The Black Caribs — Native Resistance to British Penetration Into the Windward Side of St. Vincent...

The Black Caribs —Native Resistance to British Penetration Into the Windward Side of St.Vincent 1763-1773Author(s): BERNARD MARSHALLSource: Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4 (DECEMBER 1973), pp. 4-19Published by: University of the West Indies and Caribbean QuarterlyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23050239 .

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The Black Caribs — Native Resistance to British Penetration

Into the Windward Side of St. Vincent 1763-1773

INTRODUCTION

By the second half of the eighteenth century the Carib

population of the West Indies had been either decimated or driven out of most of their former possessions by the forces of European penetration. St. Vincent however was still a major centre of Carib

population. In 1763 when that island along with Tobago, Dominica, and Grenada and the Grenadines, was ceded to Great Britain at the Peace of Paris which brought the Seven Years War to a close, its Carib population was approximately 3,000 souls.

St. Vincent like Dominica and Tobago had been pawns in the Anglo-French struggle for Caribbean supremacy of the early decades of the eighteenth century. It was not until 1748 that both powers at the Treaty of Aix La Chapelle agreed to regard them as neutral or outside the limits of either's penetration, an agreement which was violated by France with respect to St. Vincent and

Dominica. The extent of this violation is manifested in the French and slave population and production statistics of these two islands at the time of cession. In Dominica, French inhabitants numbered 1,718, their slaves 5,872 and 1,690, 368 lbs, coffee was produced in addition to cocoa and cotton. In St. Vincent on the other hand there were 1,300 French subjects and 3,400 slaves,2 and 12,490 pounds of coffee was produced in addition to cocoa and tobacco.3

But the cultivation of these commodities was not carried on to any great extent. Only 3,027 acres had been in cultivation in Dominica,4 and 6,477 in St. Vincent in 1763.5 In Tobago which had no European settlers the soil had not been scratched at all and even in Grenada which had formerly been a French colony only one third of the land fit for cultivation was in crops. The cultivation of sugar cane was being carried on in Grenada but it was of slight importance compared to coffee and cocoa.6

The mid 1760's however was a time when profits were still being made from the sugar industry which had been launched in the older islands of the British Caribbean such as Antigua, Barbados and Jamaica ever since the second half of the seventeenth century. Even though these profits were not as great as formerly it was still the object of British policy to develop the new possessions as sugar colonies. The Board of Trade therefore quickly formulated procedures and guidelines for the sale, disposal and exploitation of the lands

7 and in 1765 Commissioners were despatched to the islands

to carry them out.

4



The Commissioners completed their task in 1773, eight years after their arrival in the islands. During this time they had succeeded in disposing of all the arable lands in Dominica, Tobago and Grenada.8 St. Vincent however was a notable exception. For

instance the Commissioners were able to dispose of only 20,538 acres9 or roughly one third of the arable land in this island10

compared to 95,134Vi acres in Dominica, 57,401 in Tobago and 74,681 in Grenada11. This immediately poses the question why such a comparatively small acreage had been parcelled out in St. Vincent. The available evidence indicates that the answer lies in the native resistance of the Black Caribs who formed "a strong tribal enclave"12 in the island, to British penetration into the Windward side, the area which they inhabited, and which was the most suitable for sugar cultivation.

It is this native resistance which is the subject of this article, which also attempts to place in proper perspective the series of events leading up to the outbreak of what has been popularly termed "The First Carib War of 1773", the circumstances surrounding the termination of that war, and also its results. Indeed, an article of this nature is very timely and necessary since to date (1973) or 200 years after that event, the popular work on this subject is still that of Sir William Young who published his 'History' in the year 179513, using very important source materials, the private papers of his father who was Chief Commissioner for the sale and disposal of lands in the islands. To date, this work which has completely distorted the

picture has remained virtually unchallenged. In her study on the

Historiography of the British West Indies, Professor Elsa Goveia did more than justice to this work by describing it as "a piece of settler history",14 but no one has yet attempted to refute Young's arguments by a thorough re-examination of the available data.

Indeed, throughout the work, Young views the Black Caribs as a

group of "savages" whose sinister designs against the lives and

properties of "innocent" British subjects created a situation in which there was no alternative but to use force against them and remove

them from the island at all costs.16.

It is important to note also the date of publication of this work. That date, 1795, marked the termination of the "Second Carib War"

of 1795 when the natives were finally subjugated by the forces of

General Abercrombie and it was also a time when there was a

campaign afoot to expell them from the island so that the areas they

occupied might be converted into sugar plantations, an objective which the British settlers had at the outset and which the Caribs had

persistently and consistently prevented from realisation. Young's work therefore, ought to be viewed as a part of that campaign.

This work however, despite its distortions is nevertheless a very

important one, not only because the author had at his disposal very

important source materials, but more significantly because his

thinking has conditioned that of writers on the subject for centuries

and generations. For example, Charles Shepherd devotes a section of

his historical Account of St. Vincent to the war of 1773, and he

5



actually follows the line taken by Young. But he like Young could be considered a settler.

Even as eminent a historian as Professor Lowell Ragatz who published his masterpiece "The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean" almost a century after Shepherd accepted with out question the arguments put forward by Young and by so doing adopted the settler position of this author and Charles Shepherd. For instance Ragatz accuses the Black Caribs of committing "numerous

depredations" 17 on the plantations, instances of which did in fact

occur, but like Young and Shepherd, he refused to consider these incidents as possible actions or rather reactions to British efforts to

penetrate the part of the island they inhabited. "Matters reached such a point", he continued, "that it became necessary to launch the

expedition against them." 18

Persons resident in England who

opposed the expedition he describes as "well meaning" but dismisses as "misinformed" and he goes on to argue that the expedition in itself was "actually a necessary preliminary step to the development of the colony."

Again Ragatz sees the "acceptance" by the natives of a block of land in the northern part of the island at the Peace Treaty, as a result

of the fact that their resistance was broken, 'which seems to imply that the British won a victory both during the campaign and at the Peace Treaty. It is this author's contention that the British won no such victory and that from all indications the war ended in a stalemate. If indeed the British did in fact win such a magnanimous victory why then did they at the termination of this war get such a

negligible portion of Black Carib territory which the natives quickly reoccupied.,

21 and why were the planters so dissatisfied with the terms of the treaty?

22 On these points and others, this author

challenges existing interpretations and suggests revised and modified conclusions.

I The Black Caribs were the survivors of a cargo of an African

slave ship bound from the Bight of Benin to Barbados which was wrecked off the coast of Bequia, a small island near to St. Vincent. At the time of the wreckage, some Africans managed to reach the island of Bequia but were still in distress because of the lack of adequate supplies of food and water. The Yellow Caribs who were accustomed to resort to this island on their fishing excursions rescued the Africans from their plight and invited them to the mainland of St. Vincent, an invitation which was accepted.

In St. Vincent, these Africans settled down, intermarried with the Yellow Caribs and made a living by hunting, fishing and cultivating cassava for consumption and tobacco for export to

Martinique.2? In the process of time relations between the Black and the indigenous Yellow Caribs became strained and in 1710 the Governor of the French island of Martinique who acted as arbitrator divided the island between both groups. The Yellow Caribs were assigned the Leeward, and the Black Caribs the Windward side of

6



the island. Those French settlers who were residing on the island in 1763 did so with the blessing of the Yellow Caribs and were confined to the Leeward side 25 since the Black Caribs wanted no Europeans amongst them.

In 1719, for instance, the French Governor of Martinique sent an expedition of 400 men to the island to reduce the Black Caribs to submission. When this party attempted to penetrate the Windward side they were greeted by a shower of Carib arrows. The survivors of this ill-fated expedition quickly fled back to Martinique.28. Again, in

1723, the English monarch George I granted the island to the Duke of Montague. In fact a party of Englishmen actually landed to enforce the claims of the Duke but as a result of opposition not only from the Black but also from the Yellow Caribs, the grant was withdrawn27.

When therefore in 1763 the Board of Trade was formulating plans for land disposal, in making recommendations for St. Vincent, it was forced to take into account though somewhat reluctantly, this Black Carib tradition of hostility to settlements attempted by Europeans in the part of the island they inhabited, and also their

willingness to take up arms in order to prevent these settlements from being made. Indeed, the Board of Trade stated quite explicitly that not only were the Black Caribs "jealous of their property", but that they might be "sufficiently numerous to defeat any settlements

attempted to be made without their consent."28 Indeed this was the

logic and hard pragmatism which underlay the recommendation that

no survey of the lands they inhabited should be undertaken until

their consent was obtained, and not considerations of "humanity" as

Young makes out29.

This recommendation which was embodied in the instructions

given to the Commissioners for the sale and disposal of lands had

the effect of limiting their activities to the Leeward of the island, which was inhabited by the Yellow Caribs and French subjects. Indeed, the whole of the Windward side with the exception of

Calliaqua and certain sections of the Marriaqua valley was either

actually inhabited or claimed by the Black Caribs.

Contrary to the prevailing popular belief that the presence of the Black Caribs would scare purchasers from the island,

31 the first sales of land were very successful, with bidders coming from

Antigua, Barbados and as far away as North America.32 At this

time, 1765, a total of 7,340 acres had been sold and indeed, this

figure nearly equalled the combined sales at Dominica and Tobago. At the end of 1767 a total of 12,507 acres had been disposed off 33

since the Commissioners had begun their task.

It was from this time that trouble set in. Indeed, the 12,507 acres sold between 1765 and 1767, represented all the lands on the

Leeward side which the Commissioners had been empowered to sell

in accordance with their instructions. The original purchasers and

others interested in the island were extremely dissatisfied with this

situation for two main reasons. Firstly, the Leeward side of the

7



island was very mountainous and rugged and the actual number of cultivable acres was much less than anticipated. Secondly and more importantly this part of the island was not too suitable for sugar cultivation. It favoured the culture of coffee and cocoa which the French inhabitants grew in significant quantities. Indeed, only the valleys intervening between the hills, accommodated sugar.

34

In contrast to the Leeward side, the Windward side was the most extensive and finest part of the island. This area was generally very flat, and the soil was regarded as being "perhaps the best in the world". In addition it was well watered with rivers which would provide the necessary water power for the sugar mills. It was argued that if. the lands here were cut up into sugar plantations the island would in a few years become "a more valuable sugar colony than any possessed by the Crown" with the exception of Jamaica. 35 But in 1767 this was not a feasibility since the Commissioners had no authority to put up these lands for sale because of feared native resistance.

The Chief Commissioner therefore, in response to settler pressure, quickly sought to convince the British Government not only that penetration into this part of the island was desirable but also how it might be accomplished. He suggested that the Black Caribs be told that the King regarded them as his "loving subjects" and that he would protect them as long as they behaved "peacefully and faithfully" and submitted themselves to the Laws in force for the Government of free negroes. They should also be asked not only to acquiesce but also to assist the Commissioners in a survey of the areas they inhabited. However, they were to be allowed to choose a portion of woodland for their habitation in a specific area to be designated by the Commissioners. An interim period of five years was to be granted them so that they could reap their crops and remove their belongings to their new habitat. Finally they would be granted compensation at the rate of £10 per acre for the areas they presently inhabited36.

The British Ministry accepted most of their suggestions and indeed in January 1768, fresh instruments were sent to the Commissioners concerning St. Vincent. Subject to Carib consulta tion and approval, they were authorised to survey in a manner conformable to their former instructions all the cultivable lands between the Rabacca River and Grand Sable. The stipulated compensation for these lands was set at£ 13.4s. per acre. "

Their proposals were rejected by the Black Caribs. Chatoyer, one of the most formidable of the Chiefs gave an outright "no" and refused to entertain any further discussion. 38 But the Commission ers refused to accept his sentiments and indeed, they even violated their instructions by beginning early in 1768 to trace out a road through Black Carib territory as a preliminary step towards a survey of the lands. However an armed force of Black Caribs prevented them from getting further than Iambou near to the River Colonaire, the boundary of their territory.

38

Indeed, this and subsequent acts of provocation perpetrated by

8



the Commissioners seems to have escaped the notice of those who accuse the Caribs of committing depredations on the plantations of British subjects. For instance, towards the end of 1768, the Black Caribs made it quite clear that they would be prepared to use force if

they were not allowed to enjoy their lands in quiet. " But the

Commissioners again, paid no heed to this warning in the same manner as they had virtually brushed aside Chatoyer's sentiments on the proposals of a year earlier, and even resorted to the threat of force to accomplish their design.

It was early in 1769 that they made a second attempt to resume this road with the aid of one detachment of the 32nd regiment and four others on standby. Again the Caribs retaliated. They succeeded in cutting off communication between the Commander of this

regiment and his forty men whom they held as captives. They then

requested the surveyors "to make their escape in the best manner

they could by flight", which they did, leaving their baggage and

everything else behind.

It was on the next day that the four remaining detachments, all the white men capable of bearing arms, and some slaves marched sixteen miles into the heart of Carib territory in an attempt to rescue the forty men. These were only released after the Black Caribs were

given "a clear and explicit assurance", which they had requested, that the British "give up all immediate pretensions to interfere with their country and never again attempt to make roads of communication through it." "

After this episode the Black Caribs remained relatively free from British molestation until 1770. In this year rumours spread that they had made sales of land to French inhabitants of Grenada. According to these rumours, they had sold 700 acres to a Mr. Pichery and had made an agreement with a Jean Augier for the purchase of a large piece of woodland. The Commissioners interpreted the news of these transactions as an indication that the Black Caribs were really willing to sell and suggested to the home Government that they rather than private individuals should be the purchasers.42

As on previous occasions, the home Government acted on the

suggestion put forward by the Commissioners. That Government instructed them to put forward proposals for purchase similar to those of 1767, but at the meeting held at Morne Garou with Chief

Chatoyer and forty of his men these terms were as on the previous occasion flatly rejected despite the endeavours of the Commissioners

"by many arguments to prevail on them to alter their sentiments.""

The rejection of these proposals marked the turning point in

Anglo-Black Carib relations. It occasioned the settlers to pressure their government for more positive action. In their former petitions the resort to force as a means of accomplishing their design though stated, was by no means seen as the only possible measure and in

addition they had urged that the Caribs be given compensation either in the form of money or other lands or both. Now they no

longer sang this tune. Indeed, after 1771 military force was seen as

9



the only means, compensation was ruled out and the total removal of

the Black Caribs from the island was also advocated.

For instance it was the Commissioners belief that in future "all

treaty and negotiation" with the Black Caribs, "tho on the most just and humane terms", would be fruitless and that it would be

impossible to settle the island "without a sufficient force to terrify them into obedience". They argued that the important point was no

longer only the sale of lands. The very honour and dignity of the crown was at stake, and also its obligation to protect its subjects from the Black Caribs whose presence in effect constituted an

"imperium in imperio". "

0 The British settlers took the same attitude. They argued that

the Black Caribs ought to be subjugated since they Were a nuisance. Not only were they refusing to allow settlements in their territory but they we're also harassing English settlements. It was also asserted that the danger was more real since they were actually

being aided and abetted by inhabitants of the French island of

Martinique who supplied them with arms and had the long range objective of preserving a good understanding with them so that they might gain some advantage in the event of a renewed Anglo-French conflict. They accused the British Government of failure to provide adequate protection for their properties and investments against what they termed Carib depredations and cruelty and concluded by stating that:

"The suffering such a separate empire as these Indians claim within your Majesty's dominions is not only incompatible with the safety of your subjects, but highly derogatory from the honour and dignity of the crown, that lenity and every humane expedient to bring them to a reasonable subjection has long been tried without success."

The continuance of such measures it was urged would only increase

their intransigence.45

Even the Governor-in-Chief joined in the war cry. He had

reported that he had intercepted a letter sent to the Black Caribs by the Governor of the French island of St. Lucia. This document was hailed as confirmation of the opinion long entertained by the settlers that the Black Caribs were receiving French support. Therefore, he

argued, it was absolutely necessary to use force against them since

the "gentle methods" previously used, instead of having the desired effect "was looked upon to have proceeded from timidity." He also

argued that conditions were favourable for the deployment of this force since there was no possibility of a war with France, the Spanish War scare has passed and the troops that were stationed in the

islands as a result of that scare, could be mobilised against the Black Caribs.4"

The British Ministry in deliberating what course of action to take in view of these representations called in for consultations,

Thomas Hackshaw, James Gordon, C.P. Sharpe, Richard Ottey,

10



William Fitzhugh, all absentee proprietors, and Richard Maitland, island agent. Of these men, three were signatories to an earlier petition in which the reduction of the Black Caribs with the aid of military and naval forces was seen as possible and desirable. 47 These men were asked whether they thought that the Black Caribs should be allowed to stay on the 'island or be removed from it. If they decided on the latter expedient they were also to choose a place for them to go. "

In making their recommendations these individuals deplored the fact that the Black Caribs were in possession of nearly two-thirds of the cultivable and richest land in the island and that they had

persistently refused to give up any of it. In addition it was urged that they were not paying taxes or contributing anything to the

support of Government functions. The British settlers, they argued, could not even make fairly good contributions since their part of the island was generally rugged and broken and the yields from the soil were very poor.49

It was further argued that even if the Black Caribs were forced to yield up any of their land by military might, they would reassert their "pretended rights" as soon as that force was removed, or they received assistance from the French. Further the colony would never

prosper while the Black Caribs remained in it since their

depredations on property created a situation in which mercantile houses were reluctant to extend credit to the island.50

These arguments were used in justification for an "absolute and immediate removal" of the Black Caribs from the island. These it was argued should be allowed to choose their place of retreat so long as that place did not "endanger the safety of the other islands". If however they refused to do so, it was suggested that they be given

10,000 acres of land on some part of the coast of Africa or be sent to the desert island of St. Mathow. Finally the Yellow Caribs should be

put on the same footing as the Maroons in Jamaica.51

Again the British Government yielded to settler pressure. Indeed, that government, after examining the merits and demerits of the arguments advanced came to the conclusion that it was

necessary "to take effectual measures for the reduction of them (the Black Caribs) as the only means of giving security to the settlements of his Majesty's subjects." This was to be accomplished by the mobilisation of all the troops in the Grenada Government and Dominica and two regiments from North America. If these forces were insufficient those in the Leeward islands should be sent for and in addition the naval squadron in these parts should be in

preparedness.52

But this force was to be used only as a last resort. It was hoped that its very presence would terrify the Black Caribs into submission and force them to accept a portion of the island to be decided upon by the Governor and agree to other stipulations of a Treaty similar to that negotiated with the Maroons of Jamaica in 1731. If however

they rejected these proposals then that force would be used to

11



remove them from the island to "some unfrequented part of the coast

of Africa or some desert island adjacent thereto." 53

The execution of the whole design was entrusted to a Council composed of the Governor of Dominica, the Commander-in-Chief of the land and sea forces, and the Lieutenant Governor of St. Vincent, with the Governor-in-Chief of the islands at its head. He was specifically cautioned against any disclosure of the proposed measures so that the Black Caribs might not get wind of them and commit acts of hostility before the troops arrived. "

The proposed measures however were generally known in the island soon after they were formally communicated, by the medium of letters sent to individuals by their friends in England, with the only difference that the King had given positive orders to remove the Black Caribs to Africa. 55 The settlers were jubilant as the acquisition of the lands of the Windward Side seemed near realisation. But this mood of jubilation quickly changed to one of disappointment when the Governor-in-Chief issued a proclamation embodying the first part of his instructions, asking the Black Caribs to accept the treaty. "Such is the temper of the people" he wrote "nothing less than a total extirpation of these poor infatuated people would be satisfactory."

56 As the Chief Commissioner then in the position of Governor of Dominica put it, the general opinion in the island was that "Delenda est Carthago," and all reports seemed to justify this notion."

The Black Caribs however were quite aware of the fact that the settlers had long adhered to this doctrine and would have liked to put it in execution. They were also aware in view of the fact that the secret instructions leaked out, of what was contemplated against them. According to the Governor-in-Chief, shortly after this news leak they made frequent trips to French islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, returning with arms and ammunition.

58 In fact even

before the terms of the proposals were formally communicated to them and at a time when six companies of the 68th Regiment had arrived in the island they made it quite clear to the Governor-in-Chief, that they were determined not to yield up any portion of their lands, "which lands were transmitted to thejn from their ancestors and in defence of which they would die." 59

They reacted in the same tone when the propositions were officially communicated. They promised to "behave themselves well" if they were left in peaceful possession of their lands, but they were also determined that "let the consequences be what it would" not an inch of their territory would be given up. In view of this refusal and despite their determination the British troops that had been mobilised began to advance into Black Carib territory and the war of 1772 had begun.

60

II

The foregoing analysis of the series of events leading up to this war should indicate quite clearly to the reader who was responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. Sir William Young however places the

12



responsibility on the Black Caribs. "It was not" he writes, "until after eight years of patient forbearance by the British Government that the contumacy of the Caribs under French influence, step by step led to the necessity of control and the war of 1772." " But the available evidence indicates that this argument cannot be accepted. This affects his argument that the Black Caribs had no legitimate right to the part of the island that they claimed since they were not the original inhabitants and in fact were the usurpers of the

legitimate Carib heritage in St. Vincent. 62

But even if this was correct, that in itself did not give Great Britain any moral obligation to dispossess them of these lands. In fact the aim of that government was not to restore these lands to the

Yellow Caribs but to sell them to its subjects for sugar cultivation. It is indeed hard to see how the refusal of the Black Caribs or a people to give up what is legitimately theirs could be construed as

contumacy.

The argument that the Black Caribs were in their actions influenced by the French also needs examination. It is true that they would have welcomed moral support and even supplies of ammunition from the French to resist English attempts to forcefully remove them from their territory. For contrary to what Young writes, the years prior to 1772 were not characterized by "patient forbearance" as the attempt to trace the road in 1769 with military assistance demonstrates. 63 But the important point is that the available evidence indicates that the decision not to budge was theirs and theirs only. Indeed, they did not need the French to tell them

what to do in this respect and it needs to be recalled that they had

previously resisted attempts at encroachment by these same French men

" whom it was now claimed were their advisers.

Indeed, the entire argument that the Black Caribs were in fact

responsible for this war can only be accepted if we admit that they had no legitimate right to their lands and that they rightfully belonged to Great Britain. But the available evidence indicates no

basis for such a claim. In fact as a Black Carib sympathiser in

England put it, since these people had a legitimate right to their

lands, at the Peace of Paris in 1763, France ceded to Great Britain

only that part of the island inhabited by its subjects,65 which was

the Leeward side.

With this belief in mind, this individual asked Lord Dartmouth,

Hillsborough's successor "to put a stop to the murderous

commission sent out by your predecessor to extirpate them." He

accused the administration of "reviving the Spanish cruelties at the

conquest of Mexico, to gratify avaricious merchants, land holders

and venal commissioners," and suggested that the whole affair be

called off before it became the subject of a parliamentary inquiry.66

The affair in fact did become the subject of such an inquiry. This

was demanded by the opponents of Lord North's administration and

as a result it was finally resolved that the expedition was founded in

injustice and inhumanity. "

Major Dalrymple.the officer in charge of

13



military operations,was immediately instructed to negotiate a treaty with the Black Caribs if he had not already effected their reduction, or if the campaign had progressed to a point where in his opinion the treaty would guarantee the safety of the island. The stipulations of the proposed treaty were that the Black Caribs be left in full and

peaceful possession of their lands, that they accept full allegiance to the British Government, allow roads of communication through their

territory and that if at anytime they were disposed to sell any portion of their lands they should do so only to such persons ds were authorised by the king.

"

But contrary to what Shepherd writes, the conclusion of the

Parliamentary enquiry that the expedition was unjust was not the only factor influencing this decision. Indeed, the available evidence makes it unmistakably clear that considerations other than those of

humanity for the Black Caribs carried considerable weight, especially considerations for the safety of British troops engaged in the campaign.

The whole affair was examined after the receipt of reports of the conduct of the campaign in St. Vincent dated October 9, 1772,T and indeed these reports were by no means satisfactory as they indicated

that the Black Caribs were getting the upper hand in the conflict. Indeed in this campaign the Black Caribs did have an advantage. Few Englishmen had even been allowed access to their territory and this access was for the most part limited to specific areas and on specific occasions such as the conference held at Morne Garou in

1771. Englishmen therefore, had little opportunity of familiarising themselves even with those parts of the country in which they were allowed, more so, the whole of Carib territory which was for the most part inaccessible. So while the troops were strangers to the terrain, The Black Caribs knew it well even in the dark, and in addition they were good strategists and fighters.

So effectively did they combine these advantages that when early in October 1772 the British had lost three men in attempting to cross Lambou and all the huts built as posts in their attempted penetration had been burnt down, the Governor-in-Chief despaired of success. Indeed, this mood of pessimism was reflected in a despatch to the Home authorities:

I flatter myself, we shall soon be able to give your Lordship some satisfactory account of our proceedings, tho' I must con fess the conduct of the Charibbs is more serious and formidable, and I see greater difficultys in the execution of His Majesty's Commands than I expected. I very much fear their reduction will be a work of time, for they possess ^ country very in accessible, and seem to have a knowledge how to avail them selves of this advantage.71

A hurricane in the Leeward islands added further complications to the situation as the ships of the naval squadron were disabled and so unable to rendezvous at the island. Indeed, so critical was the situation that additional reinforcements were requested.

72

14



It was three months after this adverse report was received that the British Government finally decided to call off the expedition. When that Government instructed General Dalrymple to negotiate a treaty to end the war it was pointed out that the objectives of that treaty were the "welfare and happiness" of the Caribs and not their extirpation. Mention was also made of the administration desire "to end the bloodshed on both sides" but great concern was also expressed at the fact that "the King's troops were preparing to enter

upon a service hazardous in the execution and uncertain in the

event." "

The proposed treaty however was not negotiated until February 1773. This was so because the General was in Carib territory and did not receive the information in time seems unlikely. So too is the speculation that the treaty was proposed to the Caribs prior to February and rejected. It seems more likely that the General, in accordance with his instructions did not think it politic to negotiate before February in the hope that more would be gained by either pressing for a complete victory or a decided advantage so that in either case he could drive a harder bargain in the negotiations. By the end of 1772 his forces were divided into two bodies, one stationed at Majorca and the other at Grand Sable. At this time he complained that he had suffered many casualties, as a result of the actual fighting, diseases, and also that the country was becoming more and more difficult to penetrate.74 Early in 1773, his forces had still got no further than Grand Sable and with increasing casualties,

5 he

probably despaired of complete military victory. As for the Black Caribs their mobility in this vicinity was restricted as a result of

posts constructed by the General. In short at this time the war seemed to have reached a point of "stalemate" and since neither side was being able to win, both parties agreed to sit at the bargaining table.

At the peace treaty the boundaries of the Black Caribs were

pushed inward from the River Colonarie to the River Byera:6 Only a negligible portion of their land or roughly 2,000 acres was ceded to British settlers. " Not only were they thoroughly disappointed

78

but the Black Caribs vacated this portion only with reluctance 79 and finally resettled it in 1775. 80

Anglo-Black Caribs relations after 1773, the genesis of the "Second Carib War of 1795" and the resultant scramble for the land vacated by them following their

subjugation are the subject of two articles now in preparation.

BERNARD MARSHALL

FOOTNOTES

1. Sir William Young, A History of the Black Caribs in St. Vincent, (London 1795) p. 18. According to this source there were only 100 Yellow Caribs on the island.

2. C.O. 101/1; Answers to Queries on the State of the Islands; Dominica, August, 1763; St. Vincent, May 2, 1763.

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3. C O. 101/1; Captain Robert Paul to the Commissioners for Trade and

Plantations, March 5, 1764.

4. C.O. 101/1; Answers to Queries on the State of the Islands; Dominica, August '763.

5. C.O. 101/1; Captain Robert Paul to the Commissioners for Trade and Planta tions, March 5, 1764.

6. C.O. 101/1; Answers to Queries on the State of the Islands; Grenada, May 2, 1763.

7. For the substance of these recommendations and proposals see Bernard Marshall, 'Society and Economy in the British Windward Islands 1763 -

1823' unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of the West Indies, Jamaica, Jamaica, 1972, pp 15 - 19; L.J. Ragatz, 'The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean 1763 - 1833; (New York 1963), pp 113 - 114.

8. C.O. 101/16; Report of the Commissioners for the Sale and Disposal of lands, July 19, 1773.

9. John Byers, References to the Plan of St. Vincent as surveyed from the years 1765 - 1773, (London 1777)

10. The total acreage was approximately 86,000. Of this 20,000 had been granted to General Moncton and 4,000 to a Mr. Swinburne, leaving a little more than 60,000 acres for sale. See Byers, op cit.

11. This information is compiled from data given in C.O. 76/9, and C.O. 106/9 - 12, which are the records of the proceedings of the Commissioners.

12. Lisa Goveia, A Study of the Historiography of the British West Indies to the end of the Nineteenth Century, Mexico, 1956, p. 37.

13. Young, op cit.

14. Goveia, op cit, p. 37. For her general criticisms of this work see also p.'38.

15. Young, op cit, passim, pp. 123 - 125.

16. Charles Shepherd, An Historical Account of the Island of St. Vincent, (London 1831). He was a Chief Justice of the Colony and identified with the planting interest.

17. Ragatz, op cit, p. 117.

18. ibid

19. ibid

20. ibid

21. See for instance, C.O. 101/18, Lieutenant Governor Morris to the Earl of Dart mouth, May 24, 1775.

22. C.O. 101/16 and C.O. 101/17 contains letters from the planters to the British

ministry expressing this dissatisfaction.

23. Young, op cit, p. 6

24. See for example, C.O. 260/9, 'An Account of the Island Caribs and their mode of living', enclosed in Governor Seton's, No. 55, to Sydney. January, 1789.

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25. Young, op cit, pp. 8-11

26. ibid

27. ibid, pp. 13-14

28. C.O. 102/1, Representations to His Majesty on the method of disposing of lands in the Ceded Islands, November, 1763.


30. C.O. 106/9, Instructions to the Commissioners for the Sale of Lands, March

24, 1764.

31. See for example, 'Correspondence relating to the Estates of Sir William Young in the West Indies with claims for compensation 1768 -1835; 6 volumes, Rhodes House Library, Oxford; Volume 6.

32. Shepherd, op cit, pp. 27 - 28.

33. Compiled from date in C.O. 106/9

34. C.O. 101/11; Sir William Young's propositions for Surveying and Selling the Carib lands on the Windward side of St. Vincent, April 11, 1767.

35. ibid

36. Similar proposals dated August 13, 1765 had been put forward to the home

Government by the Commissioners in their first report (See C.O. 106/9), in

which the removal of the Black Caribs to the Grenadine Island of Bequia was

also advocated. But no immediate action was taken.

37. C.O. 101/11; Draft of Instructions to the Commissioners for the Sale of Lands

to Survey and dispose of lands on the Windward side of St. Vincent, January, 1768.

38. Young,' op cit, p. 38

39. ibid, pp. 44 - 45

40. C.O. 101/13, Lieutenant Governor Fitz Maurice to Lord Hillsborough, No.

17, December 18, 1768.

41. C.O. 101/13, Lieutenant Governor Fitz Maurice's, No. 27, and enclosures, Lord Hillsborough, May 11, 1769.

42. In a letter to the Lords of Treasury, September 4, 1770; C.O. 101/16.

43. C.O. 106/12; The Commissioners to the Committee for Trade and Plantations;

August 12, 1771.

44. ibid

45. C.O. 101/16; Governor Leyborne to Hillsborough, No. 3, November 30, 1771. The alleged letter from the Governor of St. Lucia, written in French, is

enclosed in that despatch.

47.» C.O. 101/14; Memorial of Sundry proprietors now in London to Hills

borough, January 22, 1770.

48. C.O. 101/16; Memorial of the Gentlemen interested in St. Vincent to

Hillsborough, April 4, 1772.

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49. ibid

50. ibid

51. ibid

52. C.O. 101/16; Hillsborough to Governor Leyborne, No. 4, Separate and Secret, April 18, 1772.

53. ibid

54. ibid

55. C.O. 101/16; Governor Leyborne to Hillsborough, No. 21, June 18, 1772.

56. ibid

57. C.O. 71/3; Governor Young to Hillsborough, (St. Vincent), July 28, 1772.

58. C.O. 101/16; Governor Leyborne to Hillsborough, No. 26, July 30, 1772.

59. ibid

60. C.O. 101/16; Governor Leyborne to Hillsborough. No. 34, October 9, 1772.


62. ibid; see also p. 8

63. See p. 11. Also, soon after the Black Caribs had stopped the second British attempt to resume the road through their territory, the belief was current that those of them who resorted to St. Lucia in their canoes were bringing back arms and ammunition as well as runaway slaves to augment their numbers for hostile designs against British settlers. In an effort to counteract this the island authorities put a guardas costas on patrol in these waters giving the Captain instructions to stop, search and seize all canoes he suspected of having such cargoes. On August 24, 1769 four canoes with eighty men, which refused to stop when signalled, were fired on and sunk. It was the Captain's belief that all eighty men perished. See Young, op cit, pp. 54 • 56.

64. See p. 7

65. Probus (pseudonym), to Lord Dartmouth, November 30, 1772; in the Scots Magazine, Volume XXXIX, 1772, p. 558. 'Injustice of the Proceedings in St. Vincent.'

66. ibid

67. Shepherd,' op cit,' p. 30

68. C.O. 101/16; Dartmouth to Major Dalrymple, December 9, 1772.

69. Shepherd, op cit, p. 30

70. C.O. 101/16; Governor Leyborne to Hillsborough, No. 34, October 9, 1772.

70. C.O. 101/16; Dartmouth to Dalrymple, December 9, 1772.

71. C.O. 101/16; Governor Leyborne to Hillsborough, No. 34, October 9, 1772.

72. ibid

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73. C.O. 101/15; Dartmouth to Dalrymple, December 9, 1772. (Emphasis Mine).

74. C.O. 101/17; Dalrymple to Dartmouth, December 26, 1772.

75. C.O. 101/17; Governor Leyborne and enclosure to Dartmouth, May 19, 1773. At this time, British casualties were 72 killed in fighting, 80 wounded, 110 dead from diseases, 428 sick, and 4 deserted.

76. C.O. 101/17, Dalrymple to Dartmouth, February 22, 1773.

77. C.O. 101/16, Report of the Commissioners, July 19, 1773.

78. See p. 27, footnote 22

79. See for example, C.O. 101/17; Governor Leyborne to Dartmouth, No. 11, May 10, 1773.

80. See p. 27, footnote 21

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The Black Caribs — Native Resistance to British Penetration Into the Windward Side of St. Vincent...

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