The Future Climate for Development

8/9/2019 The Future Climate for Development

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Forum for the Future, the sustainable developmentNGO, works in partnership with leading

businesses and public service providers, helpingthem devise more sustainable strategies anddeliver new products and services which enhance

peoples lives and are better for the environment.

www.forumforthefuture.org

This project was financed by the UKDepartment for International Development(DFID). However, the views presented inthis paper are those of the authors and donot necessarily represent the views of DFIDor the project steering group. The authorswish to thank DFID and other stakeholderswho were consulted in the preparation ofthis report for their comments, suggestionsand insights. The authors take fullresponsibility for any errors or omissionscontained in the report.

Please note that the scenarios containedin this report are not predictions, and donot represent desired futures. They areexplorations of possible futures only, andreference to specific countries and eventsis purely illustrative.

Forum for the Future team:Louise ArmstrongAnn-Marie BrouderAlice Chapple

Helen ClarksonGeraldine GilbertJames GoodmanJemima JewellAlex JohnsonDavid MasonGustavo Montes de OcaBen TuxworthIain Watt

watch the accompanying animations here:

www.forumforthefuture.org/projects/ the-future-climate-for-development

DFID team:Gregory BriffaNick GodfreyPhil Lewis

Report authors:Jemima JewellHelen ClarksonJames GoodmanIain Watt

For more information please contact:Jemima Jewell: [email protected]

Registered office:Overseas House1923 Ironmonger RowLondon, EC1V 3QN

Registered charity number 1040519Company limited by guarantee 2959712

Enquiries:+44 (0)20 7324 3660

[email protected]

Date of publication:July 2010

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contents

executive summary p49

introduction p10Why do this work? p10Whats in the report? p10Who is it for? p10

what factors will shape the future response

to climate change in low-income countries? p11331. The direct impacts of climate change p122. The global political context p133. Global economies p174. Low-income country politics p19

5. Demographics in low-income countries p216. Attitudes to climate change in low-income countries p237. Use of natural resources p258. The role of technology p279. The business response to climate change p31

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Scenario 1:Reversal ofFortunes

p38

Scenario 2:Age ofOpportunity

p48

Scenario 3:Coping Alone

p58

Scenario 4:The GreaterGood

p68

what does this mean for development

in low-income countries? p7882

how you can use the scenarios p8385Suggested exercises p84Supporting materials p85

appendices p8690Climate change in the scenarios p86Glossary p87

Participants in the project p89

four scenarios for 2030 p3477

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click to return to the contents page

executive summaryLow-income countries often get overlooked indiscussions about climate change. Despite the factthat they are affected first and worst and havedone least to cause the problem comparativelylittle attention has been paid to how climate change

will affect the development of states which arehome to over a billion people around the world.This is starting to change but not fast enough.

1 Climate-resilient is the term used in this report torefer to development that is robust in the contextof climate change. Similar terms in use elsewhereinclude climate-proofed and climate-smart.

The central message of this report is thatsuccessful development must take climatechange into account. It has been supportedby the UK Governments Department forInternational Development (DFID) to helpfacilitate a holistic approach to development,which looks to the long term. The work,led by independent sustainability expertsForum for the Future, draws on extensiveresearch, the expertise of a high-level steeringgroup and the opinions of more than 100development experts from all over theworld, including development professionals,government officials, business leaders,entrepreneurs and independent thinkers.

As our climate changes over the next 20

years, the probability is very high thattemperatures will rise, the frequency of stormswill increase and rainfall patterns will shift.Ecosystems will be disrupted, ice capsand glaciers will continue to melt and sealevels will rise. We may or may not reachtipping points within that timeframe, beyondwhich change becomes irreversible andmuch less predictable. Either way, climatechange impacts will transform low-income

countries, with significant social, economicand political repercussions.

It is therefore vital that development in low-income countries becomes climate-resilient.1Without this, there is a significant risk thatinvestment made today could be underminedby climate change impacts in the future.Furthermore, relying on carbon-intensivedevelopment today (such as coal-fired powerstations) could well mean a lack of efficiencyand competitiveness in the long term, whenthe worlds economy becomes a low-carbonone, as eventually it must.

There is also a huge opportunity agendato address. Low-carbon, climate-resilient

development could position low-incomecountries well in the future global economy.Addressing climate change can complementand reinforce other development goals,such as poverty reduction, healthimprovement and education. Identifyingthe win-win opportunities is crucial: forexample, how a low-carbon city can bedesigned so that it also improves the healthof its citizens; or how climate-friendly

business start-ups can generate wealth inlow-income communities.

One thing is clear: low-income countriescannot and should not have to make a falsechoice between addressing climate changeand development. This report shows howthe two are fundamentally and inextricablylinked, and demonstrates the value of aholistic approach that addresses themtogether. The future climate for developmentis designed for anyone who has a stake inthe future of low-income countries, includingdevelopment organisations and othernon-governmental organisations (NGOs),businesses, policy makers and low-incomecountry governments. It is a practical tool

to aid long-term thinking, to ensure thatdecisions made today continue to havepositive consequences in years to come.

The report contains a horizon scan, whichexamines key issues that will affect low-income countries over the next 20 years,and four scenarios, which explore howthese issues may play out in different ways,highlighting the challenges and opportunities

low-income countries may face in aclimate-changing world. The horizonscan and scenarios can be used to: future-proof current strategies,

and prioritise areas for work; generate new ideas for future

strategy or policy; look for opportunities for

collaborative working; create a vision of a preferred future.

There are more details on how to use thescenarios at the end of the report. Thereis also a range of supporting materialsavailable to download from our website, at:www.forumforthefuture.org/projects/the-future-climate-for-development

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The scenarios offer vivid, plausible, androbust explorations of different possiblefutures. Scenarios are powerful tools becausethey take us beyond the day-to-day, and showthe inter-connections between different issues.They are not predictions, but are designedto challenge current thinking and providea structured way of bringing the future intodecision-making today. The following pagessummarise the key points of each scenario.

2 The direct impacts of climate change do not varyacross the scenarios but the way each worldresponds to them does.

2030: a horizon scanand four scenarios

We conducted a horizon scan to explore howkey issues will influence the developmentof low-income countries and how theyrespond to climate change. It explores boththe long-term trends and possible shocksin nine broad areas: the global political context; global economies; low-income country politics; demographics in low-income countries; attitudes to climate change in

low-income countries; use of natural resources; the role of technology;

the business response to climate change; the direct impacts of climate change.

Needless to say, not all low-income countrieswill face the same opportunities or challenges;a group (see map) that includes countries asdiverse as the Comoros Islands, Bangladeshand Kenya will have equally diverse issues tocontend with. We also recognise that the low-income countries of today are not necessarilythe ones of 2030.

We explore the global context that thesenations will share, and pull out commonthemes that will be significant for manyof them.

The horizon scan poses questions as diverseas how politically stable will low-incomecountries be in 2030?, what developments

in energy technology might we see? andwill business investors take climate changeinto account?. The different possible answersinform the differences between our fourscenarios. Climate change forms thebackdrop to all of them.2 For more analysisof these issues see pages 1133.

Low-income countries (World Bank, 2009).The current list is: Afghanistan, Bangladesh,Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros,Congo, Dem. Rep. Eritrea, Ethiopia, TheGambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,

Haiti, Kenya, Korea, Dem. Rep, KyrgyzRepublic, Lao PDR, Liberia, Madagascar,Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique,Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal,Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tanzania,Togo, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vietnam,Yemen, Rep. Zambia and Zimbabwe.



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Reversal of Fortunes Age of Opportunity

Reversal of Fortunes Age of Opportunity1

This is a fraught world where the urgentneed to cut carbon dominates international

relations. Drastic measures to decarbonisethe global economy spell crisis for manyindustries and no country is immune to thepain. Having rapidly developed mostlyon carbon-intensive pathways manylow-income countries of the 2010s are nowmiddle-income. They speak with a strong,united voice on the world stage, holdingwealthier nations to account for the problemsof climate change. These new emergingeconomies are the least resilient andare suffering the most, and with the worldfocussed on cutting carbon there is littlemoney in the pot for aid.

In this world

the 2026 Climate Treaty makes failureto meet emissions reduction targets asserious as failure to comply with a UN

Security Council resolution. Countries thatrefuse to sign the treaty are threatened withsanctions and even military intervention;

low-income countries are handicapped bywhite elephant high-carbon infrastructure.Carbon emissions penalties make coal-fired power plants and similar installationsprohibitively expensive to run;

the pan-African grassroots ElephantMovement campaigns for high-incomecountries to repay their carbon debt toAfrica. It unites the voices of low-incomecountries in climate change negotiationsand funds lawsuits against companiesand governments;

multinational companies productsdisappear from many low-incomecountries. Entrepreneurs fill the gaps,offering locally-branded alternatives;

the 2028 Olympics are cancelled forthe first time since World War II, becauseof a lack of carbon credits to fund eitherthe building of stadiums or travel;

the UN sets up an office to coordinategeo-engineering initiatives to tackleclimate change; China proposes theworlds largest programme of seeding

rain-clouds to protect its agriculturalinvestments in Africa;

the number of climate refugees growsby the day and campaigners demandthat developed nations make landavailable for settlement.

2

This is a world where low-income countrieshave received significant and effective

development assistance as part of a strongclimate change deal. They play a growing rolein the world economy and are spearheading alow-carbon energy revolution, leapfroggingthe old high-carbon technologies in pursuitof a prosperous and clean future. Culturalconfidence in these countries is high: theirpoliticians take a prominent place on theworld stage, and increasingly people rejecthigh-carbon Western lifestyles as uncivilised.In many states power has devolved toregions and communities; in some countriesthis has brought positive change, but in otherslarge areas have fallen under the control oflocal mafia and warlords.

In this world

billions of dollars are spent each yearon emergency aid and measures tohelp countries adapt to climate change,

funded by the Climate Relief Tax a0.05% levy on international currencyand commodity transactions (modelledon the so-called Tobin Tax);

low-income countries generate 40%of the worlds solar energy, a hugeincrease since 2010;

communities and businesses haveunprecedented access to low-carbonelectricity thanks to a boom indecentralised power generation.Broadband internet access is widespreadand almost cost-free. This has boosteddelivery of water and services like healthand education;

there is a widespread move to moredevolved politics, and cities becomepowerful political entities: Nigeriasprotests are overruled when Lagos sendsits own delegation to the United Nations;

cultural confidence in low-incomecountries is high and rising: Kinshasaattracts musicians and artists fromaround the world; the Mali Film Festivalreceives as much coverage as Cannes;

smallholder cooperatives have becomethe dominant agricultural model in low-

income countries; these are linked intoglobal supply chains and organisedusing collaborative online software;

many multinational companies have movedtheir operations to low-income countries,attracted by cheap labour and low-carbonelectricity. Home-grown businesses thrive,supported by microfinance and mobilephone-based payment systems.

summaries of the four 2030 scenarios

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The Greater GoodCoping Alone

Coping Alone43

This is a world in which low-income countriesfeel increasingly abandoned. Two decades

of high oil prices and economic stagnationhave driven the global community apart.Attempts to coordinate action to reducecarbon emissions have been dropped.Regional blocs now focus on their ownconcerns, such as food security, resourceshortages and adapting to climate change.Low-income countries face all theseproblems with few resources and limitedsupport from wealthy nations; some stateshave collapsed. New models of businessand governance are starting to emergefrom the shadows of increasing inequality.

In this world

the world is still recovering from theMiddle East conflict of the 2010s whichpushed the oil price above $400 and

destabilised the whole region. Lowlevels of conflict over water persist; oil-importing countries have suffered

hugely. Oil-exporting countries havebuilt up huge sovereign wealth fundswith massive influence over the globaleconomy, and are starting to invest inrenewable energy technologies;

most global supply chains havecontracted under the shadow of highoil prices; some are kept moving bybiofuels, tar sands oil, and shippingpowered by advanced kite systems;

regional integration of low-incomecountries is a common strategy toincrease resilience and political power:the Pacific members of the Alliance ofSmall Island States become a singlestate in 2023; the East African Unionhas a common currency;

food security is a worldwide concern;vegetarianism is a global moral movement;

nuclear offshoring is becoming common:wealthy nations build nuclear plants inlow-income countries, which are runby their own military; they export thepower giving the host country a share;

desktop manufacturing is beginning totake off in some low-income countrieswhere energy is available: people userecycled plastics to make all sorts ofproducts using 3-D printers to replicateblueprints available on the internet.

The Greater Good

This is a world where people understand thateconomies rely fundamentally on access to

natural resources. Climate change is seenas the ultimate resource crunch, but thereare equal concerns over water, food and soildepletion. States manage natural resourcespragmatically to give the greatest good forthe greatest number and are prepared to takedraconian action to protect them. Individualliberties and choice have suffered, but mostpeople feel that their future is at least beingsafeguarded. Those low-income countrieswith natural resources prosper; those withouthave little bargaining power. Tensionsbetween rival resource blocs are intense,and sometimes spill over into violent conflict.

In this world

new political alliances form aroundnatural geographic boundaries such asthe Niger/Volta watershed collaboration.

Regional blocs manage food, energy,biodiversity and even population; state-sponsored family planning and

public health initiatives and limits onnumbers of children are common;

compulsory identity cards holdinginformation about personal resourceconsumption are common all over theworld; companies sell services (such aspersonal carbon quota management)to help people avoid falling foul of thestrict legislation;

smart dust a worldwide networkof nanotech computers monitorsenvironmental conditions, resource useand pollution, providing governmentsand business with real-time information;

international retailers, whose presencein low-income countries increasesyear-on-year, demand full ecosystemintegrity in the goods that they sell;entire product lines have been withdrawnfor being unsustainable;

insects, such as farmed grasshoppers,have replaced animals and fish as themain source of protein for hundreds ofmillions of people in Africa and Eurasia.

Vegetarian diets are common andenforced in some areas;

rapid urbanisation and new plannedcities create a huge market for flat-packhousing which can be constructedquickly and easily using government-approved materials.

cont

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what does this mean for developmentin low-income countries?

The scenarios are tools that any organisation can use for strategic planning,but we have given particular thought to what they mean for developmentagencies. We believe that the seven points below are important messagesfor anyone working in the development field.

1. Climate change isa development issue

Climate change and development shouldbe seen as complementary, not competing,

issues: acting on one involves acting onthe other. If ignored, climate change hasthe potential to fundamentally undermineeven the best development initiatives.

Taking action on climate change can bringa host of co-benefits for development: thesewin-wins need to inform the developmentdiscourse. Investment in renewable energygeneration and energy efficiency canenhance energy security. Promoting low-carbon transport means reduced congestion,pollution and healthcare costs. Low-input

agriculture focussed on maintaining soilquality boosts food security and is likelyto be a robust strategy for adapting to achanging climate. All of these examplescan also lead to the creation of new jobs.

Development in a climate-changing worldis not about sacrificing opportunities, butabout making smart choices, which addressthese kinds of long-term co-benefits.

3. All development mustbe climate-resilient

Development initiatives must be evaluatedagainst the context of climate change

and the radical changes it is likely to bringabout in low-income countries, in termsof economic, social and political impactsas well as environmental ones. Decision-making processes must take into accountthe potential long-term consequences oftodays initiatives to make sure they willsurvive and continue to deliver benefits.

Low-carbon development is part of a resilientlong-term strategy. It is not the only way,nor should it be the only consideration, butit is a vital ingredient in the development mix

if low-income countries are to be competitiveplayers in a climate-changing world.

2. Climate change will changethe nature of development

Whatever happens, there will still be a needto focus on some of the fundamental tenets

of development with which all developmentprofessionals are familiar: building peacefulstates and societies; protecting andenhancing the livelihoods of the poor andvulnerable; and building governancesystems that are capable, responsive andaccountable to their citizens.

But some elements of development successmay look very different in the future, andour scenarios explore this possibility. Forexample in The Greater Good democracyis no longer perceived by Western donors

as fundamental for development, and inAge of Opportunity GDP (gross domesticproduct) loses its place as the definingmeasure of success. The prospect ofradical changes such as these meansthat development organisations will needa flexible approach and a readiness todeploy different strategies.

4. Climate change maycause dramatic reversalsin countries fortunes

Climate change may cause major reversals in

the economic fortunes of countries at everydevelopment level for both better and worse.This may result from both the direct impactsof climate change and the indirect ones suchas political and economic restructuring, andthe value attached to different resources.

It will be crucial to map the potential winnersand losers of the coming decades byconsidering which countries are the best andworst prepared, socially and economically,to adapt to climate change in a variety offutures. This is likely to highlight the limited

usefulness of the current categorisation oflow-income countries, which does not capturecharacteristics like economic diversity thatwill help determine how they are affected byclimate change and how they may respond.

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5. Support change from within

As those working in development know,building a stronger civil society in low-incomecountries will bring many benefits. In the

future, provision of climate finance (to helpcountries adapt to climate change) andthe price of various natural resources maychange suddenly and in unexpected ways.Demand for accountability that comes fromwithin, rather than from external partners,will therefore be the most robust strategy.It will also be important to increase publicunderstanding and awareness of climatechange in low-income countries, in orderto build both social support for climatechange action and scrutiny of whateverclimate change initiatives are undertaken.

6. Work with businessto catalyse change

Business can be an important vehicle forcatalysing low-carbon approaches globally

and a powerful partner, particularly wheregovernment-level engagement is difficult.There is significant potential for multinationalcorporations to export climate changegood practice from high and middle-incometo low-income countries, even if the lattersgovernments are pursuing high-carbongrowth strategies. Development agenciescould play a vital role in helping low-incomecountries put in place incentives to attractbusiness investment in low-carbondevelopment, such as tax relief.

Partnering with business can also unlock newways of working: because companies needto respond to (or create) demand, they arewell placed to take a proactive, opportunity-focussed approach to climate change.

7. Prepare for the challenges thatfeature in a range of futures

The four scenarios are very different, butthey have several common themes that

development organisations should beprepared for: rapid urbanisation is one theme: projections

indicate that in many low-income countriesthe majority of the population will live incities by 2030. There is huge potential forearly intervention to maximise sustainability effectively designing expanded citiesfrom first principles;

change in agriculture and land use morebroadly especially how forests aremanaged will also be of great significancein low-income countries, affecting their

capacity to adapt to climate changeand avoid emissions, and of course theirfood security;

absolute population growth persists in allscenarios, and cannot remain the taboosubject it currently is in some quarters.Development organisations will needto explore the implications of this trendand consider their views on the subject;

persistent and growing inequality is likely,so continuing investment in social policywill be important;

future political heavyweights such asChina, and other rapidly growing economies

may interact with low-income countries inunexpected ways; there is a need to betterunderstand how these relationships couldplay out;

established political boundaries maychange: the wider region or the individualcity could be the crucial points forengagement in the future.

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Why do this work?

This report was supported by the UKGovernments Department for International

Development to shift the debate on therelationship between development andclimate change. It aims to facilitate a longer-term and more holistic approach to decision-making, in particular to highlight the win-winopportunities where acting on climatechange and development simultaneouslycan have positive consequences for both.

Much of the discourse on climate changeso far has been about, and dominatedby, high-income countries and rapidlygrowing economies. This project is one

attempt to redress that, and to thinksystematically through the possible futuredevelopment pathways for low-incomecountries in a climate-changing world.3

This work, led by independent sustainabilityexperts Forum for the Future, draws onextensive research, a high-level steeringgroup and the opinions of more than 100

experts in the development field. We havespoken to development professionals,entrepreneurs, government officials,independent thinkers and business leadersfrom all over the world, asking what thecoming decades might hold and howlow-income countries might best developin these different possible futures.

One thing is certain: climate change is notgoing to go away, and such a long-termchallenge needs a long-term approach tostrategic decision-making if the risks and

opportunities are to be managed effectively.It remains uncertain how exactly climatechange will affect low-income countriesbut it is essential that humanity confrontsthese questions, and that we approach thefuture with our eyes wide open.

Whats in the report?

The future climate for development beginswith a horizon scan identifying the factorswhich could influence the way low-incomecountries develop and respond to climatechange over the next 20 years, such as thestate of the global economy, how engagedbusinesses are with climate change and whattechnological innovations are forthcoming.

We then explore how these factors may playout in four scenarios for 2030, which presentfour possible but very different future worlds.The scenarios are a structured way of askinga lot of what if questions about factorswhich may affect low-income countries andhow they deal with climate change in thefuture. What if we have much faster thanexpected advances in renewable energygeneration? What if we see new politicalalliances between different countries? Whatif global agreements to mitigate climatechange stall repeatedly? These questions

are impossible to answer definitively, butwe can use scenarios to explore possibleanswers, discuss what those differentanswers might depend on, and explorewhat that means for low-income countries.

The next section outlines the implicationsof the scenarios and explores what all thismeans for the development agenda today.

The final section of the report providesguidance on how to use the scenarios,and details the supporting materials that

are available.

Who is it for?

This report is for anyone who has a stake inthe future of low-income countries; it is a toolto support a long-term holistic approach todecision-making. For example, the horizonscan and the scenarios can be used by: development organisations, both in the

UK and internationally, to future-proofcurrent strategy and provide inspiration

for future initiatives; businesses operating in low-incomecountries, to look at the long-term impactsof investment decisions, and to stimulatenew business ideas;

low-income country governments, toexplore the long-term impacts of decisionsmade today;

policy makers, to ensure that policies putin place today are robust and stress-testedagainst a range of possible futures.

Exploring the future in this way can help usprepare for a wide range of possibilities, and

may lead to insights which help us to shapea better future.

3 World Bank, 2009. Low-income countries are thosewhose 2008 gross national income (GNI) percapita, calculated using the World Bank Atlasmethod, is $975 or less. The current list is:Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso,Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic,Chad, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep, Eritrea,Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Korea, Dem. Rep. KyrgyzRepublic, Lao PDR, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal,Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia,Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Uzbekistan,Vietnam, Yemen, Rep. Zambia and Zimbabwe.

introduction

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what factors will shapethe future responseto climate change inlow-income countries?

This section explores the key factors that will influencehow low-income countries respond to climate changein the future. To identify these factors we conductedextensive desk research and spoke to over 100

people from around the world: entrepreneurs, futurists,sector specialists, government representatives,climate change scientists, individuals from non andinter-governmental organisations, and experts ininternational development.

We drew on Forums previous work in thisarea primarily Climate Futures, whichexamines the potential future humanresponse to climate change with a focuson business and high-income countries.We visited Kenya, Bangladesh and Ethiopiato get a better understanding of thesecountries perspectives, and to ensurethe issues we explore do not just reflect

the UK point of view.

In this section we explore where these factorsstand today and how they might play out overthe next two decades. Weve clustered theminto nine broad areas: the direct impacts of climate change; the global political context;global economies;low-income country politics;demographics in low-income countries;

attitudes to climate change inlow-income countries;

use of natural resources;the role of technology;the business response to climate change.

Clearly, it would be easy to devote an entirereport (or an entire career!) to any one ofthese subjects. We therefore take a toplineapproach to discussing their possiblefuture directions, concentrating on thebroad themes within these sections, andthe linkages between them.

We recognise that each one of these nine

areas encompasses a host of important,often interlinked, questions. Within business,for example: to what extent will businesses engage

with climate change from both anadaptation and mitigation perspective?

to what extent will supply chains beaffected by climate change?

to what extent will investors see climatechange as an issue for business to address?

will we see new business models emergingin low-income countries?

We therefore conducted an online consultationwith over 60 people from different parts ofthe world to ascertain which were the mostimportant questions within each section. Its

these questions and their possible answers that weve focussed on, both in thefollowing horizon scan and in our scenarios.

Despite this extensive trawl of differentstakeholders, we acknowledge that onevoice is largely missing: the poor themselves.Understanding their perspective will becrucial in further research on the subject.

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the direct impacts of climate change

We cannot begin to understand low-income countries responses to climatechange without considering the direct impacts of climate change itself.So this section focuses on the projected climate impacts by 2030. Althoughwe cannot be sure about how exactly the climate will change, we have agood idea of the direction of that change and, for the next 20 years at least,of the scale of change we are likely to experience.

Estimating the impacts

The Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange (IPCC) collects, assesses andsummarises all the research evidenceavailable, and produces regular assessmentreports that outline the range of expectedimpacts. The IPCCs fourth and most recentassessment was published in 2007, giving amid-range estimate for the next 20 years ofan average global warming of 0.4 degreesCelsius.4 It states that in the years to come:

the frequency and intensity of storms arelikely to increase;

there will be more areas affected by drought; there will be more and hotter heat waves in

temperate zones; ecosystems will be affected and biodiversity

will be hit; certain diseases could become more

common; sea levels are likely to rise.

Latest thinking

At the time of writing it is over three yearssince the draft text was completed for theIPCCs Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) and,in the meantime, many hundreds of papershave been published on a suite of topicsrelated to human-induced climate change.In order to capture this thinking in time toinform the climate change negotiations atCopenhagen in December 2009, 26 scientistsreleased an interim evaluation of the evolving

science in November 2009. This report The Copenhagen Diagnosis highlightedthe following as the most significant recentclimate change findings: surging greenhouse gas emissions: Global

carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels in2008 were 40% higher than those in 1990.Even if global emission rates are stabilisedat present-day levels, just 20 more years ofemissions would give a 25% probability thatwarming exceeds 2C, even with zeroemissions after 2030. Every year of delayedaction increases the chances of exceeding

2C warming.5

; recent global temperatures demonstrate

human-induced warming: Over the past25 years temperatures have increasedat a rate of 0.19C per decade, consistentwith predictions based on greenhousegas increases;

acceleration of melting of ice-sheets,glaciers and ice-caps: A wide array ofsatellite and ice measurements nowdemonstrate beyond doubt that both theGreenland and Antarctic ice-sheets arelosing mass at an increasing rate. Meltingof glaciers and ice-caps in other parts ofthe world has also accelerated since 1990;

rapid Arctic sea ice decline: Summertimemelting of Arctic sea ice has accelerated far

beyond the expectations of climate models; current sea-level rise underestimated:Satellites show recent global average sea-level rise (3.4 mm/yr over the past 15 years)to be ~80% above past IPCC predictions;

sea level predictions revised: By 2100,global sea level is likely to rise at least twiceas much as projected by Working Group 1of the IPCC AR4; for unmitigated emissionsit may well exceed one metre. The upperlimit has been estimated as ~ two metressea-level rise by 2100;

delay in action risks irreversible damage:Several vulnerable elements in the climate

system (e.g. continental ice-sheets,Amazon rainforest, West African monsoonand others) could be pushed towardsabrupt or irreversible change if warmingcontinues in a business-as-usual waythroughout this century. The risk oftransgressing critical thresholds (tippingpoints) increases strongly with ongoingclimate change.

While these updated findings do notsignificantly alter the predicted physicalchanges that we are likely to experience by

2030, they do increase the urgency for actionwithin that period if we are to avoid disruptivechange over the remainder of the 21stcentury. There is a very high probability ofthe warming exceeding 2C unless globalemissions peak and start to decline rapidlyby 2020, warn the authors. If we do not act,and follow a business-as-usual pathway forthe next few decades, then global meanwarming is estimated to reach 47C by

2100, locking in climate change at a scalethat would profoundly and adversely affectall of human civilisation and all of the worldsmajor ecosystems.

This should not, however, suggest thatdealing with climate change is a problemfor future generations. The planet willexperience real transformation as a resultof climate change in the next 20 years.

And, as many of the experts we interviewedstressed, individuals and communities in low-income countries are already experiencingelevated levels of environmental stress asa result of changes in the climate.

As Dr Vicky Pope, Head of Climate ChangeAdvice at the UK Met Office puts it, Whilewe are unlikely to cross any significantclimate thresholds in the next 20 years,many low-income countries are veryvulnerable to current climatic variability.And climate change will exacerbate thatvulnerability. Events that have been rare

especially water-related events such asdrought and flooding will become muchmore common.

All our scenarios reflect the same levelof climate change. We explore the sameclimate-related events in each, highlightingthe different responses that these producein each of the scenarios.6

4 TheIPPC WGI Fourth Assessment Report projectsa scenario-independent global temperatureincrease of about 0.2C per decade for the nexttwo decades.

5 Many nations recognise 2C as the thresholdbelow which the average global temperature risemust remain if we are to avoid dangerous climatechange. Others say that it should be lower.

6 For an explanation of why we dont vary the levelof climate change, or the climate-related events,between the scenarios, please see Appendix One.

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the global political context

How might global patterns of political power evolve over the next 20 years?What are the prospects for a binding deal on climate change? And whatwill become of Overseas Development Aid? These are just some of thequestions we address in this section, which explores what the worldspolitical platform might look like in 2030.

Could globalisation thatseemingly unstoppable force slow, or even reverse?

It may be difficult today to envisage a lessglobalised world in the future, as the cleardirection in recent decades has been towardscloser ties between countries. But manyfactors could undermine or even reversethis trend. Chief among these is surelyhow interconnected the global economyis, something we explore in our economics

section below. The cost of transportation,heavily influenced even in 2030 by theprice of oil, will have a bearing on thisquestion, as will the degree to which globalinstitutions such as the United Nationsor World Trade Organisation are, or areseen to be, worthwhile and successful.7Increasing penetration of informationtechnology, as explored in our section ontechnology, will also have an influence,perhaps helping to bind disparate culturestogether whether or not governments andbusinesses are closely aligned.

Will we see changed politicalentities in the future? Could strongregionalisation or resource-basedboundaries make this happen?

Some of the experts we spoke to whileconstructing our scenarios saw the prospectof new or altered states and new centresof power emerging in the next 20 years.The rise of China was mentioned bypractically everyone we spoke to (see boxon China on p15). Other countries such as

India, Brazil, Russia, Mexico and Indonesiaalso came up as having the potential to wieldmore power on the world stage, influencingpolitics in ways that are hard to anticipate.

The next two decades could also bringchanges to established political boundaries.Chris West, Director of the Shell Foundation,pointed out that National boundariesare becoming less and less relevant insome areas. The agriculture sector ismoving away from national boundariesto agricultural corridors.

Regional cooperation over natural resourcessuch as water could also lead to a shift inthe political landscape. According to FaisalIslam, Environment and Livelihoods Advisorat DFID Bangladesh, The scope for regionalsolutions will need to be explored muchmore over the next 20 years. The South AsiaWater Initiative promotes dialogue but moreis needed, for example, with watershed

management and possible new storage inNepal and Bhutan. The South Asia region isalready reasonably connected but moreregional cooperation may be needed toaddress some of the connected energy, water,flood and food issues. We explore a possiblemove towards regionalism in our scenarioCoping Alone, in which regional blocs suchas East Africa move towards closer integrationin response to economic and environmental

pressures, and the Association of SmallIsland States becomes a state in its own right.Increasing attention is already being paidto potential benefits of regional economicconsolidation: one project interviewee pointedout that Regional integration has got a lotof potential to boost growth Kenyas tradewould really benefit from a strengthenedmarket in East Africa. Its always been arguedthat global trade is more important, but therecession has shown sense in promotingregional economic expansion.

Could climate change put

unmanageable pressures onweaker states?

Resource pressures and poverty could alsolead to fragmentation and even the collapseof some states. Robin Milton, Senior SocialDevelopment Advisor at DFID Ethiopiapointed out to us that If we dont managethe social impacts of globalisation then thereis a risk of fragmentation of countries thatcant deal with the levels of inequality, bothinternally and compared to neighbours.

Part of the seriousness of climatechange is that we cant understandit within our current frameworks andideas of stability. Global terrorismand 9/11 are tiny in comparison.Project interviewee

Climate change itself will tend to magnifyrisks, potentially leading to conflict. NigelInkster, Director of Transnational Threatsand Political Risk at the International Institutefor Strategic Studies told us that Climatechange impacts will be greatest in areaswhere conflict is already most common the zone of conflict stretching from Africaacross the Middle East into South Asia. Thereis a possibility of managing down the risks

but this will be difficult. We could see thereturn of inter-state conflict, particularly overwater resources.

How coordinated will the globalpolitical response to climatechange be?

International relations and the formationof new countries or geopolitical blocs willsignificantly influence how coordinated oruncoordinated the global response to climatechange is. Many of those we talked to forthis project even before the Copenhagen

climate change summit were sceptical thatthe world will work together to solve the crisis.One interviewee in Bangladesh was of theview that The large developing countries arenot ready to face the reality that if the boatsinks then we all drown.

Some commentators have suggestedthat we are at a tipping point between aninternationalist response and a nationalist,protectionist response with many arguingthat the outcomes of the COP15 conferencein Copenhagen mark an early move towards

a more protectionist world.

Our scenarios reflect the uncertainty aroundhow geopolitics and the response to climatechange will play out. In Reversal of Fortunes,climate change eventually drives theemergence of a new global ethic. In Coping

7 For example, see World Trade: Possible Futures,Foresight Government Office for Science, 2009.

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New donors are coming into the aideconomy such as Taiwan, and Brazil.

This will change how aid is done.Natasha Grist, Research Fellow,Overseas Development Institute

[The Chinese] are not setting out to dogood. They are setting out to do business.Its actually much less demeaning.Arnold Ekpe, Chief Executive Officer,Ecobank, Togo8

Climate change could re-enforceaid because it is measurable forexample saving X amount of rainforest.The imposition of metrics may helpaid to become more robust. Also withclimate change high-income countrieshave a greater incentive for the aid

to work they need the mitigation totake place.Jeremy Oppenheim and Chloe Lamb,McKinsey & Co

8 Quoted in Africa: Business Destination, inTime Magazine, March 2009.

9 Cotula, L., and Vermeulen, S., Deal or no deal: theoutlook for agricultural land investment in Africa,International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 6, Nov 2009.

10 See http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/ press/07.htm for detail

11 By the end of 2008, the G7 have delivered onethird of the increases promised by 2010: only$7 billion of the $21.5 billion promised. OneInternational, data report 2009, see http://one.org/international/datareport2009/foreword.html


Alone, different countries and blocs struggleto cope with climate change in a politicallyand economically fragmented world, whilein The Greater Good a complex networkof bilateral and multilateral agreements scaleup to make de facto global structures.

How will relationships betweenlow-income countries and the restof the world evolve?

The approach that high and middle-incomecountries take to international developmentwill be key to answering this question.

Greg Briffa, Team Leader on Low-CarbonDevelopment at DFID, points out thatThere can be a tension between the twoapproaches that donors can take: a welfareapproach and one thats more aboutstimulating private sector growth. Manyof the experts we consulted had the viewthat the latter of these approaches wouldcome to dominate over the next 20 years.

One interviewee in Ethiopia said that The ageof development aid and systems is finished.The current system of aid is ultimately aboutcharitable donation based on a moral issue,whereas Chinese and Indian interest in Africais financial and commodity based. Seenin a positive light, this could usher in morebalance in the relationship between rich andpoor, based on equal exchange of materials,goods and knowledge. Alternatively it couldlead to greater exploitation and less powerfor low-income countries over the use of theirresources. Chinas influence stretches far

and wide in our scenario The Greater Good,as it brokers bilateral and multilateral deals,and invests to protect its overseas assets.Land acquisition in low-income countriesby other nations is currently a high-profiletopic in the media, and one that a numberof our interviewees saw as symbolic. Howthis will play out is highly uncertain. Globalfood security and commodity markets couldbe undermined, with local communities

radicalised and left landless. On the otherhand, long-term investments could havea positive outcome, channelling new fundsto improve local infrastructure and skills.9

What will become of OverseasDevelopment Aid, and how willclimate change fit in?

If the emphasis amongst aid-givers is awayfrom charitable aid and towards trade anddirect investment, what will become ofOverseas Development Aid (ODA)? Repeatedcommitments to devote 0.7% of GNP(gross national product) to ODA10 havein many cases yet to be honoured, withsome countries actually moving in the wrongdirection.11 However, some intervieweesargued that enlightened self-interest willactually mean that high-income countriesstart to pay more attention and money

to the issues of development which, ifignored, will have global ramifications.Will Day, Senior Associate at the CambridgeProgramme for Sustainability Leadershipobserved that When migrants start tomove then the aid budget will be seen ina different light one of enlightened self-interest as well as moral duty. Its the samewith food security and energy security theimpacts from these macro issues will mean

that some high-income countries see ODAvery differently.

Many of the experts we spoke to raisedquestions about the effect that the needfor climate change funding would haveon existing development aid. Will it divertfunds? Or will the need to prove that anyfunds are additional (to existing ODA) meanthat climate change money is ring-fenced,

which might actually prevent it from havingthe most positive development outcomes?One interviewee suggested that The climatechange agenda is likely to go the way ofgender: siloed rather than integrated. It mayeven be a necessity to do this in order to raisethe required funding. Silos are common in aidand have contributed to the great historicalfailure of aid given the long-term natureof climate change and need for integration,another silo wont help. Or, in a more positivefuture, as John Hudson, Forestry Advisor atDFID suggested, Climate change could actas a catalyst for treating the development

question properly. By exacerbating so manyhistorical development problems, climatechange could focus global attention morekeenly on the plight of poor people in poorcountries. Moreover, as climate change growsin importance, the synergies between climateaction and development action will surely onlybecome clearer. This integration of issues isexplored in our scenario Age of Opportunity.
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/07.htmhttp://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/07.htmhttp://one.org/international/datareport2009/foreword.htmlhttp://one.org/international/datareport2009/foreword.htmlhttp://one.org/international/datareport2009/foreword.htmlhttp://one.org/international/datareport2009/foreword.htmlhttp://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/07.htmhttp://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/07.htm


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The future of China

At the time of writing China already emits more CO2 per year than any other nation,

and according to the World Bank has the third largest economy, after the USA and Japan.

By 2030, although India could well have replaced China as the most populous country

in the world, China is expected to be well on the way to global economic pre-eminence.

One recent study suggested that Chinas economy will be the worlds largest by 2032 14;

others indicate a quicker rise.

Along with its economic muscle, Chinas political influence is likely to grow, and its cul-

tural reach to expand trends already visible in 2010. China is currently investing in ConfuciusInstitutes around the world, aimed at promoting Chinese culture globally. Launched in 2004,

there are now 282 in 88 countries (including 23 low-income countries).15 The Chinese govern-

ment also recently announced the launch of a 24-hour English-language news station to

compete with CNN, Al-Jazeera and BBC.

Recent attention has been focussed most on Chinas growing interests in low-income

country resources, particularly in Africa. Ton Berg, Head of Missions for Mdecins Sans Front-

ires reflected in her interview how 15 years ago you could point to where China is on a

map of Africa. You cant do that now as its everywhere. Robin Powell, a journalist based

in Japan, wrote recently in Prospect Magazine that China controls 95% of the worlds supply

in heavy metals, both through extraction at home and through its courtship of mineral-rich

African regimes, positioning China very well for the continuing boom in heavy metals use

in electronics.16

China has a particularly strong presence in Ethiopia, a country we visited during

the research for The future climate for development. Wendwossen Kebede, a Senior Programme

Manager for VSO in Ethiopia could see the appeal for the Ethiopian government in working

with China, as it is willing to fund easily the things that World Bank and African Develop-

ment Bank arent interested in. While the African Progress Panel notes that Chinese

SOEs [state-owned enterprises] are regularly accused of taking advantage of the weak

regulatory and enforcement capacities of African national and local authorities to circumvent

international standards in areas such as contract bidding, employment law, and health

and safety regulations, it also berates a simplistic analysis of Chinas role in Africa: The

notion that Sino-African relations can be viewed simply in terms of one giant resource grab

is out-dated at best. While resource extraction remains a central objective, commercial

relations between China and Africa are now increasingly multi-faceted, with interactions

developing in areas such as financial services, agriculture, or information and commun-

ication technology.17

Indeed, one interviewee wondered if China will see climate changeas a risk to its investments and therefore help low-income countries with adaptation and

mitigation measures.

Most of the experts we spoke to assumed that Chinas growth would continue

practically unabated and that we are entering a period of Chinese dominance. But discussions

in one of our scenario workshops questioned this. China could experience increased political

instability of the sort witnessed recently. Combined with the risk multiplier of climate change,

and the potential for prolonged drought or even conflict over water resources, it is certainly

possible to envisage a future scenario of partial collapse and retrenchment.

12 The Climate action and renewable energypackage, Europes climate change opportunity,European Commissions Climate Action site,see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/ climate_action.htm

13 China sets target to cut carbon intensity,Marianne Bom, November 2009 on COP 15website publications, see http://en.cop15.dk/news/view+news?newsid=2717

14 Dadush, U., and Stancil, B., 2009, The G20in 2050,International Economic Bulletin,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

15 http://college.chinese.cn/en/node_1979.htm 16 Heavy Metal,Prospect Magazine,

November 2009.17 Chinas Growing Engagement in Africa,

African Progress Panel, December 2009.


How high will climate change siton the political agendas of highand middle-income countries?

The outcomes of Copenhagen notwith-standing, many countries have begun toact decisively to both adapt to and mitigateclimate change. In the run-up to the COP15conference in Copenhagen, the EU wasoffering to replace existing commitments

(to 20% cuts in emissions by 2020 on 1990levels), with 30% cuts, in the event of anambitious global deal.12 Japan has indicatedit will aim to reduce emissions by 25% inthe same time frame. Even states that areresisting commitments to absolute emissionsreductions are taking action. Gerry Duffy,Senior Policy Advisor at DFID told us thatInitially middle-income countries did notsee the value of investing in low-carbongrowth. However, some (like Mexico, South

Africa and Brazil), after being encouragedto develop low-carbon developmentstrategies setting out the costs and

benefits, saw the opportunities to takeadvantage of new and additional financeand discovered their first-moveradvantage. China has pledged a reductionin carbon intensity (i.e. its use of fossil fuelsper unit of economic output) of 40 to 45%.13

While it would be wrong to assume thatlow-income countries will only follow theleader on climate change, it is likely that alack of visible action on climate change fromwealthier countries would act as a seriousdisincentive to action in low-income countries.And quite apart from questions of politicalwill, policies in high and middle-incomecountries will have massive global influence.For example, a carbon tax on imports into

Japan would significantly affect the viabilityof some low-income countries exports,and could force investment in low-carbontechnology. It may even be that developednations come to see high-carbon activityelsewhere as sufficiently irresponsible towarrant direct intervention. We explore thispossibility in the fraught atmosphere of thescenario Reversal of Fortunes.
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htmhttp://en.cop15.dk/news/view+news?newsid=2717http://en.cop15.dk/news/view+news?newsid=2717http://en.cop15.dk/news/view+news?newsid=2717http://college.chinese.cn/en/node_1979.htmhttp://college.chinese.cn/en/node_1979.htmhttp://en.cop15.dk/news/view+news?newsid=2717http://en.cop15.dk/news/view+news?newsid=2717http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htm


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What are the prospects fora global climate agreement?

For some, the scale of the climate changechallenge means that we will inevitably(eventually) witness an all-encompassing,high-impact global deal. Commenting ontheir recent paper An institutional architecturefor climate change,18 authors Alex Evans andDavid Steven said they can envisage a deal in

which, Either countries play a full part in thesystem, or they sit outside the internationalsystem and are effectively barred from allforms of international cooperation that thisshould currently seem inconceivable indicatesthe extent of the shift in understanding thatis still needed. For others, a deal is largelyirrelevant, and a combination of enlightenedself-interest and market mechanisms willprovide the necessary impetus for change.Our scenarios explore various points onthis scale, from the stringent global deal ofReversal of Fortunes, to the multiple bi- andmultilateral deals of The Greater Good, to

the largely regulation-free Coping Alone.

Whether or not we see a binding globalclimate change deal, the amount of moneyavailable to low-income countries for bothadaptation and low-carbon development will be a crucial factor in how they fare ina changing climate. But whilst the text ofthe Copenhagen Accord recognises the needto transfer funds, technology and capacityto low-income countries, the scale of thisspend is highly uncertain, as is its allocation.As Calum Miller, Head of the Growth and

Investment Group at DFID pointed out, Thereis a balance to be struck between gettingfinance to those countries with significantassets (e.g. forests) and those that are mostexposed to the impacts of climate change.At the moment it seems likely that a key focusfor engagement with low-income countries willbe on reducing emissions from deforestationand degradation (REDD) for whichsubstantial funding was promised at COP15.

Will mitigation mechanismshit their mark?

Current projects aimed at reducing globalemissions, such as the Clean DevelopmentMechanism (CDM), aim to put funding whereit is most needed, but so far only two percent of certified projects are in Africa. Thisis attributed to a variety of reasons, not leastthe difficulty of replicating projects, and the

heavily bureaucratic process for approval.In the future, a number of changes mightincrease the impact of such mechanismsin low-income countries. The requirementto show additionality19 might be removedfrom small-scale projects in the future,or funding could extend to avoidedemissions rather than just reductions.The latter possibility would negate thecurrent perception that in order to benefitfrom CDM a country already needs tobe emitting carbon, and to go for dirtydevelopment first before it can act positively.

For some, an important variable is where thereal benefit from any funding is felt. Someinterviewees suggested that current carbonreduction mechanisms end up puttingmoney in the pocket of the middleman whenthey take a top-down approach. There area number of initiatives currently trying tocounter this, and make sure benefits accruefrom the bottom up. Carbon Manna,20 for

Billions, potentially trillions of dollarswill need to move from places wherecarbon is being used to placeswhere it isnt. We need to make surethe mechanisms are effective andtransparent, otherwise the wholeprocess could be undermined.Will Day, Cambridge Programmefor Sustainability Leadership

example, is a beta project whereby microcarbon payments reach the individualsinvolved via their mobile phones, rewardingthem for emissions reductions made usingefficient stoves or solar panels. Could wesee this type of approach becoming muchmore widespread in the future?

18 Evans, A., and Stevens, D., 2009,An InstitutionalArchitecture for Climate Change, Center onInternational Cooperation.

19 The principle that greenhouse gas emissionreductions from a project must be additionalto those that would have occurred as a matterof course without the project being undertaken;see also http://cdmrulebook.org/464

20 See www.carbonmanna.org

http://cdmrulebook.org/464http://www.carbonmanna.org/http://www.carbonmanna.org/http://cdmrulebook.org/464


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How big will the globaleconomy be in 2030?

One key uncertainty is the extent to which thecurrent economic crisis will have a long-termimpact on the size of the global economy.

Projected population growth and increases

in productivity per person lead Jeffrey Sachsto conclude that the future scale of the worldseconomic production is likely to be severaltimes what it is today21, 22 and he estimatesthat it will be approximately $200tn by 2030.23But our research suggested that a lot willdepend on the length and depth of therecession that began in 2008, which wontbe clear for some time. There could also besecondary effects through other shocks suchas increased oil and food prices, which couldbe worsened by the recession,24 and therecould even be a permanent restructuring of

the global economy.25

For others the recession is unlikely to be morethan a blip. Dimitri Zenghelis, an economistwho worked on the UKs Stern Review26 ofthe economics of climate change, argues thatThere is no reason to think that the underlyingpattern of economic growth will be differentover the next 20 years; we wont reach bindingsustainability constraints in that time.

Some believe that developing countries havethe potential to be much more significantdrivers of economic growth than they arecurrently. The World Economic Forum arguesthat Africa has been relatively shielded fromfinancial meltdown because it is lessinterlinked with the global economy thanother parts of the world although resource

rich countries, such as Nigeria, have suffered.They argue that Africa has the potential tobe an engine for economic growth as theworld comes out of crisis if there is suitableinvestment, for example in the education ofgirls and women.27

21 Sachs, J., 2009, Common Wealth: Economicsfor a Crowded Planet.

22 World Bank puts global GDP at 60,587 billionfor 2008.

23 From $70tn in 2008.24 The global recession and Africa: Where next

after the G-20? ODI event report, May 2009.25 What the world economic crisis of 2008/09

means for global agricultural trade, UnitedStates Department of Agriculture, Economicsresearch service, 2009.

26 Stern, N., 2006, Stern Review: the economicsof climate change, HM Treasury, London.

27 Implications of the Global Economic Crisis forAfrica, World Economic Forum for Africa, 2009.

global economies

The global economic crisis that started in 2008 has disturbed many trends such as globalisation and continuing economic growth that many werestarting to consider unstoppable. Research and interviews for The futureclimate for development show that experts are now seriously divided overthe future of the global economy, with several key questions emerging fromour work: How much will the global economy grow? Will economicinterdependency continue or go into reverse? And where will the locus ofeconomic power be? Will we start to see new economic models emergingand becoming more dominant?

Once the immediate recession startsto soften we will see the return in theshort term to positive economicgrowth in emerging markets, but aswe start to experience sustainabilityimpacts in emerging markets forexample the impact of climate change

on agriculture, fisheries, wateravailability, people migration thenwe may start to see flattening of thatgrowth earlier than you might predictwithout those resource constraints.Chris Burgess, Group Director ofCorporate Responsibility, Vodafone

Will the economy buckle undersustainability constraints?

Speculation about the future of the globaleconomy must take into account its

fundamental dependence on the environment.Resource constraints and climate changeimpacts will seriously constrain growth ifnot addressed. Many low-income countries,such as Bangladesh and Ethiopia, have plansand visions to bring them to middle-incomestatus over the next 20 years. But countrieswith a heavy dependency on farming andcommodity exports are very vulnerableto climatic impacts.28 In Bangladesh, forexample, Faisal Islam of DFID told us thatalthough economic growth is currently atfive to six per cent, environmental limits

are already being hit and welfare gains arebecoming more limited. Could it be that by2030 we witness non-functioning economiesin some vulnerable countries, collapsingunder the weight of sustainability pressures?

A wide variety of industries could beaffected by climate change: insurance,agriculture, fisheries, forestry, real estateand tourism are industries that areparticularly exposed because of their

dependency on the natural environment.29As Paul Watkiss, a Research Associate atthe Stockholm Environment Institute told us,a number of aggregate models suggest thatthe economic cost of climate change30 toAfrica could be equivalent to an annual lossof 1.53% of gross national product (GDP) by2030, but theres a great deal of uncertaintyto these estimates.

Ethiopian growth is fundamentallyrelated to growth in agriculture. Wedid a study where we plotted averageagricultural growth and deviation ofrainfall from the mean and found aperfect fit. We found that 6070% ofgrowth is explained by rainfall andthats stronger as you go north in thecountry. I would expect that you cangeneralise that throughout the Hornof Africa region.

Dr Alemayehu Geda, Professor ofEconomics at Addis Ababa University

28 Eyakuze, A & Gitau M.J., 2007, Economic Policy& Performance in East Africa, inResearchCompendium for East Africa Scenarios, Societyfor International Development, Nairobi.

29 Lash, J., & Wellington, F., 2007, CompetitiveAdvantage on a Warming Planet, HarvardBusiness Review.

30 Including market and non-market sectors.

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How interdependent will theworld be in economic terms?

To some extent the degree of inter-dependency in 2030 depends in parton what happens as we come out ofeconomic crisis and whether this leadsto new systems and economic models.Protectionism could be one of the mostsignificant modifiers of economic inter-

dependency in 2030. The challenge ofdealing with climate change and its knock-on impacts on resources such as watersupplies could lead to a desire to keepnatural resources within national borders.Other factors such as extremely high oilprices could also impact on global trading,as happens in our scenario Coping Alone,with serious development consequencesfor low-income countries.

Alternatively there could be increasedeconomic cooperation between nations,and continued globalisation. We may see

countries exploiting their comparativeadvantage with different natural resources,entering into resource-based cooperativedeals; this becomes the foundation of anew if precarious global order in ourscenario The Greater Good.

Where will the locus ofeconomic power be? Is ashift eastwards inevitable?

Most experts we interviewed believe thatthe locus of economic power will shift over

the next 20 years, but are divided on whatthat means the world will look like in 2030and the point at which China will surpassthe US as the worlds largest economy.

Jeffrey Sachs argues that Asia will be hometo the worlds economic centre of gravityby 2050 because of the rise in population.31Angus Maddison believes that China willovertake the US to have the worlds highest

GDP in 2015, and that by 2030 it will accountfor one quarter of the world economy.32

Despite consensus that there will be ageneral shift of wealth and influenceeastwards, there is less agreementamongst our experts on the extent to whichother powers such as the EU, Russia,India and Brazil will be important. DimitriZenghelis for example, argues that the US

will remain the predominant power for thenext 20 years, but China will grow to the sizewhere it rivals the EU. Other intervieweesfeel that the EU can only remain a majorplayer if it learns to act as a united whole which some see as unlikely. Internationalsummits such as the 16th Conference of theParties in Mexico in 2010 may provide earlyindicators of future power shifts.

Some experts see the world as becomingeven more multipolar: one intervieweesuggested that The locus of economicpower will shift so that it becomes a big

circle around Africa, so everywhere elsewill be important apart from Africa. CamillaToulmin, Director of the InternationalInstitute for Environment and Developmentis more optimistic about Africas inclusionin such a multipolar world: The centre ofpolitical gravity is changing and movingfurther east. In Africa, land is becomingmuch more valuable.

31 Sachs, J., op cit.32 Maddison, A., 2007, Chinese Economic

Performance in the Long Run, OECD.

What will be the dominant economicmodel in 2030? Could we seea fundamental reappraisal ofeconomic value and social values?

Some believe the economic crisis and a shiftin the locus of economic power willundermine the dominant economic model inthe coming years. As Nick Dearden, Directorof the Jubilee Debt Campaign commented,

The current economic crisis should becausing us to rethink the fundamentals.There has been some recent work, suchas that sponsored by President Sarkozyof France, which does just that,33 challengingthe pre-dominance of GDP as an indicatorof economic performance and socialprogress, and we explore this idea in Ageof Opportunity. Others such as DimitriZenghelis are less convinced: although itfeels like a moment of revolution, this isin fact illusory and though there may beincreased regulation of markets for a while,change will not be revolutionary.

Its just possible that well have asubstantial values revolution in oneor two countries, a fundamentalreappraisal of life choices abouthow much we work, how muchwe consume and so on. Its unlikely,but certainly possible.Project interviewee

Im much more hopeful now than I wasa year ago, because of the financial

crisis, which changes everything,especially our perceptions of how amarket economy works what risksare appropriate to take and theallocation of resources. Its beendemonstrated that this was wrong,not justified.Terry Barker, Chairman,Cambridge Econometrics

If the locus of power in the global economycontinues to shift eastwards, thenlow-income countries may well look toeastern economic models for inspiration.Or if the world becomes multipolar or moreregionalised we might see a growingdiversity of very different models, such asthe ALBA model in Latin America whichpromotes regional networking and is basedon fundamentally different principles.34

Others felt that there is already a shift indeveloping countries away from looking atWestern models of development as theseare too slow Paul Walters, Senior EconomicsAdvisor at DFID cited Indonesia, China andTaiwan, with their fast economic growth rates,as influences.

33 Stiglitz, J., Sen, A., and Fitoussi, J-P., 2009,Report by the Commission on the Measurementof Economic Performance and Social Progress.

34 Project interviews; for more information seeALBA: Venezuelas answer to free trade: theBolivarian alternative for the Americas, Harris,D., and Azzi, D., Focus on the Global South, 2006.



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low-income country politics

Is it possible to group low-income countries together and refer in general to low-income country politics? In many respects, c learly not. Low-income countriesrange from politically fragile states such as Afghanistan and the DemocraticRepublic of Congo to relatively stable ones such as Vietnam and Tanzania;they includes former Soviet republics such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; the

Asian kingdoms Bhutan and Cambodia, and African countries with populationsbattered by decades of stop-start civil war such as Sudan and Burundi.Regarding these countries as a group with identical interests would be mistaken.

However there are some common trends influencing governance, institutionsand stability that run through this political complexity and will play a critical rolein shaping the response to climate change in low-income countries.

How effective will politicalinstitutions and governance systemsin low-income countries be?

Many people we consulted saw the efficacy

of political institutions as the single mostimportant factor in shaping the low-incomecountry response to climate change boththrough the contribution that low-incomecountries make on the global stage to climatechange negotiations, and in dealing withresource constraints and climate changeimpacts as they arise. Our intervieweespointed to positive developments ingovernance in countries such as Ghana,Cameroon, Tanzania and Nepal. But theyalso pointed out that such systems incountries such as the Democratic Republic

of Congo and much of central and westernAfrica remain inadequate.

Some interviewees suggested that indealing with climate change, we might seegovernments in the future adopt a morecommand-and-control approach. Forexample, Faisal Islam of DFID Bangladeshsuggested that In an economy such asBangladesh where governance is weak and

market mechanisms are poorly developed,a command-and-control approach maybe more effective. So for example onlyallow a certain type of car, ban two-strokeengines and necessitate the switch to better

technology. This top-down approach isevident in the fraught and urgent atmosphereof our scenario Reversal of Fortunes.

In the same vein, the US National IntelligenceCouncil predicts a growing trend for morecentralised economic models in developingeconomies. This is a characteristic of thosecountries benefitting from the worldwideshift of wealth from West to East and the impact of Russia, and particularly China,following this path is potentially greater giventheir weight on the world stage. Ironically,

the major enhancement of the state rolein Western economies now under way asa result of the current financial crisis mayreinforce the emerging countries preferencefor greater state control and distrust of anunregulated marketplace.35 Strength ofgovernance (including absence of corruption) in whatever form this governance takes will also be key in determining how muchlow-income countries can truly benefit from

global payments designed to (for example)enable clean development and protect naturalresources such as forests. We explore therole that governance plays in determiningthe varying fates of low-income countriesin Age of Opportunity.

How closely will low-income countrygovernments work with business?Will the future be one of close

cooperation, or simmering tension?Strength of governance is also likely toinfluence the stance taken by low-incomecountries with regard to the activities ofmulti-national corporations (MNCs) withintheir borders. Whether and how countriesopen up their markets to foreign investorscan vary even within a country by the typeof industry: in Ethiopia, for example, we weretold that the telecoms industry is very closed,whereas floriculture is open and a goodenvironment for businesses to invest. Theresult has been much less growth in mobile

telecommunications compared with other African countries.36 However some Ethiopianssaw the issue very differently: one intervieweetold us that At the moment it looks likethe government is selling the country, weregiving prime lands to the flower industry.The companies that got kicked out of Kenyahave come here.

On a different note, it may be that the futurebrings very close cooperation betweenbusinesses (both international and local)and low-income country governments.

We could see businesses taking responsibilityon a sweeping scale (perhaps in return fortheir licence to operate), and/or governmentsfocussing unprecedented attention oncreating favourable investment conditions.In Kenya one interviewee, Richard Fox,Managing Director of the companyHomegrown predicted that There is and willbe an increasing realisation that economiescant develop without companies. There

Entrenched interests do quite wellfrom the current system of resourceexploitation, and these entrenchedinterests are not eager to change.

When this intransigence comesup against the vulnerability andfragility that also exists in low-income countries then we canexpect flashpoints and conflict.Dr Andy White, President,Rights and Resources Group

35 US National Intelligence Council, Global Trends2025, 2008.

36 Project interviews.37 Africa Progress Panel,Annual Report 2009:

An Agenda for Progress in a Time of Global Crisis.

will be a strengthening of the relationshipbetween government and the private sector.

Many other factors are dependenton political stability. Will recentprogress in this area continue?

The most recent Africa Progress Panel Annual

Report states that despite authoritarianand corrupt leaders, wars and coups, theoverall trend in Africa is currently towardsless conflict, more democracy and greaterdevelopment.37 This reflects progress inrecent decades in South Asia: one intervieweein Bangladesh commented that We shouldtake some comfort from the fact that for thefirst time, all of the countries in South Asiahave democratic governments.

However these new democracies can beextremely fragile. Kenya, for example, has

been relatively stable for a few decades butviolence erupted after the last election, andmany worry that might repeat itself.Mike Harrison, Deputy Head of DFID Kenyatold us: You see similar things across much

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demographics in low-income countries

The size and structure of low-income country populations will profoundlyinfluence how these countries respond to climate change in the years to2030. There are three aspects that have particular significance: totalpopulation growth, urban population growth and population displacement.

How many people willthere be in 2030?

Growing human population can be seenas a stress-multiplier, much like climatechange itself, increasing competition forresources and pressure on the earthsecosystems.41 The global population isset to grow by around 20% to 8.3 billion in2030. Growth in low-income countries willbe much faster. According to UN data, thepopulation of low-income countries will risefrom 919 million in 2005 to 1,473 million in

2030, an increase of 553 million or 60%, injust 25 years.42

Growth in absolute numbers of people couldlead to higher overall emissions, but the realproblem is that it makes creating solutionsto climate change and other issues moredifficult, as Ton Berg, working for MdecinsSans Frontires in Ethiopia remarked: Onekey issue is population growth and no oneis really talking about it. It hinders furtherdevelopment, but the outside world canttalk about it. In many poor countries, rapid

population growth both drives and is drivenby poverty.

Population growth is a key variable,but it is not exogenously (i.e. externally)determined; accelerating developmentcan automatically lead to a dramaticreduction of population growth.Ashok Khosla, Chairman,Development Alternatives, India

41 Reid, W. V., et al., 2005,Ecosystems and HumanWell-being, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment.

42 World Population Prospects: The 2008 RevisionPopulation Database, UN Dept of Economic andSocial Affairs, Highlights.

43 Kloos, H., et al., 2007, The AIDS Epidemic ina Low-Income Country: Ethiopia, inHumanEcology Review Vol .14, No. 1; see http://article.wn.com/view/2009/11/24/United_Nations_HIV_ epidemic_peaked_in_1996_number_of_infecte/

44 Obesity and overweight, Factsheet no 311,World Health Organisation, 2006.

45 http://www.optimumpopulation.org/opt. earth.html

46 China View, 10 December 2009, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/10/content_ 12624315.htm

47 See http://www.popoffsets.com/48 World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007

Revision Population Database.49 United Nations World Population Prospects

databasehttp://esa.un.org/unpp/ 50 Demographia World Urban Areas and Population

Projections 5th Ed2009 http://www.demographia.com/db-worldua.pdf

51 UN-Habitat, 2008, The State of African Cities 2008.

What factors could throw populationprojections off course?

Population projections are not set in stone,and there is scope for faster or slower growththan anticipated. Whilst the evidencesuggests that deaths from HIV have peakedin most regions,43 unfortunately there isalways the risk of serious impact on humannumbers from the emergence (or re-emergence) of infectious disease; at thesame time obesity is rapidly increasingin some low-income countries, givinga double burden of disease and itsassociated influence on life expectancy.44

On a more positive note, we could also seeslower population growth if low-incomecountries develop their economies quickly,as in our scenario Reversal of Fortunes,or if more deliberate interventions are made.

According to the UK non-governmentalorganisation Optimum Population Trust (OPT),

the number of countries with a policy toreduce birth rates has decreased in the pastdecade from 82 to 75.45 But as pressure onresources intensifies, the case for moreconcerted action may strengthen. ZhaoBaige, Vice Minister of Chinas NationalPopulation and Family Planning Commission,announced at the COP 15 conference inCopenhagen in 2009 that China hasmanaged to bring down its birth rate with thefamily planning policy in the past 30 years,which results in less population and fewercarbon dioxide emissions. According to

Baige, the policy resulted in 400 million fewerbirths, meaning that Chinas annual emissionsare currently 1.83 billion tons lower than theyotherwise would have been.46 Could we seepopulation policy introduced as an explicitmeans of reducing future greenhouse gasemissions? The Optimum Population Trusthas already suggested that investmentsin family planning should be treated aslegitimate carbon offsets.47

Migration will be mostly within poorregions rather than from poor torich. Within these regions therecould be a huge stretch on urbaninfrastructure, not only in megacities,but overwhelming it everywhere.Dan Smith, Secretary General,International Alert

How many people will be livingin cities?

Among the least developed countries thepercentage of the population living in urbanareas is projected to rise from 29.4% to41.5% between 2010 and 2030.48 For somecountries, the change could be even moredramatic. While the population of DemocraticRepublic of Congo (DRC) is expected to

almost double between 2005 and 2030,49the population of Kinshasa is projected toincrease from around 8.5 million today toover 20 million in 2030.50 The DRC couldbecome a majority urban country before 2035.

If megacities in low-income countries growunplanned, this could lead to higher percapita emissions of greenhouse gases,greater difficulties in meeting peoplesneeds and greater political instability.51On the other hand, according to AshokKhosla from Development Alternatives,

The growth of cities could be an opportunity.By 2030 there will be 450 million morepeople in Indian cities. Theres anopportunity to design new cities thatdeliver high quality of life and have lowcarbon footprints. Ecological resourcescan be saved by an order of magnitudeif cities are designed from scratchinstead of old ones being retrofitted.

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The Future Climate for Development

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