THE CHANGING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN FINANCING …The Changing Role of Government in Financing Health...
Transcript of THE CHANGING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN FINANCING …The Changing Role of Government in Financing Health...
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE CHANGING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN FINANCING HEALTH CARE:AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Mark StabileSarah Thomson
Working Paper 19439http://www.nber.org/papers/w19439
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138September 2013
We thank Carolyn Tuohy, the European Health Policy Group, and particularly Janet Currie, for manyhelpful comments and advice. We also thank Matthew Townsend, Ellie Hukin and Katie Bates forexcellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarilyreflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies officialNBER publications.
© 2013 by Mark Stabile and Sarah Thomson. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceedtwo paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,is given to the source.
The Changing Role of Government in Financing Health Care: An International PerspectiveMark Stabile and Sarah ThomsonNBER Working Paper No. 19439September 2013JEL No. I1,I13,I18
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the changing role of government involvement in health care financing policy outsidethe United States. It provides a review of the economics literature in this area to understand the implicationsof recent policy changes on efficiency, costs and quality. Our review reveals that there has been someconvergence in policies adopted across countries to improve financing incentives and encourage efficientuse of health services. In the case of risk pooling, all countries with competing pools experience similardifficulties with selection and are adopting more sophisticated forms of risk adjustment. In the caseof hospital competition, the key drivers of success appear to be what is competed on and measurablerather than whether the system is public or private. In the case of both the success of performance-relatedpay for providers and issues resulting from wait times, evidence differs both within and across jurisdictions.However, the evidence does suggest that some governments have effectively reduced wait times whenthey have chosen explicitly to focus on achieving this goal. Many countries are exploring new waysof generating revenues for health care to enable them to cope with significant cost growth. However,there is little evidence to suggest that collection mechanisms alone are effective in managing the costor quality of care.
Mark StabileUniversity of Toronto14 Queen's Park Cres. W.Toronto, ON M5S 3K9CANADAand [email protected]
Sarah ThomsonCowdray HouseLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceHoughton StreetLondon WC2A 2AE [email protected]
2
I.Introduction AlargepartoftherecentdebateoverhealthcarereformintheUnitedStatesfocusedonhowmuchgovernmentinvolvementisappropriateinthehealthcaresector.NationsacrosstheOECDensureuniversalaccesstohealthcarefortheircitizensthroughnationalorregionalriskpoolingfinancedbymandatoryincome‐relatedcontributions(premiums).Ensuringuniversalprotectionagainstthecostsofhealthcareandcontrollingpublicexpendituresrequiresasignificantdegreeofnationalorregionalmanagement‐‐acommonfeatureacrossthesecountries.YetnotwohealthsystemsareidenticalandOECDcountriesachievethisgoalinavarietyofdifferentways.Manyhealthsystemsmakesubstantialuseofmarketmechanisms,forexample,despitehavingextensivepublicfundingandregulation.
ThispaperexploresthechangingroleofgovernmentinvolvementinhealthcarefinancingpolicyoutsidetheUnitedStates.Itprovidesareviewoftheeconomicsliteratureinthisareatounderstandtheimplicationsofrecentpolicychangesonefficiency,costsandquality.Economistsandhealthpolicyresearchershavewrittenextensivelyonthedifferencesinhealthcarecostsandcoverageratesacrosscountries.Inthesetwoareas–shareofGDP(grossdomesticproduct)spentonhealthandshareofpeoplewithoutanyformofhealthcoverage–theUShaslongbeenanoutlier.However,whiletherearemanysimilaritiesacross‘therest’ofthecountriesintheOECDtherearealsosubstantialdifferencesinpolicydesign.Inaddition,significantpolicychangesinthelasttenyearshaveinsomecasesledtoadegreeofconvergencewiththeUS.ExamplesincludetheintroductionofauniversalmandateintheUnitedStates,themovetowardsacompetitivehealthinsurancemarketinGermanyandtheNetherlands,andtheadoptionofmarket‐likemechanismssuchasactivity‐basedfundingtopayhospitals,selectivecontracting,andprovidercompetition.
TobetterunderstandhowOECDhealthsystemsbothdifferfromandhaveconvergedtowardsthehealthsystemintheUnitedStatesoverthepastdecade,andtoorganizethevastliteratureonfinancinghealthcare,wespecifythreefinancingfunctionspresentinanyhealthsystem,whethermadeexplicitornot:raisingrevenueforthehealthsystem(collection);poolingrisk;andpurchasingservices(Kutzin,2001).Afourthdimension–makingcoveragedecisions(whom,whatandhowmuchtocover)–cutsacrossthethreefunctions,asshowninFigure1.Weusethisframeworktoexploretheeconomicliteratureontherelationshipbetweenthefinancingfunctionsandhealthsystemperformance,drawingonrecentworkfromtheUnitedStateswhenappropriate. Thereareotherusefulwaysofcharacterizinghealthsystems.Forexample,Reinhardt’staxonomyofthecomponentsofhealthsystemsdistinguishesbetweengovernment,not‐for‐profitandfor‐profitontheproductionsideandsocialinsurance,privateinsuranceandnoinsuranceonthefinancingside(Reinhardt,2009).WeuseKutzin’sframeworkforthefollowingreasons.First,itallowsforacomparisonofanytypeofhealthsystem,andavoidstheuseoftraditionallabels(e.g.‘taxfinanced’or‘socialinsurance’).Thishastheadvantageofrevealingratherthanobscuringvitalsimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweensystemsinthewaythatmanyclassificationsdo.Second,itenablesustogetawayfromtermssuchas‘private’or‘public’,shiftingtheemphasisontodifferencesinhowcountriescarryoutthefunctionsasopposedtodifferencesinthelegalstatusoftheagents
3
responsibleforcollection,poolingandpurchasing.Third,itallowsustofocusthereviewonfunctionsratherthanontoolsandgoals.Whilemanycountriesincludeequity,forexample,amongthegoalsofthesystem,thisgoalisaffected,undereachfunction,bythenatureofthetoolsinuse.Similarly,taxesandregulationarewidelyusedtoolsratherthanfunctionsofthehealthcarefinancingsystem.Fourth,theframeworkhighlightshowhealthfinancingfunctionsaremoreorlessindependentofeachother;decisionsabouthowtopoolrisksandpurchaseservicescanbemadeirrespectiveofhowrevenuesareraised.
Theresearchgoalsforthispaper,then,aretoexploretheeconomicimplicationsofthedifferentwaysinwhichOECDhealthsystemscarryoutthefinancingfunctions,howpolicychangeshaveresultedinmoremarketforceswithinthesejurisdictions,andtheeffectsofthesechangesonsystemefficiency,costs,andoutcomes(quality).WedonotrevieworevaluatetheliteratureexaminingthejustificationforgovernmentinterventioninthehealthsectorbecausethegovernmentplaysamajorroleinfinancinghealthcareinallOECDcountries,includingtheUnitedStates.Also,whileweanalyzetheefficiencyandeffectivenessofanumberofpolicyinterventionsonparticularpopulations,weareoftenunabletomakeclaimsabouttheoverallwelfareimplicationsofgovernmentinterventioninthecountriesweexamine.
Ourreviewrevealsthattherehasbeensomeconvergenceinpoliciesadoptedacrosscountriestoimprovefinancingincentivesandencourageefficientuseofhealthservices.Inthecaseofriskpooling,allcountrieswithcompetingpoolsexperiencesimilardifficultieswithselectionandareadoptingmoresophisticatedformsofriskadjustment.Inthecaseofhospitalcompetition,thekeydriversofsuccessappeartobewhatiscompetedonandmeasurableratherthanwhetherthesystemispublicorprivate.Inthecaseofboththesuccessofperformance‐relatedpayforprovidersandissuesresultingfromwaittimes,evidencediffersbothwithinandacrossjurisdictions.However,theevidencedoessuggestthatsomegovernmentshaveeffectivelyreducedwaittimeswhentheyhavechosenexplicitlytofocusonachievingthisgoal.
Therestofthepaperisorganizedasfollows:webeginwithabriefoverviewofthecountriesweconsiderinthisreview.WethenexploretheeconomicsliteratureoutsidetheUnitedStatesforeachofthefinancingfunctionslistedabove,examiningtheconsequencesofpublicpolicychoicesmadearoundfinancinghealthcare.WereviewthetheoreticalliteraturewhereitguidesdifferencesbetweentheUnitedStatesandotherjurisdictions,althoughourfocusisontheempiricaleconomicanalysisofhealthcarefinancingpolicychoicesinternationally.Wethensummarizetheimplicationsoftheevidenceandoffersomegeneralconclusions.2.Backgroundinformationonselectedcountries
Althoughwehavenostrictcriteriaforacountry’sinclusioninourreview,werestrictourfocustorecentliteratureonhealthcarefinancingpublishedineconomicjournalsinEnglish.Asaresult,alargeamountoftheworkreviewedherefocusesonasmallnumberofcountries:Australia,Canada,France,Germany,Switzerland,andtheUnitedKingdom.
4
Figure2comparesthefinancingmixinthesecountriesandintheUnitedStatesin2011orthemostrecentyearforwhichdataareavailable.Itshowshowallsevencountriesusethefullrangeoffinancingmechanisms.Publicfinance(generalandearmarkedtaxes)dominatesanditssharehasgrownslightlyovertimeinallexceptGermany.TheUKreliesmostheavilyongeneraltaxesfollowedbyCanadaandAustralia,althoughtheextentofthedifferencebetweenthecountriesispartlyanartifactarisingfromthewayinwhichthedataarepresented.Statutoryhealthinsurance(SHI)funds(fundsthatarecompulsoryandenforcedbylaw)inmostEuropeancountriesobtainsomeoftheirrevenuefromothertaxsourcesinadditiontopayrolltaxes.Internationally,healthfinancingdataarebrokendownbyexpenditureagentratherthanbycollectionmechanism.Thishastheeffectofobscuringthetrue‘source’ofpublicrevenuesforthehealthsector.Incountriesinwhichpurchasersarestatutoryhealthinsurancefunds,somenon‐payrolltaxrevenueisinvisibleininternationalstatistics,evenwhenitmaybesubstantial;inFranceitaccountsforoverathirdofSHIrevenue(Chevreuletal.2010).Thecorollaryisthatpayrolltaxrevenuemaynotvisibleincountrieswherecentralgovernmentagenciespoolfundsandpurchasehealthservices;intheUKitaccountedforalmost20%ofNationalHealthService(NHS)revenuein2007,thelatestyearforwhichthisfigureisavailable(Boyle2011).
OECDdataindicatethatsixoutofthesevencountriesenjoyuniversalcoverage(Table1a).Thebasisforentitlementtostatutorycoveragevariesacrossthecountriesandhaschangedovertimewithincountries.EntitlementisbasedonresidenceinEngland,Canada,Australia,andFrance,whileGermanyandSwitzerlandemployuniversalmandates.UniversallycompulsorycoverageisarelativelyrecentdevelopmentinFrance,GermanyandSwitzerland.Switzerlandintroducedcompulsoryuniversalcoveragein1996toaddressconcernsaboutunequalaccesstohealthinsurance,gapsincoverageandrisinghealthexpenditure(Crivelli2013inpress).Before2000statutoryhealthinsuranceinFrancewascompulsoryforworkersandtheirdependantsandvoluntaryforeveryoneelse;thosewhocouldnotaffordtopaythefixed(non‐income‐related)contributionforvoluntarycoveragereliedonlocallyadministeredgovernmentsubsidies(Chevreuletal.2010).In2000Francebrokethelinkwithemploymentandextendedincome‐relatedcontributionstoallresidents,withfreeaccesstohealthinsuranceforthosewithverylowincomes.In2009Germanyintroducedcompulsoryuniversalcoveragetostemthegrowingnumberofuninsuredpeople(vanGinnekenandBusse2009),butitmaintainedthelinkbetweenstatutorycoverageandemployment.
GermanyistheonlyOECDcountrytoallowhigherearnerstooptoutofcontributingtothestatutoryhealthinsuranceschemeandbeprivatelycoveredinstead.Voluntary(private)healthinsuranceplaysarangeofrolesacrossthesevencountries,asshowninTable1a.WiththeexceptionoftheUS,however,itscontributiontototalspendingonhealthdoesnotexceed15%.Measuredintermsofcontributiontototalspendingonhealth,France,GermanyandSwitzerlandhavethreeofthefourlargestmarketsforvoluntaryhealthinsuranceinEurope(ThomsonandMossialos2009).
CollectionagentsforthedominantpublicfinancingmechanismrangefromnationaltaxagenciesinEngland,Canada,andAustraliaandthenationalsocialsecurityagencyinFrance,toindividualhealthinsurancefundsinGermanyandSwitzerland.AlmostuniquelyinEurope,Swisshealthinsurancefundsarefreeto
5
settheirowncontributionrates(Thomsonetal.2009)(Table1b).Incontrast,contributionratesinFranceandGermanyaredeterminedbycentralgovernment,longthenorminFrancebutarecentdevelopmentinGermany(introducedin2009)(OgnyanovaandBusse2009).Switzerlandisuniqueintwootherways.First,itusescommunity‐ratedratherthanincome‐relatedcontributionstofinancestatutorycoverage,andthesecanvarysignificantlyacrossfunds,eveninthesameCanton(region).Second,itrequiresallcitizens,includingdependentadultsandchildren,topaypremiums,whereasinFranceandGermanystatutoryhealthinsuranceautomaticallycoversdependentsatnoextracosttothehousehold.Francealsoexemptsadultswithannualtaxableincomesbelow€9,020frompayingcontributions(about2.3%ofthepopulationin2006)(Chevreuletal.2010).
Tosecurefinancialprotectionforlow‐incomehouseholdstheSwissCantonsoperateasystemofpremiumsubsidieswithinparametersdefinedbythefederalgovernmentbutwithleewaytoseteligibilitythresholdsforsubsidiesandtodeterminethemagnitudeofsubsidies.Untilrecently,thefederalgovernmentusedasystemofmatchinggrantstoencourageCantonstoofferaminimumlevelofsubsidy.Inspiteofthis,therecanbelargedifferencesacrossCantonsineligibilityforsubsidiesandhouseholdpremiumcosts(Thomsonetal.,2013).Theothercountriesavoidtheneedforadministrativelycomplexandpotentiallyinequitablesubsidiesbyimposinganationalcontributionrateandlinkingcontributionstoincome.
AsintheUS,peopleinGermanyandSwitzerlandhavechoiceofhealthinsurerforpubliclyfinancedbenefits(Table1b).Insurerscompeteforenrolleesandaresubjecttosomeformofriskadjustmentmechanism,tolowertheirincentivetoselectrisks.
Intermsofhealthcaredelivery,patientsinallofthecountriescangenerallychoosetheirphysicianandhospital.Gatekeeping(therequirementforareferralforaccesstospecialistcare)iswidelyencouraged,oftenthroughfinancialincentives.Allsevencountrieshaveexperimentedwithdifferentwaysofpayingproviders.Fee‐for‐servicepaymentofphysicianscontinuestodominateinallexceptEngland,whileactivity‐basedfundingthroughdiagnosis‐relatedgroups(asystemwhichclassifieshospitalcases/proceduresintogroupsandthenassignspaymentpricesforthesegroups,commonlyreferredtoasDRGs)israpidlybecomingthenormforpayinghospitals.EffortstolinkproviderpaymenttoperformancefeatureinallexceptCanadaandSwitzerland.3.GeneratingandCollectingRevenue Howsystemstransfermoneyfromindividualstoprovidershasimplicationsfortheefficiencyofboththehealthsystemandtheeconomythroughemploymenteffectsanddeadweightloss.Italsoaffectsfinancialprotectionforindividualsagainstlossandthepoolingofriskandmayalsoaffecttherateofgrowthofhealthcarecostsandtheresponsivenessofthehealthsystemtochangesineconomicactivity.Publiclyfinancedhealthcareisusuallygeneratedviatwocollectionmechanisms‐generaltaxesandearmarkedtaxes(oftenreferredtoassocialinsurancecontributions,particularlywhenleviedonwages)–andoftensupplementedbyuserfees.Generaltaxesandsocialinsurancecontributionsaffect
6
themedicalsectordirectlyonlybecauseofpoliticaleconomyconsiderations,whileuserfeeswillhavedirecteffectsonthemedicalsector.Thissectionfirstconsiderstherelativeefficiencyofgeneraltaxesversusearmarkedtaxesthenlooksatuserfees.ThemajorempiricalfindingsarehighlightedinTable2.GeneralandEarmarkedTaxes
Therelativeefficiencyofdifferenttypesoftaxesusedtofinancehealthsystemshasbeenexploredinthepublicfinanceandhealtheconomicsliterature.Theequityandefficiencypropertiesofgeneraltaxation(c.f.Auerbach,1985)donotdifferdependingonwhetherthemoneyisspentonhealthoreducationperse,althoughifthelevelofgovernmentthatcollectsrevenuediffersfromthelevelofgovernmentthatprovideshealthcoveragetheremaybeequityissuesandissuesaboutwhethertheleveloftaxationbestmeetslocaldemandfortheservicesrequired(c.f.AhmadandBrosio,2006).Ofcourse,theamountofdeadweightlossassociatedwithanyrevenuegenerationwilldependonthebalanceandtypeoftaxesusedtoraisetherevenue.Onceagain,standardpublicfinancetheoryontherelativedeadweightlossofincomeversuspayrollversusconsumptiontaxesapply,regardlessofthegoodbeingpurchasedwiththerevenue(Sandmo,1976). Economictheoryontherelativeefficiencyofsocialinsurancecontributionsversusgeneraltaxessuggeststhatwherethecontributionsareappliedtoanentirepopulationorgroup,withoutoption,andwithoutdirectlinkagetothebenefitreceived,thecontributionisequivalenttoatax(Blomqvist,2011).Ifthecontributionprogramisdirectlyrelatedtothebenefitprogram,thenonlythedifferencebetweenthecontributionrequiredandthevalueofthebenefitreceivedwillbetreatedasatax.Althoughthepublicfinanceliteratureoutlinestheinefficienciesinherentinearmarkedfunding,ifcontributionsareearmarkedforhealthcaretheremaybepoliticaleconomyreasons(suchtransparencyandgreaterprotectionfrompoliticalinterference)whyvoterspreferthemtotaxes(MossialosandDixon,2002).
Somesystemsmandateindividualstoobtaincoveragethroughanetworkofinsurersandmayallowinsurerstocollectsomeoralloftherevenue.Insuchcasespartorallofthecontributionmaybeleviedintheformofacommunity‐ratedpremiumratherthanasaproportionofincome.Theremaybeasingleriskpoolormultipleriskpoolswithorwithoutpublicsubsidy(weturntothisissueinmoredetaillater).Whethergovernmentcollectionofrevenuesissuperiororinferiortoothermechanismsforensuringfinancialsecuritysuchasmandatingcoveragedependsonanumberoffactors(exploredinSummers,1989).First,mandatesandtaxesonlaborcanaffectthelevelofemploymentandwages.Theextentdependsonthesupplyofanddemandforlaborandconsequentdeadweightloss.Mandates,iftheyareimplementedasbenefitsperworker,willoperatesimilartoalumpsumtax.Ifcertaintypesofemploymentareexempt(suchaspart‐timework)mandatesmayhavelargeeffectsonthedemandforfull‐timeversuspart‐timework.Second,healthcoverageleadstoanincomeeffect,thesizeofwhichdependsontheindividual’svaluationofthehealthcoverage.Third,thegovernanceofpublicinsuranceissubjecttotheusualpoliticaleconomyproblemsofgovernment.
7
Gruber(2000)providesasimpleformalizationofthisanalysisthatisusefulforunderstandingtheemploymenteffects.Supposelabordemand,Ld,isgivenby:Ld=fd(W+C)whereWiswagesandCisinsurancecost;andlaborsupplygivenby:Ls=fs(W+αC)whereαCisthemonetaryvaluethatemployeesplaceonhealthinsurance.Inthiscaseαisthevaluationofthemarginaldollarofhealthinsurance.Thenitisthecasethat:
W
C
d s
d s
whered and s aretheelasticitiesofdemandandsupplyforlabor.Grubernotesthatthisequationdiffersfromthestandardincidenceofataxonlaborbytheterm s which“capturestheincreaseinlaborsupplyduetoemployeevaluationofmoreexpensiveinsurance”(Gruber,2000,p.660).
Valuationsofα<1maybemorelikelyunderpubliclyprovidedcoverageormandatesascontributionstothesystemaretypicallydisconnectedfrombenefitsreceived.Thisdisconnectoccurswheneverredistributionisanimportantelementofthepublicinsurancearrangementandisminimizedifbenefitsarevaluedattheirfullcost.Whereinsuranceisprovidedevenifindividualsdonotwork,thenthevaluationofthebenefit(α)willbecloserto0thanifbenefitsareonlyavailabletoworkers(dependingonanydifferenceincoveragebetweenworkersandnon‐workers)andthecostwillhavealargernegativeeffectonemployment.
Giventhatmandatedinsurancecanbelessredistributivethanpubliclyprovidedcoverage,doesnotnecessarilyinvolvecentralizedrevenuecollection,anddoesnotgenerallyinvolvegovernmentprovisionofinsuranceorservices,itisarguablethattheseinefficienciesaresmallerformandatesthanforpubliclyprovidedinsurance.Summers(1989)thereforeconcludesthatmandatesaretobepreferredtopublicprovision.Ontheotherhand,transactioncostsandtheeffectivenessofmandatesmaybeamatterofconcern.Avarietyofothereconomicandpoliticalfactors,includingadesiretoredistributethroughthehealthinsurancesystem,maycausesystemstodeviatefromthetheoreticallysuperioroutcome.
Manyhealthsystemsexplicitlyorimplicitlyaimtoredistributeincomefromhigher‐tolower‐incomeindividuals.Theextentofthisredistributionisanotapriorirelatedtothefinancingmechanismused,althoughhealthsystemsfinancedthroughgeneraltaxrevenuestendtobemoreredistributiveinpracticethanthosefinancedthroughsocialinsurancecontributionsandthosethataremoreprivatelyfinanced(Wagstaffetal,1992;Wagstaff,2010).Payrollcontributionsareoftencapped,unlikeincometaxes,andiftheyareprogressiveinsteadofproportional,theytendtohavesmallerincreasesinthemarginalrateastheymoveuptheincomescale.Anotherimportantelementoftheextentofredistributionwillbetheutilizationofthesystembyhigh‐versuslow‐income
8
individuals.Oncedifferencesinaccessandlifeexpectancyaretakenintoaccount,itmaybethecasethatthemarginaldollarallocatedtohealthcareislessredistributivethanadollarallocatedtoeducationorincomeassistancebecausehigherincomeindividualsarelikelytolivelongerandthereforebenefitmorefromthepubliclyfinancedhealthcaresystem(Glied,2008).
Thereisalong‐standingdebateintheliteratureonwhetherhealthsystemsfinancedthroughgeneraltaxrevenuesarebetterabletocontrolhealthcarecoststhanthosefinancedthroughsocialinsurancecontributions,andontherelationshipbetweenfinancingstructureandhealthoutcomes.Oneofthedifficultieswiththeliteratureisthatcharacterizingahealthsystembyitsprimarysourceoffinanceisakintopaintingwithanextremelylargebrush.Notwotax‐financedorsocialinsurance‐financedsystemsarealike;forexample,theUKandCanadaarebothtaxfinanced,buttherearefewothersimilarities.Inonerecentstudy,Wagstaff(2009)usessystemchangesfromgeneraltaxfinancingtosocialinsurancewithinOECDcountriesbetween1960and2006toexaminewhethersocialhealthinsuranceleadstoincreasedordecreasedcostgrowth.Lookingatchangeswithincountriesovertimepotentiallyovercomestheproblemsofcomparisonsacrossverydifferentsystems.However,largechangesinfinancingaresomewhatrare,andmaybeafunctionofotherunderlyingeconomicconditionsalsorelatedtopublicspending.Totryandaccountforthefactthatswitchingispotentiallyendogenous,thesemodelsincludebothdifference‐in‐differencemodelsandIVmodels(usinglagsofthesocialinsuranceindicatorvariableasaninstrument).Thefindingssuggestthatthereisanincreaseinhealthcarecostsof3to4percentassociatedwithamovetosocialinsuranceandthatthismoveisrelatedtoadeclineinformalsectoremploymentof8to10percent.Someofthedeclineinformalsectoremploymentmaysimplyinvolveashifttonon‐formalemployment(presumablytoavoidthecostsassociatedwithsocialinsurancepremiumsinformalemploymentsettings)astheestimatesonoverallemploymentlevelsaresmallerandlessrobust.Thestudyfindsnoevidencethatthetransitiontosocialinsuranceresultsindeclinesinavoidablemortality(deathsfromspecificconditions,suchasdiabetes,whichshouldnotoccuriftimelyandeffectivecareisavailable).Theresultsaredrivenbythosecountrieswhichtransitionedfromsocialinsurancetotaxfinancedorviceversa,includingDenmark,Sweden,Italy,andSpainwhomovedawayfromsocialinsurance,andanumberofeasternEuropeancountrieswhomovedtowardit. Arelatedpaper(WagstaffandMoreno‐Serra,2009)usesasimilarmethodologytolookatadifferentsetofcountriesandtimeperiod.TheyexaminetransitionsbetweenonefinancingstructureandanotheramongEasternEuropeanandAsiancountriesbetween1990and2003.Thesetransitionswererelativelylargeandfastcomparedtotheslowerevolutionofmoredevelopedhealthcaresystems.Theyfindevenlargerresultsforthetransitionfromgeneraltax‐financedtosocialinsurancefinancing.Theirestimatesofincreasesinspendingpercapitaareintheorderof11percent,witha3percentincreaseininpatientadmissions(althoughaveragelengthofstaydeclined).Onceagain,therewasnoevidenceofdifferencesinhealthoutcomesasaresultoffinancingtransitions.WagstaffandMoreno‐Serrasuggestthatphysiciansinthesecountriessawthetransitionasanopportunitytoincreaseresourcesinthesystemandthereforetheirincomeswhichmayhelpexplainsomeoftheresults.Theyalsohypothesizethatthetransitiontosocialinsuranceleadtolessintegratedsystemsleavingsomepeople
9
slowtosignupforinsuranceandothersnotcapturedbypreventionprograms,bothpotentiallyleadingtoincreasedoverallcosts.However,thefactthattheyfindnooverallchangeinoutcomessuggeststhatthemagnitudeofthesetypesofeffectsmusthavebeenfairlysmall. ArecentpaperbyCylusetal.(2012)explorestherelationshipbetweencollectionmechanism(tax‐financedversussocialinsurance)andtherelationshipbetweeneconomicdownturnsandhealthcarespending.UsingOECDdataonwithincountryvariationsforseveralEuropeancountries,theauthorsestimatemodelsoftherelationshipbetweenchangesinGDPandchangesinpublichealthcareexpenditures.TheyfindthatgrowthinpublichealthcareexpendituresismorestronglyassociatedwithchangesinGDP(positively)intax‐financedcountriesthanincountriesprimarilyfundedthroughsocialinsurancecontributions.Theresultsstemfromcostshiftingandotherpolicychangesintaxfinanced‐countriesthatoccurredineconomicdownturns.Whilepolicyresponsestoeconomiccrisesareclearlypossibleinsocialinsurancecountriesaswell,costshifting(mainlyontousers)didnotoccurtothesameextent.Theauthorshypothesizethattax‐financedcountriesare,ingeneral,moresusceptibletogovernmentdecisionstoreducecostsintimesofeconomiccrisis.
Finally,recentworkbyBaickerandSkinner(2011)modelstheefficiencyofraisingrevenuestofinancerisinghealthcarecostsintheUS(andelsewhereashealthcarecostsarerisingmorequicklythaneconomicgrowthinmanyOECDcountries).Theauthorsdevelopamacroeconomicmodelthataccountsforincreasesinhealthcarespendingthatimprovelongevitybutneedtobefundedthroughincreasedtaxation.Inacomparisonofraisingrevenuethroughincreasedmarginaltaxratesversuslessprogressivepayrolltax,theyfindsubstantialdeclinesineconomicgrowthwiththeformer:an11percentdeclineinGDPrelativetothebaselineofnodistortionaryimpactoftaxfinancing.Theefficiencycostsarelowerwhenlessprogressivetaxesareusedtofinancetheincreaseincosts,althoughthisisassociatedwithlowerincomeindividualspayingalargershareoftheoverallcosts.Notsurprisingly,theefficiencycostisalsolowerwhenlessrevenueisrequiredtoachievethesamehealthgains(increasedproductivityofhealthspending).
CostSharingandUserFees
Thethirdcollectionmechanismusedinavarietyofhealthsystemsisuserchargesorfees(co‐paymentsandotherformsofcostsharing).Thesegenerallyconsistofsomeformofpositivepricechargedtotheuseratthepointofserviceandfromaneconomictheorypointofviewcanallbemodeledasconsumerprices(SchokkaertandVandeVoorde,2011).Userfeesgenerallyhavetwopurposes,firstasamechanismforrevenuecollection,andsecondasamechanismtoachieveamoreefficientallocationofresources.Regardingthesecond,allocativeefficiency,severalstudies(c.f.Pauly,1974)haveshownthatinthepresenceofmoralhazard,theoptimaltheoreticalsolutionincludessomecostsharingforsomeservices.Theprincipalproblemhereisthattheindividualhasinformationandcontroloverfuturehealthstatesthattheinsurercannotobserve.Thismoralhazardproblemresultsintheindividualconsumingexcesscareandtakinglesspreventativeaction.Theoptimalsolutioninthiscaseisfortheinsuredindividualtoretainpart
10
ofthelosses(Pauly,1974).Othershavearguedthatfornon‐electiveprocedurescostsharingmayleadtoinefficientoutcomesasindividualsplaceahighvalueonthecarepurchasedfrominsurancepayoutswhenill.Inthissettingindividualspurchaseinsurancenottoavoidrisknecessarily,butforaclaimonadditionalincomewhensick(Nyman,2003).
Inthecaseofcostsharingforthepurposeofrevenuecollection,itisnotclear,giventheadministrativecostsinvolved,andtheequityconsiderations,thatuserfeesareanoptimalmeansofsupplementingtaxesandcontributionsindevelopedhealthsystems.SchokkaertandVandeVoorde(2011)notethatstrictassumptionsaboutthelimitationsofpublicfinancingmechanismsforthehealthcarebudgetarerequiredforuserfeestobeoptimalasapartoftherevenue‐raisingbasket,namelythatthatgovernmentsubsidiesremainfixedinthepresenceofuserfees(i.e.thatgovernmentfundsarenotcrowdedout)andthattheadditionalrevenueisusedtoincreasethequantityorqualityofhealthservices.
InternationalevidenceontheeffectsofvariousformsofuserfeesasasupplementalcollectionmechanismisconsistentwiththeoryandevidencefromtheUnitedStates.EvidencefromCanada,forexample,whichexamineshowindividualswhoneedtopayoutofpocketforprescriptiondrugsusecarerelativetothosewhodonot,suggestsanegativedemandelasticityintheorderofthosefoundintheRANDexperiment(around‐0.2forprescriptiondrugcoverage)andgreateruseofpubliclyfinanceddoctorservices(Finkelstein,2002;Stabile,2001).EvidencefromCanadathatexaminesincreasesinuserfeesforprescriptiondrugsalsofindsnegativehealtheffectsandincreasedemergencyroomuseforolderandlow‐incomeusers(Tamblynetal.,2001).EvidencefromFrance,wherevoluntaryhealthinsurancereimbursesuserfeesforpubliclyfinancedservices,suggeststhatvoluntaryinsuranceincreasesutilizationand,therefore,publiclyfinancedcosts(Buchmuelleretal.,2004).Therelationshipbetweenout‐of‐pocketpricesandutilizationholdsinanumberofothercountriesintheOECDandacrossabroaderspectrumoflow‐andmiddle‐incomecountries(GertlerandHammer,1997).UsingtheintroductionofreferencedbasedpricinginpartsofCanadaasaquasi‐experiment(whereafeeisappliedtoauserifhe/shechoosesadruginthesameclassasthereferencedrugbutatahighercost),GrootendorstandStewart(2006)findonlymodestdeclinesinoveralldrugexpenditurewhencomparingchangesinexpendituresintheprovincethatintroducedreferenced‐basedpricingtothosethatdidnot.However,theauthorsnotethatpartofthereasonforthesmallbehavioralresponsefoundheremaybethatthepolicywaseithernotapplicableornotbindingformanyusers,limitingthepotentialforsavings.Thereissomeevidenceofmovementtowardsstrategiesthatpromoteefficiencythroughvalue‐basedcostsharing(usingcostsharingtoencouragepatientstousemedication,services,andprovidersthatofferbettervaluethanotheroptions)ratherthansimplyapplyinguserfeesacrosstheboard(Stabileetal,2013).
Overall,theevidencesummarizedaboveandreportedintable2reveals
policychangesacrosscountriestoimprovefinancingincentivesandencourageefficientuseofhealthservices.Theevidencesuggeststhatcollectionmechanismsalonearenoteffectiveinmanaginghealthcarecostsorquality.Someevidencesuggeststhatfinancingthroughsocialinsuranceisassociatedwithhighercostgrowthovertimethanfinancingthroughgeneraltaxrevenues,butpublic
11
spendingonhealthtendstotrackGDPmoreclosely(particularlyinrecessions)intax‐financedsystemsthaninsystemsfinancedthroughsocialinsurance.
4.PoolingRisk Thissectionexaminestheliteratureonoptionsforpoolingriskandmanagingadverseselectionandimplicationsforhealthsystemefficiencyandcosts.ThemajorempiricalfindingsarehighlightedinTable3.Problemswithadverseselectionhavelongbeenrecognizedinthehealthinsuranceliterature.Individualswithhigherexpectedcostswillbemorelikelytoseekmoregenerousinsurance,andinsuranceprovidersinavoluntarycompetitivemarketwillneedtopriceinsuranceofferingsatcostsabovetheaveragevalueofthebenefitspackagetooffsetthehigherexpectedcostsofbothbenefitsandselection(CutlerandReber,1998).Thiscanresultinbenefitspackagesthatareunaffordableformanyhigh‐costindividuals.Riskpoolingdesignedtocountertheseconcernshasbeenaprimaryobjectiveofmanyhealthsystems.Sinceinformationaboutindividuals’healthinsurancecostsisimperfectandasymmetric,perfectriskadjustmentacrossindividualsisunattainable.Second‐bestsolutionsinthepresenceofimperfectinformationleadtoanumberofpotentialproblemsinpractice,includingresidualselection,bluntedincentivesforproviderstomanagecare,amisallocationofindividualsacrossplans,orareductioninchoiceofinsurersandtypeofcoverage. Thetheoreticalliteratureonriskpoolingoffersanumberofstrategiesfordealingwithadverseselectiongivenimperfectinformation.Oneobvioussolutionisforgovernmentstocreateasingle,mandatorypoolortohavemultiplepoolsbutwithoutcompetitionandchoicebetweenpools.Whiletheclearupsidetothesesolutionsistheeliminationofadverseselectionproblems,theremayalsobeefficiencycostsduetotheuncompetitivenatureoftheinsurancemarket.
Governmentsthatwishtopreserveuniversalaccesstoinsurancewithoutusingasinglepooloreliminatingconsumerchoiceofinsurercanpursueasetofalternatestrategiestomanageriskselection.Theycanprovidesubsidiestoindividuals‐cashtransfers,vouchers,tax‐favoredtreatment,taxcredits,etc‐toenablethemtopurchasehigh‐costinsurance.vandeVenandSchut(2011)notethatpremiumsubsidiesareunlikelytobeoptimalforthreereasons:theyreducetheincentiveforefficientpurchasingofinsurancebyhigh‐riskindividuals;theyencourageexcesspurchaseofinsuranceandtheresultingmoralhazardeffects(ZweifelandManning,2000);andtheymaycreateamisallocationofsubsidesifthemagnitudeofthepremiumisbasedonelementsthatarenotrelevantforthelevelofthesubsidy(suchasdifferencesinefficiencyamonghealthinsurersorregionaldifferencesinprices).Incontrast,risk‐adjustedsubsidies,wherepaymentsarebasedonobservableriskfactorssuchasage,sex,andhealthstatus,retainconsumerpricesensitivityandcanbeadjustedovertimetoreflectchangesinconsumerrisk(vandeVen,2006).Risk‐adjustedsubsidiescanbegiventoindividualsortoinsurers.Alternatively,governmentscanregulateratesandinsuranceplanfeaturesandthencompensateplansfortheexpectedriskpoolafterthefact(vandeVenandEllis,2000).
Wheresubsidiesareprovidedbygovernmenttotheinsurer,individualsarethenchargedacommunity‐ratedcontributionforinsurancethatisnotbasedontheirexpectedcosts.vandeVenandSchut(2011)refertosubsidiesprovided
12
toinsurersasriskequalizationandnotethatthesearefarmorecommoninpracticethansubsidiesprovidedtoindividuals,duetolowertransactioncosts.Theultimatesuccessoftheseriskadjustmentmechanismsdependsonabilitytodeterminerisk(vandeVenetal.,2000).GlazerandMcGuire(2000)showthatinanoptimalriskadjustmentframework,pricespaidtoinsurersshouldnotonlyreflectdifferencesincostsacrosspatients,butalsoprovideincentivesforhigherqualitycareforthetypesofpatientslikelytoenrollintheplan.Underthistypeofframework,riskadjustmentpaymentswouldoverpayinsurersrelativetopaymentsbasedsolelyonaveragecosts(GlazerandMcGuire,2000). Brownetal.(2011)showthatfirmswillrespondtoriskadjustmentmodelsbya)reducingtheirscreeningeffortsalongthedimensionsincludedinthemodelandb)selectingpatientsconditionalonriskadjustmentandbasedoncharacteristicsnotincludedintheriskadjustmentformula.Theseeffortscanresultinincreasesratherthandecreasesinthedifferentialpayments(theoriginalpaymentgiventotheinsurertocoversomeoneminusthecounterfactualcostsifthegovernmenthadcoveredthecostsfortheperson)whichwouldbecountertotheobjectivesofthegovernmentinprovidingtheriskadjustmenttotheinsurer.
TheEuropeanhealthsystemsinthisreviewwithcompetitivehealthinsurance‐GermanyandSwitzerland‐havesignificantlyimprovedtheirriskequalizationschemesinthelasttenyearsandnowhaverelativelysophisticatedformulasthatincludehealth‐basedriskadjusters(Thomsonetal,2013).Inspiteofthis,insurers’incentivestoselectriskscanbesubstantialandtherecontinuestobe(largelycircumstantial)evidenceofriskselection(vandeVenetal,2007)andhencepotentialinefficienciesinriskpooling.
NuschelerandKnaus(2005)investigatetheeffectsofthe1996Germanreformsthatallowedforgreatercompetitionamongsicknessfundstotestforevidenceofriskselectionbycompany‐basedsicknessfunds.Thereformsincreasedthenumberofpeopleswitchingbetweensicknessfundsfromaround6percentprereformto10percentthreeyearsafterthereform.Thepapersuggeststhathealthierworkershadlowerswitchingcostsandthereforeweremorelikelytoswitchfunds(tocompany‐basedfundsandregionalfunds,soswitchingmaynothavebeenduetotargetedselectioneffortsonthepartofcompany‐basedfundsbutratherdrivenbyindividualselection)andthatcompany‐basedfundswithlowerpremiumsenjoyedahealthierpoolofenrolleesasaresultofthereforms. TheSwisssystemalsopromoteschoiceforindividualsandcompetitionamonghealthinsuranceproviders.Swissresidentscanchooseamong35differentsellersofinsuranceforthestatutoryhealthinsurancepackage(FrankandLamiraud,2009).Allindividualsarerequiredtoobtainstatutorycoverageand,asnotedabove,thereisriskequalizationrunbythestateonaCantonbyCantonbasis.Colombo(2001)investigatestheeffectsofconsumerchoiceinthiscontextandfindsthereislittleswitchingbehavior,withonly3.9%ofpeopleswitchinginagivenyear.FrankandLamiraud(2009)showthatswitchingbehavioractuallydeclinesasthenumberofoptionsavailableintheSwisscontextincreases. Riskselectionalsocanbeexacerbatedbythefunctioningofthevoluntaryhealthinsurancemarketwhenconsumerpurchasingdecisionsforthetwoformsofinsurancearelinked.Forexample,ifconsumershavestrongincentivestopurchasevoluntaryinsurancefromthesameinsurerfromwhomtheypurchasestatutoryorcompulsorycoverage(forreasonsofconvenienceorlegalrequirement),andifselectionispermittedinthevoluntarymarketanddesirable
13
forinsurersbutdifficultinthestatutorymarket,thenselectioninthevoluntarymarketmayaffectselectioninthestatutorymarket.Thiscouldlimitconsumermobilityinthestatutorymarket.Swisscitizensareabletopurchasecomplementaryvoluntaryinsurancetocoverservicesexcludedfromthestatutorybenefitspackagesuchassomedrugs,accesstocertainphysiciansandtreatmentoutsidetheCantonofresidence.Swissinsurerscansellcomplementarybenefitstoindividualsthatholdstatutorycoveragewiththesameinsurer.Incontrasttostatutoryplans,complementaryplansarenotriskadjustedorcommunityrated.Paoluccietal(2006)reviewwhetherthecomplementaryinsurancemarketcanbeusedtoundermineriskadjustmentacrossanumberofjurisdictions(includingSwitzerland).Theyexplorehowtheprobabilitythatthevoluntarymarketwillbeusedforselectioninthestatutorymarketvarieswiththestrengthofincentivesforriskselectioninthestatutorymarketandthestrengthofthelinksbetweenstatutoryandvoluntaryinsuranceandfindprimafacieevidencethatriskadjustmentinthestatutoryinsurancemarketishamperedthroughselectioninthevoluntarymarket,particularlyinSwitzerland.
AdditionalevidencebyLehmannandZweifel(2004)examinesamajorSwissinsurancecompanythatalsooffersamanagedcareoptiontobetterunderstandtheextentofriskselectionversusinnovationinexplainingthecostdifferencesbetweeninsuranceoptionsintheSwisscontext.Theyconcludethatwhilethereisfavorableriskselectionintolowercostinsuranceoptionssuchasmanagedcare–selectionthatisnotfullycapturedbythesimpleriskadjustmentmechanism–mostcostsavingsareduetocontractualinnovationonthepartofthemanaged‐careorganization.
AlthoughtheEuropeancountrieshaveputinplacenumerousmechanismstoallowindividualstomoveeasilyfromoneinsurertoanother(openenrolment,fullcoverofpre‐existingconditions,standardizedbenefitsetc)andtofacilitateinsurercompetitionformembers(theoptionforpremiumvariationandriskadjustment),thereissomeevidenceofbarrierstoswitchingforolderandapparentlylesshealthypeopleand,inSwitzerland,of‘inertia’inthefaceofmultipleinsuranceoptions.Thissuggeststwothings:first,choiceofinsurermaynotbeasgreatastimulustoenhancingefficiencyandqualityasexpectedifinsurersonlyrisklosinglow‐costindividuals,andthereforedonotfaceincentivestoimprovecareforhigher‐costindividualsbutinsteadcompeteonlyforthelowrisks.Second,theremaybeapointbeyondwhichinsuranceoptionspresentinformationproblemsthatleadtoinertiaandlossofvaluefortheconsumer.Thus,thetransactioncostsofinsurercompetitionmaybehighforindividualsandthehealthsystem. TheevidencefromGermanyandSwitzerlandreviewedaboveisconsistentwithevidencefromtheUSMedicaremarket.ArecentpaperbyBrownetal.(2011)investigatesdifferencesbetweentraditionalMedicareprogramsforolderpeopleandprivate“MedicareAdvantage”(MA)programs.DespitethefactthatthesemustbeofferedatthesamepriceastraditionalMedicareprograms,andthefactthatthegovernmentimplementeddifferentialpaymenttotheseprogramsbasedonpatientriskscores,MAprogramshavedisproportionatelyenrolledlower‐costindividuals.Newhouseetal.(2012)alsoinvestigaterecentstepstakentoreducefavorableselectionintoMAprograms,includingimprovedriskadjustmentthroughbetteruseofdiagnosticinformationoninpatientandoutpatientclaimsformsandchangestomakeitmoredifficulttoleaveMAmonthly
14
(calledapartialenrollment“lock‐in”thatkeptpeopleinMAforthefinalninemonthsoftheyear).Theyconcludethatriskselectionwasgreatlyreduced,althoughnottozero.Therefore,despitegovernmentinterventionthereisstillevidenceofsomeriskselectionamonginsurersintheUnitedStates.
USempiricaleconomicliteratureonthedemandforinsurancehasadvancedourunderstandingofwhoseeksinsuranceandwhyoverthepastdecade.Theclassicaleconomicsliteratureworkedfromthepremisethatbuyinginsuranceismoreattractiveforriskierindividuals.Themorelikelyanindividualistoneedcare,themorelikelyhe/sheistobuyinsurance.Foragivenprice,therefore,sickerindividualsaremorelikelytobuyinsurance,allelseequal.EinavandFinkelstein(2011)notethatcompetitivepricingrespondstotheaverageinsuredindividualwhileefficientpricingshouldbebasedonthemarginalindividualwhoislessriskythantheaverageindividual.Therefore,insurancepricestendtobetoohigh,leadingtounder‐insuranceinthepresenceofadverseselection.
Inrecentwork,however,Einav,FinkelsteinandLevin(2010)findthatthereareanumberofotherdimensionstothedemandforinsurancebeyondrisk,including,importantly,riskaversion.Forexample,intheUSlong‐termcaremarket,theyfoundthatinadditiontopredicteduseoflong‐termcare,individualswhoexhibitmoreprecautionarybehavior(throughpreventativemeasuressuchasseatbeltuseandgettingflushots)aremorelikelytobuylong‐termcare(advantageousratherthanadverseselection),andlesslikelytouselong‐termcare,therebyeliminatingadverseselectioninthismarket(FinkelsteinandMcGarry,2006).Fangetal.(2008)alsofindfurtherevidenceof“advantageous”selectionintheUSMedigapinsurancemarket,alonganumberofnon‐healthorrisk‐relateddimensions.SimilarresultsarefoundinvoluntaryhealthinsurancemarketsinEuropeancountries(Bolinetal.,2010).Inlightofthisempiricalevidence,Einav,FinkelsteinandCullen(2010)estimatetheefficiencyconsequencesofselectioninthecontextofalargefirmandfindonlymodestwelfarecostsfromadverseselection.Thus,whileallofthestudiesreportedfindevidenceofsomeadverseselection,theextentofthisselection,andthepresenceofadvantageousselectioninsomecases,suggestthatthewelfarelosstraditionallyassociatedwithadverseselectionmaybelessthanpreviouslythoughtandthatconcernsaboutitmayhavebeenoverstated.
Inconclusion,theevidencereviewedaboveandsummarizedinTable3suggeststhatcountrieswithcompetingpoolsexperiencesimilardifficultieswithselectionandareadoptingmoresophisticatedformsofriskadjustment.Thenatureofthemarketforvoluntaryinsurancecanplayaroleinexacerbatingselection.Recentevidencesuggeststhatmoredetaileddataonuse,coupledwithrestrictionsonabilitytochangeinsurer,cansignificantlymitigateriskselection.5.PurchasingServices
Allhealthsystemsrequirethepurchaseofawiderangeofgoodsandservicesprovidedbyhospitals,labs,pharmaceuticalcompanies,physiciansandothercaregivers.Thepurchasingfunctionmaybecarriedoutbygovernmentagencies,insurers,groupsofdoctorsactingonbehalfofpatientsorpatients
15
themselves.Itinvolvesdecisionsaboutwhatservicestobuy,fromwhom,atwhatpriceandunderwhatconditions.ManyOECDhealthsystemshaveexperimentedwithpoliciesintendedtostrengthenthepurchasingfunctionbymovingawayfrompassivereimbursementofproviders.Commontoolsadoptedinrecentyearsincludehospitalcompetition,activity‐basedpaymentforhospitalservices(orDiagnosisRelatedGroups,(DRGs)asystemwhichclassifieshospitalcases/proceduresintogroupsandthenassignspaymentpricesforthesegroups)andthelinkingofproviderpaymenttoperformanceandoutcomes(pay‐for‐performance,P4P).Wereviewtheliteratureonrecentinnovationsinhospitalcompetitionandproviderpaymentbelow,andsummarizetheempiricalliteratureinTable4.
HospitalCompetition
TheNationalHealthService(NHS)inEnglandhas,inthelasttwentyyears,engagedinseveralexperimentstofosterpatientchoiceofhospitalandencouragehospitalcompetition.Theextenttowhichhospitalcompetitionimprovesqualityorpricesmaydifferdependingonthenatureofthemarket.Forathoroughreviewofthenatureofcompetitioninhealthcaremarketsandasummaryoftherecentresearchinthisarea,seeGaynorandTown(2011).Inmanymarketspricesaresetbyregulators,leadingtonon‐pricecompetitionbasedonquality.Hospitalqualityisinherentlyhardtomeasureandhasmultipledimensions.Somedimensions,suchaswaitingtimesarerelativelyeasytomeasure.Others,suchasrisk‐adjustedmortalitycanbemoredifficulttoquantify.Thetheoreticaleffectsofcompetitionunderfixedpricesareincreasedquality,withagreatereffectwherethereisalargernumberoffirmsinthemarket;qualitywillalsoincreaseasregulatedpricesincrease(GaynorandTown,2011).Propperetal.(2004)andPropperetal.(2008)arguethatinmarketswithstricterbudgetconstraints(generallywheretherearelargegovernmentpurchasersorwherepurchaserbudgetsaredeterminedbygovernments),priceswillberelativelymoreimportantandthereforehospitalswillcompeteonpricesinsteadofonquality.Thetheoreticaleffectonqualityinthiscaseisindeterminateandmayresultinqualitybelowefficientlevels.
EvidencefromavarietyofreformsinEnglandaregenerallyconsistentwiththesepredictions.Intheearly1990sthecreationofaninternalmarketthroughapurchaser‐providersplitallowedDistrictHealthAuthorities(DHAs)withresponsibilityformeetingthehealthneedsoftheirlocalpopulationtopurchaseservicesfromhospitals.TheaimwastomakehospitalscompeteforthebusinessofDHAsandofgroupsofGPswhoheldfundstopurchasecarefortheirpatients(“GPfundholders”),therebyimprovingefficiencyandquality.Followingachangeofgovernmentin1997,thepurchaser‐providersplitremainedinplaceandnewgeographicallydefinedprimarycaretrusts(PCTs)weresetuptopurchaseservicesfromprimarycareprovidersandhospitals.Inthemid2000s,thegovernmentexperimentedwithavariantofGPfundholdingknownaspractice‐basedcommissioning(BevanandvandeVen,2010).Andin2013anewgovernmentestablishedclinicalcommissioninggroupstofacilitatepurchasingbygroupsofGPs.
Propperetal.(2004)examinetheeffectsofhospitalcompetitiononmortality.Theydefinecatchmentareasforeachhospital,capturethenumberof
16
hospitalsineacharea,thenweightthismeasurebythepopulationeachareaserves.Theirfindingssuggestthatincreasedhospitalcompetitionreducedquality;hospitalslocatedinareaswithmorecompetitionhadhigherdeathratesthanthoseinareaswithlowerlevelsofcompetition,controllingforobservabledifferencesinpatientandhospitalcharacteristics.Thesizeoftheeffectissmallbutrobust.Inafollow‐upstudy,however,Propperetal.(2008)notethatwhereoutcomesareeasilyobservable(waittimes),hospitalshadtocompeteonbothpriceandquality(waittimes)andcompetitionledtoimprovements,butattheexpenseofqualitymeasuresthataremoredifficulttoobserve.OtherevidencereviewedinBevanandvandeVen(2010)suggeststhatNHShospitalsincreasedproductivityandthatwhilewaittimesappearedtoimproveunderGPfundholdingtheredidnotappeartobemuchevidenceofareductionincosts. TheGPfundholdermodelwasinplacefrom1991to1999whenitwasabolished.Dusheikoetal.(2006)usethispolicyreversaltoexaminetheeffectsofsupply‐sidecostsharingonphysicianbehavior.TheyfindstrongevidencethatGPfundholdingresultedinadeclineinsecondaryadmissions(aswouldbepredictedbythetheory).TheyfindnoevidencethattheresultofthiswasasubstitutionofemergencyadmissionsforelectiveadmissionsthroughaGP.ThissuggeststhatincentivizingthegatekeepingfunctionofGPsdoesresultinlessutilization,potentiallyresultinginworsecareforpatients.However,wereviewothereffectsofthereformsbelow(suchasimprovedwaittimesforpatientswhowereinGPfundholdergroups)andacompleteanalysisofthewelfareeffectsofsuchpolicieswouldneedtotakeintoaccountthecombinedeffects. FurtherreformsinEnglandsoughtincreasedpatientchoiceofthelocation,timeanddayofelectivesurgerytoreducewaitingtimesandimprovequalitythroughcompetition,withmoney“followingthepatient”(DRGs)(Dixonetal,2010).Thereforms,commonlyreferredtoas“ChooseandBook”,wereslowtogetofftheground.Dixonetal.(2010)reportthatasof2008,lessthanhalfofGPreferralsforoutpatientappointmentsusedthenewsystem.Gaynoretal.(2010)examineevidenceofincreasedconsumerchoicethrough“ChooseandBook”andtheintroductionofDRGs.Usingdischargedataandcomparingvariationinmarketstructureacrosshospitalsthroughmarketconcentration,theyfoundthathospitalscompetedonquality,resultinginimprovementsinmortalityandlengthofstay.Inafollow‐uppaper(Gaynoretal.,2012)theauthorsestimateastructuraldemandmodelusingdatafromthesamereformsforcoronaryarterybypassgraft(CABG)surgery.Theirestimatesconfirmthatreformsgivingpatientschoiceofhospitalincreasedpatientelasticityofdemandwithrespecttoservicequality.Theyfoundconsiderableheterogeneityintheirestimates,withsickerpatientsrespondingmoretothereform,butdidnotfindsignificantresponsedifferencesbyincome(Gaynoretal.,2012).
Cooperetal.(2010)alsoexaminetheeffectsofincreasedcompetitionintheNHSusingadifference‐in‐differencesapproachwith“exposure”tocompetitionandtimeasthetwodifferences.Theyfindthatwhileincreasedcompetitionamongpublicsectorhospitalsimprovedproductivitythroughshorterlengthofstay(particularlyforpresurgery),competitionbetweenpublicandprivatehospitalshadtheoppositeeffect,withpost‐surgerylengthofstayincreasinginpublichospitalsasaresultofcompetition(pre‐surgerylengthsofstayremainedrelativelyunchanged).Theauthorsofferpatientselection(less
17
complicatedpatientsbeingdrawntotheprivatesector)asanexplanationforthesedifferingeffects. EvidencefromAustraliaalsosuggestsmixedbenefitsfromincreasedcompetitioninacontextwherepublicandprivatehospitalsarecompetingforpatientsandhavemultiplepayers(bothgovernmentandprivateinsurance).Australiahasarelativelyhighshareofproceduresinprivatehospitals,ataround30%ofallinpatientadmissions,andhighlevelsofprivateinsurancecoverage,ataround45%ofthepopulation(PalangkarayaandYong,2013).Inasettingwherepublichospitalsandprivatehospitalscompeteonpriceandquality,PalangkarayaandYong(2013)examinetheeffectsofhospitalcompetitiononmortalityandreadmissionsusinghospitaldischargedata.Theirevidencesuggeststhatcompetitionhasmixedeffectsonquality:asmallincreaseinmortalitybutalargerdecreaseinunplannedreadmissions.However,theresearchsettingheredoesnotallowforquasi‐experimentalcontrolforotherfactorsthatmaybeassociatedwithgreatercompetition,whichmightbiastheresults. Onceagain,theevidencefromtheUKandAustraliaisconsistentwithevidencefromtheintroductionofdrugcoveragethroughMedicarePartDintheUnitedStates.Researchtheresuggeststhatthemechanismsusedbygovernmenttopurchaseprescriptiondrugs,i.e.movingpatientsfromindividualpurchaserstomembersofaninsuredgroup,canhavestrongeffectsonmarketoutcomesincludingloweringoptimalprices(incontrasttothestandardinsurancefindingofanincreaseinprices).TheirfindingscomefrominsurersaspartoftheMedicarePartDprogramwhichbundlesinsurancewithaformularyandgrouppurchasing.Thereasonsbehindthiscounter‐intuitiveresultincludetheabilityofinsuranceplanstobundleinsurancewithformulariesandothermechanismstocreateelasticdemand.Individuals,unlikeinsuranceplans,arenotwellinformedaboutthesubstitutabilityofdrugs,anddoctorsaregenerallynotwellinformedaboutnegotiatedprices.Insuranceplans,ontheotherhand,areabletoproviderulesandincentivestotakeadvantageofbothoftheseresultinginlowerprices.(DugganandScottMorton,2010). Insum,theliteraturefindsmixedeffectsofcompetitiononquality.Thismaybepartlyduetodifferencesinqualitymeasureswithfairlyuniformevidenceontherelationshipbetweenqualityandwaittimesandmoremixedevidenceonqualitymeasuresthatarehardertoconsistentlymeasuresuchasrisk‐adjustedmortality. ProviderPayment:DRGsandPay‐For‐Performance
TheintroductionofDiagnosisRelatedGroupstopayforhospitalcarehasbeenamajortrendacrossOECDcountries.Expressedpolicyreasonsforthismoveincludeincreasedefficiency,transparency,theabilitytoincreasevolumesforselectservices,andcost‐containment.AreviewoftheevidenceacrossEuropesuggeststhatgreateruseofDRGsledtoanincreaseinadmissionratesandadeclineintheaveragelengthofstay,aswouldbepredicted,suggestingimprovementsinquality(Busseetal.,2012).EvidenceontheeffectofDRGsonoverallsystemcosts,asdistinctfromper‐unitcosts,ismoredifficulttoascertain,withsomeevidenceofhigheroverallcostsinFranceandlimitedevidenceoncostsintheUKandGermany(O’Reillyetal,2012).
18
ReformofphysicianpaymenthasmainlyfocusedonlinkingpaymenttoperformanceandtheUnitedKingdomhasexperimentedmoresubstantiallywithP4PthananyotherEuropeancountry.P4PwasintroducedtopayUKGPsin2003,with25%ofGPincometiedtomeetingqualitytargetsinasystemknownasthe‘QualityandOutcomesFramework’(QOF)(Gravelleetal,2008).QOFusesalistof65clinicalqualityindicatorsforpatientsinthepractice.Paymentsarelinearlyrelatedtothenumberofpatientswhoachievetheindicatorsasaratioofthosesuitablefortheindicator.Whenpatientsarenotsuitablefortheindicatortheyareconsidered“exceptions”.Thisensuresthatqualitymeasuresarenotappliedtothosepatientsforwhomtheyarenotappropriate.However,italsoallowsGPstoexcludepatientsforwhomtheycannotreachthequalitystandards.Gravelleetal.(2008)investigateboththedegreetowhichGPsaremeetingqualitystandardsandthemagnitudeofexceptionreportingusingGPdatafromScotland.Theresultssuggestthatover90%ofpracticesachievedthehighestlevelofpayforperformanceandthatthesepracticesexceededthestandardrequiredtomaximizepay.Only1%ofpatientsseemedinappropriatelyexcepted.However,afollow‐upstudybyGravelleetal.(2010)usesproviderleveldatatotestwhetherphysiciansgamedthesystemtotakeadvantageoftheavailablefinancialrewardsbynotonlyincreasingthenumberofpatientstreatedsuccessfullybutalsobydecreasingthenumberofpatientseligiblefortreatmenttherebyimprovingtheirratiosoftreatedpatientsandimprovingtheirfinancialrewardandfindevidenceofsuchgamingbehavior.
IntermsoftheeffectsofQOFonpatientoutcomes,theevidencesuggestsmixedsuccess.Campbelletal.(2007)examinetheimprovementsinUKprimarycareusingalongitudinalcohortstudythatspanstheintroductionofpayforperformanceandfocusesonthemanagementofthreemajorchronicconditions:asthma,coronaryheartdiseaseandtype2diabetes.Whiletheauthorsnoteimprovementsinpracticequalityforallthreeofthesegroupsoverthe1998to2005period,theimprovementsbeganbeforetheintroductionofQOFandareinevidencebothforthoseclinicalindicatorsthatreceivedfinancialincentivesforimprovementandthosethatdidnot.TheyconcludethatQOFisassociatedonlywithamodestaccelerationinimprovementforasthmaanddiabetes.
AsecondinvestigationontheeffectsofQOFonqualityofcarebySerumagaetal.(2011)focusesonpatientswithhypertension.Thestudycomparescohortswhostartedtreatmentin2000(severalyearsbeforetheintroductionofpayforperformanceintheUK)withthosewhostartedsixmonthsbeforetheintroductionofpayforperformance.Theyconcludethattherewerenochangesinincidenceofadverseoutcomesormortalityrelatedtohypertensionasaresultoftheimplementationofpayforperformance.
MorerecentevidencefromahospitalP4Pprogram(Suttonetal.,2012)usesadifference‐in‐differencesframeworktoexaminethechangesinmortalityforpatientsadmittedwithpneumonia,heartfailureandAMIbeforeandaftertheintroductionoftheAdvancingQualityprogram–ahospitalbasedpayforperformanceprogramintroducedinthenorth‐westregionofEnglandbutnotintherestofthecountry.Thefindingssuggestimprovementsinmortalityrelativetotherestofthecountryandtheauthorsnotethatincomparisontootherprogramsthathavenotfoundsuchlargeresultstheprogramhadlargerbonusesandgreaterinvestmentbyhospitalsinquality‐improvementactivities.
19
TheevidencefromtheUKisreflectedinevidencefromtheUS.Forexample,intheMedicaidmarket,Duggan(2004)findsthatgovernmentcontractswithHMOstotakeonMedicaidpatientsresultedinhighercostsperpatientwithnocorrespondingimprovementin(infant)healthoutcomes.AreviewofthebroaderliteratureonP4PbyRosenthalandFrank(2006)suggeststhattheempiricalevidenceinsupportofpay‐for‐performanceintheUSisweak.Theynotethatamongthehealthcarestudiesreviewed,manyshownoresults.Theyalsonote,however,thatmanyofthesestudiesweresmallscaleinterventionsthatmaynothavebeenpickedupbyphysicians,andthatthelackofoutcomeshere,therefore,maynotbegeneralizabletolargerscaleinterventions.
Overalltherehasbeenconvergencetowardsmoreuseofmarket‐likemechanismsinOECDhealthsystems.TheseincludewideadoptionofDRGstopayhospitals,attemptstoencouragehospitalcompetitionand,morerecently,greatereffortstolinkproviderpaymenttoperformance.Theevidenceonhospitalcompetition(summarizedinTable4)suggeststhatwhereoutcomesareeasilyobservableortargeted(suchaswaittimes)hospitalscompeteonpriceandquality(waittimes),leadingtoimprovedoutcomes.6.CoverageDecisions Decisionsaboutwhomtocover(breadth),whattocover(scope)andhowmuchofthecosttocover(depth)mayhaveimplicationsforefficiency,costs,andquality.Inadditiontocoveragedecisions,governmentsinmanyjurisdictionsareoftenabletodeterminehowquicklytoprovideservices.Systemswithfixedbudgetsorotherbudgetconstraintmechanismsforhealthcareprovisiongenerallyemploypriceandnon‐pricerationingtocontrolaccessandcostswithinthepubliclyfinancedsystem.Oneofthemostcommonnon‐pricerationingmechanismsistolimitaccesstocarethroughwaitlists.Indeed,longwaitingtimesandcarerationedbymechanismsotherthanpriceareoftenexpressedconcernsinUSpolicydebatesaroundanincreasedroleforgovernmentinthehealthcaresector(c.f.Esmail,2009).Here,wefocusoncoveragebreadthandscopeandonwaitingtimes(giventhelargeroleitplaysinthedebatearoundrationingcare),aswediscussedcoveragedepthinthesub‐sectiononuserfeesabove.TheempiricalevidencereviewedissummarizedinTable5.
DemandForInsuranceandCoverageBreadthandScope Asallthecountriesthatwereviewherehaveuniversalornearlyuniversalcoverage,weexaminetheliteratureonthedemandforinsurancethatcomplementsthesesystemsandhencehelpsdefinepubliccoveragedecisions.Wedonotaddressliteratureonthedemandforinsurancethatsupplementsor“topsup”publiccoveragehere1,withtheexceptionofthesubsidiesforinsurance
1Thepublicfinanceliteratureexploresthewelfareeffectsofallowingforprivatetoppingupofuniversalpublicbenefits,comparingtheeffectsofsuchasystemto
20
throughtaxsystems,asitdoesnotrelatedirectlytocoveragedecisionswithinthepublicsystem(seeThomsonandMossialos,2009andStabileandTownsend,2013forreviewsofthisliterature).
WhiledoctorsandhospitalservicesareuniversallyanduniquelycoveredbytheprovincialhealthinsuranceplansinCanada,coverageofotherservices,suchaspharmaceuticals,dentalservices,andothernon‐hospitalordoctorbasedcareisnotuniversal.Theseservicesarecoveredbyamixofprivateandpublicinsuranceandpublicsubsidy,dependingonprovinceofresidence,age,andincome(Stabile,2001).Severalstudieshavelookedatthefinancingandequityimplicationsofthismixedpublicandprivatecoverage,particularlyaroundprescriptiondrugcoveragewhichhasbeenoneofthefastinggrowingcomponentsofhealthcarecostsinCanadaoverthepastfewdecades(Alanetal,2005).
Researchontheeffectsofpublicdruginsuranceprogramsexplorestheequityandcostimplicationsofchangesinpharmaceuticalcoveragefromage‐basedcoveragetoincome‐basedcoverage.InBritishColumbia,priorto2003thegovernmentprovidedcoverageforindividualsage65andolder(similartoUSMedicare).In2003theprovinceswitchedfromage‐basedcoveragetoanincome‐basedcoverageprogramwheretheamountofcoverage,deductibleandcostsharingvariedbyfamilyincome.Theexplicitgoalsofthepolicychangewerea)tomaketheprovincialdrugprogrammoresustainableandb)toincreasefairnessandequitywithinthedrugprogram(Hanleyetal.,2008).Areviewoftheequityconsequencesoftheshiftfromagetoneeds‐basedcoveragesuggeststhatthecoveragechangedidresultinalessregressivedrugprograminBCintermsoftheoutofpocketfundspaidfordrugs.Thischangewasdrivenbyanincreaseintheout‐of‐pocketcostspaidbyhigherincomeseniorsfollowingthepolicychange.Althoughtheoveralleffectwastomaketheprogramlessregressive,theaverageoutofpocketcostsforlow‐incomehouseholdsalsoincreased(Hanleyetal.,2008).
Apartfromtargetedpublicdruginsuranceprograms,thegovernmentofCanadaprovidessignificantsubsidyforthepurchaseofvoluntaryhealthinsurancethroughthetaxcode.LiketheUnitedStates,Canadaexemptsemployercontributionstohealthinsurancefrompersonaltaxableincome.Themostrecentreviewofthesetaxexpendituressuggestthattheyareintheorderof$3billionannually(DepartmentofFinanceCanada,2011).ResearchexaminingtheimplicationsofthesesubsidiesonlinkingvoluntaryhealthinsurancetothelabormarketsuggestthatthereisalargerimpactofthesubsidiesontheprobabilitythatsmallfirmsofferinsuranceinCanada(aswellastheUS)andlesslikelytoaffectthedecisionoflargerfirmstoofferinsurancegiventheotheradvantages(largeriskpoolsandadministrativeefficiencies)availabletolargefirms(Stabile,2002).Theevidenceheresuggeststhatintheabsenceofthesesubsidies,complementarydrugcoverageofferedthroughsmallfirmswoulddeclinesignificantly(intheorderof50%).
Inadditiontosubsidizingthepurchaseofinsurancethroughanemployer,theCanadiansystem,liketheUSsystem,allowsfordeductionsandcreditsforoutofpockethealthcareexpenditureswhentheseexpendituresexceedacertain
onewhereindividualseitherchoosetoparticipateinthebenefitprogramoroptoutcompletely.SeeCurrieandGahvari(2008)forareviewofthisliterature.
21
shareofpersonalincome.Aswiththeemployerdeduction,thesubsidyvarieswiththeindividual’smarginaltaxrate.Evidenceexploringtheeffectsofthesesubsidiesalsoconfirmssignificanttax‐priceelasticitieswithrespecttoallhealthcareexpenditures,andwithrespecttothepurchaseofvoluntaryhealthinsurance(SmartandStabile,2005).Thereisnoevidence,however,thatthesesubsidiesaffectthepurchaseofhealthinsuranceontheintensivemargin.Thisislikelybecausebothinsurancepremiumsandout‐of‐pocketspendingareeligibleforthetaxcredit,leavingtherelativepriceofmarkethealthinsuranceandselfinsuranceunchangedinCanada(SmartandStabile,2005).Insum,thesubsidieshaveincreasedcoverageratessubstantially,butatthecostofsignificantpublicrevenuelossandreducedequity. Australiahasalsopromotedvoluntaryprivatehealthinsurancealongwiththepublicsystemthroughtheuseoftaxsubsidiesthroughlargeuniversalrebatesonprivateinsurancepurchases,lifetimecommunityratingbasedontheagethatinsuranceisfirstpurchased,aswellastaxsurchargesonhighearnerswhodonotpurchaseprivateinsurance.Evidenceontheeffectsoftheselargesubsidiesoninsurancetakeupunsurprisinglyfindslargeincreasesinprivateinsurancetakeup(Hurleyetal,2002)andselectionintoinsurancebyindividualswhoexpecttobeheavyusersofhospitalservices(SavageandWright,2003).Additionally,theevidencesuggeststhatthecombinationoftaxsubsidiesandtheeffectsofprivatesystemsonthehealthcareinputcosts(bothintheshortandlongrun)limitthepotentialcostsavingsforthepublicsector(Hurleyetal.,2002).TheauthorsnotethatthereisnoconclusiveevidencefromAustraliathatshowsadeclineinpublicwaitingtimesfollowingtheintroductionofaparallelprivatesystem,northatpubliccostswerereducedwhentheoverallcostofthepoliciesaretakenintoaccount.EconomicEvaluationandCoverageScope
Manyhealthsystemsemployhealthtechnologyassessment(HTA)andvariousdegreesofeconomicevaluation(forexample,costeffectivenessanalysis)todeterminewhatthepubliclyfinancedbenefitspackageshouldcover.Inadditiontoconsideringwhetheraparticularserviceortreatmentshouldbefunded,assessingbodiescanalsoconsiderbestpracticeswithinacceptedtreatmentstoreduceharmfulorcostlytreatmentvariation.HTAisnot,however,uniquetopubliclyfinancedinsurance–allpayersmustdecidewhattheywillandwillnotpayfor,andmanyattempttoelicitbestpracticesfromtheirproviderstoensurequality,safetyandefficiency.Thereisanextensiveliteratureonmethodsofeconomicevaluation(c.f.Drummondetal.,2005,Garber,2000).Garber(2000),buildingonGarberandPhelps(1997),explorestherelationshipbetweeneconomicanalysisanddecisionmakingbytheinsurer.Wherethedecisionisbasedontheaverageriskinthepopulation,theinsurancecompanyorpublicinsurerwillcoverthoseserviceswiththemaximumnetbenefit.GarberandPhelpsnotethatonlythoseserviceswhoseexpectedbenefitsequalorexceedcostswillbeinsuredandthesewillbeincludedinthepremium.Inthecaseofagovernmentinsurer,itispossiblethatabroadersetofcostsandbenefitswillbeusedinanyeconomicevaluation,asallcostsandbenefitstosocietyshouldberelevant.Thismayleadtodifferentdecisionsaboutwhattocover.Theperspectiveofa
22
managed‐carecompany,forexample,wouldignoreproducersurplus.However,giventhattherelevantpopulationforgovernmentmaynotincludeproducersoutsidetheboundariesofthestatethisdistinctionisperhapsnotasapplicableinpractice(Pauly,1995andGarber,2000).
Severalcountrieshavesetupbodiesaimedatincreasingtheuseofhealthtechnologyassessment.Forexample,theNationalInstituteforHealthandClinicalExcellence(NICE)wasestablishedinEnglandin1999toensurethattreatmentdecisionswouldbebasedonthebestavailableclinicalevidence,andmanyothercountrieshavefollowedsuit.However,evidenceoftheeffectivenessofHTAislimited.EvidencefromNICEsuggests,forexample,thatveryfewappraisalsofnewtechnologieshavehadanegativeoutcome(NICE,2010).WhereNICEhasrecommendedrestrictingtheuseoftechnologies,therehavebeensomesavingstotheNationalHealthService,butpartofthecosthasbeenshiftedtopatients,limitingoverallcostcontainment(Richards,2008).
AccesstoCareandWaitTimes
Intheabsenceofpricesasaformofdemandcontrol,theoptimalwaitforcarewillbeonethatbalancesmarginalsocialcostsandmarginalsocialbenefits.Assumingthatthelongerthewaitforinpatienttreatment,thelowerthetotalcostofcareinpresentvalueterms,thentheoptimalwaitwilldependbothontotalcostsandthenatureofthebenefitcurve–i.e.howthebenefitoftreatmentchangeswithdelayinbeingtreated.Incontrasttoamarketclearingprice,waitingimposesacostonthepatientbydelayingcare;italsoresultsinadeadweightlossasthereislostconsumersurplusandnogaintotheproducer.GravelleandSiciliani(2008)notethatinthepresenceofmoralhazardsomewaittimemaybeoptimal,buttheassumptionsrequiredforsucharesulttobewelfareincreasingincludethatthemarginalcostofwaitingbehigherforpatientswithasmallerbenefitfromtreatment(GravelleandSiciliani,2008).Ifwaittimesarerequired,itisoptimalforthosepatientswhofacethegreatestgaintoreceivetheshortestwaitandforthosewithnopotentialgaintowaitaninfiniteamountoftime.However,intheabsenceofperfectinformation,shorterwaittimesshouldbeofferedtothosegroupswithhigherexpectedgains(GravelleandSiciliani,2009).Therefore,whereasmostprivateinsuranceschemesimposeauniformcostacrossallpatients,publiclyfinancedcareoftenimposeswaittimesthatwillnotbeuniform,anddependinsteadonthepotentialgainsfromtreatmentandthedeadweightlossofwaiting. Propperetal.(2002)investigatetherelationshipbetweenGPfundholdinginEnglandandwaittimes.GPfundholdingallowedsomeGPstopurchaseservicesonbehalfoftheirpatientsaspartofalargersetofreformstoencouragehospitalcompetitionandlowerwaittimes(discussedabove).Alltransactionswerewithinthepubliclyfinancedhealthcaresystem.Theauthorsexaminehospitalwaittimesforover100,000electivehospitaladmissionsinEnglandbetween1993and1997.TheyfindpatientswithGPfundholderswaitedlesstime,allelseequal,thannon‐fundholderpatients.Thelongestreductionsinwaitswerefoundinthoseareaswiththelongestwaittimesapriori.Theyfindlimitedevidenceofspillovereffectsfornon‐fundholderpatientsorforotherareasofpractice.Theyconcludethatit
23
wastheabilitytopayforshorterwaittimesfromwithinthepublicsystem,andnottheabilitytochoosethehospitalfortheprocedure(fundholderscouldpurchaseserviceswithoutspecificallypayingforlowerwaits)thatresultedinshorterwaittimes(Propperetal.,2002). SicilianiandMartin(2007)alsoexaminetherelationshipbetweenincreasedchoiceinNHShospitals(throughthepoliciesexaminedabove)andwaittimesusingdatafrom120hospitalsbetween1999and2001.TheyusesimilarmeasuresofmarketconcentrationtoPropperetal,2004(reviewedabove)andfindamodestreductioninwaittimesfromincreasedcompetition.Theirresultsalsoimplythatthereisanoptimalnumberofhospitalscompetingwitheachanotherandthatoncetheoptimalnumberisexceeded(between11and14hospitalsinacatchmentarea)furtherincreasesinthenumberofhospitalscompetingcanresultinincreasedwaittimes.Theauthorsdonotprovideanexplanationforthisresult,butnotethattheeffectismodest. ResearchbyCooperetal.(2009)alsoexamineshowthepoliciesoutlinedaboveaswellasincreasedfundingbytheUKgovernmentaffectedwaittimesforcare.Theydocumentasteadydeclineinwaittimesforhip,knee,andcataractproceduresintheNHSbetween2000and2007(afteraninitialincreaseinwaittimes).Aswaittimesfell,thevariationinwaittimeacrosssocioeconomicstatusalsofell,improvingequity.Whiletheevidencepresentedisnotcausal,andtheauthorsdonottryandlinkparticularpartsoftheUKreformstothedeclinesinwaittimesandimprovementsinequity,theydoclaimthat“thepost2000governmentreformsdidnotleadtotheinequitabledistributionofwaittimesacrossgroupsthatmanypeoplepredicted”(Cooperetal,2009,p.5). Propperetal.(2010)examinetheuseoftargetsintheUKasatooltoreducewaittimes.TheyexploitthenaturalexperimentgeneratedbytheintroductionoftargetsintheEnglandbutnotScotlandtoidentifywhethertargetsettingforwaitlistsledtoafallinwaittimesinEngland.Theyfindareductioninwaitingtimesof13daysonaverage.Whilelevelsofelectivecarerosetoreducewaittimes,theydidnotfindreductionsinnon‐targetedactivitytooffsetthesechanges.Theyalsofindnoevidenceofafallinpatientquality,someevidenceofanincreaseinthequalityofcareandofwaitlist“manipulation”wherebypatientswereremovedeithertemporarilyorpermanentlyfromthelist.OveralltheauthorsconcludethattargetssuccessfullyloweredwaittimesinEngland,withlittleevidenceofadversesideeffects. WaittimeshavebeenidentifiedasapersistentpolicyprobleminCanadaaswell(Wilcoxetal.,2007).AfewstudieshavetriedtoassesstheimpactoflongerwaittimesinCanadaintermsofhealthoutcomes.Achallengeinmeasuringtheimpactoflongerwaitsisthat,inadditiontoanyhealthdifferences,theremaybenon‐healthmeasuressuchaspainorlostincomeorleisurethataremoredifficulttomeasure.However,muchoftheliteraturefocusesonmoreeasilymeasuredoutcomessuchaslengthofstaypostsurgery,ormortality.OnesuchstudyexaminespatientswithhipfracturesinQuebecadmittedtohospitalbetween1990and1993(Hamiltonetal.,1996).Aftercontrollingforpatienthealthandforbothobservedandunobservedindividualandhospitalcharacteristics,waittimeforsurgeryhadlittleeffectonpost‐surgerylengthofstayormortality.Studiesinthemedicalliteraturelookingatopen‐heartsurgery(Carrieretal.,1993)similarlyfindlittledifferenceinpost‐operativeoutcomes.However,astudylookingatwaittimesforadmissionintohospitalthroughtheemergencyroom(ER)inCanada
24
foundthatpresentingtoanERwhenthereisalongerwaitintheERhadahigherriskofshorttermdeathoradmission(Guttmannetal.,2011).TheauthorsusearetrospectivecohortstudyandhealthadministrativedatafromOntariototrackpatientswhowereeitherseenanddischargedorleftwithoutbeingseen.Theyfindanincreaseinbothmortalityandadmissiontohospitalamongpatientswhopresentduringshiftswithlongmeanwaittimes.However,patientswholeftwithoutbeingseenwerenotatincreasedriskofadverseevents. Australiaalsoexperiencesissueswithwaittimesandthegovernmenthaspushedprivateinsurancethroughexplicitsubsidiesasbothasolutiontolongwaittimesandincreasedpublicexpenditures(Vaithianathan,2002).Asnotedabove,alargenumberofAustralians(45%)holdprivateinsurancecoverageinordertoobtainfasterandpremiumservice.Joharetal.(2011)exploretheextenttowhichthedecisiontopurchaseinsuranceinAustraliaisafunctionofexpectedwaittimes.Usinghospitaladministrativedatatheymodeltheeffectofexpectedwaittimeforaprocedureonthedemandforinsurance.Theauthorsimputeexpectedwaittimesusingavarietyofhealthconditionsavailableinadministrativedata.ContrarytoanecdotalevidenceinAustraliatheyfindthatthedemandforinsuranceisinsensitivetoexpectedwaitingtimes,althoughtheydofindthatitissensitivetowaittimesfortheupperendofthewaittimedistribution.Onelimitationofthestudyisthatthedemandforinsuranceasmodeleddoesnotincludeanumberofpossiblecharacteristicsofprivateinsurancesuchasaccesstocertaindoctors.Itisalsounclearwhetherperceivedlongwaittimesbyindividualsbeforetheyactuallyexperienceillnessisn’tthedrivingfactorinpeople’sdecisiontoseekinsurance.Evidenceofthedifferenceinwaittimesforpeoplewithandwithoutprivateinsurancesuggeststhatprivatelyinsuredpatientsreceivemuchfastercarenotonlyinprivatehospitalsbutalsoinpublicones(JoharandSavage,2010). ThereislessevidencethatwaittimesareaprobleminGermany,France,andSwitzerland.AninternationalcomparisonofwaittimesbySicilianiandHurst(2004)suggeststhatthereissomeevidencethatthosecountriesthatdonotreportproblemswithwaittimesspendslightlymore,havehigherlevelsofcapacityasmeasuredbynumberofhospitalbedsanddoctorspercapita,andhavehigherlevelsofinpatientactivities.TheyarealsomorelikelytouseDRGstopayhospitals(atthetimethestudywascarriedout;nowmostuseDRGs)andfee‐for‐servicetopayphysicians.Theydonotfindevidence,however,thatcountriesthatdonotreporthighlevelsofwaittimesaremoreproductive(asmeasuredbyinpatientsperphysician).Insum,theevidencereviewedaboveandlistedinTable5suggeststhatwhilewaittimesarenotaproblemacrossallcountries,wheretheyareaproblem,governmentshavebeenabletoreducethemwhentheyhavechosenexplicitlytofocusonachievingthisgoal.Effortstoexpandcoveragebeyondhospitalandphysicianservices,ortopromotevoluntaryhealthinsurancethroughtaxsubsidieshavebeenmixedacrosscountries,withsomeevidenceofinefficientuseoftaxsubsidiesandotherpoliciestopromotevoluntaryinsurancealongsidepubliclyfinancedcoverage.
25
7.Implicationsforhealthsystemefficiency,costs,qualityLessonsLearned
Whatlessonscanwedrawfromtheevidencesummarizedaboveandwhatquestionsremainedunanswered?Intermsofcollection,manycountriesareexploringnewwaysofgeneratingrevenuesforhealthcaretoenablethemtocopewithsignificantcostgrowth.However,thereislittleevidencetosuggestthatcollectionmechanismsaloneareeffectiveinmanagingthecostorqualityofcare.First,thetraditionalclassificationoftax‐financedversussocialinsurancesystemsdoesnotdeterminehowcountriesorganizehealthfinancingfunctionstoachievepolicygoals.Theevidenceavailableontherelationshipbetweenfinancingandoutcomessuggeststhathealthsystemsfinancedthroughsocialinsurance(asopposedtogeneraltaxrevenues)tendtobemoreregressiveandhavesmallertaxbases.Someevidencesuggeststhatfinancingthroughsocialinsuranceversusgeneraltaxrevenuesisassociatedwithhighercostgrowthovertime,althoughitisdifficult,usingsuchabroadclassification,toseparatecollectionmechanismsfromothercharacteristicsmoreoftenfoundintax‐financedjurisdictionssuchasbudgetandpricecontrolsandquasi‐hardbudgetconstraints.Publichealthcarefundingintax‐basedsystemstendstotrackGDPmorecloselythanincountriesthatcollectfundsthroughsocialinsurance.Perhapsunsurprisingly,manyjurisdictionsaremovingtowardsadiversityoffundingstreams(addingtax‐basedfundingtosocialinsurance)tomanagehealthcareexpendituregrowthandmaintainuniversality.Theoryandevidenceoncostsharingthroughstandarduserfeessuggeststhatforthepurposeofrevenuecollectionitisnotclear,giventheadministrativecostsinvolved,thatuserfeesareanoptimalmeansofsupplementingtaxesandcontributionsindevelopedhealthsystems.Theevidenceonvalue‐basedcostsharing(usingcostsharingselectivelytoencouragepatientstousemedication,services,andprovidersthatofferbettervaluethanotheroptions,ratherthansimplyapplyinguserfeesacrosstheboard)suggestssomeefficiencyimprovementsinuseofcare.
Europeansystemswithcompetitivehealthinsurance(historicallyonlyfoundincountriesthatusesocialinsurancetofinancehealthcare)havemultipleriskpools,whichcanleadtoselectionissuesandinefficiencies.Allhavesignificantlyimprovedtheirriskequalizationschemesinthelasttenyearsandmanynowhaverelativelysophisticatedformulasthatincludehealth‐basedriskadjusters.Inspiteofthis,insurers’incentivestoselectrisksaresubstantialandtherecontinuestobe(largelycircumstantial)evidenceofriskselectionandhencepotentialinefficienciesinriskpooling.InsomecasessuchasSwitzerland,thevoluntaryinsurancemarketseemstoexacerbateriskselectionanditwouldmakesensetosegmentthesemarketstoavoidthisbehavior.RecentevidencefromtheUnitedStatesofferstworeasonsforoptimismonthisfront.Thefirstisthatriskadjustmentcontinuestoimproveandthereisevidencethatmoredetaileddataonuse,coupledwithrestrictionsonabilitytochangeinsurer,cansignificantlymitigateriskselection.Asaresult,thereislikelytocontinuetobeconvergenceacrosscountriestowardsbetterriskselectionstrategies.Second,recentempiricalevidenceexamininginsurancechoicebyindividualsintheUnitedStateshasfoundthatpreferences,inadditiontorisk,areimportantdeterminantsofinsurance
26
choice,sothewelfareimplicationsofadverseselectionbyindividualsinmanymarketsmaybesmallerthanpreviouslythought.
Wherepurchasingisconcerned,therehasbeensomeconvergenceamongOECDhealthsystemstowardsmoreuseofmarket‐likemechanisms,particularlytheadoptionofDRGstopayhospitals.Somecountrieshavealsoattemptedtoencouragehospitalcompetitionand,morerecently,agrowingnumberofcountrieshavetriedtolinkproviderpaymenttoperformance.Theevidenceonhospitalcompetitionsuggeststhatwhereoutcomesareeasilyobservableortargeted(suchaswaittimes)hospitalscompeteonpriceandquality(waittimes),leadingtoimprovedoutcomes.Insomecasesimprovementshavebeenattheexpenseofqualitymeasuresthataremoredifficulttoobserve,suggestingthatitwouldbeusefultohavefurthercomparable,well‐definedmeasuresofqualitybeyondwaittimes.However,wherepricesaresetadministratively,competitionhasimprovedproductivityandquality.DRGpaymentalsoappearstohaveimprovedproductivityandquality,althoughitseffectonoverallsystemcostsismixed.Thereissomeevidence(mainlyfromtheUnitedKingdom)ofimprovedphysicianproductivityandpatientoutcomesfollowingtheintroductionofP4P,althoughtheevidencealsosuggestsadegreeofgamingtomaximizefinancialincentives. Anumberofthehealthsystemsweexplorecontinuetousewaittimesasasourceofnon‐pricerationing.Theevidenceontheeffectsofwaittimesonhealthoutcomesismixed,withmorerecentstudiesfindingnegativeeffectsonpatienthealthandreadmissionrates,andolderstudiesfindinglittleeffectonhealthoutcomes.TheUnitedKingdominparticular,andtosomeextentCanada,havesignificantlyreducedwaittimesbyincreasingvolumesusingformsofDRGfundinglooselymodeledonUSMedicareandthroughtargetedbudgets.Waittimesarethereforenotinherentintax‐financedsystemsbutcanbefairlysuccessfullymanipulatedbypolicyleverssuchastargets,DRGs,andnon‐pricecompetitionbetweenhospitals.UnresolvedQuestions Ourreviewhasrevealedsomeareaswherethereisaneedforagreaterevidencebase.First,whileeffortstobemoresystematicaboutdefiningthepubliclyprovidedormandatedbenefitspackagehaveincreasedoverthepastdecade,thereisalackofevidenceonhoweffectivethesechangeshavebeen.OrganizationssuchasNICEintheUnitedKingdom,theCanadianAgencyforDrugsandTechnologies,theGermanInstituteforQualityandEfficiencyinHealthCare,ortheFrenchNationalHealthAuthority,haveemergedinmanycountriesinthelastdecade,showinghowjurisdictionsincreasinglyrecognizetheimportanceofeconomicevaluationofbestpracticeandtechnologies.However,wefoundlittleevidenceontheextenttowhichthesebodieshaveachievedtheirgoalsandsomeevidencetosuggesttheystrugglewithimplementation.
EffortsinsystemssuchasCanada’stoexpandcoveragebeyondhospitalandphysicianservices,ortopromotevoluntaryinsurancethroughtaxsubsidieshavebeenmixed.Acombinationoftaxdeductionsandsubsidieshasresultedinhighlevelsofvoluntaryprivateinsurancecoveragefornon‐publiclyfinancedservicesbutthesesubsidieshaveledtosubstantialandpoorlytargetedtax
27
expendituresandcontinuedrelianceonthefirmastheproviderofvoluntarycoverage.Attemptstoprovidepubliccoverageselectivelytoolderpeoplehavealsobeenexpensive,whilereformsaimedatre‐targetingbenefitsbasedonincomehaveloweredpubliccostsandhadsomepositiveredistributiveconsequences.Thecountriesweexaminethereforeprovideevidenceoftheinefficienciesoftaxsubsidiesandofinefficienciesassociatedwithvoluntaryinsurancealongsidepubliclyfinancedcoverage,butdonotprovideparticularlyhelpfulevidenceontheefficientmixofpublicandprivatefinance.
Thepasttentofifteenyearshaveseenhighhealthcarecostgrowthinmanycountries,includingallthosereviewedhere,withaveragehealthcarecostgrowthexceedingtheaveragegrowthinGDP(HaigstandKotlikoff,2005).Inconsideringthesuccessofdifferenthealthsystemsincontrollingcosts,theevidencesuggeststhatwhilepoliciesthateffectivelylimitdemandthroughrationingandfixedbudgetsappearstilltobeeffectiveatholdingdowncostsatapointintime,therehasbeenadiscernibleshiftinpoliciesemployedbythecountrieswereviewawayfromthesetypesofcostcontainmentstrategies,andawayfromotherstrategiesthatsimplyshiftcoststohouseholds,towardspoliciesthatfocusmoreonthecost‐benefitratioandefficiency,suchasgreateruseofhealthtechnologyassessmentandactivity‐basedfundingwithadministrativelysetprices.Whiletherearehighhopesthatthesestrategieswillproduceamoreefficientuseofhealthcareresourceand,ideally,controlcostgrowth,furtherresearchisneededtodeterminetheextenttowhichthesepoliciesachievetheirgoals.8.Conclusions ThisreviewexaminesthechangingroleofgovernmentinfinancinghealthcareoutsidetheUnitedStates.ItfocusesonpolicychoicesmadebyanumberofOECDcountriesaroundfourfinancingfunctions–raisingrevenue,poolingrisk,purchasingservices,andmakingcoveragedecisions.Itreviewstheevidenceoftheeffectsofthesechoicesonefficiency,costsandquality.Indoingsoitofferssomeinsightintohownationswithuniversalornearuniversalhealthcoverageareperformingastheygrapplewithhavingtofinanceincreasedhealthcarecosts,seektoavoidriskselectionintheirinsurancepools,andpromoteefficiencyinthepurchaseanduseofhealthcareservicesatalllevelsofthesystem. Eachhealthsystemhasuniqueattributesthathelpexplainsomeofthebehaviorofprovidersandpatients.Nevertheless,manyoftheempiricalstudiesreviewedhereoffersupportingevidencethatcrossesjurisdictions.Indeedtherehasbeensomeconvergenceinpoliciesadoptedacrosscountriestoimprovefinancingincentivesandencourageefficientutilization.Inthecaseofriskpooling,allcountrieswithcompetingpoolsareexperiencingsimilardifficultieswithselectionandareadoptingmoresophisticatedformsofriskadjustment.Inthecaseofhospitalcompetition,thekeydriversofsuccessappeartobewhatiscompetedonandmeasurableratherthanwhetherthesystemispublicorprivate.Inthecaseofboththesuccessofpayforperformanceandissuesresultingfromwaittimes,evidencediffersbothwithinandacrossjurisdictions.However,theevidencedoessuggestthatanumberofgovernmentshaveeffectivelyreducedwaittimeswhentheyhavechosenexplicitlytofocusincentivesonachievingthis
28
goal.WhiletheUnitedStatesremainsanoutlieramongOECDcountries,a
numberofpolicychangesacrossjurisdictionssuggestsignificantconvergenceintheroleofthestateinfinancinghealthcare.Thesechanges,coupledwiththeintroductionofauniversalmandateintheUnitedStates,suggestthatmanyofthelessonslearnedabovemayapplyintheUnitedStatesaswell.Greatergovernmentinvolvementwillnotpreventsignificantinnovationinincentivesforefficientpurchasingandprovision.Norwillitpreventpatientsfrombeingabletochooseinsurerorproviderorautomaticallyresultinlongerwaittimesfortreatment.Theevidencealsosuggests,however,thatfurthergovernmentinvolvementinthehealthcaresectorwithoutpriceorvolumecontrolswillnotnecessarilyleadtomoreuseofeconomicevaluationortolowergrowthratesinthecostofcare,consequencesmanypeopleassociatewithagreaterroleforthestate.
29
References
Ahmad,Ehtisham,andGiorgioBrosio,eds.HandbookofFiscalFederalism.Cheltenham:EdwardElgarPublishingLimited,2006.
Alan,S.,Crossley,T.,Grootendorst,P.,Veall,M.,“DistributionalEffectsofGeneralPopulationPrescriptionDrugProgramsinCanada,”CanadianJournalofEconomics,38(1)2005,pp.128‐148.
Auerbach,AlanJ.“TheTheoryofExcessBurdenandOptimalTaxation.”InHandbookofPublicEconomics,eds.AlanJ.Auerbach,andMartinFeldstein,61‐127.Elsevier,1985.
BaickerK.,andSkinner,J.,“HealthCareSpendingGrowthandtheFutureofUSTaxRates,”NBERWorkingPaper16772,February,2011.
Bevan,Gwyn,andWynandvandeVen.“ChoiceofProvidersandMutualHealthcarePurchasers:CantheEnglishNationalHealthServiceLearnfromtheDutchReforms?”HealthEconomics,PolicyandLaw5(2010):343‐363.
Blomqvist,Ake.“PublicSectorHealthCareFinancing.”InOxfordHandbookofHealthEconomics,eds.SherryGlied,andPeterC.Smith,Chapter12.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2011.
Bolin,K.,D.Hedblom,A.LindgrenandB.Lindgren(2010).AsymmetricinformationandthedemandforvoluntaryhealthinsuranceinEurope,NBERWorkingPaper15689.CambridgeMA,NationalBureauofEconomicResearch.
Boyle,S.(2011).UnitedKingdom(England):Healthsystemreview.HealthSystemsinTransition13(1):1‐486.
Brown,Jason,Duggan,Mark,Kuziemko,IlyanaandWilliamWoolston.“HowDoesRiskSelectionRespondtoRiskAdjustment?EvidencefromtheMedicareAdvantageProgram,”NBERWorkingPaper16977,April2011.
Buchmueller,Thomas,AgnesCouffinhal,MichelGrignon,andMarcPeronnin.“AccessToPhysicianServices:DoesSupplementalInsuranceMatter?EvidenceFromFrance.”HealthEconomics13(7)(2004):669‐687.
BusseR,GeisslerA,MasonA,OrZ,Scheller‐KreinsenD,StreetA.“Diagnosis‐relatedgroupsinEurope(EuroDRG):dotheyexplainvariationinhospitalcostsandlengthofstayacrosspatientsandhospitals?”HealthEconomics,201221(Supplement2),1‐140.
Campbell,S.,Reeves,D.,Kontopantelis,E.,Middleton,E.,Sibbald,B.,Roland,M.“QualityofPrimaryCareinEnglandwiththeIntroductionofPayforPerformance,”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine,357(2),2007,pp.181‐190.
Carrier,M.,Pineault,R.Tremblay,N.,Pelletier,L.“OutcomeofrationingAccesstoOpenHeartSurgery,”CanadianMedicalAssociationJournal,1993,I49,pp.1117‐1122.
CashinC,YChi,PSmith,MBorowitzandSThomson,eds(2013inpress),Payingforperformanceinhealthcare:implicationsforhealthsystemperformanceandaccountability,Buckingham:OpenUniversityPress
Chevreul,K.,I.Durand‐Zaleski,S.Bahrami,C.Hernández‐QuevedoandP.Mladovsky(2010).France:healthsystemreview.HealthSystemsinTransition12(6):1‐291.
Colombo,F.,“TowardsMoreChoiceinSocialProtection?IndividualChoiceofInsurerinBasicMandatoryHealthInsuranceinSwitzerland,”OECDLabourMarketandSocialPolicyOccasionalPapersNo53,2001.
30
Cooper,Zack,AlistairMcGuire,SimonJones,andJulianLeGrand.“Equity,WaitingTimes,andNHSReforms:RetrospectiveStudy.”BritishMedicalJournal339(2009):b3264.
Cooper,Z.,Gibbons,S.,Jones,S.,andMcGuire,A.(2010).“Doeshospitalcompetitionsavelives?EvidencefromtheEnglishNHSpatientchoicereforms.”Unpublishedmanuscript,LondonSchoolofEconomics.
Crivelli,L.Consumer‐drivenhealthinsuranceinSwitzerland,wherepoliticsisgovernedbyfederalismanddirectdemocracy.InPrivatehealthinsuranceandmedicalsavingsaccounts:history,politics,performance.S.ThomsonandE.Mossialos.(eds)Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2013inpress.
Cullis,John,PhilipJones,andCarolPropper.“WaitingListsAndMedicalTreatment:AnalysisandPolicies.”InHandbookofHealthEconomics,eds.AnthonyJ.Culyer,andJosephP.Newhouse,1201‐1249.Elsevier,2000.
Currie,JanetandFirouzGahvari,“Transferincashandin‐kind:Theorymeetsdata,”JournalofEconomicLiterature,46(2),2008,333‐383.
Cutler,DavidM.,andSarahJ.Reber.“PayingforHealthInsurance:TheTrade‐OffBetweenCompetitionandAdverseSelection.”TheQuarterlyJournalofEconomics113(2)(1998):433‐466.
Cylus,Jonathan,Mladovsky,Philipa,andMartinMcKee,“Isthereastatisticalrelationshipbetweeneconomiccrisesandgovernmenthealthexpendituregrowth?AnAnalysisoftwentyfourEuropeancountries,”HealthServicesResearch,47(6)2012,2204‐2224.
DepartmentofFinanceCanada,TaxExpendituresandEvaluations,2011,Ottawa,ON:Queen’sPrinter,2012.
Dixon,Anna,RuthRobertson,andRolandBal.“TheExperienceofImplementingChoiceatPointofReferral:AComparisonoftheNetherlandsandEngland.”HealthEconomics,PolicyandLaw5(2010):295‐317.
Drummond,Michael,MarkSculpher,GregStoddart,GeorgeTorrance,andBernieO’Brien.MethodsfortheEconomicEvaluationofHealthCareProgrammes.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005.
Duggan,Mark.“Doescontractingoutincreasetheefficiencyofgovernmentprograms?EvidencefromMedicaidHMOs,”JournalofPublicEconomics,88,2004:2549‐2572.
Duggan,MarkandFionaScottMorton.“TheEffectofMedicarePartDonPharmaceuticalPricesandUtilization,”AmericanEconomicReview,100(1),2010:590‐607.
Dusheiko,Mark,HughGravelle,RowenaJacobs,andPeterSmith.“TheEffectofFinancialIncentivesonGatekeepingDoctors:EvidenceFromaNaturalExperiment.”JournalofHealthEconomics25(2006):449‐478.
Einav,Liran,Finkelstein,AmyandJonathanLevin.“BeyondTesting:EmpiricalModelsofInsuranceMarkets,”AnnualReviewofEconomics,2,2010:311‐336.
Einav,LiranandAmyFinkelstein,“SelectionandAsymmetricInformationinInsuranceMarkets,”NBERReporter,3,2011:5‐7.
Einav,Liran,Finkelstein,Amy,andMarkCullen.“EstimatingWelfareinInsuranceMarketsUsingVariationinPrices,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,125(3),2010:877‐921.
Esmail,N.“TooOldforHipSurgery,”WallStreetJournal,February9,2009.
Fang,Hanming,Keane,Michael,andDanSilverman,“SourcesofAdvantageousSelection:EvidencefromtheMedigapInsuranceMarket,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy,116(2),2008:303‐350.
31
Finkelstein,A.,“Theeffectoftaxsubsidiestoemployer‐providedsupplementaryhealthinsurance:evidencefromCanada,”JournalofPublicEconomics84(3),2002:305‐340.
Finkelstein,AmyandKathleenMcGarry.“MultipleDimensionsofPrivateInformation:EvidencefromtheLong‐TermCareInsuranceMarket,”AmericanEconomicReview,96(4),2006:938‐958.
Frank,R.andK.Lamiraud(2009).“Choice,pricecompetitionandcomplexityinmarketsforhealthinsurance.”JournalofEconomicBehavior&Organization71(2):550‐562.
Garber,Alan.“AdvancesinCEAnalysis.”InHandbookofHealthEconomics,eds.TonyCulyerandJosephNewhouse,181‐222.Elsevier,2000.
Garber,Alan,andCharlesPhelps.“EconomicFoundationsofCost‐EffectivenessAnalysis.”JournalofHealthEconomics16(1997):1‐3.
Gaynor,Martin,RodrigoMoreno‐Serra,andCarolPropper.“DeathByMarketPowerReform,CompetitionandPatientOutcomesintheNationalHealthService.”NBERWorkingPaper#16164,June2010.
Gaynor,M.,Propper,C.,andSeiler,S.,“FreetoChoose?ReformandDemandResponseintheEnglishNationalHealthService,”NBERWorkingPaper18574,November2012.
Gaynor,M.,andTown,R.,“CompetitioninHealthCareMarkets,”NBERWorkingPaper17208,2011.
Gertler,P.,andHammer,J.“StrategiesforPricingPublicProvidedHealthServices,”PolicyResearchWorkingPaper1762,WorldBank,Washington,DC,1997.
Glazer,JacobandThomasMcGuire,“OptimalRiskAdjustmentinMarketswithAdverseSelection:AnApplicationtoManagedCare,”AmericanEconomicReview,90(4),2000:1055‐1071.
Glied,Sherry,“HealthCareFinancing,Efficiency,andEquityinExploringSocialInsurance:CanaDoseofEuropeCureCanadianHealthCareFinance?Flood,C.,Stabile,M.,andTuohy,C.H.eds,McGill‐Queen’sUniversityPress:Montreal,2008,pp.37‐58.
Gravelle,H.,Sutton,M.,Ma,A.,“DoctorBehaviourUnderPayForPerformanceContracting:Treating,CheatingandCaseFinding?”TheEconomicJournal,120(February)2010,F129‐F156.
Gravelle,Hugh,DavidReeves,MartinRoland,TimDoran,andCatherineFullwood.“ShouldPhysiciansbeAllowedtoExcludeIndividualPatientsfromPayForPerformanceTargets?AnalysisofexceptionreportingintheUKpayforperformancescheme.”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine359(2008):274‐284.
Gravelle,Hugh,andLuigiSiciliani.“OptimalQuality,WaitsandChargesinHealthInsurance.”JournalofHealthEconomics27(3)(2008):663‐674.
Gravelle,Hugh,andLuigiSiciliani.“ThirdDegreeWaitingTimeDiscrimination:OptimalAllocationofaPublicSectorHealthCareTreatmentUnderRationingbyWaiting.”HealthEconomics18(8)(2009):977‐986.
Grootendorst,PandDStewart,“ImapctofReferencePricingonAnti‐HypertensiveDrugPlanExpenditures,”HealthEconomics,15(735‐742),2006.
Gruber,Jonathan,“HealthInsuranceandtheLaborMarket,”inHandbookofHealthEconomics,eds.TonyCulyerandJosephNewhouse,645‐706.Elsevier,2000.
Guttmann,A.,Schull,M,Vermeulen,M,Stukel,T.,“Associationbetweenwaitingtimesandhsorttermmortalityandhospitaladmissionafterdeparturefromemergencydepartment:populationbasedcohortstudyfromOntario,Canada,”BMJ2011;342:d2983.
32
Hamilton,B.,Hamilton,V.,andMayoN.,“WhatarethecostsofqueuingforhipfracturesurgeryinCanada?”JournalofHealthEconomics,15(1996)pp.161‐185.
Hanley,G.,Morgan,S.Hurley,J.,andvanDoorslaer,E.“DistributionalConsequencesoftheTransitionfromAgeBasedtoIncomeBasedPrescriptionDrugCoverageinBritishColumbia,Canada,”HealthEconomics,17,2008,pp.1379‐1392.
Haigst,C.,andKotlikoff,L.,“Who’sGoingBroke?ComparingHealthCareCostsin10OECDCountries”NBERWorkingPaper11833,December2005.
HurleyJ.,Vaithianathan,R.,Crossley,T.andD.Cobb‐Clark.2002.“ParallelPrivateHealthInsuranceinAustralia:ACautionaryTaleandLessonsforCanada.”InstitutefortheStudyofLaborResearchPaperSeries#515.
Johar,M.,Jones,G.,Keane,M.,Savage,E.,Stavrunova,O.,“WaitingTimesforElectiveSurgeryandtheDecisiontoBuyPrivateHealthInsurance,”HealthEconomics20(S1)2011,68‐86.
Johar,M,andSavage,E.,“DoPrivatePatientsHaveShorterWaitingTimesforElectiveSurgery:EvidencefromNewSouthWalesPublicHospitals”EconomicPapers,29(2),2010,128‐142.
Kutzin,Joseph."ADescriptiveFrameworkforCountry‐LevelAnalysisofHealthCareFinancingArrangements."HealthPolicy56(3)(2001):171‐204.
Lehmann,Hansjorg,andPeterZweifel.“InnovationandRiskSelectioninDeregulatedSocialHealthInsurance.”JournalofHealthEconomics23(5)(2004):997‐1012.
Mossialos,Elias,andAnnaDixon.“FundingHealthCareinEurope:WeighingUptheOptions.”InFundingHealthCare:OptionsforEurope,eds.Mossialosetal.,99‐126.Buckingham:OpenUniversityPress,2002.
NationalInstituteforHealthandClinicalExcellence.Technologyappraisalrecommendationsummary[Internet].NationalInstituteforHealthandClinicalExcellence;2010[cited2013Feb11]Availablefrom:http://www.nice.org.uk/newsroom/nicestatistics/TADecisionsRecommendationSummary.jsp
Newhouse,J.,Price,M.,Huang,J.,McWilliams,J.M.,Hsu,J.,“StepstoReduceFavorableRiskSelectioninMedicareAdvantageLargelySucceeded,BodingWellForHealthInsuranceExchanges,”,31(12)December2012,pp.2618‐2628.
NuschelerandKnaus,T.(2005).“RiskselectionintheGermanpublichealthinsurancesystem.”HealthEconomics14(12):1253‐1571.
Nyman,J.A.TheTheoryofDemandforHealthInsurance,Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,2003.
Ognyanova,D.andR.Busse.(2009).HealthFundnowoperational.HealthPolicyMonitorRetrieved8September,2011,fromhttp://www.hpm.org/survey/de/a13/3.
O’ReillyJ,BusseR,HäkkinenU,OrZ,StreetA,WileyM(2012).“Payingforhospitalcare:theexperiencewithimplementingactivity‐basedfundinginfiveEuropeancountries.”HealthEconomics,PolicyandLaw7(1):73‐101
Palangkaraya,A.,Yong,J.“EffectsofCompetitiononHospitalQuality:AnExaminationUsingHospitalAdministrativeData,”EuropeanJournalofHealthEconomics,14,2013,415‐429.
Paolucci,F.,Schut,E.,Beck,K.,Greß,S.,VandeVoorde.,CandZmora,I.,“SupplementalHealthInsuranceasaToolforRiskSelectioninMandatoryHealthInsuranceMarkets,”HealthEconomics,PolicyandLaw,2007(2),173‐192.
33
Pauly,Mark,ValuingHealthCareBenefitsinMoneyTerms,inValuingHealthCare:Costs,Benefits,andEffectivenessofMedicalTechnologies,F.Sloan,ed.,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress(1995)99‐124.
Pauly,MarkV.“OverinsuranceandPublicProvisionofInsurance:TheRolesofMoralHazardandAdverseSelection.”TheQuarterlyJournalofEconomics88(1)(1974):44‐62.
Propper,Carol,BronwynCroxson,andArranShearer.“WaitingTimesforHospitalAdmissions:theImpactofGPFundholding.”JournalofHealthEconomics21(2002):227‐252.
Propper,Carol,SimonBurgess,andDeniseGossage.“CompetitionandQuality:EvidenceFromtheNHSInternalMarket1991‐9.”EconomicJournal118(2008):138‐170.
Propper,Carol,SimonBurgess,andKatherineGreen.“DoesCompetitionBetweenHospitalsImprovetheQualityofCare?HospitalDeathRatesandtheNHSInternalMarket.”JournalofPublicEconomics88(2004):1247‐1272.
Propper,C.,Sutton,M.,Whitnall,C.,Windmeijer,F.,“IncentivesandTargetsinHospitalCare:EvidencefromaNaturalExperiment,”JournalofPublicEconomics,94,2010,318‐335.
Reinhardt,U.“Whatis‘SocializedMedicine’?:ATaxonomyofHealthCareSystems”NewYorkTimes,EconomixBlogs,May8,2009.
RichardsM.ImprovingaccesstomedicinesforNHSpatients[Internet].London:DepartmentofHealth;2008[cited2012Nov15]Availablefrom:http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_089952.pdf
Rosenthal,MeredithandRichardFrank.“Whatistheempiricalbasisforpayingforqualityinhealthcare?”MedicalCareResearchandReview,63(2),2006:135‐157.
Sandmo,A.“OptimalTaxation:AnIntroductiontotheLiterature,”JournalofPublicEconomcis,6(19760,pp.37‐54.
Savage,E.,Wright,D.,“MoralHazardandAdverseSelectioninAustralianprivatehospitals:1989‐1990,”JournalofHealthEconomics,22(2003),331‐359.
SchokkaertandVandeVoorde,“UserCharges,”InOxfordHandbookofHealthEconomics,eds.SherryGlied,andPeterC.Smith,329‐353.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2011.
SerumagaB,Ross‐DegnanD,AveryA,ElliottR,MajumdarS,ZhangFandSoumeraiS(2011).“EffectofpayforperformanceonthemanagementandoutcomesofhypertensionintheUnitedKingdom:interruptedtimeseriesstudy.”BMJ342:d108
Siciliani,Luigi,andSteveMartin.“AnEmpiricalAnalysisoftheImpactofChoiceonWaitingTimes.”HealthEconomics16(2007):763‐779.
Siciliani,Luigi,andJeremyHurst.“ExplainingWaitingTimesVariationsforElectiveSurgeryAcrossOECDCountries.”OECDEconomicStudies38(1)(2004):96‐122.
Smart,M.andStabile,M.“TaxCredits,Insurance,andtheUseofMedicalCare,”CanadianJournalofEconomics,38(2)2005,345‐365.
Summers,LawrenceH.“SomeSimpleEconomicsofMandatedBenefits,AmericanEconomicReview,1989(79),pp.177‐183.
Sutton,M.,Nikolva,S.,Boaden,R.,Lester,H.,McDonald,R.,Roland,M.,“ReducedMortalitywithHospitalPayforPerformanceinEngland,”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine,367(19),2012,1821‐1828.
34
Stabile,Mark."PrivateInsuranceSubsidiesandPublicHealthCareMarkets:EvidenceFromCanada,"CanadianJournalofEconomics,34(4)2001,pp.921‐942.
Stabile,M.,“TheRoleofTaxSubsidiesintheMarketforHealthInsurance,”InternationalTaxandPublicFinance,9(1),2002,pp.33‐50.
Stabile,M.,Townsend,M.,“SupplementaryPrivateHealthInsuranceinNationalHealthInsuranceSystems,”UniversityofTorontomimeo,2011.
Stabile,M.,S.Thomson,Allin,S.,Boyle,S.,Reinhard,B.,Chevreul,K.,Marchildon,G.,andMossialos,E..“Containinghealthcarecostsinhigh‐incomecountries:evidencefromfournations,”HealthAffairs32(4),2013,pp.643‐652.
Tamblyn,R.,etal,“AdverseEventsAssociatedWithPrescriptionDrugCost‐SharingAmongPoorandElderlyPersons”JournaloftheAmericanMedicalAssociation,2001,285(4):421‐429.
Thomson,S.,R.Busse,L.Crivelli,W.P.M.M.vandeVenandC.VandeVoorde(2013).“StatutoryhealthinsurancecompetitioninEurope:afour‐countrycomparison,”HealthPolicy,2013,109(3),209‐225.
Thomson,S.andE.Mossialos.PrivatehealthinsuranceintheEuropeanUnion.Brussels,EuropeanCommission(DGEmployment,SocialAffairsandEqualOpportunities),2009.
Thomson,S.,Foubister,T.,andMossialos,E.FinancingHealthCareintheEuropeanUnion.Copenhagen,WHOEuropeonbehalfoftheEuropeanObservatoryonHealthSystemsandPolicies,2009.
ThomsonS,ROsborn,DSquiresandMJun,eds(2012),Internationalprofilesofhealthcaresystems,NewYork:CommonwealthFund
vanGinneken,E.andR.Busse.(2009).Mandatoryhealthinsuranceenacted.HealthPolicyMonitorRetrieved8September,2011,fromhttp://hpm.org/survey/de/a13/1
vandeVen,Wynand,KonstantinBeck,CarineVandeVoorde,JurgenWasemandIritZmora.“RiskAdjustmentandRiskSelectioninEurope:SixYearsLater.”HealthPolicy,83(2‐3)(2007):162‐179.
vandeVen,Wynand,andRandallP.Ellis.“RiskAdjustmentinCompetitiveHealthPlanMarkets.”InHandbookofHealthEconomics,eds.AnthonyJ.Culyer,andJosephP.Newhouse,755‐845.Elsevier,2000.
vandeVen,Wynand,andFrederikT.Schut,“GuaranteedAccesstoAffordableCoverageinIndividualHealthInsuranceMarketsInOxfordHandbookofHealthEconomics,eds.SherryGlied,andPeterC.Smith,380‐404.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2011.
vandeVen,Wynand,RCJAvanVliet,FrederikT.Schut,EMvanBarneveld.“AccesstoCoverageforHigh‐RisksinACompetitiveIndividualHealthInsuranceMarket:ViaPremiumRateRestrictionsorRisk‐AdjustedPremiumSubsidies?”JournalofHealthEconomics19(2000):311‐339.
vandeVen,Wynand.“TheCaseforRisk‐BasedSubsidiesinPublicHealthInsurance.”HealthEconomics,PolicyandLaw1(2006):195‐199.
Vathianathan,R.,“WillSubsidizingPrivateHealthInsuranceHelpthePublicHealthSystem?”TheEconomicRecord,78(242)2002,277‐283.
Wagstaff,Adam.“Socialhealthinsurancereexamined.”HealthEconomics,19,2010:503‐17.
Wagstaff,Adam,“SocialHealthInsurancevs.Tax‐FinancedHealthSystems–EvidencefromtheOECD,”WorldBankPolicyResearchPaper#4821,January2009.
35
Wagstaff,A.andR.Moreno‐Serra"EuropeandCentralAsia'sgreatpost‐communistsocialhealthinsuranceexperiment:impactsonhealthsectoroutcomes."JournalofHealthEconomics,28(2009),pp.322‐340.
Wagstaff,A.,vanDoorslaer,E.,etal,“EquityintheFinanceofHealthCare:SomeInternationalComparisons,”JournalofHealthEconomics,11(1992),pp.361‐387.
Wilcox,S.,etal.“MeasuringandReducingWaitingTimes:ACross‐NationalComparisonofStrategies,”HealthAffairs,26(4)2007,pp.1078‐1087.
Zok,K.,AnforderungenReaktionenaufZusatzbeiträgeinderGKV‐ErgebnisseeinerRepräsentativ‐Umfrage.WIdOmonitor,2011.2011(1).
Zweifel,Peter,andWillardG.Manning.“MoralHazardandConsumerIncentivesinHealthCare.”InHandbookofHealthEconomics,eds.AnthonyJ.Culyer,andJosephP.Newhouse,409‐459.Elsevier,2000.
Figure1:ConceptualizingtheFinancingFunctionsofHealthSystems
Source:adaptedfromKutzin2001
Health services
Contributions
Cost sharing
Th
e po
pu
lation
Collecting funds
Providing services
Purchasing care
Pooling fundsCoverage
Coverage
Choice?
Choice?
Go
vern
ance
, reg
ula
tio
n, i
nfo
rmat
ion
Entitlement?
37
Figure2Breakdownofhealthfinancingbyexpenditureagent
Source:OECDhealthdata2012
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
US 2011
Switzerland 2011
Australia 2010
Canada 2011
Germany 2011
France 2011
UK 2011
General tax Earmarked tax Private insurance Out of pocket Other
38
Table1aHealthcoveragepolicybycountry,2013
Coverage Australia Canada England France Germany Switzerland United States
Breadth: population (% covered in 2011)
100% covered by regionally administered universal program (Medicare)
100% covered by regionally administered universal program (Medicare
100% covered by universal program (National Health Service, NHS)
100% covered by universal program
90% covered by public program; 10% covered by private insurance
100% covered by universal private insurance
31.8% covered by national program for 65+ and some disabled (Medicare) or low-income (Medicaid); 53.1% covered by private insurance; 16% uninsured
Scope: benefits Benefit decisions made by national government and informed by HTA
Benefit decisions made by regional government in conjunction with doctors and informed by HTA
Benefit decisions made at regional level and informed by HTA at national level
Benefit decisions made at national level and informed by HTA
Benefit decisions mainly made at national level and informed by HTA
Benefit decisions made at national level and informed by HTA
Benefit decisions made nationally (Medicare), regionally (Medicaid) and by individual insurers (private insurance)
Depth: user fees User fees for outpatient services including prescriptions. No cap on user fees.
No user fees for publicly covered benefits. No cap on user fees.
User fees for outpatient prescriptions. Capped at £104 per year for people needing a large number of prescription drugs
User fees widely applied. No cap on user fees.
User fees for outpatient prescriptions. Capped at 2% income or 1% income for chronically ill or low income
User fees widely applied. Capped at CHF 700 CHF after deductible.
User fees widely applied. No cap on user fees.
VHI role ~50% buy coverage for
~67% buy coverage for non-
~11% buy for ~90% buy or receive government
Cost-sharing + amenities (~20%);
Majority buy for non-covered
Non-covered
39
private hospital costs and non-covered benefits
covered benefits private facilities vouchers for cost-sharing; some non-covered benefits
Substitute: 10% opt out of SHI system for private coverage only
benefits and amenities
Medicare benefits
Sources:OECDhealthdata2012,Thomsonetal2012
Note:HTA=healthtechnologyassessment;SHI=statutoryhealthinsurance;VHI=voluntary/privatehealthinsurance
40
Table1bKeyhealthfinancingfunctionsbycountry(publiclyfinancedbenefits),2013
Function Australia Canada England France Germany Switzerland United States
Collection
Revenue sources General tax revenue; earmarked income tax
Provincial/federal tax revenue
General tax revenue (includes employment-related contributions)
Employer/employee earmarked income and payroll tax; general tax revenue, earmarked taxes
Employer/employee earmarked payroll tax; general tax revenue
Community-rated insurance premiums; general tax revenue
Medicare: payroll tax, premiums, federal tax revenue; Medicaid: federal, state tax revenue
Contributions Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Centrally set; dependants covered at no extra cost
Centrally set; dependants covered at no extra cost
Insurers set premiums; dependants must purchase own cover; premium subsidies set by Cantons
Medicare: centrally determined
Pooling
Nature of purchasing agent
National government agency
Non-competing regional government agencies
Non-competing regional statutory bodies
Non-competing regional statutory agencies
Competing non-governmental non-profit insurers and competing private insurers
Competing private insurers
Competing private insurers
Risk adjustment for competing insurers
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable For publicly financed benefits
For publicly financed benefits
For publicly financed benefits
41
Purchasing services
Patient choice of primary care provider
Yes; gatekeeping required
Yes; gatekeeping incentivized in some regions
Yes, within a region; gatekeeping required
Yes; gatekeeping incentivized
Yes; gatekeeping incentivized
Yes; some plans incentivize gatekeeping
Usually; some plans incentivize gatekeeping
Patient choice of hospital
Yes Yes, through GP Yes Yes Yes Yes Usually
Primary care and ambulatory specialist provider payment
Private: FFS Private: FFS/capitation/mixed
Private: mix of capitation, FFS and P4P; salary for a minority
Private: FFS Private: FFS Private: most FFS but some capitation
Private: most FFS, some capitation
Hospital payment Public beds (67%): global budgets + DRGs
Private: FFS
Public and private non-profit: global budgets + DRGS in some provinces
Public: mainly DRGs and service contracts
Public and private non-profit: mainly DRGs and grants
Public beds (50%), private non-profit (33%), private for profit: global budgets + DRGs
Public varies by Canton: global budgets, per diem, DRGs
Private non-profit (70%), public (15%), private for profit: per diem + DRGs
P4P Primary care and hospitals
No Primary care and hospitals
Primary care, ambulatory specialists and hospitals
Primary care No Primary care, ambulatory specialists and hospitals
Sources:Cashinetalinpress,Thomsonetal2012
Note:DRG=diagnosis‐relatedgroup;FFS=fee‐for‐service;P4P=payforperformance
42
43
Table2:Selectedempiricalpapersreviewed:RaisingRevenueAuthor Title Time
PeriodCountryCovered
Findings
Wagstaff,2009
“SocialHealthInsurancevs.Tax‐FinancedHealthSystems–EvidencefromtheOECD,”WorldBankPolicyResearchPaper
1960‐2006 OECDcountries
AdoptingSHI(vstaxfinancing)increasespercapitahealthspending;reducestheformalsectorshareofemployment&totalemployment;hasnoimpactonamenablemortality;butperformsworseforbreastcanceramongwomen
WagstaffandMoreno‐Serra,2009
"EuropeandCentralAsia'sgreatpost‐communistsocialhealthinsuranceexperiment:impactsonhealthsectoroutcomes."JournalofHealthEconomics
1990‐2004 CentralandEasternEurope&CentralAsia(28countries)
AdoptingSHI(fromtaxfinanced)increasednationalhealthspendingandhospitalactivityrates,butdidnotleadtobetterhealthoutcomes
Finkelstein,2002
Finkelstein,A.,“Theeffectoftaxsubsidiestoemployer‐providedsupplementaryhealthinsurance:evidencefromCanada,”JournalofPublicEconomics
1991‐1994 Canada Reducingtaxsubsidytoemployer‐providedhealthinsurance(HI)decreasedcoveragebyonefifth
Stabile,2001"PrivateInsurance
1994‐1996 Canada Removingtaxexemptionsto
44
SubsidiesandPublicHealthCareMarkets:EvidenceFromCanada,"CanadianJournalofEconomics
employerprovidedHIwouldcauselevelsofsupplementalHItodeclinebyroughly20percent.
Buchmuelleretal.,2004
“AccessToPhysicianServices:DoesSupplementalInsuranceMatter?EvidenceFromFrance.”HealthEconomics
1998 France Individualswithinsurance:havemorephysicianvisitsthanthosewithout,butarenomorelikelytovisitaspecialist.
GertlerandHammer,1997
StrategiesforPricingPublicProvidedHealthServices,”PolicyResearchWorkingPaper
Notreported
Reviewarticle:multiplecountries,mostlynon‐OECD
Userfeesareimportantinco‐financinghealthcarebutshouldnotbetheprimarymeansoffinance,andshouldnotbeapplieduniformly‐orthewealthywillbenefitandthepoorwillsuffer
GrootendorstandStewart,2006
“ImpactofReferencePricingonAnti‐HypertensiveDrugPlanExpenditures,”HealthEconomics
1994‐2000 Canada TheapparentlymodestprogramsavingsattributabletoReferencePricing(RP)canbetracedbacktothedesignofthepolicyi.e.factorsotherthanRP
Goldmanetal.,2007
PrescriptionDrugCostSharing:Associationswithmedicationandmedical
Notreported
Reviewarticle:multiplecountriesincl.USA,Europe&Canada
Increasedcostsharingisassociatedwithlowerratesofdrugtreatment,worseadherenceamong
45
utilizationandspendingandhealth,”JournaloftheAmericanMedicalAssociation
existingusers,andmorefrequentdiscontinuationoftherapy
Tamblynetal.,2001
“AdverseEventsAssociatedWithPrescriptionDrugCost‐SharingAmongPoorandElderlyPersons”JournaloftheAmericanMedicalAssociation
1993‐1997 Canada Adoptingcost‐sharingdecreaseduseofessential&lessessentialdrugs,increasedrateofseriousadverseevents&emergencydepartmentvisits,inelderlypersonsandwelfarerecipients
46
Table3:SelectedempiricalPapersReviewed:PoolingRiskAuthor Title Time
PeriodCountryCovered
Findings
Gressetal.,2002
“FreeChoiceofSicknessFundsinRegulatedCompetition:EvidencefromGermanyandtheNetherlands,”HealthPolicy
1992‐2001 Germany&TheNetherlands
Consumerschangingsicknessfundsdependsstronglyoneconomicincentives,especiallywithregardtotheextentoffinancialrisksicknessfundshavetobearandtotheextentpremiumsorcontributionratescandiffer.
KnausandNuscheler,2005
"RiskselectionintheGermanpublichealthinsurancesystem."HealthEconomics
1995‐2000
Germany Successofcompany‐basedsicknessfundsoriginatesinincompleteriskadjustmentandthenegativecorrelationbetweenhealthstatusandswitchingcosts
Dormontetal.,2009
“Theinfluenceofsupplementaryhealthinsuranceonswitchingbehaviour:evidencefromSwissdata.”HealthEconomics
1996to2005
Switzerland HoldingSIdecreasespropensitytoswitch,butisnotsignificantwhenself‐assessedhealthis"verygood";tothecontrary,holdinganSIcontractsignificantlyreducespropensitytoswitchwhentheindividual'ssubjectivehealthstatusdeteriorates
FrankandLamiraud,2009
“Choice,pricecompetitionandcomplexityin
1997‐2000 Switzerland Asthenumberofchoicesgrowresponsivenessto
47
marketsforhealthinsurance.”JournalofEconomicBehavior&Organization
pricedeclinesallowinglargepricedifferentialstopersistholdingconstantplanandpopulationcharacteristics
Thomsonetal.,2013
"StatutoryhealthinsurancecompetitioninEurope:afour‐countrycomparison",HealthPolicy
Belgium,Germany,theNetherlands&Switzerland
HealthInsurers(HI)/providercollectivenegotiationinBelgium,GermanyandSwitzerlandcurbsHI’s’abilitytoinfluencequalityandcosts.DespiteDutchHI’saccesstoefficiency‐enhancingtools,dataandcapacityconstraintsandstakeholderresistancelimittheiruse.
vandeVenetal.,2007
“RiskAdjustmentandRiskSelectioninEurope:SixYearsLater.”HealthPolicy
2000–2006 Belgium,Germany,Israel,theNetherlands&Switzerland
Despiteriskadjustmentsystems’improvement,allfivecountriesshowincreasingriskselection,whichincreasinglybecomesaproblem,inparticularinGermanyandSwitzerland
Paoluccietal.,2006
“SupplementalHealthInsuranceasaToolforRiskSelectioninMandatoryHealthInsuranceMarkets,”Health
2000‐2008 Switzerland CombininguniversalaccessandconsumerchoiceofHI’sisimplemented.Challenge:createintegrateddeliverysystemsforhigh‐
48
Economics,Policy,Law
qualitycareinresponsetoconsumers’preferences
LehmannandZweifel,2004
“InnovationandRiskSelectioninDeregulatedSocialHealthInsurance.”JournalofHealthEconomics
1997‐2000 Switzerland Themanagedcareplansbenefitfromriskselectioneffects.InthecaseoftheHealthMaintenanceOrganization(HMO)plan,however,thepureinnovationeffectmayaccountforasmuchastwo‐thirdofthecostadvantage.
Brownetal.,2011
“HowDoesRiskSelectionRespondtoRiskAdjustment?EvidencefromtheMedicareAdvantageProgram,”NBERWorkingPaper
1994‐2006
USA Firmsreduceselectionalongdimensionsincludedintherisk‐adjustmentformula,whileincreasingselectionalongexcludeddimensions.Government’sdifferentialpaymentsriseafterriskadjustment.
Newhouseetal.,2012
“StepstoReduceFavorableRiskSelectioninMedicareAdvantageLargelySucceeded,BodingWellForHealthInsuranceExchanges,”HealthAffairs
2003‐2008
USA Policies—animprovedriskadjustmentformulaandaprohibitiononmonthlydisenrollmentbybeneficiaries—largelysucceededinreducingfavorableselectioninMedicareAdvantage.
Colombo,F, “TowardsMore 1996‐ Switzerland Measurestoimprove
49
2001 ChoiceinSocialProtection?IndividualChoiceofInsurerinBasicMandatoryHealthInsuranceinSwitzerland,”OECD
2000 switchingshouldbeaccompaniedbyinterventionstofostercompetitiononqualityandefficiencyratherthanonriskselection.Promotingincreaseinswitchingratesmightotherwisecomeatahigherpricethanthebenefits.
50
Table4:SelectedempiricalPapersReviewed:PurchasingServicesAuthor Title Time
PeriodCountryCovered
Findings
Gravelleetal.,2010
“DoctorBehaviourUnderPayForPerformanceContracting:Treating,CheatingandCaseFinding?”TheEconomicJournal
2004‐2006 UK Differencesinreporteddiseaseratesbetweenproviders,anddifferencesinexceptionratesbothbetweenandwithinproviders,suggestgaming
Palangkaraya,A.,Yong,J.2013
“EffectsofCompetitiononHospitalQuality:AnExaminationUsingHospitalAdministrativeData,”EuropeanJournalofHealthEconomics
2000‐2005
Australia Hospitalsfacinghighercompetitionhavelowerunplannedadmissionrates.However,competitionisrelatednegativelytohospitalqualitywhenmeasuredbymortality,albeittheeffectsareweakandbarelystatisticallysignificant.
Campbelletal.,2007
“QualityofPrimaryCareinEnglandwiththeIntroductionofPayforPerformance,”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine
1998‐2005
UK Introductionofpayforperformancewasassociatedwithamodestaccelerationinimprovementfordiabetesandasthmabutnotforcoronaryheartdisease
Serumagaetal.,2011
“Effectofpayforperformanceonthemanagementandoutcomesof
2000‐2007
UK Payforperformancehadnodiscernibleeffectsonprocessesofcareoron
51
hypertensionintheUnitedKingdom:interruptedtimeseriesstudy.”BMJ
hypertensionrelatedclinicaloutcomes.Generousfinancialincentivesmaynotbesufficienttoimprovequalityofcareandoutcomesforhypertensionandothercommonchronicconditions
Suttonetal.,2012
“ReducedMortalitywithHospitalPayforPerformanceinEngland,”theNewEnglandJournalofMedicine
2006‐2010
UK Payforperformancewasassociatedwithaclinicallysignificantreductioninmortality
Duggan,2004
“Doescontractingoutincreasetheefficiencyofgovernmentprograms?EvidencefromMedicaidHMOs,”JournalofPublicEconomics
1989‐2000
USA HMOenrolment andtheresultingswitchfromfee‐for‐servicetomanagedcarewasassociatedwithasubstantialincreaseingovernmentspendingbutnocorrespondingimprovementininfanthealthoutcomes
RosenthalandFrank,2006
“Whatistheempiricalbasisforpayingforqualityinhealthcare?”MedicalCareResearchandReview
1975‐2004
USA Thereislittleevidencetosupporttheeffectivenessofpayingforquality.
O’Reillyetal.,2012
“Payingforhospitalcare:theexperiencewith
1990s&2000s
England,Finland,France,
Activity‐basedfundinghasbeenassociatedwithan
52
implementingactivity‐basedfundinginfiveEuropeancountries.”HealthEconomics,PolicyandLaw
Germany&Ireland
increaseinactivity,adeclineinlengthofstayand/orareductionintherateofgrowthinhospitalexpenditureinmostofthesecountries
BevanandvandeVen,2010
“ChoiceofProvidersandMutualHealthcarePurchasers:CantheEnglishNationalHealthServiceLearnfromtheDutchReforms?”HealthEconomics,PolicyandLaw
Mid‐1970s‐2010
UK&theNetherlands
EffectivelyimplementingthefullycompetitiveDutchmodelrequirespreconditionstobefulfilled:agoodriskequalizationsystem,aneffectivecompetitionpolicy,anadequatesystemofproductclassificationandmedicalpricingandtransparentconsumerinformationontheHIproductsandonthequalityofhealthcareproviders.
LeGrand,1999
“Competition,CooperationorControl?TalesfromtheBritishNationalHealthService,”HealthAffairs
1990s UK Creationofaninternalorquasi‐market,separatingpurchaserfromproviderandencouragingcompetitionamongproviders,hadminimaleffect,partlybecauseofretentionofcentralcontrolandpartlyinadequateunderstandingofprofessionalmotivations
Propperetal., “Does 1990s UK Greatercompetitionis
53
2004 CompetitionBetweenHospitalsImprovetheQualityofCare?HospitalDeathRatesandtheNHSInternalMarket.”JournalofPublicEconomics
associatedwithhigherdeathrates,controllingforpatientmixandothercharacteristicsofthehospitalandcatchment.However,theestimatedimpactofcompetitionissmall
Propperetal.,2008
“CompetitionandQuality:EvidenceFromtheNHSInternalMarket1991‐9.”EconomicJournal
1991‐1999 UK RelationshipbetweencompetitionandAMImortality(asameasureofquality)isnegative.Wealsofindthatcompetitionreducedwaitingtimes.Indicationisthathospitalsincompetitivemarketsreducedunmeasuredandunobservedqualityinordertoimprovemeasuredandobservedwaitingtimes.
Dusheikoetal.,2006
“TheEffectofFinancialIncentivesonGatekeepingDoctors:EvidenceFromaNaturalExperiment.”JournalofHealthEconomics
1991‐1999 England Theabolitionoffundholdingincreasedex‐fundholders’admissionratesforchargeableelectiveadmissions
Dixonetal.,2010
“TheExperienceofImplementing
1990s–2000s
Englandandthe
Similarchallengeshavebeenfaced.
54
ChoiceatPointofReferral:AComparisonoftheNetherlandsandEngland.”HealthEconomics,PolicyandLaw
Netherlands Althoughchangeshavethepotentialtogenerateimprovementsandbenefits(eg.convenience,certaintyandchoiceforpatientsandefficiencygains)theyhavealsogeneratedproblemsduringimplementationincludingGPresistance
Gaynoretal.,2010
DeathByMarketPowerReform,CompetitionandPatientOutcomesintheNationalHealthService.”NBERWorkingPaper
2003‐2007
UK Effectofcompetitionistosaveliveswithoutraisingcosts.Patientsdischargedfromhospitalslocatedinmarketswherecompetitionwasmorefeasiblewerelesslikelytodie,hadshorterlengthofstayandweretreatedatthesamecost
Gaynoretal.,2012
“FreetoChoose?ReformandDemandResponseintheEnglishNationalHealthService,”NBERWorkingPaper18574
2003‐2008
UK Demandelasticityincreaseswithchoice,andthereissubstantialheterogeneityinconsumerresponse.Moreseverelyillpatientsbecomemoresensitivetoqualityofcarepost‐reform.
DugganandScottMorton,2010
“TheEffectofMedicarePartDon
2001‐2006
USA PartDsubstantiallyloweredtheaveragepriceandincreased
55
PharmaceuticalPricesandUtilization,”AmericanEconomicReview
thetotalutilizationofprescriptiondrugsbyMedicarerecipients.Themagnitudevariesacrossdrugs.
Chengetal,2012
“WhatFactorsInfluencetheEarningsofGeneralPractitionersandMedicalSpecialists?EvidencefromTheMedicineinAustralia:BalancingEmploymentandLifeSurvey,”HealthEconomics
2008 Australia EarningsofGPsarelower(vs.specialists)becauseGPsworkfewerhours,aremorelikelytobefemale,arelesslikelytoundertakeafter‐hoursoron‐callwork,andhavelowerreturnstoexperience.
Cooperetal,2010
"“Doeshospitalcompetitionsavelives?EvidencefromtheEnglishNHSpatientchoicereforms"LSEworkingpaper
2002‐2008
England Post‐reformsmortalityfell(i.e.qualityimproved)forpatientslivinginmorecompetitivemarkets.
Savage,E.,Wright,D.,2003
“MoralHazardandAdverseSelectioninAustralianprivatehospitals:1989‐1990,”JournalofHealthEconomics
1989–1990
Australia Whentheendogeneityoftheinsurancedecisionisaccountedfor,theextentofmoralhazardcansubstantiallyincreasetheexpectedlengthofahospitalstaybyafactorofupto3
Table5:SelectedempiricalPapersReviewed:CoverageDecisions
56
Author Title TimePeriod
CountryCovered
Findings
Propperetal.,2002
“WaitingTimesforHospitalAdmissions:theImpactofGPFundholding.”JournalofHealthEconomics
1993‐1997
UK Patientwaitingtimereductionsweresecuredwheredoctorspaidfortheirpatients’care,butnotwheredoctorschosehospitalsonlyanddidnotpay.
SicilianiandMartin,2007
“AnEmpiricalAnalysisoftheImpactofChoiceonWaitingTimes.”HealthEconomics
1999–2001.
England Morechoiceissignificantlyassociatedwithlowerwaitingtimesatthesamplemean(fivehospitals)althoughtheeffectismodest,alsosomeevidencethatthisimproveswithmorechoice(i.e.morethan11hospitalsincatchment).
Cooperetal.,2009
“Equity,WaitingTimes,andNHSReforms:RetrospectiveStudy.”BritishMedicalJournal
1997‐2007 England Waitingtimesforpatientshavingelectivehipreplacement,kneereplacement,andcataractrepairinEnglandreduced,asdidvariationinwaitingtimesacrosssocioeconomicgroups
Propperetal.,2010
“IncentivesandTargetsinHospitalCare:EvidencefromaNaturalExperiment,”
1997‐2004
England&Scotland
TheEnglishpolicyofsettingtargetsforelectivecarewaitingtimesachieveditsobjectives:thelengthoftimepatients
57
JournalofPublicEconomics
waitedfellandadmissionsforelectivecarerose.
Wilcoxetal.,2007
“MeasuringandReducingWaitingTimes:ACross‐NationalComparisonofStrategies,”HealthAffairs
2000‐2005
Australia,Canada,England,NewZealand,&Wales
Englandhasachievedthemostsustainedimprovement,linkedtomajorfundingboosts,ambitiouswaiting‐timetargets,andarigorousperformancemanagementsystem.Whilesupply‐sidestrategiesareusedinallfivecountries,NewZealandandpartsofCanadahavealsoinvestedindemand‐sidestrategies(useofclinicalcriteriatoprioritizeaccesstosurgery)
Hamiltonetal.,1996
“WhatarethecostsofqueuingforhipfracturesurgeryinCanada?”JournalofHealthEconomics
1990‐1993
Canada Pre‐surgerydelay(forhipfracture)haslittleeffectoneitherpost‐surgerylengthofstayinhospitalandinpatientmortality
Carrieretal.,1993
“OutcomeofrationingAccesstoOpenHeartSurgery,”CanadianMedicalAssociationJournal
1991‐1992
Canada Pre‐surgerywait(electiveopen‐heartsurgery)hadnoeffectonpatientoutcomeaftersurgery.
Guttmannetal.,2011
“Associationbetweenwaitingtimesandshort
2003‐2007
Canada Presentingtoanemergencydepartmentduring
58
termmortalityandhospitaladmissionafterdeparturefromemergencydepartment:populationbasedcohortstudyfromOntario,Canada,”BMJ
shiftswithlongerwaitingtimes,reflectedinlongermeanlengthofstay,isassociatedwithagreaterriskintheshorttermofdeathandadmissiontohospitalinpatientswhoarewellenoughtoleavethedepartment
Einav,FinkelsteinandLevin,2010
“BeyondTesting:EmpiricalModelsofInsuranceMarkets,”AnnualReviewofEconomics
2000s USA Recentadvancesinempiricalmodelsofinsurancehaveyieldedinsightsintothenatureofconsumerheterogeneityandthepossibilitythatcertainkindsofwelfarelossesfromasymmetricinformation,atleastinsomeinsurancemarkets,maybemodest.
FinkelsteinandMcGarry,2006
“MultipleDimensionsofPrivateInformation:EvidencefromtheLong‐TermCareInsuranceMarket,”AmericanEconomicReview
1995‐2000
USA Insurancemarketsmaysufferfromasymmetricinformationevenabsentapositivecorrelationbetweeninsurancecoverageandriskoccurrence
Fangeetal.,2008
“SourcesofAdvantageous
1991‐2002
USA Evidenceofadvantageous
59
Selection:EvidencefromtheMedigapInsuranceMarket,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy
selectionintheMedigapinsurancemarket.Itssourcesincludeincome,education,longevityexpectations,financialplanninghorizons,andcognitiveability.
Bolinetal.,2010
AsymmetricinformationandthedemandforvoluntaryhealthinsuranceinEurope,”NBERWorkingPaper
2004 Austria,Belgium,Denmark,France,Germany,Greece,Italy,Spain,Sweden,&Switzerland
Correlationbetweenriskandinsurancewasnegative,butnoevidenceofheterogeneousrisk‐preferencesasanexplanation
Einav,FinkelsteinandCullen,2010
“EstimatingWelfareinInsuranceMarketsUsingVariationinPrices,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics
2004 USA Find adverseselectioninemployerprovidedHI,howeverestimatethatthequantitativewelfareimplicationsassociatedwithinefficientpricingintheparticularapplicationaresmall,inbothabsoluteandrelativeterms.
EinavandFinkelstein,2011
“SelectionandAsymmetricInformationinInsuranceMarkets,”NBERReporter
N/A USA&Israel(reviewofotherstudies)
WhileprivateinformationaboutriskplaysanimportantroleininsurancedemandinUSA,anotherdimensionofheterogeneity‐riskaversion‐maybejustasimportant,orevenmoreso.
Alanetal., “Distributional 1969‐ Canada Whileprogrameffects
60
2005 EffectsofGeneralPopulationPrescriptionDrugProgramsinCanada,”CanadianJournalofEconomics
1996 aremutedwhentherearehighdeductibles,anon‐seniorprescriptiondrugsubsidyismoreredistributivethananequal‐costproportionalincometransfer,partlybecauseofdifferentialprivateHIcoveragebyincome.
Hanleyetal.,2007
“DistributionalConsequencesoftheTransitionfromAgeBasedtoIncomeBasedPrescriptionDrugCoverageinBritishColumbia,Canada,”HealthEconomics,
2000‐2004
Canada Pharmaceuticalfinancingbecamelessregressiveafterthepolicychange.Resultssuggestthatifthepublicfinancingofpharmaceuticalsweremaintainedorincreased,achangefromage‐basedtoincome‐basedeligibilitycanunambiguouslyimproveequityinfinance
SmartandStabile,2005
“TaxCredits,Insurance,andtheUseofMedicalCare,”CanadianJournalofEconomics
1986‐2000
Canada Evidenceofgreatertaxpriceelasticities(vs.traditionalpoint‐of‐servicepriceelasticityestimates),butnoevidencetaxsubsidyaffectsHIdemandontheintensivemargin
Stabile,2002
“TheRoleofTaxSubsidiesintheMarketforHealth
1995 Canada&USA TaxsubsidiesencouragetheprovisionofHIin
61
Insurance,”InternationalTaxandPublicFinance
smallerfirms.RemovalofthemwouldcausetheHIlevelinsmall(butnotlarger)firmstodeclinesignificantly.
Hurleyetal,2002
“ParallelPrivateHealthInsuranceinAustralia:ACautionaryTaleandLessonsforCanada.”InstitutefortheStudyofLaborResearch
1995‐2001
Australia Verylimitedcostsavings;publicsystemwaittimesunlikelytoreduce;regulationcomplex;independentsystemofprivatefinancenotpossible;qualityplaysakeyroleindrivingthedynamicsbetweenthepublicandprivatelyfinancedsectors;clearpolicyobjectivesareessential
Joharetal.2011
“WaitingTimesforElectiveSurgeryandtheDecisiontoBuyPrivateHealthInsurance,”HealthEconomics
2004‐2005
Australia Expectedwaitingtimedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofbuyinginsurancebutahighprobabilityofexperiencingalongwaitdoes.Onaverage,waitingtimehasnosignificantimpactoninsurance.
JoharandSavage,2010
“DoPrivatePatientsHaveShorterWaitingTimesforElectiveSurgery:EvidencefromNewSouthWalesPublicHospitals”
2004‐2005
Australia Privatepatientshaveshorterwaitingtimes,andtendtobeadmittedaheadoftheirlistingrank,especiallyforproceduresthathavelowurgencylevels.
62
EconomicPapers