The Great War at Sea 1914-1918 - Richard Hough

8/9/2019 The Great War at Sea 1914-1918 - Richard Hough

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THE GREAT WAR AT SEA

1914-1918

RICHARD HOUGH


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© Richard Hough 2013

Richard Hough has asserted his rights under theCopyright, Design and Patents Act, 1988, to be

identified as the author of this work.

First published by Oxford University Press in

1983

This edition published by Endeavour Press Ltdin 2013


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To the memory of Arthur Marder


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

AN ENORMOUS SHIP'

THE ANGLO-GERMAN BATTLESHIP RACE

CHURCHILL AT THE ADMIRALTY

THE ACCELERATION TOWARDS WAR

WAR AND EARLY MIXED FORTUNESMEDITERRANEAN MISFORTUNES

TRAGEDY IN THE PACIFIC

TROUBLE IN THE ADMIRALTY, TRIUMPH IN

THE SOUTH ATLANTICFIRST CLASH OF THE DREADNOUGHTS

THE DARDANELLES FIASCO AND IT

CONSEQUENCES

THE UNDERSEA WAR THE SEARCH FOR DECISIVE ACTION

UTLAND: BATTLE-CRUISER ACTION

UTLAND: BATTLE FLEETS IN ACTION

UTLAND: A RETROSPECTION


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THE DEFEAT OF THE U-BOAT, SURRENDER

AND SCUTTLE

OTE ON SOURCES

OTES

ABBREVIATIONS

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Extract from Unheard, Unseen by David Boyle


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PREFACE

Following the publication of his third volume oJacky' Fisher's letters in 1959, Professor Arthu

Marder suggested that I should write a biograph

of his hero, and gave me much assistance an

advice when I agreed to do so. Then, sometim

before his untimely death on Christmas Day 1980

he and the Oxford University Press approached m

with the suggestion that I should embark on a one

volume history of the Royal Navy 1914-18. In thi

proposed new work I was to have additionally thbonus of access to all Marder's papers and, o

pecial value, the papers he had accumulated sinc

he publication of the five volumes of From th

readnought to Scapa Flow. On his death thi

material was all in characteristic Marder order ipreparation for further revised and expande

editions of his own work.

Arthur Marder and I had been friends and mutua

critical admirers since the late 1950s. I was neve


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o professionally stimulated as when with him

either in England or southern California. I

Marder's company, 'shop' ruled everything, and

can recall with some embarrassment a privat

dinner at the Garrick Club during which, aopposite ends of the table, we found ourselve

overwhelming all other conversation an

earranging the cutlery in a prolonged Jutlan

debate. We did not agree on all matters, nor audgements, but that only added a spice to ou

elationship.

In the last months of his life he asked me to rea

and comment upon the manuscript of his last grea

work, Old Friends, New Enemies; and in his laetter to me written a few days before he died h

wrote warmly about my biography of our mutua

friend, Lord Mountbatten. I was able to talk t

Marder, all too briefly, about my preparatory worfor this book. I most earnestly hope that he woul

have approved of it in this final form. I know tha

he would have been gratified that I had th

continuous and invaluable advice of Lieutenan

Commander Peter Kemp, who proved himse


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Marder's own 'ready and constant counsellor' fo

o many years, and to whom I, too, owe a grea

deal over twenty-five years of writing nava

history.

RICHARD HOUGH


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'AN ENORMOUS SHIP'

The influence of the German Emperor ritain's new alliances - Admiral Fishe

appointed First Sea Lord - The need for nava

reforms - The conception of the Dreadnought, an

her critics

An onlooker described the launch of HM

readnought as 'the greatest sight I have ever see

it made me proud of my country and of the Navy

She went in without a hitch,' a naval cadet wrothome, 'She is an enormous ship.' (1)

The battleship was launched by Edward VII a

Portsmouth on a chill, dour day in February 1906

The King sang 'For those in peril on the sea' a

ardently as anyone present. He was afterwardpresented with an oak casket, carved fro

elson's flagship, HMS Victory. It contained th

mallet and chisel used in simulation to seve

readnought's last cable securing her to the slip.


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The first Dreadnought had been built in 157

and fought against the Spanish Armada, the sixt

distinguished herself at Trafalgar. This was th

ninth ship in the Royal Navy to carry the name, an

her historical associations were as numerous aher innovations. Almost every feature of thi

battleship was notable and novel. As those wh

had been chiefly responsible for her proudl

proclaimed, the Dreadnought was to be thbiggest, fastest, and most heavily gunned battleshi

n the world. She was also to be heavily armoure

and protected from fatal damage by elaborat

compartmentation. For the first time in a battleship

he Dreadnought was to be driven by efficient anclean turbines in place of reciprocating engines.

This battleship, floating high out of the waters o

Portsmouth harbour, flags taut in the breeze, and, t

he sound of music and cheers, being nurseowards her fitting-out basin by paddle tugs, was t

end her name to every subsequent capital shi

built for the world's navies. Even the Germans, th

future enemy who built almost as many as th

British, called them Dreadnoughtschiffe. It was


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breed of fighting ship that in its size and grace an

provocative appearance celebrated appropriatel

he last generation of the big-gun man o'war. Th

readnought , built at unprecedented speed and a

once making every other battleship of the worloutdated, became a political and material factor i

he naval arms race already under way betwee

Britain and Germany. 'Germany has been paralyse

by the Dreadnought' , Admiral Sir John FisheFirst Sea Lord, wrote gloatingly and with ever

word underlined, to King Edward VII. German

was dismayed, even outraged, but not paralyse

for long. Ten years later Germany could put to se

a fleet of twenty-one dreadnought battleships anbattle-cruisers in the greatest naval battle in th

war: a war which the dreadnought and th

competition she intensified, had in large measur

brought about.Fifteen years earlier Germany had possessed

negligible navy of small coast-defence vessel

and though the Germans were powerful on land

he sea was not an element that had previousl

nspired their interest or ambition. For Britain th


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Pax Britannica had been sustained since Trafalga

and the Napoleonic wars by a Navy whic

ncontestably 'ruled the waves', boasting

numerical strength greater than that of any likel

combination of navies afloat. The strength anquality of the Royal Navy were as unquestioned b

he mass of the people as those of God and Quee

Victoria. Everyone gave ‘... three cheers and on

cheer more, for the hardy Captain of the Pinaforeand 'the ruler of the Queen's Navee' would sti

have been an object of veneration even if Gilbe

and Sullivan had not kept the nation humming. Th

Diamond Jubilee review of the fleet in 1897 wa

described by the The Times as 'this unexamplecene ... Nothing could be more impressive tha

he long lines of ships anchored in perfect orde

preading over miles of water in apparentl

endless array.'The Navy's influence and presence were world

wide. From the rivers of China to the Navy

coaling station in the Falkland Islands, fro

ewfoundland to Simon's Town in South Africa

and from Malta to Wellington, New Zealand, th


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other nations was growing apace, and with it a

nterest in trade and the sea upon which

depended. Mahan was read in Washington an

Berlin, Tokyo and Paris, and a consciousness o

he value of naval strength spread through thdefence councils of nations which would benef

from it, as well as many others concerned wit

prestige and power over their neighbours.

Soon after the completion of the Dreadnoughothers of her kind even larger, more expensive, an

more powerful were ordered by three Sout

American republics, by Spain, Italy, Greece, an

Turkey, as well as by the major powers. In Japan

newly built shipyards constructed some of thfinest men o'war of their time. The United State

avy, so insignificant that it had been openl

challenged by Chile in 1891, expanded rapidly an

began ordering battleships.Before the end of the nineteenth century th

growth of navies all over the world was alread

haping the direction of twentieth-century history

owhere was the course more sharply an

uncompromisingly delineated than in Germany


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nowhere were the lessons of Captain Maha

tudied more zealously.

The rise of the German Navy from the earl

890s to 1914 was a remarkable achievement. A

navy demands a multitude of special skills both ihe construction of ships and the training of the me

o serve in them. The Germans lacked experienc

equally in the manufacture of armour-plate an

heavy naval ordnance as in gunnery, signalling, anmanoeuvring a large number of ships at sea. No

did they possess any naval traditions or history

They were starting from the first riveter workin

on the first strake and the first gunlayer behind th

ights of an 8.2-inch naval gun in a choppy sea. Buhe Germans learned fast and - like the new Unite

States and Japanese navies - largely from th

British Navy.

The inspiration for the German Kriegsmarincame from the Emperor himself, Kaiser Wilhel

I. He was a ruler whose withered left arm wa

matched by a flawed mind, who laboured unde

grievances all his life, the most dominant in th

early years of his reign being envy for the navy o


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his grandmother, Queen Victoria. It caused th

Kaiser real suffering not to be supreme. H

boasted the greatest army in the world as well a

he grandest personal uniforms and decoration

When he saw his nephew enjoying Cowes Weekand winning races there, the Kaiser set abou

building the finest ocean cutter in the world an

applying himself with earnest seriousness to the a

of racing. After expressing his complaints abouhe handicapping, his will to win prevailed unt

he future Edward VII could bear it no longer: 'Th

egatta at Cowes was once a pleasant holiday fo

me,' he remarked sadly, 'but now that the Kaise

has taken command there it is nothing but nuisance.' And he never went again.

Kaiser Wilhelm did not care to be seen in a

nferior Royal Yacht to his grandmother's so h

ordered a bigger and grander one. Wherever thKaiser sailed in his glittering Hohenzollern h

aw evidence of the dominant power of Britain a

ea. He resented deeply the Royal Navy's size

trength, and apparent efficiency. He resented th

espect for and acquiescence to the Royal Navy b


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he rest of the world, and Britain's pride in th

ervice which he saw as no more than arrogance.

The Kaiser's partner who shared an

encouraged his ambition was Alfred von Tirpitz

who was ten years older (born 19 March 1849and had originally served in the old an

unesteemed Prussian Navy. Tirpitz showed n

pecial distinction as a sailor in this minor service

but revealed himself as a brilliant and ambitiouadministrator and political manipulator. H

trongly attracted the attention of the Emperor, an

became Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy i

une 1897, a date which marks the birth of th

mighty High Seas Fleet.Tirpitz needed all his Machiavellian qualitie

and all the Kaiser's powerful support, to persuad

he Reichstag to pass the first of his German Nav

Laws in 1898 against the liberal-pacifist elemenon one side and the Prussian Army clement whic

was equally hostile. This law provided for th

considerable expansion of the service, and wa

followed by a second in 1900 of a much mor

ambitious nature. It called for a fleet including 3


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battleships, 20 armoured cruisers and 38 ligh

cruisers - a fleet which he justified in thes

momentous and threatening words:

In order to protect German trade and commerc

under existing conditions only one thing wiuffice, namely, Germany must possess a battl

fleet of such a strength that even for the mo

powerful naval adversary a war would involv

uch risks as to make that Power's own supremacdoubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutel

necessary that the German fleet should be as stron

as that of the greatest naval Power, for, as a rule,

great naval Power will not be in a position t

concentrate all its forces against us.

These words were heard with dismay in Britain

Germany's colonial expansion in Africa and th

East- the Weltpolitik - and hostile events such a

he despatch of the provocative anti-Britis

Kruger Telegram' of 1896, and the Anglophobi

chorus conducted by German statesmen and th

Press during the Boer War, all combined to caus

alarm and a massive reappraisal of the nava


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position of Britain and her Empire at the end of th

old century.

The death of Queen Victoria on 22 January 190

caused conflicting shocks of grief and disbelie

hat the old lady was not after all immortal. Heeldest, once recalcitrant and much abused so

ucceeded at a moment in the nation's history o

anxiety and the need for far-reaching decision

France, Russia, and Germany were all hostile. None approved of Britain's war against the Boe

farmers, and suspicion and disapproval of he

mperial power and stance were widespread. Now

her Navy was being directly threatened by the mo

powerful military nation in the world.As one writer was to put it, 'Without th

upremacy of the British Navy the best security fo

he world's peace and advancement would b

gone. Nothing would be so likely as the passing oea-power from our hands to bring about anothe

of those long ages of conflict and returnin

barbarism which have thrown back civilizatio

before and wasted nations.' (3) Between them

Kaiser Wilhelm II and the head of his navy ha


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brought about an end to the Pax Britannica eve

before the first keel of the first of the new Germa

battleships was laid down.

For Britain, the end of the old century and th

death of the old Queen marked also the end osolation. The accession of that most gregarious o

monarchs, Edward VII, could not have occurred a

a more appropriate time for the nation. Britain wa

n need of friends.Within a few years, the Anglo-Japanese Treat

of Friendship (30 January 1902) and the Entent

Cordiale (8 April 1904) with France, lovingl

prepared by Edward VII, permitted Britai

eventually to withdraw the greater part of henaval strength from the Far East and th

Mediterranean, and concentrate her battle fleets i

home waters. This was just what Tirpitz ha

declared Britain would not be able to do.Would these steps be sufficient to meet th

growing threat from across the North Sea, whic

had already been renamed in German atlase

German Ocean'? Were the matériel and th

fighting efficiency of the Royal Navy equal to th


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ask?

The Royal Navy at the outset of the twentiet

century was like a rich, vain old man, swollen wit

elf-confidence and living on the memory of pa

glories. He cannot move quickly nor see very welHe is a gregarious clubman but has as little regar

for modern times and trends as he has for thos

outside his circle.

The best that can be said of the Royal Navy i904 is that it had known worse days quit

ecently. In the early 1880s the service could loo

back forty years without pride on a record of ultra

conservatism. As far as the sailors were concerne

hey were fed, treated, and paid as if Nelson wertill their commander-in-chief. Hardships wer

made tolerable by companionship and the ever

iberal rum ration. The officers were indifferentl

educated, unimaginative, their style and conduculed by elaborate protocol, custom, and tradition

For them the Navy was as exclusive as a Guard

egiment. In war they would doubtless hav

performed with all the valour of their ancestors. I

peace, for decade after decade, the ol


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brotherhood which had linked them in battle wit

he lower deck had withered.

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty ha

ong since established a principle that experimen

and innovation must be avoided. Others could bnventive if they wished. Britain might follow i

due course if she thought fit. This principle applie

o all manner of advances, most conspicuously t

he acceptance of steam propulsion and the end omasts and yards. When the battleship Inflexibl

was commissioned in 1881 she was the wonde

hip of her day, with the biggest (16-inch) guns i

he service and armour-plate of 24 inches,

hickness never exceeded. She could steam aalmost 15 knots. But she was a sort of nineteenth

century hybrid, linking the eighteenth and twentiet

centuries. While she enjoyed the unique advantag

of electric light she was also fully rigged, and amuch time and skill were devoted to hoisting sa

and taking in a reef as if she had been Sir Joh

ervis's flagship at St Vincent. Traditionalism i

he Royal Navy had been strengthened after th

ntroduction of pioneering breech-loading guns i


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860 and their hasty abandonment after severa

accidents. Twenty years were to pass, when th

breech-loader was long since established i

foreign navies, before the Admiralty woul

countenance their return.The emphasis was on smartness, speed i

hoisting sail, precise conformity to signal-boo

diagrams in fleet drills, pride in pulling races an

nter-ship boxing and tug o'wars. Admiral 'PompoHeneage, who was born three years earlier tha

Queen Victoria and retired three years before sh

died, was the complete Victorian naval officer, bu

by no means the most eccentric nor exceptional i

his concern for a ship's cleanliness or smartnesWhen inspecting ships he always wore white ki

gloves,' according to one naval writer, 'and hi

coxswain followed him with a dozen spare pairs .

He liked to put his hands on the tops of pipeunning over his head, or into the most inaccessibl

nooks and crannies. If one speck of dust appeare

on the immaculate gloves, he would turn to th

Commander waving two fingers. "Dis is not de di

of days," he would observe, "nor de dirt of veek


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he deadly danger emerging from across the Nort

Sea. He also knew that the men who would on

day have to face it must be of the highest quality

With this in mind he transformed recruitmen

manning, and status in the Navy. He introducechemes to encourage promotion from the lowe

deck and at the same time abolished fees at nava

colleges through which only the well-off had onc

passed. He introduced a nucleus crews system oeserves, based on French practice, and greatl

mproved the standing of the once-despise

engineer officers.

All this was recognized by his followers in th

ervice to be of inestimable value. Fishermatériel reforms were more conspicuous. Ignorin

he cries of fury from deprived commanders an

far-flung diplomats, Fisher brought home numerou

hips, most of which 'could neither fight nor ruaway' (as Fisher expressed it) and were scrapped

Even the Mediterranean Fleet was reduced to

hadow of the great fleet he had commanded fro

899 to 1902. Through influential friends an

hrough his press contacts, Fisher concentrated th


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nation's eye on Germany, and Germany alone, a

he threat to Britain's dominance at sea. The peopl

oved it, and the Navy League flourished. B

economies as ruthless as his reforms, Fishe

educed the Navy Estimates three years runningThe Liberals loved him for that.

Above all else, Fisher gave the nation th

dreadnought. This statement requires qualifying fo

t can also be argued that the all-big-gun ship wanevitably the final stage in the design of the ol

hip-of-the-line. In the nineteenth century th

battleship had passed through numerou

developments, from the three-decker woode

walls, little improved from the mid-eighteentcentury, to mixed sail and steam propulsion, to th

mastless' ironclad. Guns had developed fro

mooth-bore 68-pounders firing solid shot, to th

6-inch, rifted, breech-loading guns of thnflexible.

As defence against the explosive charge of thes

massive shells, armour-plate had grown i

hickness and resistance until (again in th

nflexible) it was responsible for 27.5 per cent o


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The Japanese suffered critical battleship losse

from mines. Both sides became increasingl

preoccupied with the new underwater weapons.

Other lessons one learned in this naval wa

which crystallized all the problems argued over bheoreticians for years. 'Spotting' the fall of sho

accurately from ships firing mixed armament wa

een to be almost impossible, the varying siz

plashes only confusing the spotter. According the official British observer with the Japanes

Fleet at the first-ever battle of ironclads, 'when 12

nch guns are firing, shots from 10-inch pas

unnoticed, while for all the respect they instil, 8

nch or 6-inch guns might just as well bpeashooters'. To the astonishment of this sam

observer (and to the whole naval world when

was informed) the Russian battleships opene

accurate fire at 18,000 yards: 3,000 yards was stihe standard range of British battle practice at thi

ime. It was clear that heavy guns could prov

decisive long before medium-calibre guns coul

come into effective range.

Here was proof for far-sighted naval designer


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produced a hybrid with mixed 12-inch and 10-inc

guns. Only Britain had the facilities and need t

produce an all-big-gun battleship without dela

and set a pace which no other nation could match

Within a few days of his appointment as First SeLord, Fisher set up a Committee on Designs.

ncluded a number of the best 'brains' in the Navy

all imbued with Fisher's sense of urgency. Les

han a year later, the Dreadnought was laid dowat Portsmouth, and eight months after her launc

was steaming on her trials.

The effect at home and abroad was all tha

Fisher had hoped for. The Dreadnought , with te

2-inch guns, had a broadside of twice as manheavy guns as any ship afloat. When few

battleships could make 18 knots, th

readnought's turbines speeded her along at 2

knots, and of even greater significance, she crossehe Atlantic at over 17 knots average without

breakdown. The German naval authorities wer

tunned by the superiority and speed o

construction of this ship, and temporarily halte

construction on battleships that would now b


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obsolete on completion. In the competition - th

battleship race' - which was rapidly increasing i

cale and intensity, the first round between Britai

and Germany, between Fisher and von Tirpitz, ha

been won by the Royal Navy.At home there was great satisfaction an

ejoicing. Models of the Dreadnought appeared i

he shops, boys could recite every detail of he

tatistics, and wherever she could be seen crowdcollected. But among navalists, and Fisher

detractors, there was vocal criticism of th

battleship. Her cost of construction was high an

he cost of her loss in battle would b

commensurately high. There were those whfavoured smaller battleships with 10-inch gun

which could be built in greater numbers. Abov

all, if she made every battleship in the worl

obsolete, as Fisher loudly claimed, then Britaingreat superiority in numbers over Germany wa

wiped out at a stroke.

Fisher fought back at what he regarded a

counsels of doom and timidity, claiming tha

Britain could outbuild Germany and would have


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dreadnought battle squadron before Germany coul

complete her first Dreadnoughtschiff In all th

arguments that raged to and fro on the platforms, i

he Press and West End clubs, the one undeniabl

and supremely important fact appears never thave been mentioned: the all-big-gun ship was a

certain to come as day follows night, was alread

on the design boards of many foreign admiraltie

was already under construction in the UniteStates.

What Britain had done under the 'ruthles

elentless and remorseless' (as he liked to clai

for himself) methods of Fisher was to produce

world-beater overnight. The Dreadnougheasserted once again British paramountcy at sea

and in a style of theatricality which only Jack

Fisher could sponsor.


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THE ANGLO-GERMAN BATTLESHIP

RACE

Admiral Fisher's attributes - The dreadnough

race begins - Admiral Beresford’s vendett

against Fisher - The German Emperor

ntransigence - The dreadnought battle-cruiser

The 'We want eight and we won’t wait' campaig

and Winston Churchill's opposition - The Prim

inister's committee to enquire into the conduc

of naval affairs - Fisher's resignation

Admiral Fisher led the Royal Navy as First Se

Lord for five of the most critical peacetime year

n the service's history, working with a white ho

ntensity that sharpened his beliefs and prejudice

made him more bellicose than ever, anlluminated more brightly year by year th

colourful characteristics that had made him th

greatest naval administrator since Lord Barham

1) He became towards the end of his term o


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bring about a reduction in armaments and laws fo

educing the awfulness of war, Fisher had shocke

he assembly by exclaiming, 'You might as we

alk of humanizing Hell!' 'War is the essence o

violence', was one of Fisher's oft-repeateaphorisms. 'Moderation in war is imbecility. HI

FIRST. HIT HARD. KEEP ON HITTING!’

Whatever this Hague Peace Conference ma

have accomplished, and Fisher regarded it as waste of time, the second in .June 1907 wa

accepted by everyone as a failure. For politica

and economic reasons alone, Britain was anxiou

o bring about a reduction in naval armaments an

put a brake on the battleship race which had beeaccelerated by the construction of th

readnought . A proposal to bring this about wa

answered by Tirpitz: ' ... look at the facts. Here i

England, already more than four times as strong aGermany, in alliance with Japan, and probably s

with France, and you, the colossus, come and as

Germany, the pigmy, to disarm. From the point o

view of the public it is laughable an

Machiavellian, and we shall never agree t


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A counter-campaign in Britain against the new

German increase called for 'two keels to one’,

difficult target to achieve with a Libera

government dedicated to public welfare and th

casing of the inequalities in the land. But as andication of how deeply even the Liberal an

Labour factions were involved in the nation's nava

preoccupation, the Manchester Guardia

expounding the radical view accepted that navaivalry with Germany was 'rapidly becoming th

principal outstanding question of Europea

politics' (3) and that Britain should certainl

construct four new dreadnoughts a year t

Germany's three.The Conservatives and the Conservative Pres

continued to be alarmed for the future. 'Is Britai

going to surrender her maritime supremacy t

provide old-age pensions?' was typical of thbellicose questions sounded out by the Daily Mai

Fisher's enemies in and out of the Navy were now

aroused to create a further contest within th

Anglo-German contest by organizing a campaig

for his removal. The faction's idol and leader wa


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Lord Charles Beresford, once a national hero, now

elderly and bloated by extravagant living. A

rishman of aristocratic lineage and immens

wealth, Beresford had once been Fisher's ally i

he reform movement in the Navy. But the two menof equally volatile temperament and very differen

background, had fallen out, and the split ha

widened when Fisher was appointed First Se

Lord and was then promoted Admiral of the Fleeensuring the extension of his term of office t

deprive Beresford of any prospect of succeedin

him.

With its most important aim of ousting Fishe

and replacing him with Beresford, an ImperiaMaritime League was founded at the end of 1907

Lord Esher, whose support of Fisher was stead

and whose influence was great in the land, gave t

The Times a copy of the letter he wrote to thLeague defending Fisher. 'There is not a man i

Germany, from the Emperor downwards, wh

would not welcome the fall of Sir John Fisher,'

concluded.

This letter led to the most bizarre incident in thi


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Anglo-German naval rivalry. When it was show

o the Kaiser, he sat down and wrote in his ow

hand a letter nine pages long addressed to Lor

Tweedmouth, political head of the Navy as Fir

Lord of the Admiralty. In extravagant language, thEmperor of Germany stated that he was unable t

understand British fears about the rise of th

German Navy, which was not being created t

challenge British naval supremacy. He alsdescribed Esher's opinion that Germany would b

glad to see Fisher out of office as 'a piece o

unmitigated balderdash'.

This new exercise in conducting Germany

foreign policy caused amazement in Britain, anKing Edward felt impelled to write his nephew

eprimand. The Times expressed outrage: 'If ther

was any doubt before about the meaning of Germa

naval expansion,' it thundered, 'none can remaiafter an attempt of this kind to influence th

Minister responsible for our Navy in a directio

favourable to German interests.' (4)

In Germany, where the heavy warship buildin

facilities were being expanded at high speed and a


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great cost, Anglophobia grew apace, too. Eve

ensitive to being patronized, watchful fo

evidence of interference in national affair

envious of the size and wealth of the Britis

Empire, resentful of Britain's apparent failure tegard Germany as a great power, anti-Britis

feeling was easily whipped up by the Pres

politicians, and the Emperor himself. 'You Englis

are mad, mad as March hares,' he declared to aEnglish newspaper correspondent, and made

clear that the great majority of his subjects wer

hostile to England. The well-informed an

percipient British naval attaché in Berlin declare

hat he doubted now whether the Emperor, 'much ahe might desire it, could restrain his own peopl

from attempting to wrest the command of the sea

from Great Britain, if they saw a fairly goo

chance of doing so'. (5)Fisher, always a target for sniping in the Roya

avy's own internecine war, was also involved i

he complex and anxious task of improving th

efficiency of the service, protecting it fro

politicians of radical-Liberal persuasion, an


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observing from his own Whitehall based fightin

op the threatening expansion of the German Navy

Fisher had scored a second surprise mora

victory over Germany by building and putting int

ervice at great speed a new class of dreadnoughype armoured cruiser, bigger and faster tha

anything Tirpitz had contemplated, and with an al

big-gun armament twice that of any pre

dreadnought battleship. These formidable meo'war were what Fisher proclaimed to be his 'New

Testament ships', 'hares to catch tortoises', scoutin

vessels of unprecedented speed (25+ knots) an

power that could hunt down any warship anywher

n the world and sink it at leisure with its 12-incguns. The battle-cruiser was to add a new elemen

n the Anglo-German race, and by 1912 German

had six built or building against Britain's ten.

However exuberant and confident Fisheemained in the strength, numbers, and quality o

he British fleets, information from his intelligenc

department revealed the rapid improvement in th

eamanship and gunnery of the Kriegsmarine

personnel and the excellent design of the fir


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German dreadnoughts.

In 1909 there occurred the biggest peacetim

naval crisis in British history, a 'navy scare' whic

made those of the late nineteenth century (when th

French and Russians were the source of anxietyeem trivial. Towards the end of 1908, when th

mood of Germany was clearly more hostile tha

ever towards France as well as Britain, informe

ources in London told of further Germaacceleration in dreadnought building. The speed o

construction of heavy men o'war was conditione

by the months occupied in building the guns an

gun mountings. Previously, German shipbuilder

had shown that they could build a heavy ship ihree years. Now, thanks to increased facilities a

Krupp's for building armour and guns and the

mountings, this time had been reduced, it wa

believed, to little more than two years. Moreoveo rapid had been the increase in buildin

lipways and training new men in the skills o

hipbuilding, it was believed possible tha

Germany now had the capacity to build no fewe

han eight dreadnoughts a year, equal to Britis


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could afford only four new ships if the Libera

welfare commitments were to be met, and that th

Admiralty was being alarmist in asking for more.

The Conservatives, the conservative Press, an

big-navy members of the Liberal Cabinehowever, kept up a sustained campaign for

minimum of six. There were threats of resignation

nside the Cabinet and the Admiralty, and th

whole country rapidly became involved witpassions running high among extreme 'patriots' o

panic mongers' and the 'pacifists' or 'littl

Englanders'. Lloyd George came in for muc

abuse. The feeling at Buckingham Palace can b

udged by referring to a letter the King's privatecretary wrote to Lord Esher about Churchil

What are Winston's reasons for acting as he doe

n this matter?' he asked. 'Of course it cannot b

from conviction or principle. The very idea of hihaving either is enough to make anyone laugh.' (7)

In the end the violent storm abated and th

arguments were settled by the wily and ingeniou

Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith. He proposed t

his split and outraged Cabinet that there should b


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provision for the construction of four dreadnough

n the 1909-10 financial year, and a further fou

ater if they were deemed essential. In the even

hey were wanted, of course; for within month

anxiety about German intentions had become evemore widespread.

It was left to Churchill to make the comment: 'I

he end a curious and characteristic solution wa

eached. The Admiralty had demanded six shipshe economists offered four: and we finall

compromised on eight. (8)

This 'compromise' had been reached as muc

because of news from the Mediterranean as fro

Germany. On the night of Easter Sunday 1909 pecial messenger arrived at the Admiralty fro

he Prime Minister. Asquith had just learned tha

Austria, no doubt under pressure from her ally

Germany, was to build three or four dreadnoughtand he wished to know what information Fishe

had on this dramatic news. Fisher rapidly learne

hat this was indeed true, and moreover that Italy

as alarmed as Britain, was about to put in hand he

own dreadnought building programme. The ant


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navalist view was that the two programme

cancelled each other out as far as Britain's securit

n the Mediterranean was concerned. The Prim

Minister, the Board of Admiralty, and a majority i

he Cabinet remained anxious and unconvincedand the 'contingent' dreadnoughts were authorized

The ships provided for, including the 'contingen

hips, were the battleships Colossus and Hercules

four ships of the Orion class, and the battlecruisers Lion and Princess Royal . All but the fir

wo mounted 13.5-inch guns at Fisher's insistence

The Germans had nothing larger than 12-inch gun

until 1916.

Fisher's supporters regarded this unprecedenteprogramme as his culminating triumph. Hi

enemies at home did not see it in this light, an

conveniently forgot the fact, five years later whe

war broke out, that only the four extra 'contingendreadnoughts gave the Royal Navy its dangerousl

lim margin of strength over the High Seas Flee

nstead, these enemies concentrated the

considerable forces, which included the Prince o

Wales, on ousting Fisher before he could (as the


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believed) damage the Navy fatally.

The Beresford pack of hounds, those exclude

from the 'Fishpond' as they saw themselve

motivated by spite and jealousy, scarred fro

being passed over or slighted, were relentless ihe pursuit of their quarry, and used the mo

unscrupulous methods, and their wealth an

nfluence with the Press and Society.

The burden of their argument was that Fisher, bhis neglect and starvation of the Navy and refusa

o stand up to the politicians, had brought th

ervice to the brink of disaster and all bu

destroyed its superiority and magnificence, and th

esteem in which the world held it no more thafive years ago.

The closed world of the Navy which occupie

o much of its time on shipboard has alway

uffered from gossip and backbiting. Resentmentand divisiveness build up all too readily i

wardrooms, where unusual behaviour an

braininess' were discouraged and class division

were accentuated. The same could be said o

London Society.


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departments. Those in the 'Fishpond' foun

hemselves thinking more radically and workin

with a new pace and energy. He was a grea

nspirer and attracted stalwart loyalty, and hi

charm could be irresistible. Of medium height anunspectacular appearance, he remained one o

hose rare people whose presence could be felt i

any gathering.

Fisher's mind was crisp and deep, his memorprodigious. Such was his dedication to the Nav

hat his marriage to a worthy but colourless woma

faded. But he loved the company of women an

hey loved him in return, from Queen Alexandra t

Pamela McKenna and the Duchess of Hamiltonwith whom he shared a deep relationship for th

ast fifteen years of his life.

Fisher's work in Whitehall from 1904 to the en

of 1909 stands unique in British naval historyWhile Tirpitz, starting from scratch, worke

wonders in creating a superb fighting force in som

fifteen years, Fisher's task was infinitely mor

difficult. He had to break outworn traditions, an

ike Hamlet 'reform it altogether'. A servant give


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ntroduced after his resignation. But, as a

unprejudiced admiral remarked as he surveyed th

Fleet assembled for review a few days before th

outbreak of war, 'All that is best and most moder

here is the creation of Lord Fisher." (10)Winston Churchill was one of his warme

admirers and became one of his closest friend

While opposing Fisher's demands for increases i

expenditure by the Navy, he had been watching hiclosely and concluded that 'There is no doubt tha

Fisher was right in nine-tenths of what he fough

for. His great reforms sustained the power of th

Royal Navy at the most critical period in it

history ... After a long period of serene anunchallenged complacency, the mutter of distan

hunder could be heard. It was Fisher who hoiste

he storm-signal and beat all hands to quarters.'

Without Fisher's work Britain could not havurvived against Tirpitz's magnificent High Sea

Fleet from 1914. If Britain had lost the war at se

he would have been forced to surrender, succum

o the tide, and become a subservient satellite.

But Fisher's departure from the Admiralty wa


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by 1910 essential. The overdose of the purgativ

was already having damaging effects. 'He shoo

hem and beat them and cajoled them out o

lumber into intense activity,' concluded Churchil

qualifying his summary: 'But the navy was not pleasant place while this was going on. The "Ban

of Brothers" tradition which Nelson handed dow

was for the time, but only for the time, discarded

11)After accepting the necessity for his resignation

Fisher began to understand how tired he was afte

his arduous campaigns. He told Esher of his 'relie

o be free of having to run the British Navy all ove

he world. It makes one think of St. Paul! "Anbesides all this, there came upon me the daily car

of the churches." (12)

He had often spoken facetiously of retiring to th

country to grow cabbages. He did settle at his sonhome, Kilverstone Hall in Norfolk. But there wa

no gardening there for him. His interest and activ

participation in things naval and political was i

for a brief hibernation, no more.


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CHURCHILL AT THE ADMIRALTY

Churchill becomes First Lord following the Agadir Crisis- Admiral Wilson superseded -

Churchill's over -extended travels, lack of tact ,

and disagreement with the King - The 15-inch gu

and Queen Elizabeth class of super -dreadnought

Churchill switches the Navy to oil - His

enthusiasum for submarines and aviation-

Fisher’s support and guidance- Percy Scott's

director and the opposition to it - Dreyer's fire

control system- The creation of a Naval War Staff- Lower deck reform

Winston Churchill's interest in the Royal Nav

and his romantic affection for it had been known t

his friends for some time. He also entertained deep sense of admiration and affection for Fishe

which incidentally was not shared by Churchill

wife, who felt only suspicion and distrust for him.

On Fisher's resignation Churchill wrote to him


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congratulating him on his elevation to the peerag

as well as on the ‘great services you have rendere

o British Naval Supremacy'. He also ruefull

ecounted how, since he had been at the Hom

Office, he had 'stretched out several feeble pawof amity- but in vain- & I am only sorry that th

drift of events did not enable us to work together .

have deeply regretted since that I did not pres

for the Admiralty in 1908. I think it would havbeen easily possible for me to obtain it. I believe

would have been better for us all’ (1)

Asquith had been aware for some time o

Churchill's wish for the Admiralty. and less tha

wo years after Fisher's resignation he offered it thim. Fisher had been superseded by a sturdy

teady, dour old salt, Admiral of the Fleet S

Arthur ('old 'ard 'eart') Wilson, upon whom Fishe

elied to sustain his policies and methods. Lackinhe fiery stimulus of Fisher as his partne

McKenna did not thrive. On 25 October 191

McKenna was transferred to the Home Offic

much against his will, and Churchill crosse

Whitehall and exchanged jobs with him. 'As soo


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esponse was for a time confused, althoug

everyone agreed that the situation could becom

dangerous. The Press response was varied, fro

he Manchester Guardian preaching peace an

deploring panic, to the Standard on the far righThe plain truth of the matter,' ran an editorial, 'i

hat no Government ... could consent to allow

great foreign navy to station itself on the flank o

our Atlantic trade and on the line of our route to thCape.’ (3) Sir Arthur Nicolson, Permanent Under

Secretary at the Foreign Office agreed. Th

Admiralty, however, made light of the affair to th

Foreign Office claiming that the Germans woul

equire a powerful detachment to support thidistant base, which would mean weakening th

Fleet in the North Sea. Informed opinion als

believed that Germany was much more intereste

n interfering with France's suspected annexatioof Morocco, humiliating her and driving a wedg

nto the newly formed Entente Cordiale.

It was an indication of the gravity of the crisi

hat, with bellicose words thick in the air i

Germany, France, and Britain, Lloyd George. arch


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omewhere in his desk. When questioned at

meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence a

he height of the Agadir Crisis about th

Admiralty's strategy, Wilson could only mutter- h

was no orator- that, briefly, the plans were for close blockade of German ports, the capture o

advanced bases, and possible landings on th

enemy's coast. He was against the Army sending a

expeditionary force to help France until thenemy's Fleet had been destroyed.

Churchill found that Fisher's successor wa

quite out of his depth in terms of modern strategy

weapons, and conditions, with no intention o

consulting with anyone, certainly not the Army, oeven his civil master, the First Lord. Churchill

admiration for Wilson as a man was boundless

He was, without any exception, the most selfles

man I have ever met or even read of. He wantenothing and he feared nothing- absolutely nothing

He had earned the VC fighting the Dervishes] .

He impressed me from the first as a man of th

highest quality and stature, but, as I though

dwelling too much in the past of naval science, no


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ufficiently receptive of new ideas whe

conditions were changing so rapidly, and, o

course, tenacious and unyielding in the la

degree.’ (4)

Churchill selected as Wilson's successor the Cn-C. of the Home Fleet, an unexceptional man, S

Francis Bridgeman, who seemed intelligent an

alert and malleable, whom Churchill understoo

ooked forward rather than back and was in favouof a Staff. Bridgeman's first duty was to hand t

Wilson Churchill's letter demanding his resignatio

and offering him a peerage if he wanted one. Whe

Wilson had hauled down his flag for the last time

n contrast with Beresford he had expresslforbidden even the smallest demonstration. Now

he accepted the demand for his resignation i

ilence, and 'without any grace whatever

according to Bridgeman, 'promptly declined thhonour'. (5)

This incident was only an early clue to th

nature of the new regime. Suspicion of Churchi

before he came to the Admiralty was widespread

Established Conservatives of all classes saw hi


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as the man who had fought against increasing th

trength of the Navy and now was its civil hea

with the responsibility for keeping it strong. 'A

elf-advertising mountebank', was the Nationa

eview's opinion. Even the service and semervice magazines were muted in their enthusiasm

The Navy League Annual stated that his arriva

was not regarded with much favour. Nor could Th

avy 'feel much satisfaction at the change whichas taken place'.

Traditionally, the First Lord of the Admiralty i

not expected to know, or wish to know, much of th

detail of the Navy of which he is political chie

The First Lord, who was responsible for the Navo Parliament, presided at Board meetings an

acted as spokesman for the Cabinet among hi

functions. Churchill was not content with thes

imited activities. To the concern of his Board anenior officers with whom he was immediately i

ouch, he revealed himself as a civilian Fishe

nvestigating, questioning, reforming wher

eforms were not thought to be needed, formulatin

plans- and not just Naval War Plans - where plan


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already existed or were not seemingly essential.

Churchill did not sit at his desk in Whitehall lik

McKenna or Lords Tweedmouth and Selborn

before him. He dashed out to inspect dockyard

and new ships, barracks and torpedo traininestablishments. He even went to sea. His positio

entitled him to the use of the Admiralty Yach

nchantress, a 3,500-ton steam vessel, as gracefu

and comfortable as the Royal Yachts. During hifirst eighteen months in office Churchill spent

otal of six of them at sea in the Enchantress

ailing with his senior admirals fellow politician

and friends on board. He took Asquith to sea t

observe gunnery practice, and, according to thPrime Minister, was soon 'dancing about behin

he guns, elevating, depressing and sighting'. (6)

None of this rushing about helped to improve th

raditional naval establishment's opinion oChurchill. Almost everywhere he went he le

behind him hostility and suspicion for his method

and manner. He even succeeded in raising th

wrath of his sovereign who already distrusted him

George V, the new King, was not only an Admira


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Asquith had every confidence that Churchill woul

eventually settle down. He was too clever, and ha

oo clever a wife, to continue to exasperate hi

friends and create hostility among his colleague

for very long. And, as usual, Asquith was proveight. Two months before war broke out, Tirpit

eceived a letter from the German naval attaché i

London which stated that 'on the whole the Navy i

atisfied with Mr Churchill, because it recognizehat he has done and accomplished more for the

han the majority of his predecessors ... Th

ntensive co-operation of all forces for an increas

n the power and tactical readiness of the Englis

avy has under Mr. Churchill's guidance .experienced rather energetic impulses an

nspiration. The English Navy is very much awar

of it.' (8)

Churchill's prodigious work and fundamentaeforms for the Royal Navy in 1912-14 were i

ine with and in scarcely broken continuity wit

hose of Fisher, from whom he encouraged letter

as if that were necessary) containing a torrent o

facts and advice. 'As the man wrote about whit


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eather hunting breeches to his tailor,' quippe

Churchill once to Fisher about his letters, ‘“Kee

continually sending"'. (9) Thirty years ahead of hi

ime, and in characteristically violent style, Fishe

wrote to Churchill on 16 January 1912: ‘Sefighting is pure common sense. The first of all it

necessities is SPEED, so as to be able to fight-

When you like

Where you likeand How you like.

Therefore the super-Lion, the super-Swift an

he super-Submarine are the only three types fo

fighting ( speed being THE characteristic of each o

hese types). AVIATION has wiped out thntermediate types ...’ (10)

There was a brief cooling-off when Fishe

disapproved of some naval appointments bu

Churchill soon charmed him back with arresistible imitation to cruise in the Mediterranea

n the Enchantress with his wife, the Prim

Minister, the First Sea Lord, and numerous othe

bigwigs on board.

Churchill took Fisher's advice to heart on th


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construction of super-fast big ships, submarine

and 'AVIATION' as on much else, and Fisher, ou

of office but by no means out of power, took

material as well as an inspirational part in all thre

developments. A division of powerful battleshiphad been called for. They had to be fast enough t

torm ahead of the two parallel lines of contestin

battleships in order to 'turn' the enemy vanguar

and 'cross the T' - the classic naval manoeuvre thaallowed your full broadside to bear on the bows o

he enemy -just as the Japanese Admira

Heihachiro Togo had done in his defeat of th

Russians at the Battle of Tsu-Shima (May 1905

They would in theory, fulfil Fisher's requiremenand be able to fight when they liked, where the

iked, and how they liked.

Churchill was now determined to go one bette

n gunpower as well as speed. The 12-inch gun ohe Dreadnought firing an 850-pound shell ha

been followed, at Fisher's direction, by the 13.5

whose shell weighed 1,400 pounds. In the Unite

States, 14-inch guns were already bein

developed, and there could be no doubt tha


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meanings. 'To commit the Navy irrevocably to o

was indeed "to take arms against a sea of troubles

Churchill wrote later.

Fisher was an enthusiast not only for the 15-inc

gun but also for oil-fired ships. Oil was efficienand clean. It gave a battleship 40 per cent greate

adius of action for the same weight of coal. A

coal-burning fleet at sea lacked 25 per cent of it

hips which were perforce away refuelling, aexhausting and filthy process anyway. An oil-fire

fleet could refuel by turning a tap, and, in all bu

ough weather, refuel at sea. Oil required less tha

half the number of stokers. The arguments in favou

of oil were incontrovertible, with one exception. was a foreign not a home mineral.

Churchill passed the problem to Fisher. In Jun

912 he wrote: 'The liquid fuel problem has got t

be solved, and the natural, inherent, unavoidabldifficulties are such that they require the drive an

enthusiasm of a big man. I want you for this viz t

crack the nut. No one else can do it so wel

Perhaps no one else can do it at all ... '' (12) Fishe

agreed to chair a Royal Commission on oil. It


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trategy of the battle fleet and the defences of th

battleship.

The submarine was at first regarded as

defensive weapon for the protection of harbour

bases and coastlines. The German Navy saw then this role until after the outbreak of war, an

Tirpitz was astonished at the damage the U-boa

was able to inflict far from its own base. I

Britain, the submarine service grew slowly and iface of the hostility of the great majority of senio

officers and members of the Board. Whe

ubmarines took part in manoeuvres and wa

games, their successes tended to be discounted

Wilson judged the submarine as 'Underhand, unfaand damned un-English'. Most officers regarde

hem as playthings for the eccentric young men wh

dressed up in oilskins (very necessary) and looke

ike scruffy North Sea fishermen. The submarine iall major navies was patronizingly regarded as 'th

weapon of the weaker power’.

Churchill under the influence of Fisher, th

ubmarine's most ardent advocate, a small numbe

of intelligent and far-sighted senior officers, an


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politicians, supported the submarine branch an

he construction of more submarines and new long

ange torpedoes. As early as January 1912 he wa

n earnest correspondence with a number o

politicians about the influence of the moderubmarine and torpedo on the nation's defensive a

well as offensive plans. Arthur Balfour, recentl

Prime Minister (1902-5) and destined to succee

Churchill as First Lord. was especiallencouraging. 'I have been thinking over what yo

wrote about submarines,' Churchill wrote to him

They seem to me a great advantage to us. The

make invasion look more difficult than before

They are the most formidable defence for theown coasts ... On balance we are the gainers o

his new type [of submarine] ... Another thin

which properly employed will be helpful to us i

he long range torpedo. 10,000 yards! And it is mere calculation of odds to see how many must b

fired from one line of ships at another to hit ever

vessel - bar accidents.'

Balfour replied that he entirely agreed. 'I hav

ong been strongly of the opinion that submarine


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will modify the whole question of Home Defence

he answered.' (13)

By 1912 the size, range, and power of th

ubmarine had much increased and its influence o

manoeuvres could only be denied by blinkereofficers, which unfortunately included a majorit

of the Board. In the 1913 manoeuvres submarin

officers claimed to have accounted for 40 per cen

of the men o’war present, in spite of the rule thaafter making a claim the submarine was obliged t

urface for half an hour and not attack any vesse

within three miles, in simulation of what wer

udged to be real-war conditions.

Nonetheless, under Churchill's regime thubmarine was rapidly developed. The E-clas

which was to play such an important part in th

war, was a vessel 178 feet long with a radius o

action of 4,000 miles, a surface speed of over 1knots and submerged speed of almost 10 knots. N

one could totally disregard the threat of a swarm o

uch vessels on a battle fleet in misty typical Nort

Sea weather. Recognition of the threat fro

German U-boats was reflected in the fundamenta


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and highly secret strategical decision taken in 191

o cancel a close blockade of the German coast i

he naval war plans and substitute distan

blockade. In debates inside and outside th

Admiralty in the months leading to war thubmarine threat was argued exhaustively. Eve

he possibility of having to keep the dreadnough

fleet out of the North Sea altogether because o

what was euphemistically termed 'the small-cramenace' was aired.

Admiral Sir Percy Scott, a figure almost a

dynamic, controversial, and far-seeing as Fishe

but lacking his charm and wiliness), and

evolutionary figure in the field of naval gunnerycontributed an article to The Times a few week

before war was declared arguing that the Fleet o

he future would require only aircraft an

ubmarines. 'Submarines and aeroplanes haventirely revolutionized naval warfare; no feet ca

hide itself from the aeroplane's eye, and th

ubmarine can deliver a deadly attack even i

broad daylight.’ (14)

The outraged chorus of protests at thi


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uggestion included the voices of all those o

conservative inclination and with vested interest i

he continued paramountcy of the dreadnough

from shipbuilders and steel-plate manufacturers t

most officers serving in the Fleet. Scott's modeweight of supporters included the Liberal Pres

which saw in his argument a means of reducing th

crippling cost of armaments.

Nevertheless the threat of the submarine waaken seriously enough for an Admiralty Submarin

Committee to be set up to consider proposals fo

weapons to counter the menace. It remained barre

of ideas. 'It is high time', declared one admiral at

War College lecture in April 1914, 'we put the feaof God into these young gentlemen who lie abou

he North Sea attacking all and sundry without le

or hindrance.' How this was to be accomplishe

emained for the present unanswered.The hard prejudice which hindered th

development of the submarine did not apply t

naval aviation. It is true that when offered th

Wright brothers' patent in 1907 Lord Tweedmout

on behalf of the Board had turned it down. But tw


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ears later when the Hon. C. S. Rolls of the infan

Rolls-Royce motor car company offered th

Government the use of his Wright aeroplane h

used for recreation, it was gladly accepted. Befor

he resigned Fisher was showing interest on behaof the Admiralty and had ordered the constructio

of an airship. As soon as Churchill was appointed

Fisher determined that the subject should not b

allowed to drop. 'Aviation supersedes smacruisers & Intelligence vessels. You told me yo

would push aviation ... ’ (15)

Churchill himself needed no pushing. From th

first he was an enthusiastic supporter of earl

experiments and, in the teeth of Treasuropposition, put an Air Department to work. Soo

he was able to write to Fisher. 'Aviation is goin

ahead. In a few months the Navy List will contai

egular flights of aeroplanes attached to the battlquadrons.’ (16) There was little or no oppositio

within the service. The aeroplane and airship wer

proving useful for scouting, for observing the fa

of shot in action as well as locating submerge

ubmarines and minefields. They were seen as a


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aid to and not a threat to the battleship.

In Germany, under the inspiration of Coun

Ferdinand von Zeppelin and with the support o

Tirpitz, the lighter-than-air machine was favoured

and before war broke out the German Navy coulcall on a powerful force of some twenty highl

eliable and effective Zeppelins based o

Cuxhaven. Churchill respected this force bu

determined that the Royal Navy should concentraton the aeroplane which was less vulnerable

cheaper, more adaptable and could be flown o

he water on floats or carried in seaplane-carriers

At Eastchurch on the Thames estuary a small bu

efficient naval air arm came into being. In 1913 thermes, the world's first aircraft (seaplane

carrier, was commissioned. The enthusiastic pilot

and some admirals (Wilson, surprisingly, wa

among them) saw an important and wider future foaircraft. By 1914 plans were already being mad

for seaplanes to carry a charge of gun cotton fuse

o explode close to submerged submarines. A

article in a service magazine in the same year drew

he attention of its readers to aircraft as futur


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orpedo carriers.' (17)

Amidst the mass of work for which Churchi

had made himself responsible outside as well a

nside the Admiralty, he made a study of the new

machines in the greatest detail. He took lessons iflying and was thus able to correct with authorit

what he regarded as detail flaws, such as inferio

eating and flimsy controls. Charles Rolls ha

already become the first flying fatality and otherhad been killed or injured. Churchill's wife and hi

fellow politicians and friends begged him t

desist. He was about to solo when his ow

nstructor was killed and this led him at last to giv

t up, though with many regrets.It was typical of Churchill that he regarded th

detail of his work as important as the broad swee

of policy. After two years of his insistence, fo

example, on examining the working of ubmarine's periscope or a Barr and Stroud range

finder, the cooking equipment at Dartmouth nava

college, or the functioning of the feed equipment i

a new fleet tanker, the Navy gave up taking offenc

and (as the German naval attaché had learned


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Churchill was generally treated with respect an

admiration.

Gunnery and fire control was one of the large

and most important subjects to come under hi

critical eye. Percy Scott had for long beeconcerned at the shortcomings, which could prov

fatal under certain conditions, of the practice o

ndividual gunlayers and trainers being responsibl

for the accuracy of their own gun or guns. With thncrease in range of modern gunnery, Sco

contended that the gunlayer in action at hi

elatively low station might well be so blinded b

moke, haze, spume, shell splash, and mist that h

might not fire' on the correct target, let alone hit it.From about 1904 Scott began his fight for single

centralized gunnery control, or 'director firing

from a station high up in the foremast, using

master sight electrically connected to the sights oeach gun, fire being controlled by pressing a singl

key. He soon gathered disciples about him. Amon

hem was Captain Frederick Ogilvy, whose cruise

atal was top of the Navy at the gunlayers' te

anyway. This enthusiasm had originally bee


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At a higher level it was also legitimately argue

hat an error by the Principal Control Officer an

his two assistants, the Rate Keeper and Deflectio

Keeper, (all of them vulnerable to enemy fire

affected every gun in the ship.A battleship's gunnery officer recalled anothe

objection, and the simple counter-argument to th

directors' supporters: ‘I remember that what the

the detractors] feared was that the long line ocommunications from the top to the guns wa

vulnerable and might be severed by an enemy she

n the first few minutes of battle. What they forgo

was that if the Director was put out of action by

hell, there was no difficulty in changing over the older system- the gunlayers and trainers at onc

eaving their instruments and going to their sights

19)

The official acceptance of director firing wadelayed by more than prejudice and reasonabl

argument. Pioneers' misfortunes inevitabl

occurred. 'The instruments gave us a lot of trouble

They were not reliable', recalled James, now

gunnery lieutenant in HMS Neptune, the fir


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hree and a half minutes' firing- on the target wit

heir heavy guns. HMS Thunderer fitted with

director fired 39 rounds making 23 hits if the targe

had been the second ship, Orion. The Orion whic

employed independent gunlayer firing, then fire27 rounds and made 4 theoretical hits.

A second contentious gunnery issue, related t

director firing, was the development of fir

control. A fire control instrument would provide aautomatic plot of one moving ship against anothe

n order that guns could be laid for future position

of the moving enemy target. As the range of gun

ncreased, range-finders found their way into th

British fleet in 1892 and into the Japanese Navhe following year. But this did not anticipate an

plot the relative course and bearing of the target.

A man of exceptional ingenuity and originality o

mind, Arthur Pollen, began to interest himself ihe subject of fire control as the result o

witnessing a warship's target practice at a mer

,400 yards, and not accurate at that. Yet thes

ame guns, manned by naval gun crews, were at th

ime engaging Boer targets at Ladysmith accuratel


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at 10,000 yards. Pollen had been a barriste

parliamentary candidate, inventor, an

businessman, one of whose hobbies was big gam

hunting. He now gave much of his time to devisin

what was in effect a mechanically operatecomputer decades ahead of its time, an apparatu

which produced a true plot which gave an accurat

prediction of the deflection and range required t

allow for the time of flight of the ship's shells.Pollen was not alone in the field. The son of a

astronomer naval gunnery officer, F. C. Dreye

was working independently along the same lines a

Pollen. But it was not until 1913 that, afte

exhaustive trials, the Dreyer system using a fircontrol table was accepted by the Admiralty an

began to be installed in big ships.

The competition between the two simila

ystems aroused a great deal of acrimony amonheir proponents. In some respects the Polle

ystem was ahead of the Dreyer, and there can b

no doubt that the Admiralty chose the Dreye

ystem in the end because it originated more o

ess from within the service and Pollen himse


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acked tact and discretion in promoting his case

He had also made himself an enemy of Fisher.

The Dreyer system was far ahead of any navy'

and in 1914 too elaborate and complex for th

Royal Navy to get the best out of it. Like Pollenystem, Dreyer's finally depended for its accurac

on the quality of the range finder.

In his first days of office Churchill drew up a

exhaustive memorandum on the need for setting ua Naval War Staff. It was a brilliant piece o

writing, broad in its vision, profound in it

historical understanding, masterly in its display o

knowledge of sea power and the functions of

modern navy. 'In the past history of this country thavy has carried out many maritime campaign

without the help of such a body of trained experts

an one paragraph. 'But this is no proof either tha

uch a body is not required under moderconditions, or that satisfactory results would no

have often been obtained with less loss of life an

waste of time if it had previously existed ... '(21

Pointing to the development of new matériel of a

kinds in 1911, he related this breathtakin


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wentieth-century speed with the time whe

progress in naval architecture was so gradual tha

he science of naval strategy, as based upon th

capabilities of ships and the science o

administrative preparation as regards foreseeinheir wants, were simple and unchanging'. Fo

centuries only the wind could move the fleets, an

for generation after generation the stores and eve

he ammunition required to fight were identical.The case for a Staff was incontrovertible a

expressed by the young new First Lord. But his ol

First Sea Lord remained quite unconvinced

Wilson's own memorandum opened: ‘The agitatio

for a Naval War Staff is an attempt to adapt to thavy a system which was primarily designed fo

an army ... The requirements of the Navy are quit

different. In the aggregate probably more thinkin

has to be done to produce an efficient Navy than aefficient Army, but it is on entirely different line

.. The staff that does this thinking is not called b

hat name. It is comprised of the principal member

of every department of the Admiralty ...’

The core of the argument of this old


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raditionalist but highly intelligent sailor wa

contained in the paragraph: 'The Navy has learned

by long experience, thoroughly to distrust all pape

chemes and theories that have not been submitte

o the supreme test of trial under practicaconditions by the Fleet at sea, and the whol

Admiralty has been gradually developed to mak

he most of the experience so gained.’ (22)

The first reason why Asquith had sent Churchio the Admiralty was to do what everyone befor

him had failed to do, and Churchill rode roughsho

over Wilson and the great majority of senio

officers in Whitehall. The admirals who wer

ined up against him went as unceremoniously aWilson. By 8 January 1912 Churchill had a

Admiralty War Staff, with a Chief responsible t

he First Sea Lord in charge of the three division

t comprised: Operations, Intelligence, anMobilization.

Lord Esher sent his congratulations among

chorus of others. 'It is the most pregnant refor

which has been carried out at the Admiralty sinc

he days of Lord St Vincent', he declared. Th


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Press was solidly in favour of the step taken b

Churchill, which was a new experience for him.

Churchill suspected, with all the evidenc

upporting him, that war could start at any time

and the fact remained that after an upheaval aprofound as this the Admiralty would take time t

ettle and the Staff would take time to pla

hemselves in. There was not an officer in th

ervice trained in staff work.Another department in urgent need of Churchill

attention and general reform was the lower deck

ot only had the social restlessness of 1911-1

pread to the lower deck due to poor condition

and pay, but there was a great need to recruit manhousands more sailors to man the growing flee

ust one penny had been added to the pay of 1s 7

a day granted in 1852, the food was at the be

basic, and the system of maintaining discipline wapetty and undignified. Churchill's reforms in 191

did away with many injustices, and led to highe

pay and more generous leave and restrictions o

he powers of the ships' police. Promotion t

commissioned rank for petty officers and warran


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officers began a process of democratization in th

avy. The fact that it slowed to a snail's pace afte

he first rush of reform, that insurmountable clas

barriers remained in the Navy for decades, and tha

until very recently a rating or petty officer whose through hard work and merit to the ward roo

was treated as a social inferior, was no fault o

Churchill. What he accomplished in 1912-14 wa

enough to lift the spirit and self-respect of thower deck and lead to an improvement i

efficiency and fighting spirit when war came.


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THE ACCELERATION TOWARDS WAR

Relative dreadnought construction figures, anthe worsening relations with Germany- The

Hankey minion and Churchill's proposed 'naval

holiday' - Austrian and Italian dreadnought

construction and the Mediterranean scene-

Opposition to the withdrawal of British strength

from the Mediterranean- Ever -increasing naval

expenditure- The qualities of British and Germa

dreadnoughts compared - Inferior British mines

and torpedoes- British and German personnel ,their training and contrasting characters- The

shortage of exceptional talent among British an

German admirals

The naval 'scare' of 1909, which had been thundoing of Fisher, stemmed from predictions o

German near-equality in naval strength by 1912

These figures were calculated on German officia

figures of shipbuilding enlarged by unofficia


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eports, rumours, and claims from those many i

Britain with a vested interest in laying down mor

dreadnoughts. Typical of the doubtful sources o

which 'scare' figures were based was the accoun

given to Fisher by members of an Argentine navamission to Germany in 1909. They had bee

mpressed by the vast resources of Krupps wher

hey had seen stockpiled armour-plate, no fewe

han one hundred 11-inch and 12-inch guns nearincompletion, and had heard that twelv

dreadnoughts were under construction and

hirteenth about to be laid down. Perhaps th

German hosts had been deliberately exaggeratin

n order to impress their visitors: if so, it did theno good as the Argentinians ordered their tw

dreadnoughts from American yards.

In fact there was no acceleration of Germa

dreadnought building and no secret ships laidown. The substantiated figures available t

Churchill in April 1912 showed Germany wit

nine completed against the seventeen predicted a

possible or thirteen stated to be 'certain'. To se

against this, predictions of Britain's ow


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dreadnought strength had also been excessive an

only fifteen had been commissioned. 'The gloom

Admiralty anticipations [of 1909] were in n

espect fulfilled in the year 1912', Churchill wrot

ater. Lloyd George and he, then, had been 'right ihe narrow sense' in demanding a reduction i

British building. But he continued, 'We wer

absolutely wrong in relation to the deep tides o

destiny.' (1)More firmly than in 1909, every sign, ever

portent, pointed to war with Germany. The fir

communication from Buckingham Palace receive

by Churchill after assuming office confirmed a

hat he feared.

Secret

Buckingham Palace.

Oct. 25th, 1911

My dear Churchill,

The King wishes me to let you know tha

esterday he heard from a relation in Germany wh

had recently been in Berlin to the followin

effect:-


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'Admiral Tirpitz said, at the time when th

Morocco [Agadir] crisis had reached its acut

tage, that Germany would have gone to war wit

England but her Fleet was not ready yet and woul

not be until 1915 when the Canal would bfinished so that all the largest ships could pas

hrough, and by that time they would have enoug

Dreadnoughts launched to deal with any Powe

The mines from Heligoland to the mainland woulnot be ready until 1914. If war broke out now', th

Admiral said, 'the German Fleet would be smashe

for no reason at all': (i.e. with no advantage t

Germany).

The writer then went on to say: 'That is theason why Germany gave in: so far as I can se

we shall be fighting in 1915.'

If he did not hear these views expressed b

Admiral Tirpitz himself, he heard them seconhand.

Yours very truly,

(Sgd:) Stamfordham (2)

The strength of the German Fleet in 1912 ma


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have fallen short of British predictions, but ther

could be no doubt that the tempo of the 'race' wa

ncreasing. The settlement of the Agadir Crisis ha

eft Germany publicly humiliated and her peopl

exasperated and angry. Tirpitz, always the masterlopportunist, now pressed for a supplementary nav

bill to achieve a 2:3 ratio in dreadnoughts with th

British Navy. 'The purpose and aim of our nava

policy is political independence from England he greatest possible security against an Englis

attack - and a promising chance of defence if wa

hould come', Tirpitz stated. (3)

The figures 2:3 sounded to the uninitiate

comparatively modest. But there were other factoro take into account. As had been witnessed in pa

ears, battleship figures in particular could b

manipulated. For example, pre-dreadnough

battleships could count as half a battleship or noneThe last British pre-dreadnoughts completed afte

HMS Dreadnought were formidable enough to b

counted as full dreadnoughts by some calculation

Moreover, British maritime responsibilities wer

world-wide, and in spite of Fisher's concentratio


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of power at home, there remained substantia

forces in the Mediterranean and the Far East. Then

Britain as an island, with her much longer an

more vulnerable coastline, was more open t

urprise attack - the 'bolt from the blue'. ThDirector of Naval Intelligence (DNI) predicted tha

a sudden and dramatic o

The Great War at Sea 1914-1918 - Richard Hough

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Transcript of The Great War at Sea 1914-1918 - Richard Hough