The Dado enter Journal for Operational Art - אתר צה · The Dado enter Journal for Operational...

Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies

The Dado Center Journal

for Operational Art

Volume 4

Defense and Home Front – A

Reconsideration

July 2015

2 | THE DADO CENTER JOURNAL | VOL. 4

The Dado Journal for Operational Art

Volume 4 – July 2015

Defense and Home Front – A Reconsideration

Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies

Operations Directorate (GS/J3), Doctrine and Training Division Israel Defense Forces

Publication Commander and Editor in Chief: Col. Eran Ortal

Editors: LtC. Eli Michelson, Capt Lior Lebed and Mr. Saul Bronfeld

Hebrew Copy Editing: Mr Arieh Shavit

English Editor: Mr. Lazar Berman

Translation: Capt (res.) Benjamin Rutland

On the front cover: General Yitzhak Sadeh. Following the outbreak of the Arab revolt in 1936, Sade developed the idea of going beyond the perimeter and altering the defensive concept. Sadeh established the “Mobile Units” as a defensive force acting beyond the perimeter, and later commanded “Field Companies,” which implemented the idea of defense beyond the perimeter in an organized and institutionalized manner. The photograph is courtesy of the Sadeh family.

Cover Design: Operations Directorate (GS/J3), Doctrine and Training Division, Publications and Terminology Desk, Graphic Design Team

Additional volumes of The Dado Center Journal are available online:

www.maarachot.idf.il

http://www.maarachot.idf.il/

Editor’s Preface

“Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not

know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent

does not know what to attack.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has a complex history with

the concept of defense. The intensity of the debate over the

relationship between defense and offense within Israel’s security

concept and its military expression fluctuates. The IDF was born from

the Haganah, the underground defense organization created in the

1920s, and its idea of the “Iron Wall.”1 However, the IDF’s ethos was

“going beyond the wire,” and its heroes were aggressive

commanders like Yitzhak Sadeh, Yigal Allon and the legendary Unit

101, a IDF special forces unit created by Ariel Sharon in 1953. The

Agranat Commission, which investigated the failures that led up to

the 1973 war, described this ethos as “the cult of the offensive.”2

Today, the debate over the proper balance between IDF’s

offensive capabilities and the growing dominance of its defensive

forces has returned, turning into a stormy conceptual fight. As a

matter of fact, the era of wars based on standoff firepower and the

threat of terrorist incursions into Israel – the latest example being

Operation Protective Edge - sharpens the tension between the

importance of an effective defense that includes a layer of home

front defense (against rockets and missiles and a border protection

layer against raids via tunnels) and the vital importance of decisive

military power that can attack the enemy with speed and force in its

territory and shorten the duration of the conflict. The point of

departure of this debate is the assumption that there exists a bitter

1 The Iron Wall metaphor was used by Ze’ev Jabotinsky in the essay he wrote in 1923, “The Iron Wall - We and the Arabs.” It describes the doctrine that later shaped David Ben-Gurion’s security concept. 2 The Agranat Commission was a National Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate the circumstances leading to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the failings of the IDF.


fight over resources between these two types of military power and

therefore the debate is concerned with the correct balance between

the two.

This issue of the Dado Center Journal is dedicated to the

subject of defense and its place within Israel’s new security concept

and its military force design. As always, we will approach the debate

in a systemic fashion in order to create the conditions for this deep

conceptual debate.

And what are the conditions for a fruitful systemic debate?

In the systemic learning approach that the Dado Center is

developing, one can identify principles and tools that create the

conditions for a systemic debate, some of which we used in this

issue. These include setting up diverse perspectives, in order to

create a holistic systemic explanation for the phenomenon under

investigation. Another tool is the exploration of the organizational

legacy (the past), to identify existing gaps within the organizational

doctrine in relation to changing reality, and to identify repetitive

patterns of behavior and recurring obstacles to learning. An

additional tool is studying the potential to identify available

opportunities that allow us to develop a new concept and to change

accordingly. The articles in this issue use these tools.

The legacy as a tool of critical introspection - By tracing the

design of Air Force ground-to-air missile capabilities and building the

Bar-Lev line, Mr. Saul Bronfeld demonstrates in his article how

defensive concepts emerge in the IDF. While offensive components

are born from a deep conceptual debate, defensive capabilities

emerge from specific needs and are seen as components of a

response to particular threats and are isolated from a broader

concept. Traces of this phenomenon - IDF involvement in defensive

capabilities as response to threats that endanger Israeli offensive

capabilities - are found in other articles of this issue.

The potential - At least three of the articles of this issue

discuss opportunities and potentials that are still in front of us. Ms.

Dana Preisler-Swery deals with the potential for regional stability

and a de-escalation in active defense systems. Brigagier General

Shachar Shohat, commander of the Air Defense Command, and Mr.

Yaniv Friedman raise the potential of missile interception

technologies used for defense, even in contexts that break the

conceptual dichotomy between “defensive” and “offensive”

capabilities. Lieutenant Colonel Eli Michelson and the late Colonel

Munir Amar, who passed away in March 2016, argued that there is

a conceptual omission that limits the effectiveness of home front

defense in times of crisis, an omission that stems from a

misunderstanding of the operational realm in the IDF defense

concept.

Looking at this question over time, this DCJ issue allows us

to identify the IDF tendency to consecrate its offensive capabilities

while suppressing the need for defense. It is possible that the roots

of this suppression can be traced to the “beyond the wire” concept,

which is perhaps the first defining conceptual idea that defined the

modern Jewish armed forces. Occasionally this suppression results

in a powerful counterreaction - the fortification line built along the

Suez Canal in the 1970s, and the fast-growing air defense array

today. The article by Brigadier General (res.) Meir Finkel, Dana

Preisler-Swery and Yaniv Friedman emphasizes this point and

argues that in the absence of proactive systemic thinking on this

issue, Israel is forced to adopt a defensive approach that may be

dominant, but is not part of a complete systemic concept.

The strength of a systemic debate lies in its ability to break

out of the borders of existing concepts which sit in unresolvable

tension with one another, and create from these tensions a new

conceptual knowledge. The current tension between the IDF

offensive tendencies on the one hand, and the enemy’s tangible

threats on Israel’s home front on the other hand, constitutes a

potential breakthrough for new conceptual realms. More than being

a dichotomous choice prioritizing offense over defense, the “beyond

the wire” principle of Yitzhak Sadeh, his field companies and Orde

Wingate’s Special Night Squads, was a new systemic interpretation

of the term defense in the strategic context of the Arab Revolt in

Palestine in the 1930s. Similarly, we may require a renewed

interpretation of the concept of defense, taking into consideration

today’s strategic context. Shachar Shohat points out in his article the


potential of missile defense, outside the framework of the home

front defense concept as we know it today. Another potential that

arises from Preisler-Swery’s article and from Shohat and Friedman’s

article, is the potential for strategic cooperation that could develop

out of the joint defense needs of different states. As related in

Lieutenant Colonel Roni Katzir’s article, the cyber world represents

a realm where the dichotomy between defense and offense, our

territory and theirs, is clearly irrelevant to the debate.

Is it possible that these conceptual frameworks represent an

opportunity to change the decades old trend of increasingly

intensive rounds of conflicts between us and our enemies without

clear decision on the battlefield? Is it possible that the traditional

separation between defense and offense - the idea of territory - is

no longer sufficient and relevant to a discussion that takes place in a

world in which missiles, tunnels and cyber technology bypass border

demarcations and traditional military theaters to which we have

become accustomed in military thinking? Has the IDF learning

system improved itself enough compared to the past in the junction

between operational planning, conceptual thought and military

force design?

What is the appropriate way for the IDF to develop its

knowledge in order to allow the creation of the military concept, that

will provide both adequate defense for Israel and its citizens, as well

as a quick and convincing response that will put an end to the

exhausting rounds of conflicts? Who among us initiates this debate

and who leads it?

We hope that this issue will facilitate and encourage the

necessary debate.

With best wishes for fruitful and enjoyable reading,

Colonel Eran Ortal,

Head of Think Tank.

Contents

Saul Bronfeld Defense – The Other Face of Mars 9

Dana Preisler-Swery

The Last Missile War? The Influence of the “Iron Dome” on the Operational Concepts of

Hamas, Hezbollah and the IDF 49

Shachar Shohat and Yaniv Friedman

From Tactical Anti-Aircraft Defense to Systemic Aerial Defense

75

Munir Amar and Eli Michelson

The Campaign for the Home Front 95

Roni Katzir

By Land, by Sea, by Air. And by Cyber?

117

Meir Finkel, Yaniv Friedman

and Dana Preisler-Swery

Active Defense as the Fourth Pillar of the Israeli Security Concept – The Lesson from

Operation Protective Edge 137

About the Authors

157

The research, understandings and conclusions in this journal reflect the opinions

of the authors and do not represent the official positions of the IDF.

Readers who are interested in contributing to “The Dado Journal” are invited to send proposals for articles to the editors at the following email:

[email protected]

Defense – The Other Face of Mars

Saul Bronfeld

Introduction

The ancient Romans worshipped a two-faced deity, Janus,

the God of beginnings and ends. Perhaps Mars, their God of war,

should have also been depicted with two faces, representing offense

and defense.

The relationship between these two forms of warfare has

long been the subject of debate. “We must not shield ourselves to

death,” some have argued. Others have insisted that “the best

defense is a good offense.” In Israel, a common position is that the

country’s defensive doctrine manifests itself in offensive measures.

In practice, security concepts and warfare doctrines define the

relationship between the two and determine the level of resources

to be assigned to each.

This article will argue that military requirements, learning

and experience led the IDF, in two cases, to invest significant

resources in defensive systems. The case studies show that IDF

learning was flexible enough to allocate substantial resources to

defense, which was, in the past as well as today, “the fourth pillar”

of the classical security concept. This was a concept that advocated

offensive action in order to defend. It prioritized offensive

capabilities that would lead to decisive victory, preferably following

a preemptive strike. The concept was derived from the broad and

chronic asymmetry that existed between Israel and its enemies - in

geography and size of the regular army - and from the realization

that it is impossible to achieve a decisive victory through defense

alone. However, when the circumstances necessitated it, even in the

past, tremendous resources were invested in defensive capabilities.

The proper combination of defense and offense has been a

major question for security concepts from time immemorial, but this


study will refrain from diving into this doctrinal sea. This article will

discuss two events during which the military leadership decided to

adopt new operational concepts that required a heavy investment in

defense. The first event, in the field of airpower, was the acquisition

of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in the early 1960s, which competed

for resources with jet fighter procurement. The second event,

relating to ground warfare, was the establishment of a line of

reinforced fortifications on the western bank of the Suez Canal

during the War of Attrition.

Both events occurred against the backdrop of turning points

in Israel’s security reality, which compelled the IDF General Staff to

contend with a new type of war. This article will describe the

political, operational-economic and other considerations which

shaped both events as well as the sharp controversies that

accompanied the decisions to invest in defensive tools. Both events

involved symmetric warfare against regular Arab armies, but they

may provide us with insights and lessons on learning, and on dealing

with change, which is currently required in our warfare doctrines.1

Airpower: Defense Through Surface-to-Air Missiles

In September 1962, President John F. Kennedy announced his

willingness to provide Hawk surface-to-air missiles to Israel. Five

batteries were acquired prior to the 1967 Six Day War, at a cost of

$30 million. This was an unprecedented investment in a defensive

system designed to protect air force bases, the nuclear reactor in

Dimona, and the home front. Below I describe the arguments which

took place prior to the decision to procure these surface-to-air

1 The events described in this study can serve as historical background to studies dealing with

intellectual renewal. See: Eran Ortal, “Is the IDF Capable of an Intellectual Breakthrough?”, Ma’arachot, February 2013. [Hebrew] In order to emphasize the scope of this paper, I will point out that this study only deals with weapons systems that did not have a direct role in offensive action and the achievement of decisive victory. Also, this study does not deal with investments in home front protection, cyber defense, “second strike” capabilities and armored vehicle protection. Finally, investment in protecting combatants’ lives has always played a central role in security concepts, and is therefore outside the scope of the present study.

BRONFELD | THE OTHER FACE OF MARS | 11

missiles, which was a deviation from the classic concept that had

guided the Israeli Air Force (IAF) since the 1950s - achieving air

superiority - as well as the conclusion of the incident and the lessons

learned.2

1. The Operational-Economic Considerations

The combat doctrine of the IAF in the 1950s was based on a

combination of fighter aircraft squadrons (and air traffic control

units), three airfields and anti-aircraft artillery battalions - all

designed to protect the country's skies, to control airspace over the

battlefield and to participate in the ground battle. The IAF sought to

increase the size of its fighter jet force and to construct more

airfields. Improving air defense capabilities was its lowest priority.

However, toward the end of the decade, the General Staff began

considering reinforcement of Israel’s air defenses with surface-to-air

missiles. The motivation for this new thinking was the improvement

in the attack capabilities of the Arab air forces (Tupolev-16 bombers

and MIG-19 ground attack jets) and the assessment of the General

Staff’s Staff-Armaments Directorate regarding the severity of the

threat: “The worst-case scenario for the defense establishment is an

attack from the air instigated by the enemy on our airfields and

population centers. There is no way to completely hold back such an

2 This chapter relies to a large extent on Stuart Cohen's study: “Who Needs Ground-Air

Missiles? How Were the Hawk Missiles Acquired,” in Ze'ev Lachish and Meir Amitai (eds). Non-Peaceful Decade: Chapters in the History of the Air Force, 1956 - 1967. Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense, 1995. [Hebrew] See also Chapter three of Saul Bronfeld. “From A-4 to F-4: The Beginning of an Aviational Friendship,” Fisher Institute of Strategic Air and Space Research, 2011. [Hebrew], or the summary of the book in the article Saul Bronfeld. “Wise Statesmanship: Levi Eshkol and Arms Procurement in the 60s,” Ma’arachot. No. 437 (Sivan 5771 - June 2011). [Hebrew] The threat to Dimona jumpstarted the IDF’s capabilities and not only in the SAM interception field. Between 1966 and 1967 the “Senator” initiative was established by the Unit 8200 unit in the IDF J2, assisted by Air Force Intelligence, which was designed “to supply an early warning of an Egyptian air force attack on Dimona.” The intelligence that was gathered was very helpful in planning the attacks on the Egyptian airfields in the Six Day War. See Amos Gilboa. “Mr. Intelligence - Ahara'le, General Aaron Yariv, Head of Military Intelligence,” Yediot Ahronot and Hemed books, 2013, pp. 185, 192-193, 214-215. [Hebrew]


attack with aircraft only... Surface-to-air missiles are a better

defensive means against faster aircraft than interceptors.”3

The General Staff perception was spurred by an important

operational issue - the need to protect the Dimona reactor from low

altitude, hit-and-run incursions from Egyptian airfields in Sinai.

Operational considerations of time and space indicated that it would

be impossible to prevent such an attack only through aerial

interception of the MIGs, and economic considerations prevented

constant defensive air patrols.

The IAF commander, Maj. Gen. Ezer Weizman, objected to the

acquistion of surface-to-air missiles from the US for several reasons.

First, procurement of good air defense capabilities would stengthen

arguments against a preventive air strike. “I feared that when the

senior leadership would need to approve an air offensive,” Weizman

revealed, “the presence in Israel of Hawk missiles would actually

block a fast-affirmative decision [to strike first].”4

Second, he reasoned, surface-to-air missile batteries would use

a large slice of the IAF budget (even though the operational yield

would be higher than if the funds were invested to procure another

Mirage Squadron or build a fourth airfield). “One should not forget

that surface-to-air missiles are static and a missile is a single-use

weapon,” argued IAF headquarters, “while a jet fighter is flexible, it

3 A document from September 10, 1959, quoted by Stuart Cohen, “Who Needs Ground-Air

Missiles? How the Hawk Missiles Were Acquired,” pp. 255-256. Already during the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940, it had become clear that over time it is impossible defend land assets using interceptor patrols. The large contribution of the radar-detection network deployed by the Royal Air Force allowed the British Spitfires and Hurricanes to be launched just in time to intercept the German bombers, preventing the interception squadrons from having to perform grinding patrols. At that time, the United Kingdom's small air force was unable to continuously patrol its skies, but the radar network and the reporting and control system based on it, allowed the RAF to launch fighter planes just in time. The British made early use of a system that the Toyota vehicle manufacturing company brought into industry in the 1950s. See Edward Luttwak. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 235-236.

4 Ezer Weizman. On Eagles' Wings: The Personal Story of the Leading Commander of the Israeli Air Force. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., pp. 183-186.


may continue attacking the enemy and is able to handle more than

one target in a single sortie.”5

Third, another important but implicit consideration is

identifiable in the Air Force position over the years. The

organizational culture of the Air Force was not enthusiastic about

weapons systems not operated by pilots. Weizman did not like

surface-to-air missiles, his replacement Maj. Gen. Moti Hod did not

like drones and their successors did not like military satellites or the

Iron Dome system.

In internal discussions, Israel never raised concerns about the

potential for escalation, in contrast to concerns raised by the US

State Department in objecting to the sale of the Hawks to Israel.

American diplomats argued that equipping the IDF with surface-to-

air missiles would lead the Soviets to supply Egypt with long range

surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), which would expose Israel to

significant threats.6 In Israel this consideration was not deemed

relevant, because in the 50s and 60s it was the Soviets who were

introducing advanced air and ground-based weapon systems into

the Middle East, and the prevailing Israeli opinion was that they

were leading the arms race, not reacting.

2. Political Considerations

From the mid-1950s, France was the IDF’s main weapons

supplier. Israel procured tanks, fighter jets, helicopters, various

types of missiles and a nuclear reactor from France. The love affair

between the defense establishments reached new heights in the

early 1960s after France began to supply modern Mirage fighters,

and continued to help in many other ways. The French billed Israel

heavily, but had no political inhibitions and gladly consented to any

purchase request. And the Americans “are inquisitive and

5 A document from September 23rd, 1959, quoted in Stuart Cohen, “Who Needs Ground-Air Missiles? How the Hawk Missiles Were Acquired,” in Lachish Ze'ev and Amitai, Meir (eds). Non-Peaceful Decade: Chapters in the History of the Air Force, 1956 - 1967. Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense, 1995, p. 255. [Hebrew]

6 Ibid, pp. 269-270.


garrulous,” reflected Ezer Weizman. “The French never questioned

us this way, and we had a feeling that if we asked to buy 300 Mirages

instead of 72, they would have complied after merely clarifying the

terms of payment. And here [in Washington, when presenting the

shopping list for the Air Force in October 1965] there are cross-

examinations and intricate inquiries.”7

At the end of the 1950s, the United States produced the Hawk,

a surface-to-air missile, considered by the IAF “the most

sophisticated of its kind,” as well as other weapon systems that

Israel longed to acquire (primarily tanks and fighter-bomber jets).

But the Americans refused to provide the IDF with weapons of any

kind. To their credit, the Americans were aware of the threats to

Israel, but limited themselves to financial assistance, facilitating the

procurement of weapons systems from France and Britain. Prime

Minister Levi Eshkol called the American policy an “elegant

embargo,” and the policy could be referred to as “the IDF are moving

up a class, but not in the American school.” Accordingly, the debate

on the operational need and effectiveness of surface-to-air missiles

(in cost-benefit terms) was intertwined with what is known in Israeli

historiography as the debate between the “European school” and

the “American school.”8

Weizman, supported by Shimon Peres, then the Deputy Minister

of Defense, preferred to procure another Mirage squadron instead

of the Hawk batteries. This position stemmed from both the

operational-economic considerations described above, and from

the rationale that the acquisition of the additional Mirages would

strengthen Israel's status as an important client of the French

industries, thus intensifying the collaboration between France and

the Israeli defense establishments.

7 Weizman, On Eagles' Wings: The Personal Story of the Leading Commander of the Israeli Air

Force?” p. 302. His comments described the enormous political difficulty in purchasing weapons in the US, compared to the political ease of purchasing from France (and the economic difficulties in funding the acquisition).

8 Bronfeld, “From A-4 to F-4: The Beginning of an Aviational Friendship,” Fisher Institute of Strategic Air and Space Research, pp. 15-16; Cohen, “Who Needs Ground-Air Missiles? How Were the Hawk Missiles Aquired,” pp. 264-267.


Their opponents, Generals Haim Laskov, Tzvi Tzur and Yitzhak

Rabin, as well as David Ben Gurion, and later Golda Meir and Levi

Eshkol, believed that with resolute and ongoing political efforts,

Israel could break into the coveted American arsenal. The tactic

chosen by the prime ministers and chiefs of staff at the time

advocated applying pressure to obtain approvals for purchasing

defensive weapon systems to be followed by aircraft and armored

vehicles. The initial stage was successful in 1960, when President

Dwight Eisenhower consented to Ben Gurion's request to provide

the IAF with advanced air control and command (non-firing)

systems, followed by requests to procure the Hawk (a defensive fire

system), and later by requests to purchase aircraft and tanks

(offensive fire systems).

The complexity of the web of arguments of the various parties

is also reflected in the difficulty in separating relevant considerations

(operational, political and economic) from ones driven by

personality/organizational rivalries and interests. It's hard to believe

that the strained relationships between Golda Meir and Shimon

Peres, and between Rabin and Peres, did not influence the debate,

since purchasing more in France, instead of purchasing the Hawk

from the US, would have strengthened Peres position vis-à-vis the

Israeli Foreign Ministry as well as the General Staff.

Yitzhak Rabin described Peres' 1982 objection to the arms

purchases in the US, from the air control systems to the Hawks:

“Of course, Peres argued [in 1960] that there was no need to go

to the Americans, but in the end, Ben Gurion decided and returned

with Eisenhower's approval to purchase the aerial warning systems.

Then Peres, influenced by Weizman, who commanded the air force,

tried to torpedo it. We already had approval to make the purchase,

but nothing was done in order to advance the acquisition, because

Peres claimed that there was an up-to-date radar system in France,

better than that of the Americans, and they appointed a Committee.

In short, they dragged the matter on for a year or a year and a half


before actually starting, and miraculously we reached the Six Day

War with one fully functioning warning station, and on Mt. Canaan

only an improvised one, because we did not manage, since we had

wasted time. But it [the American system] is, to this day, in fact, the

backbone of all our aerial warning and control systems. Later, in the

second stage, the issue of the Hawk missiles arose, and Tsera [Tzvi

Tzur], the Chief of Staff, and I were in favor, and once again Weizman

and Peres nearly tried to torpedo it. Weitzman argued in principle

that it was not necessary, that it was a waste of money. But Eshkol

and Golda, as soon as Eshkol entered office, they made the radical

shift to the American issue.”9

Similar claims were raised by Yoash Sidon, Chief of the

Armaments and Planning Division at Air Force Headquarters (Air

Group 2) in the early 1960s, who accused Peres and Weizman of fully

identifying with Marcel Dassault, owner of the big French aircraft

manufacturing company, and of consequently introducing

erroneous considerations into the purchase of fighter jets.10

It does not matter here how accurately Rabin's and Sidon's

memories reflect Peres's and Weizman's considerations. Obviously,

personal alliances on the one hand, and sour personal relationships

on the other, lead to mistakes.

9 Avi Shlaim, “Interview with Yitzhak Rabin,” Iyunim Bitkumat Israel (Studies in Israeli and

Modern Jewish society). Vol. 8, Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 1998, pp. 688-681. [Hebrew] Rabin “forgot” to mention that after Israel made the decision to request the Hawk, Peres acted energetically to persuade President Kennedy's administration of the vitality of the missiles to Israel's security.

10 Sidon, Joash. Day and Night in Fog. Jerusalem: Ma'ariv Library, 1995 pp. 350-367. [Hebrew] Yaakov Hefetz, who was financial advisor to the Chief of Staff, said in an interview with Sidon: “There were ‘transactions’ between Ezer [Weizman] and Shimon Peres, then between Ezer and Keshet [Moshe, Director of the Ministry of Defense]. You support this and we shall support here... [Weizman and Hod who replaced him] were in direct contact with the Ministry of Defense and all sorts of partnerships in crime... unknown to the IDF Chief of Staff.” Quoted in Yitzhak Greenberg. Accounting and Power: The Defense Budget from War to War. Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense, 1997, p. 113. [Hebrew]


3. Organizational Considerations

In the 1950s, direct responsibility for anti-aircraft systems was

entrusted to the Artillery Corps, and the beginning of the missile era

sharpened the organizational dispute between the two services.

Initially, the dispute was over surface-to-surface missiles which were

developed in France for the IDF, and later over locally developed Luz

missiles. When the decision was made to purchase the Hawk

missiles, Weizman demanded responsibility for those batteries. The

Air Force arguments related, initially, to the operational need to

coordinate the employment of the anti-aircraft systems with fighter

jets, an issue which was always important, and which became critical

in the era of surface-to-air missiles. Furthermore, the technological

infrastructure required to run and maintain a SAM array was very

advanced, much greater than that at the disposal of the anti-aircraft

cannons. The Artillery Corps objected, of course, with professional

and morale-based arguments, but at the end of a long debate the

IAF carried the day.11

Chief of Staff Tzur’s decision to entrust the Air Force with the

surface-to-air missiles was an important step in transferring

responsibility for the whole air defense array from the Artillery

Corps to the IAF, as part of an operational-organizational concept

that later concentrated under Air Force wings “anything that flies” -

jets, helicopters, drones, anti-aircraft guns, missile defense systems,

surface-to-air missiles and rocket and mortar defense systems (the

anti-aircraft units were transferred in November 1970). At the

General Staff meetings where the organizational implications of the

Hawk’s acquisition were discussed, other options arose. Rabin (then

Deputy Chief of staff), for example, supported the establishment of

a missile command, directly under the Chief of Staff. Other concerns

were that transferring the surface-to-air missiles to the Air Force’s

11 Cohen, “Who Needs Ground-Air Missiles? How Were the Hawk Missiles Aquired,” pp. 275-

281.


responsibility would deprive the artillery corps and other entities in

the IDF, and would further augment the importance of the Air Force.

In debates about purchasing expensive weapon systems like the

Hawk, the first question that arises is always from which budget

would the funding be drawn.12 It is not surprising that a service that

desired a certain weapon’s platform would plot to finance the

purchase at someone else’s expense. The best option was a special

allowance from the USA. Otherwise, through increases to the

defense budget, and as a last resort, at the expense of one’s

colleagues on the General Staff. The worst-case scenario for a

service was cutbacks in one’s budget. Commanders throughout the

ages, in the IDF and other armies, would demonstrate great

creativity to avoid encountering a worst-case scenario.13

Weizman understood that the $30 million invested in the Hawks

(although spread over several years) would come at the expense of

purchasing aircraft. He feared that the many requirements of the

ground forces - especially tanks, armored personnel carriers and

modern artillery - would prevent an increase in the Air Force’s share

of the defense budget, and that a serious shortage of foreign

currency for procurement needs would also be a problem.14

4. Epilogue - Purchase of the Hawk Surface-to-Air Missile

The decision to purchase the Hawks despite IAF opposition

stemmed primarily from an immediate operational need, which

could not be fulfilled in any other way. Anti-aircraft guns and fighter

12 In another example, during the discussion of the “Goshen” multi-year plan, in 1968 and 1969, Maj. Gen. Hod opposed financing the procurement of the many helicopters required for vertical flanking “at his expense.” 13 I will limit myself to pointing out the tactic known as “the Cheech Method” named after its

creator Maj. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo (Cheech) Lahat, Mayor of Tel Aviv 1974-1993. General Lahat commanded the Sinai Division during the War of Attrition, but the method was given its nickname when he served as Mayor, developing it greatly while creating large budget deficits. When Lahat was required to cut back on expenses, he would agree immediately, and then announce that the cutbacks would be achieved by closing down services provided to the elderly in distress. “Cheech” had many imitators in the civil and defense sectors, as is evidenced by recent threats to cut back on training for combat forces, following the refusal of the Ministry of Finance to increase the defense budget.

14 Greenberg, “Accounting and Power: The Defense Budget from War to War,” p. 112.


jet patrols and even an additional airfield could not guarantee the

continuous functioning of the Air Force bases and the defense of the

Dimona reactor (nor the home front). Weizman suppressed the

operational problem, whereas Chiefs of Staff Laskov and Tzur (and

Deputy Chief of Staff Rabin) identified the new need and were even

prepared to invest significant resources in a defensive response.

Weizman's resistance to purchasing the Hawks rested on two levels,

related to the IDF’s decisive defeat doctrine. At the strategic level,

there was an apprehension that the defensive capability would

augment the political echelon’s tendency towards containment,

which would likely refuse authorization for a preemptive airstrike.

At the operational level, there was a fear that purchasing the

missiles would come at the expense of purchasing fighter jets

designed to achieve air superiority, according to classical combat

doctrine. Weizmann regarded the purchase of the surface-to-air

missiles - defensive by nature - as an impairment of the ability to

attain a decisive defeat, and he therefore opposed it (gaining the

support of Peres, who wanted to increase procurement from

France). Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir on the other hand, alongside

the chiefs of staff, decided in favor of the Hawks, both on

operational grounds and from a political desire to break into the

American arsenal.

Hindsight suggests that Weizman had neither operational nor

organizational reasons to lament that his position was rejected. His

fear that defensive improvements would prevent the political

echelon from approving a preemptive strike against the Egyptian

airfields in the Six Day War was proven wrong. In June 1967 approval

was indeed granted for Operation Moked, which was a resounding

success. Moreover, the willingness to take risks and leave only a few

Mirages to defend Israel's skies in the morning of Operation Focus

was influenced by the existence of the Hawk batteries. Weizman's

budgetary concern was also proven wrong. In 1965 Eshkol approved

the procurement of an additional 50 Mirages and 48 Skyhawks,

concurrent with the procurement of 250 Centurions and 150 M-48s,


and after the Six Day War, there was effectively no budgetary limit

on the procurement of jet fighters.

Furthermore, the Air Force succeeded in developing a combat

doctrine for the anti-aircraft missiles, integrating them with the

fighter jets, as was demonstrated during the War of Attrition and the

1973 Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War. Affirming this fact was Brig. Gen.

Benny Peled, the Head of the Air Division during the War of Attrition,

who complained that the Air Force had insufficient Hawk batteries.15

Introducing the Hawks to the IDF’s order of battle in the mid-1960s

was the first step in establishing a modern air defense array - anti-

aircraft systems and later anti-missile and anti-rocket systems -

whose importance grew from the 1990s onwards. Furthermore, the

Hawk array was very technologically advanced, and it helped the Air

Force advance in rocket, air traffic control and radar capabilities.

Finally, the Chief of Staff accepted Weizman's demand to

subordinate the surface-to-air missiles to the Air Force which

intensified Air Force control over “anything that flies.”

Image 1: Postcard of the IDF parade in honor of the purchase of the

Hawk missiles

15 The need for sophisticated air defense measures in the War of Attrition was due to the

proximity of Israeli forces in Western Sinai to the Egyptian airfields, inviting air incursions that the Mirages were unable to intercept.


On the political front, it became apparent that were no reasons

to lament the rejection of Weizman's position against the

procurement of the Hawks. Later came the M-48 and M-60 tanks,

Skyhawk aircraft, Sikorsky CH-53 helicopters, F-4 phantom aircraft

and missiles of various types and from the late 1960s the US became

Israel's main weapons supplier. The many reasons for the gradual

reversal in US policy are complex, but it is clear that the transition

from stingy American consent for the sale of recoilless cannons in

1959 to the supply of the F-4s late in 1968 had to be gradual and

that the sale of the Hawks was an important stop along this long and

winding road. Finally, the embargo imposed by the French president

following the Six Day War proved that Israel's important status vis-

à-vis the French defense industry rested on shifting sands. The

purchase, before the Six Day War, of a few additional Mirage

squadrons from the French would not have changed the scope of

the damage they inflicted.

5. What Can Be Learned?

First, don't put all your eggs in one basket. During the events in

question, Chiefs of Staff Laskov and Tzur decided not to rely on

fighter jets alone for air defense, meaning that air warfare would

have to be conducted using an integrated combat approach in which

both aircraft and sophisticated air defense systems would

participate. Ostensibly, this principle goes without saying in the

development of military doctrine, in investment management and

in other fields. But history teaches us that there is always a strong

temptation to ignore it.16

Second, the event highlights a problem inherent in the IDF

General Staff (and beyond), exacerbated in the context of

technological issues in general and aviation in particular. “In our

twisted organizational structure, the Air Force commander is the

16 The relevancy of this lesson can also be learnt from the fighting in the Sinai during the first

days of the Yom Kippur War. The shortages in artillery, mortars, modern armored infantry carriers and tank transports are a painful example of a deviation from the principle.


only source of knowledge to the Chief of Staff, and through him to

the Government, in everything relating to military aviation,” Sidon

described the situation in the years when he headed Air Branch 2,

under Weizman as Air Force commander. “He is service commander

and staff officer at once... A definite conflict of interests that is

worsening as the level of specialization in the service is deepening,

making things more difficult for the uninitiated to understand.”17

The technological leaps in various types of weapon systems since the

1960s exacerbated the need for General Staff planning entities,

headed by commanders with technological and operational

knowledge, and able to cope with the demands of the services.

The need for such professional entities was prominent in other

events related to the Air Force, characterized by a bias against

systems not operated by a human pilot. The resistance of the Air

Force to drone development in the 1970s, to the development of

military satellites in the 1980s and to the development of the Iron

Dome in 2000s is no secret. Less widely known is the unsophisticated

use of drones during the Yom Kippur war and the resistance to the

development of surface-to-surface missiles for use by the ground

forces.

The need to develop General Staff capabilities to handle

complex technological issues exists not only in relation to the Air

Force. It also especially concerns cyber warfare, command and

control systems, intelligence, unmanned systems and robotics and

many other issues that have developed over the last generation.

One hopes that today, with senior Air Force officers filling key

positions in the General Staff directorates, matters had improved in

comparison to the 1960s. However, the American experience

teaches us that even following the Goldwater-Nichols Act revolution

in 1986, which, inter alia, improved integration between

headquarters and the commands, it is not easy to uproot narrow

thought patterns and allegiance to one’s own corps.

17 Sidon, “Day and Night in Fog,” p. 352.


Land Warfare: Defense Through Fortified Outposts ("Strongholds")

On September 8, 1968, Egypt launched a war of a type

entirely new to the IDF - a war of attrition. The Egyptians shelled the

Israeli line along the Suez Canal, leaving dozens of soldiers killed and

wounded. At the same time, under the cover of darkness and

shelling, Egyptian commando units successfully crossed the canal,

planted mines, set ambushes and even attacked IDF positions,

causing additional casualties. The novelty in the War of Attrition was

the deadly combination, the likes of which the IDF had never

encountered before - fierce artillery fire and commando raids

conducted by a state army - determined and properly equipped. The

scope was infinitely larger than that of the incidents which took

place on the Jordanian and Syrian borders prior to the Six Day War,

and in the Jordan and Beit Shean Valleys after the war.

For political and military considerations, Israel decided to

keep a military presence along the Suez Canal’s eastern bank, and

not to retreat eastward. This meant that IDF forces would remain

within range of Egyptian artillery. For the same reasons, Israel

decided against pushing Egyptian artillery back by seizing the

western bank of the canal. Furthermore, retaliatory actions carried

out by the IDF, initially the destruction of Egyptian cities along the

canal and deep raids inside Egypt later, did not deter Nasser nor put

an end to the fire (though they did cause him much embarrassment).

As time went by, it became clear that this was a costly type of

warfare, which would last for a long time - several months, perhaps

even years - and that it was impossible to end it in one stroke.

The shelling and commando raids were an important

element in the strategy to drive the IDF from the Sinai Peninsula.

They were part of the Soviet-Arab effort to force Israel's retreat by

constantly igniting the theater, designed to secure US support for a

retreat, as had happened after the 1956 Sinai War. In addition, the

losses caused by the attrition, in blood and money, were meant to

soften Israel's opposition to retreating. The attrition was also seen


in Egypt as a stage that would prepare their armed forces for an all-

out war and the reoccupation of the Sinai, if international pressures

failed, as well as serving the Egyptian government on the domestic

front. It came as a response to a craving for revenge by the army and

the people, wishing to erase the shame of defeat from the Six Day

War.

Until September 1968, the IDF was deployed in western Sinai in

a thin green line, with few troops and minimal fortifications. As soon

as the shelling began, the General Staff took emergency measures,

including sending reinforcements, distancing some of them beyond

the range of the Egyptian artillery, new combat procedures and

fortifying the outposts with additional layers of earth. On October

26, the Egyptians launched another round of shelling, again causing

dozens of casualties. After the second bombardment, the General

Staff understood that the steps already taken were insufficient and

the IDF must prepare for a new type of war. This study limits itself

to the learning processes and the formation of the IDF's response

during the first, formative, phase of the War of Attrition until July

1969, when the Air Force joined the campaign.

The changes in the political and military circumstances after the

Six Day War forced the General Staff to revise its security concept

and to adapt to the new reality. The transition from an offensive

mindset, at the heart of the military discourse for many decades, to

trench warfare in the autumn of 1968, was not easy and was

accompanied by pointed debates, not always presented accurately

in the historiography of the period.18

1. Political Considerations

In the period immediately following the Six Day War, political

considerations played an important role in decisions around plans to

defend the Sinai Peninsula, and the necessary investments. On

policy issues, there were no real differences of opinion between the

government and the General Staff, which perceived a great deal of

18 Here we shall mainly use sources from the period, and refrain from using insights generated after the Yom Kippur War.


military logic in the political directives. The first directive was to not

retreat from the canal unless a political agreement was achieved.

This was accepted by the General Staff, which felt comfortable in

deploying behind a water barrier, 180 meters wide.

Similarly, there was hardly any protest against the second

directive, to maintain the status quo on the canal while not pushing

the fire back by seizing territory to the west of the canal. This

directive came from the fear of intervention by Soviet forces should

the IDF endanger the Nasser regime, and the fear that igniting the

canal would cool relations with the US, which was deterred from

confronting the Soviets because of the Vietnam quagmire. The

American consideration had another aspect, a fear that the US

would not supply the F-4s and Skyhawks, leading to a decision to

refrain from employing the Air Force to suppress Egyptian fire until

July 1969. The Israeli government and the General Staff also agreed

on the necessity to avoid endangering the acquisition of more

fighter jets.

In addition, the government and the IDF had to consider the

effect on national morale a new war would have. After the elation

brought about by the victory in the Six Day War, the Israeli public

descended into a sort of depression, not having expected another

war and so many casualties on the eastern and canal fronts. The

public was frustrated that they couldn’t enjoy quiet for even forty

days, and the persistence of the War of Attrition and the

accumulation of casualties on both fronts created a painful

atmosphere. The need to do everything possible to minimize

casualties increased. On both fronts, the IDF patrolled with armored

vehicles only, converted tanks to evacuate casualties, placed

physicians in the strongholds, and acquired bulletproof vests.

2. The Operational-Economic Considerations

The operational significance of the policy directives was that the

IDF was stuck on the banks of the Suez, exposed to the Egyptians. It

was not allowed to (nor did it necessarily want to) cross the canal,


nor withdraw to the east. Moreover, the IDF artillery order of battle

was smaller, by an order of magnitude, than that of the Egyptians,

and was unable to silence the shelling.19 The General Staff

understood that this difficult situation was expected to persist.

Therefore, the IDF prepared for an extended stay on the Suez, while

readying itself for two types of threats - an all-out war started by

Egyptian initiative aiming to reconquer the Sinai, and a limited war,

a “war of attrition” in Nasser’s parlance, in the form of heavy shelling

and commando raids on the eastern bank, which could develop into

a land grab.20

This section will describe the considerations of the IDF in

defending the canal line in the first six months of the War of

Attrition, from early September 1968 (when the first shell fell) to

early March 1969 (when the war entered its intensive, continuous

phase).21 There is a special interest in the learning processes and

dilemmas of this period, and in the gradual disengagement of the

General Staff from the memories of the Six Day War and classical

security concepts.

In addition to the emergency measures taken from September

1968, the General Staff quickly prepared along several lines of effort

for the new type of warfare. A cross-service planning team headed

by Brig. Gen. Avraham Adan, Deputy Commander of the Armored

Corps, prepared a comprehensive new program to defend the Sinai

- the “Stronghold” Plan - which was implemented immediately, even

before its final approval, in December 1968. The prompt

construction of fortifications was spurred by an intelligence report

that Egypt was about to launch a full-scale war in the spring of 1969,

19 According to Haim Bar-Lev, the ratio between their barrels and ours was 1:20 or 1:30, and no one proposed to change that by acquiring more artillery pieces. 20 The IDF also prepared for intermediate scenarios, such as a seizure of Sharm-al-Sheikh or Northen Sinai, but due to space limitations, we will not discuss them here. 21 From November 1968 to early March 1969, the fire was temporarily halted since Egypt was

forced to organize its rear defense, following a successful raid by the Israeli Paratroopers Brigade’s Reconnaissance Unit on the relay stations and bridges in the area of Nag-Hammadi (Operation “Shock”). In this article, as in the literature of the period and its historiography, the limited war which took place on the banks of the Suez Canal is referred to as the “War of Attrition,” and also occasionally as routine security activity.


and by the contribution ascribed to the strongholds in successfully

parrying an expected crossing.22 In early March 1969, construction

of the first phase of the Bar Lev Line was completed. An array of 32

well-protected outposts stood ready, some intended for actual

combat, others for early warning and observation. The outposts,

nicknamed strongholds, boasted effective protection against

artillery, were surrounded by fences and mines, and came with

access roads and firing positions for tanks protecting the line. The

strongholds were constructed to provide reasonable amenities to

the soldiers manning them, not an easy achievement in the Sinai

desert. This represented an investment of approximately 52 million

Israeli Lira on the canal line, not an overwhelming sum, comparable

to the cost of three F-4s or a hundred upgraded Patton tanks, but

more than the IDF had ever spent on fortifications.23 The cost of the

strongholds themselves only amounted to approximately 12 million

IL, and the remaining sums were invested in paving roads and other

infrastructure required for a defensive line.

The Southern Command’s Stronghold Program was an

operational plan for the defense of the Sinai during an all-out war as

well as in routine operations, integrated within the General Staff’s

“Sela” (Rock) plan, and included deployment and warfare methods,

assignment of troops and construction of operational infrastructure.

22 See the General Staff meeting, 21/11/1968, IDF archives 10/10/2013. 23 The retrospective pricing of the stronghold line at the beginning of the War of Attrition is

not simple. On the one hand, the figures cited do not include the full economic cost (not even the budgetary) of the many military personnel and heavy construction equipment involved in the construction project. On the other hand, the stronghold line’s budget contains sums, which would have been spent anyway by the IDF, even if an alternative defensive method were chosen. It is important to note that the heaviest expenditures on the Bar Lev Line were invested after the ceasefire in August 1970, when 150 million IL were spent in strengthening the line, bringing about the “infamous enrichment of the contractors.” These figures are rough estimates - 250 million IL according to Haim Laskov testifying at the Agranat Commission meeting of January 10, 1974, or 300 million as stated by Abraham Zohar in his book - of the costs of constructing the line. In any case, these figures are smaller by an order of magnitude than the refuted figures presented by David Arbel and Uri Neeman, approximately the equivalent of 100 fighter jets and 1,000 tanks, i.e. above 2,000 million IL. See Arbel and Neeman, “Unforgivable Delusion,” Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2005. p. 150. [Hebrew]; Ami Shamir, “History of the Army Engineering Corps,” Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense, 1978, pp. 79-91. [Hebrew]


It was prepared under two constraints - preventing any Egyptian

achievements, political or military, both in a limited and in an all-out

war, and avoiding casualties and costs as much as possible

(manpower, engine hours, fuel, spare parts, etc.).

There was a close link between the two constraints. After the Six

Day War, the IDF was required to deal with a limited but intense

conflict, while preparing for all-out war. Therefore, the need to

conserve power in the canal zone became a major guideline.

Moreover, the IDF was burdened with many more demanding tasks

- combat on the eastern front, controlling and managing the

territories occupied during the Six Day War, fighting terrorism within

the Green Line and overseas, increasing and improving the order of

battle, developing new capabilities (helicopter-borne attacks in

depth, water crossings, intelligence gathering, defense against non-

conventional threats), organizational changes, establishing an

operational infrastructure for road construction, and the

establishment of defense industries. The General Staff realized that

intensive attrition could last far longer than in the past, and

demanded that ongoing routine defense not curtail training, nor

wear down the order of battle designated for an all-out war.

In his memoirs, Adan described the constraint guiding the

Stronghold plan as the desire to invest in “operational employment

the minimum number of troops,” in order to “train the maximum

troops uninterruptedly, wearing down fewer tanks and artillery

pieces [and half-tracks, of which there was a critical shortage] while

conserving the troops.” The chosen solution consisted of static

strongholds and deterrence - and not a mobile and reinforced

warning screen - with the addition of ambushes.24

Adan phrased his argument in military terms, but with his

degree in economics, he could have done so in economic ones as

well. Establishment of the line was performed using a type of

“production actor” of which, relatively, there was no shortage:

24 Avraham Adan. On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War. Jerusalem: Presidio Press, 1980, pp. 54-68.


construction and civil engineering entities and a non-professional

workforce (new recruits and reservists). In addition, necessary

special warning systems could be purchased abroad or developed in

the country. This one-time investment in fortifications was designed

to conserve the resources employed in routine security patrols, and

primarily to conserve the two “production actors” of which acute

shortages were felt after the Six Day War, combat forces and

armored vehicles. Combat forces - the strongholds and warning

measures - made it possible to hold the line with less regular and

reserve personnel. And for the armored vehicles (engine hours,

spare parts and tracks), the strongholds helped reduce the scope of

patrols and operational movements required.

The lack of routine security resources was largely “real,” and not

merely financial. That is, because of the multiplicity of tasks imposed

on the IDF after the Six Day War, there was a severe lack of combat

forces, rather than budgetary resources. This is despite Israel

extending mandatory service to 36 months, and recruiting reservists

for 30 to 60 days a year. But many of those days were sucked into

routine security activities, thus curtailing training and exercises of

both regular and reserve units, constantly impacting the readiness

of armored vehicles and the equipment in the emergency supply

depots (while the Six Day War generated extensive operational

experience, as time passed the need to return to an investment in

training increased).

In the minutes of the General Staff meetings in the autumn of

1968, we find broad agreement that attrition warfare required

proper fortification of the existing outposts and an increase in their

number. Even Maj. Gen. Israel Tal and Maj. Gen. Ariel Sharon said

that for the purpose of the routine security patrols, “it [the

Stronghold plan] is very good,” and that “a very thorough job had

been done.”25

25 General Staff meeting, December 19, 1968, quoted in Amnon Reshef, We Will Never Cease!

The 14th Brigade in the Yom Kippur War. Dvir Publishers, 2013, pp. 33-34 [Hebrew].


In the learning processes, the Generals were dealing not only

with defense, but also with developing offensive responses to

incidents initiated by the Egyptians. In keeping with its classical

security concept, the IDF carried out retaliatory acts designed to

dissuade Nasser - shelling and destroying high value targets in the

cities near the Suez, raids and ambushes across the canal, deep raids

into the heart of Egypt and more. But the General Staff had no

illusion that these would stop the shelling, nor did it consider

increasing the artillery order of battle, nor an attempt to stop the

shelling by firing at the Egyptian batteries.

A dispute between the generals broke out concerning the

multiplicity of missions inherent in the investment in the Bar Lev

Line, missions that were designed for two substantially different

types of warfare - the ongoing limited war, which might last a long

time, and a future all-out war, in which the IDF would have to

contain the enemy using only the regular troops deployed in the

Sinai, before attacking and achieving a decisive victory with reserve

divisions.

The first round of the opposing stance taken by Tal and Sharon

dealt with these two types of combat and was heard during the

discussions immediately after the first round of shelling in

September 1968. Sharon proposed to evacuate the outposts on the

Suez and to construct a new line at a distance of 30 km to the east,

beyond the range of the Egyptian artillery. He proposed to perform

routine security activities using tanks, a minority on the bank of the

canal, and mostly in the rear at a distance of 10-20 km to the east.

Sharon would have used the infantry to only defend the

bottlenecks behind the line, at the Mitla and Gidi passes. Bar-Lev

reported Sharon's proposal to Moshe Dayan, saying that he and the

rest of the General Staff opposed it (he said Sharon was “in splendid

isolation”). Dayan accepted Bar-Lev's opinion, noting that infantry

According to Emmanuel Sakal: “The literature dealing with the debate at the General Staff on the defense system augmented the differences of opinions and underrated the agreements.” Emmanuel Sakal, Soldier in the Sinai: A General's Account of the Yom Kippur War. University Press of Kentucky, 2014, pp. 20-31.


posts on the canal were important for routine security activity,

adding that their evacuation would have “a negative demonstrative

effect.” However, he did not rule out the possibility that in an all-out

war it would be preferable to evacuate the outposts and conduct a

destructive battle using the armored divisions.26

The second stage in the dispute took place in November 1968,

after a deadly bombardment in October, when the General Staff

ordered Adan and the planning team to maintain a continuous

presence on the canal and to properly fortify the posts. At the same

time the controversy focused on the contribution of the strongholds

to preventing a crossing in an all-out war, but it also had

repercussions on defensive investment for routine security. At this

stage, Tal and Sharon praised the strongholds for their expected

contribution to routine security, but they added that they would

contribute nothing in the holding action phase of an all-out war.

They presented dangerous scenarios in which even the well-

defended strongholds would not withstand the destructive fire likely

to precede a crossing. Furthermore, they indicated that the

firepower provided by the strongholds towards the canal area would

be too weak to stop a crossing.

Bar-Lev rejected their opinion (and was joined by Adan and

Yeshayahu Gavish, head of the Southern Command) and explained

that the scenarios presented by Tal and Sharon about the

destruction of the strongholds in the initial shelling were

exaggerated. He added that stopping the crossing would be done by

tanks deployed on three lines, and fighter jets, assisted by fire from

the clusters of strongholds constructed on the six entry axes into the

Sinai. In other words, according to Bar-Lev’s concept, although the

strongholds would contribute to stopping the Egyptian crossing,

most of the work would be done by the tanks and aircraft.

26 See Reshef, We Will Never Cease! The 14th Brigade in the Yom Kippur War, Dvir Publishers,

2013. [Hebrew]


Although there was already no disagreement regarding the

benefits of well-fortified strongholds during the War of Attrition, Tal

and Sharon's opinion was that it was unnecessary to invest a lot of

money in their fortification. They claimed that for the purposes of

routine security, strongholds made up of two bunkers should suffice

(not four, as suggested by the planning team), or bunkers placed as

“rear positions” (behind, not in the front of a rampart). They also

believed that observation towers were not necessary, nor were

heavy investment in mines and fencing. Their position was that even

“thin” strongholds would meet the needs of routine security and

that large and expensive strongholds would not contribute to

preventing a crossing; that would be done by tanks placed on the

first line and those in the reserve. Tal's and Sharon's position was

supported by the Brigadier Generals, Rafael Eitan, Chief

Paratroopers Officer, Asher Levy, Head of the Southern Command

and Isaac Hofi, Deputy Chief of Operations.27

Bar-Lev rejected these objections due to a combination of

economic and operational considerations. He calculated that

constructing thin strongholds, as proposed by the objectors, would

only save a small percentage of the budget, because most of the

expenses were not directly related to the number of bunkers in a

stronghold, but to the logistics infrastructure of the strongholds,

roads to be paved, and the communications and observation

systems. Furthermore, it was important to maintain the possibility

of preparations for war, and to deploy larger infantry forces in the

posts along the line, because in his opinion the strongholds located

on the access roads into the heart of the Sinai would play an

important role - both in deterring the Egyptians and in blocking the

crossing should deterrence fail (he did not believe that the

strongholds should serve as an assembly area from which to cross

into Egypt). The intelligence assessments at the time were that, in

an all-out war, the Egyptians would seek to occupy the Sinai, at least

27 The meager and cheap strongholds, “pillboxes,” proposed by Sharon, were also rejected

because their shielding was based on pouring concrete which was impossible to construct in such a short time while under fire.


the area between the canal and the line between the Mitla and Gidi

passes. Thus, the combat outposts along the roads leading into Sinai

were designed to play an important role in its defense.

Bar-Lev's approach was practical. He believed that the

strongholds would provide a good response during the War of

Attrition and could also offer a greater range of courses of action for

Israeli troops in an all-out war. In his opinion, the strongholds would

effectively resolve the acute problem of routine security operations

and in case of an all-out war, which was not expected soon, would

likely assist the tanks and aircraft in intercepting the enemy.

Moreover, until an all-out war broke out, it would be possible to

address the vulnerabilities of the strongholds by special measures of

various kinds, and to increase their fire power.28

Bar-Lev's intellectual flexibility was especially apparent in the

middle of the War of Attrition, about six months after the

establishment of the strongholds. The Southern Command

requested to add strongholds at a distance of 1,000 meters from the

canal, to deepen the line. Bar-Lev rejected the request. He said that

depth would not serve routine security operations, nor would

additional strongholds contribute to the holding action phase in an

all-out war, depth would be provided by tanks, not by more

strongholds. One could justify the construction of more strongholds

only for observation purposes or in areas inaccessible by tanks. In

his opinion, the establishment of additional strongholds, especially

under fire, was unjustified, given the limited benefits anticipated

from them.29

There were important conclusions about the order of battle that

arose in the discussion about the defense of Sinai by the regular

forces. The new and distant frontiers of the period following the Six

Day War, and the accumulation of Egyptian divisions along the

28 The “Strongholds” file, General staff preliminary debate, November 4, 7, 1968, IDF archives

file 315-717/1977. 29 Summary of the debate of General Staff, September 19, 1969, IDF archives file 34-829/1971.


Canal, required an increase in the regular forces deployed opposite

the Egyptians. The regular armored force prior to the Six Day War

was primarily the 7th Brigade, to which were gradually added, after

the war, the 14th and 401st brigades, deployed in western Sinai. At

the outbreak of the War of Attrition, the 7th Brigade was deployed

on the Golan Heights, and the immediate reinforcement of western

Sinai with regular troops was supposed to be supplied by battalions

from the Armor School (later the 460th Brigade) which could deploy

within 12-14 hours. During the Stronghold Plan discussions, General

Tal argued that for the holding action phase, all regular tanks would

be required, about 300 in all, while the reserve tank formations

should be employed only to carry out a counteroffensive against

forces that penetrated the defensive lineups of the 14th and 401st

Brigades. Only thus would it be possible to prevent any significant

achievements by the Egyptians before the arrival of the reserve

brigades. Thus, was born, in late 1968 and early 1969, the magic

number of 300 tanks that accompanied IDF planning and war games

until the Yom Kippur War.30

3. Epilogue - The Establishment of the Bar Lev Line

At the beginning of the War of Attrition the IDF was a rapid

learning organization - finding a response to the challenges posed by

the Egyptians, while setting correct priorities, at a time when a large

gap had opened between its many considerable tasks and the

resources at its disposal. The General Staff judged correctly that an

all-out war against Egypt was not expected in the near future, and

therefore allocated considerable resources to routine security on

both fronts, while making an effort to continue training and prepare

the forces for all-out war, while minimizing wear and tear on

armaments and weapons systems. The Bar Lev stronghold line

30 See “Stronghold” file, operational debate in the Situation Room, December 19, 1968, IDF

Archive, file 560/381-73. Tal's position was only gradually accepted, because it meant shifting the 7th Armored Brigade from the North to Central Israel, and the establishment of a regular tank formation in the North, which later became the 188th division. In addition, it was necessary to add to the Armor School’s battalions a support and logistics layer which would enable them in wartime to completely operate as a brigade, and to establish a brigade emergency storage unit in Bir-el-Thamada (Sinai).


enabled the army to maintain a presence on the Suez while investing

relatively few resources. Also, the timing of the deployment on the

canal was consistent with the principle of economy of force - the line

was reinforced and fortified only after it became clear, in the fall of

1968, that the Egyptians could and wished to engage in a land grab

on the eastern bank, and that the green line deployed on the canal

was too thin.

The development of the War of Attrition, following the renewal

of the Egyptian bombardments in March 1969 until the ceasefire in

August 1970, is another fascinating example of learning

competition. The long duration of the war brought about an

intellectual and operational dynamic on both sides of the canal,

which is deserving of a broader and separate review. It is sufficient

to mention here the following stages of the war: in July 1969, the

IDF began to employ the Air Force as air artillery, after it became

clear that holding the line had become very difficult despite the

significant reinforcement of the strongholds. In the second half of

1969, the IAF systematically destroyed the Egyptian air defense

array, and gradually crushed the Egyptian artillery near the Canal,

while simultaneously conducting successful raids in Egypt.

In January 1970, Israel intensified the fighting and began

strategic bombing of the Egyptian hinterland. These were small scale

raids, but their political significance was great, because the US

opposed them and the Egyptians presented them as grounds to

deploy the Soviet Air Defense Division (advanced ground-to-air

missile units and MIG squadrons) on the Egyptian side. Following the

Soviet entry, the IDF stopped the attacks deep in Egypt, but the

rollout eastward of the Soviet-Egyptian air defense system

continued until the ceasefire. During the final stage, Israeli F-4s were

shot down by the air defense and MIGS, and Soviet pilots were shot

down by the IAF.

On August 8, 1970, both sides responded positively to the

ceasefire initiative from the American Secretary of State, William


Rogers. The night the ceasefire went into effect, the Egyptians

violated it by deploying surface-to-air missile batteries in the Canal

area. Israel decided to ignore the violation, and the US government

compensated the IDF with modern ground and air weapons.

In the War of Attrition, the IDF won the race of determination

and learning in the operational domain. “The Egyptians didn't

achieve any goal in the War of Attrition,” argued Bar-Lev as he

painted a picture of an Israeli victory. “They received neither land,

nor the political support which would have brought them the

desired result. They were forced to accept a ceasefire after

seventeen months of warfare [March 1969 to August 1970] while

Israel had achieved all its goals. It succeeded in preventing the

Egyptian goals and in ending the war with the minimum casualties.

The Egyptians wanted to push the IDF out of the Suez, but it

remained under our control.”31

However, political assessments of the situation were

problematic. Israel was mistaken in its assessment of Soviet-

Egyptian determination to act in the aftermath of the crushing of

Egypt’s air defenses and the subsequent air raids deep into Egypt.32

The government and the General Staff did not believe that the Soviet

Union would send combat troops (as opposed to advisors) to Egypt,

which would not hesitate to clash with the Israel Air Force and

neutralize its capabilities. This mistaken assessment stemmed from

there being no precedent of the Soviets employing forces outside of

the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Israel discovered that what the

31 Haim Bar-Lev, “The War and Its Goals in Light of the IDF’s Wars,” Ma’arachot. No. 266,

November 1978 [Hebrew]. These are the remarks that Bar-Lev made to students at the Staff and Command College, 1978. Gen. Tal saw things differently, arguing that in the War of Attrition the ground forces failed to cope with the Egyptian army, and thus the Air Force was called upon to come to their aid. He claimed that the result of this “original sin” was the establishment of a heavy Air Defense Command by the Egyptians, which wore down the IAF at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War. Israel Tal. National Security: The Israeli Experience. Praeger Security International, 2000, pp. 173-180.

32 Dima Adamsky. Operation Caucasus - The Soviet Involvement and the Israeli Surprise in the War of Attrition. Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot Press and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, 2006, pp. 34-47 [Hebrew]. The research shows that the Soviet decision to intervene had already been taken by the end of 1969, before the bombing raids deep in Egypt which began in January 1970.


Soviet Union was unwilling to do in Korea and North Vietnam against

American attacks, it was ready to do in Egypt in response to Israeli

raids. This mistaken political assessment did not bring Israel to the

brink of the abyss, for, as pointed out by Bar-Lev, the IDF succeded

in wearing down the Egyptians, and in August 1970 a ceasefire

agreement was signed when both sides were well exhausted and

after the Soviet Union and the United States applied pressure on its

own ally to agree to a ceasefire.

However, it appears that during the ceasefire period until the

outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, the learning competition favored

the Egyptian side, which derived the strategic, operational and

tactical lessons from the War of Attrition and was properly prepared

for the 1973 War, in comparison to the IDF, which increased and

improved its order of battle, but did not do its homework properly.

Maj. Gen. Amnon Reshef described the IDF planning deadlock.

“The only obvious conclusion is that the operational orders

'Dovecote' and 'Rock' were not defensive plans in the deep and

broad meaning of an operational plan,” he lamented. “These were

vague orders, shallow and lacking in real content. They lacked the

basic elements that constitute an integral part of a defensive plan.

The enemy's modus operandi was known and clear, and against this

background, the plans did not include a thorough professional

analysis of the combat zone, and consequently no 'critical areas,'

'key terrain,' 'kill zones,' etc., were defined. They had no depth, to

allow management of the defense. They did not have any definition

of what the 'end state' is. There was no counterattack plan, and

worst of all - they were not practical!”33

Some believe that Reshef's judgment, which represented the

opinion of many, was overly harsh, and that the main reasons for

the failures in the Sinai at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War are

different (the intelligence failure and surprise, the Air Force

problem, structure of the order of battle, the functioning of senior

33 Reshef, We Will Never Cease! - The 14th Brigade in the Yom Kippur War, p. 56.


commanders, the scope of the deployed forces). Between the end

of the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War three whole years

passed, a period long enough to properly re-examine the Sinai

defensive plans for an all-out war, and to detach oneself from

concepts intended for a limited war. In particular, it was important

to reexamine the detailed plan for the holding action phase by

regular units, which was not done properly, as noted by the Agranat

Commission and by many thereafter.

4. What can we learn?

The first lesson is positive: The General Staff determined the

correct priorities during a very tense period, and quickly formulated

and implemented the Stronghold Plan. Following the Six Day War, a

new kind of situation was created, requiring the IDF to engage in

attrition warfare on two fronts, while preparing for all-out war of a

new kind (new from temporal and spatial considerations, and

political restrictions).

Based on this description, Chief of Staff Bar-Lev's priorities were

correct. His first priority was routine security at the Suez, and under

his leadership a fortified line was established, within a surprisingly

short time, providing reasonable protection to the troops and

deterring the Egyptians from attempting to take over outposts on

the eastern bank of the canal. The new deployment included, in

addition to the strongholds and the infrastructure, the

establishment and deployment of regular forces in western Sinai, at

a level appropriate to the new situation.

At the same time, he made sure to improve preparations for an

all-out war: To pursue training and exercises, to increase the order

of battle, to develop and improve weapons systems, to develop new

combat tactics (for water crossings, covering fire and deep

incursions, and even protection from non-conventional weapons).

All of these issues cannot be produced with a stroke of a pen. Bar-

Lev saw the stronghold line as a dual-purpose system, necessary for

attrition and useful in an all-out war. He did not accept Sharon and

Tal's views that the strongholds would not contribute to holding the


enemy, arguing that a proper deployment, integrating mobile

armored forces, fighter jets and infantry in the strongholds, would

definitely thwart an Egyptian attempt to cross the canal.

IDF plans and exercises indeed focused on crossing the canal

into Egypt and subduing its army west of it. But Bar-Lev and Adan

are entitled to the benefit of the doubt, assuming that the neglect

of defensive plans at the time expressed primarily an assumption

that an all-out war was not expected in the near future (it is hard to

argue that neither general understood the benefits of a mobile

defense). According to this hypothesis, the critical defensive needs

during the War of Attrition focused the General Staff's attention on

the establishment of the Bar Lev Line and its employment in deep

raids (and from July 1969 employment of the air force), while

delaying the preparation of detailed plans for the employment of

the line during an all-out war. This hypothesis facilitates a

rationalization for why detailed plans for an all-out war were not

prepared until August 1970, although it cannot explain why these

were not prepared in the three years until the outbreak of the Yom

Kippur War.34

This criticism is intensified due to the fact that the IDF was well

prepared materially for an all-out war. The order of battle had grown

tremendously, the troops were properly trained and weapons were

34 See the description of the war games “Strike” in January 1971 and “Battering Ram,” July -

August 1972 and the “Dovecote” and “Rock” plans, in Reshef, We Will Never Cease! - The 14th Brigade in the Yom Kippur War, pp. 62, 74; Sakal: Soldier in the Sinai: A General's Account of the Yom Kippur War, pp. 54-78. Meir Finkel researched in depth the harmful impact of combat patterns learnt during routine security operations on capabilities for an all-out war, and concluded that as far as combat training and increasing and improving the order of battle “routine security activities [after the Six Day War] did not influence the preparations for [all-out] war.” However, he too (like the Agranat Commission and many others) indicates a doctrinal regression as a factor affecting the functioning of the IDF in the Yom Kippur War. See Meir Finkel, “The Tension Between Success in Routine Security Operations and the Risk of Assuming them to be War Capabilities” in Meir Finkel, Challenges and Tensions in Force Generation. Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 2013, pp. 79-98 [Hebrew]. Note that in the three years prior to the Yom Kippur War, Israel enjoyed “quiet” (relatively), on both the Eastern and Western fronts, and routine security operations did not dominate the General Staff’s focus.


substantially improved, mainly due to the US “compensation” to

Israel following the forward deployment of Egyptian air defenses.

The only thing missing was a doctrinal effort to reexamine the

defensive plans and adapt them to the new Egyptian warfare

doctrine, especially in anti-tank and air defense - an effort that

wouldn’t have cost money and was not limited by political,

economic or other constraints.

The second lesson relates to the need to periodically challenge

conventions and to discover whether there is still a need for

investments previously made in systems and doctrines. The painful

issue of the fighting on and around the strongholds at the beginning

of the Yom Kippur War is testimony to that. Many see this issue as

one of the major failures of the war, and there is a systematic

intellectual bias that could lead to similar failures in the future.35

Experience in many fields suggests that the human psyche has

difficulty moving on from sunk costs, because in doing so there is a

certain admission of past mistakes and despair that the investment

will never justify itself. In the military world, an argument is

occasionally heard that “it is unthinkable to withdraw from an area

whose occupation cost so much blood” (for example, the Gallipoli

Peninsula in World War I). Similarly, investors are often hesitant to

sell a stock which was purchased for a lot of money, even though the

company is in deep trouble.36

The strongholds functioned well during the War of Attrition, and

immediately after the ceasefire large sums were invested in

preparing them to withstand renewed shelling. The attrition did not

resume, but prior to 1973, fears of an all-out war increased. How

should the operational plans have been updated after August 1970,

and especially after the clouds of war gathered over the Sinai?

35 Sakal dedicated a substantial part of his study to “the contribution” of the strongholds to

the erosion of most of the 252nd Division in the first days of the war: Soldier in the Sinai: A General's Account of the Yom Kippur War, pp. 169-175.


In a 2013 article, Brig.-Gen. (res.) Dr. Meir Finkel describes the

contrasting defensive plans of Sharon and Gonen and highlighted

the unfortunate timing, with the Egyptians catching the IDF

dithering between the different plans in 1973. Finkel also proposed

lessons to be learned from such situations. In his opinion, an

alternative plan to “Dovecote” should have been formulated and

exercised, because the friction with an alternative plan would have

created insights about points of failure inherent in the existing

operational concept.37

Therefore, it is possible that serious friction with alternative

plans of various kinds would have emphasized the gap between the

existing plans and the air force's ability to participate in repelling the

Egyptian crossing, as well as emphasizing other failures which were

exposed during the Yom Kippur War.

This approach would have also generated friction with the

holding action plans that presumed there would be no combat

strongholds, only those used for observation and warning. This

would have been in effect a conceptual write-off of the investment

in the strongholds, and a drafting of an alternative defense plan.

The third lesson concerns the human tendency to rest on ones’

laurels after a substantial achievement, which can be dangerous in

the multi-round wars waged by Israel (and the Jewish population in

Mandatory Palestine before that) against Arab forces for more than

a hundred years.

The classic security concept holds that in the absence of a

political settlement a round of war is to be expected periodically.

The period leading up to the Yom Kippur War proved that one should

not rest between rounds, even if we believe that we were victorious

in an important round. The IDF won the War of Attrition due to rapid

and effective learning, but was not sufficiently prepared for the next

37 “The outbreak of war during a conceptual disagreement,” wrote Finkel in “Challenges and Tensions in Force Generation,” p. 178.


round (with the exception of the Navy), while the Egyptians did

wonders in their preparations for the Ramadan War.

The incident is underscores two important truths. First, one has

to assume that the enemy will learn, therefore the IDF must too.

Second, victory in a specific round does not guarantee a victory in

the next one. This was true when the IDF fought the Arab armies,

and is no less true in the warfare against the Hamas and Hezbollah.

This might seem obvious, not to mention trivial, but perhaps

because of this, there is a tendency to forget the lesson.

The fourth lesson is also not new - never underestimate the

enemy. Throughout the War of Attrition and in the period after, IDF

senior officers regularly dismissed Arab armies in meetings,

debriefings, lectures and reports to the Government. There is not

enough space here to describe all of these, but it is enough to say

that there was overwhelming consensus regarding the inferiority of

the Arab armies. Even Bar-Lev and Gen. Aharon Yariv, Head of

Military Intelligence, who were generally cool-headed, joined in.

Plans to defend Sinai, approved after the Six Day War, during the

War of Attrition and afterwards, were all based on the presumed

pitiful state of the Egyptian army and the superiority of the IDF, both

during the holding action phase and in counterattacking. Therefore,

a significant portion of the criticism of the IDF concerns the result of

this contempt for the enemy from which many planning failures

issued.

Although IDF learning patterns following the Six Day War and

during the first stage of the War of Attrition were prompt and

effective, subsequent events raise questions about the political-

military strategy that escalated the fighting from July 1969 to August

1970, and much more about what happened in the three years

between the ceasefire and the Yom Kippur War. These important

questions are unresolved to this day.


Conclusion

Two events of different types were described above. But

they have much in common as both deal with the IDF responses to

a substantial change of circumstances, requiring a greater

investment in defensive measures, in addition to the reinforcement

of offensive capabilities. The lack of a satisfying offensive response

to the increasing threat of the Arab air forces in the early 1960s, and

the political directives and military thinking that bound the IDF to

the Suez Canal during the War of Attrition, required creative learning

and a search for solutions which deviated from the classical

offensive security concept.

Decisions in both events were affected by a complex web of

political, operational-economic, organizational and personal

considerations, and in hindsight we may say that these were good

decisions.

In purchasing surface-to-air missiles, military

professionalism carried the day. Determined chiefs of staff, backed

up by staff work, overwhelmed the parochial interests of the IAF

chief, while contributing to the effort to convert the United States

into an important weapons supplier. The chiefs of staff were aided

by the prime minister and foreign minister, who saw political

advantages in purchasing a modern weapons system from the

United States.

The establishment of the Bar Lev Line is harder to evaluate,

largely because of the link between the War of Attrition and the Yom

Kippur War. The historiography of both wars - from the 1974

Agranat Commission report, to Amnon Reshef's 2013 book -

analyzed the establishment of the Bar Lev Line in hindsight, in the

wake of the Yom Kippur War, and a large part of it was written by

those who managed the war or commanded troops, or were

otherwise linked to it. This work is not intended to deal with the

important question of the strongholds’ contribution to the crisis of

the early days of the Yom Kippur War, or whether it was possible to


more effectively plan the defense of the Sinai against an Egyptian

offensive. It is sufficient here to conclude that the Bar Lev Line was

an effective solution in the War of Attrition, and that from the war’s

end to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, there was more than

enough time to properly plan the defense of the Sinai in an all-out

war, based on a realistic estimate of the strengths and weaknesses

of the strongholds, and of the enemy’s plans and capabilities.


Bibliography • Adamsky, Dima. Operation Caucasus - The Soviet Involvement and the

Israeli Surprise in the War of Attrition. Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot Press and

the Israeli Ministry of Defense, 5766-2006. [Hebrew]

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Account of the Yom Kippur War. Jerusalem: Presideo Press, 1980.

• Arbel, David and Uri Neeman. Unforgivable Delusion. Tel Aviv: Yediot

Ahronot, 2005. [Hebrew]

• Bronfeld, Saul. From A-4 to F-4: The Beginning of an Aviational

Friendship. Fisher Institute of Strategic Air and Space Research, 2011.

[Hebrew]

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[Hebrew]

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Missiles Were Acquired,” in Lachish Ze'ev and Amitai, Meir (eds). Non-

Peaceful Decade: Chapters in the History of the Air Force, 1956-1967.

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Operations and the Risk of Assuming Them to Be War Capabilities,” in

Finkel, Meir. Challenges and Tensions in Force Generation. Tel Aviv:

Ma’arachot, 2013. [Hebrew]

• Finkel, Meir. “The Outbreak of War During a Conceptual

Disagreement,” in Finkel, Meir. Challenges and Tensions in Force

Generation. Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 2013. [Hebrew]

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Military Intelligence. Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot and Hemed books, 2013.

[Hebrew]

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War to War. Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense, 1997. [Hebrew]

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University Press, 2002.


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Ma’arachot, February 2013. [Hebrew]

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Kippur War. University Press of Kentucky, 2014.

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o The “Stronghold” file, General Staff preliminary discussion, 4 and 7 in

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case IDF archives 34-829/1971.

o “Stronghold” file, operational debate in the situation room, December

19, 1968, M"A 381-73/560.

The Last Missile War? The Influence of the “Iron Dome” on the

Operational Concepts of Hamas, Hezbollah and the IDF

Dana Preisler-Swery

Introduction The first operational uses of the Iron Dome system during

Operation Pillar of Defense (OPD) in 2012 and more intensively

during Operation Protective Edge (OPE) in 2014, established the

IDF’s missile defense capability1 as equal to and even better than

other military capabilities. This is evident in the budget allocated to

the system and in the personnel assigned to it. In addition, the high

regard in which decision-makers and the public hold this capability

has significantly influenced the Israeli security concept and the IDF

operational concept.

Meanwhile, Israeli missile defense capabilities have led to

changes in the operational and force design concepts of Israel's

adversaries, who saw their strategic missile capabilities contained

and their expected achievements from striking the Israeli home front

fail to materialize.

In response, Israel’s opponents are racing to adapt to Israel's

defensive capabilities both during and between operations. They

study the defensive systems, try to identify vulnerabilities and strive

to bypass and penetrate them.

Consequently, a ballistic arms race2 is evolving between the

Israel and its rivals, which presents threats alongside opportunities.

1 Missile warfare against Israel includes steep trajectory weapons of the rocket type (no

guidance system), and missiles (rocket propulsion capability with a guidance system allowing precise targeting). Missile defense includes defense against short, medium, and long-range rockets and missiles. Air Defense is defense against enemy aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, etc.

2 “Ballistic arms race” - both sides are developing missile capabilities, the one offensive, the other defensive (interception). Either way, it appears that no missile defense capabilities will put an end to the missile warfare between Israel and its enemies anytime soon, but rather will bring about its continuation and refinement.


Most of the threats arise from the development of a destructive

arms race, in which Israel would continue developing missile

defenses, and its opponents would successfully develop more

precise and lethal offensive capabilities. Such a reality could

undermine Israeli deterrence, force it to invest in expensive defense

systems, while continuing to erode the “decisive victory” (hachra'a)

pillar of IDF strategy. At the same time, a continuation of the arms

race will encourage the other side to adopt new ‘combat capabilities’

in order to bypass Israeli defensive capabilities.

Nevertheless, a reality in which a ballistic arms race takes

place has an inherent opportunity - the possibility of bringing both

sides to an understanding about limiting the missile arms race, a

reality in which both sides can inflict enormous damage on one

another. An all-out missile war scenario, where the expected gains

for both sides dwindle, could also encourage restraint, promote rules

of the game in missile warfare and even prevent such conflicts in the

future.

This article will examine the impact of Israel's ability to

defend itself from missiles on the operational concepts and force

design of Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as the IDF’s operational

concept, with the assumption that it is possible to exploit the

contemporary ballistic arms race to promote understandings and

rules of the game between Israel and its key rivals.

Background

The subject of defense has gained momentum in Israel in

recent years, since being institutionalized in 2006 with the

publication of the report of the Committee on Israel's Defense

Doctrine, a civil-military project headed by former minister Dan

Meridor and submitted to defense minister Shaul Mofaz. In the

report, defense was defined as the fourth pillar of Israel’s security

concept, alongside the traditional and familiar pillars: deterrence,

early warning and decisive defeat of the enemy (hachra'a).

However, it seems that the Meridor Committee only

institutionalized a reality that already existed in Israel for many

years. It began with the First Gulf War (1991) and the damage

PREISLER-SWERY | THE LAST MISSILE WAR? | 51

inflicted on the home front; continued with the establishment of the

Home Front Command (1992) and with the development of

defensive military concepts spearheaded by the development of the

Arrow anti-missile system, the construction of the West Bank

security fence, the development of the Iron Dome and Magic Wand

- David’s Sling, and the institutionalization of the IDF Air Defense

Division.

The Second Lebanon War (2006) and the intensified rocket

fire after the disengagement from the Gaza Strip brought the

security establishment in Israel, led at the time by Defense Minister

Amir Peretz, to promote the development of the Iron Dome system

as part of a home front defense concept against short-range rockets.

Currently, the lineup also includes the Magic Wand against medium-

range missiles (not yet in use) and the Arrow system against long-

range and non-conventional missiles.

The development of the Iron Dome system began at Rafael

and MAFAT (the Administration for the Development of Weapons

and Technological Infrastructure) and gained the support of defense

ministers Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. This occurred over the IDF's

objections to the process, which stemmed from the fear that

defensive force design might come at the expense of critical

offensive elements. However, the decision of then-defense minister

Ehud Barak to increase the number of batteries and interceptors in

the system transformed the missile defense system into a fait

accompli and a strategic-operational capability for Israel.

The Iron Dome system was first deployed some months

before Operation Pillar of Defense and its first operational use

occurred during that operation. During Operation Protective Edge

the system was already fully operational with an intercept rate of

approximately 90 percent.3

3 Yoav Zeytun, “IDF: Iron Dome Intercepted 90% of Rockets,” Ynet, August 13, 2014.


Image 1: Iron Dome launcher4

The Development of the Missile Defense Concept, From the Cold

War to the Present

Missile defense capabilities (BMD - Ballistic Missile Defense)

were first developed in the early 1970s, but in the reality of the Cold

War and the nuclear arms race, the world powers signed an

agreement to refrain from using such systems on the battlefield

(ABM treaties, 1972). They reasoned that the ability to intercept

nuclear weapons would undermine nuclear stability, which was

based on the mutually assured destructive capability of both world

powers.5

4 Photography: Nehemia Gershoni, Cc-by-sa-3.0. 5 The ABM treaty was signed in 1972 between the United States and the Soviet Union, and

limited both states from developing missile defense systems (limiting the number of systems and interceptors), in order to stop the arms race and to avoid a first strike, in the reality of


In the early 1980s, the US promoted the Strategic Defense

Initiative, also known as “Star Wars.” The initiative was supposed to

provide missile defense capabilities in the air and space as part of

the confrontation between the Western and Eastern blocs. It never

reached operational feasibility, but its importance was in identifying

the economic and technological weaknesses of the Soviet Union,

while integrating many psychological warfare elements.6

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s,

the United States began developing a global defense program, based

on parts of Star Wars, mainly as a response to the North Korean

threat (US Global Missile Defense). In addition, the United States

supported the Israeli Arrow venture, which began to take shape after

the First Gulf War with the increased missile threat to the Israeli

home front.

In 2002, President Bush decided that the United States

would unilaterally withdraw from the ABM agreements. This was

due to a new national security concept that did not see Russia as the

main threat, but rather rogue countries and terrorist organizations,

and the risk of them acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The

new American concept argued that it was impossible to deter such

enemies, only to attack or defend against them. President Bush's

decision led to the collapse of the concept that attempted to prevent

the development of missile defense capabilities, which was based on

the assumption that these capabilities would harm global stability.7

In 2010, NATO decided to join the US anti-missile initiative,

changing the rules of the game that had been shaped in Europe in

the Cold War, which was based on nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction - MAD. (www.state.gov).

6 SDI influences on the Soviet Union are questionable. Some in the USSR doubted the credibility of the initiative, others saw it as an attempt to destroy the economy of the Soviet Union. Some understood it as a learning competition, even supporting the development of asymmetric responses to it. The initiative, as noted, was finally cancelled due to American economic reasons, and due to the waning of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

7 Russia objected to Bush’s decision, regarding it as harmful to its national security, its deterrence and its relations with the USA. At the same time, Russia began developing missile defense capabilities of its own. Avnish Patel. “NATO's New Strategic Concept and Missile Defense,” RUSI Analysis, 2/11/2012 (www.rusi.org).

http://www.state.gov/

http://www.rusi.org/


the context of a nuclear deterrent without missile defense

capabilities. Russia, which had also developed missile defense

capabilities, saw the decision as a direct threat to its deterrence and

to stability in Europe. According to the plan, European and Russian

defense systems were expected to follow the principles of

transparency and reporting, but this collaboration did not actually

take place. In the background, states like China, Japan, South Korea,

India, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are each in different stages of

development, acquisition or upgrading of missile defense

capabilities.8

As a result of the spread of missile defense systems around

the world, there has also been conceptual development. At the

international level, there is a linkage between missile defense

systems, stability and deterrence. In the US, missile defense

capabilities are regarded as a core element of power-projection,

defending friends and strategic deterrence, in addition to their use

to protect combat troops and national strategic sites. The main

conceptual development can be summarized as a transition from the

“deterrence without defense” model (the Cold War), to a “defense

without deterrence” model (Star Wars), and finally to the current

model of “deterrence and defense” (deterrence strategies include a

reliance on missile defense systems).9

In the background, there is also apprehension over the

dispersal of accurate and sophisticated surface-to-surface missile,

drones and unconventional weapons to terrorist organizations and

rogue states. This reality that threatens the civilian home front in

many countries and freedom of action of American forces in

particular. There is also an effort to prevent the distribution of

surface-to-surface missiles, which includes advocacy, denunciation

and arms control initiatives (ACI).

8 American Missile Defense Agency website: www.mda.mil. 9 Address by Paul Schulte, “Conceptual Approaches: The Defense, Deterrence, Disarmament

Triangle” at the “Missile Defense: Asset or Liability for Regional and International Stability Conference”, INSS, January 15, 2014; “Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020,” US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

http://www.mda.mil/


The worldwide ballistic arms race has created two parallel

reactions. There is an attempt to prevent the proliferation of missiles

and encourage the dismantling of non-conventional capabilities, as

well as an understanding that in the current reality there is no escape

from equipping oneself with defensive systems against such

threats.10

The Israeli Missile Defense Perspective

The experience accumulated during and after OPD - and all

the more so during OPE- as well as the technological advances in

missile defense capabilities, including the integration of the various

systems, turned the Israel Air Force’s (IAF) Air Defense Division into

a key player. The division's responsibility is to provide a defensive

response, multi-tiered and multi-dimensional, for detecting,

identifying and intercepting threats against Israel’s territory and its

territorial waters.

It should be noted that the IDF's response to the missile

threat does not include the interception phase only. Active defense

is only one phase among many, centering on deterring enemy missile

attacks, capabilities to attack launch systems and to thwart the

enemy’s force design, an effective warning and detection system,

including classification of threats and point of impact evaluation, and

a variety of defense, rescue and reconstruction measures.

Underlying this array sits the assumption that since the volume of

missiles threatening the Israeli home front will always be greater

than the number of interceptors, the system should function by

classifying threat levels, defense priorities and red lines.11

10 Emily Landau and Azriel Bermant. “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program: Caught Between Missile

Defense and a Comprehensive Deal,” INSS Insight, No. 558 (June 8, 2014); Michael T Flynn, James Sisco and David C. Ellis, “Left of Bang - The Value of Socio Cultural Analysis in Today's Environment,” Prism, Vol. 3, No. 4.

11 Doron Gavish, “Aerial Defense Array: From a Tactical Force to a National Strategic Array,”

Ma’arachot 444, August 2012.


The Relationship Between Missile Defense and the Other Security

Concept Components: Deterrence, Detection and Decisive Defeat

The Israeli missile defense array was developed gradually,

and the pace of technological progress often overtook Israel’s ability

to formulate a concept anchoring the role of missile defense as a key

pillar of the national security concept. Furthermore, it is necessary

to clarify the interactions between the missile defense pillar and the

concept’s other pillars, and whether the defensive pillar affects or

alters the other pillars, particularly deterrence and early warning.

First, regarding deterrence, a multi-year debate took place

about whether missile defense capabilities would contribute or

harm it. Opponents argued that defensive capabilities encourage the

breaking of red lines, and in a reality where the number of

interceptors is always smaller than the number of missiles, there is

neither absolute defense nor stability, only an incentive to launch

more missiles in an attempt to penetrate the defensive system.12

Supporters argued that in a reality of missile proliferation,

terror organizations and instability, a missile defense system is a

necessity. This argument was augmented by the assertion that

interception is cost effective (compared to the damage caused by a

missile), and particularly by the assumption that defensive

capabilities would become an important component of the state’s

strategic deterrence and contribute to its technological superiority

and regional status. This debate is now resolved and the very

existence of a defensive capability projects a message to adversaries

that the expected gains from firing missiles are bound to decline,

diverting their future efforts from missiles to other channels that

Israel may find more comfortable to deal with.13

Second, detection underwent modifications as well after the

acquisition of missile defense capabilities. If, in the past, detection

relied on the need to identify enemy intentions, in the current

reality, missile defense contributes to a tactical warning, but with

12 Reuven Pedatzur, “The Fallibility of Iron Dome Missile Defense," Haaretz, November 10,

2013. 13 For further discussion of the topic, see another article in this issue: Finkel, “Active Defense

as the Fourth Pillar of the Security Concept.”


similar strategic significance. The advanced detection and

identification capabilities of missile defense systems allow

interception, and provide the critical time needed for civil defense.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, a heated debate arose

in the IDF regarding the decisive defeat pillar, or hachra'a. On the

one hand, missile defense is supposed to support the offensive

military effort, protecting the military and the civilian rear (partially,

or fully, depending on the scenario) and providing latitude for

decision makers in Israel. On the other hand, a concern arises that

the very existence of missile defense capabilities would negate the

legitimacy of launching an offensive, the will to engage in an

offensive, the conservation of resources and the force design needed

for it.

Hence, missile defense capabilities which are supposed to

discourage the opponent also deter the party that possesses them.

As the scope of defensive systems grows - in research, development,

workforce, budgetary investment and their use in practice - other

military capabilities are affected (consciously or unconsciously).

Previous experience shows that a lack of balance between defensive

and offensive components can lead to strategic failures. This is what

happened with the Great Wall of China, the Maginot Line, the Hawk

transaction and the establishment of the Bar Lev Line in the period

preceding the Yom Kippur War. These cases show that defensive

capabilities do not prevent the opponent from trying to break

through the protective walls, while armies and states that heavily

rely on defensive capabilities usually tend to adopt a dichotomous

viewpoint that separates defense from offense in force employment,

and find it difficult to combine the two.14

The Enemy Ballistics “Muqawamah” (Resistance Doctrine)15

Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria and Iran were the primary actors

with which Israel's missile defense was designed to engage. These

14 Saul Bronfeld, “Defense - The Other Side of Mars,” in the present issue. 15 Yossi Beidatz and Dima Adamsky, “The Evolution of the Israeli Approach to Deterrence - A

Critical Discussion of the Theoretical and Practical Aspects.” Eshtonot. No. 8. The Research Center of the National Defense Colpillare (Tishrei, 5775 - October 2014). [Hebrew]


agents represent the most tangible threats to the Israeli home front

in terms of capabilities and scope, and have actually used them

against Israel.

At the head of the rival camp stands Iran, which became the

regional ballistic production facility, providing rockets, missiles and

launchers to its clients, Hezbollah and the Assad regime in Syria.

Over the years, Iran has also transferred significant quantities of

weaponry to armed groups in Gaza, primarily Hamas and Palestinian

Islamic Jihad (PIJ). This process was part of an Iranian attempt to

encircle Israel with hostile entities that would attack it and damage

its home front when the need arose.16

The shift to the use of missiles against Israel began in the last

few decades, following the superiority displayed by Israel in

conventional confrontations with Arab States between 1956 and

1982, and the corresponding military technological gap that opened.

In response, Israel's adversaries chose to adopt asymmetric

capabilities, using terror organizations and guerrilla warfare. Since

the mid-1990s the availability of technology and Iranian sponsorship

allowed Hamas and Hezbollah to develop cheap and simple aerial

capabilities with the potential to harm the Israeli home front, first in

the form of rockets and later advanced missiles currently in the

hands of Hezbollah.17

Changes in Hezbollah’s Operational Concept

Hezbollah has been threatening Israel since the late 1980s.

Sponsored by Iran, the organization acted against the IDF presence

in South Lebanon and as part of the international terror arm of Iran.

The withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon (2000) and the criticism of

Iran in the wake of the terror attacks in which it was involved, forced

the organization to develop new capabilities to allow it to continue

challenging Israel. In the years preceding the Second Lebanon War,

16 Roi Kais, “Hezbollah Shows Off Its Tunnels, Claims It Is Prepared for War with Israel,” Ynet,

May 22, 2015; Roi Kais, “Iran Exposed Cruise Missiles and an American UAV Model,” Ynet, May 11, 2014. [Hebrew]

17 Itai Brun and Carmit Valensi. “The Revolution in the Military Affairs of the Radical Axis,” Ma’arachot. No. 432 (Sivan 5771-June 2010). [Hebrew].


Hezbollah built up an impressive military capability, including a large

rocket array. These were fired at the Israeli home front, causing

considerable damage and providing Hezbollah with important

propaganda achievements during the war.18

After the Second Lebanon War, under the cover of the quiet

prevailing on the northern border and influenced by Israeli

deterrence, Hezbollah built an array of rockets, missiles and UAVs

that were dramatically larger than before, in size, quality and variety.

As of today, Hezbollah possesses approximately 100,000 short,

medium and long-range rockets, precision missiles, shore-to-sea

missiles and advanced UAVs.19

In recent years, the organization has developed a new

operational concept, influenced by its accumulated fire capabilities

and the combat experience in Syria. The principles of the concept

are a transition from attrition to a proactive concept in order to

conduct a short and intensive conflict with Israel, made possible by

the organization's rocket and missile arrays, which can strike a

painful blow at the Israeli home front. At the same time a new

ground warfare concept was developed, which includes attack

tunnels to enable command and control, combat and incursions into

Israeli territory in order to “conquer the Galilee.” The organization is

relying on the expected backing of President Assad, rooted in their

cooperation in the fighting in Syria. All of these are supplemented by

the learning ability of the organization, which has been watching the

confrontations between the Hamas and Israel and reached its own

conclusions regarding how to deal with the Iron Dome system.20

18 An expression of the operational concept against the Israeli home front can be found in the

“Spiders Web Speech,” delivered by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Bint Jbeil, Lebanon, May 26, 2000. For more about the “Ballistic Muqawamah,” see Yossi Beidatz and Dima Adamsky, op.cit. p. 19.

19 Yossi Yehoshua. “A Ticking Bomb Awaits Israel on Its Northern Border,” Ynet. April 26, 2015. 20 Yagil Henkin, “And what if we did not deter Hezbollah?” Military and Strategic Affairs, INSS.

Vol. 6, No. 3 (5775 - December 2014); Lieutenant Colonel N., “The Third Lebanon War,” Ma’arachot, December 2014.


Changes in Hamas’ Operational Concept

Significant rocket capabilities also exist in the Gaza Strip, in

the hands of Hamas and PIJ. They are rooted in the Second Intifada

and the shift from suicide bombings to rockets. The increased

difficulty in continuing to carry out suicide bombings inside Israel led

Hamas and PIJ officials to develop an independent rocket wing. The

“sporadic” Qassam rocket fire from the Gaza Strip in the early 2000s,

became a genuine ballistic branch, with its own production

capabilities, and with Iranian assistance, through which Hamas and

PIJ initially managed to disrupt the lives of residents in the area

around the Gaza Strip and later to threaten almost all of Israel’s

territory. Rocket fire from Gaza has to date led to three military

operations: Cast Lead (2008), Pillar of Defense (2012), and Protective

Edge (2014), and many rounds of fighting in between.

Hamas, like Hezbollah, adopted a proactive approach based

on the rocket arrays it had accumulated, and used this approach at

the beginning of OPE. The operational concept of the organization

was not greatly influenced by the Israeli defense capability, and its

goal remained to disrupt life on the Israeli home front, which it

managed to do, despite the presence of the Iron Dome system. The

experience gained by the organization in dealing with the Iron Dome

was reflected in adjustments made to its rocket array and the way it

was employed during the operation, while in parallel to the rocket

arm, the primary effort was invested in the further development of

additional capabilities, in particular in the underground realm,

special commando units and a UAV array.

Following OPE, Hamas began to restock its rocket array,

including mortars, short and medium range rockets, and some

unmanned aerial vehicles alongside the capability to launch large

salvos.21

21 Elior Levy. “Hamas Military Chief Deif is Alive, Laying Groundwork for Next War with Israel,”

Ynet, April 29, 2015; Gabi Siboni, “Military Lessons for Hamas from Operation Protective Edge,” INSS Insight, No. 700 (Sivan 5775-May 2015).


Image 2: Qassam rocket launchers

The Influence of the Iron Dome System on the Operational

Concepts of Hamas and Hezbollah: Efforts in the Operational

Concept and Force Design Domain

The experience gained by Hamas in OPD and OPE vis-à-vis

the Iron Dome system, led it to draw conclusions and to engage in a

two-phase learning process. In the first phase, which took place

during the operations themselves, the organization adjusted quickly

to Iron Dome. In the second, a parallel learning process took place in

both Hamas and Hezbollah which was reflected in changes to their

operational concepts and future force design channels. It should be

noted that Hezbollah, while it has not yet faced the Iron Dome in

direct combat, is learning and drawing conclusions from the

successes and failures of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, by virtue of its

observation capabilities, and the many resources at its disposal.22

22 On Hezbollah's learning from Operation “Protective Edge” see Hassan Nasrallah's

statement: “ ‘We have the capability to strike anywhere in Israel…’ Nasrallah continued to threaten that Israel would be cut off from the world, and Hezbollah would paralyze Ben-

Gurion Airport and all of Israel’s maritime ports” (IDF Army Radio website, November 4,


Hamas attempted to cope with Israeli defensive systems

primarily through saturation attempts. Saturation of the system was

mainly attempted by launching dozens of rockets from multiple

locations toward one target, or by launching from one location to

several targets.

Furthermore, it is possible to identify Hamas attempts to

locate gaps in the defensive array, seen in mortar fire at targets near

the border. It also seems that some of the fire was meant to achieve

psychological warfare goals, especially the salvos launched by Hamas

in the evening, during the main news broadcasts, which were even

announced in advance. Furthermore, during OPE, Hamas first

introduced additional strategic capabilities it had acquired, featuring

the extensive use of the underground realm, land and naval

commando forces, a concept of launching raids into Israeli territory,

and the use of UAVs, thus achieving important propaganda effect.

In the force design field, it seems that the most important

revolution that the other side is undergoing (particularly Hezbollah

at this stage) is the transition to precision fires. Previously, Israel did

not face precision missiles that could accurately strike military and

civilian targets and the defensive systems themselves. Despite the

great challenge posed by precision capabilities, it is likely that the

extent of the barrages will decrease due to cost considerations and

to the accuracy which obviates the need to fire large salvos.23

As for future force design, it is not clear whether Israel's

adversaries, mainly Iran, see the missile defense systems as a real

threat. Iranian threat analyses do not focus exclusively on Israel, but

also on the American presence in the region and American defensive

systems in the Persian Gulf. Facing these threats, Iran continues to

research and develop missiles in order to enlarge its missile array and

2011). We are likely to see substantial changes in operational concepts only in an all-out missile war between Israel and Hezbollah. However, we already can see changes in both the operational concept and force design plans of Israel’s enemies. It is known that Hezbollah is learning a lot from the Hamas's experience in recent clashes with the IDF, as well learning from its mistakes. See also Siboni, Ibid.

23 Haim Rosenberg, “The Truth about the Missile Threat,” Ma’arachot, No. 437 (Sivan 5771- June 2011). [Hebrew]


to achieve cruise, homing, stealth and maneuver capabilities,

alongside the development of a satellite array and UAVs.24

Arms Race - The Gap and the Opportunity

It is important to note that given the emerging capabilities

possessed by Israel's adversaries, the Israeli missile defense concept

is developing too. Israel has not yet unveiled the Magic Wand system

designed to cope with the precision missiles in Hezbollah’s hands,

and its introduction in coming years is expected to intensify the

presence of missiles and rockets in the region’s skies.

As a result, in practice, a ballistic arms race is developing

between Israel and its enemies led by Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas.

Each side presents a new and threatening capability, requiring the

other to present a counter capability. At the same time, gaps may

open between the concept guiding Israel and the emerging

capabilities among its adversaries, their concepts and future force

design.

As noted above, Israel's missile defense concept was

designed in light of the political echelon's demand to remove the

missile threat to Israel's home front, allowing Israelis to maintain a

normal routine.25 However, Israel's enemies have also persisted and

built large rockets and missile arrays with precise and deadly

capabilities, and have begun to study Israeli defense systems, their

advantages and disadvantages, in order to break through them.

It is possible that two gaps have opened between the Israeli

missile defense concept and the reality of the emerging trends. The

first gap comes from the fact that the development of defensive

24 The Iranian missile program was developed to deal with various threats, aside from Israel.

The program was put on the agenda of the great powers during the negotiations on the nuclear issue, but has been pushed to the sidelines, with Iran claiming that the program is not nuclear and was developed for conventional security purposes. Iran had a painful experience in the war with Iraq in the 1980s. It fears the missile programs of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and is very apprehensive about the American presence in the Persian Gulf. The missile plan is also closely associated with the Iranian space program. See Landau and Bermant, op. cit.

25 On the position of decision-makers see Amir Peretz: “...the system is not perfect, but it will soon provide security to the residents in the south.” Morning News, Voice of Israel, 27 March 2011.


capabilities affects the adversary's behavior, which is developing

counter capabilities to bypass the Israeli defense systems. The

second gap stems from the success of Israel’s defensive capabilities

and its impact on the IDF operational concept, and the relations

between its various elements (especially the relationship between

defense, decisive defeat and deterrence). In practice, missile defense

is gaining momentum within the IDF in parallel to the missile

development on the other side, and this reality is leading to an

evolving arms race between Israel and its adversaries with

implications for force employment, force design and the evolution of

the conflict. This arms race represents a threat, but also an

opportunity.26

The Threat: The Continuation of a Lethal and Costly Ballistic Arms

Race

The continuation of the current trend towards a ballistic

arms race between Israel and its adversaries could lead to the

dominance of defensive capabilities within the Israeli security

concept, which in turn could harm the balance with offensive

capabilities and other elements within the IDF operational concept.

In such a reality, Israel could find itself not only under a

destructive attack on the home front, but also in a position of

inferiority on the battle field. Furthermore, facing Israeli defensive

capabilities, the enemy may change its ballistic operational concept

in such a way that the Israeli defensive systems would no longer be

relevant.

There are many examples of weapon systems undergoing

similar modifications due to counter measures activated against

them. Examples include the changes in air warfare with the

transition from air-to-air battles to air strikes, in armored warfare

26 An arms race is a competitive mode where two rivals arm themselves, one following the

other. This situation can quickly deteriorate to war, but equally can prevent war by creating a balance of power. (Yehoshafat Harkabi, War and Strategy, Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 5767-2007, p. 300. [Hebrew]). From this point in the article, most of the analysis will focus on the reality between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah possesses advanced and accurate missile capabilities, thus creating a kind of “balance of terror” between itself and Israel in an all-out war scenario.


with the transition from armored battles to new maneuvers, or in

chemical warfare with the transition from strategic armaments to

tactical uses.27

A continuation of this arms race might also lead to the

integration of new measures alongside missiles, such as the

increasing use of the underground realm, and a desire to move the

fighting into Israeli territory in order to challenge Israel’s other

vulnerabilities.28

The Opportunity: Regimentation of the Arms Race and Even the

Abandonment of Missile Development

The high price that an all-out missile war between Israel and

Hezbollah is expected to exact from both sides could be used as a

catalyst to stabilize the current situation. On the one hand,

Hezbollah knows that the cost of using missiles will be high, and will

rise with the use of precision weapons (both economically and in

terms of the Israeli response). At the same time, the benefits it can

expect from firing at the well-defended Israeli home front will

decrease. This stands in addition to the understanding that an all-out

missile war, in the reality of capabilities and countermeasures, would

be devastating to both sides. Such an understanding could create a

reality of a non-nuclear MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction).

However, in the case of Israel-Hezbollah, it is necessary to

examine to what extent an adversary like Hezbollah is likely to

demonstrate sensitivity to the destruction of infrastructure and

human life, and responsibility for the local population. Furthermore,

27 Many weapons have succeeded in “surviving” the changes in warfare categories, mainly

because of changes in their mode of employment. For example, the large armored battles of the Second World War, the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, in which tanks were a focal element in breaking through and fighting in the open, have passed from the world. However, the use of tanks has not stopped and they have become an important element in urban warfare, supporting infantry etc. Similar changes occurred in aerial and chemical warfare. In this context see also Edward Luttwak: “A Known Paradox Is that Sometimes the Less Successful Measures Maintained Their Modest Effectiveness, While Sophisticated Means Lost Their Ability Due to the Development of Countermeasures” (Edward Luttwak. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 42-49).

28 Luttwak, Ibid. Also, Interview of Dr. Dima Adamsky of the Israel National Defense Colpillare, February 4, 2015.


it is not clear how the dramatic changes currently transpiring in Syria

will affect the decision-making process of the organization when

considering an all-out war against Israel, nor whether Iran would

approve a further employment of Hezbollah’s missile array against

Israel.29

Further development of Israel’s missile defensive

capabilities would also augment Israel's military freedom of action,

which may serve as an incentive to Hezbollah to agree to the

formulation of rules of the game in the missile domain. Iran, too,

which is accountable for the Hezbollah missile program (and Hamas

to a certain extent), is a responsible state, open to negotiations. It

should also be remembered that the Iranian missile program is

designed not only to fight Israel, but also, perhaps primarily, for the

United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other powers in the region.30

Therefore, as with the great powers’ experience during the

Cold War, missile defense capabilities could serve as a catalyst for

stabilizing processes, as well as a first step in confidence and

security-building measures, leading later to other understandings

and even agreements.

The hope that Israel's enemies will abandon their missile

programs is perhaps overly ambitious. Rather, there could be

changes in its force employment concept, and new measures are

likely to be integrated. One way or another, a question arises

whether such changes will occur without another all-out missile war,

29 In the context of Hezbollah, many questions arise as to whether a non-state and religious

organization, that has in the past demonstrated a lack of sensitivity to the loss of human life and to the destruction of infrastructure in Lebanon, could indeed be affected by such considerations. However, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, has already said in the past that “If I had known there was a 1 in 100 chance that the kidnapping of the soldiers would lead us to war, I would not have done it.” (IDF Radio, August 27, 2006).

30 Even though Iran rejected outright the attempt to discuss its missile program in the framework of the talks with world powers on its nuclear program, in the above case we are referring to a discussion of the Hezbollah missile program in relation to Israel, where it may be possible to reach understandings regarding the designation of the missile array and the circumstances under which it could be used, especially in light of the changes in the Syrian theater, the threat of ISIS and in relation to the negotiations between Iran and the USA. See Landau and Bermant op. cit.; Kais, “Iran Exposed Cruise Missiles and American UAV Model” op. cit., On the dynamics that could evolve as a result of an arms race see Harkabi, op.cit., pp. 300-307, and Lutwack, op.cit.


or perhaps two or three more rounds of warfare against Hamas and

Hezbollah - including a very costly contest between the adversary's

precision missiles and the combined Israeli defensive systems (i.e.,

following the integration of the Magic Wand system) - which might

expedite a significant abandonment of missiles, or a formulation of

rules of the game in the domain, bringing an end to the missile wars

between Israel and its rivals.

During the Arab-Israeli conflict, a number of changes in the

character of the warfare took place, where one side of the conflict

understood that there was no benefit from continuing to fight with

the current weapons of the day, and turned to new measures. The

chart below follows the dynamics of changes in the character of

warfare between Israel and its rivals, from 1948 to the present.


The future of missile warfare and missile defense is closely

tied to issues of competitive strategies in force design. In an era of

technological revolution, when both sides possess accurate and

lethal fire capabilities, intelligence penetration capabilities for the

generation of targets and advanced command and control

capabilities, a dynamic of competing strategies evolves rapidly.

These strategies demand high expenditures in research and

development, in producing new weapons, and ultimately, in human

life. The essence of the competition is in understanding the

categorical stage where both sides currently are, given that each

“combat category” has its own lifespan, from its development to its

peak, after which it wanes (but does not necessarily disappear).

When, in conjunction with the decline of one category, new

categories arise, not all of which will mature into the “next

challenge,” but some will mature and become the threats of

tomorrow. It is important to pay attention to signs indicating that a

category has culminated repetitive failures, indicating that there is


no point in continuing the competition due to its high price or small

benefits, while at the same time, sporadic events can crystallize into

trends which may become the next category.31

In missile warfare, the question arises whether we will reach

a peak from which their advantages diminish. And if so, when? At

the same time, we need to examine which of the new measures that

serve our rivals - the underground realm, cyberspace, commando

forces or the aerial domain - will mature into the next threat,

whether as a substitute for missiles or alongside them.

It is crucial to not only identify the decline in the relevance

of missiles, but also the potential of missile defense, in addition to

standard defense. This is in order to translate this strategic capability

into deterrence, decisive defeat and primarily to create rules of the

game for missile wars, before the category disappears altogether

and with it its inherent opportunities.32

Conclusion

This article examined the effect of Israel's missile defense

capabilities on its rivals, but mainly on the IDF. Examination of the

missile defense issue in the IDF illustrates that these strategic

capabilities are not only defensive or military in nature. Missile

defense capabilities are a major component of IDF deterrence- they

are influential and must be integrated as a part of an offensive-

decisive defeat capability. They are also part of the strategic

deterrence and the regional status of the State of Israel, as a tool to

demonstrate military capabilities and superiority. Besides, they are

an asset for international collaborations, to defend and assist allies,

as well as a central component of the strategic alliance between

Israel and the USA. It is therefore imperative to formulate a broad

concept for missile defense, integrating military-operational and

31 Thomas Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 1962;

Dima Adamsky. The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel, Stanford University Press, 2010.

32 “Effects of the second order.” Unexpected and sometimes undesirable effects, brought about by crossing the peak point of deterrence, i.e., the point meant to serve us with the desired effect (the cessation of hostilities and achievement of deterrence), thus creating effects other than those planned. See Luttwak, op. cit.


strategic-political elements.33 This will enable rigorous thinking

about missile defense capabilities as an asset for creating

understandings, to prevent conflicts, as well as a first step toward

broader regional agreements.

33 See in this context the statement by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S.

Armed Forces, Gen. Martin Dempsey, in the “Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense, Vision 2020” Document: “The effectiveness with which we field competent Joint IAMD capabilities will help prevent catastrophic attacks on the U.S. Homeland; secure the U.S. economy and the global economic system; and build secure, confident, and reliable allies and partners.”


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National Defense College (Tishrei, 5775 - October 2014). [Hebrew]

• Bronfeld, Saul. “Defense - The Other Side of Mars,” Bein Haktavim. No.

4. Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, IDF (Av, 5776 -

August 2015).

• Brun, Itai and Valensi, Carmit. “The Revolution in the Military Affairs of

the Radical Axis,” Maarachot. No. 432 (Sivan 5771 - June 2010).

[Hebrew]

• Finkel, Meir. “The Iron Dome - The New Maginot Line?” Maarachot.

No. 461 (Tamuz 5775 - June 2015). [Hebrew]

• Finkel, Meir. “Active Defense as a Fourth Pillar of the Security Concept

- What Can We Learn from Operation ‘Protective Edge’?” Bein

Haktavim. No. 4. Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, IDF

(Av, 5775 - June 2015). [Hebrew]

• Flynn, Michael T, Sisco, James and Ellis, David C. “Left of Bang - The

Value of Socio Cultural Analysis in Today's Environment,” Prism Vol. 3,

No. 4.

• Gavish, Doron. “The Aerial Defense Array, From a Tactical Force to a

National Strategic Array,” Maarachot, No. 444 (Av 5773 - August 2012).

[Hebrew]

• Henkin, Yagil. “And What If We Did Not Deter Hezbollah,” Military and

Strategic Affairs, INSS. Vol. 6, No. 3 (5775 - December 2014).

• Laish, Gur. “Victory Without a Decisive Defeat, Towards a New Security

Concept,” Maarachot. No. 430 (Nisan 5769 - April 2010). [Hebrew]

• Landau, Emily and Bermant, Azriel. “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program:

Caught Between Missile Defense and a Comprehensive Deal,” INSS

Insight, No. 558 (June 8, 2014).

• Lt. Col. N. “The Third Lebanon War - Towards a Different Operational

Concept of the Hezbollah,” Maarachot. No. 454 (Nisan 5771 - April

2014). [Hebrew]


• Lt. Col. S. “Attrition - Another Strategy for Victory,” Maarachot. No. 435

(Adar I 5771 - February 2011). [Hebrew]

• Pillar Rosenberg, Haim. “The Truth About the Missile Threat,”

Maarachot. No. 437 (Sivan 5771 - June 2011). [Hebrew]

• Siboni, Gabi. “Military Lessons for Hamas from Operation Protective

Edge,” INSS Insight, No. 700 (Sivan 5775 - May 2015).

• Stenzler-Koblent, Liram. “Iron Dome’s Impact on the Military and

Political Arena: Moral Justifications for Israel to Launch a Military

Operation Against Terrorist and Guerrilla Organizations,” Military and

Strategic Affairs, Volume 6, No. 1, March 2014.

• Wiener, Ariel. “The New Wars, What They are Doing to the Professional

Identity of the IDF,” Maarachot. No. 449 (Tamuz 5773 - June 2013). [Hebrew]

• Ya'alon, Moshe. “Learning and Training Challenges of Army Officers in

the IDF,” Maarachot. No. 396 (Elul 5764 - September 2004). [Hebrew]

• Zion, Shai. “The Active Defense Battle - The Challenges of Command”,

Maarachot. No. 435 (Adar I 5771 - February 2011). [Hebrew]

Media

• Bassok, Moti. “Iron Dome Might Save Amir Peretz's Legacy, but It Has

Many Fathers,” Haaretz, November 19, 2012.

• Barel, Zvi. “Operation Protective Edge as an Exercise in Drawing the

New Power Balances in the Middle East,” Haaretz, July 18, 2014.

• Ben-Yishai, Ron. “Iran Is Playing with Fire”, Ynet, December 8, 2014.

• Kais, Roi. “Iran Exposed Cruise Missiles and an American UAV Model,”

Ynet, May 11, 2014. [Hebrew]

• Kais, Roi and Levy, Elior. “The Damage to Hamas, a Message for

Nasrallah,” Ynet, July 29, 2014. [Hebrew]

• Kais, Roi. “Hezbollah Shows off Its Tunnels, Claims It Is Prepared for

War with Israel,” Ynet, May 22, 2015.

• Harel, Israel. “Iron Dome Is a Tactical Treasure but Strategic Danger,”

Haaretz, July 17, 2014.

• Levy, Elior. “Hamas Military Chief Deif Is Alive, Laying Groundwork for

Next War with Israel,” Ynet, April 29, 2015.


• Patel, Avnish. “Beyond the Iron Dome: Placing Missile Defense in Its

Regional Context,” RUSI Analysis, 23/11/2012 (www.rusi.org).

• Patel, Avnish. “NATO's New Strategic Concept and Missile Defense,”

RUSI Analysis, 2/11/2012 (www.rusi.org).

• Paz, Alon and Pollak, Nadav, “Israeli Army Officer: Hamas Has Adapted

to Our Fighting Doctrine,” Business Insider, the Washington Institute

for Near East Policy, 22/7/2014.

• Pedatzur, Reuven. “The Fallibility of Iron Dome Missile Defense,”

Haaretz, November 10, 2013.

• Quackenbush, Leghen L. “National Missile Defense and Deterrence,”

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 59 No. 4, University of Missouri,

December 2006, pp. 533-541.

• Reuter, Adam. “Hamas's Rockets Will Lead to Its Downfall,” Ynet, July

17, 2014. [Hebrew]

• Yehoshua, Yossi. “A Ticking Bomb Awaits Israel on Its Northern Border,”

Ynet. April 26, 2015.

• Yehoshua, Yossi. “Gantz's Anemones Speech,” Ynet, August 10, 2014.

• Zeytun, Yoav. “IDF: Iron Dome Intercepted 90% of Rockets,” Ynet,

August 13, 2014.

Reports

• Nuclear Posture Review Report, Department of Defense, USA, April

2010.

• “Countering Air and Missile Threats,” Joint Publication 3-01, US

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 23 March 2012.

• “Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020,” JOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFF, 5 December 2013.

Websites

• www.mda.mil

• www.state.gov

• www.rusi.org

• www.inss.org.il

• www.iba.org.il

Books and Position Papers



http://www.mda.mil/

http://www.state.gov/


http://www.inss.org.il/

http://www.iba.org.il/


• Adamsky, Dima, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of

Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US,

and Israel, Stanford University Press, 2010.

• Ben-Israel, Isaac, The First Missile War: Israel and Hezbollah Summer

2006, Tel Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, 5767 - 2007. [Hebrew]

• Harkabi, Yehoshafat. War and Strategy, Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 5767 -

2007. [Hebrew]



• Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of

Chicago Press, 1962.

• Shelach, Ofer and Yoav Limor, Prisoners in Lebanon, Tel-Aviv: Yediot

Ahronot, 5767 - 2007. [Hebrew]

Conferences

• The Forum for Military and Security Issues, Dado Center, December 14,

2014.

• Missile Defense: Asset or Liability for Regional and International

Stability, INSS Arms Control & Regional Security Program, 15/1/2014.

Interviews

• Dr. Dima Adamsky, Interdisciplinary Center and the National Defense

College.

• Mr. Goor Tsalalyachin, Kings College, London.

• Officers and Commanders in the IDF and from the defense

establishment.

From Tactical Anti-Aircraft Defense to Systemic Aerial Defense

Shachar Shohat and Yaniv Friedman

Introduction

In January 2011, after the conclusion of thorough staff work,

during which the anti-aircraft roles of the air force were studied and

defined, the name of the IDF’s anti-aircraft array was changed to the

“Air Defense Division.” This change was the culmination of a

comprehensive transformation process of the whole array. The

changing role of the Air Defense Division, which is reflected in its new

name, provides us a glimpse not only into the world of air defense in

the IDF, but in many ways, also into the formation of a new Israeli

security concept.

This article will examine the development of IDF air defenses

from its beginning as a tactical anti-aircraft system, to an array with

operational and even strategic importance. We shall present this

evolutionary process, while examining current challenges, relevant

responses and the future outlook for active defense systems.

The IDF’s anti-aircraft array was established in the 1950s.

The army at that time lacked military superiority, especially air

superiority, of the type that it enjoyed in the years after 1967. This

affected its self-image as well. Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, who

single-handedly designed the principles of the Israeli defense

concept, had personally experienced the horrors of the German

aerial blitz on London in World War II, and this experience had a

decisive influence on his understanding of the strategic aerial threat

to the State of Israel.1 The aerial might of the Arab armies, as

reflected in the bombardment of Tel Aviv during the War of

Independence, and the deployment of a French squadron in Israel as

1 Michael Bar Zohar. Ben Gurion: A Biography (Centennial Edition). New York: Adama Books, 1986, pp. 426-431. Despite the description above, Ben-Gurion did not integrate a defensive leg into his national security concept.


a precursor to the 1956 Sinai War,2 was perceived as stronger than

the young Israel Air Force (IAF), and anti-aircraft defense was

therefore a natural element of his concept.

The threat of strategic bombardment demanded a response

in the form of a Strategic Command. According to the concept at that

time, the Command was professionally subordinate to the Artillery

Corps, and operationally to the IAF, and was divided into northern

and southern sub-commands. The Anti-Aircraft Command mainly

operated 20 mm guns during the Sinai War and was perceived as

vital to the defense of Israel. Its very definition as a Command (even

though subordinate to the Air Force during the war) reflects to its

role as a key component of Israeli strategy - defense of the home

front enabled offense at the front.

The roots of the second chapter in the history of Israeli air

defense lie in the era that followed the Six Day War, when the Arab

air threat was no longer perceived as a strategic one. The anti-

aircraft array changed, and became committed to defense in the

tactical and operational contexts - defending the maneuvering

ground forces as well as IAF bases, which were perceived as the

center of gravity of the IDF's strength. The process was completed

with the integration of the anti-aircraft array into the IAF in the early

1970s, resulting in a two-headed array - tactical anti-aircraft defense.

It provided defense for the ground forces, which could not rely solely

on the aerial cover provided by the Air Force within Israel’s territory,

alongside heavier and stationary batteries, which defended the IDF’s

main operational assets - the Air Force bases and the nuclear reactor

in Dimona. This changed the anti-aircraft array from a strategic

command into a tactical force supporting the operations of other

offensive centers of gravity - the IAF on the one hand and the IDF's

maneuver formations on the other.

Israeli citizens have been threatened by rockets since the

1960s, when Palestinian terror organizations first attacked

population centers in the Beit Shean Valley with Katyusha rockets

2 This was Ben-Gurion’s condition for launching the joint Israeli-French-British campaign, a condition that arose from his great fear of an aerial “blitz” by the Arab armies on the State of Israel, such as he experienced in London during the Second World War.

SHOHAT & FRIEDMAN | FROM TACTICAL ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE TO SYSTEMIC AERIAL DEFENSE | 77

from Jordanian territory, and later attacked northern communities

and Kiryat Shmona from Lebanon. The First Gulf War and the

deployment of Patriot missiles in 1991 greatly contributed to the

formulation of a new concept for Israel, which regarded missile wars

as a new strategic threat to the state.

One can identify two major stages in the formulation of the

new operational concept.3 The first stage, the wake-up call,

originated as we mentioned earlier, in 1991 during the Gulf War and

the Al-Hussein missile attacks. The second stage, originated during

the 2006 Second Lebanon War, which featured extensive short-range

rocket fire. In the interim, Israel began to seek a strategic response

to these threats. This began with the establishment of the Arrow

system directed at long-term threats, and in the last decade the Iron

Dome was added as a response to the seemingly tactical threat of

short-range rockets, which has turned into the main type of threat

facing Israel.

The rise of standoff fire wars, whether long-range (with the

threat of non-conventional weapons), or short-range, restored the

air defense array to a strategic place in Israel’s security concept. Past

wars were mainly conducted at the front, while the home front

almost always remained unharmed and uninvolved. The anti-aircraft

array, then served as a supportive element to the primary forces -

land and air. The missile threat has changed this reality, turning the

home front into a real combat theater, and the importance of its

defense reverted to becoming a major component in Israel’s security

concept.

The aerial defense array, therefore, is today in the midst of

another jolt in its short history. In this article, we will examine the

challenges and dilemmas that characterize an array experiencing

3 The technological development began in the United States in the 1980s with the Reagan administration’s Star Wars initiative and in Israel at the end of the 1980s with the approval to develop the Arrow 1. The first signs of defense appearing in the Israeli security concept could be seen in the Meridor Commission in 1987. An important impact on the Israeli consciousness can be attributed to the Iran-Iraq war, especially the firing of Scud missiles at Tehran.


dramatic changes in such a short time; how defense is perceived as

an element in the broader IDF concept; and how to stabilize the array

as it has swung between the tactical and strategic ends since its

establishment.

Image 1: Arrow launcher

Active Defense's Place in the IDF’s Strategy and Operational

Concept

A major factor that significantly influences the decision to

develop active defense systems is Israeli society, or more precisely,

the values held by Israeli society. The importance of human life is a

basic, central and concrete value within Israeli society, deriving from

its democratic and Jewish values. From the end of the 1980s and the


beginning of the 1990s, the desire to avoid loss of human life and

limb became a dominant factor in the public discourse, naturally

affecting decision makers.

But the sanctity of human life does not relate only to the

lives of our soldiers and civilians. The desire to avoid loss of human

life relates also to the innocent civilians on the other side, that is, a

desire to conduct a campaign or a war in the “cleanest” manner

possible. In many ways, this, alongside technology, is the main factor

contributing to the decrease in the popularity of ground maneuver

within the IDF, at least as reflected in its operations in recent

decades, and to the rise of precision fires. The combination of the

sanctity of human life, and the rising threat of standoff fire wars, has

brought about an understanding of the need to generate strategic

defense arrays. This tendency was generally led by civilian policy

makers, not by the military. Consequently, when a new strategic

array came into being within the IDF, pushed by the statesmen, its

operational implications were only gradually revealed.

The relationship between the defensive pillar and the IDF’s

broader operational concept has several key aspects. First, the time

dimension - active defense changes the perception of time during a

confrontation and may even dictate the length of a campaign. The

ability of the system to prevent significant damage to the home

front, although not absolute, produces a relatively longer window

for decision-making, thanks to the knowledge that large salvos will

not take a heavy toll on the citizens of Israel. These capabilities

enable decision makers to conduct the combat in a calculated and

measured manner, avoiding the pressure that would come from

harm to the home front. In both of the recent campaigns, Pillar of

Defense and Protective Edge, the defensive array had a dramatic

impact on the duration of each operation, each in a different and

unique manner.

Second, active defense systems also affect the employment

of offensive forces. Israel’s geographical dimensions and absence of

strategic depth are well known factors. In response to this, Israel has


viewed deterrence, detection, and achieving a decisive victory as the

cornerstones of its security concept. Decisive victories are viewed as

charging the Israeli deterrence batteries. Offensive action is the

outcome of this concept and generally dictates the shape of military

force generation.

In the era of standoff fire wars a drastic change was created,

whose implications are not yet fully understood. The enemy,

employing missile systems, has bypassed the main form of warfare

for which we prepared in the past - warfare at the front. The enemies

threatening us with high trajectory fire are in one of two categories

- either too far, in regions and states very distant from the Israeli

borders, thus making it difficult to employ large offensive forces

against them, or concentrated on the borders of Israel, but within

complex built-up areas, making it very difficult to conduct

conventional offensive warfare. Within this new space, the defensive

pillar can provide a response to this challenge by neutralizing the

enemy's capabilities. Therefore, the combination of defense and

offense creates flexibility for force employment, and enables the

decisive defeat of the enemy.

However, in these conditions, a concern arises that the

presence of the defensive pillar within the framework of Israeli

capabilities will allow decision makers to avoid solving the truly

difficult puzzle - how to adapt the offensive and decisive defeat

capabilities of the IDF to the new circumstances described above.

Third, the legitimacy of warfare has been greatly influenced

by the entry of active defense systems into operational service.

There is a basic tension between Israel's desire to defend itself and

the international norms demanding that it restrict its activities.

International legitimacy is mainly measured by the just war principle

which includes moral and legal justifications that validate war. The

main argument is that due to the ability of the system to prevent

harm to the citizens of Israel, there is less justification for military

action.

However, in-depth analysis leads to the opposite conclusion.

Active defense systems allow decision makers legitimacy to act,

since, successful as they may be, active defense systems cannot fully


prevent harm and, of course, cannot prevent the actual firing. They

do indeed prevent casualties on the Israeli home front, but do not

provide a hermetic defense. The existence of a defensive capability

strengthens Israeli claims of a desire to avoid casualties, allowing the

same flexibility mentioned above regarding the type of military

action, its timing and intensity.4

Fourth, there are extensive economic implications resulting

from the employment of active defense systems. War causes

genuine harm to the economic activity of the Israeli economy. The

threat of missiles and rockets on the Israeli home front augments

this harm. The development of the Iron Dome system and other

active defense systems, and their use during a confrontation,

significantly sharpens the economic motive. The cost of developing

and employing the Iron Dome interception system is an important

component that should be added to the economic equation.

But this is not the complete equation. The benefits involved

in employing the Iron Dome system exceed the cost. Foremost, the

preservation of human life is an important component provided by

active defense systems. Reducing the number of the casualties on

the home front, apart from the obvious human side, carries a huge

economic benefit. The researcher, Uzi Rubin, examined the number

of compensation claims due to rocket damage.5 His research

emphasizes the economic importance of active defense systems.

Following the Second Lebanon War in 2006, when the systems did

not yet exist, 26,653 claims for compensation were submitted. The

number of rockets fired was 4,200. Total compensation paid, stood

at NIS 478,950,000.

On the other hand, following Operation Protective Edge in

2014, when the active defense system was in use, and 4,500 rockets

4 Liram Stenzler-Koblent, “Iron Dome’s Impact on the Military and Political Arena: Moral Justifications for Israel to Launch a Military Operation Against Terrorist and Guerrilla Organizations,” Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 6, No. 1, March 2014, pp. 73-80. 5 Rubin, Uzi. “Israel’s Air and Missile Defense During the 2014 Gaza War,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 111 (Ramat Gan: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, January 2015). pp. 27-28.


were fired, 4,525 claims were filed and the compensation paid

amounted to NIS 89,563,000. Prevention of damage to property and

the continuation of normal economic life is another key component,

influencing both economic and social resilience of the state during

wartime.

The pioneering role that Israel took upon itself in the active

defense domain, the uniqueness of our strategic situation, and our

special relationship with the United States, have also resulted in an

additional unique contribution of the defense array to the Israeli

security concept. The active defense systems were jointly developed,

with the generous support of our most important ally, the US, which

not only lightened the economic burden of our security enterprise,

but added to it an important deterrence factor, which will be

discussed below.

To summarize, active defense systems generate wide

economic leverage. They permit the continuation of economic life in

the Israeli home-front, with some restrictions, and they are in fact

an important strategic tool, whose economic usefulness is several

magnitudes higher than the cost.

An examination of the role of active defense within IDF

strategy sharpens our understanding of its importance. Given that

the process of establishing its strategic status took place in direct

coordination with the political echelon, and considering the values

shared by Israeli society, and its impact on the combat theater, this

process is bound to deepen.

Challenges

The deployment of active defense systems brought to the

surface old and new challenges, stemming from the integration, for

the first time in history, of the innovative interception of missiles and

rockets with an ongoing process of dealing with classic defense

dilemmas.

Offensive action is a central element of the traditional Israeli

security concept. From this perspective, active defense is like a

soccer goalie. The importance of the goalie as a part of the team is

clear to all. Without him preventing the other team from scoring, the


possibility of victory diminishes. His role is to thwart the opponents’

intentions to achieve a victory. He allows the team’s strikers to score

goals and thus jointly attain victory on the soccer field.

If we compare this with the military dimension, the role of

the active defense systems is to prevent goals from being scored by

the rival team. They do this by negating the ability of missiles and

rockets to cause damage, thus allowing, as mentioned above, other

IDF bodies to carry out their offensive missions and to win. Without

the ability of the active defense systems to intercept enemy attacks,

the task of other units to achieve a decisive defeat through offensive

action would become even more difficult. A collaboration between

the different units, both active defense and the offensive, is the

basis, today and in the future, for IDF success on the battlefield.6

There is another challenge on the technological level. The

technological struggle between armies is not a new phenomenon.

The development of a new weapon or the refinement of another

always creates learning and adaptation within the enemy. In other

words, the appearance of a new weapon generates a clear

advantage to the side operating it, and together with this, after an

adjustment and learning period, the opposing side develops a

response to that challenge.

The advantage of the attacker in this struggle is twofold.

First, operationally, the attacker determines the timing of the action,

its scope and place. Second, strategically, the challenge for the

defender and defense is to develop defensive systems against a non-

existent technology. The development of defensive measures

against an existing offensive system is an important step, but limited.

The challenge is in developing defense systems that will cope

successfully with future offensive technologies, not yet developed,

or in their final stages of development. This is an arms race, a familiar

phenomenon since the beginning of military history.

6 Doron Gavish, “The Air Defense Array - From a Tactical to a National Strategic Array,” Ma’arachot, 444, August 2012, p. 6. [Hebrew]


The technological struggle has not skipped active defense

systems. It is reasonable to assume that Israel’s enemies are not

ignoring its active defense capabilities and are concurrently

developing various courses of action to cope with these capabilities.

The more effective a new technology, the faster it is challenged.

Active defense systems will be required to address these challenges,

understanding that this technological race is a long process in which

each side challenges the opponent each time anew.7 Therefore, we

must constantly improve our preparedness to face the enemy's

repeated attempts to improve the type of threat at its disposal, its

scope and its range.

The last challenge is related to the human dimension. The

soldiers serving in active defense systems are required to cope with

a wide range of issues, incorporating unique elements, both new and

familiar. The soldier operating a defense system is a new type of

soldier, a fighter-defender. A combatant operating such a system is

required, in field conditions and for a long time, to be prepared to

shift immediately from routine to action and even interception.

In active defense systems, there are no benefits to

conventional military education, which promotes initiative and

aggressiveness on the battlefield. This is indeed an important

organizational value, central to the way we educate, but active

defense combatants do not initiate at the tactical-operational level.

Their basic working assumption is that the enemy will take the

initiative. Continued uncertainty is fundamental to their existence.

This is a complicated tactical reality in its human dimension.

Another aspect is the moral standard of the task. Iron Dome

soldiers and other defense systems personnel are required to carry

on their shoulders the critical implications of their actions. Failure to

intercept a rocket or missile is accompanied by a genuine and

tangible possibility of civilian casualties or real damage to a strategic

facility. The mental strength required of such a soldier is immense.

The challenge of intercepting missiles and rockets is

augmented by the fact that these are the first efforts to perform

7 Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 48-50.


interceptions of this type. The lack of historical examples and

experience increases the importance of the operators.

The human challenge expands because of the Israeli

approach to the operation of the air defense array. The Israeli school

maintains that it should be manually operated. Most air defense

arrays in foreign armies are activated automatically, and human

judgment is very limited. In Israel, the operation of these systems is

done manually, with the goal of generating flexibility, margin of

maneuverability and security for other aircraft.8

This is new, challenging and fraught with operational and

tactical challenges. It requires expertise and broad professional

knowledge, enabling the consideration of all interception and safety

margins. The fighter-defender must be alert, steadfast and

disciplined. The combination of a complex technological challenge,

stemming from the very sophistication of the active defense

weapons systems, and the tactical and human challenge requires

appropriate selection and training processes, and the integration of

people with unique quality and characteristics within the Air Defense

Division.

Examination of these challenges and responses leads to a

broader insight into the Air Defense Division. It must cope with many

dilemmas directly related to the combat environment and to the

dimensions that surround it, both economic and human. The

response must be inclusive and multi-layered. The first layer includes

the creation of a mutual and overlapping defense array, addressing

the dual threats of high trajectory weapons and aircraft, i.e. ABT - air

breathing targets. This includes the threat of aircraft and helicopters

and that of missiles and rockets. An appropriate response to the

second layer, which includes the human and economic elements in

the military field, includes more intensive training of the human

resources and a comprehensive economic approach to the active

defense systems.

8 An example of this is the rocket which hit the Israeli town of Yehud and was not intercepted due to an operator's decision.


Active Defense - More Than “Another Interception”

Active defense systems give Israel advantages in some areas,

of which just a few have been exhausted. While the tactical

advantages associated with rocket interception and protection of the

home front are clear, as demonstrated during Operation Protective

Edge, there is a tactical potential not yet realized. This applies mainly

to a possible integration of the interception systems with

maneuvering ground forces. Furthermore, there appears to be more

space to develop and leverage the benefits of these systems at the

operational and strategic levels. In what follows, we will review these

opportunities, from the strategic to the operational and tactical

potentials.

The potential at the strategic level

Active defense systems embody the potential to strengthen

political ties. Cooperation at different levels, up to alliances, is an

important element of the toolbox within the framework of the

international system. Cooperation or alliances can be formal or

informal, defensive or offensive. The broad base of most military

cooperation efforts leans on three main pillars: common interests,

common values and the capability for military cooperation. To these

three factors one must add the overriding element, a common

enemy.9

Earlier we mentioned the assistance of the US in the

development and maintenance of these systems. The development

and procurement of defense systems are a relatively comfortable

ground for strengthening the deep relationship between the two

states and demonstrating it in the region. It is no coincidence that

the legacy of the deep military relationship between the two states

began with the Hawk missiles transaction in 1962.10 The rocket and

missile threat to Israel provided (in an exceptional manner, even for

a relationship that was intimate from the outset) a fertile ground for

a wide range of technological, conceptual and resource cooperation.

9 Daniel Byman, “Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 29:5 (2006), p. 773. 10 See Saul Bronfeld, “Defense - The Other Side of Mars,” in this volume.


This joint activity is not limited to financial assistance or mutual

development, but includes joint exercises of air defense systems.

Joint exercises are held, which are designed to coordinate the air

defense systems of both states, representing a high level of

collaboration, knowledge sharing and a joint vision of future

challenges. The two states project their combined might to their

enemies and exhibit the strength of their connection to the region.

As mentioned previously, the Air Defense Division goes

beyond the narrow dimension of high trajectory weapons

interception and defending Israel, and is in fact a significant part of

the strategic cooperation with the United States. The joint

development and exercises demonstrate that both states foresee an

integrated future, both at the political and military levels, and are

ready to invest effort, time and money in long-term and joint

programs. The experience acquired in Israel in operational anti-

ballistic warfare is a valuable asset for the United States, whose

forces can be sent to conflict areas around the world, most of which

are exposed to rocket and missile threats. This collaboration

encourages additional cooperation between Israel and the USA, in

intelligence and technology, and is a locomotive pulling the entirety

of the security relationship between the two states behind it.

Another strategic potential inherent in the active defense

systems is related to possibilities for regional cooperation. Alliances

and partnerships are not new to Israeli policy. From its early days,

the State of Israel understood its position in the Middle East and

sought partners and allies to advance common interests and deny

achievements to its enemies. The Peripheral States Alliance and

various assistance activities to African states in the 1960s and to

oppressed minorities such as the Kurds in the 1970s were part of

Israel’s strategy for many years. Political processes, including the

peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, created a different

regional setting. Peace agreements and softer partnerships promote

new frameworks for collaboration between Israel and the states in

the surrounding region.


But negative processes also occurred. The Islamic revolution

in Iran, the rise of terror organizations and the establishment of sub-

state entities within state territories are serious challenges. The

threats arising from these players are partly directed against Israel,

i.e. the firing of rockets and missiles from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip

into Israel. These destabilizing players not only threaten Israel, but

its neighbors as well, challenging, to a large extent, the existing

regimes in some states. Iran's missile capability is not directed

exclusively at Israel, but can reach many other states in the region.

Israel’s active defense capability enters this space. There is

huge potential in the mere existence of such systems. Developed and

manufactured jointly with the United States, they generate an

extensive and strong appeal to regional players, who see the

attractiveness of joining a global power and ally. The reputation

created is of tremendous importance.

Furthermore, active defense systems could enable, under

certain conditions, interception capabilities for other actors aside

from Israel and could provide them with a certain interception

umbrella. In certain contexts, it may even be possible to equip

friendly states with their own defense systems, with necessary

limitations. This variable is an important attractive factor, which

could be used as a proactive regional foreign policy engine, at the

public and covert levels. Under the auspices of regional defense

options, it will be much easier to mobilize regional players having

common interests, and more important - common enemies - into

broad coalitions and to establish regional security systems, beyond

the narrow scope of interception. The active defense systems are in

effect an initial enticement, allowing the generation of initial

interest, which could be developed into regional security

arrangements. Moreover, the Iron Dome success in intercepting

missiles and rockets, besides augmenting the Israeli deterrent

aspect, offers an economic aspect. The technological success which

was observed and viewed around the world, is stirring up the

interest of other states sharing Israel’s defensive needs, thus offering

many economic opportunities for the Israeli defense industries.


The potential at the operational and tactical levels

Although Israel has a technological advantage over its

enemies, non-state adversaries have succeeded in reducing (or at

least blurring) this gap due to the growing proliferation of military

technologies and their reduced cost. This has enabled Israel’s

enemies to acquire precision firepower and advanced intelligence

capabilities. Interception technologies, however, are still a field in

which only a few states have a clear technological advantage over

non-state adversaries.

Israel is a leader among them. It is possible, and from our

perspective it would be wise, to integrate the potential of this

interception technology not only for defensive uses, but for offensive

purposes as well, and to develop interception capabilities that can

suppress, for example, anti-tank missile systems, surface-to-air

missiles, and the threat from UAVs of all kinds that the enemy is

expected to develop. If we take this path, air defense warfighters

could once again participate in tactical combat, defending the

maneuvering forces on land and in the air, in the same manner as

was done in the past by tactical anti-aircraft units against traditional

aerial threats.

Our last fundamental-conceptual argument uses two

examples of existing weapons systems and their potential

integration into the IDF. The first is the American Centurion system,

based on the naval Phalanx Close-in Weapon System, used by the US

military in Iraq to protect its bases. The Centurion fires 20mm shells

and is designed to intercept short range rockets and mortars. It is

operated from three main platforms - on ships and aircraft carriers,

stationary ground systems and mobile systems on trucks. The

Centurion protected, among others, the Green Zone, the heart of the

US administration in urban Baghdad. The second system is the

American anti-missile system that was supposed to be deployed on

Czech and Polish soil (EIS).11 Its radar was slated to be stationed in

11 Patricia Sandres, “Missile Defense Program Overview for the European Union,” (Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Security and Defense. Missile Defense Agency, 2007), pp.


Czechoslovakia, while the launchers and missile interceptors were to

be placed on Polish territory. This integrated system is meant to be

an American solution, protecting Europe and America against an

intercontinental missile threat from the Middle East.12

At a conceptual level, these two systems represent a

different approach than that of Israel's active defense. The

Centurion-Phalanx is a tactical defense system. Through the

development of the Centurion-Phalanx concept using more

advanced technologies, it may be possible to create spatial

defensive-offensive cover for maneuvering forces in areas saturated

by missiles (such as anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air missiles, shore

to sea missiles or high trajectory fire), thus restoring to conventional

military forces their freedom of movement, which has been

considerably limited in recent years. In a reality in which our forces

can move more securely through enemy saturated areas, even

without being dependent on tank and APC protection, the possibility

of offensive operations in enemy territory would be seen more

positively. It is therefore a tactical idea, but with serious operational

significance on IDF offensive moves in enemy territory.

The EIS idea, in contrast, is not tactical, but involves the

forward deployment of an interception system. Instead of long-

range ballistic missile interception over Western Europe or the

United States itself, the system is intended to intercept incoming

missiles far away from their targets, and high above the

atmosphere.13 In this way, not only will the threat be removed from

its target, but a second interception opportunity would remain,

closer to home, if the first interception were to fail.

Israel's challenge is different. Long-range missiles are not

new, but given the presence of short range missiles, this challenge

has unique characteristics. From bordering states, we deal with

missiles and rockets whose flight range and flying time is much

13-15. This program was formulated during the Bush Jr. administration, and frozen by the Obama administration. Today, similar missile defense programs are being discussed. 12 Tali Goldstein. “American Weapons to Be Deployed in Poland, the Russians Are Outraged,” Walla (August 20, 2008), news.walla.co.il/item/1333479. [Hebrew] 13 Avi Bitzur, “The Home Front in Israel's Security Concept,” Ma’arachot, 426, August 2009, p. 18. [Hebrew]

news.walla.co.il/item/1333479


shorter. However, conceptually the development of a forward

interception capability would likely afford the IDF more than one

interception opportunity for each threat, and possibly reduce the

number of alarms and alerts on the home front. Intercepting enemy

missiles in their initial flight stages, might also provide the enemy

with a more frustrating combat experience, thus contributing to

persuading the enemy of the futility of the war from its own

perspective.

That being the case, these two foreign examples provide us

with conceptual inspiration for ways that technologies and advanced

defense and interception capabilities might change the defensive

equation. These could transform combat interception systems into

an important part of the IDF’s offensive concept, both in securing the

movement of our forces in enemy territory, and by taking advantage

of the proximity of our forces to the launchers, in order to improve

the overall interception capabilities of the IDF while undermining the

enemy's expectations from war.

Future Potential and Conclusions

In this article, we have reviewed the active defense arrays

that are a part of the Air Defense Division. The predecessor of the

division was established in the early days of the State, and is a key

operational service within the IDF's capabilities. The active defense

arrays are the young children of this network. The first interception

of the Iron Dome occurred only in April 2011, and the system was

fully operational for Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012.

During Operation Protective Edge, in July-August 2014, the active

defense system was employed extensively, registering considerable

successes. In this article, we analyzed the effect of the active defense

systems on the duration of hostilities, on the economy and

legitimacy. Further, we reviewed the challenges facing active defense

systems, and finally, we demonstrated the further, offensive

potential of missile interception.


In conclusion, we can point to the important evolutionary

process that has taken place within the Air Defense Division. This

process occurred simultaneously with the growth in challenges to

the security of the State of Israel, and it is still developing. This

process gave the division a highly important role, as part of the

overall IDF response to these challenges. The process has

contributed to a change in the status of the Aerial Defense Division

and the active defense systems, from marginal status to a central

strategic position - within the military might of the State of Israel.

Today, the Air Defense Division integrates both the logic of

decisive victory and the logic of defense. It serves as the main

defensive wall preventing enemy attacks, as well as enabling the

offensive element to find expression in the IDF’s concept. The

division exists in the tension between being reactive and taking the

initiative. It links the three pillars of the Israeli security concept -

deterrence, early warning and decisive victory. On the one hand, by

virtue of being a defensive system, it responds to enemy action. Still,

as we have shown, it has the potential for initiative, which may

develop in the future beyond the tactical realm of preventing enemy

fire.

It is important to note two other issues, relevant to the

future vision of the Air Defense Division. The first issue is related to

the optional technological development of non-kinetic interception.

Iron Dome is based on the “Iron on Iron” principle. An interceptor

missile hits an incoming rocket. In recent years, a new interception

approach has been developing, based on electrical laser beams.

Such systems use a beam produced by electrical power and are

designed to intercept targets at short ranges. There are three types

of laser interceptors: fiber, panel fiber and free-electron laser. Fiber

laser is the most advanced, having the greatest potential of all,

whereas the other systems are based on it. Many advantages are

expected of laser systems, low interception cost, a never-ending

magazine, automatic battle management capability and relatively

easy operation. A future integration of systems of this type in the

framework of the air defense array, would augment Israel's defensive


capabilities, enabling it to better cope with current and future

threats.14

The second issue relates to a future vision of regional

realities. If Iran succeeds in achieving nuclear capability, with or

without an agreement, it will be important to regard active defense

systems as a tie-breaker, which would bring to such a campaign a

weapons system that Iran does not possess. Israel's interception

capabilities, especially the Arrow system, would enable it, in a

complex, difficult and extremely dangerous balance of power, to

employ a response that would thwart the nuclear missile threat, and

assist in maintaining its strategic superiority.

In conclusion, for as long as Israel is faced with security

challenges, a strong and professional defensive arm will be required,

providing responses to all levels of warfare. The untapped potential

of the Air Defense Division and its technologies, should be developed

to play a significant role in the offensive lineup of the IDF. Thus,

through a balanced development and deployment of interception

systems, it will be able to offer a proper response in coping with the

challenges forming in our environment.

A professional, flexible system that nurtures its personnel,

understands future challenges and is adept at adjusting itself to rapid

changes in the environment, is the key to victory in the next

campaign. From our familiarity with the Air Defense Division and the

active defense systems, assuming proper and timely procurement,

we are certain that they will cope successfully with any challenge at

their doorstep, and continue to provide Israel with the protective

wall that is so necessary for its existence.

14 Itamar Shushan, “On the Way to a Laser Weapon,” Israel Defense, 11 February 2013. [Hebrew]


Bibliography • Bar Zohar, Michael. Ben Gurion: A Biography (centennial edition), New

York: Adama Books, 1986.

• Bitzur, Avi. “The Home Front in Israel's Security Concept,” Ma’arachot,

426, August 2009, pp. 13-19 [Hebrew]

• Bronfeld, Saul. “Defense - The Other Side of Mars,” Bein Haktavim, Vol.

4, Dado Center, June 2015.

• Byman, Daniel. “Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism,” Journal

of Strategic Studies, 29:5 (2006), pp. 767-811.

• Gavish, Doron. “The Air Defense Array - From a Tactical to a National

Strategic Array,” Ma’arachot, 444, August 2012), pp. 4-11. [Hebrew]

• Goldstein, Tali. “American Weapons to Be Deployed in Poland, the

Russians Are Outraged,” Walla (August 20, 2008),

news.walla.co.il/item/1333479 [Hebrew]

• IDF Operations Directorate - Training and Doctrine Division. The A to Z

of Human Resources Combat Doctrine Terms, 2013 [Hebrew]



• Rubin, Uzi. “Israel’s Air and Missile Defense During the 2014 Gaza War,”

Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 111 (Ramat Gan: Begin-Sadat

Center for Strategic Studies, January 2015).

• Sandres, Patricia. “Missile Defense Program Overview for the European

Union,” (Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Security and

Defense. Missile Defense Agency, 2007), pp. 1-33.

• Shushan, Itamar. “On the Way to a Laser Weapon,” Israel Defense, 11

February 2013 [Hebrew]

• Stenzler-Koblent, Liram. “Iron Dome’s Impact on the Military and

Political Arena: Moral Justifications for Israel to Launch a Military

Operation Against Terrorist and Guerrilla Organizations,” Military and

Strategic Affairs, Volume 6, No. 1, March 2014, pp. 69-85.


The Campaign for the Home Front

Munir Amar and Eli Michelson

Introduction

On the night of July 22, 2014, Sergeant Sean Carmeli, who

was killed during Operation Protective Edge, was laid to rest in Haifa.

Sean hailed from Texas, and immigrated to Israel without his family

to serve in the IDF. The announcement of Sean's death in combat in

Gaza as a lone soldier provoked strong public emotions, and more

than 20,000 people attend the funeral.1

A mass event of this kind, during an emergency and within

the range of enemy missiles, should not be taken lightly. It raises

many questions regarding daily routine on the Israeli home front. For

example, what tools enable those in charge of safety on the home

front to exercise their responsibility? What could assist them in

providing safety during such an event? What is the equilibrium

between the desire to maintain normal daily routine and the duty to

protect the public from possible mass casualties?

We must sharpen our focus on these questions, and

investigate the appropriate calculations in providing protection

during this type of event from the anticipated threats (mainly high

trajectory fire), to determine what would allow us to act

appropriately to meet the challenge.

Many dilemmas emerge in times of war, especially around

the tension between a desire for full protection on the home front

and the desire to maintain the fabric of daily life. Should we allow

the opening of supermarkets and for what hours? Should schools

open, and under which conditions? Should concerts be held? Should

we allow cafés and pubs to operate? Should soccer games be held?

Should sea ports operate? These dilemmas land on a commander's

desk at the Home Front Command during emergencies, requiring

him to deal with the challenge of maintaining the public’s daily

1 Moshe David-Ahikam, “20 Thousand People at Lone Soldier Sean Carmeli's Funeral,” Walla news (July 22, 2012), news.walla.co.il/item/2767842 [Hebrew]



routine alongside the challenge of saving life. These dilemmas

become more acute as an operation continues and the pressure and

need build to go about one’s routine as much as possible.

Conflicts in recent years have been characterized by changes

in the combat environment and by fire on the home front during

relatively long periods of combat. The combination of this type of

conflict and missile defense systems (and their future development)

created a situation in which it is possible to identify the potential for

a different policy. The gap between the intensity of conflicts (which

is dropping) and the quality of defense (which is rising) now enables

a continuation of daily routine during emergencies. In this context,

different ways of coping and decision-making are required. This

article will discuss the effect of this phenomenon, which enables us

to operate differently when defending the home front, the

opportunities that arise, and the accompanying challenges and

expected future trends. The changing nature of conflicts, as reflected

in recent years, and the development of active defense, are the basis

of the following discussion.

Since the 1990s Israel’s enemies have employed a strategy

that focuses on causing civilian casualties and paralyzing the Israeli

home front. They continue to invest considerable effort in these

attempts. In recent conflicts, and likely in future ones, success is

measured by an accumulation of achievements (in points), not by a

quick and unambiguous decisive defeat (a knockout). Therefore, the

need is growing to succeed on several levels of simultaneous direct

and indirect struggle - at the frontlines, in contact with the enemy,

at the home front, in the media and in cyberspace. At the home

front, there is a growing necessity to prevent casualties, while

allowing the continuity of the populations’ daily routine and the

functioning of the national and civil systems in a manner as close to

normal as possible.

Although the importance of successful management of the

home front during a security crisis is obvious, there are no clear

definitions and metrics for such success. Some home front objectives

are defined, like support for the war effort, providing maneuvering

AMAR & MICHELSON | THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE HOME FRONT | 97

room for decision-makers and saving lives,2 but they do not define

success clearly and unambiguously. For example, great value is

ascribed to the uninterrupted activity of the Israeli economy during

emergencies. Damage to the Israeli economy during a confrontation

can be measured in several respects, such as loss of gross national

product (GDP) due to a decrease in productivity (absence from work

by reservists, parents remaining at home with their children), a

decline in labor productivity (business’ closing), reduction in demand

(domestic and foreign tourism, dining and entertainment services),

damage to infrastructure and buildings etc.3

Alongside the economic damage from the impact of rockets

and missiles on property and human lives, there are great benefits

to a campaign from continued economic activity. It benefits the

prevailing narrative adopted by the public and the national security.

Most noticeable is that public resilience depends largely on the

ability to maintain a reasonable daily routine during a crisis, while

enabling the public systems to function and provide the necessities

of life - food, water and medicine and the full functioning of the

economy. Thus, we may understand Isaac Ben-Israel’s argument that

Israel's defense leadership failed to understand during the Second

Lebanon War (2006), that the main damage caused to the home

front was social and economic, and not human life or property.4

Achieving a high level of protection requires a shutdown of

the civilian and public systems, and the evacuation of the population

into protected spaces. In contrast, the desire to maintain routine

activities and the need to enable the functioning of various systems

entails risks during emergencies. It should be emphasized that

success on the home front has a considerable influence which may

contribute to the overall achievements in a campaign. This success is

measured in two respects - seemingly contradictory but in fact

2 Reut Institute, Civil Resilience Network - Conceptual Framework for Israel's Local & National Resilience (Version B), Reut Institute, August 2009. 3 Yashiv, Eran, “Operation Protective Edge: Economic Summary,” in Kurtz, Anat and Brom, Shlomo (eds). The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, INSS, November 2014, pp. 127-130. 4 Isaac Ben-Israel, Israel’s Defense Doctrine, Modan and the Ministry of Defense, 2013, pp. 71-73. [Hebrew]


complementary - in preventing casualties and in allowing civilian

systems to function “normally,” even routinely.

Currently, the understanding is growing that due to changes

in the reality of war, both in terms of the challenge and response,

the importance of the local dimension to the success of the home

front is increasing. In this article, we wish to refine and emphasize

this argument: there is a necessity to manage the tension between

protection levels and the maintenance of routine activities by

strengthening and providing tools to the local echelon of the Home

Front Command (District level). These tools do not yet exist. This is

based on the understanding that this is the level that bridges the

national context and interests, and the tactical challenges.

We will discuss this on two levels - at the operational level -

the challenge and potential in developing the operational level of

home front defense, and at the strategic level - the link between

defending the home front and the national security concept, and

possible achievements in future conflicts. We will deal with this issue

while looking at several aspects of home front defense. We will

discuss the current and developing challenges to the home front,

present the tensions between protection and maintaining routine,

evaluate which institutional level within the home front would

enable the management of these tensions, and finally discuss the

growing context between defending the home front, and Israel’s

national security concept.

The Israeli Home Front as an Element in the Enemy’s Combat

Concept

Attacking the home front is not a new phenomenon in the

history of war in general, and Israel isn’t an exception. During the

War of Independence (1948), aircraft from Iraq, Syria, and primarily

Egypt, attacked the Israeli home front. Many cities were attacked,

including Haifa, Jerusalem, Ramat Gan and Tel Aviv. In total, 172

soldiers and civilians were killed on the home front and 321 were

injured.5 Attacks on the home front continued, such as the firing of

5 Moshe Naor, Social Mobilization in the Arab/Israeli War of 1948: On the Israeli Home Front, Routledge, 1st edition (April 16, 2013), pp. 161-162. It is important to note that many


Katyusha rockets at Kiryat Shmona from 1969, but in Israel’s

campaigns, from the 1956 Sinai War to the 1982 Operation Peace for

Galilee, this type of fire was relatively insignificant. The main

objective of attacking the home front was to motivate the civilian

population to influence decision-makers. Nevertheless, during the

War of Independence and in the other wars, attacking the home

front was relatively a secondary objective, and the enemies’ main

efforts focused on combat at the front.

In recent years, we have seen the development of a reverse

situation, turning the home front into a major target. An analysis of

the approaches to confronting Israel demonstrates that the

fundamental principle is winning by not losing. In practical terms,

these approaches have led to a focus on two key combat elements -

continuous rocket fire and systematic holding actions which cause

the attrition of our forces.6 These approaches are based largely on

the understanding that the Israeli home front encompasses national

assets, like every state, coupled with the understanding that Israel is

sensitive to casualties.7 A central element in the other side’s concept

is the prolongation of the fighting while paralyzing basic services,

thus influencing decision-makers by causing civilian unrest. The

combination of these elements - damaging national assets on the

home front, alongside our sensitivity to casualties and the

prolongation of the conflict - allows our opponents to produce a

“victory image,” which serves them in the construction of a general

narrative about their achievements during the campaign.

Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, described in 2003 the

way that this conceptual change occurred:

“The first time we shot at the Israeli settlements was the day

that our Secretary General, Abbas al-Moussawi was killed [16

settlements near the confrontation lines, among them Jerusalem, were under artillery fire for a long time. 6 Itai Brun, “The Development of the Combat Concept of the ‘Other Side’ (1979-2009)” Tatzpit 50, IDF Operations Directorate - Doctrine and Training Division, 2010, p. 58. [Hebrew] 7 Michael Milstein, “Muqawama: The Challenge of Resistance to Israel's National Security Concept,” Memorandum No. 102, Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, December 2009. [Hebrew]


February 1992]. The first blow we landed on them was very painful,

because it was a surprise to the Israelis. On our part, we discovered

that after launching Katyusha rockets at the settlements, the enemy

stopped attacking us and from that day we understood the lesson of

that event…”8

The firing of rockets at the home front and the integration of

new offensive elements9 in the opponent's strategy, are designed to

serve several possible concepts, such as an accumulation of

achievements by taking a toll in life and property, disrupting the

fabric of life by damaging societal life (for instance the closure of

learning institutions), disruption of the economy, damage to

strategic assets, etc. Furthermore, one can identify in recent years

and conflicts a prolongation of the fighting, thus exhausting Israel in

general (attrition) and the home front in particular.10 This

combination of a threat to the home front and the prolongation of

hostilities creates a real challenge to the home front and to national

security. As the campaign continues, the need to return to routine

becomes stronger, although the conflict is continuing.

Tensions in Home Front Defense

The underlying imperative behind the Israeli home front civil

defense effort is saving lives. The idea is to minimize the damage

caused by enemy attacks on the population, based on a multi-tiered

response whose main components are preventing assaults by

8 Interview with Hassan Nasrallah, Al-Jazeera, 27 May 2003, quoted in Brun, op. cit. p. 70. The effect of the fire on the home front was already a point of discussion in 1981 among the PLO in Lebanon, when it recognized the significant impact the fire had on the Israeli population. See also: Isaac Ben-Israel, op. cit., p. 71. 9 LTC N., “Third Lebanon War - Toward a Change in the Systemic Concept of Hezbollah,” Ma’arachot, 454, April 2014, pp. 4-8. The combat during operation Operation “Protective Edge” demonstrated that Hamas has intensified the basic elements of the strategy - firing of rockets and holding actions - while developing an additional offensive element, an offensive array whose purpose was to achieve psychological warfare achievements and which focused on raids whose objectives were not to seize territory, but rather to cause damage and casualties. It is discernible that Hezbollah has undergone similar changes, leading to the development of offensive elements. 10 “Attrition” has been the subject of many debates: whether it is a tactic of the strong or the weak side to a conflict. It worth noting that attrition in campaigns of this kind, is not solely a tactic used by our opponents, but it could also serve IDF strategy.


attacking threat sources, active defense, and personal protection.

Concurrently, efforts are made to maintain an “emergency routine,”

the essence of which is to allow a basic daily routine for civil society

during conflicts. This effort contributes to the national strength by

“augmenting the resilience of the economy locally and nationally,

and by creating a functional continuity…”11

These efforts create a tension whose essence is in risk-taking

- between conservation of life (defense and avoidance) and

maintaining the fabric of daily life. As the level of protection

decreases, restrictions on the functioning of the home front

increase. As shown in the diagram below, two opposing forces

influence the functional range of possibilities during emergencies.

On the one hand (the green arrow) the desire to protect and

safeguard life calls for “taking cover,” and on the other hand (the

purple arrow) the desire for freedom of action and daily routine

encourages a continuation of normal life and the taking of risks.

Figure 1: Home front efforts - Protecting oneself vs functioning

This range of possibilities includes all the normal activities of

daily life - from medical services to entertainment and leisure. Of

course, there can be no comparison between various normal

activities and the proper functioning of the health system, which is

immeasurably more important than the broadcasting of reality

11 Home Front Command, Basic Concept, IDF internal document, p. 93. [Hebrew]


programs (such as the television show Big Brother during Operation

Protective Edge). However, one should not underestimate any of the

public activities because together they comprise the complete

package known as societal resilience. The Israeli home front’s

steadfastness during Operation Protective Edge was characterized

by societal resilience allowing it to effectively cope with a long

attrition campaign.12 Societal resilience was reflected in the ability to

“respond flexibly to serious disturbances (...), to allow a proportional

and temporary functional withdrawal, to bring about a quick, with

local changes and occasional adaptations, functional recovery to the

original level of societal identity and conduct.”13

Facing the fire on the home front, active defense systems

were developed, reducing damage to the home front, but

exacerbating the tension between routine and protection due to

their ability to reduce the likelihood of damages to the home front.

As the level of defense increases the sense grows among the public

that it is possible to maintain daily routine life during an emergency.

Defensive systems indeed reduce the risk, thereby increasing the

need to enable routine activities and the taking of calculated risks.

These defensive systems, which, as noted, serve as a protective layer

in the effort to save lives, affect the decision-makers and the public

on both sides. The influence of the defensive systems is in increasing

the leeway and calculated risks that can be taken to enable daily

routine life and civilian activities, in addition to those necessitated

during war.14

12Meir Elran and Alex Altshuler. “Lessons from the Civilian Front - Interim Summary,” INSS Insight 581, July 31, 2014. 13 Meir Elran and Alex Altshuler. “The Civilian Front in Operation Protective Edge,” in Anat Kurtz and Shlomo Brom (eds). The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, INSS, November 2014. 14 On the potential of defensive systems, read the article by Brig. Gen. Shahar Shohat, Commander of the Air Defense Division and Yaniv Friedman, a researcher at the Dado Center in this volume.


Figure 2: The relationship between the quality of defense and the

intensity of the conflict

During ongoing conflicts, whose essence is attrition,

decision-making becomes more complicated, and a dilemma arises

between preserving life and maintaining the fabric of life. As the

conflict continues and the level of the home front protection rises,

the tension between saving lives and efforts to preserve routine life

increases. This intensifies the need to grapple with a relatively new

type of dilemma, requiring decisions that will contribute to success

in both aspects, while understanding the interest and the national

context, as well as the tactical challenge of this type of defense.

This tension between self-protection and the enabling of the

fabric of daily life allows an escape from the rigid framework of self-

protection (which is in essence unambiguous and apparently

presents no dilemmas), and allows a dialogue about the space where

one can maintain the fabric of daily life. A discussion of the latter

type requires an understanding of the broader context - the enemy’s

will, our own will and the circumstances - and of what it can

contribute to national resilience, therefore leading to a freedom of

action and to promoting our own interests, as well as to an


adaptation to local needs and challenges - this will be discussed

below.

The Operational Level of Home Front Defense

Success in preserving daily routine alongside reducing injury

to life and property may lead to an important achievement for Israel,

by removing the sting from enemy actions. Operation Protective

Edge, which lasted 50 days, demonstrated (with reservations and

limitations) success in home front defense, whose strategic

significance was in neutralizing the central element of the

opponent's strategy - causing injury to the home front.15

Active defense systems played a crucial role in this

achievement. But this impressive achievement is not the essence.

Alongside defense, the ability to function in emergencies and

perform routine activities is another major factor that should be

given consideration. In conflicts where achievements are cumulative

(points) and not a decisive defeat (knockout), reducing the enemy's

achievements is highly valuable. Prevention of damage on the home

front is one important motive, but it is not the only one. Preventing

the obstruction of daily life is a supplementary one. The ability to

maintain a relatively reasonable daily routine is a genuine force

multiplier, gaining “points” in this type of campaign. Another

important fact to keep in mind is that failure on the home front,

measured in casualties and dysfunction, may cause the whole

campaign to be considered a failure, regardless of the successes at

the front.

The ability to maintain a relatively reasonable daily life, as

was evident during Operation Protective Edge, was based on a

differential defense policy setting (distinct and tailored to the

threat), on the exercises and implementation of defensive

procedures, on increasing the number of warning areas and

improving warning capabilities through additional measures (such as

cellular phones). This practice reduces the frequency of disturbances

to citizens’ lives and harm to the economy, as well as contributing to

15 Meir Elran and Alex Altshuler. “The Civilian Front in Operation Protective Edge,” op. cit., pp. 110-111.


overall conduct during the emergency.16 The combination of physical

protection and the contribution of active defense systems generated

a reality that allowed the maintenance of almost routine activity.

This combination neutralized the central operational element of the

enemy’s campaign - causing injury to the home front by firing

missiles and rockets.

Decision-makers engaged with the home front should

discuss the challenges and unique local needs of each district. These

requirements vary per region and the nature of the campaign, with

defensive steps needing to be adjusted to a region’s character.

At the local level, it is possible to provide an appropriate

response to the tension between the need to protect in order to

safeguard lives and the need for routine activities and the

functioning of the system. The local level of the Home Front

Command (District) can best provide an interpretation of the

national interest whose essence is the success of two efforts -

preserving life and maintaining the daily routine - by understanding

both local challenges and opportunities. As with any operational

entity, influenced by the unique-strategic context and concrete

circumstances, each sub-command must act in accord with its

unique conditions, which vary with the type of conflict and the

circumstances. In this context, the head of each Home Front District

is required to act in the space between the national (strategic) and

the local (tactical) contexts, bridging the levels and the requirements

of each.

In the 1991 Gulf War, only two levels of control were

identified for managing challenges on the home front - the strategic

level, where decisions were made on a nationwide scale (defense

rules, institutions closures, evacuation etc.) and the tactical level,

where the troops acted to save lives. This was apparently also the

case in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. The changes, manifested

during the Second Lebanon War in the intensity of the threat to the

home front, alongside other developments that have taken place in

16 Ibid.


recent years in active defense capabilities, necessitate the

development of another layer of thinking to cope with the challenge.

Such a layer level should combine national needs with local

challenges, leading to the achievement of local successes, with

implications for national achievement.

The operational-local home front defense level is the

appropriate one for managing the tension between lifesaving and

routine maintenance. In emergencies, the strategic level can work

towards achieving maximum protection. However, without

understanding unique local challenges and variables, it will struggle

to even meet this one-dimensional challenge. Adding the need to

maintain daily routine and the dilemmas which arise from it

necessarily leads to the development of the local level, which can

understand the wider context and the need to maintain daily routine

alongside the capability to maneuver defensively.

In order to realize this, implementable and practical tools are

required to protect the home front. These tools for the local level,

that is the district commander, are analytical - providing a good

understanding of the context- as well as practical - enabling the

improvement of defensive actions, and a concentration of effort to

deal with a developing threat or a local event (such as an inevitable

mass gathering similar to the funeral mentioned in the introduction

to this article).

Despite all this, it is important to clarify that currently district

commanders lack tools which would enable them to influence the

defense of their sector. The defense situation changes constantly and

a district commander is required to influence all the defensive

elements in their sector, but they are limited in their capabilities and

therefore cannot implement their significant insights about

defensive needs. This limitation stands out especially in relation to

the ability to influence air defense in terms of time and space, and

the ability to affect actions on the front which may improve the

home front defense (to be further discussed below).

The local point of view, as reflected in the perspective of the

district commander, is relatively broad (more than one city or several

communities). This broad perspective allows the tackling of


defensive challenges in the district, through an integrated

examination of all the threats and needs, as well as through

differential actions. For example, within a single district one might

define several different protection levels, in relation to different

threat levels and the need to maintain daily routine. The District

Command can analyze the defensive needs of different sub-districts,

assigning each one an appropriate defense level, while maintaining

routine in less threatened sub-sectors. Within a district, one can

analyze the concrete threats to each sub-district, in relation to the

complexity of its population and the means of protection at its

disposal, the strength of the local leadership, etc. This analysis is

made possible by the deep personal familiarity, formal and informal,

of the commander with his district. A district commander may

concentrate his efforts on a certain sub-district, thus reducing the

personal protection level, while increasing the freedom of action of

his residents. This situation might not only permit some residents to

return to their daily routine, but it might also positively affect the

whole district.

Sometimes, in tactical defensive operations, a community is

defined as so vital as to be held at all costs. If evacuated by its

residents, it would no longer be defined as crucial. In an analogy to

home front defense, a distinct thinking may lead to defining certain

areas as vital, thus determining the levels of protection and defense

assigned to them. As appropriate in each situation, the District

Command might change these levels, for example, following the

departure of residents or their evacuation, or following the removal

of a dangerous industrial component.

The operational level dealing with home front defense has

another channel of influence, a channel that should be further

developed, which influences the discourse about military action at

the front. Strengthening the relationship between action taken at

the front and defensive measures on the home front is vital to both

sides, because it may reduce threats to the home front while

promoting operations at the front, achieving significant influence

over the opponent and their achievements. This can be achieved by


converting threats that accurately target certain home front sectors

into military objectives at the front. An example occurred during the

Second Lebanon War, when the Galilee Division under the command

of Gal Hirsch employed the elite Maglan unit to silence the fire from

the Tyre area towards the Western Galilee. The Maglan unit

succeeded in neutralizing about 70 Hezbollah targets.17

Defense of the Home Front and Its Contribution to the Overall

Achievements in a Conflict

In this part of the article we will present another perspective

on this issue. We will argue that success in defending the home front

- preventing casualties and maintaining daily routine - contributes

directly to success in the conflict. Consequently, defense in general

and home front defense in particular, must be integrated within the

security concept discourse.

Events on the home front in the War of Independence,

especially the bombing of Tel Aviv, deeply affected the founder of

the Israeli national security concept, David Ben-Gurion. Ben-Gurion

feared that attacks on the home front, to which he was personally

exposed, would lead to the abandonment of settlements, and saw

them as an “enormous danger.”18 The problem as he saw it was

related to national, social, and personal strength, and the solutions

he proposed were not necessarily military, but social and economic,

similar to other elements in his security concept. In Ben-Gurion's

view, the physical damage to the home front (life and property) was

not the main issue, and could not subdue Israel. The primary damage

was collateral, to the economy and morale.

In the development of the Israeli security concept over the

years, and in accord with its relevance during the different

confrontations (from the Sinai War to the 1982 Lebanon War), it is

apparent that defending the home front was not central to the

17 Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff. 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; Chen Kotas-Bar. “You See the Launcher Fire Ten Rockets - And You Blow It Up,” Maariv, September 12, 2007. 18 David Ben Gurion. "Security Review," Ma’arachot, 279-280, May 1981, p. 11. [Hebrew] The review was originally written in October 1953 and published in 1981.


security concept and discourse.19 In fact, until the early 1990s, the

front was hit only in an extremely limited way, as a secondary

objective only. But in 1992, in the wake of the First Gulf War, during

which the home front was hit and the threat intensified, the Home

Front Command was established.

The call to address the threat to the home front and

understand its importance to national security was formalized in

2006. In its report on Israeli defense doctrine, the Meridor

Committee argued that the element of defense should be added to

the Israeli national security concept. Today, it is clear that the

outcomes of the struggle between Israel and its enemies will also be

determined to a large extent in the home front theater, and that

“success on the home front is essential for a national victory in future

conflicts.”20 This success will be measured in casualties, but in other

respects as well, such as economic, including damage to national

infrastructure, to the Israeli economy, to the gross national product

(GDP), to tourism and to other determinants of success. It is clear

that extensive injury to life has a significant impact on success or

failure in the home front theater, and on the public narrative that

develops after a war. The effort to save lives is the central one, but a

paralysis of civilian systems and various other damage can

undermine success, both inwardly and outwardly.

Recently we have witnessed an increase in the importance

of home front defense, and its impact on confrontation outcomes is

increasing. In an era where clear-cut victories at the front are not

achieved, and Israel must deal with non-state organizations firing at

the home front, every aspect of civil activity has a great value.

Efficient management, functioning civil systems and “business as

usual,” may well forestall enemy achievements.

19 It is important to qualify this statement and note that in Ben-Gurion's view, perhaps because of his personal experiences in London during WW II, defending the home front loomed large, therefore he demanded that during the Sinai War the French deploy a squadron of aircraft in Israel, and prior to the Six Day war, he was angry at the Chief of Staff Rabin for neglecting the home front. 20 Reut Institute, op. cit., p. 20.


The Second Lebanon War was a major turning point in our

understanding of the importance of home front defense. In that war,

which lasted 34 days, 160 Israelis were killed, including 41 civilians,

thousands were injured, hundreds of houses were damaged, and

hundreds of thousands of citizens were forced to leave their homes.

Many were required to stay in shelters and protected areas for long

periods of time and found it difficult to maintain a normal daily

routine. Economic activity was disrupted and affected, small and

medium businesses collapsed and daily activity in northern Israel

was substantially reduced. About 300,000 inhabitants of the north

left their homes and moved temporarily to the south. The State

Comptroller, who investigated in depth the functioning of home

front defense during the war, pointed to numerous flaws in the

functioning of the home front authorities during the emergency.21

Local initiatives led by individuals, such as the tent city set

up by (then) Israeli businessman Arcadi Gaydamak, testified to the

loss of control by the authorities, and to their being situated on the

lowest rung of the hierarchy of needs in the home front - security

and a desire to survive.22 At the end of 2006, when rockets were fired

from the Gaza Strip towards the South, and another civilian initiative

to evacuate residents was put on the table, Defense Minister Amir

Peretz attacked the initiative, explaining that: “We should prepare

an orderly program to assist residents, so that they won’t need to

knock on the doors of philanthropists.”23

Furthermore, in May 2007, in response to Gaydamak’s

request to establish a tent city in Tel Aviv, the Deputy Defense

Minister, Efraim Sneh, retorted: “Gaydamak is serving Israel's worst

enemies with his actions.”24 It seems that these statements reflect

lessons learnt from the conduct of the home front in the Second

21 Israel State Comptroller, Preparations of the Home Front and Its Functioning in the Second Lebanon War (Summary), 2007. [Hebrew] 22 Eli Bernstein, “Gaydamak Establishes Another Tent City,” Maariv, July 24, 2006. [Hebrew] 23 Michael Greenberg. “Tent City? Arcadi Gaydamak Takes the Residents of Sderot for a Weekend in Eilat as a Result of the Increased Rocket Attacks on the City.” The Marker, November 16, 2006. [Hebrew] 24 IDF Radio quoted in “Gaydamak's Tent City Moves to Tel Aviv,” Globes, May 22, 2007. [Hebrew]


Lebanon War, and an internalization by the authorities of their

responsibility to the home front.

The ability to navigate crises on the home front and to deal

with them successfully adds to Israel's national security in general

and to its deterrence in particular. Success of this kind generates

social resilience, projecting to the public and the civil systems that it

is possible to cope with the challenge. Such success radiates

outwards as well, to the enemy, emphasizing that we have the ability

to get through the crisis, and that their attacks on the home front

have a negligible effect, despite their increasing and growing

investment in attempts to strike at it.

Success on the home front has several levels. At the basic

level is the prevention of human casualties. Furthermore, the basic

civilian system must continue to function properly in the fields of law

enforcement, medicine, energy, food, water and other services. The

upper level includes the functioning of the economy and all civilian

systems in a manner close to normal. A functioning of all systems

and success on all levels would contribute significantly to the general

success of a campaign.

These levels may be described as a pyramid analogous to

Maslow’s pyramid of needs, representing the aspiration during

emergencies for a restoration of all systems, and to their return to

normal activity. In a military campaign, we wish to position ourselves

as close as possible to the top of the pyramid, symbolizing greater

achievement. Greater success on the home front means that we are

positioned at a higher level. Each level of the pyramid rests on its

predecessor, and it is difficult (although sometimes possible) to skip

levels. Each home front district has its own pyramid, which

corresponds to its ability to function, and each one should aspire to

a full recovery of all systems. The pyramid may represent, post

factum, each district’s success in maintaining routine.

For example, during the Gulf War learning institutions were

closed in many areas of the country, people were evacuated from

their residences and cultural and leisure events were canceled. Thus,

we may understand that during that conflict, the engagement was


primarily at the first level of needs, and the second functioned

because the threat was limited. However, in examining Operation

Protective Edge, for example, we can distinguish between conflict

areas where the realization of the needs was mainly at the first level,

and others where activities were close to the topmost level.

Figure 3: The pyramid of needs on the home front

It is important to emphasize that the scenario involving an

attrition campaign as part of a long conflict, in which the rate and

effectiveness of fire on the home front are declining, is not the only

conceivable one. It is possible to imagine campaigns with intense

fire, having a widespread impact over a short timeframe. Such

situations would produce a sharp and clear challenge to the home

front, primarily around the saving of lives. Such cases present no

dilemma for the defensive forces at the home front: all their energy,

and efforts, would be invested in the immediate challenge.

These are complex situations, especially in terms of the

physical challenge, requiring a capability to deal with multiple strikes


within a short time. Dealing with these situations is very similar to

coping with a natural disaster (a blizzard or huge fires), where the

struggle is mainly physical in facing the immediate challenge

(rescuing the injured, maintaining open rescue routes, etc.). During

national challenges of this type (an existential threat or another

major threat), the steadfastness of the Israeli home front, which is

based on a general mobilization, cohesion, and a faith in the

righteousness of our path, is realized in a clear and admirable

manner.

Conclusions and a View to the Future

Due to the changes in warfare - from total to limited wars,

involving smaller forces, from wars involving decisive victories to

wars of attrition - the importance of the home front has changed.

Today, due to the nature of war and the conversion of the home front

into a central objective for our enemies, defending the home front

requires saving life, while simultaneously allowing the civilian system

to function at various levels - social, economic, and more. The

functioning of the civilian system at all levels, in a manner allowing

routine daily activities to take place, is an important achievement,

neutralizing the operational purpose of our enemies.

In conclusion, we understand that in order to bridge the

tension between the need for protection and the saving of lives, and

the need to conduct routine activities, a local level is required, in the

person of the District Commander, who must mediate between

these tensions while managing risks and continuously exploring

what can possibly be maintained of daily routine. The challenge at

each level of home front defense is in saving life (the basic level of

the hierarchy of needs), but also in climbing the pyramid of needs to

reach the higher levels of functioning. It is important to understand

that the challenges vary between the geographical districts, and for

each an appropriate response is required. Alongside the

understanding that the district commander is able to best integrate

strategic insights together with local challenges and to optimally

implement both in his sector, we also appreciate that they lack the


tools to influence the defense of their sector, especially in the

context of the fighting at the front and air defenses.


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Protective Edge, INSS, November 2014.

By Land, by Sea, by Air. And by Cyber?

Roni Katzir

Introduction

“I have decided to establish a national authority for cyber

affairs, which will take care of the cyber defense of Israel. Not only

for the defense of important installations and defense facilities, but

also to protect the citizens of Israel from attacks. This is a new

authority; it is, in effect, the establishment of an Israeli Air Force

against new threats… We are in a new world, preparing ourselves

with new forces.”1

With these words, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu opened the cabinet meeting at which he announced his

intention to establish a “National Cyber Defense Authority,” which

would serve as the executive arm of the National Cyber Bureau.

A few months later, the government passed the decision

establishing the Authority. The Authority’s role, once established,

will be to defend Israel’s national realm within cyberspace. This will

include formulating national situation assessments in the field,

identifying threats and attacks, and dealing with attacks and

incidents in real time. All this will take place in coordination with the

relevant security entities. 2

This decision puts an end (for now) to the ongoing dispute

between the Israel Security Agency (also known as the Shabak/Shin

Bet) and the National Cyber Bureau over which of the two bodies

would be entrusted with defending the civil sector from cyber

threats.

Curiously, the voice of the IDF was absent from the debate.

The decision makes it clear that the IDF will not bear responsibility

(or authority) for defending Israel from threats in cyberspace. “A

1 Excerpts from the Government meeting of September 21, 2014. See: Moti Bassok, “Netanyahu: National Cyber Defense Authority to be Established,” The Marker, September 21, 2014. [Hebrew] 2 Government of Israel, Cabinet Decision 2444, February 15, 2015.


cyber force” will be established, but unlike the air, sea and land

forces - it will be established and exist outside the IDF.

This article will discuss the practical implications of Israel's

decision to establish a National Cyber Defense Authority and the

IDF’s role in this field. It will critically examine the decision to snatch

the responsibility for national defense in cyberspace from the IDF

and place it in the hands of a new entity, which is to be entrusted

with defending civilian interests in cyberspace.

To examine this issue, I will begin by examining the meaning

of the term “cyber warfare,” and attempt to understand the type of

threat facing Israel. I will also review the development of the Israeli

institutions engaged in this field. This will serve us as the background

for discussing the appropriate entity to bear responsibility for cyber

defense, and I will relate, among others, to the role definition and

function of the IDF, and to the difficulties inherent in the

employment of the IDF by a civilian entity.

What Is Cyber Warfare?

The cyber threat is a multifaceted phenomenon, but to pose

a strategic threat to a state like Israel with advanced cyber

infrastructure, an attacker needs a combination of intent and means.

Regardless of the intent, and assuming it exists, today the tools for

action against an advanced state are primarily in the hands of world

powers. However, these tools are likely to be obtained by terror

organizations and states supporting terrorism against Israel in the

future. Therefore, the main threat, even in cyberspace, is still the

security threat, or more precisely the threat of cyber warfare.

The relationship between the development of the

technology world and the evolution of the modern battlefield is

clear. The flood of information and technologies that have

penetrated the battlefield, and the accessibility of cyber-attack

capabilities to anyone who has access to a personal computer, have

KATZIR | BY LAND, BY SEA, BY AIR. AND BY CYBER? | 119

led to a fundamental change in the characteristics of war3 and gave

birth to the term “cyber warfare.”

In the 1990s, the concept of “information warfare” was first

developed.4 Military thinkers and scholars led by Alvin and Heidi

Toffler discussed the importance of information and the control of

information on the battlefield. At the time, the prevailing

assumption was that information warfare and cyber warfare were

one phenomenon.5 A conceptual debate arose when Arquilla and

Ronfeldt, political scientists from the Rand Corporation, published an

article with the ominous title, “Cyberwar is Coming!”6 which foresaw

a deep change in the structure of military organizations in view of

the expected frequent occurrence of cyber warfare based entirely on

electronically transmitted information.

From that moment on, the world has been divided into two

groups - “the alarmists,” pessimists who predict that the

development of cyber capabilities could bring down a modern state;

and the skeptics, who understand that a cyber threat exists which

may harm civilian or national infrastructure, but regard it as a mere

nuisance, not a national threat.7 Over the years, a debate has

evolved along this axis relating to American policy for dealing with

cyber threats. However, the experience gained in recent years has

led to one general consensus: contrary to the concept espoused by

Arquilla and Ronfeldt, most experts currently tend to accept the

assertion that the cyber dimension is not an independent battlefield.

Just as it is unlikely that on the modern battlefield warfare will take

3 See, for example: Rex Hughes, “Towards a Global Regime for Cyber Warfare,” in Christian Czosseck and Kenneth Geers (eds.), The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber Warfare, 2009, pp. 106-117. 4To analyze the implications of information warfare from the perspective of the end of the 1990’s, see: Yitzhak Ben-Israel. “Information Warfare,” Ma’arachot, 369 (2000), p. 18. [Hebrew] 5 See, for example: Gil Baram, “Cyber war preparedness,” Ma’arachot, 456 (2014), pp. 22-27. [Hebrew] 6 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is coming,” Comparative Studies, 12: (1993), pp. 141-165. 7 See: Jean-Loup Sammaan, “Cyber Command, The Rift in US Cyber Training Strategy,” RUSI Journal, 155: 16-21 (2010); Ryan Singel, “White House Cyber Czar: There Is No Cyberwar,” Wired.com, 4 March 2010.


place in one dimension only - air, sea or land - so it is unlikely that

warfare will occur in the cyber dimension only.

The attack on Iran, known as Stuxnet, strengthened this

approach. This attack is considered one of the most advanced in

history, and it was the first to cause substantial physical damage.8

However, though great efforts were clearly invested in the attack, its

result was, at best, a slight bump in the road for the Iranian nuclear

program. 9

Therefore, in the military context, cyber capabilities are a

sophisticated addition to the tools of the combat forces, as were the

airplane, the submarine, and the nuclear bomb. This understanding

of the cyber threat should underlie the debate about how to defend

against it.

The Development of Cyber Defense Institutions in Israel

Israel was among the first states to identify the emerging

challenges presented by cyberspace. In 1997, The Tehila Project

(Government Infrastructure for the Internet Age) was established to

secure government ministry links to the Internet. In 2002, the

Information Security National Authority was established within the

Israel Security Agency (ISA).10 It supplies professional guidance on

computer infrastructure security to entities of national importance,

against threats of terrorism, espionage and exposure.11

With increasing threats in cyberspace,12 a special team was

established in November 2010 to engage in formulating a national

8See, for example: David Kushner, “The Real Story of Stuxnet,” IEEE Spectrum (26 February 2013), downloaded from Spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet. 9 Jon R. Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare,” Security Studies, 22 (2013), pp. 365-404. 10 Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs Decision B/84 of 11 December 2002. 11 The powers of the ISA in this regard are derived from the “Law Regulating Security in Public Institutions – 1998.” 12 Since 2007 the world has witnessed several attacks in cyberspace during disputes between

states, such as Russia’s attacks on Estonia and Georgia, attacks by China on the United States and the Stuxnet attack in Iran that was mentioned above. Recently, Kaspersky Labs released documentation of attacks performed against states involved in the search for the Malaysian plane which went missing, which were immediately responded to by one of the states attacked. Costin Raiu and Maxim Golovkin. “The Chronicles of the Hellsing APT: The Empire Strikes Back,” Securelist (15 April 2015). For an in-depth overview of attacks that have been

Spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet.


program aimed at placing Israel among the five leading states in

terms of activity in cyberspace.

Following its work, which was titled “The National Cyber

Initiative,” the government decided on August 2011 to establish a

National Cyber Bureau in the Prime Minister’s Office. The mission of

the Bureau is to formulate Israel’s defensive concept in cyberspace

and to promote cooperation among government entities, academia,

industry and the private sector. The Bureau is also entrusted with

establishing a program for the development of cyber infrastructure

technologies and research.13 The Cyber Bureau was established on

the recommendation of a team headed by the Chairman of the

National Council for Research and Development, Maj. Gen. (res.)

Professor Yitzhak Ben Israel. The establishment of the headquarters

was meant to create a “strategic roof” for all operational units

providing cyber defense (ISA, IDF, Israel Police etc.).14

The next step in the development of the national cyber

defense infrastructure was the establishment of the National

Cyberspace Defense Authority. Following the declaration of the

Prime Minister quoted at the beginning of this article, on February

15, 2015, the Cabinet approved a comprehensive plan for national

readiness in cyberspace. The decision stipulates that a National

Cyber Defense Authority will be established within the Prime

Minister’s Office which will have overall national responsibility for

cyber defense. The Authority’s primary role is to “direct, operate,

and execute as needed all defensive and operational efforts at the

national level in cyberspace, based on a systemic approach, to allow

a full and ongoing defensive response to cyber-attacks, including the

handling of cyberspace threats and cyber events in real time…”15

publicized see: Sharon Afek, “Breaking the Rules and Joining in - on the Encounter between Cyberspace and International Law,” Bein Haktavim, Vol. 3 (2014), pp. 45-75.

13 A broad overview on the development of the Israeli engagement the cyber research area appears in an internal study conducted by the IDF. 14 See also: Shmuel Even and David Siman-Tov, “Cyber Warfare: Concepts and Strategic Trends,” Memorandum 117, Institute for National Security Studies, May 2012, p. 79. 15 Government of Israel, Cabinet Decision 2444, February 15, 2015 (author’s emphasis).


It was also decided that the Authority will operate a

Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT-IL), whose functions

will be similar to equivalent entities around the world - coordinate

relevant cyber defense information, and share it with all parties in

the economy (including civilian) in a manner that will improve

national preparedness for dealing with cyber-attacks. The Authority

is also entrusted with the design, implementation, and integration of

a national cyber defense doctrine; with the preparation and

readiness of the Israel economy for cyberspace activity; and with the

promulgation of regulations which enable the direction of the

economy and of the cyber defense services market.

The significance of this decision is that alongside the Cyber

Bureau, an operational arm will be established, bearing

responsibility, authority and the capabilities to carry out proactive

activities in cyberspace for the benefit of the national defense. The

responsibility of the Authority will encompass all defense efforts in

cyberspace, and it emerges from the decision that all other agencies

operating in this field, even though they will retain their

independence in specific fields, will operate according to the

guidelines and doctrine as decided by the Authority.

Alongside the national bodies, the IDF has also established

cyber entities. The IDF Cyber Bureau is subordinate to IDF SIGINT

Unit 8200 and is primarily entrusted with the operational aspects of

cyber warfare.16 Another entity is the Cyber Defense Department,

within the C4I Directorate. The main task of this department is to

thwart intelligence attacks and prevent disruptions and damage to

components of the IDF’s computing systems, in order to ensure the

continuous operation, availability and integrity of the IDF’s

computing processes. The Department employs the most advanced

technological capabilities, and has developed groundbreaking

warfare concepts. However, the Department’s mission indicates that

its main tasks are those doctrinally defined as “security,” comparable

to the securing of IDF bases. It does not deal with operational or

16 Sagi Cohen, “8200: Not Only Looking for Geeks with Eyeglasses,” Ynet, 23 October 2012.


national defense, meaning the defense of the borders of the state

and the security of its citizens from enemy threats.17

Defense in Cyberspace Versus Defense From Cyber Warfare

There are many definitions of the term cyberspace, whose

common denominator is that it is a complex and evolving dimension,

and any attempt to define it is almost doomed to failure from the

start. Therefore, I will not discuss a definition of cyberspace.

However, I will try to evaluate what kind of defense is required in this

dimension, and to distinguish between threats to cyberspace and

threats originating from cyber warfare.

One of the main shapers of state strategy in cyberspace is

the recognition that, on the one hand, this is a crucial space for the

ongoing functioning of the modern state and on the other, it is

exposed to varied threats, some of which are different from the

classical threats to state entities. For example, a single anonymous

attacker in cyberspace striking at civil institutions (such as banks) for

criminal motives, can cause strategic and even tangible security

damage to a state lacking proper defenses. Consequently,

appropriate cyber defense preparation by a state requires the

integration of governmental and civilian systems to establish

defensive systems, gather information and deal with threats in real

time.

One can distinguish between three cyberspace defense

areas. The defense of critical infrastructure (with which the ISA is

currently entrusted);18 the government - civil arena, currently

defended by the government’s ICT Authority; and the

17 For example, “defensive operations” are defined as “blocking enemy attacks and preventing

the capture of the defended area...” (Operations Division, Basic Operational Doctrine, p. 77). A defensive battle is defined as “a tactical form of battle, intended to block enemy attacks and to prevent the capture of the defended area, or to prevent injury to people and equipment found in the area being defended and for who’s safety the defender is responsible.” (Ground Forces, Ground Forces Operations, vol. 3, defensive operations, p. 3).

18 The Government decision states that the responsibility for cyberspace will be transferred within three years from the ISA to the “National Cyber Defense Authority.”


defense/security arena, in which each organization defends its own

sector.

In addition, it is imperative to prepare a dedicated cross-

sector defense. For example, in the criminal field a comprehensive

package is required, including prevention, investigation, and

enforcement of cybercrimes, currently entrusted to the Israel Police.

However, cross-sectorial defense requires intelligence gathering for

warning and interception, and a national center to identify,

investigate and manage the campaign. The intelligence-gathering

tasks should be consolidated through a special department to be

established at the National Cyber Bureau.

As for a national center to manage such a campaign, a Cyber

Command should be established within the IDF, which would serve

as the cyber operational arm in emergencies. The reasons for this

are mainly practical. Cyberspace is a dimension of war and the IDF is

the only organization able to respond rapidly and effectively to

developing threats, while utilizing the existing budgetary resources

and personnel at its disposal. Also, the IDF has the operational

flexibility to act in all areas of warfare. At the same time, an

understanding that responsibility for defending the civil sector

should be in the hands of a civilian entity operating under the

National Cyber Bureau is reflected in government decisions.19

The establishment of a National Cyber Defense Authority,

whose functions were described above, shows that the concept

adopted by the Israeli government is a unified response to civilian

and security threats, through a civilian authority, which will also

direct the activities of the security forces. The Authority will be

required “to manage, operate and perform” all defense operations

in cyberspace. It seems that the Authority is intended to spread its

wings over all the defense circles, and will even lead the cross-

sectorial defense - both in terms of intelligence collection and the

management aspects of the campaign.20

The proposed response requires a holistic approach to the

threats in cyberspace and to Israeli infrastructure, and is consistent

19 Internal IDF research. 20 Internal IDF research.


with the approach that considers cyberspace a new warfare

dimension, requiring a unique response.

The Israel Defense Forces - Also Defending in Cyberspace

One of the main reasons for establishing a civil Cyber

Defense Authority is that a substantial proportion of the threats

involve civilian targets. Consequently, and considering the nature of

the cyber warfare dimension, exercising responsibility in this field

necessarily involves exercising of authority over civilian entities.

My understanding of the term cyber warfare, as noted,

subverts these insights. If we perceive cyberspace as a unique and

holistic warfare theater, the claim that it requires a unique response

makes sense. But if we accept that cyber warfare is not a stand-alone

concept, but an extension of the existing battlefield, then dealing

with this threat should form a part of dealing with the entire network

of threats leveled against the State. This concept returns military

issues to center stage.

In Israel, the IDF is the entity entrusted with defending the

state’s borders from external threats. Its status is anchored in the

Basic Law: The Army, which states that “the IDF is the State’s army.”21

The Law and Administration Ordinance stipulates that the army

“shall have authority to do all lawful and necessary acts for the

defense of the State.”22 The IDF's mission is also derived from this

Ordinance which states that: “Subject to the competent authorities

of the State of Israel and its decisions, the IDF is designated (…) to

defend the State of Israel as founded, its territorial integrity and the

borders of its territory (…), the safety of its citizens (…), and any other

national interest (…) against any enemy or threat, external and

internal.”

There is no dispute that as part of its purpose and function,

the IDF is also responsible for defending civilian institutions, such as

the electric and water companies and the banks, from external

21 State of Israel, Israeli Basic Law: The Army, 1976. 22 State of Israel, Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948.


threats. It is clear to all that the IDF is responsible for intercepting

attacks from the air, sea and land, even when they are directed at

civilians. If so, what is different about the cyber dimension? An

understanding of cyber warfare as a part of classic warfare supports

the conclusion that the overall responsibility for defending from

cyber threats should be entrusted to the IDF.

Furthermore, to fulfill its responsibilities, the IDF was given

the authority to act in the civilian sector during emergencies. The IDF

still has powers originating from the Defense Regulations which

allow, for example, the closure of areas within the state (which is

activated routinely), the removal of people from certain areas, the

closure of roads, and even the directing of civilians. Therefore, there

is no impediment in principle to entrusting the army with the

authority necessary to fulfill its responsibilities in cyberspace, even

if its implementation would involve certain violations of individual

freedoms.23

The law regulating the establishment of the IDF as the sole

armed force in the State of Israel enshrines the basic democratic

principle that on the one hand, the state is entitled to defend its

existence, including through force, and on the other hand, the armed

forces are concentrated in the hands of one entity and are limited

solely to performing the necessary actions in defense of the country.

Also, the Basic Law: The Army, specifies that “no armed forces should

be established or maintained, outside the Israel Defense Forces,

except by law.” Therefore, it seems that the intention to establish a

new operational entity, requiring powers involving the use of force

against foreign entities, raises fundamental constitutional

difficulties.

23 It is understood that this would involve the implementation of a constitutional balancing between the purpose for which the authority was given and its impact on the individual. However, this balancing is the same whether the authority is military or civilian. In any case, the exercise of authority should be made for proper purposes and to no greater extent than required.


Unity of Command: Between Cyber and the Home Front

I argued above that the cyber threat is a part of the military

campaign, therefore it is appropriate to entrust the IDF with the

response. Some claim that the unique characteristics of cyber

warfare, including the anonymity of the attackers, the possibility that

anyone with a computer can carry out an attack, and the virtual

outcomes of an attack, justify the establishment of a civil authority,

while retaining the operational capabilities and the power to use

force, in the hands of the IDF, to be applied if necessary by the

Authority.24

This option could undermine the fundamental principle of

unity of command, under which each office holder in the IDF is

responsible to the authority of a single commander. This splitting of

command would undermine military discipline. According to this

principle, no civilian authority should be given jurisdiction over IDF

soldiers, who are concurrently subject to military command.25 We

may illustrate this difficulty by two possible scenarios.

One such scenario is the threat of an arbitrary cyber-attack

against critical civil infrastructure. In response, the Authority might

order immediate action to be taken by a military unit. Of course, as

long as the unit is subject to military command, this instruction raises

a difficulty. How will the unit choose between tasks imposed on it by

its military command and the civilian mission? Who will prioritize

among the missions and resource allocation?

It can be argued that this difficulty would be resolved if the

military unit was completely subjugated to the Authority. However,

this solution leads to a second scenario, the integration of a cyber

threat within a total war. A cyber-attack could be, for example, a

preliminary attack to a kinetic one. In this case, which entity will lead

the management of the event? The Authority - responsible for cyber

24 It is reasonable to assume that this was one of the courses of action examined prior to implementing the decision to establish the authority, if only for the practical reasons mentioned above. 25 All of this is relevant, even without a discussion of the source of the civilian authority to give orders to a soldier, and the consequences of failure to comply with the order in this case.


defense, or the IDF - responsible for defending from other theaters

of war? How would the two “armed forces” be integrated? Who

would decide whether the cyber warriors, under the command of

the Authority, will be employed in defense or offense?

A similar attempt was recently made in the home front

domain. With the establishment of the Ministry of Home Front

Defense, an attempt was made to endow it with authority to directly

employ the Home Front Command. The IDF’s position on this issue

was firm and unequivocal: The Head of the Home Front Command

has a single commander - the IDF Chief of Staff. The IDF also insisted

that in an emergency, it is impossible to separate the front from the

rear, and that the Ministry of Defense and the IDF should be granted

full authority to manage emergency incidents. As for the Ministry of

Home Front Defense, it was proposed that it would focus mainly on

coordination between the government and additional entities and

local authorities and on the preparation of local authorities for

emergencies.

The analogy to the tasks of the Home Front Command leads

to two important conclusions. One conclusion concerns the issue of

responsibility. The rationale, according to which the IDF should be

given complete responsibility for the management of emergency

incidents, is also valid for emergencies in cyberspace, all the more so

when concerning integrated warfare events. This is also true

regarding instructions to the population at the home front. The IDF

was given responsibility in this field, due to an understanding that it

would have the most up-to-date information about the nature of the

latest threats, the chances of their occurrence and the proper way

to defend against them. Likewise, the army has the ability to

determine, subject to political guidance, which actions of the

population would best serve the objectives of the entire campaign.

It is quite possible that in future wars, involving cyber warfare, it will

be necessary to guide the population on how to behave in

cyberspace (such as guidelines restricting Internet or computer use).

Recognition that the cyber and kinetic campaigns are one and the

same supports the conclusion that this responsibility should also be


entrusted to the entity dealing with the entire management of the

campaign, the IDF.

The second conclusion concerns the issue of authority. If it

was found to be possible to give the IDF the authority required to

engage in the emergency management of the home front, a task

which by its nature involves exercising authority over civilians,26

there is no impediment in principle to granting the IDF similar

powers to deal with the threat of cyber warfare.

The Palmach and Cyberspace

Finally, I would like to present a slightly different angle on

the issue. Dr. Alexander Vacca, an expert in information systems

security and Director of Strategy at the Northrop Grumman

Corporation, claims that the manner in which a combat doctrine is

formed is strongly influenced by the culture of the organization

forming it.27 Organizational culture is reflected in the unique

language common to all members of the organization; in the system

of analogies and metaphors which allow us to understand what

motivates the members of an organization; and the causal contexts

that explain phenomena and traditions within the organization; and

especially, shape the way that new information is processed.

According to Vacca's approach, it is too early to define the

nature of the cyber threat and consequently, too early to decide on

the correct way to deal with it. Therefore, he proposes a “cultural

tool” to predict how combat doctrine would evolve in the cyber

world, according to the entity responsible for its implementation.

Using this tool, he tries to predict the development of the cyber

warfare concept of the US Navy’s Cyber Command, in contrast to its

development by the US Air Force Cyber Command.

The combat culture of the American Navy is based largely on

the writings of Alfred Mahan, an admiral in the American Navy, a

26 The powers of the home front are primarily defined in the Civil Defense Act, 1951. 27 W. Alexander Vacca, “Military Culture and Cyber Security,” Survival (53 (6)), (2011-12), pp. 159-176.


military historian and thinker, termed “the most important American

strategist of the 19th century.” Mahan argued that the Navy was

crucial to maintaining global trade and the ability to deploy forces

from one place to another, in a manner permitting intervention in

military conflicts, thereby increasing the armed force’s influence

beyond their actual power. Thus, he developed the military doctrine

of the US Navy, based in part on powerful vessels balancing offense

and defense - capable of defeating any enemy at sea and difficult to

defeat; on a proactive approach, rather than the passive concept of

creating deterrence; and based on the concept that defeating the

enemy at sea would indirectly bring victory in the war. Vacca claims

that these characteristics would also shape the combat doctrine of

the Cyber Command, which would be based on securing cyberspace

and its maintenance as a means of trade and the transmission of

military information.

Compared to the Navy, the Air Force's combat doctrine is

influenced by the writings of the military thinker Giulio Douhet, one

of the first thinkers in the field of exercising airpower, at the

beginning of the 20th century. Douhet believed that the best defense

is offense, and saw in the Air Force an offensive machine, whose

enormous power would produce deterrence, but which could also

decide wars by itself, not least through the considerable moral

influence of the offensive. Within this culture, the Air Force has

evolved, as expected, a concept of cyber warfare based on a

powerful offensive capability, synchronized with existing kinetic

capabilities, and capable of producing real psychological effects that

could help to defeat the enemy.

This cultural tool may also be helpful in demarcating the

boundaries of responsibility for cyberspace defense in Israel. Indeed,

unlike the situation in the United States, the number of entities

dealing with the subject is not large, and it would presumably be

difficult to trace the military reasoning underlying the establishment

of the IDF Cyber Bureau, or the thinking underlying the

establishment of the National Cyber Defense Authority, which is

currently underway.


However, it is certainly possible to try predicting through the

cultural tool the benefits (and drawbacks) that would be derived

from entrusting the IDF with the responsibility for cyber defense.

There is not enough space here to fully discuss the possible

influences of the IDF’s culture on the development of cyber warfare

doctrine. One can only assume that the fighting spirit of the IDF, its

combat principles and doctrine, rooted in the spirit of the Etzel since

the days of the Palmach pre-state paramilitary organization, would

all be revealed in a cyber warfare doctrine. In the changing cyber

environment, where it is difficult to determine what will develop and

when the next attack will occur or how, it seems that the strong

values of the IDF would certainly help to rapidly develop the required

capabilities in cyberspace.

Conclusion

The national threats in cyberspace are many and varied.

They range from an independent hacker breaking into a bank's

computers and stealing a database of credit card numbers; through

organized groups operating across the network to achieve global

objectives; to state or quasi-state organizations using the cyber

world as a weapon for all intents and purposes. The Government of

Israel recently decided that the operational response to these

threats should be provided by a civilian cyber force - an operational

authority which will operate under the National Cyber Bureau,

whose function will be to perform and manage all operational tasks

to defend cyberspace. This is based on a recognition of the need to

provide a uniform and comprehensive response to the unique

threats directed against Israel in cyberspace.

This article introduced another viewpoint, which sees the

mission to defend cyberspace from within the primary security

threat, that of a cyberwar. This threat does not exist on its own, but

is another tier in the network of threats arising from the conflict in

which the State of Israel has found itself since its foundation.

This understanding of the cyber threat casts doubt on the

argument that it should be dealt with by a civilian authority. Just as


the invention of the airplane, the nuclear weapon and the

development of submarines required a realignment of existing

armed forces - including the defensive systems which protected

civilian installations - but did not lead to the establishment of civilian

armies, the cyber threat should be treated similarly, and all the more

so in Israel’s case. Unlike the states for whom cyberwar is a modern

form of the Cold War between superpowers with no physical

confrontation between them,28 for Israel, the cyber security threat

originates primarily from states and terror organizations with whom

we are in an ongoing armed conflict.

Therefore, it is appropriate that the response to cyberwar be

given in the same manner as the responses to other security threats,

i.e., through the IDF’s might. Entrusting responsibility and authority

to the IDF is in line with the democratic principles underlying the

establishment of the IDF as a single armed force in the state, it

implements correctly the IDF’s mission and vision, while preventing

a conflict with the basic principle of unity of command. Aside from

these arguments, there is also the military tradition - bringing with it

a legacy, combat doctrines and crystallized concepts which may also

contribute to the faster development of capabilities in cyberspace.

There are other benefits, which due to the limitations of space were

not reviewed here, such as the advantages of the IDF in recruiting

and developing human resources, and the structural and

technological advantages of the IDF.

The decision to establish a National Cyber Defense Authority

is another expression of Israel’s responsibility, as a world leader in

this field over years. However, it does not absolve us from asking: is

this indeed the most suitable response to a future cyberwar, would

it not be more appropriate to entrust the IDF - as defender of the

state’s borders in the air, on land and at sea - with this in cyberspace

too?

28 For example, the confrontation between the United States and China and Russia.


Epilogue

Shortly before the publication of this article, the decision of

the IDF’s Chief of Staff to establish a cyber arm was made public.29 It

seems that this decision reflects an understanding among military

leaders of the IDF's role, among others, in defending Israel from

cyberwar threats. However, it seems that this decision is inconsistent

with the Government's decision. It may create a struggle over

authority between the civilian cyber branch, which “will have overall

national responsibility for cyber defense, and will oversee cyber

defense activities,” in the operational space and the military cyber

branch. It seems that to fulfill the Chief of Staff’s vision, it will be

necessary to re-examine the functions and responsibilities of the

recently established Cyber Defense Authority.

29 Yoav Zitun, “IDF establishes new cyber branch,” Ynet, 15 June 2015. [Hebrew]


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Strategic Trends.” Institute for National Security Studies Memorandum

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[Hebrew]

Active Defense as the Fourth Pillar of the Israeli Security Concept – The Lesson from Operation

Protective Edge

Meir Finkel, Yaniv Friedman, Dana Preisler-Swery

Introduction

The traditional Israeli security concept proposed three pillars

- deterrence, early warning and decisive defeat (hachra’a) - as the

basis for Israel’s ability to cope with the security challenges

surrounding the country.1 This concept, which had served as the

basis for Israeli thinking in the early years of the State, was found to

be lacking in the 1980s and 1990s. The missile threat on the Israeli

home front in the first Gulf War in 1991, and more so during the

Second Lebanon War in 1996, informally led to the addition, through

the Meridor Committee on Israel’s Defense Doctrine in 2007, of a

fourth, defensive pillar.2 Operations Pillar of Defense in 2012 and

Protective Edge in 2014 further demonstrated the centrality of

defense to Israel’s future security challenges.

However, a conceptual debate about the centrality of

defense within the security concept has yet to be carried out.

Despite the centrality of defense to the new concept, the requisite

combination of defense with the other components of the security

concept - deterrence, early warning, and decisive defeat - has not

yet been deeply examined. Furthermore, a comprehensive analysis

of the existing tensions and the required balance between defense

and offense and its implications has been lacking.

Operation Protective Edge will serve as the basis for our

discussion of the status of defense in the Israeli security concept.

During the operation, an active defense system was widely

employed, and we shall use this experience to examine the status of

1 Israel Tal, National Security: The Israeli Experience, Praeger Security International, 2000, pp. 67-88. 2 Dan Meridor, “Civil Defense as Part of the Israeli Security Concept,” in Elran Meir (Ed.) The Civil Front, INSS Memorandum No. 99, June 2009, pp. 15-16. [Hebrew]


active defense within the wider concept of the defensive pillar of the

security concept.

This article will focus on these two key issues. First, we will

examine the balance between defense and offense within the

security concept, followed by an analysis of the debate between the

political and military echelons over the role of defense. Both issues

will be examined for contrast and comparison, over two-time

periods - before and during Protective Edge.

We will offer two main arguments. The first concerns the

relationship and balance between defense and offense. Operation

Protective Edge was a defensive strategy where the defensive

element was dominant, unlike the military concepts prior to the

Operation that favored the dominance of protection. The second

argument deals with the role of defense in the eyes of the political

and military echelons, following an examination of differences

between politicians who regarded defense as external to the IDF and

equal in value to offense and the IDF which regards defense as an

integral component of its role.

This article is divided into four parts. In the first we will

discuss the dilemmas arising from the addition of the defensive pillar

to the Israeli security concept; in the second we will examine prior

concepts about the relation between defense and offense versus the

reality during Protective Edge; in the third part, we will delve into the

gaps between the political and military echelons, prior to and during

Protective Edge; and in the fourth we will summarize and propose

several operational conclusions.

A methodological note - In this article, we will discuss two

aspects of defense. One is the “defensive pillar” as a new component

of the Israeli security concept, meaning defense of the home front

from all threats. The other deals with active defense - the air defense

array and active defense systems which are concerned with

thwarting the enemy’s rocket and missile capabilities and not with

repulsing enemy forces attempting to enter our territory.

FINKEL, FRIEDMAN & PREISLER-SWERY | THE FOURTH LEG OF THE SECURITY CONCEPT | 139

Dilemmas in Force Design Due to the Addition of a Defensive

Element to the Israeli Security Concept

An understanding that Israel’s security concept needed to

change led to the addition of the defensive pillar. This addition

generated a number of dilemmas due to a clash between the

defensive element and the other elements of the security concept,

as well as the normal tensions underlying any system undergoing

change and reorganization.

Organizationally, as with any system whose resources are

limited, the addition of defensive systems directly reduces other

units' budgets. Since the struggle over resources underlies any

organization or system, the decision to develop, produce, employ,

and maintain defensive systems was met with opposition from the

proponents of an offensive approach within the IDF, who were

apprehensive about budgetary issues as well as the shift in focus to

the new systems.

Conceptually, a debate developed among decision makers,

both politicians and military officers, about the influence of

defensive systems on the decisive defeat concept and its derivative

tool - offense - on the broader IDF security concept. Opponents of

the defensive pillar raised serious arguments concerning the

problematic nature of relying on defense. They argued that “a

defensive line is bound to break,”3 and that real damage would be

sustained to the decisive defeat and offensive principles. These

might well become secondary within the security concept, due to

the creation of a defensive capacity able to neutralize the offensive

capabilities of the opponent.4

An additional conceptual debate centered around the link

between deterrence and the defensive systems. A defensive

capability does contribute to Israel’s deterrence. However, a tension

3 IDF Ground Forces Command, Ground Forces Operations, January 2012, p. 5. [Hebrew] 4 Yiftah S. Shapir. “Lessons from the Iron Dome,” Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 5, No. 1, May 2013, pp. 87-88.


exists between deterrence and defense. Investing in defense5 may

be perceived by the other side as an attempt to avoid confrontation,

as an Israeli vulnerability. The proponents of this approach argue

that Israeli deterrence will always provide the best defense, and

investing in defensive means is a waste of resources.6

A third, difficult dilemma that stems from the addition of a

defensive pillar to the security concept is related to the flexibility of

the force. For a long time, the IDF preferred to invest in flexible

weapons systems, with both offensive and defensive characteristics.

The clearest example is the fighter jet, capable of carrying out both

offensive action - bombing enemy targets; and defensive missions -

intercepting enemy aircraft in Israel airspace. Israeli armored forces

are another good example. The anti-aircraft array is a defensive

weapon, while tanks, according to IDF doctrine, are an offensive one.

However, already in the 1950s, the IDF preferred to rely on tanks for

defensive purposes and not only for offensive ones, and thus

consolidated the idea of flexibility.7

Defensive and active defensive systems do not realize this

conceptual idea, since they normally lack the required flexibility to

balance between offense and defense.8 A large budgetary,

operational, and conceptual investment in a non-multifunctional

system required - and still requires - a fundamental change in

attitude to force design concepts and in the willingness of decision

makers to adopt such systems.

These dilemmas, which are related to the role of defensive

systems within force design continue to accompany decision makers

who must create the required balance between budgetary

5 See, for example, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s pronouncement: “A State cannot protect itself ad-infinitum,” in Ahia Rabed. “Olmert: A State cannot protect itself ad-infinitum,” Ynet, June 28, 2007, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3418874,00.html [Hebrew] 6 Meir Elran and David Friedman. “Gas Masks: Toward the End of the Line?” INSS Insight, No. 487, November 24, 2013. 7 Zeev Elron. “The Armored threat and the IDF’s anti-tank array, prior to the Sinai War,” in Hagai Golan and Shaul Shai (eds). The Engines Thunder: 50 years to the Sinai War, Tel Aviv, Ma’arachot, 2006, p. 149. [Hebrew] 8 One can interpret the employment of the Vulcan cannon in the First Lebanon War as an exception.


constraints, the different elements of the security concept and

flexibility for the military force. In the article’s next section, we will

examine the balance between offense and defense in earlier

concepts, as compared to the reality of Operation Protective Edge.

The Balance Between Defense and Offense in the IDF’s Operational

Concept Compared to Its Execution During Operation Protective

Edge

In this section, we will review the IDF’s official approach9

when dealing with the defensive pillar, and compare it to the orders

which were written and distributed during Operation Protective

Edge.

The IDF’s approach, as it was developed prior to Protective

Edge, reveals the crystallization of an understanding of the role of

9 The “IDF approach” mentioned here is a summation of the conceptual papers written over the last decade, in addition to the conclusions of the Meridor Committee on Israel’s Defense Doctrine.


defense in relation to the security challenges. It supports the

centrality of defense in the changing battlefield and the need to

augment this element. On the other hand, this approach emphasizes

the importance of a balanced security concept, while doubly

emphasizing the roles of deterrence and decisive defeat. It

concludes that the defensive pillar accompanies offensive action and

in fact enables its implementation, therefore a necessary balance

must be maintained between offensive and defensive responses.

This approach makes clear the (current) need to continue

examining the defensive pillar’s influence on the other three pillars

of the concept - deterrence, early warning and decisive defeat. This

examination, which has not been satisfactorily performed, exists in

the shadow of the presumption that the role of defense is to enable

the realization of the offensive concept.

Furthermore, the secondary role of defense as a supporting

element to the offensive effort is perceived by some of the shapers

of this approach as not only secondary to the other components of

the security concept, but as a component which could actually

become a heavy burden. They fear that it could prevent further

development of the other components and damage, even weaken,

Israel’s offensive response.

In conclusion, underlying the IDF’s approach is the

assumption that the defensive pillar plays a lesser role than the role

it actually played during Protective Edge (as we will show below).

This approach even views the defensive pillar as a “stepson” of the

security concept, which was born to live in the shadow of its two

dominant brothers - deterrence and decisive defeat.

In reality, during Protective Edge, defense received a very

different type of treatment. The massive aerial bombardment and

limited ground maneuver which specifically targeted the offensive

tunnels gave the fighting the appearance of an offensive operation.

However, Protective Edge’s rationale was conservatively defensive,

with limited objectives, focused on returning calm to the south of

Israel and removing threats. Examination of the General Staff’s

operational idea demonstrates the same rationale - the defensive

effort as the priority, even during the offensive stage of the ground


maneuver. This rational was also shared by the political echelon,

prior to and during the operation, whose main objective was to

thwart and prevent injury to the Israeli home front.

This examination exposes a growing gap concerning the

defensive element between the IDF’s concept and attitudes prior to

the operation and the actual approach adopted during Protective

Edge. Prior to the operation, the prevailing concept in the IDF viewed

the defensive pillar, in the best case, as an element supporting the

offensive, which was supposed to assist the other three pillars,

primarily the offensive (decisive defeat) one; or in the worst case as

a delaying factor which would hinder the proper employment of the

other elements. In fact, it is clear that during Protective Edge, the

defensive pillar acquired a central importance, even gaining

dominance over the other elements of the classic security concept.

Why was such a wide gap created between perceptions of

defense prior to the operation (as well as during other operations)

and its actual implementation?

There are three possible reasons, which in combination

created this gap. First, the lack of study of the influence of the

defensive pillar, a pillar that has strengthened over the years, on the

other security concept elements. Second, the hostilities that led to

the writing of the General Staff and conceptual position papers were

major operations, in which the offense was the primary component,

while defense played only a supporting role. An operation directed

at achieving limited objectives, such as Protective Edge, was not

mentioned in these position papers, and therefore the defensive

element, which was central to the operation, did not find expression

in them. The third reason relates to the IDF’s ethos. The offensive

ethos of the IDF is clearly expressed in these conceptual papers, as

part of an outlook that emphasizes the centrality of offensive force

design. In the current reality, this is not the sole consideration and

other non-military considerations play a significant role too.

Despite the gap between the defense concept and its

implementation, it seems that the centrality of defense within the


Israeli security concept, and in the totality of its practical tools, is not

in doubt. Still, the question remains, why not develop defense to the

maximum?

A partial answer to this question was presented in the first

part of the present article, which noted the struggle over resources,

the balance among the security concept components, and flexibility

of force design, as considerable and counterbalancing factors against

the desire to invest greater resources in defense. However, it is

important to note two points within the IDF discourse, which hint at

dilemmas arising from apprehension about an over-reliance on the

defensive pillar.

The first is linked to the psychological-cognitive

characteristic associated with defensive capabilities and to a possible

failure of defense. We have already mentioned the basic tenet of

ground warfare that “a defensive line is bound to break,”10 as a basic

principle of defense. This accurate observation has one more

implication that is directly connected to the Israeli active defense

systems. Israeli expectations, both military and civil, as were

reflected in Operations Pillar of Defense and Protective Edge, are for

a perfect defense.

However, we should remember that there is a technological

aspect to Israel’s struggle with its opponents.11 It is entirely

conceivable that Israel’s enemies are working on a response to its

defensive advantage, and by finding a way to breach the defensive

systems, will strike, even partially, at its home front. Such a strike

may considerably reduce the effectiveness of Israel’s defensive

systems. There is an apprehension that an over-reliance on defensive

systems exposes Israel, given the sense that each blow to the home

front, even if only amounting to a few rockets and casualties, would

be considered a major failure.

A good demonstration of this was the media's attitude about

the closure of Ben Gurion Airport following the landing of a single

10 IDF Ground Forces Command, op. cit. 11 Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Harvard University Press, 2002.


rocket in a nearby town,12 and the resentment of the residents of the

Gaza border towns due to the IDF’s failure to intercept mortar

shells.13 Such a concept, which relies on the dominance of the

defense, may create an unachievable benchmark during a conflict,

thus generating public, psychological and operational

disappointment.

The second point is associated with the required balance

between defense, offense and decisive defeat in relation to the

length of a campaign. The success of the active defense systems in

Protective Edge, both the Iron Dome interceptions and the early

warning, identification and location system, provided political and

military decision makers with a longer period to make decisions, due

to the reduced impact on the Israeli home front. Massive damage to

the Israeli home front would have forced a shortening of the

campaign, involving a ground maneuver, a massive employment of

aerial strikes and wide collateral damage to civilians on the other

side.

This breathing room, unlike the situation in the Second

Lebanon War, had a real impact on the campaign’s length. An

examination of the strategic objectives of the operation raises an

essential question about the role of the defensive system in

influencing the operational rationale of the campaign. The limited

strategic objectives which did not seek to achieve a decisive defeat

pushed the offensive effort into second place and considerably

eroded the prevailing understanding of the need for a short

campaign. The apprehension that arises is connected to a desire to

balance defense and offense when determining the strategic

objectives of future operations, and with the need to conduct a

systemic analysis of the influences of all defensive systems on all

types of IDF operations.

12 Yiftah Shapir, “Rocket warfare in Protective Edge,” in Kurz, Anat and Brom, Shlomo, (Eds) The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, INSS, November 2014, p. 45. 13 Oded Bar Meir, “In the Eshkol Regional Council: ‘Feeling like sitting ducks’,” Mynet, 21 August 2011, http://www.mynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4111775,00.html. [Hebrew]

http://www.mynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4111775,00.html


The Gap Between the Earlier Attitude and the Operation’s Conduct

What we learn from this gap leads us to two complementary

conclusions. The first relates to the importance of integrating the

defensive pillar in Israel’s security challenges, the other tries to

balance the dominance of defense, as seen in Protective Edge, with

future challenges.

Assuming that operations such as Protective Edge - with

limited objectives, lacking a clear foundation for achieving decisive

defeat, and a goal of restoring calm - will continue to form a key part

of the totality of security challenges facing Israel in the near future,

then focusing on defense in general and on active defense in

particular is both vital and proper. Planning such a campaign (of

limited objectives) and its conduct will necessitate regarding this

pillar as a key component, alongside the other security concept

elements.

That said, it is important to look forward, beyond the last

campaign. Despite the success of the active defense systems, history

teaches us that over-reliance on defensive systems is dangerous. Our

opponents’ ability to breach these systems means that over-reliance

is problematic at best, and grossly irresponsible at worst.

The challenge is twofold. From the technological-

operational perspective, we must continue to maintain Israel’s

qualitative advantage and to increase it, to be ready for any new

challenge. From the conceptual-psychological perspective, we must

not be drawn into feeling that such operations (of limited objectives)

are the only challenge. We must continue discussing both all-out and

limited war doctrines in order to develop and strengthen them. We

must examine how, in such a scenario, offense can be turned into the

main element in the decision makers’ toolbox, in order not to

unsettle the important balance between offense and defense. This

challenge is not limited to the understanding of the military echelon.

It is validated by the need to explain these insights to the political

echelon and to emphasize the complexity and problematic nature of

over-reliance on defense.


The Dispute Between the Political and Military Echelons Over Air-

Defense

Our primary argument here is about the existence of deep

conceptual gaps concerning defensive systems between the political

echelon and the IDF. While politicians regard the defensive element

as external to the IDF, a parallel track to the military-offensive and

political elements, the IDF regards defense as an integral component

of its function, to be employed in a similar manner to other

components of the military system, and devoid of any specific

importance justifying special treatment. These gaps create tensions

between the political and military echelons, regarding the type of

force design and employment to be adopted.

Even prior to Protective Edge, the political echelon placed

defense high on its list of priorities. The political echelon was the

motivating force behind the development of this capability, due to

its understanding of future challenges. It therefore gained a sense of

ownership over the system. In the statements of several defense

ministers during the years 2001-2010, and in an interview with Amir

Peretz, defense minister from 2005-2006, their perception of

defense as an important and central element is apparent: “We must

not be satisfied with offense only, but must create an integrated

defense… passive… plus Iron Dome which will guarantee the military

and political echelons completely new maneuvering space...”14 This

perception was also clearly reflected in actual force design and in the

political echelon’s will to emphasize defensive, especially active

defense systems, as significant element deserving of special

attention.15

14 Amir Peretz, an interview on the Knesset Channel, March 12, 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3LJsqI5F9k. 15 According to Amir Rapaport, in the IDF’s Multi-Year Plan Teuza, active defense is assigned the third priority (together with the Air Force) after cyberwarfare and intelligence. The ground forces are accorded the forth priority. Amir Rapaport, “The IDF’s Multi-Year Plan: force design or the dismantling of the ground forces,” in “The IDF’s Force design”, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy, No. 28, Bar Ilan University, 2014, p. 24. [Hebrew]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3LJsqI5F9k


Throughout the operation one may identify the deep

involvement of the political echelon in decisions regarding active

defense and defense in general. The winds blowing in from the

political echelon regarding defense in previous years did not subside

with the beginning of Protective Edge. The importance ascribed by

the political echelon to defense and its different appreciation of

defense’s role was expressed in their involvement in decisions

regarding the employment of active defenses. The high regard and

priority given to defense was reflected in the association between

the successful employment of active defense systems in intercepting

Hamas’s rockets and missiles on the one hand, and with the political

echelon regarding this success as strategically thwarting Hamas’

objectives on the other. The strategic importance ascribed to these

interceptions became an attractive factor and greatly contributed to

the political echelon’s perspective of the defensive systems as being

external to the IDF.

The key point is connected to the political echelon’s position

on the balancing of offense and defense (as noted). The political

echelon regards defense as enabling a reduction in the need to take

the offensive and thus defense belongs to the political, not the

military, toolbox.

On the other hand, the IDF regards defense as an internal

element, similar to the other elements in its toolbox and to be

employed in the same manner. This IDF approach in not only

conceptual, but is reflected at the other military levels. This does not

relate solely to the technical-organizational level, dealing with

question of who employs the defense system and to whom it

belongs, but touches on a broader perspective of the system and

military action.

From the army’s viewpoint, since defensive tools belong to

the military, they are part of the military toolbox, not the political

echelon’s. Active defense is not a tool to be directly controlled by the

political echelon and decision makers, but a military one. The role of

defense from this perspective, is to support the offense and in effect

to enable it.


This issue is associated with an operational issue of the

highest priority: “What is to be defended?” There is a built-in tension

between the natural political inclination to defend the population in

the home front and the military-professional inclination, which is

natural as well, to protect installations of strategic importance to the

military campaign. Assuming that overall resources are limited, and

that this is a practical, not a theoretical, dilemma, we are witnessing

here another aspect of the gap between the two perceptions.16

16 Yossi Arazi and Gal Perel quote Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, who stated as Head of the IDF Northern Command that: “The Iron Dome must be directed first and foremost at preserving the IDF’s offensive capability and not at defending civilians… it should protect Israel’s critical infrastructure, IDF bases, and military forces’ gathering points,” Yossi Arazi and Gal Perel. “Integrating Technologies to Protect the Home Front against Ballistic Threats and Cruise Missiles,” Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 5, No. 3, December 2013, p. 94.


Two questions arise from the gap between the positions and

perceptions of the political and military echelons: Why does the

political echelon aspire to directly control the active defense

systems? Why does the IDF ignore the dissonance between itself and

the political echelon?

As for direct control, there are some possible answers. First,

regarding the ownership aspect, the political echelon regards itself

as directly responsible for the very existence of active defense

systems, having forced them upon the army, having obtained the

funding from abroad and having pushed for their employment. This

bestows upon them, in their opinion, the right to control a tool that

they promoted. Second, this aspiration is associated with changes in

the nature of war. In the past, the IDF stood between the home front

and the enemy, but currently, in the age of missile and rocket wars,

this separation has disappeared. The defense array is what separates

citizens from rockets. Therefore, this array, brought to the army by

the political echelon, should be under the latter’s control.

This point is associated with the meaning of failure. If, in the

past, a tactical, even an operational, failure on the battlefield did not

immediately affect the home front, currently, a tactical failure in

intercepting a missile or a rocket leads directly to civilian casualties.

The direct link between the success or failure of the active defense

systems and citizens' lives has major political importance, and

politicians therefore wish to control these systems, which they

assume are easier to control than offensive systems. The offensive,

decisive defeat effort draws international shockwaves, e.g. the

Goldstone Report; it may entail heavy casualties; and may critically

undermine regional stability. Therefore, the political echelon wishes

to minimize it, preferring limited campaigns of a primarily defensive

nature. Such campaigns offer better control and supervision, and

politicians believe that they should be entrusted with these.

There are several possible answers to why the IDF ignores

this dissonance between itself and the political echelon. First, the

IDF’s offensive ethos is incompatible with the spirit of this defensive

approach of limited operations. Conflicting ethos are not only a

methodological problem, they also give rise to a cognitive


dissonance that prevents one or both sides from understanding the

gap.

Second, the IDF’s force design and its major capabilities -

military units, weaponry and training- are all directed at an offensive

scenario. These existing capabilities directly address the existing

concept and prevent an understanding of the existing tension.

The third answer stems from an issue mentioned above, the

multifunctional nature of the force. The active defense array is an

anomaly in force design. It is not flexible, it cannot be employed for

both offensive and defensive purposes as most of the force

generated by the IDF.

The last reason is directly linked to the first, the offensive

ethos. The IDF does not believe in the possibility of achieving victory

in a war, campaign or a limited conflict through the defense. A victory

always entails an offensive. This cognitive gap, alongside the other

points raised above, feeds the existing dissonance between the IDF

and the political echelon.

How Can These Gaps Be Narrowed?

The response to these gaps should, first and foremost, be a

dialogue between the political and military echelons. Exposing these

dilemmas is a necessary condition for their resolution, but is not

sufficient. As noted, the military echelon should clarify to the

politicians the problematic character of an over-reliance on defense.

Both echelons should jointly study the characteristics of active

defense systems employment, especially the built-in tension

between defending critical national and military infrastructures,

which on the one hand is essential to the offense and on the other,

defending the home front and population centers.

Another issue to be clarified is the significance of overusing

defense during limited operations on the readiness for an all-out war

which may break out during such an operation. An overly intensive

employment of active defense systems, disregarding the proper

balance between these systems, during a limited operation, may


hinder the tactical-operational as well as cognitive readiness for

more intense warfare. Clarifying this issue is critical to coping with

possible future situations in which a limited campaign on one front

may escalate into an all-out war on several fronts. At that point, all

basic concepts - from the readiness to embark on such a campaign

to the level of supplies and armaments, would require a complete

rethink.

Conclusion

Operation Protective Edge was the second operation, after

Pillar of Defense, in which active defense system were widely

employed. Despite the offensive employment of the air and ground

forces, the prevailing concept throughout the operation regarded

defense as the dominant element of the security concept. In fact, we

witnessed a new IDF concept that regarded preventing enemy

achievements as the first priority, no less than achieving our own

objectives. Using soccer terminology, we may say that the IDF

preferred a 1-0 win over a 5-1 victory.

Two major conceptual gaps were discussed in this article.

The first dealt with the relation between offense and defense.

Protective Edge had a defensive operational rationale. Preserving

the status quo, seeking to achieve victory by forestalling enemy

achievements, became the main operational idea. In such a

campaign, the defensive element gained dominance over the other

security concept elements, mainly offense and decisive defeat. This

was a totally different situation from the previous national-military

concept, which was aware of the importance of the defensive pillar,

but never granted it leadership, certainly not dominance, over the

other pillars.

The other gap is related to the role of defense in the eyes of

the political and military echelons. Due to the reasons noted above

- ownership of the defensive systems, the changing characteristics of

warfare, and the will to control these systems directly - the political

echelon regards the defensive element as being somewhat external

to the IDF and on the same level as the military-offensive and the

political elements. The IDF, on the other hand, regards defense as an


internal element and therefore as part and parcel of the totality of

force design and employment. This gap creates many tensions in

force design and employment.

The main significance of the operation was in fact related to

the success of the defensive pillar. In contrast to previous experience

which demanded a rethink or a genuine process of drawing of

conclusions following a failure, the positive results of the active

defense systems encouraged us, and rightly so, to examine future

influences.

We can predict, with a certain degree of caution, that its

success will position defense as an equal, or perhaps as dominant,

among the security concept’s pillars. Therefore, we expect to see it

gaining influence among military and political decision makers.

However, due to the dangers of an over-reliance on defense, whose

risks were first exposed during the last operation, it is important to

preserve the dominance of the IDF’s offensive capabilities and to

further develop them.

The debate over the development and influence of the

active defense array, was until now focused on the capability itself. It

is our duty to develop an operational analysis of the totality of the

IDF’s capabilities, hand in hand with the political echelon, in order to

balance all of these elements, and to be prepared to optimally cope

with all the challenges waiting at the IDF and Israel’s door.


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Home Front against Ballistic Threats and Cruise Missiles.” Military and

Strategic Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3, December 2013, pp. 89-110.

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ducks’.” Mynet, 21 August 2011. [Hebrew]

• http://www.mynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4111775,00.html.

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Line?” INSS Insight No. 487, November 24, 2013.

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the Sinai War,” in Golan, Hagai and Shai, Shaul (eds). The Engines

Thunder: 50 years to the Sinai War, Tel Aviv, Ma’arachot, 2006, pp. 117-

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pp. 15-18. [Hebrew]

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June 28, 2007. [Hebrew]

• http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3418874,00.html

• Rapparot, Amir. “The IDF’s Multi-Year Plan: force design or the

dismantling of the Ground Forces,” in “The IDF’s Force Generation”,

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Diplomacy No. 28, Bar Ilan University, 2014, pp. 19-24. [Hebrew]

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Affairs, Volume 5, No. 1, May 2013, pp. 81-94.

• Shapir, Yiftah S. “Rocket warfare in Protective Edge,” in Kurz, Anat and

Brom, Shlomo, (Eds) The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, INSS,

November 2014, pp. 43-50.

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http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3418874,00.html


• Tal, Israel. National Security: The Israeli Experience. Praeger Security

International, 2000.

About the Authors

• Mr. Saul Bronfeld is a research fellow at the Dado Center. He was

CEO and chairman of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange from 1996-

2003, and is a former member of the Bank of Israel's

administration. Bronfeld holds an MA in Security Studies from

Tel Aviv University, and teaches in the Executive MBA program at

Tel Aviv University.

• Brigadier General (Res.) Dr. Meir Finkel heads the Dado Center.

He is the former director of the IDF's Ground Forces Concept

Development and Doctrine Department. As a Colonel in the IDF,

Finkel commanded armored units up to brigade level. He holds

a PhD in Evolutionary Biology and a PhD in Political Science.

• Mr. Yaniv Friedman is a researcher at the Dado Center. He was a

researcher at the Center for National Security Studies at the

Haifa University. Friedman holds an MA in International

Relations and History.

• Mrs. Dana Preisler-Swery is a researcher at the Dado Center. She

led the political-security branch and studied the Israeli security

concept at the Reut Institute. Preisler Swery holds an MA in

Security Studies from Tel Aviv University.

• Brigadier General Shachar Shohat heads the Air Defense

Command, including during Operation Pillar of Defense and

Operation Protective Edge. He commanded Air Wings 167 and

168. Shohat holds a BA in Human Resources Management and

Business Management from Ben Gurion University, and an MA

in Political Studies from Haifa University. He is a graduate of

Israel’s National Security College.

• Colonel Munir Amar, of blessed memory (1968-2016), was Head

Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. He

commanded the Haifa District of the Home Front Command and

was commander of the Mount Hermon Brigade, 2009-2012. He

graduated from the National Security College.

• Lieutenant Colonel Eli Michelson heads the Knowledge

Development Department at the Dado Center. He served in a

range of command positions in the Armored Corps, and also


served in the Ground Forces Command. Michelson holds an MA

in Business Management from Ben-Gurion University, and wrote

a thesis about the IDF’s force design prior to the Six Day War. He

is a PhD student at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

• Lieutenant Colonel Roni Katzir is the Head of the Legislation and

Consultancy Branch in the Military Advocate General Office. He

has served in a range of positions in the Military Advocate

General Office. Katzir holds an MA from the Law Faculty, and a

BA in Legal Studies and Accounting at Tel Aviv University. He is

currently a PhD student at Tel Aviv University's Law Faculty.

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