The Ethics and Legal Implications of Military … Ethics and Legal Implications of Military Unmanned...

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The Ethics and Legal Implications ofMilitary Unmanned VehiclesBy Elizabeth Quintana, Head of Military Technology & Information StudiesRoyal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

Established in 1957, the British Computer Society (BCS) is the leading body for thoseworking in IT. With a world-wide membership now over 60,000 members in over 100countries, BCS is the qualifying body for Chartered IT Professionals (CITP). BCS wasincorporated by Royal Charter in 1984. Its objects are to promote the study and practiceof computing and to advance knowledge of and education in IT for the benefit of thepublic. BCS is also a registered charity.

Through its Professionalism in IT programme, BCS is leading and building ITprofessionalism. BCS members are working in the public and private sector, in areas asdiverse as healthcare, defence, financial services and media.

Foreword

The use of unmanned vehicles is not new;examples of basic, unmanned vehicles dateback to the Second World War however, inrecent years, technology in this sector hasmatured and unmanned vehicles areproliferating both in number andapplication. The operational benefits areundeniable but the proliferation ofapplications and the rate at which thesesystems are being adopted has raised someinteresting ethical and legal conundrums.

This paper seeks to outline the currentapplications of unmanned systems andexamines some of the issues pertaining totheir use on the battlefield today and in thefuture. The report is split into five areas:capability of unmanned vehicles;proliferation of unmanned vehicles; theethics of autonomous vehicles; internationallaw and regulations; and operationalconsiderations. Much of the material stemsfrom discussions at the RUSI Ethics andLegal Implications of Unmanned VehiclesConference held in February 2008. Allmaterials from this event are reportedwithout attribution except for preparedremarks given from the platform.

The author would like to thank the BritishComputer Society for initiating andsupporting the project and recognise thehelp of Allison Barrie, Michael Franklin, IanGallett & Kent DeBenedictus in puttingtogether the report. Thanks also to all thespeakers and participants at the RUSI Ethics& Legal Implications of Unmanned Vehiclesconference in February, who through theirpresentations and other input helped scopethe initial topics and laid the foundation forthis report.

Capabilities of UnmannedVehicles and TechnologyTrends

Unmanned vehicles can be divided intothree categories: Unmanned Air Vehicles(UAVs), Unmanned Ground Vehicles(UGVs) and Unmanned Naval Vessels. Thelatter category can be further subdividedinto unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) andUnmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs).

Military unmanned systems also havedifferent degrees of autonomy: (remote)controlled, semi-autonomous (systemswhich have a degree of autonomy butremain supervised) and fully autonomous.Generally, current models are remotecontrolled although some have a level ofautonomy. Next generation systems arelikely to exhibit much higher levels ofautonomy while co-operative systems (i.e.robot teams of two or more) are also beinginvestigated.

Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs)

A broad spectrum of UAVs is in operationtoday, ranging in size from hand-heldsystems to UAVs that are the size of mannedaircraft. The performance characteristics ofthese systems are extremely varied andprovide different operational capabilities.The majority are used for surveillance,reconnaissance and target destination, butthere are some combat variants that are ableto deploy weapons. It is principally thiscombat capability which raises ethicalconcerns.

The largest and most capable operationalUAVs are Medium Altitude, LongEndurance (MALE) UAVs, such as the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper, and HighAltitude, Long Endurance (HALE) UAVs,

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such as RQ-4 Global Hawk. Such systemscan have flight times in the region of 30hours and operate at altitudes of up to65,000 ft. The RQ-4 Global Hawk is thelargest UAV currently in production, with alength of 14.3m, wingspan of 39.6m and apayload capacity of 1360 kg. These systemstypically have electro-optical sensors, infra-red sensors and a Synthetic Aperture Radar(SAR) with moving target indicator (MTI)capability. This provides day and night, all-weather reconnaissance to ground stationsthat can be located thousands of miles away.

Short Range and Tactical UAVs include theHermes 450, the SPERWER and the HunterUAVs. These have shorter ranges (typically125-250km) and operate at lower altitudes(i.e. <15000 ft). They typically carry anelectro-optic/infra-red dual sensor andprovide narrow and wide angle views of thebattlefield.

Mini-UAVs, such as the Desert Hawk, aremuch smaller and are designed to be man-portable. They are hand launched andare operated from a laptop by militarypersonnel close to the front line. Theirendurance is much shorter (around an hour)and they are primarily used for beyond-line-of-sight scouting at a range of roughly 5 km.They have been used extensively by alliedforces to detect Improvised ExplosiveDevices (IEDs) and ambushes on convoyroutes.

There are also several ‘micro-UAVs’currently in service, such as the USAF’sWASP Block III. The hand-held WASP UAV(length 38cm, wingspan 72 cm) providesBattlefield Air Targeting using forward andside looking colour and infrared videocameras. It is electrically powered, providingan endurance of about an hour, andoperates at a mission altitude of between 15and 300m above the ground. TheWASP can

perform fully autonomous missions, usinga GPS-based navigation system, although itcan also be manually flown via remotecontrol equipment.

Remotely operated rotary vehicles are alsoavailable ranging from the size of a mini-UAV to that of a light utility helicopter.Unmanned helicopters are particularlypopular with navies as they require less decklanding space than manned; Deck landingcapability, however, has yet to be fully tested– for example the leading rotary UAV, FireScout, has yet to complete sea going trials

Unmanned Ground Vehicles

UGVs are mainly used for ExplosiveOrdnance Detection (EOD) and disposalversions can be used for reconnaissance,surveillance and target acquisition. Theyhave also been proposed for perimetersurveillance, vehicle checkpoints, houseclearance searches, logistics, fire-fighting,casualty recovery, mobile communicationslinks, mobile power supplies and decoytargets.1 UGVs tend to be either tele-operated (remote controlled) orautonomous. The autonomous vehicles areas yet relatively simple systems but cannavigate an environment without humanintervention, work for extended periods,detect objects of interest such as people andvehicles and avoid situations that areharmful to themselves or innocent civilians.Some have a level of learning ability too.

UGVs are particularly useful for the urbanenvironment. At the RUSI conference, it wasestimated that there are over 4,000 groundrobots in Iraq at present, most serving

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1 NATO RTO-TR-HFM-078: Unmanned MilitaryVehicles – Human Factors of Augmenting theForce.

explosive ordinance disposal purposes.Examples of EOD robots include theAndros EOD, TALON Swords and theiRobot PackBot. Small, lightweight tacticalUGVs, such as Gladiator have also deployedwith forward forces providing additionalsurveillance and firepower in urbanenvironments.

Larger, ruggedised UGVs have beendesigned for perimeter surveillance such asthe IAI Guardium, and Applied PerceptionTAGS UGVS. These all-terrain vehicles areapproximately the size of a car and are semi-autonomous. They are intended to removethe need for sentries on the perimeter ofbases and can autonomously patrol an areafor unwelcome intruders while beingmonitored by base security. Static, remote-controlled weapon systems are also used forborder protection. These include the IsraeliSee-Shoot system (which is to be deployedalong the border with the Gaza strip) andthe Samsung SGR-A1 (which has beendeployed along the Demilitarised Zonebetween North and South Korea). Bothsystems are able to function with some levelof autonomy but will be remotely operatedfor the present.

There are also a large number of logisticsapplications for UGVs. The MobileDetection Assessment and Response System(MDARS) patrols logistics centres to detectintruders and helps keep track of inventorystock. The Crusher and MULE are semi-autonomous vehicles which are designedto accompany dismounted troops andreduce the load each soldier has to carry.The US Army is keen to automate logisticsupply convoys; given the large number ofIED attacks on US convoys, this approachcould significantly reduce the number ofdeaths and injuries to US personnel. Anumber of solutions have been proposed:one is a Follow-the-Leader system, where

only the front vehicle requires a driver,the other vehicles simply follow the truckin front. This system is relatively mature andhas recently been tested with drivers in thefollower vehicles. Soldiers taking part inthe investigation commented that thesystem gave them more opportunity towatch for threats. It is rumoured, however,that it is relatively easy to get the followertrucks to follow other vehicles. Certainly,the biggest danger with unmanned logisticsvehicles is the risk that they will arrive on abase with an enemy explosive device onboard.

There are also new systems underdevelopment called ‘throwbots’ which areeffectively intelligent grenades. Thethrowbots are lobbed into a building wherethey scan the area. If the building holdshostile personnel, the throwbot can bedetonated; if the building only containscivilians, the weapon will shut itself off.

Unmanned Underwater Vehicles

There is a long history of unmannedunderwater vehicles. There are two groupsof UUVs. The first is a Remotely OperatedVehicle (ROV), which is tethered to amother ship via a cable through which itreceives power and communicates from itsoperators. This technology is wellestablished and has been aiding underseaexploration for decades:

The Cable-controlled UnderseaRecovery Vehicle (CURV) wasdeveloped in the early 1960s by theformer Pasadena Annex of the NavalOrdnance Test Station, one of SSCSan Diego’s parent laboratories.CURV was designed to recover testordnance lost off San Clemente Islandat depths as great as 2000 feet, butbecame famous in 1966 with the

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recovery of an H-bomb off Spain in2800 feet of water.2

The second is an autonomous vessel (oftendenoted AUV). A NATO report on HumanFactors for unmanned vehicles indicatedthat:

In the military underwater domain,more than others, research has beencharacterised by a desire for a directroute to behaviourally simple butfully autonomous UUVs.

Potential AUV uses include: minecountermeasures, environmental data-gathering, rapid environmental assessment,above and below water intelligencegathering, anti-submarine warfare,expendable sensor deployment for, amongother tasks, tracking and trailing an enemysubmarine, bi-static sonar operations, orsimply as a trainer.

The US Battlespace PreparationAutonomous Underwater Vehicle (BPAUV)is a good example of an AUV. The BPAUVweighs 800 pounds, is 122 inches long, ispowered by lithium polymer batteries andhas an operational speed of 3 knots. Thevehicle is launched by crane from a minewarfare vessel and travels on a preset courseloaded into its programme. BPAUV searchesthe waters ahead of the MineCountermeasure Vessel (MCV) for mine-like objects using a synthetic aperture sonar.Such sonar systems are very capable but arepower-hungry and can limit the enduranceof the vehicle. No communication occursduring a mission and BPAUV does not havean onboard identification or classificationcapability. Other AUVs use sonarcommunication to update mission

information and have more advancedonboard processing units. AUVs cancurrently operate for up to 20 hours.

UUVs were used in support ofOperation Iraqi Freedom. Naval SpecialClearance Team (NSCT) One, alongwith Royal Navy and Australianforces, on 24March 2003, handled thetask of exploratory mine hunting torender the port safe for incominghumanitarian aid shipments. NSCTOne accomplished its mission withthe aid of Unmanned UnderseaVehicles (UUV). It also conductedadditional UUV operations further upthe river at Az Zubayr and Karbala,Iraq. NSCT One went into action byinitially checking the bottom formines. Then the divers conductedtactile searches of the quay wall outinto the surrounding water todetermine any possible mine burialzones.

Looking to the future, the Woods HoleOceanographic Institute and the WebbResearch Corporation have recentlydemonstrated an underwater glider whichcan ‘fly’ using underwater thermal currents.The team claims the glider could operate foras long as six months at a time, risingoccasionally to the surface to orient itself byGPS. This could be a considerablebreakthrough for UUVs, providing cheapervehicles and significantly extendingoperational availability. Currently, the glideronly operates limited sensor suites in orderto minimise the power demands. Furtherwork is needed to achieve similarendurances with synthetic aperture sonar,for example.

Enabling Technologies

A number of the tasks currently undertaken


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2 www.globalsecurity.org

by a pilot/driver/captain on a mannedvehicle must be reallocated for anunmanned vehicle. These functions caneither be assumed by a remote operator orautomated (either in on-board systems orthe ground equipment). Both of theseoptions rely on microprocessor andcommunication (data link) technology.Advances in these two areas will determinethe future autonomous capabilities ofunmanned vehicles. Potentially, the entiretyor any subset of unmanned vehiclefunctions could be autonomous in futuresystems. These functions include:

1. Sensor and other information fusion2. Communication management3. Optimal path planning4. Collision avoidance5. Trajectory motion and path following6. Target identification and threat

evaluation7. Engagement decision8. Weapons deployment9. Abort decision making/response10. Task scheduling11. Co-operative tactics

Current technologies provide automation inbasic functions but with very limitedautonomy in performing more complextasks. A fully autonomous capability, inwhich the unmanned vehicle will generateand perform multifaceted missions, isunattainable until a true ArtificialIntelligence (AI) technology becomesavailable. Speakers at the RUSI conferenceestimated that we are around ten to fifteenyears from having intelligent machining. AIis a vague term and can be (erroneously)applied to a variety of systems. Artificialconsciences, certainly, are some way off.Applying Moore’s Law, one might estimatethat computers will not achieve the sameprocessing power as the human brain before2040. In addition, it is very difficult to

produce safe software because software willoften interact in unpredictable ways.Furthermore, it is increasingly difficult totest software properly because largeprogrammes can consist of millions of linesof code.

The US DoD Unmanned Aircraft SystemsRoadmap 2005-2030 predicts future levels ofautonomy with reference to tenAutonomous Control Levels:

1. Remotely guided2. Real-time health/diagnosis3. Adapt to failures & flight conditions4. Onboard route re-plan5. Group co-ordination6. Group tactical re-plan7. Group tactical goals8. Distributed control9. Group strategic goals10. Fully autonomous swarms

The roadmap expects to achieve level 10 by2015, which seems rather ambitious giventhe current rate of adoption. While the USUAV Battle Lab oversaw the firstdemonstration of co-operative UAV flightin August 2007 and BAE Systems has justflight tested several cooperating UAVs, itwill be some time before such systems aredeployed into theatre.

Communications

The communications infrastructureassociated with the control of an unmannedvehicle is a key issue. There is a critical trade-off between the on-board intelligence andthe demand for data link capacity; thegreater the reliance on a remote controller,the more information must transferbetween the unmanned vehicle and theoperator. Reconnaissance systems that relayreal-time colour video to the ground, forinstance, require many megabytes per

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second. Current systems use RF band datalinks or UHF SATCOM for command-and-control uplink and data downlinks. Thesecould all be subject to jamming, spoofing ordenial, which is of particular concern forremotely operated vehicles. In addition, thespectrum allocation in a particular countrycan determine whether or not a UAV can flyin its airspace. Different nations allocatetheir electromagnetic spectrum differently,and this could mean, for example, that UKArmed Forces would not be able to fly a USplane over their home territory because thefrequency used by US aircraft is extensivelyused by UKmobile phone operators. In Iraqthe government has been selling off parts ofthe frequency spectrum and this is alreadycausing problems for some UAVs.

Communication in the underwaterenvironment is highly problematic. RadioFrequency is so short range it is almostuseless underwater, most underwaterplatforms rely instead on sonar. Even sonaris relatively short range and the rangedecreases as the frequency increases. Thismeans it is difficult to achieve high data rates.It is for this reason that AUVs have provedso popular in the underwater environment.

A potential beneficial future technology islasercom. This technology uses optical datalinks and could offer data rates two to fiveorders of magnitude greater that the bestfuture RF systems. Lasercom is very difficultto jam but the ability of optical data links toprovide stable communications in badweather is limited. Lasercom is also line-of-sight technology, which means thatcommunications could be lost if an objectpasses in front of the beam. Anycommunications infrastructure wouldrequire to be resistant to jamming orspoofing to ensure control over the vehicle.Encryption techniques are thereforeessential.

Propulsion

Increased endurance is a significantadvantage that unmanned vehicles have overmanned aircraft. It follows thatadvancements in propulsion technologiesthat lead to increased endurance, power andreliability are critical to the ongoingimprovement in unmanned vehicleperformance. The options for propulsion ofan unmanned vehicle are internalcombustion engines, gas turbines, batteries,fuel cells and solar cells.

The US Unmanned Aircraft SystemsRoadmap 2005-2030 predicts specific powerconsumptions of each of thesetechnologies. The maximum endurance ofcurrent systems is in the region of thirtyhours. However, increases in propulsiontechnologies could see this expandsignificantly, particularly if mid-flightrefuelling problems can be overcome.

As discussed in the UUV section above,ROVs are generally powered through theumbilical cable while UUVs rely on batteryor fuel cells. The endurance of thesesystems is dependent on their size and thesensor & processing suites onboard. Inaddition, navigation is much less preciseunderwater as there is no GPS equivalent.

Weapons

It is possible to integrate a range of weaponsinto unmanned aerial platforms. In apermissive Air Defence environment UAVshave the advantage of being able to moveclose to targets without exposing humancrews to target defences, so there is less of arequirement for sophisticated and expensivelong-rangemissiles. It is therefore likely thatUAVs will be armed with smaller guidedmunitions. The payload capacity of the UAV,which depends largely on its size, constrains


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the type and number of weapons which canbe carried. Suitable technologies should belightweight and offer precise delivery. TheUnited States Air Force has successfully usedPredator unmanned air vehicles armed withHellfire missiles in the current conflicts inAfghanistan and Iraq. The AGM-114Hellfireis a semi-active anti-armour missile, whichhas been integrated for the UAV platform.

The advent of small, lower-power jammingsystems has provided the potential forUCAV-based airborne electronic attackcapabilities, which could be used to suppressradar and communication systems. The USHunter Joint Tactical Unmanned AerialSystem is an example of an operational UAVthat can conduct electronic attack missions.The Hunter has carried electroniccountermeasure payloads includingcommunications radar jammers. The size,weight and cost of jamming units areconstantly being driven down by technologyadvantages.

UAV are also ideal platforms from which todeploy Directed Energy Weapons (DEW).Although there are no systems currentlyoperational, extensive research anddevelopment is being conducted in this area.High Power Microwave (HPM)technologies are the most probable DEWweapon. An HPM weapon generatescontinuous or pulse microwave beams thatcould be directed at a target. A microwavebeam operating at gigawatt power levels hasthe potential to turn any electroniccomponents into molten silicon. However,development of DEW technologies iscurrently hindered by the large size of theunits required to generate the necessarypower. A further technological challenge isthe potential for self-kill due to energyspillover. For example, microwave spillovermay affect the internal systems of the UCAVsuch as its avionics and may also jam the

UCAV’s own data links. Accurate pointingof a DEW is extremely difficult to achievefrom an airborne platform. In order toachieve the desired effects, a DEW beamneeds to be focused on a point for a numberof seconds. During this time, pointingcontrol system will have to prevent thebeammoving from the target, whilst copingwith significant vibrations and buffeting ofthe airframe.

Summary

Unmanned vehicles are being developed fora wider variety of purposes in the land, seaand air domains. UUVs show the greatestlevel of autonomy to date. The militarybenefits of unmanned systems are beingproved every day in Afghanistan and Iraqand unmanned systems have cemented theirfuture in US and UK force structures (andthose of allied nations). There are likely tobe significant advances in robotics in thenext twenty-five years and levels ofautonomy are likely to increase. Despitethis, public perception and the relativenewness of the technology mean thatunmanned systems working in populatedareas are likely to remain under humansupervision, at least in the medium-term.

Proliferation of UnmannedVehicles*

The number of robots worldwide isincreasing and their price is dropping.Robots are now 80 per cent cheaper in 2006than in 1990 – it is now possible to build aUAV for as little as £250 – and thetechnology is becoming very widespread.This is illustrated by the number of states

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*Updates to this section are available at www.rusi.org/research/militarysciences/information

either actively researching or showinginterest in robotics – Australia, Belgium,Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy,Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Russia,Singapore, South Africa, South Korea,Spain, Sweden, UK and US to name but afew. Currently, the UK has the lowestnumber of robots per capita (1/28) in thedeveloped world. In Japan the figure isnearer 1/8. South Korea wants a robot inevery home by 2017 and is talking about arobot police force by 2010.

Asmight be expected, the US is investing themost heavily in military robotics. In 2001,the President announced that unmannedvehicles would make a significantcontribution to future force structures withover a third of US Army vehicles to beunmanned by 2015.While this seems ratherambitious, the US DoD is forecast to spendover one billion dollars on ground androbotic vehicles over the next five years.Their Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032outlines future projects and the level ofautonomy that is to be expected over thenext twenty-five years. The six key goals setout in the US Unmanned Systems Roadmap2007-2032 also emerge consistently in thefuture planning of allied nations:

1. Improve the effectiveness of coalitionunmanned systems through improvedintegration and collaboration

2. Emphasise commonality to achievegreater interoperability among systemcontrols, communications, dataproducts, and data links on unmannedsystems

3. Foster the development of policies,standards, and procedures that enablesafe and timely operations and theeffective integration of manned andunmanned systems

4. Implement standardised and protectivepositive control measures for unmanned

systems and their associated armaments5. More flexible prototyping, test and

logistical support processes to supportrapid demonstration and integration ofvalidated combat capabilities indeployed systems

6. Competition, refining and prioritisingrequirements, plus increasednetworking among systems are to beimplemented tomore effectively controlcost

Most user countries are concentrating oncapabilities for urban operations and combatapplications; Japan, however, sets outdefensive applications for robotictechnologies as the primary goal. It is worthhighlighting other instances in which theroadmaps of other countries havesubstantively differed. The Human-RobotInteraction (HRI) approach of Japan issimilar to the US, but Japan’s humanoidrobotic technology is currently moreadvanced than that of the US. The US isconsidering partnering with South Koreawhich began investing heavily in HRI wellin advance of international efforts. Canada’splatform technology has progressedcomparably to the US and it is expanding itsefforts with platforms.

A number of allies currently conductresearch and development projects focusedon developing military capabilities forrobotics and UGVs.

• Germany has funded efforts todevelop critical UGV technologiesincluding human interface, planning,intelligent control, perception andautonomous robotic vehicleplatforms. Recently, small man-portable robots have also become adevelopment priority for Germany.

• Canada prioritises research with afocus on sensors and integration for


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robotic systems, control systems forrobotic applications, datacommunications systems, roboticvehicle platforms, artificialintelligence for robotic systems, andthe ergonomic aspects of the human-machine interface.

• Australia is concentrating on theareas of platform-relatedtechnologies and weapons. It is alsofocusing on development of man-unmanned formations, controltheory, and control systems.

• France is primarily concentrating onthe development of systemcollaboration, weapons andautonomy. Additionally, it is focusingon night vision and electronic sensorsincluding countermine and de-mining technologies.

• Israel is already well-known for itsUAVs and has started collaboratingwith India in this area. It is alsodirecting efforts towards tank systemsand laser rangefinders.

• South Korea recently initiatedresearch focused on the developmentof a platform similar toMULE. It hasalso prioritised producing a vehiclethat can be used to monitor theDemilitarized Zone and has thereforefocused on real-time tracking andHRI efforts.

• Switzerland has also prioritised HRIwhile Denmark has directeddevelopment to systems for mineclearing and mobility.

• The United Kingdom is primarilyworking on navigation, mobility,communication, and ground vehicleintegration.

• Russia has experience in roboticsthrough its space programme andhas just demonstrated an unmannedcombat air vehicle.

China

There is a dearth of information availableon the Chinese roadmap, but Chinesedevelopment future planning does notappear to concentrate on replacing humanoperators in hazardous militaryenvironments and instead seems to beprimarily directed toward functions wherehuman operators cannot operate (e.g. deepsea). There is one reference to militaryrobotics in an abstract from a thesis postedby the Institute for Intelligent Machines ofthe National Academy of Sciences thatmakes reference to Chinese developmentsin military robotics as ‘very late comparedwith other developed countries.’ This thesisis aimed at teleoperation for ordnancedisposal, but is not particularlygroundbreaking. China’s limited researchand development programme onlocomotion prioritises biomimetics,including serpentine, swimming, andquadrupedal motion. Space roboticshowever appears to be a wider area of focusfor several institutions. Development ofintelligent systems for robotics appears to bea Chinese priority as indicated by the workat Tsinghua University and otherinstitutions.

Chinese projects are largely focused onperception, sensing and informationtechnologies includingmulti-agent systems.There have also been several reports of thejoint development of intelligent multi-robotsystems, comprised of a leader with fourfollower robots, at the Beijing University ofAerospace and Aeronautics and thePolytechnic University of Milan. Intelligentagents and mobile ad hoc networking workis also widespread and represents a focus onkey enabling technologies for advancedmulti-robot systems.

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UK

In the past, the British Army used platformssuch as Buster and Phoenix UAVs, while theRoyal Air Force and Royal Navy have longemployed unmanned drones for surface-to-air and air-to-air missile and gunnerytraining. However, the recent deploymentof the Hermes 450 UAV in support ofcurrent operations is seen as a significantstep forward for the UK. This UAV providesendurance in excess of fifteen hours and isnow a credible, reliable and sought afterresource in theatre. Airmanship skills havebeen seen as key to its successful operationsand safe integration into the Joint BattleSpace. Hermes 450 is the precursor to theUK’s Watchkeeper programme.

The RAF has participated in the JointPredator Task Force supplying pilots andintelligence analysts to man the US PredatorA UAVs. The UK has recently acquired threeof its own Predator B or Reaper aircraft toprovide Intelligence, Surveillance andReconnaissance (ISR) capabilities overAfghanistan; these will be flown out ofNevada for the time being. The experienceof the operators from the Joint PredatorTask Force has made this acquisitionrelatively straightforward. BothWatchkeeperand Reaper are remotely operated.

The most advanced UK system in terms ofautonomy is the HERTI. This UAV wasrecently deployed to Iraq as part of a warfighting experiment to support operations.Operated by RAF personnel, this semi-autonomous’ system has enjoyed someencouraging success while supporting landoperations. The platform enjoys a highdegree of autonomy in take off, flightcontrol and landing but true autonomy is along way off.

Finally, mini-UAVs such as Desert Hawk

have played a valuable role in the forceprotection of deployed troops.

Looking to the future, the UK’s HERTI andTerranis programmes are the ones likely toprovide the most autonomy in the airdomain. Terranis is to be a stealthyunmanned combat vehicle, able to take off,fly and land autonomously. It will stillrequire a controller to oversee its operationand authorise attacks against high-valuetargets.

In the maritime domain, the UK recentlyacquired 2 REMUS UUVs, which will beemployed for mine detection. The UK alsooperates a Scorpio 45 ROV as part of itsSubmarine Rescue Service headquarters.

In the land domain, the UK’ s main focus hasbeen on EOD applications. The UK hasbeen operating Remotec’s Wheelbarrowrobot in Northern Ireland since the 1970’s. Ithas recently bought 30 iRobot Packbotsunder the Urgent Operational Requirementscheme but plans to procure a further 80EOD UGVs under the CUTLASSprogramme.

The MoD’s Grand Challenge competition,seeks unmanned solutions to the problemsof operating in urban environments. Anumber of solutions have been put forwardand will be tested in a live demonstrationlater this year. More information on theMoD Grand Challenge can be found athttp://www.challenge.mod.uk/

Use of Unmanned Vehicles by Non-State Actors

Robot technology is very common andthere are many legitimate civilian uses ofautonomous systems. Toys are alsobecoming highly sophisticated and there aremany lightweight aircraft, road vehicles and


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even submarines originally built for theleisure industry which have been used forillegal activities. The technology isimproving quickly; systems are smaller,faster, and can cover increasing distances.While Western forces debate how to buildethical constraints into their systems,terrorists are unlikely to worry about suchcomplications.

The first generation of Al-Qa’ida talked agreat deal about developing autonomoussystems. Their efforts have since abatedbecause the current generation seems toprefer simpler (and cheaper) solutions.Hizballah has flown six UAV flights intoIsrael and the Israelis have found other toyplanes fitted with explosives. There is alsoevidence to suggest that insurgents recycleAllied UAVs that crash in Iraq and that threeworkshops on the Afghanistan-Pakistanborder are now manufacturing UAVs. TheFARC in Colombia allegedly has nine UAVswhile other criminal elements useautonomous systems for surveillance,electronic disruption, and the transfer ofdrugs (particularly in the maritimeenvironment).

Non-state actors are moving into thefollowing environments: urban,underground, maritime, space, cyberspaceand ungoverned spaces. Most of these lendthemselves to unmanned vehicles. The firstgroups tomake use of autonomous systemsare likely to be hybrid irregular forces(irregular forces with access to regularmeans).

Defence Mechanisms

Criminal activity is a profitable business;elements that acquire autonomous systemtechnology will sell it to groups with variousmotives. An important security componentin any autonomous system will be an anti-

tamper system that renders UAVsinoperable should it fall into the wronghands. Future insurgents and terrorists willhave access to Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs)and other air defence systems so UAVdefensive aid suites will become increasinglyimportant, particularly for the moreexpensive platforms.

Ethics of AutonomousVehicles

We should first begin by asking what ismeant by ethical behaviour. ProfessorChristopher Coker suggests that:

Moral thought is deeply concernedwith the systematic examination ofthe relations of human beings to eachother. Ethics is concerned with howwe should conduct relations withothers. When codified by the statethey become laws.3

The aim of war, Clausewitz argued, is topersuade the enemy that he has beendefeated. Death therefore is not necessarilycrucial. In addition, Rorty proposed that

We have rules because it is prudent todo so. Our responsibility is to remainalways alive to the consequences ofour own actions.4

Thus, it follows that the more ethically wecan conduct our warfare and the treatmentof prisoners of war and civilians, thesmoother the process of concluding warmight become.

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3 Christopher Coker, Ethics and War in the 21stCentury, (London: Routledge, 2008).4 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

The British Defence Vision is to be ‘A Forcefor Good in the World’. Underpinning thevision are the international Law of ArmedConflict (LOAC) and the Single Services’lists of Core Values and Standards. The ‘justwar’ principles define just cause for war (adbellum) and just conduct during war (inbello):

• Just cause, right intention,proportionality, hope for success, lastresort

• Careful choice of targets andobjectives, military urgency toprevent a worse occurrence andhumanity

These are the basis of LOAC and alsoinform the writing of Rules of Engagement(RoE).

In addition to LOAC and RoE, ArmedForces have a number of Core Values andStandards. The Royal Navy and BritishArmy, for example, hold the same six ‘corevalues’: Commitment, Respect for Others,Courage, Integrity, Loyalty, Discipline. TheUS Army also holds to a similar set ofvalues: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, SelflessService, Honor, Integrity, and PersonalCourage. The relationship between thesevalues, the ethics of the use of the militaryinstrument, and morally acceptablebehaviour in combat is complex.

However, just because ‘right’ behaviour hasbeen codified or mandated, it does notfollow that all personnel will behave in amorally acceptable manner on thebattlefield, particularly when they come intocontact with the enemy. Indeed, a reportfrom the US Surgeon General’s Office5 in

2006 indicated that:

1. Only 47% of (US) Soldiers and38% of (US) Marines agreed thatnoncombatants should be treatedwith dignity and respect.

2. Well over a third of (US) Soldiersand (US)Marines reported tortureshould be allowed, whether tosave the life of a fellow Soldier or(US) Marine or to obtainimportant information aboutinsurgents.

3. 45% of (US) Soldiers and 60% of(US) Marines did not agree thatthey would report a fellowsoldier/marine if he had injuredor killed an innocentnoncombatant.

4. A third of (US) Marines and over aquarter of Soldiers did not agreethat their NCOs and Officersmade it clear not to mistreatnoncombatants.

5. Although they reported receivingethical training, 28% of (US)Soldiers and 31% of (US) Marinesreported facing ethical situationsin which they did not know howto respond.

6. Combat experience, particularlylosing a team member, wasrelated to an increase in ethicalviolations

These variabilities in human behaviour haveprompted Dr Ron Arkin of GeorgiaInstitute of Technology to claim that the useof autonomous systems would lead to anincrease in ethical behaviour on thebattlefield rather than a decrease. In a recentreport to the US Army Research Laboratory,Dr Arkin stated that robots:

1. Do not need to protect themselvesand can be used in a self-sacrificing


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5 Surgeon General’s Office, Mental Health AdvisoryTeam (MHAT) IV Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07,Final Report, Nov. 17, 2006.

manner if appropriate;2. Can be designed without

emotions that cloud theirjudgment or result in anger andfrustration with ongoingbattlefield events;

3. Need not be affected by thehuman psychological problem of‘scenario fulfillment’ . Thisphenomenon leads to distortionor neglect of contradictoryinformation in stressful situations,where humans use new incominginformation in ways that only fittheir pre-existing belief patterns, aform of premature cognitiveclosure;

4. Will eventually possess a broadrange of sensors that will givethem greater battlefieldobservation capabilities thanhumans currently possess;

5. Can integrate more informationfrom more sources far fasterbefore responding with lethalforce than a human possibly couldin real-time. This can arise frommultiple remote sensors andintelligence (including human)sources, as part of the Army’snetwork-centric warfare conceptand the concurrent developmentof the Global Information Grid;

6. When working in a team ofcombined human soldiers andautonomous systems, have thepotential capability ofindependently and objectivelymonitoring ethical behavior in thebattlefield by all parties andreporting infractions that mightbe observed. This presence alonemight possibly lead to a reductionin human ethical infractions.6

These statistics are indeed alarming and the

arguments that Arkin puts forward are alsocompelling. However, it would be useful toset out some independent tests to help todecide whether robots would act more orless ethically than humans.

Morality Tests

A set of criteria was proposed by MichaelCodner, Director Military Sciences, RUSI, atthe conference which, according to just warprinciples, should help to determinewhether or not unmanned systems areindeed more ethical:

1. Will the systems raise or lower the barfor the justification of the use of militaryforce by governments? For instance, willthe prospect of lower risk to own forcesand fewer civilian casualties encouragethe use of force?

2. Will the systems achieve greaterdiscretion?a. Will there be fewer innocent civilian

casualties?b. Will there be less collateral damage?

3. Will the systems improveproportionality?a. Will the violence used by the forces

using the weapons be at a lowerlevel in proportion to the intendedconsequences of the operation?Unmanned Air Vehicles, forexample, have already proved to behelpful in capping violence duringPeace Support Operations.

4. Will fewer of the armed forces using thesystems be killed or injured by their use?

5. If a system were to fall into enemyhands, could the technology be stolenand used malevolently?

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6 Ronald C. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour:Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture (Atlanta: GeorgiaInstitute of Technology).

In addition, there should also be an ethicalframework for the human(s)-in-the-loopwhether they are remote operators,commanders, politicians or suppliersbecause it would be difficult to hold even afully autonomous robot responsible for theconsequences of its actions, unintended orotherwise. Dr Patrick Mileham proposedMacIntyre’s test of moral judgement (1999)and responsibility, which states:

1. First moral agents so conceived arejustifiably and uncontroversially heldresponsible for that in their actionswhich is intentional.

2. Secondly they may be justifiably heldresponsible for incidental aspects ofthose actions of which they should havebeen aware.

3. And thirdly, they may be justifiably heldresponsible for at least some of thereasonably predictable effects of theiractions.

These tests are designed to ensure that themilitary does not deliberately use robots toconduct activities which would constitutewar crimes nor wash its hands of anyirresponsible accidents.

Perceptions

Films and documentaries such as ‘I Robot’and ‘Terminator’ influence publicperceptions so the idea of a fullyautonomousmilitary robot is likely to comeup against some opposition. Even if thepublic becomes more comfortable with thedeployment of unmanned systems, thereplacement of armed personnel by highlycapable (and expendable) robots may reducea nation’s tolerance for casualties. Onespeaker suggested that by taking the bloodout of war, autonomous systemsmaymakeit easier to justify military action politically.On the other hand, wars waged by

autonomous systems may ultimately beharder to win. As the Coalition hasdiscovered in Iraq, there is no substitute forsoldiers on the ground. In addition,autonomous systems could be perceived tobe ‘unfair’ given their tactical advantage andthe lack of risk to operators. This perceptioncould be used against Western interventionforces and may even incite resistance.

In today’s warfare the media can be apowerful weapon. If UAVs were to cause amassacre, there would be widespreadrevulsion. On the other hand, if on a day-to-day basis they prove on balance to be lesslethal than the effects of suicide bombers,they are more likely to be acceptable. Thefitting of cameras on autonomous systemscould be seen as a means of ensuringappropriate use in that informationcollected could be used to justify orcondemn their actions.

Because humans write software and applysettings to autonomous systems, there willbe an ethical element to programming ofautonomous systems. This ethical elementwill be consistent with the code of ethicsused by the particular society using thesystems and not will necessarily be acceptedby other cultures and societies. Even if anact relating to an autonomous system ismorally just to the programmer, it could beperceived as wrong in a local culture intheatre and cause problems for a militaryintervention mission.

Even if an autonomous system can beprogrammed to do the ‘right’ thing, is thatnecessarily the ‘good’ thing? Bad humandecisions at every level from the tactical tothe grand strategic (including ill-consideredentry into ‘risk free’ wars) could nullify anyeffort by the programmer to ensure theautonomous system is an ethical entity.


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Conclusion

To conduct war according to ethicalprinciples is not only moral, it is sensible.Any advances in technology in thebattlespace should therefore be measuredagainst accepted ethical principles to ensurewe are at least maintaining, if not raising,the current moral standards by deployingthem. Lowering the standards, howevergreat the capability the technologyprovided, would be self-defeating.

Autonomous and remotely operatedsystems need to adopt current ethicalpractices, and operators or commandersmust accept responsibility for unnecessarydeath and destruction delivered by thesesystems. There is a possibility in the longerterm that AI and self-learning in thesesystems will reach a stage at which theirbehaviour, although strictly regulated withinethical codes, becomes unpredictable to theuser and moral responsibility becomesdifficult to assign to specific humans. In asense they could become moral agents intheir own right. However, in the meantime,increases in autonomy are likely to begradual. As problems and issues arise andare identified, they can be accounted forboth in the programming of autonomoussystems and in the parameters under whichthey are employed.

It is possible that public perceptions willhold sway over the deployment of fullyautonomous vehicles.

International Law andRegulations

Military unmanned vehicles are governed bya number of different sets of laws andregulations.

Firstly, they are subject to the standard safetyregulations set down by the civil andmilitary authorities for safe use of suchsystems within their designatedenvironments. Then, there are internationalLaws of Armed Conflict (LOAC), nationallaws and caveats and national Rules ofEngagement, which govern how armedforces operate within a given theatre. Forexpeditionary operations, this may befurther complicated by the national laws ofthe country in which they are operating andby the national caveats of coalition forces.

Unmanned Combat Vehicles

The key question in the deployment of fullyautonomous vehicles is: Where doesresponsibility for injury and death ultimatelylie: programmers, manufacturers,operators, commanders, civil servants orpoliticians? Even if a system is fullyautonomous, it does not mean that nohumans are involved. Someone has to planthe operation, define the parameters,prescribe the rules of engagement, anddeploy the system.

Geoffrey Parker claimed ‘Technology hascreated a paradoxical situation in most post-modern conflicts. While in general onlythose who kill or maim innocent civiliansface-to-face risk being held accountable by awar crimes tribunal, those who act from adistance – although they often inflict farmore damage – are rarely put on trial.’7 Ifthis is true, international law needs to betightened to ensure that unmanned vehiclesare not used to undertake activities of amorally dubious nature.

With regard to who is responsible for illegalactions, it is necessary to distinguish

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7 G. Parker, Empire War and Faith in Early ModernEurope (London: Penguin, 2002).

between civil (or collective) and criminal (orindividual) responsibility.

Civil Responsibility

If the state (or nation) is subject tointernational law, it will bear civilresponsibility for the actions of itsdepartments and any contractors actingon behalf of those departments. Thegovernment department that is involved isirrelevant so for example the USgovernment is just as liable for mistakesmade by the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) as it is for the Department of Defense(DoD). This means that regardless of thelevel of autonomy of an unmanned vehicle,the state in question is responsible for payingcompensation.

If the unmanned vehicle had a design orprogramming flaw, it is likely that themanufacturing company would be heldresponsible.

Criminal Responsibility

At present, there is no moral issue over theuse of autonomous systems as long as ahuman reviews the decision to attack (whichmeans unmanned vehicles will remain semi-autonomous). No existing international lawor treaty prohibits combat autonomoussystems. However, international conventionrequires distinction, proportionality, and theother standard factors of target selection. Ahuman controller must assess these factors.Any algorithms used in programmingmust:

1. Verify that the target is in fact a militaryobjective

2. Weigh the proportionality of themilitary importance of the attack

3. Spare civilians and civilian objectiveswhenever possible

4. Warn civilians of an attack if possible

In the case of semi-autonomous systems,the operator is responsible for any death orinjury caused by the unmanned system.Because of this, remote operators shouldalways be military personnel so that amilitary legal framework applies. Withregard to civilian contractors in theatre, it isunlikely that civilians would be heldresponsible if they were simply servicing avehicle but any civilian contractor or non-military government officials using suchvehicles to apply lethal force would lose allprotection that LOAC offer to non-combatants. This means that they could betargeted on the battlefield and later tried formurder. In addition, if civilians could haveprevented the use of the vehicle for illegaltargeting but failed to do so, they could alsobe held criminally responsible for the action.

In the case of the completely autonomousmachine, whilst there is no doubt that theparty responsible for the machine will havecivil responsibility, the problem remainswith criminal liability. There is a stronghuman need to blame somebody when anaccident occurs. Potentially, theprogrammer of the machine could beresponsible for faulty software whichprompted the war crimes or equally a civilservant, who bought these machines for themilitary. A commander in the field mightalso be held responsible if he deliberatelyfailed to override the autonomous system.

Another part of the discussion consideredwhether a fully autonomous robot could beconvicted of war crimes, and if so what thepotential punishment would be. There is thequestion of the purposes of criminalconviction and punishment – denial,deterrence and retribution – and how thesemight apply to a non-human being whetherrobot or animal. Somewere unsure whetherthis discussion was meaningful. There is aparallel line of argument to that of the


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ethics of these systems discussed earlier,which is that the slow evolution of trulyautonomous capability and sophisticatedself-learning will allow for legal systems toevolve to cope with emergent artificialmoral agents. Review of the jurisprudencein this area would be a subject for furtherwork.

Civil Regulations and their Impact onMilitary Unmanned Vehicles

In the US, Predator and Global Hawkaircraft are being used to supplement bordersurveillance capabilities, however, in mostother nations unmanned vehicles are notpermitted to fly in civil airspace and insteadare restricted to pockets of airspace whichhave been cleared by the national Civil AirAuthority (CAA). In the UK, a programme –ASTRAEA – is underway to provide thenecessary technology and standards in orderfor the CAA to certify safe use of UAVs innon-segregated airspace alongside generalair traffic. This includes sense and avoidtechnologies, which would allow UAVs toavoid collisions and communication systemswith air traffic control. Currently, air trafficcontrollers rely on voice communication,which would be impossible with UAVs asthey rely on data links for control updates.ASTRAEA is also concerned with securingthe code (so that no one can tamper with it)and developing a system of graduatedautonomy with its (remote) controller, forexample:

1. ‘Should I do x?’2. If there is no response, ‘Unless you say

otherwise, I will do x’3. If there is then no response, UAV does x

on its own

In addition, CAA has recently published‘CAP 722 – Guidance for UAS Operations inUK Airspace’. Similar work is being carried

out in other nations devoting effort todevelop their use of UAVs.

The UK Ministry of Defence has a numberof standards which are pertinent toautonomous weaponry, with respect to itsdesign and behaviour. Defence Standard0056 ‘SafetyManagement Requirements ForDefence Systems’ describes the safetyrequirements applied to all weaponsincluding autonomous systems but does notaddress some unique and specific featuresrepresented by unmanned systems, likeunplanned collisions. Defence Standard 00-970 ‘Design And AirworthinessRequirements For Service Aircraft, Part 9UAV Systems’ was developed especially forthe airborne autonomous systems. Thereare no specific standards for UUVs or UGVsbeyond Defence Standard 0056 however thisis not surprising as there are very few inservice in the UK. The US has published the‘Unmanned Systems Safety Guide for DODAcquisition 2007’, which applies to all classesof unmanned vehicles.

Civil Regulations Pertaining to UUVs

The legal boundaries concerning unmannedunderwater vessels are currently veryunclear. Vessels that go to sea are typicallyreferred to as ‘ships’ and the law governingnaval vessels is based upon this description.A ship has clear liability and sailors areusually navigating it pursuant to acommercial, social, security related,scientific or other operation from one placeto another. On the other hand, unmannedunderwater vehicles undertake ratherdifferent activities. In the UK, the Society ofUnderwater Technology is trying to tacklesome of these issues and is proposing Codesof Practice for these vehicles, with a view tohaving them incorporated into internationallaw. This could help accommodate some ofthese differences

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In the case of UUVs, there is no liabilityregime which means that in theory there isno limit to the damages that can be awardedfor damage directly or indirectly caused by aUUV (although the vehicles are not largenor do they travel very quickly – thuslimiting damage). Insurers have stated that,to date, insurance claims on UUVs tend tobe for vehicle losses but that the uncertaintyover who would be responsible for damageor injury caused by the UUVs makes itdifficult for underwriters to establishcommercially acceptable ways to insure thecraft.

Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs), whichare attached to themother ship are normallythe legal responsibility of the master of themother ship. The same applies to RFcontrolled unmanned surface vehicles,whether they are controlled by a ship or acoastal operator. It is not easy to have totalsituational awareness when operating thesesystems. Standard practice when conducting‘unusual activity’ at sea, such as geoseismicsurveys is for the mother ship (or indeedcoastal operators) to warn other vessels inthe vicinity. This device has reduced theMaster’s liability in the event of an accidentby up to 60 per cent. It was suggested thatsimilar practices could be adopted by theUUV community in the absence of a legalframework. For unmanned surface vessels,which can be quite large and operate atmuch higher speeds, it might also beappropriate for them to have standardlighting for collision avoidance.

Withmilitary UUVs and USVs, the situationbecomes more complicated. Neither of thesuggested codes of practice are particularlyappropriate for stealthy operations butmight be appropriate in othercircumstances. More worrying, any UUVscaught up in fishing nets automaticallybecome valuable salvage (i.e. the

government has to pay to get them back),which means UUV operations could bedisrupted with relative ease. For the present,the onus will therefore be on the operatorto ensure that their vehicles and theircontrol mechanisms are sufficiently robustin order to minimise their liability in theevent of an incident.

Ground Vehicles

While there are a number of privatecompanies investing in projects to produce adriverless car, UGVs to date have not beenused on roads and there is no civil initiativeto safely govern their use of which theauthor is aware. It would be safe to assumethat any unmanned vehicle would need tocomply with standard road safetyregulations. However, there are many otheruses of UGVs within the urbanenvironment and this is a matter that willneed addressing in the near future.

Conclusions

The adoption of unmanned vehicles is justbeginning and as a result few regulationsexist either in the civil or military domainfor UUVs and UGVs. UAVs are currentlycovered broadly in international law whileNATO and national defence standards andprogrammes such as ASTRAEA areworking to address specific safety concerns.The issues of target distinction andproportionality assessment remain hurdlesto the acceptance of fully autonomousattack systems. The easiest solution,therefore, is simply to retain a humancontroller in the system. If the technologycan progress enough to consider all of thesefactors and thus eliminate the necessity of ahuman controller, then there would be nolegal issues preventing their operationalemployment.


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Operational Considerations

This section focuses on the operators’perspectives. Most of the material has beentaken from presentations and discussions atthe RUSI conference and is reported as such.There is some overlap with previoussections but the comments have been left infor completeness.

Professor Coker stated

The problem with robotics is that itdemands even less of the individualsoldiers it is threatening to replace. Inincreasing the distance betweenourselves and our enemies, robotics isalso demanding less and less of thesocieties that send them out to battle.8

He then went on to ask:

Whether in increasinglyinstrumentalising the world – inhollowing out the warrior’s honour,or threatening to replace warriorsthemselves with machines – we riskignoring Aristotle’s insight that ethicsis in the striving. In the striving wediscover much about ourselves andotherness. If we are not allowed tostrive, what will there be left todiscover?

Automation versus Human Control

Automation has nearly always beenwelcomed by operators because of theincrease in system effectiveness andreliability it offers. Removing humans fromthe decision-making cycle can improveperformance and allow them to concentrateon other tasks. Human reaction time is

typically 400 milliseconds whereas amachine can respond in a few nanoseconds.The potential military advantages ofautonomy are obvious, especially if themachine has learning abilities. It is alsoexpected that, with the right level ofprogramming, unmanned systems willprovide increased precision and thereforereduce collateral damage.

There are, nevertheless, several argumentsfor maintaining human oversight. Many sawa ‘man in the loop’ as essential forunmanned systems to work properly, letalone ethically. However, one panelistdescribed remote operation as clumsy andslow; the human operator is far less capablethan a pilot of deft control over themovements of the vehicle.

It was suggested that robots are beingbrought into service because they arecheaper thanmanned vehicles. Furthermorethey remove the concern about self-defencebecause there is no human on board. As aconsequence their use will be more ethicalbecause there will be less risk to humans.Unfortunately, the cost of producing someof the more advanced unmanned vehicleswould prohibit exploitation of thisadvantage.

The use of UAVs by Special Forces andintelligence agencies has also causedproblems. Special Forces flying operationsare generally covert. Such activity couldcause mid-air collisions and generateinterference on frequencies designated forother operations.

UAV Operators and Training

Participants identified both positive andnegative aspects of the physical andemotional distance that remote operatorshave from the battlefield. On the positive

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8 Christopher Coker, Op cit.

side, without the concern for their self-preservation, remote operators could focuson other mission related issues. They couldexploit greater freedom of movementbecause they would not be risking their ownlives. By being spared the emotions of theheat of battle, they could make morerational judgments. On the negative side,remote operators could be detached fromthe moral implications of their actions. Iftheir lives are not at risk, they could becomemore careless. Interestingly, a recent USAFreport discovered that UAVs remoteoperators are more stressed than pilotsoperatingmanned aircraft in theatre. This ispartly because the set up is notergonomically optimised but also becausethe aircraft is capable of up to 18 hours offlight. Operators are therefore conductingone mission after another for up to 8 hoursa day, 5-6 days a week. The tempo ofoperations is simply more intensive, even ifit is less dangerous.

One panelist saw remote operators ashaving poorer situational awarenessbecause, unlike a pilot or a ground vehiclecommander, the operator would not be ableto use his other senses; but another believedthat the integration of additionalcommunications and intelligence systemsinto a control room would provide bettersituational awareness than that which wouldbe available in a cockpit or vehicle.

A handful of panelists had serious doubtsabout the ability to inculcate the values ofsoldiers into the operators of unmannedsystems, especially if these operators aremere ‘civilians in uniform.’ A specificconcern was that the values sought inmilitary officers would be circumvented byplacing technically proficient civilians incharge of these systems. There was a clearpreference among the military participantsfor military personnel over the ‘PlayStation

generation’ and a higher premium wasplaced on discipline and the ‘warrior ethos’over technical proficiency. One solutionoffered was to include the computertechnicians in the military. Questions aroseover how effective basic military trainingwould be for these civilian operators andwhether such rudimentary instructionwould really instil the values that themilitary participants sought. Even withmilitary training a remote operator may notproperly understand the commander’sintent for the operation without havingexperienced events on the ground.

British ArmyUAV operators are drawn fromthe artillery regiments and start life on thefront line as mini-UAV operators, whosemain duties are force protection (scoutingfor IEDs and providing ‘over-the-hill’surveillance). They then progress toincreasingly larger platforms, until they aredeemed proficient for operating the Hermes450, which requires remote operation up to150 miles from the front line. This approachmeans that army-operated UAVs maymarginally increase the number ofpersonnel on the front line but provide theoperators a better understanding of theenvironment in which their fellow forces areworking. The Army view is that the overallbenefit of UAVs to frontline forces faroutweighs the additional risks.

The RAF maintains that airmanship is anessential skill for all UAV operations. Inparticular, the safe and effective operation ofmedium to large UAVs, which operatebeyond line of sight and need to interactwith air traffic control (and possibly otheraircraft) requires personnel to have a clearunderstanding of air traffic regulations andprocedures. For ISR platforms (which do notcarry any weapons), the aircraft could besensibly operated by any qualified pilot. Onthe other hand, for combat UAVs, the


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requirements of Rules of Engagement,Laws of Armed Conflict and a tactically fluidsituation demand operators with skills thatmatch those of a fighter pilot or navigator,either of whom would have experience inoperational weapons release. This isparticularly important as enemy combatantsare often located close to friendly forces andit is vital to avoid friendly fire incidents. USAir Force Reaper operators are drawn fromtheir pool of fighter pilots for this reason. Inaddition, each UAVmission is supported bya team of image analysts to interpret what isbeing seen on the ground. For the timebeing, RAF UAV operators are being drawnfrom the pool of manned aircraft operatorsalthough a full range of options is beingconsidered for training operators in thefuture. The increasing demand forexperienced image analysts will also need tobe addressed.

It is worth noting that while medium-largeUAVs do require a team of engineers andsupport staff in theatre, this is lower than thecomplement of support staff that mannedaircraft need. On the other hand, the levelof data captured by a UAV demands a largeamount of processing, which is labourintensive. For certain short missions, it maybe that a single seat aircraft couldaccomplish the task more efficiently.Therefore planners need to avoid thetemptation to overtask UAVs when amanned platform may suitable.

Casualties have a severe effect onpolicymaking in the world today; ifgovernmental leaders are able to mitigatethe risk to their soldiers’ lives, the public willexpect them to do so.

Psychological Impact of UAVs

One military participant described thepresence of a UAV as a tremendous morale

boost to British forces because they knewthat ‘someone was always watching overthem.’

UAVs are used in different operationalsituations to achieve secondary effects. Thesmaller, noisier UAVs give away the positionof forces but this is often exploited to cleara path. In Afghanistan, the Taleban haverecognised the UAV as a warning that BritishForces are in the vicinity and scatter out ofthe way. (It has also meant that IEDs androcket launchers are now largely remotelyoperated). There have been several cases ofinsurgents surrendering to UAVs. The largerUAVs are armed and can operate at veryhigh altitudes and this allows them tooperate stealthily. This can destroy enemymorale because there is nothing they can doto counter them. UAVs have also been usedto great effect in driving insurgentsunderground in peacekeeping operationselsewhere in the world. David Wardrop inhis article ‘Drones, New Aerial GuardiansAgainst Atrocities’ suggests that UAVscould, in fact be used by the internationalcommunity to collect evidence for theinternational courts on human rightsinfringements. He even proposes unmannedsystems as a viable alternative to economicsanctions, which typically hurt the verypeople they are trying to protect. To date,the UN has refused to procure UAVs.

There was little knowledge among theconference participants regarding howunmanned systemswere viewed by the localIraqi and Afghan populations. However, itwas proposed that a nation which usesunmanned vehicles could lose the moralauthority that comes with the willingness torisk life. Clausewitz teaches that ‘the abilityto inflict our will on others is dependent onrisking one’s own life’. In any campaign towin the ‘hearts and minds’ of the localpopulation, the absence of military

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personnel on the ground undermine thiseffect. A state seeking victory withoutrisking its own citizens could be perceivedas cowardly, particularly if the conflict wasbloody.

Summary

Unmanned systems provide a number ofwelcome advantages to the military. For theforeseeable future, these systems willrequire human oversight and their operatorsare likely to be military personnel. The

employment of unmanned systems doesnot necessarily reduce the deployedmilitaryfootprint. Furthermore these systemscurrently require considerable live trainingfor operators and users to gain maximumbenefit out of the system. The use of UAVshas boosted morale among coalition forcesand is affecting the way enemy forcesoperate. However, unmanned systems andautonomous systems are most unlikely everto replace the soldier on the ground fully,particularly in complex emergencyoperations such as counterinsurgency.


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About RUSIRUSI was founded in 1831, the oldest such institute in the world, at the initiativeof the Duke of Wellington. Its original mission was to study naval and militaryscience, what Clausewitz called the ‘art of war’.

It still does so: developments in military doctrine, defence management anddefence procurement remain central elements in the Institute’s work. But inrecent years RUSI has broadened its remit to include all issues of defence andsecurity, including terrorism and the ideologies which foster it, and the challengeswhich we face from other man-made or man-assisted threats and naturaldisasters.

RUSI is a British institution, but operates with an international perspective. It hasamassed over the years an unequalled expertise in its field and an outstandingreputation for quality and objectivity. RUSI’s heritage and reputation, its locationclose to the Ministry of Defence and other ministries in Whitehall and its range ofcontacts with key opinion formers both inside and outside government, givesunique insight and authority.

RUSI MembershipMembers of the Institute enjoy a range of benefits that encourage maximumparticipation in our key roles. Membership opportunities cater for both individualsand businesses.

The Individual Membership package has been designed for those with a personalinterest in national and international defence and security. Members includeserving and retired armed forces personnel; ministers and government officials;academics; journalists; emergency response planners and operators; facilitiesmanagers; advisors and students. They meet regularly at the Institute, manytaking advantage of the impressive library. For a one-off joining fee and anannual subscription, individual members receive an official identity card givingaccess to the premises, and to a busy programme of lectures, seminars andconferences, plus a regular copy of the RUSI Journal and RUSI DefenceSystems. Additional publications can be added to the membership subscription atany time. These include RUSI’s Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor,RUSI’s Whitehall Papers and Newsbrief and the Chinese Military Update.

The Corporate Level Membership packages have been designed both fororganizations in the public sector, such as government departments, embassiesand high commissions and universities; as well as for private sector companieswhich trade in the defence and security markets and whose business interestsare affected by developments in the international security field.

The military benefits of unmanned vehicles to multi-national forces in Iraq andAfghanistan are widely acknowledged. What is less clear is how the adoption ofunmanned vehicles will affect military forces in the future.

In February 2008, RUSI held a conference supported by the British ComputerSociety and the Society for British Aerospace Companies examining the ‘ethical andlegal implications of unmanned vehicles’. The event considered the principal issuesraised by military, ethics and legal experts in the UK. Subsequent discussion withexperts, professional bodies and academics elaborated on the initial findings. This isthe summary report and is offered primarily to promote debate in this area.

The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) is theleading professional forum in the United Kingdom for those concerned with nationaland international defence and security.

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