Avingudade Maria Cristina», in front of the Main Press Center, andwith my wife —and my personal pager just in case some-thing happened— I headed off there. The atmosphere was,sure enough, extraordinary, and when I got near the MagicFountain I could hear the applause that accompanied thechanges in form and color of the water. It did not surpriseme because from the time I was a child I knew that the Ma-gic Fountain was one of the main tourist attractions in Bar-celona. What really surprised me was when, arriving at thefountain, I realized that all the people congregated therewere Catalans and that there must only have been at most adozen foreigners among those applauding. That crdwd hadseen the fountain in action all their Uves and in the changingof colors they simply found an excuse for doing what theyfelt like doing, which was applauding.

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