The God of Reason: The Enlightenment Revolution And the ...
Transcript of The God of Reason: The Enlightenment Revolution And the ...
The God of Reason: The Enlightenment Revolution
And the Justification of Violence
Joseph Harmon
Advisor:
Jennifer M. Jones, PhD
Rutgers University
Department of History
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Table of Contents
Introduction……………………………….........………….2
Chapter 1: The Enlightenment Revolution………………11
Chapter 2: Robespierre and Reason……..……………….38
Chapter 3: The Politics of Terror……….………………..59
Conclusion……………………………….....……………85
Bibliography……………………………………………..88
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Introduction
Enlightenment-21st Century
The paradox of the Twentieth Century is the paradox of the nuclear bomb. The
century of unprecedented achievement and progress in terms of technology was the most
violent in our recorded memory. Yet we remain surprisingly optimistic; the human spirit
seems resilient as ever, and we are far more willing to accept the risk of violence than
give up our technology and the advances which human reason has attained. The monsters
in our fairy tales are not fire-breathing dragons bringing violence, but rather such
impersonal entities that seek to withhold our freedom as Big Brother of Orwell’s 1984,
the robots of Asimov’s I, Robot, or the computer programs in The Matrix. Human beings
remain unsatisfied with the Leviathan’s answer to violence and inequity, and we seek to
find our own way to live peaceably with one another without sacrificing the freedoms we
hold dear. This is not the place for a serious study of folklore, but one wonders whether
the dragon has disappeared from our stories because today the danger comes not from
without, but from within our society and within ourselves. The dragon, then, has not
disappeared, but resides, with the unseen lethal power of a dormant volcano, in the risky
bonds of human community.
For what leads the human family to such internal strife? The answer to this
question remains as varied perhaps as its instances, but if we do ask, “What allows for the
human person to strike at his brother or sister?,” we find a commonality that offers itself
as wisdom. And that answer is this: that the human person is allowed to attack brother
and sister, not for lack of some external constraint as Hobbes would have it, but for a
failure to perceive brother and sister as such. As much wisdom as can be found in the
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dictum, Love Thy Neighbor, so much evil is also possible when our human brother or
sister is not our neighbor. The lurid tale of systematic violence refutes the child’s rhyme
which fears “sticks and stones” above “words.” “Christians,” “Infidels,” “Jews,”
“Puritans,” “Cockroaches,” “aliens,” and the long list of labels used to dehumanize
certain groups of people and relegate them to the realm of Other manifest not only the
power of words, but also the necessity of dehumanization as a prerequisite for violence. I
may not kill my brother or sister, but I may kill the Other, the monster, the mearcstapa,1
and indeed I perhaps have to duty to do so in order to protect the community. And
because of the availability of technological power, the human person today has a duty to
himself and to the community to safeguard all his brothers and sisters, and to stamp out
any attempts to dehumanize any people through language, for this is one of the steps to
systematic violence.2
But if we both fear constraints on our freedom and have the potential to destroy
life when we are unconstrained, to what utopia do we look forward with such optimism?
That is, why should we speak of clean energy, of medical cure, and of economic equality
in the face of such obvious tendencies toward destructive energy, biological warfare, and
improper use of power? Perhaps we believe in this possibility because we do have on a
micro-level this kind of cooperative work for the common good in families, associations,
and small communities. Then our question is that faced by Hobbes, Montesquieu, Locke,
Rousseau, Mill, and the other thinkers who sought to discover and articulate a
legitimation for government of peoples. How can the social contract both protect the
1 Old English word used to describe Grendel in Beowulf. The word connotes walking the borders between
the community and the realm of the Other. Arnold, Thomas, trans. Beowulf (London: Longmans, Green,
and Co., 1876), line 103. 2 Stanton, Gregory. “The 8 Stages of Genocide,” Genocide Watch,
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integrity of the person and the safety of the community? On the one extreme, a monarchy
needs but one man to fail in respect for human life and Mill’s “tyranny of the ” will
ensue, while on the other extreme, majority rule similarly allows for unjust laws to be
instated in the “tyranny of the ”. The apparent middle way, that of constitutional
democracy (democracy plus rules) seems to offer an answer, but here again, who shall
write the constitution and upon what principles and anthropology shall it be written? For
in the constitutional democracy, the question must be “Is this action or measure
constitutional?” or “Is it in keeping with the thought of the Founding Fathers?” Even the
constitutions must have (if we may be permitted to give it a title) the Law of Human
Dignity - what Martin Luther King, Jr. called “the moral law or the law of God” -
expressly written into the man-made code.
We must emphatically defend this moral law in the public square and in every
other forum if we will have any hope for the future. However, such a position demands
justification in this post-Enlightenment epoch, when the “sacred” and the “truth” have
been identified with the “factual” and the “scientifically observable.” For the Law of
Human Dignity necessarily rests upon a religious assumption, and the scientific method
will brook none but the barest of epistemological assumptions about our sensory
perceptions. Unfortunately, sensory perceptions of themselves yield only fact, not
meaning or truth, and the universe is therein reduced to mere activity. Yet the human
person demands meaning; the idea of nihilism jars our very core, nor does our experience
of meaning within our relationships allow us to accept true nihilism. Nearly every
philosophy and religious worldview recognizes this, and even searches for and attempts
to define it. We are not chiefly concerned with nihilism, however, for if Nietzsche was
http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/8stagesofgenocide.html (accessed February 25, 2010].
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correct and “God is dead,” the human community is reduced to a Hobbesean State of
Nature or a hedonistic frenzy; such results are impossible due to the human desire for
meaning, but also they do not yield systematic violence, which is only possible in a
“system” which accepts meaning of some form or another. What we are concerned with
is the intellectual malaise that is too complacent to challenge its own logic: the fantasy
that the scientific reductionism can in fact give meaning and support the Law of Human
Dignity. Again, this reductionist paradigm can only support such a law by either
assuming a God (for there to be a “law of God”) or the law itself (simply accepting
human dignity as an unassailable truth). But the fantasy of meaning offered by scientific
reductionism claims human dignity without such an assumption. The reductionist upholds
declarations of human rights on a certain level, but never admits that those rights are
assumed, and in fact believes that the rights are derived from pure rational inquiry. If
only the reductionist would admit the assumption and defend it, or if not admit, at least
uphold it in constancy, there would be no reason for concern. But the reductionist,
believing the Law of Human Dignity to be derived from scientific reason, is particularly
vulnerable to rational offers of utopia which involve as a means subordinating human
dignity to achieve the utopian end. Camus warned us, “[A]s soon as crime reasons about
itself, it multiplies like reason itself and assumes all the aspects of the syllogism.”3
This syllogism of crime is the systematic violence which is part of the paradox of
the Twentieth Century. No violence is desirable, but the violence of the bully is not as
frightening in aspect as systematic violence because one is never deceived into perceiving
the bully as a doctor. The systematic violence of the rational utopia has the mocking
sneer of holy war in the name of God, in that murder is perceived as a good. Again,
3 Camus, Albert. The Rebel (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 3.
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Camus, though an atheist, accepted the Law of Human Dignity as an assumption (or at
least the inadmissibility of murder, which is only the negative of the Law); he examines
this fearful aspect of holy war in the name of Reason: “In more ingenuous times, when
the tyrant razed cities for his own greater glory, when the slave chained to the
conqueror’s chariot was dragged through the rejoicing streets, when enemies were thrown
to the wild beasts in front of the assembled people, the mind did not reel before such
unabashed crimes, and judgment remained unclouded. But slave camps under the flag of
freedom, massacres justified by philanthropy or by a taste for the superhuman, in one
sense cripple judgment.”4 Judgment is crippled because the reductionist allows for no
comparison of value beyond what is empirically measurable. Thus the computer monsters
of modern fairy tales are particularly frightening in that they permit injustice to some in a
calculus of total lives preserved. Massacres justified by philanthropy evade the scales of
justice, because those scales are weighted by values uncounted in empirical reductionism.
Today, in the public square of the most prominent (in terms of empirical values)
nation-states the protocol is dominated (though not entirely defined) by the illusion of
reductionist morality. Unspoken almost out of an assumption of universal apparency, this
illusion consists in a belief that human beings and society in general is gradually
emerging from the shadows of ignorance, which was the principle cause of evil, into the
light of knowledge, which provides the basis for the rights of the human person. This
model is not wholly off the mark, in that humankind clearly has advanced in its
recognition and respect for human dignity, and that such perception does indeed remove
the possibility for a right-thinking individual to harm his brother or sister. But the illusory
paradigm, failing to perceive its own assumption, is vulnerable to dangerous promises of
4 Ibid., 3-4.
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ending human suffering and inequality through murder, for by perceiving rights as
ordered to the end of a peaceful utopia, this paradigm will accept the utopia over those
rights when the two conflict.
This, then, is the predicament of the Twenty-first Century. Are we to respond to
the hope visible in the human heart, even in the face of such heavy obstacles, by taking a
“leap of faith” in the “law of God”? Or shall we rather carry on the legacy of the previous
century, subordinating the human person to ends noble and ignoble, from lebensraum to a
Great Leap Forward to population control and even to happiness? What shall be the
paradox of the Twenty-first Century? Hopefully, it will be that, when given the sword, by
following the “law of God” we will turn swords into ploughshares.
In order to act, we must first know where we stand, and what is the nature of our
predicament. It is the aim of this thesis to argue that our predicament is a political
worldview begun in the Enlightenment. This worldview is so ubiquitous and so deeply
ingrained in our time that we scarcely perceive it as a worldview. This is the work of the
Enlightenment which brought about a revolution in perception, from a worldview in
which truth was ultimately found in God to one in which people could discover it
themselves through empirical investigation and rational analysis. The secularizing trend
in the Enlightenment has often been pointed out, but we shall look at that specifically, not
simply as a reduction of the power of the institutions of the Church and the monarchy as
revealers of truth, but as the creation of an entirely different value structure oriented
toward rational inquiry as the measure of truth. We will thus first explore this
phenomenon in the Enlightenment, drawing on several historians who looked broadly at
the period, such as Gay, Cassirer, Habermas, Adorno and Horkheimer, as well as the
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writings of certain philosophes (Kant, for his reflection on the period, and Rousseau for
his connection to the Revolution) in order to see not so much the individual philosophies
as the underlying framework with which people came to determine progress, truth, and
morality.
We shall then engage the French Revolution, that conjunction of political,
philosophical, religious and indeed all the energetic forces of humanity. The French
Revolution, now seen in a distinct historical bracket, in fact occurred contemporaneously
with the Enlightenment revolution, and therefore offers itself as one of the first
laboratories of the new framework of truth. Again, we shall not look for connections
between specific philosophies of the Enlightenment and beliefs or actions of the
revolutionaries, but rather we will examine how the political violence of the Jacobin
terror came to be justified within a worldview created by the Enlightenment.
This worldview still holds today, and thus we will return to our own time in the
third chapter, and engage with a number of commentators on twentieth century violence
(Hannah Arendt, Isaiah Berlin, Gregory Stanton, and Karol Wojtyla) whose analysis
offers some important insights on the workings of systematic violence. Drawing upon
these commentaries, we hope to provide an argument for how we may approach the
twenty-first century and avoid systematic murder without sacrificing the many positive
contributions of the Enlightenment. This is the vital question of our time, and we argue
that we cannot adequately answer it without recognizing the metaphysical framework
with which our political systems work were founded in the Enlightenment.
Camus adamantly supported the position of the Rebel, who neither gave into
totalitarian justification of murder, nor submitted to the idea of meaningless in the
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universe. Indeed, for Camus, rebellion was almost an ontological category (surprisingly
not unlike the ecclesial reality of Communion in the early Christian Church): “I rebel -
therefore we exist.”5 In any case, how can or ought the human person to address his time
today? He and she must rebel against the reductionist protocol and take, over any
constitution or declaration of rights, the Law of Human Dignity as his fundamental
foundation: when one is committed to loving one’s neighbor, ascribing rights (which are
in this view ways to respect the dignity of each human person, rather than empirical data
or means to attaining a utopia) to people and shunning violence are the rational steps. He
and she must insist that constitutions - “man-made codes” - be based firmly on the natural
law, not merely on empirical observation. But to do all this, the person must understand
the nature of this illusion, which we previously identified somehow as a post-
Enlightenment phenomenon (i.e., the rational holy war).
To this end we inspect the Enlightenment as a revolution of perception; a change,
not only in renewed and innovative (classical and modern) emphasis on the power of
human reason, but also in the way in which that reason could be used. The former change
has been well-documented since the Eighteenth Century, and indeed has been unjustly
(and perhaps narrow-mindedly) blamed for the godless evils which have afflicted the
human family in the last two hundred years. But such a charge is both simplistic and
unfair. The Enlightenment comprised such an eclectic collection of philosophies that it is
almost laughable to attribute the total wars of nationalism, pan-Germanism, Nazism,
Communism, revolutionary violence, and terrorism to soulless mechanical tautology.
Besides, the Enlightenment was neither soulless nor a tautology (can one seriously hold
this view and read Rousseau?). Furthermore, the technological progress encouraged and
5 Ibid., 22.
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enabled by the Enlightenment has greatly improved living standards around the world
and been used to oppose and depose evil regimes, as well as stoke the optimism which
was an important inspiration to this whole question.
No, we must view the Enlightenment as a revolution in perception: the new
emphasis on reason (which produced so many goods) was in part attributable (and
probably contributed to as well) to a new perception on the uses and boundaries of
reason. Here we shall argue that in the Enlightenment, for the first time Reason was not
only a useful tool (to learn about the universe and about God as in previous centuries) but
an end in itself: a goal to attain, which might of itself divulge moral norms or “truth
value” as well as factual values. We shall look at this Enlightenment proposal (the
illusion), and then at the Terror (which, if it was an excess, was nevertheless allowed by
reason) as a first example of rational holy war, the first crusade of the god called Reason.
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Chapter 1
The Enlightenment Revolution
“Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage” said Kant in
1784 in his famed essay ‘What is Enlightenment?.’ It is difficult to speak of the Age of
Enlightenment in any but the broadest possible terms, and some historians have even
doubted whether it is meaningful to do so, given the enormous span of space, time,
history, philosophy, politics and economics, wars and revolutions that all fall under that
title. The list reads like a modern social studies curriculum. However, historians cannot
help but see in that long eighteenth century a certain something, or an uncertain
everything, that occurred in a tectonic scale and that has left its detectable marks upon
Europe and the rest of the world to this day. Indeed the shape of societies today can be
attributed to conditions and movements in the eighteenth century almost as the shape of
the universe today is traced to conditions and temperatures in its early form.6 The United
States of America, the United Nations, the democratic governments of European
countries and the constitutions of many nations in the world today can trace their origins
to the Enlightenment and to Enlightenment principles, and still other forms of
government whose principles are different were only possible in a post-Enlightenment
world. The principle mark of the Enlightenment that is pertinent to our overarching
question of modern systematic violence is the worldview that perceives truth as that
which is rational.
If Kant was answering the question, ’What is enlightenment?,’ we today are
6 See Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, in The Enlightenment: A Sourcebook and Reader, edited by
Paul Hyland, Olga Gomez, and Francesca Greensides, 398-400 (London and New York: Routledge, 2003)
and Postman, in Building a Bridge to the 18th
Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1999), especially
Chapter 1.
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trying to answer the question, ’What was the Enlightenment?’ Kant himself noted that his
was an “age of enlightenment,” and historians, whilst perhaps agreeing that the name is
still meaningful and worth keeping, now argue about which qualities are to be attached to
the name. In this question Peter Gay provides a sound articulation of the problem: how to
avoid “sacrificing unity to variety” (and by implication sacrificing the order which
historians study to chaos) while still respecting the variety.7 Gay has no use for
“interpretations that treat the Enlightenment as a compact body of doctrine” and notes
insightfully that “unity did not mean unanimity,” a statement which is surely reflective of
that age.8 The philosophes may have generally banded together, but they were not of one
“anima”--one soul or mind. And it is the philosophes we are chiefly interested in here in
this argument. Indeed this argument in a large way stems out of an understanding that
action follows from thought, individually and corporately, even given the effects of
environmental influences. Thus in inquiring into any historical action, we would look for
the primary “why” in the thought of the actors, even when their thought was responding
to outside forces. In this aspect of the Enlightenment, the “unity” of which Gay spoke
becomes important--not as a unity of doctrine surely, for the men of the Enlightenment
included Deists, Atheists, and even Christians. We speak here rather of a unity of
“value,” a common importance, so to speak, that marked the philosophes even in their
differences. As Gay puts it, “behind their tactical alliances and personal fellowship there
stood a common experience from which they constructed a coherent philosophy,” with
the common experience being an interest in antiquity, a clash with Christianity, and
progress toward modernity, and the coherent philosophy being what Gay calls “Modern
7 Gay, Peter, The Enlightenment: an Interpretation (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company,
1966), X.
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Paganism.” 9 Whether one agrees with Gay’s determination--and he argues compellingly
for “paganism” as a meaningful and accurate name--we are here concerned with the
common value which gave the philosophy (or philosophies) of the Enlightenment its
coherence.
The common value of the Enlightenment was, simply put, enlightenment--freeing
oneself from the “self-incurred tutelage.” If this statement seems at first redundant or
barren, we must think a little deeper and longer upon its implications. We are taking the
philosophes at their own word (perhaps a dangerous thing for historians): we are
endorsing the century’s self-bestowed title of Enlightenment as its chief marker. As
distinct from pursuing the best economic system, the most honest metaphysical system,
or the fairest political system, the common value of that age was the pursuit of
enlightenment itself. Economic, philosophical, and political systems would reveal
themselves to be “good” or “bad” precisely in whether or not they were “enlightened.”
The image to envision here is the famous metaphor of the Cave from Plato’s The
Republic. Enlightenment is the person escaping the fetters, seeing the fire and the shapes
causing the shadows on the wall, climbing out of the Cave, seeing the reflection of the
form and then finally the form itself in the true light of day. There was no compact body
of doctrine held by the philosophes, no common idea of what the true form was, but each
of them insisted that his or her own particular doctrine was good because it was the way
to “get out of the cave”.
This was a profound revolution. The educated elite of this century wanted more
than anything to scatter the shadows of ignorance and (especially) superstition in order to
8 Gay, X & 4, respectively.
9 Gay, 8.
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grasp the truth about the world and about human nature. As Newton had done in the
world of physics, they sought to illuminate human nature. Pope’s witticism, “God said,
‘let Newton be,’ and all was light” was the hope concerning the dealings of the human
person, in the varied and opposing thoughts of the philosophes. Ernst Cassirer, a towering
figure in histories of the Enlightenment, writes that eighteenth-century philosophy was
“not content to look upon analysis as the great intellectual tool of mathematico-physical
knowledge; [it saw] analysis rather as the necessary and indispensable instrument of all
thinking in general.”10 Even in their disunity, this common hope gave coherence to the
philosophes. Thus Rousseau argued that only democracy could be just for people, while
to Kant limited civic freedom was necessary to extend personal enlightenment. But to
each the goal was personal freedom through breaking the shackles of enslavement of
thought. The goal of freedom itself was not revolutionary perhaps. The traditional
message of both Protestant and Catholic Christianity was personal salvation, freedom
from sin, etc. But ultimate freedom is not here on earth in Christian thought: eternal life,
at least in its fullness, is found after death in heaven. Freedom through enlightenment,
however, is more akin to classical Greek philosophy. While most of the philosophes
believed in God, he was a Deist sort of “supreme being,” the ultimate Truth sought by
Newton in his studies of physics and alchemy, the uncaused cause whose existence
Descartes had attempted to prove. As Socrates and Plato had moved from the idea of
gods who were themselves subject to the petty vices of mankind to a concept of spiritual
perfection, so the thought of the philosophes moved from the idea of a Trinity of persons
to the divinity of Reason itself. In the context of this extension of the Lutheran critique,
10
Cassirer, Ernst. “The Philosophy of the Enlightenment,” in The Enlightenment: A
Sourcebook and Reader, edited by Paul Hyland, Olga Gomez, and Francesca Greensides,
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the nuanced dogmas and doctrines of Christian belief, particularly in Catholic France,
became more and more removed from “the real.” As Luther had attacked the clerical
hierarchy as an unnecessary block between God and the human person, the philosophes
increasingly questioned the necessity of organized religion in the human person’s
approach to Reason. Enlightenment is a change in an individual mind, which is endowed
by the creator with the power of rational thought--Homo Sapiens, “thinking” or “rational”
human, was the term applied by Carl Von Linne to distinguish human beings among the
animal kingdom in his System of Nature. The philosophes did not all attack religion or the
clergy--Kant accepts that a clergyman will preach and teach--but the clerics themselves
must be enlightened, and the idea of going to a priest to have one’s sins forgiven was
surely the outgrowth of superstition and ignorance.
The depth of this revolution is clear: in the old Catholic worldview, Dante is
guided by Reason in the form of Virgil the classical poet in order to get to God, but in the
Feast of the Supreme Being during the French Revolution, Reason is God. The world of
antiquity was useful in helping to enlighten men to that fact, but man‘s salvation was to
be found in the pursuit of Reason.
In order to better understand the nature of this new worldview, we benefit from
extremely helpful argument by Neil Postman, a twentieth- and eighteenth-century
commentator. His insight is in fact vital to comprehending the reality of the illusion
unintentionally created by the philosophes Postman makes use of an insightful and
radical paradigm for analyzing social groups: insightful, because it is startlingly honest,
and radical because it applies old language to new ideas and constructs. In the beginning
of his book, The End of Education, Postman enters the topic of education by addressing
381-383 (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 381.
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how not only schools but all elements of a society are fundamentally oriented toward a
particular end or goal. How many schools and programs begin with an orientation, how
many businesses place so much stress upon their mission statements, how many nations
and courts toil over the principles upon which their constitutions and laws are founded.
This sense of purpose is vital to human beings, and therefore to human institutions,
because humans have such an innate desire for meaning in a way that is truly unique.
Human beings not only feel pleasure, but joy because their pleasure is somehow
connected to their identity. Human beings not only feel pain, but they suffer because their
pain is connected to their consciousness, and their suffering is worst when it is apparently
meaningless. A person can accept suffering for a cause, can give up life to save others,
but the seemingly careless suffering of a medical mutation, natural catastrophe, or
meaningless murder…this suffering is truly and even ontologically intense, the kind that
shudders the core of a person, because it attacks that basic notion of meaning. The
strongest argument for atheism continues to be the problem of suffering. All this is to say:
whether there really is meaning in life and a connectedness between our own experiences
and the universe, humans desperately need meaning in order to function.11 Radically,
Postman uses the term “god” to describe this sort of meaning. A society needs a “god” in
order to function. Postman defines this god as “a transcendent spiritual idea that gives
purpose and clarity” and also “a great narrative, one that has sufficient credibility,
complexity, and symbolic power to enable one to organize one’s life around it.”12 The
word “god” is perhaps a little surprising in academic work today (not unlike Gay‘s
terming the philosophes “pagans“); it carries the baggage of superstition and lacks the
11
Postman notes that “the idea that there is order to the universe…is a fundamental
assumption of all important narratives” (9).
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intellectual rigorism of science, except perhaps in a study of cultural anthropology. But
Postman purposely chooses “god” over “narrative,” “end,” and other such terms to
describe this transcendental purpose in order to point out that even secular narratives such
us communism require “faith and dogma.”13 In this is Postman’s radicalism, for to
suggest that contemporary post-enlightenment societies rely on dogmas is, to use the old
expression, going out on a limb.
Indeed, Postman’s argument has particular importance to our own discussion, for
in looking at the Enlightenment, we are particularly focused on the common value (or
“god”) of the philosophes. When the old critics and reformers from Martin Luther to
Pierre Bayle to Locke, Voltaire, and Holbach attacked the dogmatism of religion, they
attacked it as a hindrance or a shadow that prevented people from learning the truth (of
the universe, of human nature, etc). But these very attacks rested on the assumption that
“truth” was to be found in scientific facts, which was a belief certainly not shared by the
episcopate. This consistency among their critiques points to a common “god,” though the
variety of the philosophes merits deeper study, which we shall soon engage.
A final important assertion by Postman is this: A society has a god whether it
knows it or not. As examples of this point, he notes the phenomena of Communism,
science, and technology. The communist narrative certainly rejected an idea of God, but
its understanding of politics, economics and society became in itself a god toward which
all aspects of social and government life were ordered. The gods of science and
technology are, similarly, often unconscious. Scientific and technological advances seem
to have nothing at all to do with faith or religious beliefs, but for that very reason people
12
Postman, 5 and 6, respectively. 13
Ibid.
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can turn to science for larger metaphysical answers. The purpose of life is progress:
learning how the world works, how to improve human standards of living, etc., are
“obviously” part of the road to progress. But that progress itself therefore is the god; in
this narrative, what is censored is questioning the “where” of progress: progress towards
what?
Aided by Postman’s paradigm, we shall look at the common value of the
philosophes in light of this idea of a god, which can ultimately be understood as a basis
and source of moral values. That is, what a person understands to be morally permissible
(or morally obligatory) depends upon his or her god. Thus the radical religious believer
can kill in the name of God, the radical social reformer can kill in the name of society,
and the organized crime thug can kill in the name of the family.14 In this manner, the
person does not deny the action or seek to demonstrate why this particular case is an
exception to the moral rule, but rather holds it as a good in the service of the god. Slavoj
Zizek, in his essay ‘Robespierre, or the “Divine Violence” of Terror,’ notes that in the
revolutionary logic, the necessary violence or terror must be “fully endorsed”15
Maximilien Robespierre articulated this idea famously in his speech to the Convention,
the purpose of which was, tellingly, to delineate the moral principles that should guide
the government. In that speech he declared that terror is justice; it is “an emanation of
virtue.”16
14
This was the major critique of Albert Camus in the twentieth century: that any system
which concedes murder has already nullified itself. He thus saw the only alternative to
the religious murder and godless murder to be the embracing of “the absurd.” See The
Rebel, Chapter 1. 15
Zizek, Slavoj, “Robespierre, or, the ‘Divine Violence’ of Terror,” in Virtue and
Terror, (New York: Verso, 2007), ix. 16
Robespierre, Maximilien, Virtue and Terror, ed. Slavoj Zizek and John Howe (New
York: Verso, 2007), 115.
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And here we truly come to the crux of the matter: the question of morality, which
may be outside the scope or expertise of history. But we must at least outline the
fundamental questions, and how they are important today by showing how they were
important yesterday. And the fundamental questions of morality may often be simplified
to a question of whether there is a fundamental moral law, or set of moral principles,
which are abstract and applicable in all places and times (what Zizek described as “a
virtual point of reference”),17 or whether the ideas of moral rules are merely the results of
the evolution of social groups and their need for compromising self-preservation and
group-preservation. Robespierre certainly appealed often to moral principles, a notion
consistent with his belief in the Supreme Being. But the reason this question of normative
ethics must enter our historical discussion is that of course if history is to inform our
thinking presumably there should be a reason for it doing so. And in this case in
discussing the workings of the intellectual revolution of the Enlightenment we hope to
draw meaning from them. For we do not mean here to trace the ideological origins of
terror--or presume that all evil comes from a single ideology--but we do want to think
about what makes a society susceptible to terror, particularly from the inside. A state of
moral anarchy is more or less a state of Nature, the ruthless arena of sinew, tooth, and
claw that Golding was working with in Lord of the Flies. But that is not the world of the
philosophes. The Enlightenment is often simplistically described as a movement toward
moral relativism, a reaction against the Thomistic and Scholastic tradition of objective
truth, but the philosophes in fact mostly believed in a Deity that would be un-phased by
the miniscule caprices of human civilization. Hobbes may have believed morality was
relative to each state, but by and large thinkers like Locke, Hume, Diderot, Voltaire, and
17
Zizek, xviii.
20
Rousseau, even if they disagreed with one another and with traditional Christian thought
on what was moral behavior, held a concept of objective “inalienable” or
“imprescriptible” (a term used by Robespierre) rights and moral elements. However, the
way one came to know such rights (i.e. the difference between a right and a claim) was
through rational analysis (as opposed to, say, scripture or royal decree).
Thus this common value of the philosophes, this god of Reason if we may, was
one of rational morality, not the meaningless nihilism of later philosophers such as
Nietzsche. In keeping with the value of enlightenment, of getting out of the cave to be
able to see the truth, there was a true form of morality to be found. Though the Church
and establishment may have burned their books and found their ideas of permissible
sexual behavior to be perverse and dangerous, it is clearly inaccurate to denounce the
Enlightenment philosophes as unholy enemies of the Almighty and of moral society.
Unholy they may have been, and critiques of moral norms and teachings of the Church as
well, but generally they were theists (with exceptions like Holbach) and believers in
morality. Gay firmly forbids such oversimplification; though the philosophes may have
attacked religion and longed for secularism (generally) we cannot ignore their moral and
theistic beliefs. Such simplistic interpretations Gay calls “definition by larceny[:]…to
strip the Enlightenment of its wealth and then complain about its poverty.”18 Indeed the
philosophes often had very abstract humanitarian values, quite out of place in political
context of the wars of their time: “[the philosophe] would often exalt the interest of
mankind above the interest of country or clan.”19
The very fundamental principle of enlightenment, of personal intellectual (and
18
Gay, x. 19
Gay, 13.
21
perhaps spiritual) freedom pre-assumed a moral value: that it is “good” for men and
women to be free. Kant of course, in ‘What is Enlightenment,’ accepts that the clergy
themselves may be vehicles of truth to the people, so long as the cleric remain true to his
“inner religion.”20 Rousseau begins his Contrat Social lamenting that “Man is born free,
and everywhere he is in chains”21; many philosophes in fact saw human beings in
thralldom of some kind--like Kant’s “tutelage“ or even Robespierre’s “habit”--and in
need of liberation.22 Thus the reaction against the Church in the Enlightenment may have
been irreligious, perhaps even immoral, but it was not amoral.
If the Enlightenment was not, after all, a clash between belief and unbelief,
between theism and atheism (as Robespierre suggested in some of his speeches23), how
does the question of morality fit into our discussion at present? To begin with, we must
be clear again that while the philosophes believed in morality and differed from the moral
code of the Church, they did not offer a unified opposing moral code, though they all
20
Kant, 56. Kant’s very reference to some sort of “inner religion” (we may perhaps
interpret this phrase as the conscience of an enlightened individual) points to an idea of a
truth “outside,” which religion seeks in degrees to uncover and conveys through
“symbol.” That he thought religion mere symbol is not so very important to us here as the
fact that he accepts a reality for which there can be symbols. 21
Rousseau, “Contrat Social,” in Political Philosophy (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press: 2005), 293. 22
Rousseau, Diderot, and others voiced a common idea of the corruption of Man, though
they differed as to which reasons the corruption was attributable. Rousseau certainly fears
the oppression of absolute rationality devoid of the phenomena of passion, sentiment, and
emotion, and he has been understood by some such as Gregory Dart to be a source for the
Romantics. Diderot was more likely to attribute corruption to the ideas of superstitious
religions. But whatever the cause, it is supremely remarkable that the philosophes found
themselves repeating Augustine’s concept of fallen nature, given their concern over the
Church keeping the common people in submissive obedience. Q 23
Robespierre attacked atheists as enemies of the people (as with most of his opponents),
saying “I do not speak…as a systematic philosopher but as a representative of the people.
Atheism is aristocratic. The conception of a great Being…is democratic.” Scurr, Ruth,
Fatal Purity, (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2006),
294.
22
perhaps believed that they were referring to the same universal Reason as a means of
discovering morality. For instance, in the Supplement, Diderot effectively counsels
people to follow their instincts: his fictional Tahitian character says to the Catholic priest,
“Would you like to know what’s good and what’s bad in all times and places? Stick to
the nature of things and of actions….”24 Bentham, Kant, and others offer different (also
rational) means of discerning moral actions. The Church had also placed importance on
human reason in matters of morality, but the Church’s moral theologians were working
with an understanding of human nature as related in its scriptures and tradition (as
opposed to an understanding gained through pure rational analysis) and, as we shall see,
differing viewpoints on human nature lead to vastly different moral programs. Indeed, a
people’s understanding of human nature is very much related to the “god” it serves. To
Hegel the state is god; to Hegel the human person is the servant of the state. To the
gospel-writer John God is Love; the human person is a beloved child of God. As we can
see, this distinction is cardinal to any moral program. And therefore the reason the moral
question is important is that, whether there is an objective morality which the human
person is capable of attaining or not, the understanding thereof which a person or
community of persons has will influence his or its praxis of action. In other words,
ethicists and philosophers may argue over whether we may pass moral judgment on other
cultures, but for our purposes here, any picture of a society (especially of a political
program within a society) must be informed by the understanding of morality of that
culture in terms of its god and its understanding of the purpose and place of the human
24
Diderot, Denis, “Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville,” in The Enlightenment: A
Sourcebook and Reader, edited by Paul Hyland, Olga Gomez, and Francesca Greensides,
320-327 (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 324.
23
person.25
In the historical picture of the eighteenth century western elite, the philosophes
did not argue that there was no such thing as objective morality or that it cannot be
known, but that they had already discovered it: Reason is god, and therefore Reason
determines moral standards. Few if any philosophes26 argued for complete moral
relativity. It was far more typical for them to decry the evils of their age and proclaim
they had discovered diagnosis of society’s ills.
So the philosophes had found their god, and had found that their god’s dogmas
and commandments taught men and women how to eliminate the evils of society. If there
were yet some ills that seemed beyond the skill of man, these could conceivably be
solved if only more intensive study and thought were applied. It was the Church that was
hindering the innoculations against smallpox in Paris;27 the cure to this disease was found
not in faith in God but through practical rational experiment. The same methods,
employed by the American philosophe Benjamin Franklin, soundly demonstrated the
difference between spurious mesmerism and experimental electricity and magnetism.
Even churchmen such as John Toland and Bishop Butler, amongst whom their was much
disagreement, sought to look at the scriptures through the lens of rational skepticism.
That the philosophes chose Reason for a god may be interesting, but is it so very
25
Here, for instance, we argue that the historical analysis of Marx is flawed in not taking into account the
moral dimension. This is not to say that his philosophy or his economic theory was wrong because it was
materialistic and atheistic, but rather that his understanding of history did not use all the data. Whether
morality is objective or relative, historical analysis must include societal ideas on morality. A paradigm of
class warfare is missing the moral dimension of the classes, the god each serves and the willingness of each
to subordinate the human person to the good of the class. To reiterate, this is not a question of philosophy,
but of historical understanding; indeed, it is to say that philosophy is important in the historical picture just
as is class inequity, social movements, the arts, etc. (This is not a particularly bold claim, but yet a
necessary rule nonetheless: thought precedes action). 26
Perhaps Hobbes came closest in Leviathan, though even there it is debatable whether
he was a complete relativist, as he claimed moral authority in the sovereign.
24
revolutionary? Was it not part of the great march of progress of humanity from ignorance
to knowledge? A great many philosophes seemed to believe in this idea of progress. Was
the Age of the Enlightenment not just another step in mankind’s evolution, or if one takes
a less optimistic view of human history and doubts progress, was it not simply another
religious narrative? Using language such as Postman’s “god” surely seems to suggest
such a notion. But the claim of Reason as god was truly different in a wholly new, earth-
shaking way. In polytheistic cultures the gods are often fickle, and fight with one another,
and it is up to men and women like Odysseus and Brynhildr to take sides as with a petty
warlord. Often with the non-personal cosmic gods of eastern traditions, a pure
transcendent truth is the ultimate goal, and a good life is ordered toward achieving that
cosmic union. In the great monotheistic religions like Islam and Judaism, the goal of life
is to serve and praise God, perhaps with the hope of life after death in blissful paradise. In
the theology of Christianity, the dominant belief system in Europe at the time of the
Enlightenment, the full life was one participating in the life of the Church and in service
of God and the community.28 The god of Reason was a radical break from each of these.
Where a Moslem, a Jew, or even an unscrupulous, amoral Italian prince knew why he
acted and what was his ultimate goal (serving Allah or ruling the city-state), the servant
of Reason knew only how he was supposed to act, not why. An astrologer and an
astronomer both probe the depths of the heavens and ponder their meaning, yet only the
astronomer could be an honest philosophe, free from the constraints of superstition and
swelling the library of human knowledge. Indeed, for the realm of science, this approach
produced wonders in the Scientific Revolution from which the philosophes of the
27
Gay, 15-17. 28
Obviously the beliefs and actions of individual Christians and even larger elements
25
eighteenth century were benefiting, as well as in recent advances in medicine through the
use of experimentation. Ernst Cassirer comments, “However much individual thinkers
and schools differ in their results, they agree in this epistemological premise. Voltaire’s
Treatise on Metaphysics, d’Alembert’s Preliminary Discourse, and Kant’s Inquiry
concerning the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality all concur on this point. All
these works represent the true method of metaphysics as in fundamental agreement with
the method which Newton, with such fruitful results, introduced into natural science.”29
Thus this god did indeed seem to be delivering into the hands of enlightened persons not
only miracles, but the power to work them.
But again, this power did not come attached to moral imperatives and
prohibitions, but relied on the already-held notions of its new recipients. In this way, this
new power was not different in kind but only in degree from all earlier advances in
civilization, from the development of strong metals to advances in mathematics to
achievements in engineering and architecture. It can even be useful to view historical
movements through the lens of technology, in that many conquests (military or
otherwise)--from the Hittite civilization in Sumeria to the more recent colonization of the
New World by the European powers--hinged upon technological advantages. Now,
however, the method--or rather the methodology--of improvement was hailed as god. In
the great sixteenth century clashes between Catholic Europe and the Ottoman Empire in
the Mediterranean, the wars provided great impetus for improvements in military and
nautical technology, from the better rifles of the janissaries to the table-turning Venetian
galleons of Lepanto. But throughout the long unrelenting wars of that century in that
within the Church at the time were not in accord with its professed theology. 29
Cassirer, 381.
26
theater, such improvements were received by each force and each emperor as a new tool
in the service of their gods.30
Neither the Moslem nor the Christian would ever confuse
the power to advance with God himself, whose kingdom each was apparently in the
business of expanding. But the philosophe’s crusade was expanding the kingdom of
enlightenment.31
The new emphasis on rational analysis raised it from “a means to an
end” to “an end” in itself.
Like the aforementioned technological lens, the rational paradigm also offered an
apparently comprehensive scheme of history. Human beings of every culture have moved
slowly toward enlightenment, in a progress which is natural according to Kant: “If only
freedom is granted, enlightenment is almost sure to follow.”32 Religious beliefs were but
a primitive attempt at explaining the world, but which nevertheless bore the mark of the
human person’s innate notion of and desire for the perfection ultimately attained through
rational inquiry. And now, in this self-proclaimed Age of Philosophy, Reason, and
Enlightenment, humanity was finally throwing off the vestiges of the primitive
explanations. This vein of thought was especially pronounced in the more radical atheists
such as Holbach and Hume, but even the Christian philosophes found themselves
defending Christianity, not as the means to salvation, but as a rational worldview. This
had of course been carried out in earlier ages by Aquinas, Anselm, Augustine, Ambrose,
etc., but they had sought to show that the attacks upon their faith were unfounded,
30
Those gods may or may not have been Allah/God; political and financial power seem to have also been
of interest to the Sultan and the Holy Roman Emperor. Roger Crowley’s Empires of the Sea offers not only
a riveting story but an educational look at the relevance of technological advances in the Islamic/Christian
contest, a premodern war strikingly similar to modern total wars ordinarily thought to have begun with
Napoleon. 31
Gay notes that in Kant’s vision of a “revolt against superstition” we see the belief of those crusaders of
light: they “were sure they were the men who were bringing light to others; with sublime self-
satisfaction…they praised their age as an Age of Philosophy” (Gay, 21). 32
Kant, 55.
27
whereas the Christian philosophes of the eighteenth century (among whom were varied
thinkers such as Locke, Bishop Butler, Bayle, Toland, and even perhaps Newton) meant
to clean up a wrinkled old orthodoxy and present it as a viable option for the enlightened
person. Consider here Thomas Jefferson’s translation of the New Testament in which he
removed any references to the miraculous. This sort of sentiment found more welcome in
Protestant thought (indeed it truly sprang from a uniquely Protestant paradigm through
the types of criticism offered by Luther, Bayle, Toland and others)33 than in the Catholic
faith, which still held the mysteries of the Trinity, transubstantiation, and others as central
to the faith (a stance which obviously could not be wholly comfortable with Toland’s
Christianity Not Mysterious). The reasonableness of God was more important than any
other attributes.
Thus to the philosophe, even to the apparently34 Christian philosophe, explaining
the world was most important, and there was no room for mystery and miracle. Hume’s
writings on miracles are typical of the philosophes’ mindset, in that nothing has
miraculous origin; if phenomena appear to be miraculous, “philosophers … ought to
search for the causes whence it might be derived,”35 and so scientifically learn the true
nature of the phenomenon. We can thus see that rational thought carries with it its own
moral values, or rather its derivation does: it is preferable to be rational than to be
irrational. Again, there is no great shift in that preference, but if Reason is god, then there
33
Crocker III, H.W., Triumph, (Roseville, California: Prima Publishing Forum, 2001),
324-326. 34
While there is room for doctrinal argument within Christian groups, to be included in
‘Christian groups’ one must at least profess to be a follower of Christ. Thus even without
taking any one particular set of Christian beliefs, we can fairly confidently state that
certain thinkers like Newton or Descartes were more intent on proving God’s existence
than on loving him; neither Newton or Descartes wrote poetry about God. 35
Gay, 146 [from Hume’s “Essay on Miracles”].
28
are no other moral standards (discernable through rational inquiry alone). The revolution
of the Enlightenment was not a new penchant for rational thought, but a dispensation of
attachments to other values. That is the revolution.
* * *
The historical debates about the Enlightenment and its legacy have in large part
been concerned either with it as unified body of doctrine whose flaws led to the radical
“excesses” of the Terror and even of later totalitarian horrors, or as a disconnected
collection of eclectic thinkers with varying goals, or else as an unfinished and
misunderstood project. We are particularly concerned with this last view, offered by
Jurgen Habermas in that last century,36
because it seems to have most hold in our present
civilization, and we shall engage it more thoroughly in chapter V.37 The Marxist historical
picture, being materialistic in its philosophical grounding, focused less on the importance
of the intellectual “roots” of the Revolution that reached deep into the Enlightenment and
beyond. Marx and what became known as the “leftist” (another tribute to the Revolution
itself) historians were more focused on “the facts,” as Timothy Tackett, a more recent
American contributor to the debate writes in his chapter entitled “A Revolution of the
Mind?”38
Tackett himself, whose work represents an in-depth exploration of the personal
36
Jurgen Habermas, in “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,” in The Enlightenment: A
Sourcebook and Reader, edited by Paul Hyland, Olga Gomez, and Francesca Greensides (London and New
York: Routledge, 2003), argues how it was in fact through the discourses in the public sphere made
possible during the eighteenth century that ordinary illiterate people developed a sense of autonomy and
other human values, and, in fact, “in a word, humanity” (389). 37
In terms of our present civilization, we speak here along the lines of the current “taste”
described by Zizek as “the name for a basic ideological disposition” Whether or not most
people (or even most political leaders) have studied the Enlightenment and come to their
own conclusions, the “rules of the game” in the public square in most democratic
countries have consciously or unconsciously adopted the “Enlightenment value” as the
rational means of escaping religious, absolutist limits on personal freedom. 38
Tackett, Timothy. Becoming a Revolutionary. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 48-76.
29
writings left by the deputies themselves, suggests that philosophical leanings were not
very good predictors of revolutionary (and specifically violent) behavior. Nevertheless,
philosophy played an important role, as we shall discuss (Indeed, the very fact that
disciples of particular philosophes ended up in opposing factions is one of the results of
choosing Reason as god), since it was not the particular philosophy or theory of
metaphysics that shaped the culture and the political structure, but the notion that reason
was the assurance of truth, and this was a “revolution of mind.”
Since our present argument will investigate the Terror as a result of the
Enlightenment Revolution, it may be supposed that we should side with Furet’s
description of the discourses of the Enlightenment, or with Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s
mathematical dialectic paradigm, both of which posit the strict logic which produced the
Terror. However, the view of the Enlightenment as a varied collection of thinkers bound
loosely by the value of “getting out of the cave” is what we work with here. To describe
the Enlightenment as a strict logic is to fall prey to the simplistic explanations Gay
warned us of. To see it as an unfinished project is to fall prey to the mistaken vision of
the philosophes themselves (but we shall arrive there in due time).
In the “strict logic” view, terror is seen as the unavoidable result of ideological
roots in the Enlightenment. Beginning soon after the oft-invoked “excesses” of the
Terror, thinkers on what became the Right linked the new absolutism of the Jacobins, not
with the old absolutism of the Monarchs, but with the liberal-minded philosophes who
had so undermined the intellectual and spiritual foundations for “l’Estate c’est moi”.
Edmund Burke was perhaps the first to articulate these ideas, and the legacy of the
Jacobin administration or regime has been contested ground ever since, the ebb and flow
30
of the battle lines reflecting changing political climes in which historians wrote. Thus
under the counterpart “excesses” of the Industrial Revolution, the age of the Robber
Barons and mass labor, the interpretations steered away from Burke and were a little
more willing to believe Marx’s depiction of class revolution over the injustices of
inequality. Such Left-leaning interpretations were not ameliorated by the horrific blow
Europe suffered in its First World War, when millions perished for such paltry
motivations--“lions led by lambs” “even for an eggshell.” After the ghastly, yet
systematic experiences of the Second World War (and possibly on the brink of a Third)
Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer moved back to a vision of the totalitarian logic
of a single enlightenment ideology. For the atrocities of this war had been ruthless and
calculated, not mindless and blind as in 1915. Now Adorno and Horkheimer described
enlightenment, not as illuminating the darkness of ignorance, but as “mathematical
procedure.” To them, the philosophes saw truth as information, and wisdom as
information processing (one also notes the historical context of psychology and early
computers that brought along Alan Turing’s philosophical questioning of the human
mind as a computer): enlightenment “turns thought into a thing, and instrument - which is
its own term for it… [T]hought becomes mere tautology.”39 In the succeeding years, the
world struggled in an East-West paradigm in which both sides seemed to be moving
inexorably toward an end they both feared. In such a context of super-militarization,
Peter Gay published in 1969 a renewed picture of the philosophes (one which would
perhaps have pleased them most) as “modern pagans,” thinkers who valued human rights
above ideology and were cosmopolitan citizens of the world. They were willing to both
39
Adorno, Theodor and Max Horkheimer, “The Dialectic of Enlightenment,” in The
Enlightenment: A Sourcebook and Reader, edited by Paul Hyland, Olga Gomez, and
31
enter non-Western perspectives and defend non-Western rights. More recent historians40
have returned again to study of the popular and official terror, and in a post-September
11th
world, observers such as Slavoj Zizek return to the terror of the French Revolution to
try and make sense of the current picture in light of the past.
The above interpretations are not to be glossed over as historical and political
thermometers, however, for they do raise important questions. Hopefully our present
conception of a common value (getting out of the cave) without a single body of dogma
can provide a connecting thread through the commentaries that neither sacrifices unity to
variety nor succumbs to definition by larceny. Thus we should not dismiss Adorno and
Horkheimer as mere “polemic,” as did Porter, because they take too great liberties with
the beliefs of the philosophes. Their criticism depicts the world of the philosophe as an
amoral world, a world without right or wrong but rather correctly calculated or
incorrectly calculated. (Here remember Hume’s reasoning for not believing in miracles:
not [if we take him at his word] through emotional distaste for religion, but through
careful weighing of probabilities). Thus if Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s blanket argument
fails to do justice to the beliefs of Rousseau, Voltaire, and Diderot, they still posit a stern
and immovable truth that applies to the common value of enlightenment: if one believes
that moral truth is found through human rational thinking, one risks conflating “truth”
with “fact” and subordinating other human values to the value of enlightenment. This is
indeed the central problem with the god of Reason.
Comments on other interpretations. Cassirer “analysis” as the “necessary and
Francesca Greensides (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 385. 40
See Jean-Clement Martin, Violence and Revolution: an Essay on the Birth of a National Myth, (Paris:
Editions du Seui, 2006), who shows “that popular violence was considerably more brutal than is usually
thought and that the political elite’s relation to it was considerably more compromised and opportunistic,”
32
indispensable instrument of all thinking” - philosophes redefining thinking. Good/bad?
Now, if we cannot hold that the Enlightenment was a body of values which lead
to dystopia, should we not then turn to the liberal Habermasian view that “enlightenment”
is a value toward which we must still work, but which was in fact ignored by the dictators
of the past two centuries. After all, was Stalin “enlightened”? One certainly cannot pin
his horrific programs of mass murder and mass terror to the Enlightenment thinkers. And
as Roy Porter wrote, “the Nazis loathed the philosophes.”41 Had the philosophes not
decried such madness, as had Montesquieu, Voltaire, and other satirists? The
contemporary thinker Slavoj Zizek offers an adamant rebuttal to this platform of such
“sensitive liberals” in his essay Robespierre, or, the ‘Divine Violence’ of Terror, in which
he defends the radical Left.42 But as Zizek’s argument deals intensively with moral values
(particularly those of Robespierre) and we are not yet concerned with specific moral
values, we must wait to engage with him until we begin the case study of the Terror as a
result of serving the blind god Reason. For now we shall merely engage Habermas’s
unfinished project question.
We do not necessarily need to agree with Habermas’s value judgment on
enlightenment, while still distancing ourselves from the simplistic approach. This is
because, viewing the philosophes as a body of thinkers with varied goals, we see the true
(and most important) character of accepting ratio dominum est. Michel Foucault, who,
like Porter, does not like to be “‘for’ or ‘against’ the Enlightenment,” insightfully
remarked that the value of enlightenment “is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but
in Sutherland’s review. 41
Porter, in The Enlightenment: A Sourcebook and Reader, edited by Paul Hyland, Olga
Gomez, and Francesca Greensides (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 379. 42
Zizek, vii.
33
rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude.” However, while Foucault identifies that
attitude as a “permanent critique” of society, we must agree with Gay (and others) that
the philosophes were not merely destructive, but were also seeking to create a uniquely
modern and uniquely true society, in the sense that it be founded on verified truths rather
than on unverified traditions. Constant self-examination is of course essential, but it is not
the end in this scheme, only a means. But we may agree with Foucault that the common
value of enlightenment did not in fact unite the philosophes in a common understanding
of morality. The dictum to keep going forward with one’s eyes open did not entail that all
need be walking in the same direction.
Thus, while Habermas offers important constructive counsel to use a more
comprehensive spectrum of historical study in terms of social context, his “unfinished
project” idea falls prey to the same flaws as the original Enlightenment Revolution.
Nietzsche remarked “he who has a why to live can bear with almost any how,” but in
“enlightenment cave paradigm” we forget Nietzsche’s “why,” and get caught up in the
“how” of living. Most importantly its surface-level anthropology is still “homo sapiens” -
- that is, the human person is a rational entity (rather than, say, a relational being). This
surface-level anthropology can be harnessed to many competing philosophies for good or
ill, from Hegel’s to Marx’s to Ghandi’s. For if the human person is viewed in terms of
rationality, quality-of-life categorization immediately comes into play, the basis for the
mathematical murder that Camus warned against. As we noted above [note 26], this
anthropology is the modus operandi of mainstream social and political philosophy today;
the legitimacy for law is accepted to be its rational justifiability (whether followed in
practice or not). as witnessed by the importance placed upon secular measures and
34
policies that are born out of the idea of a “neutral” secular moral system. Thus we have
returned to Postman’s “god.”
Reason is a unique choice for a god, in that so many of its followers could have
such contradictory beliefs. This is different from differing schools of theology within
Islam, Christianity, or Judaism, because each school has a different understanding of who
God is or of who the human person is. But the philosophes all understood what reason
was, and even more, they understood in common what was required to serve reason. The
problem here was that reason itself could serve different ends. This is in fact the crux of
the matter, the reason the Enlightenment was truly revolutionary. For the first time, men
and women placed their faith in something which was not an end in itself to be served.
And because of the nature of reason, they did not perceive their own faith. They
considered themselves to have “true knowledge” requiring no leaps of faith. What the
philosophes in essence had was a faith without dogmas. With belief in rational
secularism, there’s no room for dogmas.
We would like to argue that the community of the philosophes held a common
god of rational thinking as a means to truth, and therefore had also a illusory notion that
they also believed in a common truth. In reality, and as witnessed by their many differing
personal philosophies, each had his own conception of what “truth” meant. Consider
Hume, or the mechanical philosophers, whose idea of truth was the discovery of the
causal mechanics of the universe, or Rousseau, to whom truth was what we might call the
virtuous life which individuals should strive for but which was discovered not through
mores handed down from frowning clerics but through introspection and embracing the
35
“the order of nature” and “a well-regarded natural instinct.”43 Rousseau’s thought is
particularly illustrative of this Enlightenment phenomena, as so many of his ideas are so
near to traditional Church teaching. Where the Church taught of the person’s inclination
to sin as a result of separation from God, Rousseau held that people were everywhere
corrupt because of social constructs (Social Contrat: “Man is born free, and everywhere
he is in chains”; Emile: “Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things;
everything degenerates in the hands of man.”). While his ideas on moral behaviors were
grounded in both observation and his “innate sense of truth or falsehood,” the Church
included what it saw as the testimony of scripture in its empirical evidence, and held that
the “innate sense” was the indelible mark of a Creator, but that such a sense could be
dulled by sin and so create a need for an authority.44 But in Rousseau’s thought and in the
thought of the philosophes natural reason lights the way to an ideal state. However, the
vision of the ideal state was unique to each. Thus Reason was only an imagined god.
It may seem paradoxical to use Rousseau as an example of a rational paradigm,
and certainly he does not fit the strict computational mathematics of Adorno and
Horkheimer. It was Rousseau after all who said of the philosophes, “I found them vain,
dogmatical and dictatorial... Ignorant of nothing, yet proving nothing.”45 It was Rousseau
who so doggedly fought against the subtle arguments of rationality and distrusted the
philosophe’s good intentions, asking “Where is the philosopher who would not readily
deceive mankind, to increase his own reputation?”46 Nevertheless, though at odds with
43
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar. Vol. XXXIV, Part 4.
The Harvard Classics. New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909–14; Bartleby.com, 2001.
www.bartleby.com/34/4/. [accessed January 27, 2010], paragraph 3.Paragraph 3. 44
Ibid. 17. 45
Ibid. 12. 46
Ibid. 14.
36
the philosophes and an opponent of soulless mechanistic philosophy, Rousseau in fact
disagreed only in detail with the Rationalist view, and still held to the god of Reason. For
to Rousseau, Nature was the great revealer of truth, and what he disdained about the
philosophes was inscrutability and distance of their thought from the reality of
experience; he faulted them for failing to take into account the experiential data of human
passions. In his Profession of a Savoyard Priest, after proclaiming that moral rules not
based on Nature will come to naught, “how strongly soever prohibited by reason,” he
then builds his own system by saying “The love of Truth comprises all my philosophy.”47
His Profession reminds one very much of Diderot’s Supplement, and taken with his ideas
of Nature, education, corruption, and proper government, we see that his thought too
takes up the belief that the human person has the wherewithal (“the simple and easy rule
of common sense”48 ) and desire to overcome the ills of life and create an ideal society.
And though he separates “reason” from his own natural common sense, he holds the
common value of enlightenment: that the application of one’s natural rational faculties
will produce a utopia.
We finish this chapter with regard given to Rousseau because he had such a
strong impact on the thought of the men and women of the French Revolution, which is
often seen as the culminating mark of the Enlightenment. His impact on Robespierre was
very marked in terms of political thought in the idea of the Republic of virtue, but also
(and perhaps more importantly) in the almost spiritual reverence for the pure, simple
virtue of the common people, whom Robespierre adored in the abstract. The illusory god
of Reason could lead a thousand persons in a thousand different directions, as in the past
47
Ibid. 3, 18. 48
Ibid. 18.
37
a thousand local gods had, but now the individuals all thought they were moving in a
common direction, toward a common, true, modern state.
* * *
What come into play, then, under the god of Reason are anthropologies. Because
rational analysis or common sense can lead to different ends, what determines those ends
are the notions of the ideal and of human nature which a person brings with him or her
into analysis, the premises to which a person applies reason. Thus, given an input with
notions of human rights, common sense yields behavior in keeping with such rights.
However, in a system like that of Hobbes or Hegel, where morality is essentially
determined by the state, human rights and even the human person may subordinated
within reason toward the goal of creating a utopia. When such a step happens, the
justification of murder becomes possible, which Camus so abhorred: “…as soon as a
man, through lack of character, takes refuge in doctrine, as soon as crime reasons about
itself, it multiplies like reason itself and assumes all the aspects of the syllogism.”49 This
danger which Camus (and many others) so feared must be recognized even today, for it
has the potential for major human consequences. To observe these consequences we shall
look at the “excess” of the Terror, after which we shall consider the state of the
framework of law in the global community today, which is arguably “post-
Enlightenment” in identity and values. As rational analysis leaves room for a variety of
moral systems (witnessed by the Nuremburg investigations and the founding documents
of the UN, which emphasized the need for an accepted basic moral system) current
constitutional governments are obliged to consider this reality.
49
Camus, 3.
38
Chapter 2
Robespierre and Reason
On June 8 (20 Prairial in the Revolutionary Calendar), 1794, the First Republic of
France under the National Convention held a revolutionary holy day: the Festival of the
Supreme Being, a feast in celebration of a god created in the image and likeness of the
revolutionaries. L’etre Suprême was a god of Reason, represented in the festival as a
classical goddess under the name of Wisdom - the sublime beauty of the feminine form
was a more fitting image for pure reason than the rough and wounded body of a Jewish
carpenter. In honoring a god fashioned after the taste of the Eighteenth Century, the
revolutionaries were ironically almost praising their own enlightenment more than any
being outside themselves. Robespierre called that day “fortunate,” because on that day
the French people (“the most interesting part of humanity”) gathered to “offer to the
Author of Nature the only homage worthy of him.” The Enlightenment critique had come
full circle, for the worshippers of Reason now preached as hegemonic a dogma as had
ever a religious zealot, if not more so, for by laying claim to the only worthy method of
worship Robespierre dismissed all other religious cults of worship practiced by
humankind.
Throughout the day, the French people - the “benefactors of mankind” - led by
Robespierre celebrated and honored divine Reason. Robespierre was perhaps priestly in
that he acted symbolically for the people, burning a statue of atheism to reveal Wisdom in
its place,50
but he was not a priest in the sense of acting on behalf of a fallen or powerless
50
It would perhaps be thought that the atheistic Cult of Reason of the Hebertists would pose a better
example of the moral revolution, but Robespierre’s cult serves just as well if not better, by avoiding
painting the secularization of the Revolution in simplistic terms. There was variety in the Revolution, as
there had been in the Enlightenment (as Timothy Tackett reveals in Becoming a Revolutionary, Chapter 2),
39
humanity in pleading to the gods for mercy or good harvests. Here, the human person’s
release from self-imposed tutelage was central. If the human person was enlightened by
Reason, then the Supreme Being was honored. Thus the new religion was a celebration of
human enlightenment, and fittingly the new hymns were to France herself as well as to
Reason. Robespierre led the deputies then from Reason to Liberty, as they processed to a
manufactured mountain, at the top of which was a Liberty Tree. Two days later,
Robespierre led the Committee of Public Safety in passing the infamous Law of 22
Prairial, which ushered in the climax of what has come to be known as the Reign of
Terror. In the thirty-seven days following the Festival of the Supreme Being, 1,376
people were sent to the guillotine in Paris alone.
The monumental irony of these events which offer themselves as drama provides
a symbolic example of the contradictions of the Terror. To understand Robespierre
himself and the means by which he and the Jacobins brought about the Reign of Terror
we will look at biographical material (Ruth Scurr) and at Robespierre’s own speeches, as
well as the analysis of the Jacobin rational offered by Slavoj Zizek’s and Dan Edelstein’s
work on the justifications for terror. It becomes apparent that the contradictions of the
Revolution are the contradictions of the Enlightenment revolution, and thus the Reign of
Terror offers much clarity to our question of systematic violence.
***
June and July of 1794 saw the peak of the violence of the Terror, but as a whole it
took rather longer, lasting from late 1793 to July 27, 1794, when Robespierre was
arrested. To the economic historian,51
the Terror was simply another bungled attempt to
and Robespierre himself decried atheism (see Scurr, 293-296, 320-321). 51
Marx, of course, provides the classic linear historical model in which the tensions of human interaction
40
solve the economic problems which had plagued Louis XVI: bankruptcy, bad harvests,
skyrocketing bread prices. To address popular unrest, Louis had attempted to institute a
tax on the nobility, and had then been pressured into calling the Estates-General to decide
the issue. Here the nobility were met with a host of young bourgeois professionals, more
educated and literate at a higher rate than ever before, and talented at argument and
debate through training in the legal courts, the clubs, lodges, and societies, as well as the
taverns--venues that formed a strong component of the “public sphere.”52
The clerical
and noble estates proved to be unprepared for such an intellectual onslaught, riding on the
momentum of more than a century of reaction to supernatural explanations of any sort
and especially to the Divine Right of kings and Divine Revelation. The political unrest of
what swiftly became a political revolution only exacerbated the economic turmoil, adding
new fear to the mob as the foreign powers arrayed themselves for war to protect the
ancien regime. And as the people who were lowest on the economic ladder perceived that
a democracy was as impotent as a monarchy when it came to putting bread on the table,
the new class of politicians found themselves between the hammer of foreign invasion
and the anvil of insurrection. In this climate the radicals such as Danton, Marat, and
Robespierre appeared to be the side willing to actually do something to save France, and
in their polemics the Jacobins did much to support this picture by presenting their
opponents as self-interested. Such self-interest was antithetical to a Republic of Virtue,
and therefore France had to be protected from her enemies with decisive force.
Robespierre had no thirst for blood, unless it be the blood of the enemies of his vision of
and use of environmental resources moves naturally towards equilibrium: to him, in the Communist state.
See also Timothy Tackett, Becoming a Revolutionary, especially Chapter 4. 52
See Jurgen Habermas classic work which examines the role of social phenomena in preparing for the
political revolution.
41
France - as a young lawyer in Artois he had been repulsed by the death penalty even for
the guilty. In his mind he had no choice but to employ terror to preserve the Republic for
the good of the people.
We emphasize that Robespierre saw himself as without choice because it is
important to note that he was not choosing between Terror on the one hand and peace on
the other. Most famously, he declared, “If the mainspring of popular government in time
of peace is virtue, then the mainspring of government in time of war is virtue and terror:
terror, without which virtue has no force, and virtue, without which terror is disastrous.”
These words are unnerving to the modern ear, which has associated terror and terrorism
with evil excesses and crimes against humanity, but to Robespierre terror was a defense
against such crimes and excesses. Terror was not merely a more effective way; it was the
only way. Given Robespierre’s assumptions - his “faith” so to speak, that the happiness
and goal of humanity was to be found in the republic based on virtue (“Virtue produces
happiness as the sun produces light”53
) - we can understand how he was able to marry the
contradictory beliefs in the Declaration on the one hand and in the use of terror on the
other. As a young representative from Arras to the Estates-General, he wrote to the King
to encourage him to “to lead men to happiness through virtue, and to virtue by legislation
founded on eternal principles of justice and so framed as to restore human nature to all its
rights and all its dignity.” More importantly, he noted that this task could be achieved by
“by removing all the causes of oppression.”54
Although he probably did not yet have
revolution in mind as a means of removing such causes (in Arras he had written that “it is
53
Scurr, 47. 54
Scurr, 57.
42
dangerous to look for the remedy for a specific ill in a general revolution”55
) he did
believe that laws based on eternal principles could form virtue, and that therefore those
laws were the primary function and goal of government.
Here the Enlightenment Revolution’s influence made itself felt. There was no set
of Enlightenment principles (save perhaps that of “being enlightened” - that is, thinking
for oneself, and basing one’s decisions on rational analysis); but there was an idea that
Reason would lead to such principles. With no agreed-upon moral laws, the course of the
nation was left to the competing interests of the representatives in the Convention. This
revolution left, in effect, a kind of power vacuum, in that the guiding principles of a state
would now be those of the sovereign: Cuius regio, eius religio.56
As the legislators in
power were the Jacobins, it was their primary beliefs which became the guiding beliefs.
A parallel situation in fact occurred politically in the French Revolution in that the
various legislative bodies which succeeded the Monarchy all feared an executive power
becoming another absolute tyrant, and so never legislated specifically for powers
executive. In this power vacuum, a strong Committee or a strong, driven personality
could effectively take that power.
***
Historians have often approached the Terror in one of two ways: we must either
view Robespierre as a mad fanatic (and perhaps the first modern dictator) who hijacked
the language of reason, rights, and revolution in order to pursue his own ideological ends,
or we must take Robespierre at his word and view the Terror as, in fact, an application of
natural reason. We here argue for the second view: whether or not Robespierre departed
55
Scurr, 47. 56
‘Whose realm, his religion’ The rule of the Peace of Augsburg, deciding which German states would
43
from the moral norms expressed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and
in the thought of the philosophes (even that of Rousseau, who most influenced
Robespierre), he was pursuing a rational program designed to protect the people by
producing a Republic of Virtue. In fact, we may indeed say that Robespierre was
certainly striving to attain his own ideological ends, but he was doing so in a rational
legal way, through law and due process, with the approval of the legislating
representatives of the people.
From the beginning, Maximilien Robespierre pursued specific ideals in his career,
so that, while he recognized his own ambition,57
he was a uniquely sincere man, well-
deserving of his epithet “the Incorruptible.” He was ambitious, but for ideological rather
than selfish ends.58
As a lawyer in his small hometown of Arras, he took the side of the
poor and weak parties and upheld rational principles over privilege, probably in part due
to his own suffering on account of his father’s delinquency and his wish to be judged in
his own merit rather than in the shadow of his father.59
His sister Charlotte later
remembered him saying, “To defend the oppressed against their oppressors, to plead the
cause of the weak against the strong who exploit and crush them, this is the duty of all
hearts that have not been spoiled by egoism and corruption.” This aversion to corruption
(and its association with self-interest) would be present throughout his political career.
follow Lutheran or Catholic Christianity. Furet and Baker 57
Scurr, 40. 58
The purity of his own ambition was a strength of Robespierre’s, for he could and did attack his
opponents as being “devoured by passions and ambition,” as in his defense of the political clubs in
September of 1791 (Virtue and Terror, 25), whereas his own ambition was ambition for the success of the
revolution. If he ultimately needed power to defend that success , it was only as a humble servant thereof,
and his ethic and commitment attested to this. See Scurr, Fatal Purity, (335-337), for the extent to which
opponents had to go to try to paint Robespierre as a corrupt politician bent on personal power. 59
Scurr, 41
44
He was ever devoted to his vision of a moral state of things,60
and he so identified himself
with the attainment of that vision that his own enemies were always oppressors,
conspirators against the moral state, and he came also to perceive himself as a victimized
martyr for the cause. This perception is apparent in a poem he wrote early in his career:
The just man’s torment, at his final hour,
The only pang he feels--and I shall feel--
Is the dark breath of calumny and blame
Breathed by a grimmer ghost than death himself:
The hate of those for whom he gives his life.61
Again, it is important to note that Robespierre equates his political ideal with justice and
virtue: he is a “just man,” giving his life up for the people. This sense takes on a semi-
religious meaning: one is reminded of the Hebrew scriptural theme of the “just man” of
the Book of Wisdom, whose suffering is incomprehensible to those who don’t follow the
law of the Lord; and the “suffering servant” of Isaiah, who suffers for following the laws
of God rather than the wickedness of men. One also recalls the ideal philosopher-king of
Plato, the follower of truth who is ultimately killed by the ignorant people who cannot
accept that truth. Robespierre takes such a mantel of moral righteousness, at least in his
own perception. Very interesting on this note is Robespierre’s literary tribute to the poet
Gresset. In his essay he touched again on the idea of the noble wounded spirit: “I have
been so bold as to insist upon his [Gresset’s] virtue, upon his respect for morality, and
upon his love of religion. This will undoubtedly expose me to the ridicule of the witty
majority; but it will win me two votes which are more than a recompense--that of my
60
His vision was not necessarily a single unchanging ideal--in a letter to the king from February 1789, he
speaks of the responsibility of the king to uphold the rights of the people, and in another letter from before
the Revolution, he wrote that “there is no need for us to change the whole system of our legislation; it is
dangerous to look for the remedy for a specific ill in a general revolution.” What is key is that his vision
was equated with moral truth, not personal gain (Scurr, Fatal Purity, 57,47). 61
Scurr, 39
45
conscience and that of yours.”62
His identification with another martyr may come across
as pride (and biographer Ruth Scurr draws this connection with his model: “he was--as
Rousseau had been--exceptionally self-absorbed”),63
but most importantly, his conviction
is sincere (to the point of death) and righteous (in his eyes).
This conviction of righteousness remained a distinctive part of Robespierre as the
political upheaval unfolded in France. In a different age, when his conviction was at odds
with the currents, he perhaps would have remained in obscurity or been silenced for his
reformist beliefs, but in the French Revolution, Robespierre’s conviction became more
and more the conviction of the time: his devotion to the republic became “the order of the
day,” as it were. The moral dimension of his conviction meant that he personally was
beyond reproach, in terms of the morality of revolution, and of course this advantage
added fuel to his ambition in cyclical fashion so that more and more Robespierre’s
adamantine vision became conflated with the revolution itself.64
In the pressures of 1793-
4 (the war, counterrevolutionary insurrection, and popular unrest) the necessity of
protecting the revolution until it could finish its work became a necessity of protecting
Robespierre’s republican vision.
***
This vision was, if not connected to any particular moral argument of the
Enlightenment, only possible in the world of the Enlightenment, for Robespierre
compellingly articulated his republic as a product and goal of natural reason. As the
62
Scurr, 50 63
Scurr, 53-4 64
See Scurr, especially 101, on how Robespierre came to be identified, and to identify himself, with the
Revolution and its outcome. Scurr writes, “In short, he behaved like someone with nothing whatever to lose
outside the Revolution itself” His religion, his morality was the revolution. We have no reason to doubt his
word that he was a martyr, for his god was the republic.
46
events that would ultimately earn the name “revolution” began, Robespierre argued in the
name of natural reason, which he saw as only leading to the republic of virtue. In his
famous speech, Robespierre spoke in his characteristically grandiose terms to the
convention, claiming, “In our country we want to substitute morality for egoism, honesty
for honor, principles for customs, duties for decorum, the rule of reason for the tyranny of
custom…that is to say, all the virtues and all the miracles of the Republic for all the vices
and all the absurdities of the monarchy.”65
To Robespierre, the “rule of reason” and
“morality” meant his concept of the Republic, and he continued to support the
marginalized poor by means of this natural, reasonable morality. As the Estates-general
clashed, he supported Abbe Sieyes’ influential pamphlet, confronting the archbishop of
Nimes in an early public speech and challenging the higher clergy to “convert all their
superfluous wealth into food for the poor.”66
After the mob stormed the Bastille,
Robespierre defended their questionable vigilantism as a swelling of Rousseauvean
general will: “M. Foulon was hanged yesterday by the people’s decree.”67
This defense
reveals an early endorsement of violence for political ends: as Robespierre says “the
terror inspired by this national army…determined the Revolution,” he truly justifies terror
(in the Pauline sense of the term: “to make just”)--that is, he does not merely excuse the
use of violence, but acknowledges its positive moral value as a part of the revolution, an
idea he would later aptly articulate as an “emanation of justice.”
65
Robespierre, 115. 66
From one of Robespierre’s earliest speeches to the Third Estate in Versailles, early in May, 1789, quoted
in Scurr, Fatal Purity, 89. 67
Scurr, 94. Interestingly, Robespierre was relatively atypical among the deputies in his support of the
vigilantism, as suggested by Timothy Tackett’s readings of the deputy diaries in his Becoming a
Revolutionary (1996). As Ruth Scurr notes of Robespierre, he “grasped early, rapidly, intuitively the
conflict between ends and means that was destined to blight the Revolution, cause tens of thousands of
deaths, and haunt the survivors…. He was vehemently committed to the Revolution and anything it
entailed, passing quickly over moral scruples, intellectual incoherence, and political doubts. In short, he
47
In the immediate aftermath of the Terror, reactionaries on the Right claimed that
the Terror was the logical result of revolution, revolutionary philosophy, and even
Enlightenment philosophy. The Irish-born member of the English House of Commons, an
acclaimed writer and speaker in his time, Edmund Burke offered almost immediate
critique in a letter from October 1789, his famous Reflections on the Revolution in
France and on the Proceedings in Certain Societies in London relative to that Event.
Burke’s response arose out of yet another (very English) perception of what is “natural”
for society, “a constitutional policy [by which], working after the pattern of nature, we
receive, we hold, we transmit our government and our privileges, in the same manner in
which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lifes”: that is, the tradition of
inheritance.68
To Burke, innovations which attacked tradition were inherently flawed
because they undermined their own staying power. The revolution destroyed the age of
privilege and chivalry, when “ten thousand swords must have leaped from their
scabbards”69
in defense of honor, and to Burke it was only consequential that the reckless
innovations should result in disorder and violence.
However, we hardly need to rebut these perspectives, which are among the
simplistic answers of the kind Gay wished to avoid in describing the Enlightenment. The
Revolution is similarly complex, and while Burke’s pragmatic commentary on the social
turbulence of revolutions is well-made, it is at the same time perhaps too universal in its
claims and too grounded in the perspective of British Imperialism. To the notion that
terror was the unavoidable result of upsetting the “natural” tradition of the age of
behaved like someone with nothing whatever to lose outside the Revolution itself” (Fatal Purity, 101). 68
Burke, Edmund, Reflections on the Revolution in France (London: MacMillan and Company, 1890), 36. 69
Burke, Edmund, “The Age of Chivalry,” in Modern Eloquence, vol. IX (London: Modern Eloquence
Corporation, 1923), 132.
48
chivalry, we still offer an alternative view: Terror may have been necessary to
Robespierre’s ideology, but a republic clearly could conceivably exist without the Terror,
to which the almost half millenia of Republican Rome gives evidence. The situation in
France seemed to prove the fears of the traditionalists and counterrevolutionaries, but
they also played into the fears of the radicals that the enemies of the revolution were
inciting counterrevolution. Thus both sides provided fuel for the arguments of the other,
without either gaining a real answer to their question. The revolutionary government did
indeed resort to violence in order to protect the new order (an order of the rights of
citizens), but this did not prove Burke right. Burke prophesied that “the popular leader is
obliged to become active in propagating doctrines, and establishing powers, that will
afterwards defeat any sober purpose at which he ultimately might have aimed.”
Robespierre became such a leader, but not through any competition for personal ambition
as Burke assumed, but in pursuit of a pure vision. He was “obliged” by the threat of his
enemies, or rather (as he saw them) the enemies of the people. But had those enemies not
been there, had the powers of Old Europe not reacted in fear, would the Reign of Terror
have been necessary? It is certainly debatable - Furet argues that the Terror emerged in
response to other internal pressures rather than the war - but it is clearly not the sound
proof of democracy’s flaws that the early founders of conservativism saw it as.
The Enlightenment did not write a program for the Terror; rather it left open the
door for those who could write such a program, just as much as it allowed for truly
uplifting enterprises which uphold human dignity.
***
“The Dust that Speaks to You”
Human Nature in the Terror
49
Looking specifically at the program of the Terror, we can learn specific factors
which allowed for sanctioned violence. The three principle architects - Danton, Marat,
and Robespierre - to varying degrees were willing to place human life in the category of
“dispensable” for the sake of creating the ideal state (or even of simply preserving the
Revolution, as an alternative to slipping back into the slavery of a monarchy, until such a
time as a constitution could be written). This kind of thought must be sharply
distinguished from “Just War” or self-defense arguments, which maintain the value of
human life throughout. A person may kill in self-defense as last resort to protect an
innocent life from unjustified murder. To the proponents of Terror, human life is
subordinated to the good of the work of producing a good society. In such reasoning,
violence in support of the Republic of Virtue is not a “necessary evil,” as in the case of
self-defense. Rather, terror “is an emanation of virtue.”
This idea of terror as an emanation of virtue is extremely important for theory of
legitimate government and constitutionality. Because the historiography has focused on
different aspects through the years (no doubt due in part to changing events that made
those aspects more interesting at different times), the justice or virtue of terror has been
somewhat ignored by those not advocating its use.70
As we have seen, the Terror has
been labeled an excess of an otherwise wholesome philosophy or else mathematical
product of the factors of materialist Enlightenment morality. To Marx, it was the clash
between great dialectical forces; to Habermas, it was a lapse in true enlightenment
growth; to Furet, it was an outcome of discourses competing over political ideas and
affected by the war; to Arendt, it was a failed revolution. However, there are a few
70
Except by thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, who were principally concerned with twentieth-century
violence.
50
authors who have engaged with this separation between morality and rationality, which is
cardinal to our present question. To begin with, Camus, as we have already mentioned,
saw that philosophy “can be used for any purpose.” Camus makes a resolute argument
against totalitarian murder by means of an assumption of the inadmissibility of murder in
his articulation of the Absurd, but he does not specifically deal with this idea in terms of
the Terror. Slavoj Zizek, the contemporary Slovenian philosopher, takes note of terror
and virtue in “Robespierre, or, the “Divine Violence” of Terror”. Zizek, in riveting
fashion, discusses the relationship between humanism and terror, working with a matrix
that sets up “four variations on this motif: humanism and terror, humanism or terror, each
in a ‘positive’ or in a ‘negative’ sense” for comparison. The classic Christian perspective
holds “humanism or terror,” calling for humanism as a optimal choice.71
To Zizek,
totalitarian murderers conflated humanism with Terror (humanism and terror in the
‘positive’ sense). Then there is the ‘negative’ of humanism and terror, in which terror is
perceived as the result “of the humanist project itself, of its hubris” - the idea that
humanism always leads to violence.
There is, however, a fourth variation, usually left aside: the choice ‘humanism or terror,’ but with
terror, not humanism, as a positive term…. In today’s ‘post-deconstructive’ thought…, the term
‘inhuman’ has gained new weight, especially in the work of Agamben and Badiou. The best way
to approach it is via Freud’s reluctance to endorse the injunction ‘Love thy neighbour!’-- the
temptation to be resisted here is the ethical domestication of the neightbour -- for example, what
Emmanuel Levinas did with his notion of the neighbour as the abyssal point from which the call of
ethical responsibility emanates. What Levinas thereby obfuscates is the monstrosity of the
neighbour, a monstrosity on account of which Lacan applies to the neighbor the term Thing, used
71
Zizek places this variation (humanism or terror, humanism being positive) in the camp of “the liberal-
humanist project” and the “neo-Habermassians”; we of course would disagree on the grounds of this thesis
- that the humanists fail to truly prevent terror by believing themselves to have found “the answer” in some
51
by Freud to designate the ultimate object of our desires in its unbearable intensity and
impenetrability… In proper dialectical paradox, what Levinas, with all his celebration of
Otherness, fails to take into account is not some underlying Sameness of all humans but the
radically ‘inhuman’ Otherness itself: the Otherness of a human being reduced to inhumanity…72
In Zizek’s piercing analysis, Robespierre does not engage in dialogue with the Other,
with the people: “he does not claim that he has direct access to the people’s Will which
speaks through him.”73
Robespierre rather sees the necessity of creating or attaining
social order in which humanity can flourish: for this work terror is necessary, and
Robespierre may undertake it because he has in fact given himself already to the cause.
He is a man of “moral integrity and full devotion to the revolutionary cause.”74
He was
driven by a “holy love for humanity”75
to not only take part in a mere event of revolution
(such as the storming of the Bastille or the execution of a king) but to “impose on social
reality a new lasting order” in “‘fidelity’ to the Event.” “This is the properly ‘terrorist’
dimension of every authentic democratic explosion.”76
Zizek’s clarity is extremely
helpful to our present discussion, for he articulates perfectly (and even defends) the
exquisitely lucid ratio in Robespierre’s mission. His was not a cold calculus, but a
passionate martyrdom - held to its iron course by its very passion - for the sake of his
perception of humanity. “Who am I…?” asks Robespierre, near the end. “a slave of
Liberty, a living martyr of the Republic.”77
Robespierre’s perception of humanity was
remarkably important. Zizek notes that Robespierre said “The characteristic of popular
sort of ideological solution: in effect, for failing to be truly humanist with “human” as the highest priority. 72
Zizek, xii-xiv 73
Zizek, xvii 74
Zizek, xxxviii 75
Robespierre, Virtue and Terror, 129 76
Zizek, xxxv 77
Robespierre, Virtue and Terror, 131
52
government is to be trustful toward the people and severe toward itself.”78
And it is so
very striking that the day before his arrest, amidst failing health and a frenetic climate in
Paris, Robespierre gave one final, dramatic oration to the Convention in which he alluded
to the Festival of the Supreme Being which had taken place just before the climax of the
Terror began:
O day forever fortunate! When the French people rose altogether to offer to the Author of Nature
the only homage worthy of him, what a touching assemblage was there of all the objects that can
fascinate the eyes or attract the hearts of men! O honored old age! O generous and ardent youth! O
pure and playful joy of childhood! O delicious tears of maternal fondness! O divine influences of
innocence and beauty! O the majesty of a great people, happy in the contemplation and enjoyment
of its own strength and glory and virtue!79
These appeals were certainly not germane to the specific points of his speech that day, yet
at the same time they speak eloquently, as though his ideals burst through the details of
the speech. Here is the vision of humanity which drove Robespierre to exert himself
almost to the point of expiration even if his end had not come prematurely. His idea of
the people and of trusting them Zizek calls a “wager that the large majority of the people
support these severe measures, see them as their own, and are ready to participate in their
enforcement.”80
The assumptions which Robespierre brought with him into Paris and the
Revolution - formed perhaps in his early hardship, in his classical education, in his
experiences as a lawyer for the marginalized in Arras - these guided his program when he
found himself in the seat of power.
Another very recent work which deals with this rationality in an important way is
Dan Edelstein’s The Terror of Natural Right: Republicanism, the Cult of Nature, and the
French Revolution. Edelstein addresses the rationality of the Terror in the light of a
particular juridical theory - natural right theory - which arose out of the particular guiding
78
Zizek, xxxvi 79
Robespierre, “Speech of 8 Thermidor,” in Scurr, Fatal Purity, 347-8. 80
Zizek, xxxvii.
53
philosophy of Robespierre and his radical followers. This is a different aspect from that
addressed by Zizek81
but it also helps to emphasize the capacity for terror within an
Enlightenment system, even a system founded on natural human rights. Edelstein
pinpoints this philosophical idea of natural right theory as the particular cause of the
Reign of Terror: “Jacobin political leaders…drew on natural right to authorize and draft
the laws underpinning the terror.”82
Edelstein’s description of the Terror is insightful, as
it goes beyond the perhaps too simplistic “polemic” of Adorno and Horkheimer in
pointing to the particular values toward which Robespierre and the radical Jacobins were
working. These values were a particular vision of the Republic of Virtue, inspired in an
important way by Rousseau and others, that Edelstein terms “natural republicanism.”
Natural republicanism is a combination of the idea of a republic as the best political
system with Rousseauvian humanism, with the result that the republic is no longer merely
a good or useful construct of society, but the natural end of interpersonal relationship.
Thus it is “natural” (that is, the design of the Supreme Being) for people to form a
republic based on virtue. Edelstein ties this vision in to the myth of the Golden Age
which the revolutionaries began to embrace as a utopian reality: “By the time of the
French Revolution, the myth of the golden age no longer appeared to many as a myth; it
had become the ideal and natural template on whose basis all of society could be
reorganized.”83
Robespierre again and again appealed to this idea of the “natural” good of
the republic, noting that reason produces republican ideals: “it is reason, which will make
the republic immortal; where reason reigns, the people are sovereign, and such an empire
81
Edelstein’s analysis is more pragmatic than philosophical; he looks at the juridical foundations for
Robespierre’s political action, rather than the metaphysics of his justification. 82
Edelstein, Dan, The Terror of Natural Right (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2009),
4.
54
is indestructible.”84
To Robespierre, well-versed in Rousseauvean thought, the republic
was the hope for mankind which was on the verge of realization in the Revolution, and he
was the man to help France realize that hope.85
The thoughts of Rousseau and
Robespierre were not identical, however, for while Rousseau argued for the republic on
the grounds of its legitimacy as a form of government by the people, Robespierre went a
step further and equated the will of the people with the republican utopia itself.
Rousseau’s Contrat Social holds that “The articles of this contract are…unalterably fixed
by the nature of the act…. [O]nce the social pact is violated in any instance, all
obligations it created cease….”86
Clearly, to Rousseau the legitimacy of popular
government is grounded in the contract among the participants. Robespierre abandoned
the social contract idea, believing that the “spontaneous voice of the people” (which was
nebulous enough even in Rousseau) was the civic virtue of the republic. That is, it was
outside Robespierre’s concept of “natural” for a person to oppose the republic. It was not
a matter of majority rule favoring a republic, but of Nature favoring a republic: thus the
opponents of the republic were opponents of Nature, the Supreme Being, and good order.
Edelstein argues this very point, noting that the Jacobin vision (which was in some sense
a moral claim: to be doing things the “right” way) claimed “that the laws of nature were
also the laws of the republic” and that this claim led to “a conflation between nature and
nation that had grave consequences for anyone misfortunate enough to break (or to
83
Ibid., 14. 84
Scurr, Fatal Purity, 295 85
In the purges of the Hebertists and the Dantonists, we see how convinced Robespierre was of his own
infallibility: he trusted very few people close to him to hold the pure vision of the Republic. Even other
republican revolutionaries had to be removed as enemies to his vision of the Republic. Here we see that
Enlightenment revolution at work: “heaven on earth” was no longer a platitude, but a mission statement and
a goal that could be achieved through social change. 86
Rousseau, J.J., “The Social Contract,” in Aspects of Western Civilization, vol. II, ed Perry M. Rogers
55
appear to break) the law.”87
This was indeed a move away from the legitimacy of social
contract to a legitimacy of moral rectitude based on the republican ideal. Rousseau did
allow for law enforcement within the contract (“…whoever refuses to obey the general
will, shall be compelled to it by the whole body, which is in fact only forcing him to be
free”88
), but this is clearly different from the enemy-of-nature justification. Such a model
would never have survived in a Hobbesean worldview, in which the natural state of man
is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”89
However, the revolutionaries embracing the
republican utopia had a warmer conception of humans in their natural state, more along
the lines of the ideas of Rousseau and Diderot, coming out of the new contact with people
in the New World. Edelstein notes that natural republicanism found its way into literature
in “works such as Fenelon’s Telemaque and Montesquieu’s Lettres persanes [which]
depicted societies … that existed in a revised state of nature, in which individuals were
social and equal, no one ruled over anyone else, and virtue came naturally.”90
Here we
have a remarkable paradox: the revolutionaries relied on the “natural goodness” idea to
support “natural republicanism” as a good state for society, but they also relied on the
natural right juridical theory which was developed as a justification for imperialist action
against the “savages” of the New World.91
Natural Right theory became very central to
Robespierre’s logic in the Terror, justifying it as an “emanation of justice.”
The concept of natural rights was largely developed by the Enlightenment
thinkers “in direct response to the pressing legal questions raised by European
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 104. 87
Edelstein, 3. 88
Rousseau, 106. 89
Hobbes, “Leviathan,” in Political Philosophy, ed. Steven M. Cahn (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 225. 90
Edelstein, 11.
56
imperialism in the New World.”92
Here, again, it cannot be emphasized enough that
anthropology is the key distinction in the praxis of any philosophy: how we see the
human person determines how we treat people. Edelstein notes that Thomistic
philosophers supported what we might today call “human rights” or the innate dignity of
the human person. But some philosophers responded with the idea of people who can
remove themselves from that natural rights category by opposing themselves to the laws
of Nature. Francis Bacon called on nations to “suppress” those who “have utterly
degenerated from the laws of nature.”93
John Locke, one of the great founders of
democratic thought, held that one who violates natural law “declares himself to live by
another Rule, than that of reason and common Equity…and so he becomes dangerous to
Mankind.”94
In Locke in particular we see the notions of reason and nature combined
here: what is natural is reasonable; what is reasonable is good. These Enlightenment
jurists produced a body of thought that included the concept of hostes humanis generis,
or enemies of the human race.95
Thus natural right theory played a key role in justifying violent action against
people who are perceived to be enemies “outside the law” so to speak -- such came to
include the king himself.96
In this knowledge, if we are to speak of the “excesses” of the
Terror, or of the Terror “going off track,” we must be very clear in specifying what
91
Edelstein, 27. 92
Edelstein, 27. 93
Bacon, Advertisement Touching a Holy War, in Edelstein, 28. 94
Locke, “Second Treatise of Government,” in Political Philosophy, 247. 95
Edelstein, 15-17. 96
Not all used the concept to attack the legitimacy of the monarchy; Jacques Benigne Bossuet went so far
as to say that disobedient subjects fit that category: “whoever refuses to obey the king cannot appeal to
some other judge, but will be condemned to death without appeal as an enemy of the public peace and of
humanity” (Bossuet, “Politque teree des propres paroles de l’Ecriture Sainte,” in Aspects of Western
Civilization, 55).
57
moderate good became evil in excess, or from what good track the revolution derailed.
Likewise if we are to speak of the totalitarian logic of the Terror, we must be equally
clear in specifying which and whose premises produced that conclusion. As we have
seen, each of these paradigms has something to offer, but given Robespierre’s moral
purity and the centrality of natural right theory, none of these paradigms is precise
enough. The Terror was not an excess of Republican virtue, nor was it the republican
ideal gone off track. Neither was it inevitable in a post-Enlightenment world. Rather it
was the rational means of Robespierre and the Jacobin radicals to produce a free society
with a popular government that could be safe from tyrants, foreign attack, and internal
conspiracy. And this radical means was determined out of their anthropology: the human
person is the virtuous citizen. Any outside of that definition fall under a different
category, “enemies of the people.”
***
Robespierre said “To punish the oppressors of humanity: that is clemency; to
forgive them, that is barbarity. The rigour of tyrants has rigour as its sole principle: that
of republican government is based on beneficence.”97
Any system must ensure that
human life is never subordinated to another end, even another good end, because it is the
human experience, founded in the inner life of the person, which gives the very meaning
to life which is the basis for desiring utopia. Pure Reason does not ensure this; it must be
accepted as an assumption, rather than a deduction from empirical data. The nature of this
assumption must be recognized formally in law in order to not leave the door open to
justified killing. The French Revolution, in postponing writing a constitution until the
97
Robespierre, “On the Principles of Political Morality that should guid the National Convention in the
domestic administration of the Republic” (February 5 1794), in Virtue and Terror, 117.
58
country was safe, left that door open, and the thousands who lost their lives give
testimony to that reality. Today, the strongest states have the responsibility to protect
people from their own power; in foreign and domestic policy these politically and
economically powerful states must insure against the possibility of being driven down the
path of systematic destruction of human life, the environment, and the larger human
community. The subject of the next chapter will be this necessity in the modern post-
Enlightenment state.
59
Chapter 3
The Politics of Terror
The Revolution of mentality which allowed for the radical Jacobins of the French
Revolution to attempt to discover moral principles from natural reason is not a
meaningless thing of the past. The post-Enlightenment mentality has affected mass
movements in the twentieth century, and still affects our political thinking today. Many
millions of persons have been killed in the name of some ideology or other, and yet those
peoples most influenced by Enlightenment thinking (Western industrialized democracies)
continue to perceive such atrocities as flawed reasoning, rather than misplaced values.
The rationalists see such murder as the work of ignorant, rather than depraved, minds,
and approach the new challenges of our day such as the use of terrorism by radical
religious fundamentalists as stemming from people placing religious beliefs over reason.
Indeed, the term “fundamentalist” implies that what is problematic is that beliefs of faith
are fundamental - that is, foundational. If only people relied on natural reason, war,
violence, and inequality would not occur. Pure secular rationalists pay lip service to
religious beliefs, perhaps as a cultural heritage, but ultimately such beliefs must be
subordinated to reason.
This mentality is still alive today, especially in the West. Many constitutions in
democratic nations are based on the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, a
product of the Enlightenment paradigm, and even the charter and vision of the United
Nations is related in many ways to the French declaration. Thus as we approach new
challenges in the twenty-first century, our question becomes very pertinent. In this
chapter, I will bring the connection between the Jacobin Terror and Enlightenment
60
humanism up to date in twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This connection is not a
moot topic but an important concern of any government and is tied in a basic way to the
legitimacy of law.
The first half of the twentieth century shocked the world. On a single day in 1916,
almost 60,000 men were killed or captured in the Somme region of France, and the rest of
the war “to end all wars” proved equally devastating. In the Ottoman Empire during the
same years, the world suffered one of the early appearances of genocide (a term all too
familiar in twenty-first century ears) as over half a million ethnic Armenians were
“exterminated.” The death tolls continued to rise as the already-stricken suffered the
worst epidemic to date in the Spanish Influenza, food shortages associated with a global
Great Depression, and further civil wars in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as a continuation
of “ethnic cleansing” movements which surfaced around the world throughout the
century. World War II truly saw the world mobilized in warfare, and saw also the fruits
of mankind’s energies turned towards war in fire-bombing of civilian areas, the
devastating power of nuclear weapons, and the numbers of mobilized soldiers as a
sizeable percentage of the world’s population engaged in conflict. Totalitarian dictators
from Hitler to Stalin to Mao to Pol Pot executed social restructuring plans whose costs in
human lives was heavy to the point of being meaningless by the sheer scale of the
numbers. It is said that when Oppenheimer, the director of the development of the atomic
bomb, saw the first successful testing of the bomb, he said, “Now I am become Death,
destroyer of worlds.” Truly, on a global level at least, humanity was forced to see itself in
a new way, and what it saw was of terrible aspect.
Those twentieth-century intellectuals, activists, observers and contemplators of
61
the human person “become Death” responded in new ways to violence and found (or
were forced into) new paradigms with which to attempt to comprehend the “monstrosity
of the neighbor,” to use Zizek’s term.98
There were, of course, a variety of responses
ranging from cynicism (we think here of Celine’s pseudo-autobiographical Journey to the
End of the Night and certain reactions in the world of art to the apparent fatalism of the
First World War such as Wilfred Owen and Otto Dix) to a more resolute commitment to
understand and oppose the new attack. For our purposes we shall again engage with the
thought of a few commentaries in order to analyze certain facts about systematic murder
and oppression in order to come to a positive program, not a specific arrangement of
society but rather essential principles to guide such arrangements.
In response to this terrible new age of death, a group of scholars from a variety of
fields met in a conference at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in March of
1953, to discuss specifically the topic of Totalitarianism. The goal of the scholars was a
“clarification of the issues” of totalitarianism, a phenomenon which impressed itself upon
the twentieth century as fundamentally new; in his introduction, German American
scholar Carl J. Friedrich, an important member of the conference, emphasized that
totalitarianism came “unexpected and unannounced.”99
Attending this conference (though
she did not submit a paper) was a Jewish immigrant from Germany, a political scientist
named Hannah Arendt, whose interest in the topic of totalitarianism would produce a
wealth of insight into the nature of society, politics, and the history of twentieth-century
Europe, publishing her seminal Origins of Totalitarianism five years later in 1958.
Arendt’s work on totalitarianism is extremely important for any study of modern political
98
Zizek, in Virtue and Terror, xiv. 99
Friedrich, Carl J., “The Problem of Totalitarianism - an Introduction,” in Totalitarianism (Cambridge,
62
philosophy, and especially for our task in the twenty-first century of preventing
justifications for murder. Friedrich, drawing upon Aristotle’s high regard for political
science, makes an insightful remark on “the impossibility of making any science
contribute to the good life without understanding how the community is governed,”
placing the mind over the tool. Better minds have pointed out the errors of
technocracy,100
but it may be said that the necessity of responsibly and ethically handling
technology directs us to consult Arendt’s analysis of the flaws of totalitarianism in order
to avoid them in our own society.
Even at the conference in 1953, Arendt noted that totalitarian rule, while marked
certainly by the use of violence, is unique in that it utilizes ethically unsavory tactics “in
broad daylight.”101
Totalitarian regimes established themselves by using conspiratorial
methods in the open to attack an alleged conspiracy in the government or society. By
acting in “daylight,” agents of totalitarianism break off from the normal state, in which
violence belongs “in the dark,” not in the realm of daily life. “The point,” says Arendt,
“…is not the use of violence per se, not even on an unprecedented scale, but that
“totalitarian indifference” to moral consideration is actually based on an reversal of all
our legal and moral concepts….” 102
Our normal legal and moral concepts, based on the
prohibition to murder, suddenly become ineffective frameworks for analysis. This is
perhaps in part why, as a phenomenon, totalitarianism took the world by surprise.
Totalitarian rule did not excuse violence with circumstantial evidence to show why,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), 4,1. 100
For instance, Postman in Building a Bridge to the 18th
Century, esp. Chapter 1, or early 20th
century
journalist and essayist G.K. Chesterton, who in a variety of works questioned the wisdom of blind
technological progression and apathy toward history and tradition. See, for instance, The Everlasting Man
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993). 101
Arendt, Totalitarianism, 77
63
violence was in this case permissible; in its own legal and moral concepts, there was
simply no need to find an excuse. As Arendt notes, “The peculiarity of totalitarian crimes
is that they are committed for different reasons and in a different framework which has a
“morality” of its own.” The totalitarians were not unenlightened or ignorant; they were
working off different assumptions, to a degree without historical precedent (with the
possible exception of Machiavelli).103
This is a very important point to be made in a
secular democracy.
Arendt does note that totalitarian terror seems to kill without reason, but even this
seeming irrationality fits into the anti-moral (in the sense of anti-matter, it’s negative or
opposite) framework. She writes that while totalitarian terror ““punishes” independently
of any subjective guilt for “objective” reasons,” nevertheless this punishment is part of
the negative morality, a part of “the scientifically forecast course of history itself,
according to which certain crimes are necessary and for which therefore “criminals” must
be found.”104
The word “necessary” is extremely important here. Observers of certain
examples of justified murder in the twentieth century can be tempted to call such
atrocities “madness” and “irrational,” again linking evil to ignorance or to a social system
built upon irrational structures (as did the men of the Enlightenment and as have many
post-Enlightenment thinkers ever since). But such commentary is only possible from
within the observer’s own moral framework. In other words, the impression or
appearance of madness is only perceived from within particular viewpoints or through a
particular lens; if the observer viewed the situation through the lens of the totalitarian
ideology, he should affirm that the so-called atrocity was perfectly rational and therefore
102
Arendt, Totalitarianism, 78 103
Arendt, On Revolutions, 30-2.
64
perfectly acceptable. We remember here the words of Robespierre: “To punish the
oppressors of humanity, that is clemency; to forgive them, that is barbarity.”105
Working
from within an observation point in which opponents of a particular system are in fact
enemies of humanity (hostes humanis generis), it is indeed barbarity to forgive them.
Hence, the phrase “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom-fighter.” One might
almost say, the observer can only call the mass murderer or the terrorist mad because of
the ignorance his own lens of perspective in a sort of cultural relativism applied to moral
actions.
Arendt continues and refines her analysis in Origins. In this voluminous study of
European politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, she explores more deeply the
nature of totalitarian rule’s reversal of the moral and legal concepts of the norm.
Totalitarian rationality is not nihilistic chaos or moral relativism, but a new set of moral
and legal rules, and indeed a new conception of the relation between morality and
legality: “It is the monstrous yet seemingly unanswerable claim of totalitarian rule that,
far from being “lawless,” it goes to the sources of authority from which positive laws
received their ultimate legitimation, that far from being arbitrary it is more obedient to
those superhuman forces than any government was before, and that far from wielding its
power in the interest of one man, it is quite prepared to sacrifice everybody’s vital
immediate interests to the execution of what it assumes to be the law of History or the
law of Nature.”106
The centralized nature of totalitarian rule results in that its inverted
rationality is total in its control over society. There is not room for dissent, which is an
104
Arendt, Totalitarianism, 79. 105
Robespierre, speech before the Convention, “On the Principles of Political Morality that should Guide
the National Convention in the Domestic Arbitration of the Republic,” February 5, 1794, in, Virtue and
Terror, 117.
65
irrational (and even immoral) act within the totalitarian framework, because the law of
Nature and the law of History (which can become conflated into one concept, as in, say,
Marxism, which sees history as a linear evolution) point to a particular end: namely, that
touted by the ideology in question. This conflation, along the lines of what Edelstein saw
in the Jacobin use of natural republicanism - which made the laws of the republic the
laws of nature intended by Divine reason - is a very important element within totalitarian
rule and action. In the framework of the norm, “Both moral judgment and legal
punishment presuppose this basic consent; the criminal can be judged justly only because
he takes part in the consensus iuris.” People who are thought to make an oath of
agreement share a common set of principles; one who commits an action not in line with
those principles is transgressing the law, and the law holds him accountable. But
totalitarianism, conflating the principles with totalitarian action, has no need of laws (in
the normal sense) because the idea of “legality” must change in a system of movement
toward some other state. Arendt writes, ““Totalitarian policy does not replace one set of
laws with another, does not establish its own consensus iuris, does not create, by one
revolution, a new form of legality. Its defiance of all, even its own positive laws implies
that it believes it can do without any consensus iuris whatever, and still not resign itself
to the tyrannical state of lawlessness, arbitrariness, and fear…because it promises to
release the fulfillment of law from all action and will of man; and it promises justice on
earth because it claims to make mankind itself the embodiment of the law.”107
The
normal concept of law is a man-made code aimed at the preservation of society, to ensure
the security of human persons in their interactions. In totalitarian thinking, society is
106
Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 461-2. 107
Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 462
66
moving toward some goal, the ideological utopia, and therefore the “law” becomes
human action toward that end.
This new conception of law is fully realized in the application of terror, for which
reason it is particularly pertinent to our discussion. Since the law of Nature or of History
which totalitarian thinking follows is one of total movement, society in general and the
human person in particular must also “move totally” - must ever change toward the
ideological utopia. The role of laws formerly in attempting to recreate in human society
the natural law or the laws of God are replaced by terror, which is in a similar way
“designed to translate into reality the law of movement of history or nature.”108
This new
concept of morality and legality as terror of course brings with it new conceptions of old
ideas in morality and legality. “Right” and “wrong,” “morally permissible,” “guilty” and
“innocent” take on new meanings. Because totalitarian terror is not lawless nor arbitrary,
these ideas are not dispensed with. Instead they take on new roles, reflective of the new
moral and legal framework. Right and wrong are now based on the direction of
movement of humanity; “No free action…can be permitted to interfere with the
elimination of the “objective enemy” of History or Nature.”109
Note that right and wrong
are still objective notions, but now with relation to the objective movement and the
objective enemies. We are no longer necessarily speaking of personal action, of
subjective guilt or innocence, but of objective facts: not only those who act against the
rule but also those who simply are against it by nature of their not fitting into the
ideologically perceived categories of humanity’s movement (i.e. those humans who need
to be “weeded out,” inferior races, the weak and vulnerable, “dying classes and decadent
108
Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 464. 109
Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 465.
67
peoples”110
). As Arendt says, “Guilt and innocence become senseless notions; “guilty” is
he who stands in the way of the natural or historical process,” and, in the terror “all
concerned are subjectively innocent.” Victims are not killed because of something they
have necessarily done, and the murderers do not themselves order their deaths but rather
“execute a death sentence pronounced by some higher tribunal”: the law of the
ideology.111
Totalitarian terror was arguably new; Robespierre’s Reign of Terror was not
totalitarian by Arendt’s definitions. Robespierre had written definite laws in the
traditional legal sense, as articulations of natural law (republicanism was natural,
according to Jacobin thought). His vision of Republican utopia was not linear movement
along the lines of evolution, but rather a picture of a state to aim for. Thus Robespierre’s
terror was of course politically revolutionary, but it operated within the republican legal
framework. Nevertheless, the two are related, because both systems are marked by the
subordination of the human person (among all other concerns) to some other end -
producing a republic of virtue (in Robespierre’s case) or “the fabrication of mankind”
(the goal of the law of History and of Nature). When a philosophy or political system
takes this step (the subordination of the human person), it becomes an ideology (“isms
which…explain everything and every occurrence by deducing it from a single premise”).
Nothing matters but reaching the end - producing the republic, fabricating mankind -
ostensibly in the name of mankind itself. The problem to be noted here is the substitution
of the vague and general humanity for the neighbor in the old dictum of the Great
Commandment from Leviticus: Love thy neighbor becomes instead, Love humanity.
110
Ibid. 111
Ibid.
68
Arendt, herself raised in the Jewish moral tradition, saw the flaw in this thinking. She
made very strong argument against totalitarian rule that it “destroys the space” between
individuals, destroys their “plurality” in order to create “One Man of gigantic
proportions.” In pursuit of this goal of abstract humanity, terror “eliminates individuals
for the sake of the species.”112
The flaw in this substitution of the species for the person is
that the genius of the Great Commandment lies in its praxis, in the actual work of
respecting another individual person which rises above the level of an emotional feeling
or attitude to that of an act of the will for the good of the other. This Dostoevsky
articulates perfectly in The Brothers Karamazov, with the doctor who loves humanity so
much remarking, “The more I love mankind as a whole, the less I love individual
people…The more I hate individual people, the more ardent is my general love for
mankind.”113
This is not, of course, a rule of logic, but a testament to the distinction
between programs that aim at whole societal change and working for the good of people;
the former may be necessary for the latter to be achieved, yet if such programs take on
preeminence, the systematic subordination of the person becomes dangerously possible.
This is true whether the programs be totalitarian or not, and thus this fact figures
significantly as a litmus question to be posed across a range of political, economic, and
even religious systems.
Another twentieth-century commentary to our interest in understanding the
elements of systematic murder is offered by the philosopher Isaiah Berlin. From a
philosophical perspective, rather than one of political science, Berlin offers insight into
what he describes as “the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical
112
Ibid., 465,6 113
Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (New York: Bantam Dell, 2003) 71-2.
69
ideals.”114
Berlin offers his own principles to guide political arrangement, which we shall
consider in due time, but first we will look into his analysis of the causal errors in
thinking, which are related to Hannah Arendt’s points, but articulate in a very specific
way the logical progression of those errors. First pointing out the flaws in practical
“monism” - the idea that all good human practices (social justice, equality, liberty,
happiness) are mutually conducive and cooperative - Berlin points out that certain goods
must be sacrificed for the attainment of others. Choosing between these objective and
subjective goods is “an inescapable characteristic of the human condition.”115
However,
when an ideology claims that one program of action will eventually provide for all those
human desires (i.e. happiness, equality, and personal freedom) it necessarily conflicts
with and subordinates those other values. Indeed, argues Berlin, this claim is the cause of
the slaughter, “the belief that somewhere, in the past or in the future, in divine revelation
or in the mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history or science, or in
the simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution” (emphasis
added).116
Supporting democratic values in political arrangement, Berlin notes the centrality
of liberty in the democratic system. Liberty is both a prerequisite necessity for and a goal
of democracy. However, Berlin posits that there are actually two distinct concepts of
Liberty, a “positive” and a “negative” conception, which may be distinguished simply as
“freedom from” and “freedom for.” The one notion is connected with a lack of external
coercion within an area of motion or action, while positive liberty is the power to control
114
Berlin, Isaiah, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Social and Political Philosophy: Contemporary Readings,
eds. George Sher and Baruch A. Brody (Harcourt Brace Publishers, 1999), 8. 115
Berlin, 10. 116
Berlin, 8.
70
one’s own condition, especially connected with the ability to play a role in government -
the “wish, above all, to be conscious of [one]self as a thinking, willing, active being,
bearing responsibility for [one’s] choices and able to explain them by references to
[one’s] own ideas and purposes.”117
While, infringement on either of these liberties
makes one feel “enslaved” to some degree, Berlin notes that as two separate values, they
are not necessarily mutually cooperative, and on the contrary are in “direct conflict.”
That even such an accepted good as liberty could become the cause and
justification for systematic murder is of great importance to us, particularly because it is a
democratic value (in the famous trio of liberty, equality, and fraternity). Berlin
demonstrates how such a good is transformed into a ideological end with such drastic
consequences. The value of positive liberty in conjunction with the belief that one has
found the rational final solution - the one which therefore all rational people should desire
and which Reason itself desires - can allow for one to construct a system based on his
solution, while any opponents are opposing the rational answer and therefore are acting
out of some ignorance or blindness.
“What gives such plausibility as it has to this kind of language is that we recognize that it is
possible, and at times justifiable, to coerce men in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or
public health) which they would, if they were more enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not,
because they are blind or ignorant or corrupt. This renders it easy for me to conceive of myself as
coercing others for their own sake, in their, not my, interest. I am then claiming that I know what
they truly need better than they know it themselves.”118
This is another side to the “fabricating mankind” justification in totalitarian terror that
Arendt pointed out and to the natural republicanism (along with the notion of hostes
humanis generis) that Edelstein charted in Jacobin radicalism; Berlin here reveals how
one’s assumptions can lead one to believe that one is really acting in the interests - the
true desires, in fact - of even one’s enemies.
117
Berlin, 6.
71
Again, the importance of assumptions highlight the paramount importance of a
person’s or groups anthropology. Berlin sees clearly that “conceptions of freedom
directly derive from views of what constitutes a self, a person, a man.”119
What we see
emerging as a common element or formulation in systematic violence is this distortion of
the definition of the human person applied in some kind of rational program of social
arrangement. Now two clarifying points should be made with this claim. First, non-
systematic violence of course is also related to a distorted perception of the human
person; our perceptions are a basic factor in any interpersonal relations. Our focus here
on systematic murder is chiefly concerned with its justification, which seems to be a
common characteristic.120
Second, there may be objection to any talk of “the definition”
of the human person, when our perceptions are inherently subjective. “Human nature” as
a concept is prone to utilization in over-simplifications (and a subjective one at that) as
substitutes for close analysis. We will address this question in some depth when we come
to discerning (if possible) some positive principles to guide political and social relations
in order to prevent their abuse of the human person. Coming to such principles will of
course necessitate choosing some understanding, and discarding others, and this process
must be analyzed and defended. Let us only re-emphasize Berlin’s warning that “Enough
manipulation with the definition of man, and freedom can be made to mean whatever the
manipulator wishes. Recent history has made it only too clear that the issue is not merely
118
Berlin, 7. 119
Berlin, 8. 120
The justification of terror (as “an emanation of virtue” [Robespierre] or in “the reversal of our…moral
concepts” [Arendt]) is perhaps the most important challenge to us, for it is a metaphysical challenge: it
changes our categories of knowledge and language, and thus almost removes the possibility of
communication and resolution through dialogue. Thus overcoming this challenge is the most important task
for “social cooperation” as the early political philosophers like Hobbes, Mill, and Locke saw.
72
academic.”121
***
In her reflections On Revolution, Arendt comments that “Theoretically, the most
far-reaching consequence of the French Revolution was the birth of the modern concept
of history in Hegel’s philosophy.”122
In Arendt’s analysis, the law of history plays an
important role in totalitarian rule in both Nazism and Communism. To our purposes, the
key element is the replacement of systems of value which uphold the human person with
systems (on either end of the political spectrum) which subordinate the human person to
some other end. Connected with Berlin’s diagnosis of the potential misuse of positive
liberty in coercing people into the rational arrangement for their own good, “those who,
throughout the nineteenth century and deep into the twentieth, followed in the footsteps
of the French Revolution, saw themselves not merely as successors of the men of the
French Revolution but as agents of history and historical necessity.”123
That the French
Revolution and the Enlightenment have had profound influence upon humanity up to and
beyond the twentieth century does not need to be argued here; we only point out that
specifically the weight given to rationality as the final measure of things has been a key
value in the moral, political, and intellectual heirs of those event, given that, “Historically
speaking, both conservative thought and reactionary movements derive not only their
most telling points and their elan but their very existence from the event of the French
Revolution.”124
Ours is an Enlightenment-guided world - even when it contradicts the
121
Berlin, 8. 122
Arendt, On Revolution, 45. 123
Arendt, On Revolution, 46. 124
Arendt, On Revolution, 287. Arendt holds that the Fr Rev departed from values, but clearly they just
applied the value of rationality as the measure of truth to different assumptions. Thus it is not quite accurate
to speak of a departure of “values,” for although the personal moral beliefs of the revolutionaries differed
73
personal moral values of the philosophes, inasmuch as it seeks justification in reason -
and so long as this worldview holds, the human person is in danger.
Another term besides “totalitarianism” which came into use in the twentieth
century to describe new phenomena is “genocide,” a word now unfortunately familiar to
us. Coined by Raphael Lemkin in connection with the war crimes tribunal at Nuremburg,
genocide refers to the “destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.”125
While this is not
the place for an in-depth analysis of that terrible phenomenon, there are some things
germane to this discussion that may be learned from it. Gregory Stanton, one of the
foremost students of genocide and the founder of Genocide Watch, an organization aimed
at preventing genocide, published a paper for the U.S. Department of State in 1996 on
preventing and responding to genocide. “The 8 Stages of Genocide” outlines a model of
genocide as a “process” that develops in logical steps. Stanton’s findings are very
revealing in light of Arendt’s and Berlin’s emphasis on the role of anthropologies.
Perceptions of the human person again play a role in the case of genocide: the most
openly violent stage of genocide according to Stanton’s model is the seventh:
Extermination, which “is “extermination” to the killers because they do not believe their
victims to be fully human.”126
Perception of the victim group as outside the category
“human” is indeed a main component right from the earliest stage, which is Classification
of the targeted group in a different class than the perceived majority. This classification
of a group of persons into a subhuman and non-person category is yet another way of
overcoming the ethical Great Command to Love thy neighbor as thyself, in this case by
and perhaps changed (see Tackett, Chapter 2), the value of the Enlightenment, the one which seemed to
provide the basis for liberty, justice, etc., was Reason. 125
,Oxford English Dictionary, “Genocide”, cf. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe ix. 79 126
Stanton, The 8 Stages of Genocide.
74
redefining the enemy as something other than the neighbor. The concept of the “Other” is
of course a recurring theme in human interaction, manifested most often in the practice of
labeling, and this is another stage in genocide.127
The target group, after being classified
in a “outside” group, undergoes dehumanization and polarization. Dehumanizing names
such as “cockroaches” (as in the case of the term used for Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994) are
applied and the victims are actively presented as the polar opposites of the normal,
healthy, or moral majority. Most importantly, “dehumanization overcomes the normal
human revulsion against murder.”128
Along similar lines, M. Hassan Kakar, an observer
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, writes that “For genocide to happen…members of
the dominant society must perceive their potential victims as less than fully human.”129
The twentieth century encounter with genocide thus reestablishes the centrality of the
human person in any moral system; terror and systematic murder when happen when
groups fail to recognize the human person as such, and when the human person is
therefore subordinated to the pursuit of some other end, whether it be equality or racial
“purity.”
***
Given the negative warnings of Arendt, Berlin, and Stanton (as well as many
other commentators), we know when programs of action are wrong - when they perceive
and use persons as objects or enemies - and we know also that the secular liberal
127
The Other is also present in various figures in literature, such as Grendel in Beowulf, who is called a
mearcstapa - a “mark-stepper” or being who inhabits the borders of the human world; or Frankenstein’s
monster, portrayed hauntingly with a human psychology and inner self, yet ostracized simply for his
appearance. The recurring figures of the witch, the monster, Quasimodo, the barbarian outside the polis all
point to a mix of fear and fascination with the Other, who has been the object of much analysis for the last
several centuries from Hegel to de Beauvoir to Levinas. 128
Stanton, The 8 Stages of Genocide 129
Kakar, M. Hassan, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982 (Los
Angelas: University of California Press, 1997), 215.
75
“project” of the Enlightenment is not enough alone to avoid the danger. This knowledge
is a sort of negative ethics: what not to do. But what positive principles should be
adopted? Stanton’s paper is itself a call for positive response, and he calls for
governments to have the “political will” to intervene in the process of genocide anywhere
in the world. Skirting discussion of national border claims, the idea of “political will” of
course goes without saying. The real question is, “who’s” will? Or, which principals shall
direct the will, political or otherwise?
Isaiah Berlin does put forward a working principle, that of “negative liberty.”
While positive liberty is more apt to be misused for systematic murder, as history has
shown, Berlin holds that negative liberty is a workable principle which is naturally
opposed to misuse. What we have here is along the lines of Mill’s harm principle, though
perhaps expanded to allow for some social benefits, which Berlin seems to deem
permissible. “Pluralism,” he writes, “with the measure of “negative” liberty that it entails,
seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great
disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of “positive” self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or
the whole of mankind.”130
For many of the same reasons for which Mill argued against
suppression of opinion, pluralism has some practical inhibitors against mistaken idealists coercing
the people. However, as a practice even pluralism demands a grounding in principle - one needs
to value things like equality, justice, and freedom in order for pluralism to work practically. Even
those structures of social justice which infringe upon personal negative liberty would need to be
justified somehow; without a supporting principle, pluralism can slip into relativism. Even Berlin
quotes Joseph Schumpeter131
in writing, “To realize the relative validity of one’s
convictions,” said an admirable writer of our time, “and yet stand for them unflinchingly,
130
Berlin, 11.
76
is what distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian.” To demand more than this is
perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical need; but to allow it to determine one’s
practice is a symptom of an equally deep, and more dangerous, moral and political
immaturity.”132
Unfortunately, relative validity is not sure enough ground for principles,
indeed counters the very idea of the word “conviction,” and Berlin himself should not
have crafted his argument in the first place had he not been convinced of the objective
evil of the “slaughter on the altars.” What we approach here is the very crux of the whole
matter, the “metaphysical need” which Berlin criticized as dangerous.
The systematic murderers of course do not hold that morality is relative: they
work “in a different framework which has a “morality” of its own.”133
“Right” and
“wrong” are orientations toward or away from the end of the ideology. However, it is no
very helpful response to deny the objectivity of morality, or our inability to know it
objectively. Such denial only offers a Hobbesean State of Nature which is the problem
which social cooperation seeks to overcome in the first place. Zizek addresses this
problem and the necessity of social cooperation to avoid disaster. For, he argues, without
social cooperation we live in a “dream” imagining that we can continue in our “wild
expansion,” grasping at both individual freedom and equality. Ironically, he advocates
that we take a second look at Robespierre’s claim, in order “to intervene into our pseudo-
natural development.”134
The answer to “the threat of ecological catastrophe” is to turn
again to revolutionary “institutionalization” so that people can cooperate to pursue a
“path of a contained life of balanced reproduction, focused on cultural refinement,
131
Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003), 243. 132
Berlin, 12. 133
Arendt, Totalitarianism, 78. 134
Zizek, xxxvii.
77
avoiding wild expansion.”135
Zizek therefore encourages a combination of four
“moments” delineated by the philosopher Alain Badiou which support that
institutionalization of truth. These four elements are egalitarian justice, terror,
voluntarism, and trust in the people. This is ultimately a reliance on social control in
order to ensure fidelity to the people.
Here ultimately these tensions between Self and Other, Humanism and Terror
make themselves felt as the basis of any social arrangement and even of interpersonal
interaction itself. We return to those words of Robespierre which are the quintessence of
this “social control” anthropology:
If the mainspring of popular government in peacetime is virtue, the mainspring of popular
government in revolution is both virtue and terror: virtue, without which terror is disastrous;
terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror is nothing but prompt, severe, inflexible justice; it
is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a specific principle as a consequence of the
general principle of democracy applied to our homeland’s most pressing needs.136
There is a lyrical beauty to Robespierre’s speeches, even in translation. His parallelisms
and contrasts, constructed on monumental and heroic universals, are light and graceful;
they almost carry themselves. But the meaning of the poetry is terrible and terrifying.
And we must take Robespierre at his frightening word: The “general principle,” the “sole
principle,” to which he appeals is Democracy and Republican Government. For
Robespierre, Democracy was the god; Providence, or the Supreme Being, might almost
be said to be “good” insofar as He endowed men with the Reason to be able to seek
Democracy. It seems that to Robespierre oppressing humanity is “wrong” because it is
undemocratic; or rather, what he means ultimately by oppression is non-democracy.
Oppression in the service of democracy is simply not oppression; it is “justice” and
135
Zizek, xxxvii. 136
Robespierre, speech before the Convention “On the Principles of Political Morality
that should Guide the National Convention in the Domestic Arbitration of the Republic,”
78
“virtue.” Saint-Just said, “That which produces the general good is always terrible,” but
Robespierre does not agree, as can be seen in his dramatic appeals to weeping mothers
and playful children in his final speech- there is a vision, somewhere in his mind, of
idyllic utopian Republican democracy safe from the conspiring tyrants of the world, a
vision of a good unaccompanied by evil. He did not think man evil, as Zizek suggests,
but seemed to have held a Rousseauvean notion of inner goodness; like Rousseau, he
believed people were corrupted, (indeed, in a way not unlike orthodox Christian teaching
on Original Sin) - however for Robespierre corrupted man is almost no longer man. In
this Zizek’s argument applies, for the corrupted men, the schemers, the enemies and
plotters against the dream-Republic…these were “the Thing,” the “monstrous other” in
the Neighbor that we fear and loathe. And because Robespierre’s dream world could
never hold people who disagreed with him, it became necessary to seek democracy itself
in the present, and destroy those who would stand in the way: “to punish the oppressors
of humanity: that is clemency.” How? Does Robespierre simply change the definition of
clemency, which meant ever, not treating a man according to his actions, but treating him
according to one’s own mercy? No, Robespierre does not really mean to simply change a
word’s meaning to assure himself that virtue was on his side. Here, again, we take him at
his word. Punishing the oppressors of humanity is indeed mercy, for the oppressors no
longer belong to the category of humanity which is “self” but are rather exiled to the
realm of the “monstrous” Other.137
February 5, 1794, in Virtue and Terror, 115. 137
This kind of reasoning is found, for instance, in certain contemporary ethics theorists such as Judith
Thompson, who argues that self-defense or defending the innocent is permissible because the unjust
attacker relinquished the right to not be attacked, and therefore may be killed in the defense of the innocent.
But of course this idea is frightening in every aspect. One can only not attack a man because he has a right
to not be attacked? What does this say about the victim? It does not address whether one ought to attack
79
Zizek’s suggestion, especially in the “trust in the people” part - “the wager that
the large majority support these sever measures, see them as their own, and are ready to
participate in their enforcement”138
- clearly falls prey to the weaknesses of positive
liberty as Berlin outlined them. And his call to take the “risk…to endorse again large-
scale collective decisions,” while addressing the dangers of unguided expansion, does not
take into account the dignity of the individual person (as Arendt said, sacrificing
“individuals for the sake of the species”).139
Reliance on social arrangement to solve the
problems of social cooperation (a key idea in so many of the “isms” offered or imposed
on humanity) is thus built on a fundamental misapprehension of the human person and of
interpersonal relation.
How then to arrive at a principle to guide such arrangement and yet remain in
keeping with the nature of the human person and of interpersonal relation. Hobbes’ great
insight was to begin with sense perception, for he saw that our convictions are tied to our
perceptions, which are inherently subjective. Locke of course countered with an appeal to
the Creator, which is the great answer of religion as a foundation for equality (i.e. that
God made us for his glory).140
But the mere appeal to the Creator is on the same level as
Robespierre’s appeal to supreme Reason, and runs the danger of providing a tautology
him or treat him well, nor does it address the obligation to protect the innocent. If one sees a man
threatening the innocent, one have the duty to protect the innocent. In the relinquishable rights view, one is
merely coincidentally present to a window of opportunity wherein the right of one of two individuals to not
be attacked has been relinquished. Furthermore, if the attacker could be incapacitated without killing him,
one is certainly not permitted to kill, even though this measure would also save the innocent. If the man had
given up his right to not be attacked, this would not be the case. Rather, it is the danger to the innocent
which must be stopped for the sake of the innocent. In the interest of the individual and of the common
good, the danger must be stopped even if it involves hurting the attacker, but not because the attacker has
given up his own dignity. 138
Zizek, xxxvii. 139
Zizek, xxxviii. 140
Locke, 247-8.
80
based now upon our theology rather than our anthropology.141
But given the subjective
nature of our perception, and the clear danger of moral frameworks based on some
conviction, can we really counter the totalitarian program with another of our own with
any certainty that ours is based on the objective reality of which our perceptions differ?
Can we claim to somehow apprehend the “true” nature of the human person where so
many other projects have failed?
One way to attempt this is via our negative convictions, which are in fact accepted
with certainty by the sheer force with which crimes against the human person attack the
humanity in all of us. Indeed, the measure of any program all along has been whether it
justifies violence against the human person. Thus arising out of assurance of human
suffering, we see something of the human person emerging, as distinct from an animal in
pain, in but a few basic facts: the fact of questioning, of feeling an affront to one’s
dignity, the sense that this should not happen; the fact of an inner self capable of such
questioning; and the fact of the relational nature of that self, which finds and
comprehends meaning (of any sort, even of the questioning of suffering) through
communication with another. Mere secular pluralism does not provide for the human
person as this fundamentally relational being with an inner self, because it allows for
value to be conceived as a relative matter: truth as consensus is never acceptable for it is
not in keeping with the truth of the human person.
Arendt’s warning not to be willing to sacrifice the individual for the species is
quite in keeping with this interpersonal nature, as is Dosteovsky’s insight. Yet another
twentieth-century philosopher, statesman, and churchman has in fact argued for the pro-
141
Such flaws have clear historical precedents in pogroms and massacres during the Crusades, jihad and
holy wars in general, as well as of course in the practice of human sacrifice found in certain religio-cultural
81
active principle supporting the person-as-relational idea in the principle of Love. Karol
Wojtyla, the Polish priest later to become Pope John Paul II, drew upon the psycho-social
aspects of phenomenology (which was his particular field within philosophy), combined
with his own experiences with Nazism and Soviet Communism as well as his pastoral
work with young people and families in Poland under the USSR, to produce Love and
Responsibility, which aimed to give a basis of principles for action, “a basis as definitive
as possible, relying on the most elementary truths and the most fundamental values or
goods. Such a good is the person…”142
Interestingly, the work was principally designed
to draw principles for human sexual relationships in particular, yet the reasoning applies
to human action in general, because it is still based upon the fundamental value of the
human person, which is the basis indeed for our sense of meaning, as noted in our
discussion of crimes against humanity. Wojtyla thus offers Love as the guiding moral
principle, “for love is a good peculiar to the world of persons.”143
Wojtyla first denies any validity for those systems (already dealt with here) which
subordinate the human person to some other end. As he says, “In modern times…what
we have to deal with is a conscious utilitarianism, formulated from philosophical
premises, and with scientific precision.”144
The programs decried by Berlin all valued
some form of social control over the human person; people would be free, or fully
human, only in a certain condition. The principle based on truth of the human person,
Love (which “in its “purest form” is amor benevolentae, or goodwill: willing, in motive
and action, the good of the other) can never use another person as a means to an end.
practices. 142
Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 16 143
ibid. 144
Wojtyla, Love and Responsibilty (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 35.
82
Thus those systems which allow for systematic murder by placing other values above
human life cannot be permitted.
…it becomes obvious that if the commandment to love, and the love which is the object of this
commandment, are to have any meaning, we must find a basis for them other than the utilitarian
premise and the utilitarian system of values. This can only be the personalistic principle and the
personalistic norm. This norm, in its negative aspect, states that the person is the kind of good
which does not admit of use and cannot be treated as an object of use and as such the means to an
end. In its positive form the personalistic norm confirms this: the person is a good towards which
the only proper and adequate attitude is love. This positive content of the personalistic norm is
precisely what the commandment to love teaches.145
The personalistic norm and Love are of course rooted in interpersonal relation (which is a
necessary thing in order to avoid systematic murder), but is this norm in keeping with
value of justice? The answer to this question goes back to the metaphysical nature of
love: all human values such as justice, equality, and freedom only have their very
meaning insofar as they correspond to something in the human person, namely the
dignity which demands respect. Wojtyla writes, “To be just always means giving others
what is rightly due to them. A person’s rightful due is to be treated as an object of love,
not as an object for use.”146
Love and the personalistic norm thus can never be
manipulated to subordinate the person, because their end is the person: “the general
problem of sexual relationships between man and woman [and other problems, for the
same reasons] cannot be solved in a way which contradicts the personalistic norm. we
have to do here with the value of the person, which is for all humanity the most precious
of goods - more immediate and greater than any economic good. It is therefore
impossible to subordinate the person as such to economics, since its proper sphere is that
of moral values, and they are intimately bound up with love for the person.”147
Economic
and other goods thus find their proper place in relation to the good of the human person;
145
Wojtyla, 41. 146
Wojtyla, 42.
83
even the value of the species as such exists by fact of its containing persons.
Returning to the question of social arrangement, its very aim becomes clearer in
light of the personalistic norm: the end of any political or economic system must be the
good of the human community as revealed in the good of the person. Such a principle
therefore does not demand a specific arrangement, but rather that every person and every
institution recognize the inherent goodness of the person; it does not aim for a particular
utopic state, but urges society to work in an ongoing way to strive ever closer to that goal.
But at the same time, the personalistic norm provides a very concrete standard against
which to measure the validity of a course of action (i.e. war, social programs),
recognizing both the value of positive freedom as reflected in the free will which is an
essential component of that “inner self” and the value of the objective good of the person.
The objection may certainly be raised that the commandment to Love and the
personalistic norm is idealistic and abstract, no real blueprint for an political and socio-
economic arrangement. But neither does Love hold that there is one “final solution.”
Rather the ideal is necessary to provide an objective value against which to measure
systems, policies, and even individual acts. In this way Love is quite practical: within
reason, if human laws are based upon the personalistic norm, a group cannot at least
attack or subordinate the human person justifiably and systematically, “in broad
daylight,” as Arendt puts it. Within the practice of Love and the personalistic norm is
contained all the goods hoped for by even the most violent ideologies: justice, human
rights (natural and political), freedom, the fulfillment of the human person. Ironically,
perhaps Robespierre said it best: “What is the goal we are aiming for? Peaceful
enjoyment of liberty and equality; the reign of that eternal justice whose laws are
147
Wojtyla, 65.
84
engraved, not in marble and stone, but in the hearts of all men, even of the slave who
forgets them, and the tyrant who denies them.”148
148
Robespierre, speech before the Convention “On the Principles of Political Morality that should Guide
the National Convention in the Domestic Arbitration of the Republic,” February 5, 1794 quoted in, Virtue
85
Conclusion
On the day before his arrest, Robespierre spoke before the National Convention,
which was now largely disenchanted with the application of terror over the last several
months. Robespierre, fearing that his beloved Republic was in jeopardy, recalled the
ideals which had inspired their grand endeavor: “the French Revolution is the first to
have been founded on the theory of the rights of humanity and the principles of justice.”
This fact - for fact it was - was the material for the leading question of this project. How
indeed could a voyage announcing such a sublime destination and with such committed
members wind up in the dark reality of terror in practice? The misappropriation of such
ideals pointed us in the direction of political theory: how can the polis protect freedom
and avoid systematic terror? This question deals with the legitimization of law and
government, specifically with the notion of secular government: the idea that people can
arrive at a system which protects human rights through the application of reason.
The Age of the Enlightenment was of course the quintessential “experiment” in
reason, and was also the great influence upon the French Revolution itself, founded, as
Robespierre said, on human rights and the principles of justice. The very variety of that
period confirmed that reliance on reason was no sure means of arriving at a consensus of
law and government, let alone truth and morality. The Enlightenment served to
demonstrate that rational policies are in fact based upon the assumed premises of the
policy-makers. Nevertheless, the Enlightenment has had a lasting impact in the form of
this illusion that human beings can arrive at truth merely through the process of reason,
apart from assumptions and beliefs which are thought to be necessarily distorting.
The example of the Reign of Terror proved to be an apt example (and perhaps the
and Terror, 109-110.
86
first) of how this Enlightenment illusion can have devastating results even among well-
meaning, level-headed, rational people. As Dan Edelstein helped to show, the Jacobin
republicans had as their grounding premise the idea that a very specific political
arrangement of society was necessary for the happiness and fulfillment of people. Given
this premise, there were very little lengths to which they would not go in order to achieve
that social arrangement. The prime element of the terror was its justification as a
necessary good.
The illusion of rationality which the Enlightenment engendered has held influence
even into the twentieth century and right up to our own day. The wars, revolutions,
genocides, and general disregard for human life can be summed up in Camus’ phrase,
“massacres justified by philanthropy.” The reflections and commentaries on such
phenomena from thinkers from a variety of scholarly and religious backgrounds (Hannah
Arendt was a Jewish political scientist; Gregory Stanton a Protestant in the field of law
and genocide studies; Isaiah Berlin an analytical and liberal philosopher; and Karol
Wojtyla a Catholic phenomenologist) help to reveal that one of the key flaws in the
secular illusion is the claim that social structures must be changed for people to be
fulfilled. Wojtyla’s notion of the personalistic norm and the principle of Love offer
themselves as a sound answer to the illusion rational reductionism. They are grounded in
common experience and on the premise of human value (an assumption which supports
rational inquiry and also recognizes the existential aspects of meaning), and therefore
cannot be manipulated in the way Berlin warned of because they cannot change the
definition of man without destroying their own premises.
What is perhaps the most strongest testimony of the personalistic norm is that
87
while it certainly calls for social justice and structures which are in keeping with the good
of the human person, it does not admit social change at any cost. What is more, Love and
the personalistic norm are fundamentally grounded in interpersonal relation. Thus
meaning and fulfillment are not found in some future utopia, but in the present relations
of every individual; people must work toward political policies and social arrangements
which uphold human dignity, justice, and equality, but even in situations of gross
indignity, injustice, and inequality, individuals must still follow the personalistic norm
and the principle of Love. This is what was being shown in Victor Frankl’s epiphany in
the death camp at Auswitzch, when he said that “for the first time in my life I saw the
truth as it is set into song by so many poets, proclaimed as the final wisdom by so many
thinkers. The truth -- that love is the ultimate and the highest goal to which man can
aspire. Then I grasped the meaning of the greatest secret that human poetry and human
thought and belief have to impart: The salvation of man is through love and in love.”149
Today’s policy-makers must recognize in law the fundamental value of the human
person in such a way that it cannot be subordinated to any other end. This will require
overcoming finally the illusion of the Enlightenment. In this project it would perhaps be
fitting to pay heed to the words of another twentieth century thinker, one who did indeed
strive for justice, always in light of the dignity of the human person.
A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law
of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law.
To put it in the terms of Saint Thomas Aquinas, an unjust law is a human
law that is not rooted in eternal and natural law. Any law that uplifts
human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is
unjust.
- Martin Luther King, Jr
Letter from a Birmingham City Jail
149
Frankl, Viktor, Man's Search for Meaning, (Nagasandra, Bangalore: Better Yourself Books, 2006), 42.
88
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