The First Global Crisis of the Twenty-first Century: Was it Predictable?
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The First Global Crisis of the Twenty-first The First Global Crisis of the Twenty-first Century: Century: Was it Predictable? Was it Predictable?
Saktinil RoyAthabasca University
IntroductionIntroductionThe US Subprime Crisis by now a global crisis “unprecedented” since the Great
Depression
However some authors suggest: historical bank-
centered crises in several other parts of the world could foretell the story
My research reviews and confirms this proposition
Introduction (contd...)Introduction (contd...)In particular, Reinhart & Rogoff (2008a) find “striking” similarities between post world-war
banking crises in advanced economies and the US subprime crisis
consider a few crisis indicators and suggest certain changes in their behaviour as “precursors” of crisis
Reinhart & Rogoff (2008b) arrive at the same conclusion with an extended
database that goes back to 1800 and includes a core sample of sixty-six countries
Introduction (contd...)Introduction (contd...)But the questions really are
Could we actually “predict” the subprime crisis with historical experiences?
How well in advance?
Which country experiences would have given the best prediction?
Which indicators are most relevant?
Introduction (contd...)Introduction (contd...)Some other observations Shiller (2008):
The recent housing boom in the United States was lot more pronounced in the low-price tier than in the high-price tier.
After the bubble burst the sharpest fall in house prices was observed in the low-price market
Krugman (2007): Increase in risky mortgage debts in the United States partly
as an effect of protracted increase in income inequality over the last three decades
Iacoviello (2008) suggests a similar causality: Examines the US time series of income distribution and
household debt from 1963 through 2003 Finds that long run increase in household debt can be
explained only by increasing income gaps
Introduction (contd..)Introduction (contd..)
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50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05
Labor productivity Real wage
Figure 1. 1950--2007: US Labor Productivity and Real Wage Rate
Introduction (contd..)Introduction (contd..)Hence, a couple of other questions
The historical crisis episodes better understood in relation to rise in income inequality?
This could help predict the US experience with greater confidence?
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008aReinhart & Rogoff, 2008aPostwar Crisis episodes:
The “Big Five” Crises: Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991),
Sweden (1991), Japan (1992)
Other Postwar Bank-centered Financial Crises: Australia (1989), Canada (1983), Denmark
(1987), France (1994), Germany (1977), Greece (1991), Iceland (1985), Italy (1990), New Zealand (1987), Britain (1974, 1984,1991, 1995), and the United States (1984)
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a (contd..)(contd..)Indicators:
Real Estate Real Price Real Equity Price % of Current Account in GDP Growth of Real GDP per Capita Public Debt
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a (contd..)(contd..)
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a (contd..)(contd..)
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a (contd..)(contd..)
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a (contd..)(contd..)
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a (contd..)(contd..)
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a (contd..)(contd..)Limitations: If a certain change in the behavior of an indicator must
be accepted as a “precursor of crisis” is an issue that must be settled only in practice – specifically with an actual out-of-sample forecasting exercise
If we assume that the four year period foreshadows a crisis episode, then for “prediction” purposes it is also important to know if there were similarities even before this period – this will then allow us to distinguish between a period that is “tranquil” and a period that is “pre-crisis”
A comparison of any crisis with the “average” of historical crises could be elusive There could be differences across countries which
might be cloaked under the “average” construct For prediction purposes such differences need to be
controlled
Predicting the US Subprime Predicting the US Subprime CrisisCrisisThe Problem:
Specifically, could we predict the crisis starting from 2003?
Same as asking: going back to the year of 2002 or earlier could we predict that the United States was not going to experience any financial crisis in 2006 or earlier (except the savings and loan crisis in 1984)?
Predicting the US Subprime Predicting the US Subprime Crisis (contd..)Crisis (contd..)I consider two additional indicators
Growth difference between average productivity and real wage rate In the absence of adequate data on Gini
coefficient and other measures of income inequality this is taken as the measure of growth of income gap
Inflation To account for growth of cost of living
Predicting the US Subprime Predicting the US Subprime Crisis (contd..)Crisis (contd..)Data, Methodology & Criteria:
For any historical crisis include only eight observations prior to the actual occurrence
Labelling “Pre-crisis” period: four years just prior to the
crisis episode “Tranquil” period: four years even prior to the
“pre-crisis” period
Predicting the US Subprime Predicting the US Subprime crisis (contd..)crisis (contd..) A panel probit model
The binary dependent variable = 1 when “pre-crisis”; = 0 when “tranquil”
To conclude in favour of a crisis incidence within a period of four years The predicted probability is compared to a
pre-specified threshold value If the probability exceeds the threshold then a
crisis incidence is predicted I consider both 50% and 75% as the threshold
Predicting the US Subprime Predicting the US Subprime Crisis (contd..)Crisis (contd..)Results: Four specifications
Specification 1A (all postwar crisis episodes) Except Public Debt all indicators considered by Reinhart &
Rogoff (2008a) are significant
Specification 1B (all postwar crisis episodes) The two additional indicators are introduced – only
“inequality growth” is significant but with a wrong sign
Specification 2 (only the BIG FIVE crises) Only Real Estate Price, Public Debt & Inflation are significant
Specification 3 [Finland (1991), Italy (1990), Japan (1992), New Zealand (1987), UK (1995) & US (1984)] Real Estate Price, Public Debt, Current Account and
Inequality Growth are significant with the correct signs
Predicting the US Subprime Predicting the US Subprime Crisis (contd..)Crisis (contd..)
Spec 1A Spec1B Spec 2 Spec 3 ______________________________________________________________________________________________
Threshold Probability = 50%
Percent of pre-crisis years correctly called 86.8 85.3 80.0 79.2 True alarms as percent of total alarms 77.6 79.4 94.1 82.6
Threshold Probability = 75%
Percent of pre-crisis years 69.1 64.7 80.0 70.8correctly called
True alarms as percent of total alarms 73.9 74.6 94.1 94.4
Within Sample Performance Results
Predicting the US Subprime Predicting the US Subprime Crisis (contd..)Crisis (contd..) Out-of-Sample Performance Results
Spec 1A Spec1B Spec 2 Spec 3 ______________________________________________________________________________________________
Threshold Probability = 50%
Percent of pre-crisis years correctly called 100.0 75.0 100.0 100.0 True alarms as percent of total alarms 80.0 100.0 80.0 100.0
Threshold Probability = 75%
Percent of pre-crisis years 50.0 50.0 75.0 100.0correctly called
True alarms as percent of total alarms 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Predicting the US Subprime Predicting the US Subprime Crisis (contd..)Crisis (contd..)Interpretations:
Significance of Real Estate Price: Consistent with Shiller (2008) – “irrational
exuberance” -- economists, policy makers & market experts believed in ever-rising house prices
Similar thing was observed during the housing & stock market booms in Japan before the financial crisis in 1992 and also in Sweden and Finland before the financial crises in 1991.
Predicting the US Subprime Predicting the US Subprime Crisis (contd..)Crisis (contd..) Significance of Current Account
Consistent with Reinhart & Rogoff (2008a, 2008b): persistent current account deficit & capital flow bonanza are precursors of crisis
Significance of Public Debt Again, consistent with Reinhart and Rogoff
(2008a)
Significance of Inequality Growth Like with other historical experiences, rise in
earnings inequality contributed significantly – consonant with Krugman (2007)
ConclusionsConclusions The US Subprime fiasco could be predicted
consistently starting in 2003 Earlier than 2005 when Robert Shiller (one of the
few economists) predicted the crisis
Despite Alan Greenspan (2007) talking about “froths” in the local markets, thus rejecting the possibility of a speculative bubble
The crisis could be predicted much earlier than February 2007 -- a date that the Global Financial Stability Report (ch. 3, April 2009) by the IMF states as the earliest when increasing systemic pressures could be signaled
One got to look at both “similarities” and “dissimilarities” across historical crisis experiences
Apart from the traditional indicators, inequality growth contributed significantly