THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENTS

OSU Climate Change Webinar Series, June 12, 2012

Alex Thompson

Department of Political Science

Ohio State University

Cooperation over Climate• A global public good

• The “free riding” problem (Olson)• “What is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of

care. Men pay most attention to what is their own; they care less for what is common; or at any rate they care for it only to the extent to which each is individually concerned.” – Aristotle, Politics

• A tragedy of the (global) commons?

Solutions to the Climate Tragedy?

• Top-down regulation• Hobbes: A Leviathan• Hardin: “mutual

coercion, mutually agreed upon”

• International level: Binding rules with a mechanism to monitor and enforce

My Arguments• Binding rules and a top-down approach difficult to

implement in the relative “anarchy” of international politics

• The “hard law” approach can be counter-productive: deters participation and constrains policymaking

• The future of the global climate regime is likely to be more flexible, more decentralized, and more fragmented

…and this is okay for now.

Copenhagen 2009

• Stakes: The future of the climate regime• New round of “Annex 1” commitments under Kyoto• A new and broader long-term agreement

• Months of preparatory work and two weeks of negotiations, including heads of state

Copenhagen 2009• Outcome: Copenhagen Accord

• 2.5 pages!• Limit warming to +2 C⁰• Increase technology and $$ to developing world• “Pledges” to be decided on a national basis (bottom-up)

• No specific commitments and not legally binding• Delegates agreed only to “take note” of it

Copenhagen Assessments

• Generally negative• Geenpeace: “The city of Copenhagen is a crime scene tonight.”• Swedish Environment Minister: The summit was a “disaster” and

a “great failure”

• Main criticism: No binding agreement on emissions reductions• Gordon Brown: “I know what we really need is a legally binding

treaty as quickly as possible.”• WWF: “The Copenhagen Accord is far from the fair, ambitious

and binding deal the world needs.”

• Reflects a bias in favor of hard law solutions• Implicit or explicit comparison to the Kyoto Protocol

Lessons from the Kyoto Protocol (1997)

• The hard law follow-up to the 1992 Framework Convention

• Main problem: Limited participation• Sovereignty concerns, especially for developing countries

• Result: commitments only for 38 industrialized countries

• Ratification hurdles • John Kerry on Kyoto: “What we have here is not ratifiable in the Senate.”• Entry into force delayed until 2005

• No upside in terms of compliance/action• Narrow policy incentives

• Binding targets and timetable→quick fixes• Measurable, “project-based” approach

China 19%

USA 18%

Euro

pe 13%

Russia 5

%

Brazil 5

%

India 4.9%

Japan

3.6%

German

y 2.6%

Canad

a 2%

U.K. 1.7%

Italy

1.5%

Australi

a 1.5%

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

Largest GHG EmittersM

illio

n m

etric

tons

-200

7

no Kyoto commitments (47% of global emissions)

Kyoto Target and Actual Emissions

 Country

KyotoTarget (1990 baseline)

Change1990-2007

Canada -6% 26.2%

EU-15 -8% -4.3%

Germany -21% -21.2%

Italy -6.5% 7.1%

Japan -6% 8.2%

Norway 1% 10.8%

Portugal 27% 38.1%

Spain 15% 53.5%

Sweden 4% -9.1%

U.K. 12.5% -17.3%

Kyoto: The Cart before the Horse

Binding rules without political will to reduce GHG emissions

Too much weight on hard law solution (binding, top-down)

The “Softer” AlternativeClimate Politics: three defining features

1. Public good (tragedy, free-riding)

2. Uncertainty• Impacts• Policy alternatives• Humans ↔ Nature IPCC (2007): “In all cases, policy decisions will have to be made with incomplete understanding of the magnitude and timing of climate change, of its likely consequences, and of the costs and benefits of response measures”

3. Heterogeneity across countries• Uneven impacts• Costs of abatement• Political constraints on governments

Value of Flexibility and Decentralization

• Flexibility as a response to uncertainty• So policies and obligations can be adjusted over time

• Decentralization as a response to heterogeneity• Like a federal political system

• Combination promotes “adaptive management”• Multi-level policy experiments• Updating and learning

• Example: U.S. versus Canada• More activity and creativity among states

Copenhagen and Beyond• Copenhagen reconsidered:

• 82 countries have submitted targets or actions (80% of global emissions)

• Developing countries have made mitigation pledges for first time

• More flexible approach to mitigation policy• E.g., REDD+, sectoral & programmatic approaches, longer time

horizon

• Looking beyond mitigation• Adaptation and capacity building

• Reliance on a wide variety of actors and organizations• Regional efforts and public-private partnerships

“-(C) French Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo told the Ambassador that the key to advancing climate negotiations is to drop the notion of a legally binding treaty in favor of a system of national commitments.

-Borloo argued that the key to implementing the "equilibrium" revealed at Copenhagen was an arrangement that would be voluntary…”

-Paris to Washington, 2/17/2010(Wikileaks)

Questions?

Copenhagen/Cancun Pledges:% Change in Emissions from 2005 levels in 2020

* Pledges take the form of a reduction from BAU in 2020.

Post-Copenhagen Pledges (Annex 1)

Country Emissions Reduction (by 2020) Baseline Year

Australia -5% up to -15% or -25% 2000

Belarus -5% to -10% 1990

Canada -17% 2005

Croatia -5% 1990

EU (27) -20% or -30% 1990

Iceland -30% 1990

Japan -25% 1990

Kazakhstan -15% 1992

Liechtenstein -20% 1990

Monaco -30% 1990

New Zealand between -10% and -20% 1990

Norway -30 to -40% 1990

Russia -15 to -25% 1990

Switzerland -20% or -30% 1990

United States -17% 2005

COP 1 1995 Kyoto 1997 Marrakesh 2001 Bali 2007 Copenhagen 2009

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

79 10

18

54

Average Size of Delegation, Major Climate Conferences

Event

Distribution of Delegation Size, Copenhagen 2009

Top ten (200+): Brazil, Denmark, China, EC, Indonesia, USA, France, S. Korea, Nigeria, Sweden, Canada

Fewer than 10: Afghanistan, Antingua & Barbuda, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, DR Korea, El Salvador, Haiti, Kyrgystan, Libya, Lichtenstein, Moldova, Myanmar, Nieu, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome & Principe, Somalia, Togo, Tonga, Yemen

1 9 17 25 33 41 49 57 65 73 81 89 97 1051131211291371451531611691771851930

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Size of DelegationsKyoto 1997

• United States: 99• France: 30• Australia: 37• Norway: 23• Canada: 63• China: 18• Brazil: 14• Indonesia: 10• Mexico: 16• S. Korea: 25• Ghana: 5• Panama: 6• Jordan: 6• Mozambique: 3• Turkmenistan: 2

Copenhagen 2009

• United States: 273• France: 264• Australia: 98• Norway: 161• Canada: 207• China: 333• Brazil: 572• Indonesia: 303• Mexico: 30• S. Korea: 261• Ghana: 60• Panama: 12• Jordan: 22• Mozambique: 28• Turkmenistan: 3

Kyoto Targets

EU-15 (“bubble”), Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland

- 8%

United States - 7%

Canada, Hungry, Japan, Poland - 6%

Croatia - 5%

New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine 0

Norway + 1%

Australia + 8%

Iceland + 10%

Alternative methods to estimate national-level forest carbon stocks

Gibbs, et al. 2007

Identifying feasible and uniform approaches to measurement is the “foremost challenge” for deforestation-based climate policy.