The Evolution of the Electronic Media in the Contemporary Middle East

7/29/2019 The Evolution of the Electronic Media in the Contemporary Middle East

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Douglas A Boyd

The evolution of the electronic media in the contemporary

Middle EastIn: Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Mditerrane, N47, 1988. pp. 23-34.

Rsum

Rsum : L'volution des mdias lectroniques dans le Moyen Orient aujourd'hui. C'est en premier lieu pour rpondre aux

besoins de communication du systme colonial que les mdias ont t implants dans les pays arabes. Les mmes raisons ontamen leurs structures tre fortement centralises et sous contrle gouvernemental. L'apparition et le dveloppement des

missions radiophoniques en arabe ont t fortement influencs par les facteurs politiques, rivalits entre puissances coloniales

puis entre tats d'orientations diffrentes. Dans la rgion du Golfe, la diffusion de tlvision franchit elle aussi couramment les

frontires (imbrication des territoires, similitudes de langues et de rgimes, quelquefois stratgies publicitaires). Elle est trs

fortement concurrence par les vidocassettes, le plus souvent pirates, et dont les contenus chappent pratiquement

l'intervention des institutions locales. La programmation radio-tlvise est principalement axe sur le divertissement. La place

importante qu'y occupent les importations occidentales s'explique en particulier par leurs prix peu levs et par l'influence des

normes sociales et culturelles des pays industrialiss sur les responsables comme sur une partie des audiences. Souvent la

deuxime chane nationale leur est pratiquement consacre. La production audiovisuelle s'est d'abord implante en Egypte,

s'appuyant sur les importantes structures dj en place pour le film et sur l'influence rgionale de celui-ci. Les antagonismes

politiques (hostilit au nassrisme, puis l'tablissement de relations avec Isral) ont favoris le dveloppement d'implantationsanalogues dans les pays du Golfe, faisant largement appel des personnels expatris d'autres pays arabes, principalement

d'Egypte. Peu de recherche srieuse a t mene jusqu'ici dans la rgion sur les effets des mdias, sauf dans le cadre de

stations internationales (B.B.C., Voice of America) et d'tudes du march publicitaire. Le recrutement et la formation du

personnel trs qualifi ncessaire, l'adaptation des mdias au dveloppement conomique et social des pays concerns,

rencontrent des difficults, notamment au niveau de la coordination qu'elles impliquent, entre organismes responsables des

divers domaines comme entre pays. Le satellite Arabsat, d'ores et dj en orbite, offre de vastes possibilits, encore

incompltement mises profit. Par contre les satellites diffusion directe vont brve chance permettre aux grandes

puissances mondiales d'atteindre les audiences arabes au-del de tout contrle national. F.C.

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

Boyd Douglas A. The evolution of the electronic media in the contemporary Middle East. In: Revue de l'Occident musulman et

de la Mditerrane, N47, 1988. pp. 23-34.

doi : 10.3406/remmm.1988.2207

http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/remmm_0035-1474_1988_num_47_1_2207
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/author/auteur_remmm_792http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/remmm.1988.2207http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/remmm_0035-1474_1988_num_47_1_2207http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/remmm_0035-1474_1988_num_47_1_2207http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/remmm.1988.2207http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/author/auteur_remmm_792


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tudes

Douglas A. Boyd

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ELECTRON IC M EDIAIN THE CONTEMPORARY M IDDLE EAST

Rsum :'volution des mdias lectroniques dans le Moyen Orient aujourd'hui.C'est en premier lieu pour rpondre aux besoins de communication du systme colonial que lesmdias ont t implants dans les pays arabes. Les mmes raisons ont amen leurs structures tre

fortement centralises et sous contrle gouvernemental.L'apparition et le dveloppement de s missions radiophoniques en arabe ont t fortement influencsar les facteurs politiques, rivalits entre puissances coloniales puis entre tats d'orientationsdiffrentes. Dans la rgion du Golfe, la diffusion de tlvision franchit elle aussi couramment les frontires(imbrication des territoires, similitudes de langues et de rgimes, quelquefois stratgies publicitaires).Elle est trs fortement concurrence par les vidocassettes, le plus souvent pirates, et dont les contenus chappent pratiquement l'intervention de s institutions locales.La programmation radio-tlvise est principalement axe sur le divertissement. La place importante u'y occupent les importations occidentales s'explique en particulier par leurs prix peu levset par l'influence des normes sociales et culturelles des pays industrialiss sur les responsables commesur une partie des audiences. Souvent la deuxime chane nationale leur est pratiquement consacre.

La production audiovisuelle s'est d'abord implante en Egypte, s'appuyant sur les importantes structures dj en place pour le film et sur l'influence rgionale de celui-ci. Les antagonismes politiques(hostilit au nassrisme, puis l'tablissement de relations avec Isral) ont favoris le dveloppementd'implantations analogues dans les pays du Golfe, faisant largement appel des personnels expatrisd'autres pays arabes, principalement d'Egypte.Peu de recherche srieuse a t mene jusqu'ici dans la rgion sur les effets de s mdias, sauf dansle cadre de stations internationales (B.B.C., Voice of America) et d'tudes du march publicitaire.Le recrutement et la formation du personnel trs qualifi ncessaire, l'adaptation des mdias au dveloppement conomique et social des pays concerns, rencontrent des difficults, notamment au niveaude la coordination qu'elles impliquent, entre organismes responsables des divers domaines commeentre pays.Le satellite Arabsat, d'ores et dj en orbite, offre de vastes possibilits, encore incompltementmises profit. Par contre les satellites diffusion directe vont brve chance permettre aux grandes uissances mondiales d'atteindre les audiences arabes au-del de tout contrle national. F.C.

ROMM 47 , 1988-1


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24 / D.A. BoydBoth print and the electronic media were introduced first in those Arab countrieswith the most exposure to the West, more specifically Arab countries with colonialhistories. For example, the introduction of Arabic printing and later radio was

very different in North Africa, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq than in the Arabian Gulfstates of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,Oman, or the Yemens. The Frenchin North Africa and Syria-Lebanon, and the British in Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq,fostered an interest in printing because they needed to establish that technologyto facilitate communication among themselves as well as with those they eithergoverned or otherwise tried to influence. However, even in the late 1980s, illiteracyin the Arab world is high.Pre-World War II

With the exception of occasional transmissions by oil companies for theiremployees and the illegal stations in Lebanon, all Arab broadcasting stations aregovernment-owned and -operated by a ministery of information. The patternwas first introduced by the British and French who wanted to maintain controlover transmissions in countries where they were influential. Private stations wouldhave necessitated advertising support, and during the 1930s and 1940s, it wasreasoned, the economic base fo r such an undertaking did not exist. Also, commercialoperation woul have brought about a kind of popular programming which wasat variance with the political and developmental broadcasting believed by thosewho introduced it to be most beneficial. The French and British felt that a morecentralized system following from their own public service-oriented domesticexperience would be most beneficial to the country about to receive its first radiostation. France and Britain did not necessarily intend for Arab-world broadcastingto be government-operated, but the European concept of a public broadcastingcorporation, such as the BBC, independent of government, did not turn out tobe politically transferable to the Arab world.The popularity of radio in the developing world was predictable. Even the mostenthusiastic programmers, however, did not envision the pervasiveness ofgovernment stations by the late 1980s broadcasting to a vast number of transistorradios in the Arab world. Radio is an ideal medium in a developing area such asthe Middle East where the culture is family-centered and where most entertainingis done at home.Early concerns of the British about the effects of Italian Arabic broadcasts tothe Arab world from Radio Bari in the mid- 1930s had a lasting effect on radiodevelopments in the Middle East. Starting in 1934, Mussolini's radio service beamedArabic programming across the Mediterranean with the hope of gaining supportfor Italian aspirations in North Africa and Ethiopia. When the tone of the RadioBari broadcasts turned decidedly anti-United Kingdom, the british governmentformed several committees to determine how to counter the entire range of Italiananti-British propaganda in the Arab world. As a result, the government authorizedthe BBC to transmit in Arabic, its first foreign language. lBoth the Allies and the Axis powers were active in Arab-world broadcasting duringWorld War II. Each side broadcast directly to Arabs and attempted to extend


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The Electronic Media in the Middle East I 25influence by infiltrated Arab sympathizers into those few national systems thenexisting.Post-World War II

Two major factors have influenced radio and television developments since WorldWar II. First, both the poorer countries (Egypt, the Sudan, Syria, and the Yemens)and the wealthy states in the Gulf believed, fo r different reasons, that radio services,following what has been called the transistor revolution, were essential forcommunicating political and development messages. Television, introduced muchlater than radio, was promoted for similar reasons. Second, radio and in at leastone instance television services were expanded in terms of numbers of separatechannels and powerful medium- and short-wave transmitters to counteract aggressivepropaganda-oriented services operating in the 1950s and 1960s from Egypt, Syria,and Iraq. Arab states, for example Saudi Arabia, believed a strong radio organisationto be a necessary form of self defense against hostile regional radio propaganda.

STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS OF ARAB BROADCASTINGSeveral factors make radio and television unique in the Arab countries. Thisresults from a combination of religious, geographical, climatic, political, economic,and linguistic factors.Organization All broadcasting is done by governments. The only exceptionto government operation of official broadcasting was the Lebanese television servicebetween 1959 and 1977. Two separate advertising-supported stations operated withLebanese, French, and U.S. financing.2 After the 1975-1976 Civil War, theLebanese government became the dominant influence and half-owner of Tele-Liban,the Lebanese national television service an amalgam of the two private stations.Until 1975, the radio services in Lebanon were state-controlled. However, sincethe Civil War, and increasingly since the summer 1982 Israeli invasion, numerousunofficial stations operate; the Lebanese government has not been strong enoughto close them. In late 1987, there were over fifty illegal radio stations operatingin Lebanon.Receivers Radio receivers are abundant in Arab states. Because countries wantcitizens to hear the government radio services, national development policies haveincluded provisions for making low-priced transistor sets available. Some factoriesoperate to provide both radios and the necessary batteries. In the wealthy Gulfstates, receivers imported from Asia are inexpensive since these well-to-do countriesdo not need revenue from heavy import taxes. This factor and the rather freewheeling consumer economy of the Gulf states make prices for more expensiveradios, color television sets, and home video recorders lower than in Europe orthe United States. In the poorer countries, monochrome receivers are expensive

considering the per capita gross national product. However, because the cultureis family-centered and television is, to a greater extent than radio, a status symbol,the determination among the less fortunate to own a television set is strong. Membersof the extended family often band together to purchase a used set. The same situation


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26 / D.A. Boydapplies to home video cassette recorder owners. Whether sets are operating in publicor private places, several people are usually viewing or listening. Arab hospitalitydoes not permit one to be selfish with a receiver.

Domestic and International Broadcasting The number of medium-and shortwave transitters in the Arab world increased dramatically during the 1960s and1970s. As the medium-wave band became more crowded, the power of transmittersincreased because states wanted to reach both citizens and residents of othercountries. By the early 1980s most Arab countries had at least one 2000-kilowattfacility. Between 1979 and 1981, Saudi Arabia alone added 12 megawatts of medium-wave radio transmission power.3 Both during the day and at night it is possibleto hear services from most Arab states east of Egypt on an inexpensive medium-wave transistor radio.Surveys done by the Voice of America and commercial marketing organizationsshow that Arab-world listeners regularly hear non-Arab world-radio broadcasts.Particularly during times of crisis in the area, listeners compare news reports frominternational services such as the British Broadcasting Corporation, Voice ofAmerica, and France's Radio Monte Carlo Middle East. When one considers thatthe government operates radio in the Arab world, the desire to hear what othersare saying is not surprising. Also, several foreign broadcasters, specifically thosementioned above, operate powerful medium-wave services beamed to Arab countries,thereby eliminating the listener's need for expensive and intricate short-wave radios.Unlike medium- and short-wave radio signals, television transmissions usuallycover short distances. However, in some areas of the Arab world, the warm humidweather produces favorable conditions for television transmissions to travel longdistance. It is possible for Egyptian television to be seen in Lebanon, Israel, orJordan, but most transborder television watching takes place among the Gulf states.These states share similar linguistic and conservative religious backgrounds, andare governed by ruling families with common defense goals. The attempt to makestate radio and television service available throughout the Gulf area is a form ofcultural and political communication. However, in at least one case, the motivationfor broadcasting to others is financial. Bahrain, an island nation just off the easterncoast of Saudi Arabia, lacks the oil revenue of its wealthy neighbors and must attractradio and television advertisers in order to help finance its broadcast media.Advertisers purchase commercial time on television and radio with the hope ofreaching consumers in Saudi Arabia. In January, 1986, the Saudi government beganallowing commercials on the second television channel. This action was taken inlight of a threatened budget cut because of decreased oil revenue, as well as becauseof competition from commercial advertisements inserted in video cassettes andfrom other neighboring commercial television services.Media Competition In the Arab world, particulary in the Gulf states, televisionhad little competition until the introduction of home video cassette recorders inthe mid-1970s. Few cinemas, theaters, and nightclubs exist, and those that do arenot attractive to most members of the family-centered Arab culture.Strong competition for the television viewer has come from the home video cassetterecorder. The relative wealth of a country is the main factor in determining whetherthe purchase of recorders and tapes (alternativaly available for rent) is an importantconsumer activity. Research has also shown that the desire to circumvent education-and development-oriented government-owned television in the Arab world is another


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The Electronic Media in the Middle East I 27strong motivation for one to acquire a VCR.4 Home video recorders in Kuwait,Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates provide direct competition to statetelevision broadcasters. Cassettes are available in the form of American and Europeanfilms and television programs as well as material from Egypt the Arab world'smost important cinema and television production country. Most VCR materialin the Middle East, like that in the rest of the developing world, is pirated.Estimated 1987 Arab World Video Cassette Recorder Ownership

CountryKuwaitSaudi ArabiaBahrainQatarU.A.E.EgyptIraqJordanLebanonSyriaNorth YemenThe SudanOman

percentage of TV Homes withVCRs887579778041030551025175

Western entertainment as well as pornographic material is, of course, of greatconcern to Arab governments. Of equal concern is the potential fo r cassettes tobe used to disseminate subversive political or religious information : the part thataudio tapes played in the Iranian revolution of 1979, has been recognized byinformation ministry officials in the Gulf.Programming In the Arab world, radio and television programming is mostlyentertainment-oriented. Each country attempts to produce programming reflectinglocal culture, but, in fact, informational and educational offerings do not dominatetelevision schedules. The former director of Egyptian television observed in 1980that ... a television set is usually bought with the intention of entertainment.Nobody thinks of television as a means of education when they go to buy a televisionset.5 This observation applies to other countries as well as to Egypt.Of course, Arab television stations feature a mix of information, educational,and entertainment programming, but the latter, whether imported from the Westor produced in the Arab world, constitutes the majority of program time.Programs imported from the U.S., Europe, and since the late 1970s Australia,are attractive to Arab television programmers for two reasons. First, they are cheap,but whatever the cost, they are far less expensive than local production. TV World'ssurvey of world-side programming prices shows that a half-hour American programcan be telecast in Egypt for between $ 650 and $ 800. 6 Second, many Arabtelevision executives have been trained in the West and feel comfortable with suchprogramming and often believe that offerings such as Dallas are a status symbol,showing that a television system in a developing country can program what is


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28 / DA. Boydavailable to viewers in New York, London, or Paris. Often, Western televisionprograms are featured exclusively on second channels such as those in Jordan,Bahrain, Kuwait, Dubai, and Qatar. Western material became essential fo r thesecond channels catering both to citizens of the country and to a large English-speaking expatriate community.Egypt became, and to a large extent remains, the Arab-world leader in television,primarily because of its long involvement in film production. Egypt has had afilm industry since the late 1920s. After the 1952 Egyptian revolution, thegovernment became interested in the use of mass media as a means of reachingand changing people. Film production rose markedly in the 1960s and 1970s becausethe government, after nationalizing the film industry, mandated acceptable socialand political themes in films. The result was a decline in the popularity of Egyptianfilms in countries whose leaders were not receptive to Egyptian President GamalAbdel Nasser's Arab socialist philosophy. Although Saudi Arabia desperately neededArabic-language material fo r its television system when it started in 1965, Egyptiantelevision productions and films were not acceptable because of their politicalorientation : at the time, the kingdom's relations with the Nasser government wereat a low over the Civil War in North Yemen. However, Egyptian films were andare popular, serving the purpose of establishing Egyptian talent (and thereforethe Cairene dialect) as the Arab world standard. Most Arab countries did not havea pool of talented writers, technicians, and actors for television, but Egypt hadpeople trained in film both able and willing to make the transition. It was onlynatural for Arab television stations to seek Arabic-language programs from a countrywith what was believed to be a quality product for sale.

The Gulf states in particular found that local production of anything other thannews and informational programs was made difficult because they had almost noartistic tradition. Sculpture, painting, and drama were discouraged because theGulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia, were influenced by the traditionalinterpretation of Islam that forbids reproduction of human forms. Also, the bedouinculture, which dominated these countries until modern times, inhibited artisticdevelopment because of tribal wanderings. When local production of drama wasattempted, many states found their facilities lacking. After the initial decision tointroduce television, the aim was to get a signal on the air. In the process, emphasiswas placed on buldings to house transmitters, video tape recorders, films chains,and other equipment. Little thought was given to facilities fo r production of anythingother than interviews and news.By the time that the Gulf states and other Arab world countries had convertedto color, had expanded coverage to reach most citizens, and had expanded telecastingschedules through longer hours or second channels, the need for more Arabic-language programming became apparent : Egypt was ready to sell what it had inexchange for much needed hard currency.Since the mid-1970s, Egyptians writers, producers and actors have found it morefinancially rewarding to leave Egypt and produce special programs and 13-parthistorical and contemporary series in other countries. The goal was to sell theseto the wealthy Gulf states a group of countries attempting to decrease theiroutput of Western-produced material. A group of Egyptians might take a scriptto Athens,London, or Frankfurt, rent a private studio, tape a program as quicklyas possible and then sell it to the Gulf states.


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The Electronic Media in the Middle East I 29Following the Camp David agreements prior to the establishment of diplomaticrelations between Egypt and Israel, a group of Arab countries headed by Iraqdeclared a boycott of Egyptian products and services. It was made clear that the

move to isolate Egypt was aimed at the Anwar Sadat government and not at theEgyptian people. Temporarily, television services stopped purchasing Egyptiantelevision programming directly from the Egyptian state television organization,and television production by Egyptians outside of Egypt boomed. Gulf states werethen in the middle of the post- 1974 oil price increase and could afford to purchasesuch offerings. Organizations such as Saudi Arabian-based Gulfvision createdto promote common television interests in the region and the Kuwait-basedArabian Gulf States Joint Program Production Institution promoted the use ofGulf talent. It was not so much that Gulf television viewers dislike Egyptianprogramming; rather, they wanted productions dealing with Gulf cultural concernsin their own dialect. Perhaps more than any other production, the Arabic versionof Sesame Street (Iftah Ya Simsim), produced by the Joint ProductionInstitution in the Kuwait television studios, gave Gulf television personnelconfidence that they could make quality television programming. A follow-up toIftah Ya Simsim was completed in 1987 in Amman, Jordan, at a commercialtelevision production organization with some government ownership.Althought local production is increasing and the resulting drama and otherprogramming forms deal more specifically with local concerns, Arab television like the medium in other Third World countries has a predominantly Westernstyle. Television is a Western invention that has been molded by Western filmand other artistic traditions. What one can do on television is closely tied to thetechnical limitations of the medium. Virtually all early television systems in theArab World were designed and installed by Western European or U.S. equipmentmanufacturers. (The Japanese did not enter the television production andtransmission market until the late 1970s). Training has been done by Westernerson-site, or alternatively local employees have been sent to Europe or North Americafor production training. Not surprisingly, the result is Western-type televisionprogramming in Arabic; little of what is seen on Arab world television stationsis uniquely Arab.Color Television The decision as to whether a developing country introducescolor television transmissions is often a financially difficult one. Not only musta country purchase color modification equipment for its transmitters, but also itmust upgrade or completely replace lighting and most monochrome productionequipment. Viewers must then decide whether to purchase new television sets,which are often four to six times as expensive as conventional monochrome receivers.The decision would not be so difficult if color television sets could be manufacturedeasily in-country, but often scarce foreign exchange must be used to import receiversfrom Asia or Europe.The decision to start color television has not been a difficult one for the Gulfstates, most of which are extremely wealthy. In the case of Oman, its first twostations in Muscat (1974) and Salalah (1975) were color. Egypt's eventual conversionto color started in 1974 when the French donated some color production equipmentfor one studio. The Egyptians were initially interested in color video tape productionbecause they knew that the Gulf states were converting to color and that they wouldneed to have programs in color to sell to that area.


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30 / D.A. BoydAlong with the financial considerations of color conversion, Arab countries hadto choose between two incompatible color television standards : PAL (West German)and SECAM (French). Most Arab-world countries use PAL, but some use SECAM

because of French government's success in linking the adoption of their color systemto military, economic, and cultural agreements.7Of the six countries in the Gulf states, only Saudi Arabia uses SECAM. In 1971,the Saudi Ministry of Information hired Hammett and Edison, a California-basedbroadcast engineering consulting firm, to study the PAL and SECAM systemsto determine which one would be best fo r the kingdom. In 1972 the firmrecommended PAL, but King Faisal made the decision in favor of the SECAMsystem, perhaps because at that time Saudi Arabia had concluded several agreementswith the French government. The Saudi decision was a political rather than atechnical one. The country made a commitment to a viable national television systemand has the funds to reach this goal, and an impressive amount of transmissionand production equipment has been purchased since 1977, most of t from France.A new one-half million dollar television production complex in Riyadh, completedin 1982, is entirely equipped with French television hardware.Since the late 1970s, the equipment needed to convert (transcode) PAL to SECAMand SECAM to PAL has decreased in cost and is technically better. This has helpedSaudi Arabia exchange color programs with its Gulf neighbors, but the desire isstrong to reach Gulf states with a PAL color signal. For this reason the Saudigovernment converted its powerful Damman television transmitter to PAL ratherthan to SECAM so that Bahrain, Qatar, and the U.A.E.regularly, and Kuwaitoccasionally, could receive the Saudi national television channel in their own colorstandard. Damman area residents may see the Saudi channel via another transmitter,a lower-power UHF one transmitting SECAM color.Research Almost no serious research has been done on the effects of broadcastingand the print media in the Middle East. Most research thought to be reliable isdone by marketing research firms for stations allowing commercial sponsorship,for international broadcasters, or for advertising agencies hoping both to use theinformation and to sell it to others.Systems depending on commercial sponsorship for support have an understandableinterest in counting those who listen and watch. Lebanon and Jordan are examplesof countries which have hired firms to assess the popularity of television in Lebanonand both radio and television in Jordan. In a competitive broadcasting market,this is the only means of establishing a station's audience size and thus determiningadvertising rates. International broadcasters such as the British BroadcastingCorporation and the Voice of America undertake media habits research so thatthey can organize programming to fit listener preferences. Such information isalso used to justify the existence of these services. The case of Radio Monte CarloMiddle East (RMCME) is rather special. Originating in a Paris studio, this popularArabic service reaches most of the Arab world east of Lybia with a medium-wavesignal from the Cyprus-based transmitter. The service is owned by organizationscontrolled by the French government. RMCME actually competes fo r advertisingincome with local Arab world commercial stations, such as Egypt's Middle EastRadio, Radio Jordan, and the commercial services in the United Arab Emiratesand Bahrain. Radio Monte Carlo Middle East spends a great deal of money on


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The Electronic Media in the Middle East I 31its on-going advertising sales campaign, and the research consistently indicatesthat the service is very popular.8However, fo r the Arab countries in general, Browne's statement about researchis accurate : A very large share of the world, the developing nations in particular,has no comparable need for audience research, and has not developed the capacityto conduct it.9 In these countries the lack of enthusiasm for research is causedby a lack of funds and because research is not a priority. Also, there is amisunderstanding of research methods and a lack of qualified personnel both toundertake and to interpret research results. Most broadcast officials believe thatthey know their audiences well enough to give them a well rounded service. Inthe event that research indicated a negative attitude toward broadcast offerings,officials are not sure how they would react to negative comments. Aside fromoccasional letters to the stations, no formal or informal stuctures exist for citizenfeedback.Personnel Iraq, Egypt, the Sudan, Lebanon, and Jordan are self-sufficient withregard to all technical as well as artistic broadcasting personnel.Gulf states do not have adequate personnel to operate the government, privateindustry, or the military without skilled people from other countries. In some Gulfstates, the indigenous population constitutes only about half the total population.The media must compete for personnel from among those in a small pool.Expatriates primarily from Egypt and Jordan played an important role in thebeginning of both radio and television in some Gulf systems and many stayed forseveral years until local citizens could be trained to take over. The situation inmany countries has not changed much because many broadcasting jobs are notseen as attractive in terms of income or prestige by citizens who prefer to choosecareers from among the many others available. Several of the broadcasting servicesin the United Arab Emirates were headed by expatriates at first, and non-citizensstill hold important positions in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Jordan is the chiefexporter of technical personnel to the Gulf states.At one point the Gulf states ministers of information investigated the possibilityof establishing a technical training center to help solve the personnel problems,but they decided to wait for developments at the Arab States Broadcasting Union(ASBU) training project in Damascus, Syria. Originally based in Cairo, Egypt,ASBU headquarters' moved to Tunis when all Arab League organizations left thecountry in protest of its 1979 peace agreement with Israel. Prior to the move, ASBUhad established three separate field offices to deal with specific aspects of radioand television : a technical center in Khartoum, Sudan; a research office in Baghdad,Iraq; and a technical training complex in Damascus, Syria. By 1980, the buildingfor the training center was complete, but financing was not available for theequipment or staff to undertake training. The Iraq-Iran situation during the early1980s only exacerbated the situation in Syria, where the Assad government'spolitically antagonistic attitude toward neighboring states meant that few Arabstates, and probably no Gulf countries, would send citizens to Syria for training.The Syrian support fo r Iran in the Iraq-Iran conflict only made Syrian isolationworse. However, the most serious result of the Syrian situation has been that Arabcountries still have no place in the Arab world to which they can send personnelfor training. The training effort essentially remains informed, except for those who


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32 / D.A. Boydare sent outside the Arab world for instruction. Some countries will continue torely on the talents of non-citizens fo r both radio and television operation.

In November, 1987, following an Arab summit meeting in Amman, Jordan, aresolution passed stating that individual Arab states should decide whether to renewdiplomatic ties with Egypt. Most Gulf states did so immediately. Jordan and Egyptexchanged ambassadors in 1985.Mass Media Philosophy and Development Most Arab countries seem tounderstand the political importance of both the print and the broadcast media.Beyond this, however, media managers do not appear to have a grasp of how themedia could be utilized in national development ; those with such knowledge havegenerally been unable to operationalize it in the form of specific development-oriented programming. Arab states usually have central planning organizations,often at the ministry level, that control the economic planning of the country. Staffedmostly by economists, these organizations do not seem to be aware of the role themedia can play in educational, social, and cultural change. Further, there is asurprising lack of communication and cooperation between ministries of education,information, and communication. In Saudi Arabia the education and informationministries have never been able to agree on the type of instructional programmingto complement the elementary or secondary school curriculum. However, thisproblem may be solved with additional studio facilities in Riyadh and the secondnational television channel.

ARAB MEDIA : THE FUTUREIt is axiomatic that the future of the media in the arab world depends to a largedegree on political and economic developments there. It is unlikely that the basicstructure within which both the print and the broadcast media function will bealtered. Governments will continue to own and operate the electronic media becausethey believe it is in their best interests to do so.Probably the most serious problem facing Arab countries is cooperation. Someunderstanding will be required if interference in the medium-wave band is to beheld to the present crowded, but acceptable, level. Not even the Gulf states canafford to continue building more 1- and 2-megawatt medium-wave transmitters.

Cooperation on television channel use in the VHF band in the Gulf states shouldbe a priority, but most importantly, programming cooperation is essential. Assumingthat the trend toward decreasing the amount of imported Western televisionprograms continues, high-quality Arab productions must be shared in order tofill expanding program schedules.One convenient means of increasing communication within the Arab world willbe ARABSAT, a project financed mostly by Saudi Arabia and sponsored by theArab League. Two functioning satellites already provide more reliable telephone,telex, and data transmission capability, but perhaps the most striking use of thesatellite will be fo r television. The satellites could provide a more convenient andless expensive means of sending television signals from one country to anothervia both C and KU bands if political differences were put aside. Also, large countrieswith scattered populations could connect ground stations within a country withoutINTELSAT transponders. By 1983, four states Oman, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan,


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The Electronic Media in the Middle East I 33and Algeria were using leased transponders on one of the INTELSAT satellitesfor this purpose. Satellite transmission of television signals can be much lessexpensive than terrestrial links and offers higher quality signal transmission. TheArab satellites were designed to transmit a television program throughout the Arabworld directly to villages, but programming details for this community televisiontransmission have not as yet been finalized. 10 As in other areas of cooperationamong Arab countries, political and economic factors as well as colloquial languageproblems stand as barriers to cooperation.These same factors impede the distribution of printed matter in the Arab world.European and American newspapers and magazines usually appear on news-standswithout much censorship, particulary in those countries with large Westernexpatriate populations. But Iraqi papers are not usually sold in Egypt, and Syrianpapers are seldom found in Saudi Arabia. While radio signals usually reach theintended audience, it is easy to stop the importation of printed material.The 1979 move of the Arab States Broadcasting Union from Cairo to Tunishas been disruptive, and a great deal of the initial enthusiasm fo r the organizationhas diminished. It may be that differences among Arab countries, from Moroccoto Iraq and from Lebanon to the Yemens, are too great for large-scale cooperation.Here the example of the Gulf states'television organization, Gulfvision, is perhapsappropriate. Rather than attempt the type of compromise necessary along politicaland economic lines, clusters of countries might work together in such areas as newsgathering, program production, and frequency allocation. Common interests andconcerns provide a natural grouping of the North African countries, Egypt andthe Sudan, and Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.Perhaps more than anything else, the future effects of all media on Arab societydepend on how well and to what degree the Arab states adapt to new technology.Already, VCRs offer an attractive alternative to viewers of government televisionservices. The importation, duplication, and sale of VHS and Beta cassettes havein effect circumvented one of the main motivations fo r beginning national television :to control the kind of programming available to viewers.Direct broadcast satellites (DBS) may be introduced into the Middle East sometimein the late 1980s. Television via DBS is of little concern to governments becausethey, via ARABSAT, are likely to be in control. Direct satellite radio broadcastingis another matter. Technically it is possible to broadcast directly to receivers withoutthe use of satellite receiving dishes, as long as the frequency is above 27 mHz.If the Arab countries continue to be politically and economically important to theworld's major powers, international radio broadcasting via satellite may be anacceptable, although expensive, means of reaching Arab listeners with a reliablesignal.

NOTES1. Asa Briggs, The Golden Age of Wireless (London : Oxford University press, 1975), pp. 398-9.2. Nabil H. Dajani, Lebanon (London International Institute of Communications, 1979), pp. 269.3. Douglas A. Boyd, Broadcasting in the Arab World : A Survey of Radio and Television in the MiddleEast (Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1982), p. 124.


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34 / D.A. Boyd4. Douglas A. Boyd and Joseph D. Straubhaar, Developmental Impact of the Home VideoCassette Recorder on Third World Countries, Journal of Broadcoasting and Electronic Media,Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter, 1985), 5-21.5. Tomader Tawffik, Television in Egypt, Paper delivered at the Annenberg School ofCommunications World Communications Conference, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 12 , 1980.6. World Prices for US Sales of Half-Hour Series, TV World, July, 1982, pp. 46-7.7. For a discussion of the French color system and the French export of the color televisiontechnology, see Rhonda J. Crane, Th e Politics of International Standards : France and the ColorTV War (Norwood, New Jersey : Ablex Publishing corporation, 1979).8. Audience, Penetration and Listenership of Pan Arab Commercial Radio Stations in Jordan,Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE/Oman, Extract of MMEMS 1979, the 79 McCan Erickson MiddleEast Media Study conducted in February-March, 1979, Table I, supplied by Radio Monte CarloMiddle East. Also see, Douglas A. Boyd, Radio and Television Audience Research in the MiddleEast : Why Don't the Arabs do it? Th e European Journal of Communication, Vol. I (1987), 13-28.9. Donald R. Browne, International Radio Broadcasting : The Limits of the Limitless Medium(New York : Praeger Publications, 1982), p. 318.10. See papers on Arabsat in this issue (EC).

BIBLIOGRAPHYBarbour (Neville), Broadcasting to the Arab World, Middle East Journal, V (Winter, 1951), 60.Boyd (Douglas A.), The Arab States Broadcasting Union, , Journal of Broadcasting, Vol. XIX,No. 3 (Summer, 1975), 311-20.Boyd (Douglas A.), Broadcasting in the Arab World : A Survey of Radio and Television in theMiddle East, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1982.Boyd (Douglas A.), Development of Egypt's Radio : "Voice of the Arabs" Under Nasser, Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Winter, 1975), 645-52.Boyd (Douglas A.), International Broadcasting in Arabic to the Middle East and North Africa, Gazette, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1976), 188-96.Boyd (Douglas A.), Radio and Television audience Research in the Middle East : Why Don'tthe Arabs do it?, The European Journal of Communication, Vol. 1 (1987), 13-28.Boyd (Douglas A.) and Straubhaar (Joseph), Developmental Impact of the Home Video CassetteRecorder on Third World Countries, Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, Vol. 29,No. 1 (Winter, 1985), 5-21.Browne (Donald R.), Television and National Stabilization : The Lebanese Experience,Journalism Quarterly, LII (1975), 692-98.Browne (Donald R.), The Voices of Palestine : A Broadcasting House Divided, Th e MiddleEast Journal, XXIX (Spring, 1975), 133-50.Crane (Rhonda J.), The Politics of International Standards : France and the Color TV War,Norwood, New Jersey, Ablex Publishing corporation, 1979.Dajani (Nabil H.), Lebanon, London, International Institute of Communications, 1979.El-Sherif (Mahmoud), The Arab Attitude to Mass Media, Inter-Media, Vol. 8, No. 2 (March,1980), 28-9.Hatem (M. Abdel-Kadar), Information and theArab Cause, London, Longmans Group, Ltd., 1974.Katz (Elihu) and Wedell (George), Broadcasting in the Third World, Cambridge, Mass., HarvardUniversity Press, 1977.Laffin (John), The Arab Mind Considered, New York, Taplinger Publishing Company, 1975.Pige (Franois), Radiodiffusion et Tlvision au Maghreb, Paris, Fondation Nationale des SciencesPolitiques, 1966.Rugh (William A.), Th e Arab Press : News Media and PoliticalProcess in the Arab World, Syracuse,N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1979.Tracy (William), Sesame Opens, Aramco World Magazine, September-October 1979, pp. 9-17.Wood (Richard E.), Language Choice in Transnational Radio Broadcasting, Journal ofCommunication, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring, 1979), 112-23.

The Evolution of the Electronic Media in the Contemporary Middle East

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