The Era of Suleyman Magnificent-crisis of Orient..

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The Era of Suleyman the Magnificent: Crisis of OrientationAuthor(s): Subhi Labib

Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Nov., 1979), pp. 435-451Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162212Accessed: 15-03-2015 09:48 UTC

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2/18

Int.

J.

Middle

East

Stud.

IO

(1979),

435-451

Printed

in

Great Britain

Subhi Labib

THE

ERA

OF

SULEYMAN

THE MAGNIFICENT:

CRISIS

OF ORIENTATION

When the

Prophet

Muhammad died on

7

June

632,

the

larger part

of

Arabia

had

already accepted

Islam. In

fact,

Islam

had

created

a solid

Arab

community

that

dominated Arabia and was ready to begin its amazing expansive

movement

in

world

history.

The

Arab

conquests

put

an

end

to

the Sassanid

Empire

and

deprived

the

Byzantine

Empire

of

its

Asiatic dominions

up

to the Taurus

and of

all its

African

possessions.

Muslim

troops

crossed Gibraltar and subdued

almost

all the

Iberian

peninsula.

In

brief:

with

their

conquests

in

the seventh

and

eighth

centuries

(634-751)

the Arabs

became

the

neighbors

of the Franks

and

Byzan-

tines

on

the

other

side of the

Mediterranean.

In Asia

the

subjection

of

Persia

brought

them

into

northern India

and

the Turkish

vassal

states

of China in

Central

Asia.

In

the second

half

of

the

seventh

century

the Arabs

began

to establish

them-

selves as

a

new

power

in

Central Asia.

They

crossed

the

Oxus

and

gained

a

permanent

foothold

in

the areas

beyond

it. In

the first half

of

the

eighth

century

Islamic

troops conquered

the

Jaxartes'

provinces

where the centers of

Hellenistic

culture and

Buddhism

were soon to

become centers of

Islamic

and

Arabic

culture.

A

confrontation with

China,

whose Turkish

vassal

states

were

occupied

by

Islamic

troops,

was

inevitable. A

55-year

struggle

between

China and

the

Arabs

ended in

751

when

the Islamic

forces annihilated

a

Chinese

army

on the

Talas

River.

China lost

its

control over

Central

Asia.

The Arabs'

huge

success was

owing

not

only

to Arab or Islamic

military

capacity

and

religious

zeal

but

also

to the world situation at that

time:

the

weakness

of

both the

Byzantine

and

Sassanid

empires, centering

on

their

struggle

for

supremacy

and their

efforts to

check

the barbarian

invaders.

The

continuing

challenge

and

gigantic imperial

responsibilities

took

a

heavy

toll

of

their

resources and

energy.

Internal weaknesses were

not

easy

to

overcome.

The

obvious

disintegration

in

Persia,

predating

the clash with

the

Arabs,

and

the

revolts of

Byzantine

provinces

in

the East

as

well as unstable

Byzantine

rule

in

the

West

accelerated

the

expansion

of

the Arabs. Furthermore

the

Byzantine

Empire was facing an insoluble problem - lack of manpower - and Gaulish and

Germanic

Europe

did

not

represent

a

Mediterranean

power.

The

disunity

of

India

encouraged

the

Arabs to march

upon

northwest

Indian

areas,

which

had

already

been

incorporated

into the

Persian

and

Hellenistic

cultures.

Owing

to

0020-7438/79/0300-0408

$0I.50

?

1979 Cambridge University

Press

435


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3/18

436

Subhi

Labib

local

conflicts,

the Arabs

could invade

the Indus

Valley.

China of the

seventh

and

eighth

centuries

was not

strong

enough

to

check the eastward

drive

of

the Arabs.

It was not even able to support Persia against the invaders; when the defeated

Persian

king

sent

several

embassies to

the

son of heaven

he declined to offer

any

military help against

the

victorious

Arabs.

The

Arabs

gained

the

support

and

cooperation

of

the

indigenous

population

in

the

area

they conquered,

thus

furthering

their

expansive policy.

On the

western

front the

Berbers took

a

major

part

in

the invasion of

Spain

as

well as in

the

raids

on

Sicily

and the western

Mediterranean.

They

even

supported

the Arabs

in

subduing

rebellious

Berber tribes

and

Berbers

allied with

Byzantium

in

the

Maghrib.

On the eastern

front

(Oxus-Jaxartes)

the Persian mawali

(clients)

who

fought with the Arabs were in fact fighting against their old 'national' enemies,

the

Turks. On both

frontiers,

Islam

became a

dynamic

factor

of

integration

and

inspiration.

The

new Muslims

of

the

conquered

areas

-

Persia

and the

Maghrib

are the best

examples

-

were now

ready

to die

in

establishing

the Islamic

principles

of

equality

among

the believers.

It

was

Islam

that

gave

them

backbone

and

put

into

their hands a

weapon

against

their masters: the

Arabs and

the

Arab

Umayyad

house

(661-750).

With

the rise of the Abbasids

the

Empire

became

primarily

Muslim,

and

exclusive

Arab

predominance

ceased.

Power now

lay

not with the Arab

tribes but

with

professional

soldiers and administrators.

The

soldiers

were Persians

as

well

as

Arabs;

from the middle

of

the ninth

century, they

were

usually

chosen

from

among

the Turkish slaves

of the

Caliphs,

whose

power by

the

beginning

of the tenth

century

was

in

steady

decline.

The nomadic

Turkish

peoples

began

to

play

a decisive role in Islamic

history

-

the

Maghrib

excluded

-

in

the tenth

century.

Before

the

end of that

century

and

during

the

eleventh

century,

several

migrations

of

Turkish

peoples deeply

affected

the

history

of

Eastern

Europe

and the

Middle East. The

most

important

Turkish

migration

into

the

Islamic

East

was that

of the

Saljiiqs,

known

by

the

name

of the

family

(Saljfq)

that

led them.

The

Saljuqs

entered Ma-wara'

an-Nahr

(Transoxiana)

in the late tenth

century

and

adopted

Sunni Islam before

crossing

the

Oxus,

that

is

to

say,

before

their

penetration

into the Islamic

world.

As

auxiliary

troops

of

the

warring

Muslim

powers

in

Khurasan

and

Transoxiana

they

soon overcame their

masters.

In

the first

half

of

the eleventh

century

they

even

expanded

their

military

and

political

power

to Iran.

In

1055

they

entered

Baghdad

as

deliverers

of

the Abbasids

or as

champions

of the Sunni

cause,

thus

putting

an end

to

the

Buyid

(Shi'i)

hegemony

over the

Abbasid

(Sunni) Caliphate.

Not

only

did

they

seize

power

in

the Abbasid

Empire,

they

also

challenged

Fatimid

rule

in

Syria.

Furthermore,

they

broke

through

the traditional frontiers

between Byzantium and the Islamic world. After controlling Armenia the Saljuqs

won

a

decisive battle

against

Byzantium

at

Manzikert,

near Lake

Van,

in

I071.

It

was the most

disastrous battle

in

Byzantium's

later

history.

The

immediate

result

of

Manzikert

was

the

intensive

migration

of

the Muslim

Saljfq

and

Turco-

men

hordes into

Asia

Minor,

the

heartland of the

Byzantine

Empire

in Asia.




4/18

The

Era

of

Suleyman

the

Magnificent 437

Under

the

pressure

of

increasing

Turkish

expansion

in Asia

Minor,

and

owing

to their lack

of armies and

pressing

financial

difficulties,

the

Byzantines

repeated-

ly appealed to the Pope for help in expelling the Turks from Asia Minor. The

papacy,

whose

policy against

Islam had

been successful in

Spain,

Italy,

and

Sicily,

was now

ready

to extend

the

war

against

the

Turks. Manzikert

justified

Western

intervention.

The

goal

of the West was not

only

to rescue

Byzantium

but also to release

the Christian

holy

places

from

the

hands of the unbelievers.

Neither

aim was realized.

The

crusading

challenge

for the

deliverance

of

the

Holy

Land ended

in a

complete victory

for Islam.

Even

Asia

Minor was almost

lost

to the Turkish hordes while

the Franks

were

holding Constantinople (1204-

1261).

Not

only

in

Syria

and

Egypt

but also in

North

Africa,

the

Islamic

ecumene

built an

impregnable,

unshakable barrier between

Africa

and

the West.

This

is

the most

decisive

and definite

change

in

the

history

of Africa from the rise

of

Islamic world

power

to the

Portuguese

discovery

of the

Cape

of Good

Hope,

and

even

the

Spanish

discovery

of

America

-

that is to

say

from

the seventh to

the sixteenth

century.

During

this

long

period

Islamic

maritime

power

in the

Mediterranean deteriorated

considerably.

The

long

challenge

with

Byzantium

but,

more

importantly,

with

the Christian

Western maritime

trade

republics

-

primarily

the Italian but

also

the Normans in

Sicily

and south

Italy

-

put

an end

to Islamic naval

power

in

the Mediterranean. Never

again,

after the loss of

Cilicia, Crete,

Cyprus,

Sicily,

Malta,

and the Balearic

Islands,

did medieval

Islamic

powers

regain

their

position

of

superiority

in

Mediterranean waters.

Even the creation of a

huge

navy

(with

seven

hundred

vessels,

considered the

biggest navy

in

the

Mediterranean) by

the Almohad

Caliph

'Abdal-Mu'min

(II30-II63),

cannot minimize the

significance

of

this

basic historical

change.

Only

in

the

sixteenth

century

did the Ottomans

revive Islamic naval

power

in

the

Mediterranean for a

limited

period.

In terms of

economic

history

and

challenge,

the Muslims

gradually

became the

only

big

business

partners

of the Italian

merchants.

In

accordance

with

the

state's newly crystallized Islamic Mediterranean policy, these Italian merchants

were

allowed to trade

only

at

certain

points

on

the Islamic

Mediterranean coast.

In

other

words,

the

African

and

Asiatic

(Syrian)

coastline of the Mediterranean

remained an

iron

curtain built

up

by

Islam to

face the

West. This Islamic

front

was able

to check

all

the

crusading enterprises.

Even the

rapid

Mongol

expansion

in

the thirteenth

century

did not

destroy

it;

Egypt

survived the

Mongol

storm.

Thus,

no Asiatic or

European

power endangered

Islamic

superiority

and

pene-

tration in

Africa from

the

rise of

the Islamic world

power

in

the seventh

century

until

the

Portuguese geographical

discoveries

in

the sixteenth

century.

The

situation in Asia was somewhat different. The huge Mongol Empire established

a

Pax

Mongolica

throughout

Asia

and

opened

its

trade routes

-from the

frontiers in

Asia Minor and the Black

Sea

to

the

Chinese

ports

-

to its

neighbors.

Western

merchants and Frankish

missionaries

began

to

cross

Asia for

the

first

time

since the

rise

of

Islam. The Pax

Mongolica

or

Pax

Tartarica,

which




5/18

438

Subhi

Labib

lasted

for about

a

century

(from

the

middle

of

the thirteenth

century

to

the

middle of the

fourteenth)

ended

with the

disintegration

of the

Mongol

Empire.

During

the

Mongol

era of

world

supremacy, however,

no effective

political

or

military cooperation

came

into

being

between

Mongols

and Franks. Not less

important

is

the

fact

that Islam

began

to

spread among

the

Mongols

themselves

as

well as

among

their Turkish

subjects,

thus

expanding

the

Islamic

ecumene.

Ii

In

1243

the

Mongols destroyed

the

Rum-Saljuq army

at

K6sedagh

(near

Siwas),

transforming

Turkish Anatolia into

a

Mongol

protectorate.

But

the

Mongols respected

the

independence

of the Greek

emperor,

who

resided

in

Nicaea after

the

loss

of

Constantinople.

They

did not attack

Frankish

Con-

stantinople.

In

fact,

both

the

Greek and the Frankish

emperors

were allowed

to

keep

their

holdings

to counterbalance

the

Saljuq

vassal state in Asia

Minor.

In

126I

the Greeks

recovered

Constantinople,

but

they

never succeeded

in reinte-

grating

their

empire. They

even

neglected

the fortification and defense

of

the

remnant

Byzantine holdings

in Asia Minor after

moving

their

capital

to

Constan-

tinople.

But,

it

was neither

the remote

Mongols

nor

the

weak

Rum-Saljiq

dynasty

that filled

the vacuum

in Asia Minor

after

1261;

this was

destined

for the

Turcoman Ghazi

emirates,

whose

population

increased

steadily

through

Turkish

immigrants escaping

the

Mongol

devastations, and also at the

expense

of the

Greek

population

in the

newly occupied

Anatolian

areas.

By

the middle of the

fourteenth

century

the

Ghazi

emirates

had

annexed

almost all the Asiatic

possessions

of

the

Byzantines.

The

Ottoman

Ghazi

emirate was

the

most successful

and militant. After the

capture

of

Bursa

(original-

ly

Brusa),

Nicaea

(Iznik),

and

Nicomedia

(Izmit),

the Ottomans

strategically

presented

the

most acute

and

pressing

peril

to

Constantinople.

Moreover,

the

conflict

between the

competing

emperors

John

VI

Cantacuzenus

and

John

V

Palaeologus

ended

in the

Ottomans

successfully

establishing

Islamic

rule

in the

Balkans, and from about 1365 Adrianople (Edirne) became their new residence.

Furthermore,

the

untimely

death of the Serbian

King

Stephen

Uros

IV

Duschan

in

1355

and

the death of

the

Hungarian

King

Louis

(Liajos)

the

Great

of

Anjou

in

1382

left

a

vacuum

in

southeastern

Europe

which

was filled

by

the

Ottomans,

and not

by

the

Hungarians

with

whom

Bosnia,

Bulgaria,

Wallachia,

and Mol-

davia

did

not

intensively

cooperate

-

as their

vassal states

-

against

the

Ottoman

peril.

The

new

masters,

the

Ottomans,

concentrated

on

subduing

the

area

between

the

Danube

and

the

Maritza.

In

1389,

barely

40

years

after

they

began

to settle on

European

soil,

the Ottomans

won

a

decisive

victory

at the

Battle

of

the Amselfeld (field of the blackbird; Turkish Kosovo). Thereafter they became

the most successful

power

in the

Balkans.

In the defeat at

Kosovo,

Serbia

-

like

Bulgaria

before

her

-

became

a

vassal

state

and the Serbians

had

to

fulfill their

military

obligations

in all the

major

battles

of

early

Ottoman

history:

in

Bayezid's

attack on

Wallachia

in

1395,

in

the

victorious

engagement against

the

Crusaders




6/18

The Era

of Suleyman

the

Magnificent

439

at

Nicopolis

in

1396,

and,

finally,

in the fatal battle of Ankara

against

Timur

Lenk

in

1402.

Thereafter,

the

Ottomans lost

their

possessions

in Asia Minor

to

the

Mongols,

and

they

had to recreate their

domination

in

Europe after the

Mongol

retreat.

Western

Europe

did

not

make use

of this rare

chance. Almost

exactly

at that time

- the middle

of the

fourteenth

century

-

the German colonial

movement

in

southeastern

Europe

came to

a

standstill.

In

1413

Sultan Mehmed

I

restored

Ottoman

unity,

and the Turkish menace

was once more

crystallized

when

H-ungary

proved

unable

to

regain

Serbia

or

any

strategic

position

to the south of the

Danube. With Murad's

(Murad

II:

142i-1451)

victory

against

Hungary

and

her allies at

Varna in

i444,

the

Otto-

mans consolidated

their

power

on the Danubian line.

The

Hungarian

hero

(and

regent

of

Hungary during

the

minority

of

Ladislau

V),

John

Hunyadi,

insisted

on

avenging

the defeat

of

Varna. He

penetrated

into Serbia and met

Murad II

in

Kosovo,

where the Christian

resistance

fought

its

last

battle

(1448)

to

rescue the

Balkans. After

1448,

it

was

only

a matter

of time before Christian resistance

in the

Balkans was

brought

to an

end.

On the

Islamic and

Turcoman front the

Ottomans absorbed

all

other

Turco-

man

Ghazi

principalities,

but

they

still

had to face two

opponents

in

Anatolia.

First,

the

Shi'i

Turcomen; second,

the

Karamanians whose

prince

resided

in

Konya

and

enjoyed

the

support

of the

Mamluk Sultans as well as the

rising

religious

and

military

order

of the

Safavids

in

Iran.

Although

Safavid activities

accelerated the

crystallization

of the

challenge

between Iran and the Ottoman

Empire,

the

capture

of

Constantinople

was

the more

pressing

question

after

the

Ottoman success

in

storming

and

destroying

the

Hexamilion,

the Greek

wall

across the Isthmus of

Corinth,

in

1446

(and

after Murad's

triumph

at Kosovo in

1448).

The

Ottoman

state,

which inherited the

Byzantine Empire

in the

first

half of the

fifteenth

century,

needed the

natural

imperial

capital

of

the

area,

Constantinople.

Before the

end

of

May 1453,

Constantinople

was in

the hands of

the

Ottomans,

and

Hagia

Sofia was

converted into a

mosque

when Sultan

Mehmed the

Conqueror entered it to pray. Soon the Ottoman Sunni conqueror proclaimed

himself the

protector

of the

Orthodox

Christians,

the

Greek

Church,

thus

announcing

the

main

religious

orientation

and the cultural

characteristic

of the

Empire:

Islamic

and

Christian

orthodoxy

under

Turkish

leadership.

The

traditional

rights

and

obligations

of

an

Orthodox Patriarch in

an Islamic state

were established.

In

his wars in

Europe

and Asia

Mehmed

II

was

annihilating

the

strategic

position

of

Venice and Genoa in

the Ottoman

waters,

not

only

in

the

Aegean

and

the

Sea

of

Marmara but also

in

the

Black

Sea,

even before the

annexation

of

the

Crimea in

I475.

On the Danubian front Mehmed failed to take Belgrade in 1456,

the last

barrier

to his

crossing

the

Danube and

marching

upon

Hungary,

owing

to the

effectiveness of

Hungarian

resistance

under

Hunyadi's

leadership.

Thereafter he

concentrated his

efforts on

incorporating

the whole

Balkan

peninsula

to

the

south

of

the

Danube

and

proceeding

into

Italy.

In the




7/18

440

Subhi

Labib

Balkans Mehmed's

success

was

sure.

His forces sent to south

Italy

in

1480

captured

Otranto

(near

Brindisi).

The

fall of

Otranto

might

have

been

followed

by the sack of Rome, but Mehmed died suddenly in 1481, while he was preparing

an

immense

expedition.

The

Ottoman

forces

did

not

penetrate

into

Italy

and had

to evacuate

during

the

rule

of

Bayezid

II.

Furthermore,

Mlehmed

checked Uzun

Hasan's

power

in

the East.

Uzun

Hasan

(I423?-1474), originally

the chief

of

the Turcoman tribes known

as

the

Ak-Koyunlu

(

=

the

white

sheep)

or the

Ak-Koyunlu dynasty

or

state,

extended

his

protection

to the

Greek

Emperor

of

Trebizond as

well as

to the

Turcoman

beys

of

Karaman,

the

bitter enemies

of

the

Ottomans in east

Anatolia. In

1472,

he

even became

an

ally

of

Venice,

Cyprus,

and the

Knights

Hospitallers.

He

prom-

ised to send a force of

30,000

men to the shores of the Mediterranean

where

they

were to

be

joined

by

Venetians armed with firearms.

This

remained

only

a

plan.

What

really

happened

was

a

separate

quarrel

between

the Islamic

powers.

At

first

the Ottomans routed Uzun

Hasan's

forces.

This

victory

was

essentially owing

to

the use

of firearms

by

the

Ottomans,

and

Uzun Hasan

had to

give

up

further

incursions into Ottoman

territory.

In

I474

lMehmed's

forces

easily

completed

the

conquest

of

the

Karamanid

possessions.

Thereafter

the

Ottomans

had to

face

the

Dhu'l-Qadr

(Zulkadir

or

Dhulghadir)

in

Elbistan,

and

their

overlords,

the

Mamluks,

in

southeastern

Anatolia.

Mehmed died

in

1481.

Two

sons survived him:

Bayezid,

the

candidate of the

Devshirme

party,

and

Jem,

the candidate

of

the

Turkish

nobility.

In their

competition

for

power

Bayezid

reached the

capital

earlier

and became

sultan.

Jem

decided to resist

but

had to

flee

to

Europe

when

he

failed

to

gain

power

in

Anatolia. The

story

of

Jem

is

unique

in Ottoman

history.

The

simple

fact that

a

brother of the

ruling

sultan

was still

living

and free could

disturb

the internal

peace

and order

of the

Ottoman

state.

The

European

powers,

which

were still

hopelessly fighting

the

Ottomans,

understood how to

make use

of the

oppor-

tunity.

Even

the Mamluk

sultan

in Cairo was

now

very

anxious

to

catch

the

victim that he

once

barely

supported

to

gain power.

In

1495

Jem

died in

myster-

ious

circumstances,

and the constant

danger

that a coalition of Christian

powers

might

invade

the

Ottoman

Empire using

Jem

as their

instrument was

over.

Now

Bayezid

continued

the

work of

Mehmed II: the

consolidation

of the

Ottoman

power

on the Danubian

line,

along

the

eastern Islamic

frontier,

and

in the eastern

Mediterranean.

Bayezid's

rival in

Hungary

was

King

Matthias

I

(I458-1490),

son

of the

Hungarian

hero

John

Hunyadi.

In the

Balkans he retained a

small

area in

northern

Bosnia with the

support

of

the

Croatian

nobility.

No serious

conflict

occurred

between

him and

Bayezid.

In

fact

Matthias Corvinus

almost

dropped

the

idea

of

serious offensive operations against the Turks; instead he began to realize his

dreams

of

uniting

Central

Europe

under his

own rule and

of

acquiring

the

im-

perial

crown.

An unsuccessful Ottoman attack

on

Belgrade

and

raids

into

Transylvania,

Croatia,

and Carinthia

ended in

1495

when

Bayezid

once more

concluded

a

truce

with

Hungary,

in order

to

concentrate

on the

Italian

conflict.




8/18

The Era

of

Suleyman

the

Magnificent

441

In

fact,

the French

claim

to

supremacy

in

Italy

accelerated the Ottoman

penetration

into the Adriatic and the raids

upon

the Italian littoral.

Venice,

facing

both France

and Ottoman

penetration,

was

alarmed at the

growth

of

the

Ottoman

fleet both

in number and activities - not

only

in the

Aegean

but also in

the

Adriatic,

where Venice still

possessed

her old

strongholds

on the coasts

of

Dalmatia,

Albania,

and the Morea.

Furthermore,

the

Ottoman fleet was

sup-

ported

by

the Muslim corsairs who were

becoming

a formidable

power

at

sea.

Owing

to financial

difficulties

and lack of

manpower

the

Signoria

could

not

equip

a

fleet

strong

enough

to beat

the Ottomans. The

Holy League,

formed

in

1501,

including

the

Pope,

France,

and

Hungary,

was weak from

the

beginning,

and

the Ottomans

annexed a number

of

Venetian

naval

strongholds

in

the

Adriatic.

In

1503

and

in

1506 respectively,

the

continental-Mediterranean

European

Ottoman war

was

concluded

and the Christian

states,

implicated

directly

or

indirectly

in the

war,

obtained a truce from the Sultan.

Poland

was included in the

peace treaty

of

I

503,

which also

asserted

the Porte's

acquisition

of Moldavia and the

annexation of

Kilia and

Akkerman,

at

the

mouth

of the Dniester.

In

fact,

lack

of

cooperation

between the

Jagellon

brothers

to

fill

the vacuum

left

by

the

disintegration

of the Golden Horde

established Ottoman

suzerainty

in what we call Romania and the

Crimea.

After

1503

Bayezid

had to face the

threatening

situation

in

Anatolia and on

the

Islamic

front,

where the Safavids

had

strong religious

and

political

chances to

establish their

power

for three essential reasons. First there were the

military

victories

of

both the

Ak-Koyunlu

of

Diyar

Bakr

and the Timfrids over the

Kara-

Koyunlu

of

Azerbaijan

and

Irak.

The

dynastic

feuds

among

the

Ak-Koyunlu

after the death of

Uzun

Hasan

(1453-1478)

ended also the

close alliance

of

the

Safavids with the

white

sheep

tribal

confederations,

who

then became the

target

for

Safavid

political

and

military

ambitions.

In

fact,

the

contemporary

Mamluk

sultans

missed the chance to

consolidate

their

power

in the

area,

and

the

rapid

collapse

of the

Ak-Koyunlu

left a

political

vacuum

in

Diyar

Bakr

and

Azerbaijan

which

was

only

filled

by

the Safavids. Furthermore the Timfirids failed to

maintain themselves in western Iran after the death of Shah Rukh (1405-

1447).

In

1500

Isma'il as-Safawi entered

Azerbaijan.

In

I50i

he routed the

forces

of

the

Ak-Koyunlu,

and in the same

year

he

proclaimed

himself

the

first ruler

of

the

Shi'i

dynasty

in Persia.

There

were hundreds of thousands of Shi'i of

various

persuasions

in Anatolia

who

could be

suspected

of

favoring

the Safavids.

The unbroken

vigorous

Safavid

propaganda

in Anatolia

in

the

second

half of the

fifteenth

century

won remarkable

success

among

the Turcomen in different

parts

of

Ottoman Anatolia. As

early

as

1502

Bayezid, already conscious of the danger to the Ottomans of the new Shi'i

emperor

in

Persia,

Shah

Isma'il,

had

ordered the

deportation

of Shi'i

elements

from

Asia

Minor to

the Morea. The

Shi'i nomadic

rebels

in

Anatolia,

distin-

guished

at

the

time

by

their

red hats

(known

as

Qizilbash),

owed

religious

as

well

as

political allegiance

to

their Safavid

leaders

in

Persia and

began

to undermine




9/18

442

Subhi

Labib

Ottoman

rule in Anatolia.

Their

leader,

Shah

Kuli,

preached

the end of Ottoman

domination.

An

Ottoman

army

drove

Shah Kuli from

Teke

(in

southwestern

Anatolia),

where the revolt

began,

toward

Kaysari

in east Anatolia.

Near this

town

a battle was

fought,

in

151

I,

in which

the

Anatolian Safavids were

defeated

and

chased

from

Asia Minor.

Like the Ottomans

the Safavids

recognized

and

represented

the

principles

of

Ghazw

and Futuwwa

with

their

dynamic

impact

on both Islamic

expansion

and

Islamic

urban

communities

in

Anatolia. The Futuwwa

was

a

brotherhood

or

fraternity

that

combined Islamic ethics

and

mystical

inclinations

with

the

virtues

of

the

Turkish or Persian

warrior.

Akhism,

a

specific

Anatolian Futuwwa with

Shi'i

coloring,

had

already

been

acknowledged by

Sunni

authorities.

It

spread

in

towns and

dominated the Islamic

'guilds,'

the

groups

of

artisans

and

craftsmen,

which never

possessed

the

monopoly

of

production

and distribution in

an

Islamic

town.

With the

development

of

the

Ottoman centralistic

administration

in the

fifteenth

century

and

owing

to their Shi'i

links,

the

guilds

lost

the freedom

they

had

enjoyed

during

the

early period

of islamization and turkification

of Asia

Minor.

It

was

exactly during Bayezid's

and

Selim's

rule

that this fundamental

change

was

enforced.

Both sultans

simultaneously

suppressed

the

'guilds'

and

Shi'ism

in

Anatolia.

In

1512

the

ageing

Sultan

Bayezid

II was forced to abdicate

and

give

way

to

his

son

Selim

I

(1512-1520),

who led the inevitable war

with the Safavid

Shah

Isma'il of Persia and the Mamluk Sultan Qansufhal-Ghauri of

Egypt.

The

conflict of the three Islamic

powers

for

hegemony

in the Middle

East

culminated

in

1514

when Selim

I

defeated the Safavids

at Chaldiran.

There

is no

doubt

that the

victory

at Chaldiran was

essentially owing

to the new

'Frankish

Weapon,'

the firearms

which

the

Ottomans

adopted

rapidly,

extensively,

and

with

great

effect.

This

Ottoman

victory

did not terminate

Safavid

rule;

but the

Safavids did

not

dare to attack

Asia Minor

after their defeat at

Chaldiran,

and

the

Shi'i in

Anatolia

were

now

at

the

mercy

of

Ottoman rule.

The Ottoman triumph at Chaldiran and the annexation of Dhu'l-Qadr by

Selim

accelerated the decisive

military

confrontation

between

the

Mamluks

and

the

Ottomans.

In

fact,

the two

big

Sunni

powers preferred

to reckon

up

rather

than to

face the

Portuguese

danger

in the Indian Ocean

with double

energy.

Once

more firearms

decided the

future of the Islamic

Middle

East.

Like the

Safavids,

the Mamluks

did not

even

try

to overcome

or circumvent

Ottoman

artillery by

executing

a

massive

surprise

attack

in

the

appropriate

moment.

With

their

victory

at

Marj

Dabiq

in

1516

and

Raidaniyya

in

1517

the Ottomans

inherited

the Mamluk

empire,

which

included

Egypt,

Syria,

northern

Sudan,

great dominions and supremacy in the Red Sea area as well as overlordship of

Yemen

and the

Islamic

holy

cities.

Selim also

began

the

annexation

of

the

Maghrib.

During

the

reign

of

Bayezid

II

began

the Ottoman

penetration

into

the

western

Mediterranean.

The

fleet

was

employed

to rescue

Moorish

refugees

before

and

after

the

fall of

Granada

in

1492.

During

Selim's

rule

the

Ottomans

gained

a




10/18

The Era

of

Suleyman

the

Magnificent

443

foothold in the

Maghrib,

where the

Spaniards

had

already occupied

the

principal

points

on the coast

within a few

years (before

the end

of

the

fifteenth

century

and

the beginning of the sixteenth). Although the Spanish policy of expansion was

based

on

the

occupation

of

strategic

points

from

which

raids

could

be carried

out

in the

surrounding

countryside

at

favorable

moments,

Selim decided

to free the

Mediterranean

coasts of the

Maghrib

from the new

aggressors

and to

reestablish

the

traditional Mediterranean barrier

between

Africa and the west.

Not

only

the

political

weakness of the

Maghribi

states and the

discovery

of

the

Cape

of Good

Hope,

but

also the

conquest

of

the Mamluk

empire, Libya

included,

made the

Ottoman intervention

in

the

Maghrib

inevitable.

The

Ottoman

conquest

of

North

Africa

was,

in

fact,

initiated

by

the Barbarossa

brothers,

who

shifted

their theater of

action

from

the

Aegean

Sea to the

western Mediterranean.

The

famous

admiral

or

champion

among

them,

Khayr

ad-Din,

refused to

cooperate

with the Christian

powers

and

linked

his

destiny

with

that

of the

Ottoman

Empire.

In

I519

he

swore

homage

to Sultan

Selim,

who

gave

him

the

title

of

pasha

and

appointed

him

Beylerbey

of

Algiers.

Between

1517

and

1574

the

Ottomans

completed

the annexation of

the

Maghrib

except

for

Morocco. In

other

words,

all the

Mediterranean outlets of the

African

and

Asiatic trade

routes

were

now

under

the control of

the Porte

and of the

state

of

Morocco.

But

before

the end

of

the

fifteenth

century

the

Portuguese

were to discover the

route

of

the

Cape

of

Good

Hope,

thus

ending

the

unique

significance

of

the

geographi-

cal location of the Islamic world in the traffic between East and West. Sultan

Selim, however,

kept

up

the

Islamic/Egyptian

traditional

monopolistic

trade

policy.

The

treaty

he concluded with Venice

(I517)

was

more

or

less a

copy

of

pre-Ottoman agreements

between

the

Mamluks and

the

Signoria.

Furthermore,

Selim

was

concentrating

on

increasing

his

Mediterranean naval

power.

In

1515

he

began

with

the creation of

a

great

arsenal at

Istanbul,

where

a

new,

more

powerful

fleet was built. Also

in

the South

Seas

the Ottomans

inherited

Egypt's

responsibility.

It

is

important

to

notice

that

the Ottomans

were involved in

the

challenge

against

the

Portuguese

even

before the annexation

of the Mamluk empire. After the famous victory of the Portuguese against the

combined

Egyptian

and Indian

forces at Diu

in

1509

Sultan

Bayezid

II

offered

his

support

to

Egypt

in her

jihad

against

the infidels. In

15

1 four

hundred

guns

and

about two tons of

gunpowder

were

sent

by

the

Ottomans to assist the

Egyptian

forces

fighting

against

the

Portuguese

in the

south.

Moreover,

the

Ottomans

placed

at the

disposal

of

the Mamluk

government

two thousand

warriors

trained

to

use firearms. This

force,

under the command of

Salman Re'is

(

=

Salman

al-'Uthani),

reached Cairo

in

1512

and

was

immediately

sent

to

the

Red

Sea

headquarters,

where

a

bitter

quarrel

began

between the Mamluk

admiral, Emir Hussein, and Salman. In 1517 the Ottomans took Cairo while the

Egyptian

forces were

fighting

to

strengthen

their

position

in

Yemen

instead of

checking

the

Portuguese

advance in

the Indian Ocean. Before

Salman

Re'is

arrived in

Cairo to

meet Sultan Selim in

1517,

he had had

Emir

Hussein

killed.

Both Selim

and his son

Suleyman

retained

Salman Re'is

as

the Ottoman admiral




11/18

444

Subhi Labib

in the

south,

where

the

Egyptian

Mamluk and

Yemenite forces were still

fighting

against

Ottoman domination

in Yemen.

III

Selim left to his son

Suleyman

(1520-1566)

an

empire

vastly

increased

in

size

and

resources

and able to

resume

the

offensive

against

the Christians

on a

formidable

scale.

Belgrade

surrendered

to the

Ottoman

forces

in

August

1521

and the

route to

Hungary

was

open.

On

29

August 1526

came the

devastating

Hungarian

defeat at Mohacs.

Ten

days

later,

the

victors entered Buda. Two-

thirds

of

Hungary

were

now

lost to the Ottomans.

The

victory

at

Mohacs

encouraged Suleyman to march upon Vienna. The siege of Vienna in 1529 was,

in

fact,

the

most

daring

military

enterprise

in Ottoman

history

and

the

climax of

the

Turkish drive westward.

The Christians

held

out

against

the

Turkish

assault,

however,

and it was not

the Christian

defence

but

the difficulties of the

Ottoman

expedition

which

decided the future

of the Ottoman assault

on

Vienna.

Problems

of

supply

and

transport

were

especially

hard

to resolve.

In

spite

of

his

earlier

misadventure

Suleyman repeated

his march

to

capture

Vienna

in

I532.

The

campaign

did not

fulfill its

aim,

nor

did he reach Vienna.

In

spite

of

his

failure to

capture

Vienna,

Suleyman

was

the

ruler

of the

biggest

empire

in

the

'ancient world'

to

the west

of India.

He

challenged

not

only

the

Archduke

of

Austria and

claimant to

the throne

of

Hungary,

but also Charles

V,

the last

Emperor (15 I9-1556)

of the

Holy

Roman

Empire.

In their

conflict

Suleyman

and

Charles

had to determine

the future

of

Italy

and the

supremacy

in

the western

Mediterranean.

Suleyman's

ally

in

this

conflict was Francis

I,

the bitter

enemy

of Charles

V.

The Ottomans

possessed

every

means to

accomplish

their

supremacy

in

the western Mediterranean after

their

overwhelming

success

in the eastern

Mediterranean:

great

arsenals,

abundant

timber,

and

good

warriors. What

they

needed was

an efficient

high

command,

a

match

for Andrea

Doria,

the

best admiral

of his

time

and the

Genoese

ally

of Charles.

Suleyman

appointed

Khair ad-Din Barbarossaadmiral

of the Ottoman fleet

in

the

Mediterranean

(I533).

He

and his

splendid

sailors

and corsairs

were

well

trained

in

ceaseless

sea

forays against

the

Christians.

In

1534

Barbarossa

and the

Ottoman

fleet

captured

Tunis,

but

in

the

following year

Charles led

a

campaign,

took

it,

and restored

the Hafsid

ruler under

his

suzer-

ainty.

Charles's

Spanish

troops

were now stationed

in

La

Goletta,

the fortress

that controlled

the Tunisian

coast.

The

challenge

for

supremacy

in

Italy

reached

its

climax when

Francis

I

declared war

on Charles

in

1536,

hoping

to

regain

Genoa and to

enter

Milan.

Francis's ally, Suleyman, did not attack Italy at the same time. In 1537, after the

Ottomans

had finished

their

naval

preparations,

Khayr

ad-Din advanced

to

Otranto,

raided

Apulia,

and

kept

the

command

of the

strait of Otranto.

But

in

spite

of this

success,

neither Khair

ad-Din

with

his

big

fleet,

nor

Francis,

who

badly

needed financial

support,

was

able

to stabilize

his

position

in

Italy.

The




12/18

The Era

of

Suleyman

the

Magnificent

445

Ottomans

did not dare

to

attack

Rome,

and

Francis

began

to

negotiate

with

Charles

for

peace

on the Italian front. The

French

danger

to

Genoa was

over,

and Andrea

Doria

began

to attack Barbarossa

in

the

strait

of

Otranto.

A

turning

point

in

the

sea war for

supremacy

was effected when

Suleyman

ordered

his

forces

to concentrate

on

attacking

Corfu

instead of

Italy.

Corfu was a

Venetian island

and an

important goal

of

the Ottoman

strategy

to

dominate

the

central Mediterranean. With

Khayr

ad-Din's

attack on

Corfu,

Charles

won

a

new

ally against

the

Ottomans

-

Venice

-

and

a

new

league

between

the

Emperor,

the

Pope,

and

Venice was

created.

In

1538

the

Ieague's

fleet

was

defeated

at

Prevesa

by

Barbarossa.

Although

the Christians lost

only

a few

ships,

Prevesa was not followed

up

with a

decisive

engagement.

On

the

other

side,

neither

Suleyman

nor

his

ally,

Francis

I,

renewed

his

attack on

Italy

after the

failure of

1536-1537.

The Ottomans

kept

their

supremacy

in the Mediterranean

from

Prevesa to

Lepanto

(1538-I571).

Soon after

Prevesa

the Christian

League

lost its value. Then Venice

aimed

essentially

at

getting

Charles's

support

to

stabilize

its

position

in the eastern

Mediterranean,

and Charles had to

concentrate on

defending

his

position against

the Berber corsairs

in

the

western

Mediterranean.

In

1540

the

Signoria

had to

conclude a

separate

and

humiliating

peace

treaty

with

the Porte.

On

the other

side,

Charles

renewed

his

attack

upon

the

strongholds

of

the

Muslim

fleet and

corsairs in

Barbary

without

success. The

splendid

imperial

armada of

5I6

sails,

carrying I2,330 sailors and 24,000 soldiers, suffered a disastrous defeat in

1541

(at

Algiers)

caused

by

storms and rains.

After this natural

catastrophe

Charles

was

neither

ready

nor

able

to

repeat

the assault.

Consequently

the

Holy

Roman

Empire

as well as

Europe's

Mediterranean maritime

powers acknowledged

the

de facto Ottoman sea

supremacy

in

the

Middle Basin

from

their defeat

at

Prevesa

in

1538

till

their

victory

at

Lepanto

in

1571. During

this

period

the Ottomans

completed

the

conquest

of

Tunis in

1569,

but the

strong

Turkish Armada

which

attacked the

Hospitallers

in

Malta in

1565

failed to

crush the Christian

resistance

in the central

Mediterranean. In

the

Levant the

Ottomans

assured

their

supremacy by taking Cyprus from Venice in 1570-1571. Once more the Christian

powers

-

Venice,

Genoa,

Spain,

the

Hospitallers,

and

the

Pope

-

formed an

alliance to check the

growing

supremacy

of

the

Ottomans in the Mediterranean.

In

other

words,

the

conquest

of Tunis in

I569

and

of

Cyprus

in

1571

led to the

inevitable

confrontation at

Lepanto,

the last

decisive

naval battle

in the

Mediterranean

until the

eighteenth

and

nineteenth centuries.

Lepanto,

which

ended in the

overwhelming

defeat of

the

Ottomans

(7

October

I57I),

also

put

an end

to

Islamic-Ottoman naval

supremacy

in the

Mediterranean,

in

spite

of

the fact that the Porte

restored

its

fleet

immediately

after the battle, that Venice concluded 'humiliating' peace terms with the Porte

in

1573,

and

that

the

Christians failed to

vanquish

the

corsairs

in

North

Africa.

Venice could

not afford

a

long

war

with the

Porte.

Also,

the brief

period

when

Phillip

II

had

been

able to

concentrate

his

forces

in

the

Mediterranean

had come

to an end.

Spain

was

now

deeply

involved

in

Western

Europe

and her financial




13/18

446

Subhi Labib

crisis could

not

allow

any

big military

and

naval

engagement

in the

Mediter-

ranean.

Like

Venice

in

1573,

Phillip

had to

make

peace

with

the Porte

in

I581,

thus

giving up

the idea of

revenge

in

Africa under the

pressure

of

his

precarious

position

in

Europe.

In

I588

the

Spanish

Armada

was lost

in the

naval war

against England

and

during

its

journey

back. Even

after this

Spanish

catastrophe,

which created new

chances

for

the

Ottomans

in

the

Mediterranean,

the Porte

did not

develop

a

new

maritime

policy

which

would

assure Islamic

supremacy

after the

retreat

of

Spain

and

the

decline of

Venice.

In

fact,

neither

Suleyman

the

Magnificent

nor his

successors

began

constructive

plans

for the

future

-

either

in

the

Mediterranean or in the Indian

Ocean;

nor could

the

unhealable

struggle

on

the

heretic front

be

overlooked or

underestimated.

The

important

rivals of the Porte

after the

acquisition

of the Mamluk

empire

were the Shi'i Safavids.

Suleyman

found in France and Francis I a Christian

ally

against

Charles V.

In

the east

Charles

tried to establish

his

relations with Shah

Tahmasp (1524-1576).

In

1529

Charles's

envoys

met the

Muslim

rival of the

Ottomans. This

rapprochement

between the

Habsburgs

and the

Safavids

had

relatively

or almost

no

positive

or

military

effect. At

any

rate,

it

was one

of

Suleyman's pretexts

to attack

Persia,

in

order to solve frontier

problems

and

to

take

Iraq,

where the

Shah's

governor

of

Baghdad

had

offered

submission

to the

Porte. In

I534

Ottoman

forces

even succeeded in

entering

Tabriz.

Shah

Tahmasp

already

knew that his forces could not match

Suleyman's

Janissaries

and field artillery. He avoided all risk of a

great

battle and even removed his

capital

to

Qazvin.

In

1538

Basra

was

also

annexed.

There,

the

Porte established

an

arsenal and

a

base

of

operations

which had

little

strategic

importance.

In

1548 Suleyman

marched

once

more

upon

Tabriz,

but did not

conquer

it. He

returned

to Istanbul

in

December

1549

without

realizing

conclusive

results.

A

protracted

war

(1553-I555)

ended

in

the

destruction

of

the

Persian

border

defenses

that had

long

been

the main

point

of

departure

for

Persian

raids

into

Asia

Minor.

Now

Suleyman

was

ready

to

conclude

peace

with

the Safavids:

in

the

peace

of

Amasya

(May

I555)

the

Porte

abandoned

all

claim

to Tabriz

but

retained Iraq, together with most of Kurdistan, western Armenia, and western

Georgia.

This

peace

did

not terminate

the hostilities on the heretic

front,

which

drained Ottoman

resources

and

manpower during

the

following

centuries.

Suleyman

did

not

entirely

neglect

his

Islamic

obligations

in

the south.

In

1525

his

admiral

Salman Re'is

exacted from certain

Yemenite

coastal

areas

a

nominal

obedience;

a

confrontation

with

the

Portuguese,

however,

did

not

take

place.

In

1538

the

Porte established

Ottoman

rule

in

Aden

and

ended

Egyptian

resistance

in the

Yemen.

With the

reconquest

of

Basra in

I546

Suleyman

was

strategically

able to

attack

the

Portuguese

from

the Persian Gulf

as well as

from

the Red Sea. He sent three important expeditions against the Portuguese in the

Indian

Ocean.

The

first,

in

1538,

was to

support

Bahadur

Shah,

the

sultan of

Gujarat,

to

regain

Diu. In

spite

of

the

huge

armada

the Turkish

admiral

ordered

the

lifting

of the

blockade

of

Diu

after

about

twenty

days

of

siege.

The

two other

expeditions

hopelessly

tried to

capture

Ormuz on the Persian

side

of

the

Gulf,




14/18

The Era

of Suleyman

the

Magnificent 447

thus

stabilizing

the

Portuguese position

in western India as well as in the Gulf -

Ormuz,

Maskat,

and Bahrain. In the Red Sea

Suleyman,

on the

contrary,

chastised the

Portuguese

and

preserved

the medieval

policy, averting

'the evil

deeds

of

the

Portuguese

infidels' in that

Islamic

sea,

though

he

could not

annex

Christian

Ethiopia.

IV

Suleyman

lived

during

a

decisive

period

of world

history.

He was victorious

in

Europe

and the

Orient,

but

his

success was

obviously

limited.

Suleyman

consolidated

Ottoman

possessions

in

Europe,

and the

Danube became the

undisputed

Ottoman

frontier

in

the

north.

But

he

failed

to

incorporate

the

remote Danube or to take

Vienna,

the

gateway

to the center of

gravity

in the

west.

According

to his

concept,

which

he inherited from

later

medieval

Islam,

Rome was the center

of

the

Christian/Frankish

west. That

concept

was

un-

historical,

or at

least

not

up

to date. Rome

was never the

capital

of the

Holy

Roman

Empire,

whose center of

gravity

was to the north and

west

of the

Danube,

not to

the

south

of

it.

In

any

case,

Suleyman

also failed to

conquer

Rome or to

gain

a

foothold

in

Italy.

In

short,

the two red

apples,

Rome

and

Vienna,

did not

fall

into the

hands

of

the Ottomans.

Furthermore,

the Ottomans

did not

restore

the

unity

of the

Mediterranean,

although

Mehmed

the

Conqueror

revived the

Roman

imperial

title ;asar after the fall of

Constantinople.

The local

history

of

Western

Europe during Suleyman's reign

was dominated

by

two essential events:

the

rivalry

of the

Habsburgs

and

Valois,

and

the

Christian

Reformation

which

deeply

divided the

West.

They

did

not,

however,

seriously

change

the

balance

of

power.

From

1519

to

1559

the two

dynasties

struggled

for

supremacy

in

Europe

and

in

the western

Mediterranean.

Nevertheless,

after

1529

-

more

exactly,

after

the decisive

battle

of Pavia

(I525),

in which France

was defeated

-

the

French were

checked

and their

future success

comparatively

limited

until

1559

when the

Habsburg-Valois

struggle

came to an end with the

treaty of Le Cateau-Cambresis.

Le Cateau-Cambresis is a landmark

in

European history.

After

this

peace

treaty,

the

activities of

Europe

were stimulated and the

goal

was

the Atlantic

Ocean,

which

the

Turks,

Suleyman

the

Magnificant

included,

almost

entirely

neglected.

Charles

V

realized

that the heart of his

Empire

was in

Spain

and not

in

Central

Europe

and

Germany.

And it

was

Spain

more than the

imperial

gold

crown

that

made Charles

-

Spain,

and the

mines

of

America.

Suleyman

failed

to

realize the

significance

of

this

change

or to

foresee its

deep

impact

upon

Europe's

future and on

European

policy

from

then on.

In the Habsburg-Valois challenge for supremacy in Europe, Suleyman played

a

part

which

must be

considered of

second-grade importance.

Then

the

very

Christian

King

Francis

I

did not

cooperate (or

did not

succeed

in

cooperating)

with

Suleyman

in

his attack on

Italy.

Outside

Italy

their

cooperation

did

not

endanger

Charles's

position

in

Western

Europe.

Behind

and above

the

struggle




15/18

448

Subhi

Labib

between

the

Habsburgs

and

Valois

(Francis

I

and his

successor

Henry II)

was a

clear

aim,

and

Suleyman

missed its

significance:

this

aim was

to hinder

the

Habsburgs' predominance

in

Europe,

to

hinder the concentration

of

power

in

one hand.

And this

was,

and

is,

exactly

the

backbone

of

the Germanic

way

of

political thinking

and

political

behavior.

The other

essential event that dominated the

local

history

of

Western

Europe

in the

sixteenth

century

was

the Christian Reformation.

To

weaken

the

position

of Charles and the

Habsburgs

in

Germany,

Suleyman

the

Magnificent

was

ready

to

encourage

the Protestant

movement.

He

even

promised

on

oath

that he would

not

harm the Protestant

princes

if

Germany

came

under his

sway. Suleyman

also

encouraged

the

spread

of

Calvinism

in

Hungary.

The

Ottoman

campaigns

against

Vienna

and

Austria, however,

worked

on

Germany

to

the

disadvantage

of both

Francis I and

Suleyman

the

Magnificent.

At

any

rate,

the rise of

Protestantism

in the

sixteenth

century

-

after the

discovery

of

the Americas

and

the

Cape

of

Good

Hope

-

is

the

best

proof

that

Europe

had

overcome

the

Islamic

pressure

or Islamic

danger

and

was

in

need

of

an

inner

religious

movement or

Reformation

to

counterbalance the

papacy

and

the

dominant

Catholic

Church.

v

Suleyman's activities did not match the new dimensions of the world in which

he

lived,

or,

simply

the

contemporary

politico-economic

map.

As we know

now,

in the

north

Suleyman

did not

confront the core

powers

of

Europe.

He

must

have

calculated

the

danger

of Russia for the

future

of

his

empire.

Then he conceived the bold

plan

of

uniting

the

Don

to the

Volga

by

means

of a canal which could

have

asserted Turkish

control of

the lower

Volga

and the

Caspian,

thus

providing

a

directly

link with

the

Ozbecks

who

were

enemies

of Persia and

Turkey's

allies

in

Central

Asia. But

this

vital

project,

too,

was

neglected

by

Suleyman's

successors.

In the east his policy was almost unbelievable, in spite of all his victories.

Suleyman

did

not establish Ottoman Rule in Tabriz. He did

not even overcome

the

technical difficulties-

problems

of

supply

and

transportation,

the

pre-

requisite

for

success

in

Tabriz. Almost

the

same

problems

led to

his

failure to

take

Vienna.

More disastrous

was his

inadequate

Mediterranean

and

Indian

Ocean

policies.

The backbone

of

naval

policy

was

only

the

raiding

principle

of

jihad,

which

could

not

or

did

not

promote

a

durable,

solid,

or

progressive

Ottoman

role

in the

Mediterranean.

Suleyman,

as

well as his

father

Sultan

Selim

I

and

his

son and successor Sultan Selim II (1566-1574), challenged the Spanish penetra-

tion

into

Islamic

North

Africa,

but

none of them ever

created

a

constructive

Ottoman

policy

there.

The

African

coast

became

the

corsair coast

for

centuries

to come.

Suleyman

the

Magnificant

and

Selim

II

continued

the

traditional

Ottoman




16/18

The Era

of

Suleyman

the

Magnificent 449

policy

to

end

the

political position

of

Venice

in the

Mediterranean.

To

reach

this

aim,

they

also

kept

up

the traditional Ottoman

policy

of

encouraging

the other

Italian trade

republics,

Venice's

relatively

weak

rivals,

who could never revive

the traditional

medieval trade routes after the Dutch and

English

broke into the

Mediterran

and the Indian Ocean.

Suleyman

also

took

France

as his

ally

in

the

Mediterranean,

but

France was

not,

or not

yet,

a Mediterranean maritime

power. Consequently,

she could

not

replace

Venice

in the area.

Suleyman's

Capitulation Treaty

with France is

almost

always

overestimated

by European

and American scholars. The

Capitula-

tion

Treaty

of

1535 (Francis I/Suleyman)

is

more or less an extension

of

the

treaties

between

the Italian

maritime

trade

republics

and

Egypt

in

the

later

Middle

Ages

-

before the Ottoman

invasion and

the

discovery

of the

Cape

of

Good

Hope.

It

could never

have met

the

challenge

of the economic

and

political

situation

in the

sixteenth

century,

when

Egypt

and the Islamic

Mediterranean

virtually

lost their

monopolistic

position

in world trade.

Also

the

Greek,

Armenian,

and

Jewish

merchants

-

in

fact,

the

intermediaries

between

Ottoman business and the

West

-

could not

inaugurate

the

big

maritime

and trade business between the East and the

West.

In

spite

of

their

vital

role

for

the

Ottoman

Empire,

we have

to

keep

in mind that

they

were then second

class

subjects

or

tolerated 'citizens.'

In

the

sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries the

only

reasonable

solution

toward a constructive Ottoman

policy

in the Mediterranean would have been

close

cooperation

with

Venice.

The

Italians,

and above

all the

Venetians,

had

been

very

interested

in

mutual

understanding

with

the Mamluk

Sultan

in

order

to survive the two

big

pressures: unhampered

Ottoman

military

expansion

and

Portuguese

economic

pressure following

the

discovery

of

the

Cape

of Good

Hope.

The Mamluk Sultan refused

close

cooperation

with Venice. It

is

truly

amazing

that

the Ottomans

kept up

the traditional Islamic

protectionist

trade

policy

without

shaping

it to match the

needs,

the

situation,

or

the

scope

of a

new

world

-

the world

after

the

European

geographical

discoveries and

their

revolutionary results: a world of competition, not monopoly. In other words,

Suleyman

did not

understand how to initiate and

to

take the

necessary

steps

to

keep pace

with the

changing

world of the sixteen

century.

It was

during

the

reign

of

Suleyman,

who

failed

to

take Vienna

or to reach

Rome and

who,

through

his Christian and non-Christian

spies

and

advisors,

was

well informed about the

increasing

significance

of

the

Americas

for

Europe

and

his

imperial

rival,

Charles

V,

that the Ottoman

Empire

was

obviously

in need

of a more constructive maritime and trade

policy

in

the Mediterranean

and

the

Indian Ocean

to

counterbalance

Charles's

policy

or

Europe's progress

in the

Atlantic and the Indian Oceans. A constructive policy would also have counter-

balanced the

overwhelming power

of

the

Janissaries

and at

the

same

time

protected

the state

and

its

subjects

against

the abuse of

the

principle

of

jihad.

Suleyman

preferred

to

repeat

his

attacks

upon

Vienna,

the

Christian Mediter-

ranean,

and Persia

than

to take

Morocco

and

reach

the

gold

sources and

slave




17/18

450

Subhi Labib

areas

of

West

Africa,

as well as the Atlantic coast

in

order to

correctly

face or

compete

with

the

rising

transatlantic/Atlantic

European/

Christian

powers.

Then

the

European

oceanic discoveries ended not

only

the traditional

monopoly

of

the

Muslim

intermediaries

between East

and

West but also broke the

traditional

frontiers

of the

challenge

between East and West and erected new ones. In

other

words,

the

European

oceanic discoveries

set

new dimensions for the

East/West

challenge

which

the Ottomans did not

really

or

sincerely

take

into

considera-

tion.

For the Turks there was

simply

no

compelling

motive to undertake

trans-

oceanic

journeys,

because

they possessed

shorter routes

to

the Indian Ocean. But

it

was,

above

all,

The Era of Suleyman Magnificent-crisis of Orient..

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