TA-4 circled overhead trying to keep his flock from runningamuck. During the missions to 881S, the men of India andMike, 3/26, added to the hullabaloo with a little twist oftheir own. When the CH-46s settled over the hill, the Marineson the ground tossed out a few dozen smoke grenades for addedcover and then every man in the perimeter fired a full magazineat anything on the surrounding slopes which appeared hostile.With some 350 men hosing down the countryside at the same time,the din was terrific.

Neither the deluge of lead from 88lS nor the suppressivefire of the jets and gunships kept the NVA completely quiet.The 120mm mortar crews in the Horseshoe were especially activeduring the resupply runs to 88lS and always lobbed some roundsonto the hill in hopes of knocking down a helicopter. Thesetubes had been previously registered on the LZ.s and the smokescreens had little effect on their fire; as a result, the Marinesfrequently shifted landing zones.(*) The smoke did block theview of the North Vietnamese machine gunners and they were forcedto fire blindly through the haze- -if they dared fire at all.The choppers still took hits but nowhere near as many as beforethe Gaggle was initiated. The CH-46 pilots, poised precariously

(*) There is an interesting possibility as to why the mortarsin the Horseshoe were never silenced. Fourteen years earlier,at Dien Bien Phu, the North Vi,etriainese used an ingenious methodto protect their heavier siege mortars from air attacks andthey may well have repeated it at Khe Sanh. The mortar crewsselected a site on the slope of a hill, figured the elevationand deflection necessary to hit one specific target, and thendug a small tunnel at that precise angle into the side of thehill. The mortar was emplaced at the bottom of the tunnel withconnecting caves which housed the gunners. When fired, themortar rounds traveled up the shaft, sometimes as far as 50 feetbefore reaching the surface. The foliage was cleared away fromthe mouth of the tunnel so that the rounds did not hit the over-hanging brmnches and detonate premaure1y. Mortars emplacedin this manner were, of course, limited to only one target and,as far as the gunners in the Horseshoe were concerned, that

target was 88lS. When the siege was later broken and Marineunits began to maneuver in the terrain surrounding the hill mass,they were never taken under fire by the 120mm mortars eventhough they did receive fire from smaller caliber weapons.Hill 88lS, however, continued to be hit periodically by thel20mms.

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above the LZs during the few agonizing seconds it took to un-load their cargo, often heard the sickening smack which meantthat a bullet had torn into the fuselage of their thin-skinnedhelos. The members of the two-man Helicopter Support Teams(HST), 3d Shore Party Battalion who were attached to the riflecompanies were also prime targets. These men had to stand upwhile they guided the choppers into the LZs and, every few days,they had to attach bundles of cargo nets, which accumulatedfrom previous missions, for the return trip to Dong Ha. This

was dangerous for the aircrews as well as the HST men because,during the hook-up, the pilots had to hold their aircraft in avulnerable position a few feet above the ground with the nosecocked up and the belly exposed to fire from the front. Whilethey attached the bundles, the ground support personnel couldhear the machine gun rounds zing a few inches over theirhaadsand slap into the soft underside of the suspended helicopter.Not all the bullets and shell fragments passed overhead; on88lS, the defenders were operating with their fourth UST whenthe siege ended.

In spite of the seriousness of the situation, the Gagglewas not without its lighter episodes. In one instance, an HSTman attached to 1/3/26 hooked up an outgoing load and gave thepilot the "thumbs up" when he discovered that he had become en-tangled in the pile of nets. The CH-46 surged into the airwith the startled Marina dangling helplessly from the bottom ofthe net by one foot. But for the quick reaction of his comradeon the ground who informed the pilot by radio that the chopperhad taken on more than the prescribed load, the young cargohandler would have had a rather interesting trip to Dong Ha.The CH-46 crews also provided a human touch during these missions.When the Sea Knights swept over the hills, it was not uncommonto see a machine gunner on board quit his weapon for a second,nonchalantly pitch a case of soda pop out the hatch, and thenquickly return to blaze away at the enemy positions. At 1stMAW Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Carey, who had been aninfantryman in Korea before he went to flight school and whosympathized with the men on the outposts, felt that a smallgesture acknowledging their continued outstanding performancewas in order. Special efforts were made to obtain quantitiesof dry ice for packing and one day, without notice, hundredsof Dixie-cups of ice cream were delivered to the men on the hillsas part of the regular resupply. This effort was dubbed Oper-ation COOL IT. The only hitch developed on 88lS where the Marines,unaware of the contents, allowed the cargo to remain in the LZuitil after dark when it was safe to venture out of the trenchline.

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The ice cream was a little sloppy but edible and greatlyappreciated.

The introduction of the Super Gaggle was a turning pointin the resupply effort. Prior to its conception, the Marineson the outposts dreaded the thought of leaving their positionsto retrieve cargo- -even when it included mail- -because of theheavy shelling. With a dozen Skyhawks pasting the surroundinghills during each mission, this threat was alleviated to a largedegree arid casualties tapered off. The Company I, 3/26, corn.-mander later stated: "If it weren't for the Gaggle, most of usprobably wouldn't be here today." The helicopter pilots, knowingthat their jet jockey compatriots were close at hand, were alsoable to do their job more effectively. In the past, the trans-port crew chiefs occasionally had to jettison their externalload prematurely when the pilot took evasive action to avoidground fire. When this occurred, the cargo nets usually slammedinto the perimeter and splattered containers all over the hill-top0(*)(131) With the Super Gaggle, the pilots had less enemyfire to contend with and did not bomb the hills with the cargopallets as much; as a result more supplies arrived intact. In

addition, the system greatly facilitated the picking up ofwounded personnel. (**)

The Marine helicopters continued their flights to and fromKhe Sanh throughout the siege. In spite of the obstacles, thechopper pilots crammed enough sorties into those days with fly-able weather to haul 465 tons of supplies to the base duringFebruary. When the weather later cleared, this amount was in-creased to approximately 40 tons a day. While supportingOperation SCOTLAND, MAG-36 and MAG-l6 flew 9,109 sorties, trans-ported 14,562 passengers,and delivered 4,661 tons of cargo.(132)

(*) Of all the jettisoned loads, those containing water werethe most spectacular. On one occasion, a CH-46 carrying plasticcontainers of water was forced to release the net about 200feet above the ground. The containers broke open in midair andthe contents cascaded on the hill below. The Company E, 2/26,commander, Captain Breeding,later recalled that it produced oneof the prettiest waterfalls he'd ever seen.

(**) It is no exaggeration to say that MAG-36 helicoptersplayed a decisive role in the battle. The maintenance of thehill outposts was imperative if Khe Sanh was to be held, andthese units depended on the helicopters for survival.

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Colonel Lo.nds was more than satisfied with the airbornepipeline which kept his cupboard full and he had quite a cup-board. The daily reqi.iirement for the 26th Marines to maintainnormal operations had jumped from 60 tons in mid-January toroughly 185 tons when all five battalions were in place. Whilethe defenders didn't live high off the hog on this amount, atno time were they desperately lacking the essentials for combat.There were periods on the hills when the Marines either stretchedtheir rations and water or went without, but they never ranshort of ammunition. Understandably, ammunition had the highestpriority- -even higher than food and water. A man might not beable to eat a hand grenade but neither could he defend himselfvery effectively with a can of fruit cocktail. This did notmean that the men of the 26th Marines went hungry. On theaverage, the troops at the base received two C-Ration meals aday and this fare was occasionally supplemented with juice,pastry, hot soup, or fresh. fruit. The men on the hills sub-sisted almost entirely on C-Rations and the time between mealsvaried, depending on the weather. Within the compound, waterwas rationed only when the pump was out of commission and thatwas a rare occurrence. Lieutenant Colonel Heath's position onHill 558 was flanked by two streams so 2/26 was well suppliedbut the Marines on the other four outposts depended on heliliftsfor water; it was used sparingly for drinking and cooking.(*)(133)Besides the essentials, the 26th Marines also required tons ofother supplies such as fortification material, fuel, tires,barbed wire, and spare parts- -to name a few. PX items were onthe bottom of the bottom of the priority totem pole because,as Colonel Lownds remarked: "If you have to, you can live with-out those." On the other hand, mail had a priority second onlyto ammunition and rations. The men at Khe Sanh received over43 tons of mail during the worst month of the siege.(l34)

One portion of the airlift which affected morale as muchas the arrival of mail was the swift departure of casualties.A man's efficiency was greatly improved by the knowledge that,

(*) During one period of extremely bad weather, the platoonfrom A/l/26 which held positions on Hill 950 went without re-supply for nine days and the water shortage became a majorproblem. Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson authorized the platooncommander, Second Lieutenant Maxie R. Williams, to send a squadout to a small stream which was about two hours march from theperimeter. In addition to finding water, the Marines surpriseda group of North Vietnamese and killed nine of the enemy. OneMarine was also killed.

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A CH-46 helicopter of Marine Aircraft Group-36 evacuateswounded from Hill 861A (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)

U. S. Navy doctors and corpsmen, wearing helmets and flakjackets, treat wounded at Charlie Med aid station, (Photocourtesy David D. Duncan)

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if he were hit, he could expect immediate medical attentionand when necessary, a speedy evacuation.(*) Those with minorwounds were usually treated at the various battalion aid sta-tions and returned to duty; the more seriously injured weretaken to Company C,. 3d Medical Battalion. Charley Med, as thisdetachment was called, was located just south of and adjacentto the aircraft loading ramp. There, U. S. Navy doctors andcorpsmen treated the walking wounded, performed surgery, andprepared the litter cases for medevac. From Charley Med, itwas a short, but often nerve-racking trip to a waiting aircraftand a hospital at Phu Bai. During the siege, the courageousmen of Charley Med, often working under heavy enemy fire,treated and evacuated 852 wounded personnel.(135)

Thus the Marine and U. S. Air Force transport pilots, heli-copter crews, loadmsters, and ground personnel 'kept open thegiant umbilical cord which meant life for the combat base.Without their efforts, the story of Khe Sanh would undoubtedlyhave been an abbreviated edition with a not-too-happy ending.On the other hand, accounts of the heroism, ingenuity, andskill demonstrated by these men would fill a book. But therewere other things besides man-ia falling from the heavens atKhe Sanh and the vital role of the transports was frequentlyeclipsed by the efforts of air crews who carried a much deadliercargo.

(*) Bad weather occasionally precluded the immediate evacua-tion of casualties from the hill outposts.

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PART VI

SUPPORTING ARMS AND INTELLIGENCE

The amount of air and artillery support that the 26thMarines received during the defense of Khe Sanh was enormous.Few regiments ever had such an overwhelming amount of f ire-power at their disposal. The reason was that General Westmore-land gave SCOTLAND priority over all other operations in Viet-nam. The well-publicized struggle had long since become morethan just another battle; it was a symbol of Allied determina-tion to hold the line in Vietnam. The stubborn resistance ofthe 26th Marines had generated an emotional impact that wasfelt not only in the United States but around the globe. Thanksto a small army of war correspondents arid reporters, millionsof people followed the battle day by day and, in essence, themilitary prowess of the United States was exposed to the world.

The agency at the combat base which was responsible forcoordinating the vast array of supporting arms was the 26thMarines FSCC which was headed by the 1/13 commander, LieutenantColonel Henrielly. The FSCC, with its artillery and air repre-sentatives, was an integral part of the regimental staff and itplanned and supervised the execution of all fire missions with-in the SCOTLAND area of operations. Subordinate to the FSCC,was the 1/13 Fire Direction Center (FDC), headed by CaptainLawrence B. Salmon, and the Khe Sanh Direct Air Support Center(DASC), under Major Charles D. Goddard. The FDC served as thebrain of the artillery battalion where initial fire requestswere received and transformed into numerical data for the guncrews. To speed up the process, Captain Salmon relied heavilyon the Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer or FADAC. The

DASC had displaced to the KSCB on 19 January with the sole mis-sion of handling the deluge of incoming aircraft. Requests forair support from the FSCC were channeled through the DASC to theTactical Air Direction Center of the 1st MAW. Whenever thewing could not completely fill a quota, liaison teams withinthe DASC called on the other services for assistance. Once theschedule was met and the strike aircraft arrived on station, theMarine DASC, aided by an Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC)from Seventh Air Force, coordinated all air operations withinthe KIte Sanh TAOR.(*)(l37)

(*) Marine control of air support within the KIte Sanh TAOR

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This mammoth air u.iibrella, called Operation NIAGARA, lastedfrom 22 January until 31 March and was truly an Allied effort.At one time or another, the Khe Sanh DASC utilized the assetsof all services: 1st MAW, Seventh Air Force, Strategic AirCommand, U. S. Navy Task Force 77, Vietnamese Air Force, andvarious U. S. Army aviation companies. The majority of thesorties, however, were flown by U. S. Marine, Navy, and Air Forcecrews. Their mission was to "destroy enemy forces in the SCOTLAND...TAOR, interdict enemy supply lines and base areas,...and pro-vide maximum tactical...air support to friendly forces." Gener-

ally, the type of strike fell into one of three categories:c1ose air support, B-52 Arc Light strikes, or radar-controlledbombing. (*)(138)

Close air support missions were utilized against pinpointtargets .in proximity of friendly troops. Along with radar-controlled bombing, this type of air strike was the most respon-sive to the needs of the ground commanders and the most accurate;the attack pilots, however, required reasonably good weather tobe able to hit their targets. There were usually fighter/bombersoverhead at Khe Sanh around the clock; if not,they could bequickly scrambled from hot pads or diverted from other missions.When the pilots arrived on station, they checked in with theDASC and were handed off to a Marine or Air Force Tactical AirController (Airborne) who personally directed the strike. There

resulted from negotiations .betwen CG, III MAF and the SeventhAir Force. General Cushman was delegated authority for ColonelLownds to control, through his FSCC, all supporting fire, in-cluding air strikes within a circle which encompassed the rangeof the regiment's 155mm howitzers, D'uing the period 22 January-13 February, operational difficulties caused ComUSMACV to giveCommander, Seventh Air Force full responsibility for the overallNIAGARA air effort through the ABCCC.

(*) Close air support in Vietnam includes all air attacksthat are coordinated with the supported force. Radar-controlledbombing and B-52 strikes, in this context, can be called closeair support but, for the purposes of this study, the three abovementioned categories will be considered separately. Althoughthe delivery method is technically not a criteria, close airsupport in this text will refer to those missions where fixed-wing pilots, under the direction of an airborne or ground con-troller, visually acquire and attack a target in proximity tofriendly forces.

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were seven TAC(A)s assigned to the 26th Marines; the Air Forcepersonnel were members of the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadronand the Marines were from Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron36 and Marine Observation Squadron 6. At least five of thesepilots, flying Ol-E Birddogs or UH-lE gunships, remained overthe battlefield during the day and maintained direct commu.:iica-tions with both the attack aircraft and the troops on the ground.In this manner, the TAC(A)s could rapidly employ the jetswherever they were needed the most and the close supervisionreduced the chance of accidentally bombing friendly forces.

During the day, the air around Khe Sarih was filled withthe high-pitched shriek of jet engines: Marine, Navy, and AirForce F-4 Phantoms; Marine and Navy A-6 Intruders, A-4 Skyhawks,and F-8 Crusaders; Air Force F-l05 Thunderchiefs and F-100 SuperSabers. In addition to the jets, the South Vietnamese prop-driven A-i Skyraider, a rugged attack aircraft of Korean Warvintage, was in evidence. At times, the sky overhead resembled

a giant beehive. When a flight arrived on station, the Khe SanhDASC normally directed it into a holding pattern until a TAC(A)or a Forward Air Controller on the ground was free to handlethe strike. These patterns sometimes extended up to 35,000 feetwith scores of planes gradually augering their way downward aseach preceding flight unloaded its ordnance and scooted for home.

When a TAC(A) picked out a lucrative target or was assignedone by the FSCC, he cleared the strike aircraft into his area.The pilots then broke up whatever formation they were in, slippedinto trail, and snaked their way through holes in the overcast- -

all the while keeping a sharp eye out for helicopters. Belowthe clouds, the TAC(A)s and attack pilots often had difficultyfinding each other because of the ever present haze and dust.Even on a clear day, the camouflaged Birddogs and Hueys werehard to spot because they blended in so nicely with the sur-rounding landscape. To expedite the link-up, the jet pilotsfrequently used Automatic Direction Finders to get a fix on theTAC(A)s radio transmissions. All the while, the airborne spotterwas passing on pertinent information such as target description,elevation, run-in heading, direction of pull-off, number ofpasses, direction and distance of nearest friendly troops, andwhether ground fire was expected.

When the controller and his flight made visual contact,the real work began. The TAC(A) made a marking run during whichhe either fired a smoke rocket or pitched out a colored smokegrenade on the position he wanted hit. Once the attack pilots

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0'I,

Marine and Air Force TAC(A)s controlled strike aircraftfrom light observation aircraft called Birddogs. (USMCPhoto A40204B)

UH-lE Gunships of Marine Observation Squadron-6 were alsoused to direct close air support missions. (USMC PhotoA4 21451)

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r

—A

2

had the smoke, the TAC(A), and the nearest friendlies in sight,they rolled in on the assigned heading and made dummy passesuntil the controller was satisfied that the jets were lined upon the right target. He then cleared them in for hot passes.While the jets streaked in, the controller monitored his VHFtactical net to the ground troops and gave short correctionsto the attack pilots over his UFIF radio. An example of anaverage commentary follows:

TAC(A): Number One, from my smoke go six o'clockat 100 meters....PILOT: Roger, Ones in hot... TAC(A):I have you in sight, you're cleared to fire....TAC(A):PILOT: Ones off target...Switches Safe....TAC(A):Number Two, from One's hits come three o'clock at 50meters...PILOT: Roger, in hot....etc., etc.

The aircraft continued their race track pattern until allordnance was expended at which time the leader announced thathis flight was pulling off "high and dry."(*)

The TAC(A) would then swoop low over the smoke-shroudedtarget and attempt to record the results of the strike. ThisBattle Damage Assessment (BDA) was relayed to the departingpilots for their intelligence debriefing back at homeplate. Anexample of one such transmission would be:

Your BDA follows: 5 KBA (killed by air); two bunkers,1 automatic weapon, and 50 meters of trenchline destroyed;one secondary explosion. You have been flying in supportof the 26th Marines; your controller has been SOUTHERNOSCAR. Good shooting and good afternoon, gentlemen.

While the strike pilots checked out with the Khe Sanh DASC andheaded for home, the TAC(A) looked for another target and waitedfor another flight.(139)

One of the most unusual incidents involving the use ofstrike aircraft occurred near Hill 88lS and the key figure inthe episode was a Marine from American Sarnoa--Lance CorporalMolimao Niuatoa. The corporal was a bull of a man, who becauseof his origin and wedge-shape physiçue was nicknamed "PineappleChunk." (A second American Samoan in the company of considerably

(*) High and dry meant that all ordnance had been expended.Another frequently used term was "ammo minus."

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smaller stature was dubbed "Pineapple Tidbit.") But it wasnot the muscles which distinguished Niuatoa, it was his eyes;the man had absolutely phenomenal vision. During his recruittraining, this gift had enabled him to post a score of 241 outof a possible 250 on the rifle range. Besides his vision, thecorporal had the patience of Job and a deep power of concentra-tion--q-ualities which were essential in his job as an artilleryspotter.

One day, Corporal Niuatoa, using a pair of 20-power navalbinoculars, was scanning in the direction of 305 when he pickedup the muzzle flash of an enemy artillery piece; he then sawthe gunners hurriedly cover the weapon with a screen. As theround sputtered overhead on its way to Khe Sanh, the corporalnoted the position and reported his discovery to the companycommander. Referring to a map, Captain Dabney could not getanything other than a general idea of the location because thesite was from 12,000 to 13,000 meters away and the terrain inthat area was so mountainous that he could not pinpoint theexact contour line. Not so Corporal Niuatoa, he could seeexactly where the gun was and kept his eyes glued to the bin-oculars. Normally, he would have adjusted on the target withmarking rounds but the site was beyond the range of friendlyartillery. The only way the gun could be taken out was withaircraft.

While Pineapple Chunk maintained his reference point, anOl-E Birddog aircraft arrived on the scene, and was directed tothe general area of the artillery position. On the heels ofthe spotter craft came several flights of Marine A-4 Skyhawksarmed with 500-pound bombs. Although the TAC(A) didn't knowexactly where the target was, he rolled in and cranked off asmoke rocket. The puff from the 2.75-inch rocket wasn't visibleto the Marines on 88lS but the billowing clouds left by the500-pound bombs of the first A-4 were. Using standard artilleryterminology, Corporal Niuatoa adjusted: "Left 2,000, add 1,000."The corrections were passed to the TAC(A) who fired anotherrocket, on which an A-4 pilot placed another string of bombs.Gradually, the bracket was closed until a Skyhawk in the fourthflight scored a direct hit and the gun position erupted in aseries of secondary explosions.(l40)

The NVA troops, however, were not always on the receivingend; they frequently dished it out. In addition to numeroushelicopters shot down around the combat base, several of thespeedier jets were also knocked out of the sky. During one

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\

Marine F-4B Phantom delivers Snakeye bombs on enemytrenches. Large tail fins retard the descent of thebombs. (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)

Corporal Robert J. Arrotta (center), controlled over 200airstrikes from Hill 881S. (Photo courtesy Major WilliamH. Dabney)

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a

close air support mission, an A-4 flown by Major William E.

Loftus of Marine Attack Squadron 311 received heavy battle

damage and the pilot realized that he could not make it to

the coast. Not wanting to end up in "Indian Country," he

nursed his crippled Skyhawk toward Khe Sanh and ejected right

over the base. As the smoking A-4 knifed into the lush junglegrowth and erupted in a brilliant orange fireball, Major Loftus

floated down and landed in an outer ring of barbed wire justoutside the Company B, 1/26 perimeter. Lieutenant Dillon, the

2d Platoon commander, took several men out and helped extricatethe major who had become hopelessly entangled in his parachute

shroud lines and the barbed wire. After being freed, Major

Loftus grinned and told the lieutenant: "If you weren't so

damn ugly, I'd kiss you." After a quick medical check-up, themajor climbed aboard a helicopter and returned to his squadronat Chu Lai for another plane and another day.(l41)

One of the closest escapes, however, occurred to the south-west of the base. In late January, Lieutenant Colonel Harry T.Hagaman, Commanding Officer of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron323, and his Radar Intercept Officer, Captain Dennis F. Brandon,were leading a flight of F-4B Phantoms against what the TAC(A)

described as a "suspected" antiaircraft position. The enemygunners confirmed their presence during the first pass. As

Lieutenant Colonel Hagaman's F-4B, armed with napalm and 250-pound Snakeyes, skimmed low over the treetops, the North Viet-namese cut loose and laced the belly of his plane with a stitchof 50 caliber shells. The aircraft shuddered under the impactand burst into flames. Captain Brandon, a backseat veteranwith over 300 combat missions, knew instantly when he heard theseries of ominous "thuds" that the Phantom had been mortallywounded; he quickly pulled his face curtain and ejected. Lieu-tenant Colonel Hagaman stayed with the bucking Phantom momentarilyin a vain effort to stabilize the aircraft by using his rudders.The delay almost cost the pilot his life because the F-4B beganto tumble end-over-end barely 100 feet above the ground. Sud-

denly the world outside became a spinning blur of blue and green.The second time that he saw green- - indicating that the aircraftwas inverted- -Lieutenant Colonel Hagaman started to pull hisalternate ejection handle which was located between his knees.In the second that it took the escape mechanism to function,the Phantom flipped upright and the ejection cartridges blastedthe pilot from the flaming cockpit. Seconds later, the planecartwheeled into the ground and exploded. The pilot was so lowwhen he "punched out" that the chute had scarcely deployed whenhis feet touched the ground. Both crewmen hid in the tall

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elephant grass within earshot of the North Vietnamese who weresearching for them. Within minutes, rescue helicopters lumberedon the scene and, while the downed crew's wingman made dummypasses to discourage the enemy soldiers, the choppers darted inand plucked the shaken, but otherwise uninjured, Marines tosafety. (*) (142)

If there was anything that could top that performance, itwas the spectacular air shows provided daily by B-52 Strato-fortresses of the 4l33d Provisional Heavy Bombardment Wing,based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam,and the 4258th StrategicBombardment Wing in Thailand0 The B-52 pilots did not counton finesse as much as they did on sheer power because eachStratofortress carried a 27-ton payload of 108 mixed 500- and750-pound bombs. Since these giants had the means to virtuallymove mountains, the Arc Light strikes were used on area targetssuch as troop concentrations, marshalling points, supply depots,and bunker sites. The result of the enemy build-up around thebase was an enormous number of targets located in dispersed butcommon areas and such complexes were ideal for heavy bombers.These targets were programmed into computers aboard the air-craft and the strikes were conducted from altitudes above 30,000feet. To the bomber crews, it was an impersonal type of warfarebecause, from above the overcast, they rarely even saw theirbombs explode. The bombs did not have to be seen to be felt.(143)

When several flights of B-52s worked over a target, the re-sults were awesome. The exploding bombs churned up strips ofthe terrain several thousand meters long and the ground formiles around literally shook from the blasts. Many enemy casual-ties were sustained from the concussion alone. One entry froma captured North Vietnamese diary read: "18 February: Theheavy bombing of the jets and B-52 explosions are so strongthat our lungs hurt." In some instances, NVA soldiers werefound after an Arc Light strike wandering around in a daze withblood streaming from their noses and mouths.(**) Often the

(*) Both crews suffered sore backs from the ejection but noother injury. Lieutenant Colonel Hagaman became the third COin a row from VMFA-323 to leave an F-4B via the ejection route.Captain Brandon returned to action and eventually compiled 400combat missions- -a first for Marine Radar Intercept Officers.

(**) To catch stunned survivors above ground, the 1/13 bat-teries frequently put massed artillery fire into the target area10 to 15 minutes after the bombers departed.

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internal hemorrhaging induced by the concussion was so severe

that it resulted in death. Qiite understandably, such missions

could not be unleashed too close to the Marines.(144)

In the early stages of the conflict, Arc Light strikeswere not authorized within a prescribed distance of friendly

lines. The same rule had applied during the heavy fighting atCon Thien the year before and the NVA had taken advantage ofthe buffer zone by moving troops and supplies in as close tothe Marine base as possible to avoid the bomber raids. They

tried the same thing at Khe Sanh. When American airborne ob-servers noted enemy bunker complexes cropping up near the KSCB,the no-bomb line was moved in to about half of the originaldistance. At first, the regimental commander was afraid thatthe resulting concussion would collapse his own bunkers andtrenches; as it turned out, the enemy fortifications were theonly ones which suffered. The first few B-52 raids inside theold line touched off scores of secondary explosions and un-doubtedly snapped the North Vietnamese out of their sense ofsecurity. The closer strikes also served as a morale boosterfor the defenders who flocked from their bunkers to watch, whatthe Marines called, "Number One on the hit parade."(l45)

According to the regimental Target Intelligence Officer(Tb), Captain Mirza N. Baig, the B-52 was an accurate weaponssystem which the FSCC employed around Khe Sanh much the sameas the other supporting arms. About 95 percent of the Arc Lightmissions were targeted at the 26th Marines headquarters.(*)Reqiiests were submitted to the 3d Marine Division Air Officer15 hours prior to the drop at a rate of 8 strikes every 24 hours0Up to three hours before the strike, the HO, upon direction,could divert the bombers to new unscheduled targets, bu afterthat the Stratofortresses were restricted to their originaltarget. The response time was later trimmed even more by usingcells of three B-52s which left Guam and Thailand every threehours; this put the bombers over Khe Sanh every hour and a half.In spite of this streamlining, the B-52s were never as responsive

(*) General Westmoreland gave his constant personal attentionto the targeting of these strikes and while most of the targetswere generated by the 26th Marines Headquarters, GeneralWestmoreland personally approved the requests. Based on intel-ligence he also directed or diverted B-52 raids from Saigon.TD keep right on top of this aspect of the battle, the generalslept at night in his Combat Operations Center during the siege.

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or flexible as the droves of fighter/bombers which were over-head constantly. Nevertheless, the devastating power andpsychological effect produced by the Stratofortresses, coupledwith the surprise factor, made them an extremely valuableadjunct. (*) ( 146)

The type of strike which most impressed the regimentalcommander, however, was the ground-controlled radar bombing.Although these raids lacked the punch of an Arc Light strike,they were as accurate and flexible as dive-bombing attacks andcould be conducted in the worst weather. In fact, the techniquewas designed especially to cope with the inherent bad weatherwhich accompanied the monsoons in Southeast Asia when attackaircraft could not get below an overcast to hit the target.

The controlling agency at Khe Sanh for these strikes wasAir Support Radar Team - Bravo (ASRT-B), Marine Air Suppo.tSquadron 3 which had moved from Chu L.ai on 16 January. Theground controllers operated from a heavily reinforced van whichhoused their sensistive computer equipment and used the TPQ-lOradar to guide aircraft to their target; thus, the missionswere called TPQs.(**)(147) The radar emitted a pencil-shapedbeam which detected and locked on to the aircraft. Using tar-git coordinates provided by the FSCC, the controller programr'iedthe enemy position, ballistic characteristics of the bombs,current winds, and other pertinent data into a computer whichwas connected to the radar. The computer also received inputsfrom the radar and, in turn, provided corrections in airspeed,altitiicle, and heading which the operator passed on to the pilot.The controller closely monitored his set and, at a predeterminedrelease point, called a "Mark" to the pilot who "pickled" hisbombs.(***) In specially-equipped aircraft, such as the A-4

(*) The 26th Marines Command Chronology does not list sortiesbut strikes which were made up of several aircraft and 430strikes were recorded.

(**) The van, as well as crew living quarters, was emplacedunderground and was heavily sandbagged. The sturdiness of thebunker was an important factor becauss of the heavy shelling.One enemy round scored a direct hit on top of the bunker withno damage to the fragile equipment. The computer van remainedoperational throughout the siege.

(***) The term "pickled" is slang used by pilots which meansto drop their ordnance.

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Skyhawk and the A-6 Intruder, the bombs could be released auto-matically from the ground. On ground controller could handlea single plane, a section (two planes), oc a division (fourplanes) on the same pass as long as the pilots flew in a tightformation and the radar did not break lock. One of the con-trollers' favorite aircraft was the A-6 because it packed sucha heavy wallop; a single Intruder usually carried 28 500-pounders.Any fighter/bomber, however, could be used as long as it carriedlow-drag ordnance and the pilot could make a smooth run.(148)

Even though most TPQs were conducted from around 14,000feet, the accuracy of ASRT-B was phenomenal. When new personnelarrived at Khe Sanh, they were given several check drops on anearby hill to test their proficiency before the newcomers wereallowed to conduct strikes near friendly troops. The firstdrop was always within 40 meters of the target and, after theyadjusted there was virtually no error. Calibration drops werealso conducted twice weekly to ensure the accuracy of theequipment. One member of the FSCC stated that, if he were ina foxhole and under attack, he would have no qualms about callingan ASRT-B controlled TPQ within 35 meters of his position. Therule of thumb which the FSCC generally applied when determininga safe distance for normal operations, hOwever, was one meterfrom the friendlies for every poufld of conventional ordnancebeing delivered. Tnus, for TPQs, a 250-pound bomb would notnormally be dropped within 250 meters of Allied troops, a 500-pounder within 500 meters, and so on. This criteria was notestablished because the men on the ground lacked confidence inthe system but because of the large fragmentation pattern pro-duced by the bombs. Besides, anything inside the prescribedradius could be handled just as effectively by artillery,mortars, and direct fire weapons. In an emergency, the regi-mental commander would have undoubtedly lifted the restriction.Concerning the quality of support he received from ASRT-B,Colonel Lownds said, "Anything but the highsst praise would notbe enough."(149)

In addition to its accuracy, the TPQ system was extremelyflexible. A strike could be programmed and executed within 10or 12 minutes utilizing any available aircraft. Most of themissions were at night when it was inefficient and dangerousto conduct dive-bombing strikes. As a matter of routine, twoMarine and three Air Force flights were scheduled every hourunless an emergency developed. On 18 February, ASRT-B set anew squadron record for a single 24-hour period by controllingaircraft which delivered 486 tOns of ordnance on 105 separate

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S.S.

S0Lfl

A-6 Intruder, under TPQ control, B-52 Stratofortresses flew strikesprovides precision bombing around daily in support of the 26thKhe'Sanh despite poor weather. Marines. (Photo courtesy USAF)(USMC Photo A422000)

a —

targets. After that, the record was approached frequently but

never broken. During the siege, ASRT-B controlled 4,989 TPQs

in support of the 26th Marines.(l50)

Beginning on 20 February, ASRT-B also assisted withsupply drops whenever the Khe Sanh MATCh was inoperable. Nor-mally, the controllers could have guided the transport pilotsto an exact release point but, at Khe Sanh, the C-130s had tofly directly over the station and the TPQ-10 would break lock.(*)(151) Therefore, the ASRT personnel used the same techniqueas the MATCU controllers and called a "Mark" when the Herculeswas over the eastern threshold and the pilots completed theruns with Doppler navigation and stop watches. The only problemwas that, when the ASRT conducted supply drops, it was drawnaway from the primary mission of handling TPQs. (152)

While air support was vital to the defense of the base,Colonel Lownds felt that his artillery played an equally im-portant role. When the fighting first broke out, the colonelsurmised that the side which managed to keep its artillery in-tact would win the battle. The Marine artillery emerged almostunscathed. Many incoming rounds landed within the battery po-sitions, however, very few actually hit the gun pits and through-out the operation only three artillery pieces at the base weredestroyed; one was a 155mm howitzer parked alongside the loadingramp awaiting airlift to Dong Ha.(**) Generally the pieces,were tucked away inside heavily sandbagged revetments and, whilethe crews were often showered with fragments, it would havetaken a direct hit, squarely on top of theweapon, to knock outa howitzer. Fortunately for the Marine gunners, the North Viet-namese scored only one such a hit which led the regimentalcommander to the conclusion: "Either they were amazin1y in-accurate or we were amazingly lucky."(l53)

The enemy's failure to silence Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly'sbatteries was a big point in favor of the Marines. WhileAmerican news reporters gave wide coverage to the number ofshells falling on the base, they frequently neglected to mentionthat 1/13 answered each enemy round with 10 of its own. Throughout

(*) When a TPQ-lO broke lock, the radar beam strayed fromthe aircraft and inputs to the computer were interrupted. Theoperator also lost visual contact on the radar screen.

(**) One 105mm howitzer on 88lS was also destroyed.

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the battle, 1/13 cranked out 158,891 mixed rounds in directsupport of the 26th Marines. The methods employed by the FSCCwere reminiscent of those used in World War I. Time On Target(TOT) by massed batteries, Harassment and Interdiction (H&I)by battery volley instead of a single piece, artillery boxes,rolling barrages, and battery zones were a few techniquesadopted by the FSCC which more than lived up to its motto:"Be Generous."(*)

Since the enemy did most of his manuevering under the coverof darkness, that was when the Marine and Army batteries werethe most active. Captain Baig, who wore one hat- -Target Intel-ligence Officer- -in the S-2 section and another- -Target Infor-mation Officer--in the FSCC later described a good night's work:

An average night's pattern of pre-planned fires wasas follows: Combined TOTs from 9 batteries (4-6); separatebattalion TOTs (Army 4-6, Marine 10-15); battery multiplevolley individual missions (40-50); battery H&Is (20-30).Normal 1 gun, 1 round H&Is were not used; this type of firewas of little value. Marine and Army artillery were em-ployed in target areas and at ranges to reduce to a minimumcheck fires caused by the arrival of TPQ and reconnaissanceaircraft. Later, as we learned finesse, air was given thetargets south of the base and west of the maximum rangeof the 175mm guns; 1/13 was given any targets whose rangerequired a maximum ordinate of less than 14,000 feet(altitude of TPQ rui); and the 175mm guns were assignedtargets to the north, northwest, and east of the base.Such were the pre-planned fires.(l55)

In addition to volume, reaction time was a key factor. Un-•

less friendly aircraft in the target area necessitated a checkfire, artillery response was immediate- -no matter what theweather. To test the proficiency of the Fire Direction Centerand the gun crews, Colon2l Lownds periodically walked into the

(*) Not every artillery round that left Khe Sanh was high ex-plosive. During March, Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's battalionhad accumulated more ammunition than it could safely store. Sincethe ammo would not fit in the berms and presented a hazard aboveground, the decision was made to fire it all. This excess in-cluded some 90-odd rounds of green smoke. On 17 March- -St.Patrick's Day--the Marines fired all the green smoke rounds onknown enemy positions to honor the patron saint of the FightingIr i sh.

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tk IT' fr;ji;-

A

-J

- I_I

• I

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A 105mm howitzer of 1/13 lashes out at NVA troops sur-rounding Khe Sanh. The artillery battalion was in directsupport of the 26th Marines. (USMC Photo A190832)

The 175mm guns of the 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery, USAwere in general support of the Khe Sanh garrison. This

gun was located at Camp J. J. Carroll. (USMC Photo

Al 90709)

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FSCC bunker, pointed to a spot on the huge map which adornedthe wall and directed Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly to hit it.The coordinates were quickly sent to the FOC where they wereeither fed into the FADAC computer or worked out manually andthe firing data was then passed on to the gun crew. After ad-justing the tube, the gunners slammed a round home and sent iton its way. The entire process usually took less than /40 seconds,This "instant artillery" constantly hampered enemy movement with-in the TAOR and helped break up numerous attacks.(156)

The defensive fire plan adopted by the FSCC was separatefrom and not to be confused with the final protective firesemployed by the defenders who manned the perimeter. The artil-lery batteries were used to prevent the enemy assault forcesfrom reaching the wire and to cut off the lead elements fromreinforcements. The fact that the North Vietnamese usuallyattacked with their battalions in column made it somewhat easierfor the FSCC to isolate the assault elements from the reserves.When the enemy launched his attack, the FSCC placed a threesided artillery box around the lead battalion; three batteriesof 1/13 executed this mission. The fourth battery then closedthe remaining side, which faced the friendly positions, with abarrage that rolled from one end of the box to the other- -muchlike a piston within its cylinder. The NVA force in the boxcould not escape and could not avoid the rolling barrage. Those

North Vietnamese who spilled out of the open end of the box weresubjected to the final protective fires of the Marines alongthe perimeter.

At the same time 1/13 worked over the assault force, the

FSCC put a secondary box into effect for the benefit of the

back-up units. The Army 175mm batteries were responsible fortwo sides which were about 500 meters outside the primary box.

On order, the gunners rolled their barrages in toward the sides

of the primary box and back out again. The third side wassealed by continuous flights of aircraft under the control of

the TPQ-1O radar. Whenever B-52s could be diverted in time,Arc Light strikes were used to saturate the approach routes to

the battle area.(157)

Another key factor in the defense of Khe Sanh was the

manner in which Lieutenant Colonel Herinelly's FSCC coordinated

their air effort with the artillery so that the two components

were complimentary. One prime example was the Mini-Arc Light

which was devised by the Assistant Fire Support Coordinator,

Captain Kenneth 0. W. Steen and the TIO, Captain Baig. As the

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name implies, this techniqiie was used against an area targetthe same as a B-52 strike, only the former could be organizedand employed much qiiicker. When intelligence reports indicatedthat NVA units were in a certain region, the FSCC plotted a500 by 1,000-meter block in the center of the suspected areaor across a likely route of march0 Two A-6 Intruders, eacharmed with 28 500-pound bombs, were called on station for aTPQ and the batteries at Khe Sanh, Camp Carroll, and the Rockpilewere alerted for a fire mission0 Thirty seconds before the twoA6s dropped, the 175mm batteries, concentrating their fire onone half of the block, salvoed the first of approximately 60

rounds. At the same time the A6s rippled their load down themiddle of the block, the 1/13 batteries opened up on the secondhalf with around 200 155mm, l05mm, and 4 2-inch rounds. Tne

trajectory and flight time of all ordnance were computed so thatthe bombs and initial artillery shells hit at the same instant.The saturation of the target area was such that any enemysoldiers caught in the zone during the bombardment simplyceased to exist.(158)

During the second week in February, a special Mini-ArcLight was directed against a major NVA headquarters. Two

members of the 26th Marines S-.2, Majors Robert B. Coolidge andJerry E. Hudson, learned from their various sources that aforce-wide meeting of NVA commanders and their staffs wouldoccur in an abandoned schoolhouse near the Laotian bor4er. Abeefed-up Mini was prepared to welcome the delegates. For this

strike, the target block was reduced to 500 by 300 meters aroundthe schoolhouse which would take in, as one of the plannersstated, "the hangers-on and other idlers who usually congregatearound large staffs." Twenty minutes after the meeting wasscheduled to start, the trap was sprung. Two Marine A-6 In-truers and four F-4B Phantoms unloaded 152 500-pound bombs intothe block in concert with the opening volleys of eight artillerybatteries (total of 350 artillery rounds).(159) The target wasobliterated, but whether or not this unusual ambush netted anyNVA brass-hats was never ascertained.

Tne Micro-Arc Light was executed in the same manner as theMini except smaller amounts of ordnance were u3ed and the blockwas cut down to 500 by 500 meters, Arty aircraft on stationwould suffice, preferably ones armed with 12 to 16 500-pounders.Artillery fire was reduced to 30 rounds from the 175mm guns and100 mixed rounds from Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's battalion.The advantage of the Micro was that it could be put into effectwithin 10 minutes while it took roughly 45 minutes to plan and

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xecute the Mini. On an average night, three to four Minisand six to eight Micros were executed, usually to the southand southeast of the base; both were extremely effective.(160)

The massive firepower supporting the Marines would havebeen almost useless had they not known where and when to em-ploy it. The 26th Marines intelligence section was responsi-ble for this facet of the operation and these people had morethan a passing knowledge of the enemys past strategy. At

Dien Bien Phu and Con Thien, the Communists had followed afairly predictable pattern- -not unlike the classic siege of the18th Century. There were three distinct phases involved inthis type of campaign: arrival on the sene and encirclementof the garrison, construction of siege works and support fa-cilities, T-ing the sapheads and final assault. After investingthe base, the North Vietnamese first established numerous for-ward logistic bases within a few thousand meters of the base.Under the cover of darkness, the enemy soldiers dug a seriesof shallow trenches, interlaced with supply bunkers, leadingfrom these points toward the American positions. The firsttrenches began to appear at Khe Sanh around 23 February and theheaviest concentration was to the south and southeast. Once

in close, the main trenches branched off into ones whichparalleled the Ilarines lines; these secondary trenches, whichfrom the air looked like long fingers reaching greedily towardthe base, were the ones from which the NVA assault troops in-

tended to attack.(l61)

At first, the defenders tried to prevent the enemy frommoving in too close to the base. The routes into the valleywere saturated; artillery H&I fire and frequent air strikeswere employed but such tactics only tended to slow down theenemy and force him to bypass certain routes- - they did not stop

him. Constant, massed artillery would have effectively blocked

infiltration but that alternative was, from a logistics stand-

point, impossible. The S2 personnel recommended that the best

way to counter the enemy was to allow the North Vietnamese to

close and pursue their siege tactics and then, to borrow a

phrase used by General "Chesty" Puller (then a colonel) on 28

November 1950 when his regiment was surrounded near the Chosin

Reservoir in Korea, "that simplifies our problem of finding

these people and killing them."(l62)

The S-2 section utilized a multitude of sources to develop

an accurate picture of the enemy's activity around the base.

While much of this information was self-generated, the 26th

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Marines received substantial intelligence support from the MACV,III MAF, and 3d Marine Division Headquarters. Ground and aerialobservers, photo reconnaissance, infrared imagery, target listsof higher headquarters, crater analysis, shell/flash reports,and agent reports were all tools of the intelligence communityat }e Sanh. By comparing this information with the knowledgeof enemy doctrine as applied in past situations, the S-2 staffwas able to accurately estimate the intentions of the NVA on a

day-to-day basis.

One good example of how this intelligence produced hardresults occurred in late February. From their various inputs,the two men who were responsible for the earlier attack on theNVA staff conference, Majors Coolidge and Hudson, pinpointedthe exact location of 12 artillery positions and 2 major axrimuni-don depots. These targets were concentrated in two main areasto the south of the base. Air strikes were called in on theenemy positions and, after the planes departed, the whole areaerupted in secondary explosions which lasted for the next 40minutes. Two weeks later, these officers repeated a similarperformance in another area.(163)

The activities of the intelligence community at Khe Sanhand higher headquarters were vital to the conduct of the battle.Almost every major attack against the 26th Marines was pickedup well in advance by the S-2 section. Whenever enemyactivity was detected, the information was passed to the FSCCand this was the signal for Colonel Lownds to put his defensivefire plan into effect. The base was placed on Red Alert, theprimary and secondary boxes fired, and saturation air strikeswere employed. This method of cutting off the attack force bymassed fires, once the S-2 section had provided a warning,proved to be a decisive factor in thwarting the major enemythrusts which came late in February.(164)

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PART VII

THE TURNING POINT

While the supporting arms continued to whittle away atthe enemy's strength, the defensive posture of the 26th Marinesgrew more formidable with each passing day. By the end ofFebruary, the Americans and South Vietnamese had erected some510 bunkers, dug miles of trenchline, and laid hundreds ofminefields and trip flares. Each sector was guarded by a mazeof double-apron, tanglefoot, and concertina barbed wire obsta-cles.(*) The Marines also had sophisticated anti-infiltrationequipment such as the Night Observation Device, the PPS-6ground-surveillance radar, and the Starlight Scope; all ofwhich could detect infiltrators along the wire during night-time and other periods of reduced visibility.(165) Whereverthese apparatus were employed, the number of enemy killed alongthe perimeters increased and the number of probes decreased.

In addition to the standard issue, themen improvisedmany of their own jerry-rigged gadgets. Drawing from hischildhood experiences on the farm, Colonel Lownds devised atype of electric fence which was employed along some of thecompany fronts in the main perimeter. The plan was simple;the Marines figured out which strands of barbed wire the enemywould more than likely cut to penetrate those obstacles andthey attached trip wire in a circuit. Flashlight batterieswere the power source and the network of wires tied into acentral switchboard located in each company CP. When a NorthVietnamese soldier clipped the barbed wire, he short-circuitedthe system and one of the warning lights on at the switchboardwent out. A few grenades in the right place or a broadsidefrom a Claymore mine and the snooper usually became anothergrim statistic.

On the hill outposts, the fasse was used extensively.The Marines dug holes along the slopes which faced the enemy

(*) Tanglefoot, as the name implies, is a barbed wire entangle-ment that is stretched low to the ground and is usually usedbetween larger barriers. Concertina comes in rolls which arelaid side by side or on top of each other. Double-apron obstaclesare simply barbed wire fences in depth.

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and embedded barrels or cans of mixed gasoline and diesel fuel.The detonator for this volatile concoction was usually agrenade, a blasting cap, or a pound of C-4 plastic explosivetaped to the container. The triggering device was a wireleading back up the hill to the Marine positions. Whenattacked, the defender simply jerked the wire and detonatedthe lethal munitions.(166)

The Scout Sniper Platoon attached to the 26th Marinesprovided another kind of deterrent. At least one team of thesehand-picked, specially-trained sharpshooters was assigned toeach company. Using commercial, bolt-action rifles with high-powered scopes, the snipers preyed on individual NVA soldierswho carelessly exposed themselves around the fringes of theperimeter. Patience was a must in this business and the marks-men often waited for days until their quarry appeared. Whenthe snipers finally got a chance to practice their deadly art,the results were almost unbelievable. As though they werefiring for record on a rifle range, they calculated the wind,adjusted their slings, took steady positions, and slowly squeezedoff their shots. Many North Vietnamese who felt safe beyond1,000 meters of the Marine positions never received a chance toponder their mistake. The psychological impact was also afactor. One can imagine the eerie feeling experienced by anNVA soldier who had just seen a comrade "zappedt' and neverheard the report of the rifle that did the trick.(167)

By no stretch of the imagination did the 26th Marines havea monopoly on good snipers. The NVA marksmen, armed with riflesand scopes which were comparable to those of their Americancounterparts, lurked around the edges of the perimeters- -especially the hill outposts- -and waited for a target. Althoughnone of this deadly business could be categorized as humorous,there was one sniper incident on Hill 88lS which could not helpbut evoke a chuckle. The men of Company I had been cursed withthe presence of a particularly accurate sniper who was locatedin the brush to the so'uth of their perimeter. The riflemanscored frequently and had wounded 10 Marines in the period ofabout a week, all of whom were medevaced. In addition to beinga hazard, the sniper was also a general nuisance. A man movingfrom one place to another within the perimeter was always hurriedon his way by slugs which kicked up dirt at his heels or buzzedpast his head like angry hornets. Thus, the Marines were con-stantly waiting for the culprit to expose himself and one daya glint off the telescopic sight proved to be his undoing. TheMarines marked his position and, on Captain Dabney's order,

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Sniper attached to Company E, 2/26 Men of 1/26 lay wire along Blueon Hill 861A waits for a target. Sector. Dong Tn Mountain is in the(Photo courtesy David D. Duncan) background. (Photo courtesy David D.

Duncan)

S'sfr.

lugged a 106mm recoilless rifle from the northern side of thehill, sighted in, and blew the sniper away- -tree and all. The

victory was short lived because his successor proved equallyas effective. More Marines were hit. The second riflemanlasted about as long as the first before he suffered the samefate at the hands of the 106mm gunners.

His replacement, however, was a complete wash-out. Ex-

pending between 20 and 30 rounds a day, the misfit flailedaway for over a week without hitting anyone. In the process,he too gave himself away. After the Marines had manhandled the106 into position for the third time, and were sighting in,one private, after deep thought, approached the company com-mander with a proposition: "Skipper, if we get him, they'lljust replace him with someone who might be able to shoot. Hehasn't hit anyone so why not leave him there until he does."It was so ordered. The sniper's ineptitude had saved his lifeand he blasted away for the rest of the battle and nevertouched a soill.(*)(l68)

The incident with the snipers pointed out the advantageof having 106mm recoilless rifles on the hills. Unlike theartillery pieces at Khe Sanh, the lO6mms were used in a directfire role and because of their extremely flat trajectory,they could be employed when attack aircraft were in the targetarea. Another feature which endeared these weapons to theMarines was their extraordinary accuracy. The recoilless rifleswere used with great finesse, especially against the well-camouflaged enemy gun positions which ringed the outposts. In

most cases, it required minute adjustments to put a roundsquarely on target and knock out these emplacements. This wasevident in one instance when a 106mm on 881S was used to silencean NVA 12.7mm machine gun which had been spraying Marine heli-copters.

The automatic weapon was situated inside the mouth of asmall tunnel which had been cut deep into the side of a hilllocated north of the Company I, 3/26, perimeter. The tinyaperture, which faced south, restricted the gunner's fields offire but that was no drawback because he only concentrated on

(*) To rub salt into the wound, the Marines devised a redflag- -Maggies Drawers- -like the ones used on rifle ranges tosignal that the shooter had missed the entire target, andwaved it every time the sniper fired.

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the resupply choppers as they hovered over the Marine positions.On the other hand, the small opening prevented the gun frombeing knocked out by anything except a direct hit from thefront. Once the men on 881S had pinpointed the heavily camou-flaged site, they went to work with their 106mm. Out of neces-

pity, their firing routine was erratic; the gunners cranked off

a round, dived for cover when enemy mortars responded, jumpedup, adjusted the weapon, and fired again. While spottersguided them with such unorthodox jargon as "Right a tad," or

"Up a hair," the gunners repeated the process and slowly closed

in on the enemy position. Finally, one glowing round disappearedcompletely into the side of the hill and a split second later

there was a muffled explosion from deep within. Smoke belched

out the mouth of the tunnel and the NVA machine gun was no more.

This performance was repeated several times during the battle

with the same results.(l69)

The three 105mm howitzers on 88lS were also used exten-

sively in the direct fire role and were especially useful

against targets of opportunity. The ever-present fog around

the hill reduced the number of such targets but on one occasion

a momentary break in the weather yielded an extremely lucrative

prize. When the fog suddenly lifted, an alert Company I ma-

chine gunner spotted a 20-man column of North Vietnameseslowly climbing Hill 758 which was due south of 881S. They

were carrying what appeared to be several mortar tubes. The

Marine immediately opened fire and even though the range was

1,200 meters he managed to hit several of the enemy soldiers.

Instead of scattering, the remaining NVA troopers clustered

around their fallen comrades and this proved to be a fatal

error. Tha C/1/13 gunners attached to Company I sprang to the

105mm howitzer on the south side of the hill, quick1y knocked

aside the parapet, and depressed the tube for a downhill shot.

Using a combination of point detonating and VT fuzes which

were set to explode 50 feet above the ground, the gunnersslammed a dozen rounds of direct fire into the midst of the

tightly packed enemy soldiers. By the time the fog closed in

again, there was no sign of life on the opposite slope. The

action was so brief, that the first report received at the

3/26 CP was a laconic message from Captain Dabney that 20 North

Vietnamese had been sighted, engaged, and killed.

There were also innovations inside the compound. Ever

since 21 January, the NVA gunners had concentrated their fire

on the base ammunition dumps. Originally there were two large

caches but the main one was totally destroyed on the opening

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day of the battle. After that, Colonel Lownds decentralizedhis stores in several widely-scattered berms which were large,12-foot-deep trenches, gouged out of the ground by bulldozers.One end of the berm was sloping so that 2 ton trucks could bedriven down a corridor between two flanking stacks of ammunitionwhich lined the sides of the trench. This arrangement greatlyfacilitated loading because the Marines could stand on top ofthe stacks and pass rounds onto the bed of the truck which wasat their level. The driver then backed out of the berm and tookthe ammunition to the distribution points of the various units.The ammunition was not only dispersed, it was also segregatedaccording to type. This way, if a berm of artillery high-explosive shells was hit, fire fighters were not hampered bytear gas or white phosphorous fumes. On three occasions, am-munition stores were hit but the resulting devastation neverreached the proportion of that on the 2lst.(170)

Although the berms were prime targets, the ASRT, MATCU,FDC, 26th Marines communications center, and other units whichdepended on sophisticated and delicate equipment suffered fromthe heavy shelling. Consequently, they all had one commonproblem- -maintenance. The normal difficulties associated withkeeping the various radars, radios, antennae, generators, andcooling components in an "up" status were complicated by theconstant incoming, the. dust, and the limited supply of replace-ment items. The vans and bunkers were heavily sandbagged butanteniae and some communication lines were exposed and fre-quently knocked out by enemy rounds.(*)(171) The speed withwhich the vital installations were returned to operation servedas a tribute to the technicians who maintained the equipmentunder the most adverse conditions imaginable. In one instance,a 122mm rocket exploded a scant seven meters from the ASRT-Bvan and sheared off most of the radio antennae. Thanks toseveral trouble shooters who braved the intense barrage andrepaired the damage, the station was back on the air within 20minutes.(**) Such performances were routine. The ASRT normally

(*) To keep the North Vietnamese from zeroing in on his com-munication bunkers, Colonel Lownds ordered that fake antennaebe placed on every structure at Khe Sanh- - including the f our-

holers0

(**) The ASRT-B radar antennae sustained over 200 hits fromshell fragments but continued to function near maximum efficiencythroughout the siege.

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operated 23 hours a day and shut down oiie hour for maintenance.The MATCU, which was essential for ground-controlled approachesand paradrops, was kept operable 95 percent of the time.(172)

Major John A. Shepherd, Communications Officer of the26th Marines, was responsible for the vast nework which en-abled the ground commanders to keep abreast of the situationand in touch with their units. The major praised the accomplish-ments of his men, stating that they "provided support in winningevery battle, firing every round of artillery, controllingevery air strike, and providing the means to receive everybean and bullet." There were six radio relay teams which keptopen 52 channels between Khe Sanh and the outside world. In

addition, there were five external teletype nets in operation24-hours a day. Radio relay provided voice and teletype linksto agencies at Dong Ha and Da Nang. For classified information,there were two secure voice circuits operating full time. Onenet linked the Combat Operations Center of the 26th Marines tothat of the 3d Marine Division at Dong Ha.. The other, theRegimental Tactical Net, enabled Colonel Lownds to disseminatehot information to his battalion commanders.

To protect it against the artillery, mortar, and rocketattacks, all communication eqi1ipment was either underground orheavily san*agged. Major Shepherd moved his communicationscenter into a shelter which was made from 4 conex boxes, 16feet underground.(*) This nerve center housed the teletypeequipment and switchboards which provided service for 65 on-base subscribers and 40 external radio relay voice circuits.In spite of the protective measures, the antenna and internalwire system sustained damage on a daily basis. Following everybarrage, wiremen tracked down cuts and spliced them and repaireddamaged antennae so that the various nets were back in oper-ation within minutes. The maintenance and repair of the elec-tronic devices used for perimeter security placed an additionalburden on the communicators.(l73)

While trucks and forklifts were not exactly delicate equip-ment, the base motor transport personnel had their share ofproblems. These vehicles were used constantly. During thesummer and fall of 1967, they were used to haul rock fot therepair of the runway. Throughout the siege, the drivers

(*) A conex box is a large metal container primarily used tosea-lift cargo.

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carried ammunition from the berms to the distribution pointsand supplies from the drop zone to the combat base. Many ofthe trucks were in bad shape and mechanics worked around theclock to keep them rolling. The biggest headache was causedby flat tires, of which the constant shelling produced anabundance; the drivers became paste and patch experts of thehighest order. More often than not, these men were caught outin the open when the enemy decided to pound the base. Sincetheir cargo usually contained high explosives, the drivers hadgood reason to be apprehensive. Some simply bailed out of thecabs during the attacks and dived for cover; others, performinga wild imitation of the Grand Prix, raced for revetments.Needless to say, the base speed limit of five miles per hourwas frequently violated.(l74)

When there wasn't any work to do, many Marines createdsome and the threat of enemy tunnels provided a powerful moti-vation. When the word spread that the enemy might try to digunder the base, the tunnel ferrets went to work. Many of thedefenders became fascinated with the prospects of uncovering a"mole" and their antics were near comical. It was not uncommonto see a man crawling around in front of his position, pattingthe ground with the flat side of a shovel,and listening forhollow spots. Others drove metal stakes into the ground andlistened with stethoscopes by the hour for tell-tale signs ofdigging. If they heard something, the next step was to dig alarge hole in front of the enemy so that he would tunnel himselfinto a trap. Some self-appointed water witches walked aroundwith divining rods and waited for the downward tugwhich meantthat they had discovered a subterranean intruder. When thenews media got into the act and publicized the possibility oftunnels, the regimental commander began receiving scores ofletters from around the world with "If I were you" themes.One American planter who lived in Sao Paulo, Brazil, wrote andsuggested that the Marines purchase commercial sensors likethe ones he used to detect bugs which fed on the roots of histrees. Another suggested that the defenders strap hand grenadesonto rats and turn them loose in the tunnels,(l75)

Unknown to the Marines at the time, the enemy never triedto tunnel under the base. The KSCB sat atop a plateau, andthe slopes were wrinkled with deep ravines. Colonel Lowndslater surmised that the enemy would have had to go so deep tokeep from breaking the surface that such excavations were im-practical. The men of Company K, 3/26 did, however, discoverone tunnel leading toward Hill 861 and called in air strikes

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against it; at the base itself, the North Vietnamese limitedtheir digging to trenches.(176)

Unlike the phantom tunnels, the trenches were very realand served as a constant reminder of the enemy's intentions.These networks were quite understandably a source of concernto the defenders who watched with fascination and no smallapprehension as the trenchlines drew closer and closer eachday. Working at night or under the cover of fog, the NorthVietnamese often moved their lines forward as much as 200-300meters at a time. There were several methods used to counterthe trenches with artillery and tactical air strikes being themost prevalent. Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's batteries pro-vided constant fires during the night especially to the eastand southeast where the heaviest enemy siegeworks were con-centrated. The VT-fuzed ammunition with its deadly airburstsno doubt hampered the enemy efforts considerably. During theday, attack aircraft hit the trenches with every type of aerialordnance from 20mm cannon fire to 2,000-pound bombs. At night,TPQs were run to within about 250 meters of the wire while Miniand Micro Arc Lights were targeted from 500 to 1,500 meters.(177)

In addition, the Marines along the perimeters concocted

their own schemes which added to the displeasure of the enemy.

During the day, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson's men registered

on the close-in trenches with their M-79 grenade launchers;these shotgun-like weapons fired a 40mm projectile to a maximum

range of about 375 meters and produced a frag pattern approxi-

mately 5 to 10 meters in diameter. At night when the NorthVietnamese were digging, the Marines periodically lobbed these

rounds into the trenches and disrupted the sappers.(178)

In spite of the harassment, the NVA launched several attacks

against the base from the trenchlines during the last 10 days

in February. At 1245, 21 February, the North Vietnamese fired

350 mortar, rocket, recoilless rifle, and artillery rounds into

the eastern sector and followed up with a company-sized probe

against the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion. The enemy troops, how-

ever, did not attempt to close with the South Vietnamese and,after a distant fire fight, withdrew at about 1500. Although

no body count was ascertained, the Rangers estimated that 1/13

artillery and their own defensive fires had claimed from 20 to

25 of the enemy. Six Marines from 1/26 and 18 Rangers were

wounded during the encouriter.(179)

On 23 February, the base received the worse shellacking

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of the siege. In one eight-hour period, the installation wasrocked by 1,307 rounds- -a total which surpassed the daily highreceived at Con Thien in 1967. Many of the rounds came fromthe 130mm and 152mm artillery pieces in Laos. The runway tookseveral hits but the Seabee and Marine working parties filledthe craters and quickly replaced the damaged strips of runwaymatting. At 1600, the barrage touched off a fire at one of tt.supply points and 1,620 rounds of 90mm and 106mm ammunition vc.redestroyed. Cumulative friendly casualties for the day were 10killed, 21 medevaced, and 30 wounded but returned to duty.(180)

Two days later the Marines suffered one of their mostserious setbacks. On the morning of the 25th, the 1st and 3dSquads, 3d Platoon, B/l/26 departed Grey Sector on a patrol tothe south of the base; the patrol leader was a second lieutenant.The two squads were reinforced by an 81mm mortar FO, an S-2representative, a Kit Carson Scout, one rocket team, and amachine gun section (two guns).(*) Each man carried 500 roundsof ammunition and six grenades; each machine gun team had 1,800rounds. Their mission was to sweep to the south along a well-defined route and attempt. to locate an enemy mortar which hadbeen harassing the Marines. The patrol leader was assignedthree checkpoints from which he was to radio his position andprogress to the company commander, Captain Pipes. The lieu•tenant was under strict orders to follow the planned route andkeep within sight of the base as much as possible.(l81)

Around 0900, the two squads reached their first checkpoint;the lieutenant made the required radio report and the Marinesstarted on the second leg of their trek. Unknown to CaptainPipes, the patrol had deviated from course and was actuallyabout 600 meters south of its scheduled route. Shortly afterhis first transmission, the lieutenant spotted three NVAsoldiers walking along a road which branched off Route 9 andran northwest into the FOB-3 compound. The North Vietnamesewere apparently trying to suck the Americans into a trap- - atrick as old as war itself, In spite of warnings from the KitCarson Scout, the young patrol leader took the bait and pursuedthe three men; the decision was to cost him his life.(182)

The Marines moved south across the road, chased the NorthVietnamese and ran head-on into an ambush. A heavily reinforced

(*) Kit Carson Scouts were enemy ralliers who scouted forthe Allies.

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NVA company was entrenched just south of the road in a crescent-shaped bunker compiex the tips of which curved to the north.When the trap was sprung, the patrol was caught squarely in thecenter andy in essence, was double-enveloped by stationary po-sitions. At first the Marines opened up and gained the advantagebut the enemy fire gradually built to an overwhelming crescendoand the patrol became pinned down. When the lieutenant realizedthe full implications of his predicament, he dispatched the 1stSquad to flank the NVA emplacements from the west. The maneuvermight have worked but the squad leader did not hook out farenough to the west before turning back in on the enemy positions.Instead of hitting the tender flank, the 1st Squad walked intomore blistering, frontal fire. When the lieutenant was unableto raise the squad leader on the radio, he sent one of his fewunwounded men, Hospitalman 3d Class Frank V. Caizia, a U. S.Navy corpsman, to find out what had happened. The corpsman re-turned later and reported that every man in the 1st Squad, ex-cept one, was dead.(l83)

Captain Pipes immediately realized that his men were introuble and, upon direction of higher authority, sent the 2d

Platoon to the aid of the patrol. The cunning North Vietnameseanticipated such a move however, and positioned a blockingforce in the path of the relief column. The two separated Marineunits were engaged in heavy fighting for about four hours before

the remnants of the patrol could break contact and withdraw

through the positions of the 2d Platoon. Marine tanks rumbled

into the southern portion of the compound but supporting fires

were restricted by ground fog and the proximity of the combatants.As he pulled back, the patrol leader was hit in both femoral

arteries and bled to death before reaching the perimeter. His

radioman, Corporal Rolland R, Ball, a full-blooded Sioux Indian,

carried the lieutenanfs body back to the base. Friendlycasualties during the day were 1 killed, 25 missing and pre-

sumed dead, 13 medevacs, and 8 wounded but returned to duty;

the bodies of the missing men were all recovered. Enemy losses

were undetermined. The action on the 25th sobered the men ofCompany B and there was one predominant thought in their minds.Captain Pipes probably understated the feelings of his men

when he said: "We are anxious to repay the loss." Before the

siege ended, Company B did just that.(l84)

The flurry of activity to the east and south of the base

led General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds to believe that the

major enemy thrust was imminent. Recalling the accuracy of theNorth Vietnamese lieutenant's previous predictions, they felt

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sure that the attack would come from the east. From variousother reports, they knew that large NVA uiits were massingaround a deserted plantation to tha south and an old Frenchfort near the junction of Route 9 and the two roads which tiedin with the KSCB. Although the North Vietnamese had not se-cured the hill outposts according to the first phase of theirplan, time was running out. Each day, the skies over Khe Sanhcleared a little more as one of the enemy's greatest allies,the monsoons, slowly abandoned him. If American airpower, un-hindered by the weather, were ever fully brought into play, theenemy's task would have been next to impossible. The NVAlaunched a heavy attack against the base on 29 February; whetherit was in fact the main prong of the Communist offensive, his-torians may never know for sure.(185)

Largely because of the quick response by the FSCC and theoverwhelming firepower at its disposal, the enemy attack nevergot up a full head of steam. Early in the evening of 29 Febru-ary, current intelligence showed that the enemy was on themove0 Each succeeding report indicated that the North Vietnamesewere heading toward the eastern perimeter. The FSCC spranginto action and called on all assets to saturate the enemy'sroute of march. Massed artillery, TPQs, as well as Mini andMicro Arc Lights were targeted in blocks to the east, southeast,and south. Flights of B-52s, diverted from other targets,arrived overhead in two and a half hours and added to the carnagebefore the enemy troops had moved completely through the killingzone.(l86)

At 2130, a battalion from the 304th NVA DIViSiOn launchedthe first attack against the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion. TheSouth Vietnamese responded with their final protective fires;1/13 contributed thousands of conventional and special artilleryrounds while strike aircraft streaked in and raked the attackingforce. The enemy pulled back without even breaching the outerdefenses. The first assault was followed by one at 2330 andanother at 0315 (1 March); both were similarly stifled shortof the wire. The North Vietnamese finally called it quits andwithdrew with those bodies which they could retrieve. 4henthe Rangers investigated the next morning, they found 78 deadNVA soldiers huddled in three successive assault trenches a fewhundred meters from the perimeter. Some were in a kneelingposition as if they had been killed just before going over thetop. Many had been peppered by the artillery airbursts andwere covered with small holes. Crude devices made from bamboostrips and laced with blocks of TNT lay beside many of the

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bodies. These were obviously to be used as bangalote torpedoesbut the sappers never had the chance. The slaughter along theperimeter, however, was nothing compared to the losses sustainedby the NVA reserves.(187)

While the S-2 personnel could never ascertain the exactnumber of enemy killed, they felt reasonably certain that anentire NVA regiment had been virtually wiped out. The easternapproach was saturated with tons of high explosives; the roadjunction, the plantation, the old French Fort, and all bottle-necks along the enemy's route were heavily hit. Moritagnardtribesmen, who inhabit the surrounding hills, later reportedfinding from 200 to 500 North Vietnamese bodies at a time stackedin rows along the trails and roads leading to the base. It wasobvious that they had been caught while on the march and mangledby air raids and piston-like artillery concentrations. Whilemany of the defenders at the KSCB never fired a shot, what wasbelieved to be the long-awaited enemy onslaught came and passedwith a whimper instead of a roar.(188)

Even though the North Vietnamese continued to probe through-out March, it was obvious that they had shot their bolt on thenight of 29 February/i March. The NVA never mustered anotherlarge ground attack against the base; the battle had reached aturning point. Having had their fingers burned too often, theNorth Vietnamese settled into a wait-and-see strategy. They

continued to pound the base with artillery but exerted no majorground effort; instead they lurked in the hills and waited forpatrols which ventured too far from the perimeter.(189)

The waiting game proved to be just as disastrous for theenemy as had his previous strategy. The month of March wasmarked by clear skies over Khe Sanh and there were only fivedays during which weather hampered flight operations. Whilethe overcast had never interfered with Arc Light strikes orTPQs, the retreat of the monsoons was a blessing for the attackpilots and fighter/bombers swarmed into the valley like locusts.The number of close air support sorties in March almost doubledthe amount flown the previous month. Any enemy movement with-in the TADR during the day invariably drew a flight of sleekjets, prop-driven A-i Skyraiders, or helicopter gunships with-in minutes, The trenches and bunker complexes inside the B-52line were also worked over daily to insure that the NVA stayedat arm's length. What's more, the unrestricted visibility en-abled the TAC(A)s and airborne observers to ferret out andcall in artillery on the enemy gun positions which had been

125

hammering the base. For the most part, 1/13 had been limitedto intelligence-generated concentrations during February, butthe good weather in March provided Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly'smen with something they could sink their teeth into- -observedtargets. Enemy gunners no longer enjoyed a reprieve and eachround they fired was an invitation to instant retaliation. With

Birddogs or Hueys overhead, the enemy seldom even fired andthis was no small consolation to the men at the base. The clear

skies and accurate supporting fires were a potent combinationand the number of confirmed enemy dead recorded in March in-creased approximately 80 percent over February.(190)

The enemy's plight at Khe Sanh was echoed, albeit in veiledterms by his propaganda broadcasts. The Radio Hanoi, English-speaking announcer, Hanoi Hanna--the Communist's anemic versionof Tokyo Rose- -gradually shifted her theme from, "We will crushKhe Sanh" to "Ho Chi Minh would be unhappy if we wasted ourtime on only 6,000 Marines." The Communists also attempted tosell the line that 20,000 North Vietnamese had "tied down" the26th Marines. Such rationale smacked of sour grapes. This

illogical reasoning would be similar to a defeated footballcoach saying that he didn't really want to win the game, onlykeep the other team "tied down" for an hour or so. At the KSCBitself, there were a few feeble attempts to sway the defenders.On 10 March, an incoming mortar round released about 200 propa-ganda leaflets. The following day, an NVA loudspeaker blareda message to the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion which invited theSouth Vietnamese to "join their brothers from the North indriving out the Americans." There were no takers. The psycho-logical effort was just one more indication that the enemy washurting. (191)

About mid-March, the 26th Marines S—2 be.gan noting anexOdus of major NVA units from the Khe Sanh TAUR. Most of thesereports came from mountain tribesmen who provided valuable in-formation on enemy troop dispositions throughout the siege.The 325C NVA Division Headquarters was one of the first to pullout toward Laos, followed by elements of the 95C and lOlD Rçg-ments which also relocated to the west. About the same time,the 304th NVA Division withdrew several thousand meters to thesouthwest. The enemy still retained enough troops around thebase to maintain pressure and thus the shelling and probescontinued.(l92)

Closely correlated with the enemy's retrograde movementwas another large influx of refugees into the KSCB. Most were

126

Montagnards who had inhabited the smaller villages surroundingthe base and unfortunately had become the pawns of war. Whenthe fighting first broke out, the Allies advised them to evacuatetheir homes and move overland to Cam Lo or else they would beexposed to fire from both sides. During the period 23-28 Jariu-ary, 1,050 Vietnamese and tribesmen with their families wereair evacuated to Da Nang and then on to Quang Tn City. Aboutth same time, some 1,800 tribesmen completed an overland trekfrom Ithe Sanh to Cain Lo by way of the the Ba Long Valley. Lateran additional 3,000 or more attempted to reach Cam Lo, butduring the journey, the North Vietnamese intercepted this groupand directed them back into the }e Sanh area. Presumably, theNVA used the Montagnards to screen troop movements and confuseAmerican intelligence. The next surge of refugees into thecombat base occurred in early February following the attack onLang Vei. On 7 March, the tribesmen again started to filterinto the base. They were screened., interrogated, and processedfor evacuation in the FOB-3 compound. As many as 661 were air-lifted to eastern Quang Tn Province in a single day and thetotal for March was l,432.(193)

Although the enemy had scaled down his forces, the heavyincoming continued to plague the Marines. On the average, thebase received about 150 rounds a day during March. During thecourse of a normal day, the preponderance of fire was from the82mm mortars but on peak days the greatest number of rounds wasfrom the heavier artillery. On 23 March, the KSCB received itsheaviest daily saturation of the month--l,109 rounds. Of these,over 30 percent were from the enemy's big guns in Laos. In

addition to the indirect fire, the Marines took a sprinklingof recoilless rifle shells; but these weapons were easy to spotbecause of their large back blast and thus were vulnerable toair attack and counterbattery fire.(l94)

During March, the defenders, on order of General Cushman,began to push out from the perimeter. On 8 March, the ARVNRangers conducted a series of sweeps east of the runway. Thefirst patrol made no contact but the next two became heavilyengaged with an NVA force of unknown size. The Rangers attackedand poured into the enemy trenches, got eye-ball to eye-ballwith "their brothers from the North" and killed 26. On the24th, a patrol from Company A, 1/9, made contact with two NVAplatoons which were dug in approximately 1,500 meters northwestof Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell's main perimeter. The Marinesattacked the enemy emplacements and in a four-hour battle killed31. North Vietr-se. :riring the fighting, a UH-1E helicopter

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of \rMO-6 was shot down while supporting the Marines but thecrewmen were rescued.(*) Friendly casualties were five killed,four inedevaced, and two with minor wounds. The largest en-counter, however, came on 30 March when Company B, 1/26, re-ceived a chance to settle an old score. The target area wasthe same complex, approximately 850 meters south of the per-irneter, where the B1l126 patrol had been ambushed on 25February. (195)

The attack had been planned by the battalion coirimander,Lieutenant Colonel Frederick J. McEwan (who relieved LieutenantColonel Wilkinson on 1 March) and his operations officer, MajorCharles E. Davis III, with careful attention to every detail.In fact, the 1/26 staff had been working on this attack for amonth. The sweep was also closely coordinated with the FSCCto ensure that the maximum supporting arms were available. To

support Company B, Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's staff workedout 'a variation of the defensive fire plan with nine batteriesparticipating. Marine artillery (1/13) formed the primary boxand rolling barrage while the Army l75inms and TPQ-lO controlledaircraft were responsible for the sides of the secondary box.The latter fell on the high ground adjacent to the objectivewhich might influence the battle, The plan called for CaptainPipes to move his unit into the primary box and follow approxi-mately 75 meters in trace of the rolling barrage. As the companyadvanced, the entire cylinder also advanced. Outside the primarybox, the sides of the secondary would open and close over theterrain like a giant accordian. One extremely important factorwas that the artillery fire would not necessarily alert theenemy of the impending attack because the same technique hadbeen used so frequently in that area0 The element of surprisestill belonged to the Marines

At O800, Captain Pipes' men swept out of a draw and, underthe cover of heavy fog0 crossed the access road which ran fromthe Route 9 junction to the B3 compound0 Tnis jumping offpoint had been secured by one platoon during the night. Totheir front and flanks0 waves of exploding artillery shellschurned up the terrain0 At the same time0 four 106mm recoillessrifles and six .50 caliber and M60 machine guns provided over-head fire; a type of support which would have warmed the heartof 'Manila John Basilone(**) The crescentshaped defenses,

(*) The pilot was badly burned in the crash and died that night.

(**) Gunnery Sergeant John Basilone was a Medal of Honor winner

1 2C

manned by an NVA battalion, were roughly 100 meters southeastof the road and extended along a 700 meter front. The enemytroops occupied heavily fortified bunkers, trenches, and fightingholes. Although the objective was indeed formidable, CompanyB was not to be denied that day.(196)

After about 10 minutes of continuous supporting fire,Company B moved swiftly into final assault positions and CaptainPipes directed the FSCC to collapse the two artillery boxes.The fire was shifted to cut off any enemy reinforcements fromreaching the battle area and to suppress NVA artillery andmortars. As if on cue, the dense fog suddenly lifted; the lastthing that many enemy soldiers saw that morning was two Marineassault platoons with fixed bayonets only a few yards in frontof their positions. The surprise was complete. Pipes' menpoured into the trenches and swarmed over the startled defendersbefore they could react. While one element laid down a base offire with small arms and machine guns, Marines armed with flame.-throwers, grenades, and satchel charges rushed through thetrenches to sear and blast enemy emplacements. The men ofCompany B carried out their grisly work for over three hoursand, by noon, the trenchworks had become a smoking tomb for 115North Vietnamese.

Tne only effective resistance during the battle was enemymortar fire. Eventually, the NVA placed about 100 rounds on theattacking force. One of these scored a direct hit on the companyCP and killed the radio man, the artillery FO, and the 81mm mortarFO. The company commander was also hit. A mortar fragmentpassed through Captain Pipes' arm and lodged in the side of hischest about two inches from his heart. Pipes not only survived,he continued to direct the attack.

With the loss of his two forward observers, the captainhad to handle the coordination of supporting arms by himself.Fortunately, Lieutenant Colonel McEwan and Major Davis had madeallowances for such a possibility. During the planning phase,they plotted general fire zones in the objective area and assignedeach one a call sign (e.g. Apples, Oranges, Grapes, etc.)Captain Pipes knew where these zones were located and whenever

in World War II. During an action at Edson's Ridge on Guadal-

canal, Basilone's machine gun section fired over 26,000 roundsin one night and helped break up a fanatical Japanese attack.

Manila John was later killed on Iwo Jima.

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he wanted to hit a target he simply told the FSCC, "Fire

Apples" or "Fire Oranges." In short order, the designatedzone was saturated with mortar arid artillery rounds. Pipesutilized this technique throughout the rest of the battle.(197)

Once the Marines had consolidated the objective, theycollected their casualties which included nine dead and returnedto the perimeter. As Company B retired, the primary and secondaryboxes closed back in around the Marines and walked them home.During the battle, the raiding force was shielded by some 2,600artillery shells and 1,000 mortar rounds. On the return trip,NVA artillery tracked the column; ironically, one casualtyduring the withdrawal was an NVA prisoner who was killed by hisown fire. Lieutenant Colonel McEwan later described the oper-ation as a "classic raid." He attributed the success to thedetailed planning, the coordination with the FSCC, and CaptainPipes' precise execution which "adhered to the tactical funda-mentals and principles of war."(*) For his part, the captainwas later awarded the Silver Star and the entire company re-ceived a warm congratulatory message from General Westmoreland.The debt had been paid in full.(198)

This purge to the south of the base marked the last signifi-cant encounter of SCOTLAND and, at 0800 on 31 March, the oper-ation was officially terminated. The operational control ofthe 26th Marines was passed to the U. S. Army 1st Air CavalryDivision (1st ACD), commanded by Major General John J. Tolson,III, and Operation PEGASUS commenced. The Army division, alongwith the 1st Marines and the 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force startedthe push from Ca Lu to reopen Route 9, relieve the pressure onthe KSCB, and destroy remnants of the NVA units in the Khe SanhTAOR. In effect, the siege was over. Cumulative friendlycasualties for SCOTLAND, which began on 1 November 1967 were205 friendly KIA, 852 medevaced, and 816 minor wounded. Theextent of NVA losses was never determined and more than likely

(*) Another interesting point was that the attack was largelycarried out by inexperienced troops. During the siege, CompanyB suffered considerable casualties and most of the replacementswere fresh from the States. Major Davis later commented thatthe conduct of these Marines during the operation spoke highlyof the type of training that they received before arriving inVietnam. This ability to adapt quickly plus the high qualityof small unit leadership was, in Davis' opinion, a key factorin the Marine victory.

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never will be. The Marines counted 1,602 enemy bodies alongthe perimeters but the total number of North Vietnamese deadwas probably between 10,000 and 15,000. The enemy alwayscarried off his dead when possible and many others undoubtedlydied in the surrounding hills and were not found by anyone.There was little doubt that the heart of two crack NVA divisionshad been ripped out at Khe Sanh. The full impact of the suffer-ing endured by the enemy, however, did not become evident untilthe Marine, Army, and ARVN troops began mopping up operationsaround the base.(*)(199)

(*) The breakdown of fixed-wing tactical sorties under Oper-ation NIAGARA follows: Marine-7,078, Seventh Air Force-.9,684, andU. S. Navy-5,167. These figures were derived from 1st MAWCommand Chronologies and Project CHECO, Southeast Asia Report.The two sources do riOt agree on Marine sorties (Project CHECOcredits USMC aircraft with 6,385); 1st MAW records in this casehave been cited. Statistics for B-52 strikes and Marine heli-copter operations have been previously incorporated in the text.

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PART VIII

THE BREAKOUT

The blueprints for a major Allied drive into the Khe SanhPlateau had been on the drawing boards at III MAF Headquartersin the embryo stage since late January. The 1st ACD was slatedfor the campaign since that division had displaced from BongSon, in II Corps, and arrived at Phu Bal on 22 January. Threedays after he assumed operational control of the new division,General Cushman directed General Tolson to prepare a contingencyplan for the relief of Khe Sanh. This action evertual1y re-sulted in Operation PEGASUS but there was a series of eventswhich delayed its start until April. The first was the dis-ruptive Communist TET Offensive and the resulting Battle ofHue City which raged until 25 February. Throughout Februaryand early March, the 1st ACD was busily engaged in and aroundthe old imperial capital. Logistics was another consideration.General Westmoreland had initiated a supply build-up in I Corpsduring December 1967 but III MAF did not yet have sufficientstock levels to support an operation the size of PEGASUS, es-pecially while the heavy fighting still continued in Hue.Finally, the poor weather prevented large-scale helicopteroperations in the Khe Sanh area.(200)

An alteration of the command structure in I Corps also in-directly affected the proposed operation. Until the early partof 1968, the three divisions in I Corps (1st MarDiv, 3d MarDiv,and the U. S. Army Mierical Division) were under the directcontrol of General Cushman, CG, III MAF. General Westmoreland,however, was convinced that a critical, if not the most critical,phase of the war was taking shape in I Corps and had begun topump reinforcements into the two northern provinces. These in-cluded the 1st ACD and the 101st Airborne Division. To keepcloser tabs on the action in the north, General Westmorelandalso established a forward echelon of his MACV Headquarters,under the Deputy, ComUSMACV, General Creighton W. Abrams, atCamp Hochrnuth, Phu Bai on 9 February. There was little formalchange in the command structure; General Abrams simply actedas an agent for ComUSMACV in an advisor/coordinator role. On10 March, however, the structure did change; MACV Forward wasconverted to Provisional Corps, Vietnam (PCV) and placed underthe operational control of General Cushman, CG, III MAF. PCV'snew commander, Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, U. S. Army,

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assumed control of all American combat forces operating in thenorthern two provinces, less the southern portion of Thua Thien.At that time the three major U. S. units in the area were the3d MarDiv, the 1st AOD, and the 101st Airborne Division. In ad-dition, the reinforced ARVN 1st Division was operating in thisregion. In essence, PCV was established to provide closer super-vision over growing U. S. forces and coordination with the Viet-namese units in the northern area.(201)

As the operations around Hue tapered off, General ushman,on 29 February, directed General.To1son to take the plans forPEGASUS back off the shelf. During the first week in March,General Tolson met in Da Nang with Generals ushman and Abramsfor a discussion of the operation.(*) The mission was three-fold: relieve the Khe Sanh Combat base, reopen Route 9 fromCa Lu to Khe Sarth, and eradicate any NVA elements within thearea of operations. In addition to the three brigades of the1st ACD, General Tolson was to assume operational control ofthe 26th Marines, the 1st Marines, and the 3d ARVN AirborneTask Force. D-day was tentatively set for 1 April- -dependingon the weather. With the basic directives, General Tolson re-turned to Camp Evans, and settled down to detailed plan-ning with his division staff. During the next few weeks, therewere numerous planning and coordination meetings with III MAF,PCV, the 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, SeventhAir Force, and representatives of the attached units.(202)

The logistics portion of the plan hinged around constructionof a base and airfield near Ca Lu which could accommodate C-7Caribou transports and later C-123s. Before work could beinitiated, elements of the 3d MarDiv had to secure and repairthe stretch of Route 9 between Ca Lu and the Rockpile so thatsupplies, fuel, ammunition, and construction material could bestockpiled. Once this was accomplished, a joint task force ofengineers- -the 11th Engineer Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, the1st ACD's 8th Engineer Battalion, and Navy Mobile ConstructionBattalion 5--began construction of an airfield, parking ramps,logistical facilities, and defensive positions. By the time thelead assault elements were ready to jump off in the attack, theinstallation was 83 percent completed. The base was dubbedLanding Zone (LZ) Stud.

(*) It was around this time that PCV was formed and GeneralAbrams departed I Corps. General Rosson then became a keyfigure in the planning of the operation.

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On 25 March, D-6, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1/9CavSqd), operating from LZ Stud, began extensive reconnaissancein the PEGASUS area of operations to pave the way for the initialair assaults. Tne mission of the unit was "to find the enemy,destroy his antiaircraft capability, acquire hard intelligencefor exploitation, and locate and prepare suitable landingzones." Since General Tolson had little concrete informationon exact enemy locations, the activities of the 1/9 CavSqd wereessential to the operation. The squadron fanned out from LZStud in ever increasing concentric circles under the cover oftactical air, B-52 strikes, and the 8-inch and 105mm batterieswhich had been moved to Ca Lu. During this phase, the aircavalrymen called in 632 tactical air strikes, 49 speciallyfuzed construction sorties (Daisy Cutters), and 12 Arc Lightstrikes on enemy antiaircraft positions, troop concentrations,and future landing zones.(203)

As a prelude to PEGASUS, th 3d MarDiv launched a regi-mental-size, diversionary attack in eastern Quang Tn Province.On 30 March, Task Force KIlO, comprised of the 2d Battalion,4th Marines; the U. S. Army 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry; and the3d Battalion, 1st ARVN Regiment pushed northward from Dong Haon a search and destroy sweep through the Gio Linh coastal plainarea between the Cua Viet River and the DMZ. In addition, a companyfrom the 101st Airborne Division was u5ed as a reconnaissanceforce and to convey a picture of greater weight and diversityof attack. Although the foray was primarily designed to confusethe NVA and draw attention away from the mailed fist which waspoised at Ca Lu, the Allies of Task Force KILO killed 150 NorthVietnamese during the first day.(204)

At 0700 on D-day (1 April), two battalions controlled bythe 1st Marines (2/1 and 2/3), which had moved from Phu Bai toLZ Stud several days before, spearheaded the attack to the west.Meeting only light resistance, 2/1 wheeled to the north of Route9 and secured its objective while 2/3 swept through and con•-solidated the area to the south of the road. With both flanksscreened by the infantry, the 11th Engineer Battalion began themammoth task of renovating Route 9. Later in the day, elementsof the 3d Brigade (Bde) 1st ACD leapfrogged by helicopter topositions midway between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh. The 1st and 2dSquadrons, 7th Cavalry swarmed into LZ Mike which encompassedHill 248, approximately 7,500 meters east of the KSCB. Thishigh ground to the south of Route 9 was cradled on three sidesby branches of the Quang Tn River. To the north some 3,000meters, the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry air-assaulted the southern

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slope of Dong Chio Mountain which was designated LZ Cates. Thisstretch was particularly critical because the road was sand-wiched between the Quang Tn River on the south and the nearlyperpendicular cliffs which towered menacingly over Route 9 tothe north. Following the Initial waves, the 3d Brigade Head-quarters displaced to LZ Cates and established a CF. By 1650,the Flying Horsemen were in place and continued to expand bothzones while 105mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery,were helilifted in for direct support. Throughout the PEGASUSarea of operations, the Americans established, defensive peri-meters and passed the night with little or no contact.(205)

While the combat engineers continued their steady movementalong Route 9, additjonal elements of the airmobile armada werethrown into the action. On D plus two, the 2d Brigade, 1st ACDwhich had been staging at Ca Lu conducted a vertical envelopmentinto LZ Torn and LZ Wharton which were roughly 6,000 and 8,500meters southeast of Khe Sanh. The air assault went smoothlyeven though the zones were shelled by NVA gunners. By the endof the day, all 2d Brigade units were in position along withthree batteries of the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery. In themeantime, the 3d Brigade and the 1st Marines expanded theirTAORs along Route 9.(206)

On 4 April, General Tolson began to put the squeeze onenemy elements to the south of the KSCB. Moving northeast fromLZ Wharton, the 1/5 CavSqd attacked the old French fort near thejunction of Route 9. At the same time, the 26th Marines, whichhad been attached to the 1st ACO since 31 March, began the longawaited breakout from the base. At 0600, three companies ofLieutenant Colonel John .J. H. Cahill's 1/9 re1ieved LieutenantColonel Mitchell on 1 April) moved out of the rock quarry peri-meter and advanced on Hill 471 which was 2,500 meters due southof the airstrip. The hill was a key terrain feature since itoverlooked the road junction and that segment of Route 9 whichsnaked to the southwest. The area was also occupied by majorelements of the 304th NVA Division. After heavy prep fires,the Marines stormed up the slope in the face of light enemy fireand secured their objective at 1720.(*) Thirty North Vietnamese

(*) Although the rifle companies encountered only slight re-sistance during the assault, the Company A command group, whileadvancing toward the objective, took a direct hit from an enemymortar. The Air Officer, Captain Walter C. Jones, III was killedas was one radio operator; the battalion Operations Officer,

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bodies were strewn over the hilltop.

The men of 1/9, however, were in for a long night. Laterthat night, the enemy lashed out at the hill with 192 mortarand artillery rounds. The barrage was undoubtedly designed tosoften up the Marines for counterattack the next morning.The North Vietnamese might as well have saved their ammunitionand their counterattack.(207)

At 0515, the 7th Battalion, 66th Riment, 304th NVA D-vision, charged up Hill 471 in a vain attempt toknock 1/9 fromthe crest0 The 66th Regiment was definitely a hard-luck outfit;it had been bloodied at Khe Sanh Village on 21 January and againduring the abortive attack against the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion,on 29 February/i March. The enemy's string of bad luck remainedunbroken on the morning of 5 April. Lieutenant Colonel Cahill'sMarines stood their ground, poured withering fire into the on-rushing enemy troops, and, with the aid of artillery and tacticalair strikes, smashed the North Vietnamese attack. During theone-sided exchange, one Marine was killed and 19 wounded; the66th iment left 122 dead on the slopes. This fight was oneof the major highlights of Operation PEGASUS.(*)(208)

The surge of Allied units into the previously uncontesteddomain of the 304th NVA Division continued for the next fewdays.(**) On the afternoon of the 5th, the last element of the1st ACD- -the 1st Brigade- -departed Ca Lu aboard droves of heli-copters and swooped into LZ Snapper, 7,500 meters south of thebase. The following morning, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry (2dBrigade) moved northeast from LZ Wharton and relieved LieutenantColonel Cahill's battalion on Hill 471. After relief was effected,

Major Ted R. Henderson, was seriously wounded and evacuated.The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Cahill and hisArtillery Officer, First Lieutenant John K. LeBlond, Jr. werealso wounded at that time but were able to continue.

(*) In addition to the Marine killed during the attack, ninewere killed by enemy shelling the night before. A total of 57Marines were medevaced.

(**) The 325C NVA Division had long since departed the areaand left the 304th to continue pressure on the 26th Marines.Some elements of the 304th swung to the north of the base andreplaced units of the 325C.

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1/9 initiated a drive toward Hill 689 some 4,500 meters to thenorthwest. On the opposite side of the KSC, the 5th Battalion,7th Cavalry (1st Brigade) conducted a landing just 500 metersnorth of the Blue Sector wire. me 2d and 3d Battalions, 26thMarines fanned out to the north and northwest of their hill out-posts. Company G, 2/26 bumped into an NVA company that after-noon and killed 48 of the enemy.

The initial relief of the combat base occurred at 1350 on6 April when the lead company of the 3d. ARVN Airborne Task Forcewas airlifted to Khe Sanh and linked up with the 37th Rangers.This move was primarily intended as a morale booster for the37th. Two days later, after 2/7 CavSqd had completed the sweepalong Route 9 and linked up with the 26th Marines, the officialrelief took place. At 0800 on 8 April, the 3d Brigade airliftedits CP to the base and became the new landlord. Relieved of itsduties along the perimeter, Lieutenant Colonel McEwan's 1/26saddled up and attacked to the west that day but made littlecontact. (209)

Traditionally, the lifting of a siege has been the occasionfor great emotional outbursts, bands, and stirring oration; inthis regard, the relief of Khe Sanh was somewhat of a disappoint-ment. General Tolson intended for the 1inkup to be '3as businesslike as possible with a minimum of fanfare" so that he could getthe Marines on the offensive again. A few newsmen at the basesnapped pictures of Marines shaking hands with the Cavalrymenbut the men usually shrugged indifferently afterwards and wentabout their business. The defenders generally looked on theproceedings with sort of a "ho-hum" attitude, perhaps they feltthat they had not been rescued from anything. In fact, theywere right; the enemy threat had been squelched weeks beforePEGASUS had gotten off the ground. "I've been at Khe Sanh fornine months," the regimental commander stated, "and if they keepme supplied, I could stay here another nine months." No doubtmost men were glad they did not have to remain because the stand

at Khe Sanh had not been "all peaches and cream," but, as faras the defenders being snatched out of the jaws of destruction

--it just did not happen that way.(210)

With the arrival of the 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force, allmaneuver elements involved in PEGASUS were on the Khe Sanh

Plateau. On the 8th, the three South Vietnamese battalions(minus one company) leapfrogged from Quang Tn to LZ Stud andthen conducted a helicopter assault into LZ Snake about 2,000meters southwest of the base. In effect, the encirclement was

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complete; only, this time, pressure was being applied in theopposite direction. As the Allied oil slick spread over thevalley, the Americans and South Vietnamese uncovered ghastlyevidence of how badly the NVA had been beaten. The variousunits found hundreds of North Vietnamese in shallow graves;hundreds more lay where they fell. A total of 557 individualweapons, 207 crew-served weapons,and 2 antiaircraft pieces wereeither capt.ured or destroyed. In addition, 17 vehicles, rangingfrom PT-76 tanks to motor scooters, and tons of ammunition,food, radios, and individual equipment were discovered. The.

mountains of captured or abandoned enemy stores indicated thateither Operation PEGASUS had caught the NVA completely flat-footed or the remnants of the two enemy divisions were in noshape to cart off their equipment and supplies.(211)

Even though the rest of the operation centered around com-pleting work on Route 9 and sifting through the debris of battle,there were several contacts with the retreating enemy. On 8April, the .ARVN forces turned back an NVA counterattack west ofthe base and killed 78 in the process. The same day, the 1stBattalion, 9th Marines, assaulted and seized Hill 689 with noopposition but discovered 37 NVA killed during a fight the pre-vious night. Air and artillery also hammered away at the NVA;on one occasion, a Ti. S. Army airborne observer spotted 100North Vietnamese in the open and called in artillery fire whichaccounted for 30 of the enemy. While the NVA pulled away tothe west, the engineer task force crept toward the base fromthe opposite direction, and at 1600 on 11 April, Route 9 wasofficially declared open. The engineers had repaired 14 kilo-meters of road, replaced 9 vital bridges, and constructed 17bypasses; General Westmorelarid applauded their feat as "her-culean."(2l2)(See Maps 8 and 9).

The day before the road was completed, General Tolson re-ceived a visit from the PCV commander, General Rosson, whichresulted in an alteration of Operation PEGASUS. General Rossondirected his division comnander to begin extracting units toQuang Tn and Camp Evans in preparation for an assault into theA Shau Valley (Operation DELAWARE). General Tolson anticipatedthat the operation would last much longer and had initiallyplanned to expand his sweeps far to the south, north, and north-west. In addition, the 1st Marines was slated for air assaultsinto a valley west of the Rockpile. The A Shau Valley, however,was a major enemy base area and logistics complex which supportedhis operations in Thua Thien and Q.iang Nam provinces. To launcha mobile strike into this region and destroy the enemy's base

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OPERATION PEGASUS

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FRIENDLY SITUATIOND PLUS 8

9 APRIL 1968

OPERATION PEGASUSK.WWHII 1

326USMC

CA LU

I7I8 I5

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had been a major MACV objective of long standing. Su?port ofthis operation had been one of the reasons for the troop andlogistical buildup in the northern area which had begun theprevious December. The weather in the A Shau Valley was nowideal for airmobile operations and General Westmoreland wasanxious to get DELAWARE underway before the end of April. Thefollowing day, the 11th, all air assaults were cancelled andGeneral Tolson began to withdraw elements from Khe Sanh. ThelstBrigade, less one battalion, was airlifted to Quang TnCity and the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, which had fought sovaliantly, was pulled out and sent to Da Nang. Two days later,th division command post and elements of the 3d Brigade de-parted for Camp Evans.(213)

Another noteworthy departure was that of Colonel Lownds.The colonel, who did his job well enough to earn the nation'ssecond highest award- -the Navy Cross- -turned over the reins ofthe 26th Marines to Colonel Bruce F. Meyers on 12 April. Thenew commander wasted no time; he planned and executed the attackwhich in effect, ended the Battle for Khe Sanh. It was scheduledfor 14 April- -Easter Sunday.

Ironically, the last engagement took place between Hills881S and 881N precisely where, on 20 January, the whole affairhad begun. The 3d Battalion, 26th Marines which had started thefight was also on hand to finish it. Ever since the 4th, Lieu-tenant Colonel John C. Studt's battalion (relieved LieutenantColonel Alderman on 15 March) had been sweeping to the north andnorthwest of Hill 88lS and, on several occasions, had takenfire from 88lN. The enemy troops still clung tenaciously tothat piece of real estate from which they had directed rocketfire against Khe Sanh and antiaircraft fire against the heli-copters resupplying the Marines on 881S. Lieutenant ColonelStudt's mission was to secure the terrain between the two hills,then attack and seize 88lN.(2l4)

Since the enemy gunners had zeroed in on the slopes of 881Swith their mortars, Lieutenant Colonel Studt moved his attackingelements into position the night of the 13th. The assault compa-nies of 3/26 slipped out of the defensive wire under the coverof darkness and moved down the forward slope of the hill alongroutes which were protected by security patrols. As he watchedthe Marines file by, the battalion's operations officer, MajorCaulfield, could not help but be concerned about them. Most of themen had spent the past two and a half months in a foxhole ortrench; they had received minimum rations and a maximum of enemy

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shelling. All were tired and dirty; some suffered from largebody sores because the water received by these men had goneinto their bodies and not on them. Even though they were Marines,

the major wondered how they would perform the next morning. At

0800, he received his .answer.(215)

The attack, which the troops referred to as their "EasterEgg Hunt," was preceded by a deluge of supporting fire. Colonel

Meyers, who flew to 881S by helicopter, observed the attack and

personally ensured that sufficient supporting arms were employed.In addition to the artillery of 1/13 at Khe Sanh and the 175mmbases, 155mm and 8-inch batteries of the 1st ACD at LZ Stud werecalled on to help cave in the enemy bunkers. Strike aircraft

worked over the hill with bombs, rockets, and napalm. The

Marines who remained on 881S also provided heavy support. Be-

sides the 60mm and 81mm mortars, these men had pooled all eightof the battalion's 106 recoilless rifles, the two remaininglO5mm howitzers, and six .53 caliber machine guns which hadbeen salvaged from downed helicopters or stripped off of trucksat the base. As the assault troops advanced, the weapons on881S provided direct overhead fire which sometimes preceded thefront ranks by no more than 50 meters. As usual, the recoilless

rifles were extremely effective. One observer later remarkedthat when the lead elements approached a treeline, no chanceswere taken; the 106 gunners fired a broadside and the treelinewas sLmply blown away.(2l6)

Because of the weight and speed of the attack, the enemywas never able to recover. Moving behind a wall of steel, thebattalion clawed its way through the defenses between the twohills and prepared for the final push. Major Caulfield, whohad worried about the Marines' weakened condition the nightbefore, soon found the opposite was true- -he was having troubleholding them back. At one point, a group of NVA soldiers whohad been hammered senseless by the prep fires, broke from theirpositions and fled into the open. An airborne spotter directedthe companies to hold up while he called in air arid artillery.Scanning the front lines, Major Caulfield noticed that a handfulof Marines with fixed bayonets were in hot pursuit of the enemy.The major contacted the company commander by radio and toldhim to collar his troops. The reply was, "Sir, I can't stopthem...." Neither could the enemy.(217)

The men of 3/26 stormed the hill, swarmed over the crest,and killed anyone who stood in their way. At 1428, the objec-tive was secured and the men signaled their victory in traditional

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Marine Corps fashion, as Colonel Meyers later described:

On Sunday, 14 April (Easter), I helicoptered to831S and with Captain Bill Dabney, Company Commander of1/3/26, personally watched the U. S. Colors (which hadbeen fortuitously carried in a squad leader's pack)hoisted again over 88lN. This was the signal (visual)that Lieutenant Colonel John Studt's assault had beencompleted. I watched the jungle utility-clad Marine"shinny-up" a shrapnel torn tree whose limbs had beensheared from the intensive prep fires, and affix theStars and Stripes.(218)

With the enemy either dead or gone, the hill again lost itsvalue. Terrain wasn't so important in the fluid Vietnam war,but people were and, in that respect, Lieutenant Colonel Studt'smen had completed a very successful operation- -106 North Viet-namese were dead. In addition to the enemy dead on the objec-ttve, air strikes and artillery fire had completely blanketedthree large groups of NTA fleeing from the hill but because ofthe dense vegetation and the approaching darkness, no bodieswere recovered. Two slightly shot-up North Vietnamese, one ofthem an officer, were captured and flown back to Khe Sanh inColonel Meyers' helicopter. Considering the strength of theenemy defenses, Marine casualties were surprisingly light- -6killed and 19 medevaced. Lieutenant Colonel Studt stated:",,,stand off plastering with supporting arms...prior to eachassault was the key factor here."(2l9)

That night the battalion commander and his operationsofficer stood at the gate on •381S and slapped the men on theback as they trooped back into the perimeter. One Marine, atall, lanky, slow-talking Kentuckian, held out a captured riflefor Lieutenant Colonel Studt's inspection--it was filthy. Duringthe attack, the Marine had come face to face with the owner;both men raised their rifles simultaneously and pulled the triggerbut only the M-16 barked out--the enemy's rifle jammed. Thesurvivor's explanation was simply, "I cleaned my weapon lastnight, he didn't."(220)

The next morning at 0800, PCV terminated PEGASUS. Theoperation was very successful and all objectives were achieved;oute 9 was open, the enemy had been routed,and the base itselfwas relieved. The North Vietnamese had lost another 1,304killed and 21 captured, while 41 U. S. Army troops, 51 Marines,and 33 South Vietnamese died. Air support again had played an

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important role. There were 45 B-52 Arc Light strikes and1,625 tactical sorties conducted during PEGASUS. Of the latternumber, 650 sorties were flown by Marines, 463 by the U. S. AirF.orce, 436 by carrier-based Task Force 77, and 77 by the U. S.Army and VNAF. From 31 March to 8 April, U. S. Air Force C-130and C-l23 aircraft delivered 843 tons of supplies to Khe Sanhby paradrop and the low altitude extraction system. On 9 April,the strip was reopened to C-l3Os and the supply level at theKSCB began to grow large enough so that the 1st ACD could drawfrom the 26th Marines stockpile.(221)

With the termination of PEGASUS, the 3d Marine Divisionagain assumed responsibility of the Khe Sanh area. Task ForceCLICK, comprised of the 26th Marines, the 1st Marines, and the2d 'Brigade(-), 1st ACD, launched Operation SCOTLAND II at 0801,15 April. The 26th Marines, however, did not remain in theoperation very long. Three days later, the new commandingofficer and two of his battalions were transferred to Quang TnBase and, for the men who had taken 77 days of the best the NVAcould offer, the defense of Khe Sanh was over.(*)(222)

(*) The 2d Battalion, 26th Marines did not return to QuangTn with the regiment but was transferred to the operationalcontrol of the 4th Marines at Camp Carroll. General Tompkinssaw to it that each man who returned from Khe Sanh immediatelyreceived a hot shower, a clean uniform, and a big steak dinner.As an added touch, the 3d Marine Division band was on hand, andgreeted each arrival with a stirring rendition of the "MarinesHymn."

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PART IX

EP IJJJGUE

On 23 May 1968, several members of the 26th Marines whohad fought at Khe Sanh had a reunion of sorts in Washington,D. C. and the surroundings were a far cry from the dirt andgrime of the combat base. The "" belonged to the Presidentof the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson. In the Cabinet Roomof the White House, the Commander in Chief paused to honor themen of the 26th Marines and awarded the Presidential UnitCitation to the regiment. Colonel Lownds, whose large handle-bar mustache had been shaved off at the direction of "thehighest possible authority"--his wife, and Sergeant MajorAgrippa W. Smith, senior enlisted man at the KSCB, were onhand to receive the award. While it was fitting that the 26thMarines be cited as a unit, the President also praised theSouth Vietnamese, U. S. Army, U. S. Navy, U. S. Air Force, andMarine aviation and support units which contributed so gallantlyto the defense of the installation.(223)

In some quarters, however, there were still grumblingsover the Khe Sanh issue. During the siege, there had been avirtual storm of protest from critics who opposed the Adminis-tration's decision to hold the base. These doomsday prophetssuffered from what some military experts referred to as the"Dien Bien Phu Syndrome." Many noted intellectuals were in thevan of this group and throughout the battle they could not beconvinced that air and artillery support would provide the marginof difference; they warned that the tiny base would suffer thesame fate which had been meted out to the French garrison 14years earlier.(224)

There are several reasons why Khe Sanh did not becomeanother Dien Bien Phu. The first and most obvious being thatthe Americans possessed the overwhelming supporting arms whichwere not available to the French. Contrary to the predictionsof many critics, air and artillery were decisive and more thanmade up for the numerical superiority of the enemy. Over100,000 tons of bombs and 150,000 artillery rounds were delivered- -and delivered intelligently- -by the Americans during the siege.Much of the credit goes to the regimental commander and his staffwho knew how to coordinate their different sources of firepowerto achieve maximum results. The NVA learned this during the

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'S

pp.

'II A

0\

During the presentation of the Presidential Unit Citation to the 26thMarines, President Lyndon B. Johnson (C) congratulates Sergeant MajorAgrippa W. Smith (L) while Colonel David E. Lownds (R) looks on.

five major attacks against the base and hill outposts.

The ability to keep Khe Sanh resupplied was another majorfactor The NVA encirclement did not coincide with the monsoonseason by accident. With Route 9 interdicted, the fate of thegarrison hinged on the success or failure of the airlift aridapparently the North Vietnamese anticipated that it would fail.The fact that the airlift was successful in the face of heavyenemy fire and the foulest weather imaginable is indeed a tri-bute to the aircrews and recovery personnel but the resupplyeffort went much deeper than just delivering the goods. TheForce Logistics Command at Da Nang augmented by U. S. Armysources at Cam Ranh Bay was responsible for the mountain ofsupplies and material which sustained the 26th Marines. An ex-cerpt from the works of Winston Churchill which was selected asthe motto of the Force Logistics Command best describes thevital role these logistics agencies played: "Victory is thebeautiful colored flower. Supply is the stem without which itcould never have blossomed. "(225)

Another important facet of the defense was the close super-vision and leadership provided by the senior commanders, namelyCG, 3d MarDiv, CC, III MAF, and ComUSMACV. Since much of thesupporting arms and all of the logistical support was handledby agencies external to the 26th Marines, constant coordinationamong these three headquarters was imperative. General Tompkinswas the pivotal figure of the triumvirate. During his dailytrips to the base, the general learned first hand what theregimental commander needed; he not only saw that Colonel Lowndsreceived adequate support but he insured that the defenders madethe most of their resources. In so doing he exposed himself toheavy enemy antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar fire as didGeneral Cushman durtn his periodic visits to Khe Sanh. Com-menting on the strong role played by the 3d Marine Divisioncommander, General Cushman later said, "General Tompkins madeor approved every major decision during the battle."(226)

The real hero of Khe Sanh, however, was on the oppositeend of the rank scale- -the individual fighting man. For 77days the defenders waited in the trenchlines while the bulk ofthe credit and publicity went to the artillery, fighter/bombers,and B-52s. On several occasions the supporting arms could notprevent major enemy assaults from reaching the wire; at thispoint, it was the Marines or ARVN Rangers, armed with rifles,grenades, and bayonets, who stopped the North Vietnamese- -oftenin bitter hand-to-hand combat. Without exception, the battalion

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commanders were lavish in their praise of the young Americansand South Vietnamese who held the perimeter and denied theenemy a much-needed victory. In spite of the inherent hardshipswhich accompanied the siege and the incessant shelling, thedefenders were always itching for a fight. The most overusedexpression during the battle was, "I wish they (North Vietnamese)would hurry up and come so we can get this thing over with."When asked by a reporter if the NVA troops could take Khe Sanh,one officer answered, "Hell no, those 19-year-old Marines won'tlet them."(*)(227)

Finally, much of the credit for the American success atKhe Sanh belongs to the NVA. The North Vietnamese obliged the26th Marines by standing toe to toe in a slugging contest duringwhich they were outgunned and outfought; in effect, the enemydestroyed himself. If there was one salient feature which re-suited in the enemy's defeat it might well be his rigid adherenceto a siege strategy in the face of certain failure. Even whenit became obvious that the Americans were aware of their masterplan, the North Vietnamese doggedly pursued their siege tacticswithout alteration. The extremely lucrative target presentedby the massed NVA forces which ringed the base was one of themain reasons the garrison was maintained. Thus, the questionmay be legitimately asked, "Who besieged whom?"(228)

To a lesser degree, there was a controversy over who orwhat had won the battle. Pioponents of air power and strategicbombing were the most vocal; they felt that the B-52 had beenthe most decisive instrument of defense. While the Strato-fortress was a valuable asset and, without doubt played a majorrole, any attempt to single out one supporting arm as the ulti-mate weapon in the battle would be futile. The B-52 was butone part of an intricate defensive fire plan. The bombers strucktargets beyond 1,100 meters of the base; tactical air and

artillery took up the slack to within about 250 meters and theorganic weaponry of the defenders provided close-in fires. Thesystem was balanced and effective but, if any part were eliminated,the defenders would have paid a much higher price in casualties.Both General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds were unstinting in

(*) Many of these young men exhibited a maturity beyond theiryears. One message, scrawled on the back of a C-ration cartonby an anonymous Marine, was found after the siege. It read:"Life has a special flavor to those who fight for it that thesheltered never know."

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their praise of all supporting arms, as well as the logisticaleffort; they stressed, and stressed heavily, that the defenseof Khe Sanh was a joint endeavor. The highly successful results

were achieved through the contributions of all U. S. Services

and the South Vietnamese. While the Marines had been unable tofind an infantryman who could carry a 27-ton payload, neither

had 'the U. S. Air Force come up with a B-52 which could man a

foxhole. Both, in their own way, were essential.(229)

The Khe Sanh story again became news in late June 1968

and the old controversy over strategy was rekindled. Prior to

leaving his post as ComUSMACV on 11 June, General Westmoreland

visited PCV Headquarters in I Corps and approved the recommenda-

tions of Generals ushman and Rosson to raze the KSCB and with-

draw all Allied forces to the Ca Lu area. While GeneralWestmoreland made the decision prior to his departure,, he did

not close the base at that time, because mopping-up operations

were being conducted around Khe Sanh. In addition, large

amounts of supplies had been stockpiled there and the general

deemed it more economical to maintain the base while these

stocks were consumed in support of the operations rather than

backhaul them to Ca Lu. For these reasons, he left the choiceconcerning the optimum time to dismantle the installation up to

his successor, General Abrams. When bulldozers finally began

to level the bunkers and structures which had housed the 26th

Marines throughout the siege, the American people wondered why

the base had been so tenaciously defended if it was to be

eventually abandoned. Had American blood been shed in vain?Critics of the hold-out policy argued that,in the final analysis,

they had been right and those who decided to defend the base

had been wrong. Such rationale pinpointed the inability of

many Americans to break away from the techniques employed in

past wars and recognize the pecularities of the conflict in

Vietnam.

There were several reasons for the deactivation of the KSCB

since, for all practical purposes, the base had outlived its

usefulness. The rationale endorsed by General Cushman and

General Rosson was threefold. First, the enemy had reduced his

forces and changed his modus operandi in the Khe Sanh area.

Secondly, the NVA artillery in Laos had accurately targeted the

base and access road which compounded the casualty and resupply

problems. Finally and most important, General Cushman had suf-

ficient assets in June to pursue the mobile offensive strategy

which he had advocated strongly for such a long time. Two U. S.

Army divisions (i.e. 1st ACD and the 101st Airborne) with their

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inherent helicopter resources had been shifted to III MAF and,during March and April ,the tremendous logistics burden associatedwith the introduction of these 50,000 men into northern I Corpshad been alleviated. Since he had sufficient maneuver elementsto go on the offense in western Quang Tn Province, GeneralCushman no longer needed five battalions buttoned up in KheSanh. (230)

An additional consideration for the abandonment of the basewas President Johnson's announcement on 31 March that the U. S.would end air strikes in North Vietnam.(*) While the decisionwas a major step toward peace, it also enabled thousands of NVAsupport persomiel who were responsible for road repair in NorthVietnam to move further south. These workers constructed a net-work of infiltration arteries which bypassed the combat base andthe continued policy of positioning static Allied defense in-stallations in the path of these routes would have been inefficientand undesirable. In this regard, the best defense was a highlymobile offense and while a forward operating base for such oper-ations was essential, the LZ Stud/Ca Lu area was much bettersuited than 1e Sanh.(231)

By the time PEGASUS was over, LZ Stud was in full oper-ation. The airstrip was extended to accommodate C-123s, aForce Logistics Area was established, and local defenses werestrengthened. The base was outside the range of the NorthVietnamese 130mm and 152mm guns in Laos and the stretch ofRoute 9 from Ca Lu to the Rockpile and eventually Dong Ha waseasier to keep open. Thus, two factors- -enemy shelling andresupply problems- -which had negated the effectiveness of KheSanh as a base of operations were absent at LZ Stud.

While not physically located on the Khe Sanh Plateau, theforces at LZ Stud controlled it. Two forward fire bases wereestablished in the vicinity of the old combat base from whichextensive patrolling was conducted. Ground patrols were sup-plemented by air surveillance. Whenever contact with the enemywas made, lighting-fast helicopter assaults were launched fromLZ Stud and were supported by the artillery of the forward firebases, tacticalaireraft, and Huey gunships. The enemy wasattacked by these mobile forces whenever and wherever he appeared.

(*) The attacks were halted except in the area north of thedemilitarized zone where the continuing enemy buildup directlythreatened Allied forward positions and where the movements oftheir troops and supplies clearly related to that threat.

150

When a major NVA unit was encountered, sufficient reinforcementswere also injected by helicopter. So, the only thing thatchanged on the Khe Sanh Plateau, besides the face of the combatbase, was the style and tempo of operations.(232)

The new strategy by no means diminished the accomplishmentsof the men who had held Khe Sanh; it was simply a continuationof the battle in another form. When the leaders in Hanoi finallyaccepted President Johnson's peace overtures and consented tomeet with U. S. representatives in Paris, there was one thingthat the North Vietnamese negotiators did not possess- -the battle

standard of the 26th Marines. An editorial in the WashingtonStar provided an appropriate tribute to the men of Khe Sanh:

To be sure, Khe Sanh will be a subject of con-troversy for a long time, but this much about it is

indisputable: It has won a large place in the historyof the Vietnam war as an inspiring example of American

and Allied valor. One day, in fact, the victory overthe siege may be judged a decisive turning point that

finally convinced the enemy he could not win.(233)

151

APPENDIX A

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND FOOTNOTES

Exp1anaçy Note: Unless otherwise noted the material in thismonograph is derived from Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, USN, andGeneral William C. Westmoreland, USA, Report On The War InVietnam, hereafter Sharp and Westmoreland, Rrt On The War;Maj John J. Cahill, USMC, and Jack Shulimson, "History of U. S.Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Juri65"; FMFPac, Oper-ations of U. S. Marine Forces Vietnam, Nar67-Apr68, hereafterFMFPac Marine Qpns in Vietnam; Fi'Pac, U. S. Marine Corps Forcesin Vietnam Mar65-Sep67 Historical Summary, Volume I: Narrative,hereafter FMFPac HistSum; III MAF Command Chronologies Apr67-Apr68, hereafter III MAP CmdChron; 3d Marine Division CommandChronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter 3d MarDiv CmdChron; 1stMarine Aircraft Wing Command chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, here-after 1st MAW mdChron; 26th Marines Command Chronologies,Apr67 -Apr68, hereafter 26th Marines CmdChron; 1/26 C' ndChronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter 1/26 CmdChron; 2/26 -mmandChronologies, Jan68-Apr68, hereafter 2/26 cmdChron; 3/26 Coh. 'ndChronologies, Juri67-Apr68, hereafter 3/26 cmdChron; 3d MarinesKhe Sanh Operations After Action Report, 9Jun67, hereafter 3dMarines the Sanh AAR; VMGR-152 Command Chronologies Jan68-Apr68,hereafter VMGR-152 CmdChron; Marine Corps Command Center, Statusof Forces, Apr68, hereafter MCCC Status of Forces; Defense In-telligence Bulletins Dec67-Apr68, hereafter DIA IntBul; SixMonth Evaluation Report, prepared by HQ, MACV 31May68; Presenta-tion of LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, in 1968 GeneralOfficers Symposium Book, HQMC, dtd 15Jul68; CG, FMFPac msg toCMC dtd 200327Z t1ar68; Combat Operations After Action Report,Operation PEGASUS (C), hereafter PEGASUS MR; Gen ii1iam C.Westmoreland ltr to CMC dtd 14Dec68, Subj: Review of the draftmanuscript "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafterWestmoreland Comments; LtGen Lewis W. Walt Interviews with HistBrdtd 17Dec67 and 14Jan69; LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, ltrto Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HQMC, dtd 26Dec68,Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter CushmanComments; LtGeri Herman Nickerson, USMC, memo to Assistant Chiefof Staff, G-3, HQMC, dtd Dec68, Subj: Review of draft manu-script, "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafter NickersonComments; LtGen William B. Rosson, USA, ltr to CMC dtd 18Dec68,Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter RossonComments; LtGen John J. Tolson, III, USA, ltr to CMC dtd 21Jan69,

152

Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter Tolson Comments;MajGen Norman J. Anderson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division,HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: Khe Sanh Historical Monograph, here-after Anderson Corrmients; MajGen Louis Metzger, USMC, memo toAssistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HQMC, dtd 23Dec68, Subj: "TheBattle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Metzger Comments;MajGen John R. Chaisson comments on draft manuscript, "TheBattle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Chaisson CoinmentsInterview with MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, USMC, dtd 26Aug68No. 3088 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC), hereafterTomkins Interview; Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) comments ondraft manuscript, "The Battle of The Sành," dtd 9Dec68,. here-after DCSIAir Comments; BGen Robert P. Keller, USMC, ltr toDeputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 17Dec68,Subj: "The Battle of The Sanh," hereafter Keller Comments;BGen Harry C. Olson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC,dtd 13Jan69, Subj. "The Battle of The Sanh," hereafter 01Comments; BGen Carl W. Hoffman, USMC, ltr to CMC (Code AO3D)dtd 22Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of The Sanh," hereafter HoffmanComments:; Chief, USAF Historical Division Liaison Office ltr toHistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 18Dec68, Subj: Review ofHistorical Study, "The Battle of The Sanh"; Chief, HistoricalStudies Branch, USAF Historical Division ltr to HistBr, G-3Division, HQMC, dtd 22Jan69, Subj: Review of Historical Study,"The Battle of The Sanh"; Chief, Project CORONA HARVEST ltr toHistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 15Jan69, Subj: Review of DraftManuscript, "The Battle of The Sanh," hereafter Air ForceHistorical Comments; Interview with Col David E. Lownds, USMC,dtd Jul68, No. 801674/4 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC),hereafter Lownds Jul Interview; Col David E. Lownds, USMC, Inter-view with HistBr dtd 13Sep68, hereafter Lownds Interview;Col Frank E. Wilson, USMC, ltr to HistEr, G-3 Division, HQMC,dtd 6Jan69, Subj: Review of "The Battle of Khe Sanh," here-after Wilson Comments; Col Bruce F. Meyers, USMC, ltr to HistBr,G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 16Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of The Sanh"hereafter Meyers Comments; Interview with Ccl Franklin N. Pippin,USMC, dtd 24Jun68, No. 2907 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,HQMC); Interview with Col Johnnie C. Vance, Jr., USMC, dtd20Jun68, No. 2909 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); ColRobert D. Brown, USAF, ltr to HQMC (AD3D) dtd 8Jan69, Subj:"The Battle of The Sanh" hereafter Brown Comments; Col RobertE. Brofft, USAF, ltr to HQMC (AO3D) dtd 8Jan69, Subj: Monograph,"The Battle of The Sanh," hereafter Brof ft Comments; LtCol JohnF. Mitchell, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 31Jan69,Subj: Comments on "The Battle of The Sanh," hereafter MitchellComments; LtCol Harry L. Alderman, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3

153

Division, HQMC, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter

Alderman Comments; LtCol James B. Wilkinson, USMC, ltr toHistBr, G-3 Division, HQIMC, dtd Dec68, Subj: Response to HQMC

ltr AO3D-rem S807 373 of 6Dec68, "The Battle of Khe Sanh,"hereafter Wilkinson Conuents; LtCol John A. Hennelly, USMC,comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh" of15Feb69, hereafter Hennelly Comments; Interview with LtColEdward J. A. Castagna, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral HistoryCollection, HistBr, HQHC); LtCol Francis J. Heath, Jr., USMC,comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Heath Comments; LtCol Frederick J. McEwan,USMC, Itr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 30Dec68, Subj:Comments on "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafterMcEwan Comments; LtCol Johnny 0. Gregerson, USMC, ltr to HistBr,G-3, HQMC dtd 3Jan69, Subj: Review of a draft copy of thehistorical monograph: "The Battle of The Sanh, Apr67-Apr68,"hereafter Gregerson Comments; LtCol John C. Studt, USMC, ltr toHistBr, G-3, HQMC dtd 24Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of The Sanh"manuscript, hereafter Stut Comments; Interview with LtCol HarryT. Hagaman, USMC, dtd 2Mar68, No. 2548 (Oral History Collection,HistBr, HQMC); LtCol William J, White, USMC, comments on draftmanuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" n.d., here-after White Comments: Interview withMaj William J. Sullivan,USUC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,HQMC); Maj John A. Shepherd,USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division,HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: "The Battle of The Sanh, Apr67-Apr68"hereafter Shepherd Comments; aped comments of Maj Matthew P.Caulfield, USMC, on the draft manuscript, "The Battle of KheSanh, Apr67-Apr68" dtd 2Jan69, hereafter Caulfield Comments;Interview with Maj Matthew P. Caulfield, USMC, dtd 10Feb68,No. 2535 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Maj Wayne M.Wills, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj:Historical Monograph, "The Battle of The Sanh, Apr67-Apr68,"hereafter Wills Comments; Maj Harper L. Bohr, USMC, ltr toHistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 18Dec68, Subj: Comments concerning"The Battle of The Sanh" hereafter Bohr Comments; Maj Jerry E.Hudson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMO, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: Re-

view of Historical Monograph of The Sanh, hereafter HudsonComments; Maj Mirza M. Baig, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division,HQMC dtd 23Dec68, Subj: Comments on draft manuscript, "TheBattle of The Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter Baig Comments; MajWilliam H. Dabney, USMC, comments on draft manuscript nd, "TheBattle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter Dabney Comments; MajWilliam H. Dabney, USMC, Interview with HistBr dtd 10Jan69;Maj Earl G. Breeding, USMC, comments on draft manuscript dtd22Dec68, "The Battle of The Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter

154

Breeding Comments; Interview with Capt Earl G. Breeding, dtdJul68, No. 2121 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Ma]Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, n.d.,Sub]: Khe Sanh Manuscript, hereafter Comments; Interviewwith Capt Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (OralHistory Collection, HistBr, HQHC); istLt James M. Alexander,USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, n.d., Sub]: "The Battleof Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter Alexander Comments; Inter-view with lstLt James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with lstLtWilliam L, Everhart, USMC, dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral HistoryCollection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with Sgt Timothy B. Keady,USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC);Interview with HN3 Frank V. Calzia, USN, dtd Mar68, No. 2621(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LCpl Michael A. Barry,USMC, Interview with HistBr dtd 17Feb69; Cornelius D. Sullivan,et al., The Vietnam War: Its Conduct and Direction(Washington, D. C.: The Center For Strategic Studies, GeorgetownUniversity, 1968) (U), hereafter Sullivan, et al., The VietnamWar; Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nains (New York: FrederickA. Praeger, 1965 ed.) (U); Colonel Robert D. Heini, Jr., USMC,Soldiers of the Sea (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute1962 ed.) (U); Capt Ken Kashiwahara, USAF, "Lifeline to KheSanh," The Airman, v. XII, no. 7 (Jul68) (U), hereafterKashiwah.ara, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh"; Washigon Star, 25May68,p. 13 (Early Bird) (U); Washington Star, 9Jun68, p. l-E (EarlyBird); Baltimore Sun, 25May68, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U). Alldocumentary material cited is located in the HistBr, G-3 Division,HQMC and, unless otherwise noted, carries an overall classifi-cation of Secret.

155

(1) Major John J. Cahill, USMC and Jack Shulimson, "Historyof U. S. Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Jun65,"

pp. 67, 68, 126 (s).

(2) FMFPac, Marine Opns in Vietnam, Jun67, pp. 5-12 (s).

(3) Ibid.

(4) 3d MarDiv mdChron, Oct68, p. 11 (S).

(5) FMFPac, Marine Opns in Vietnam, Mar67, p. 15 (S).

(6) 3d Marines Khe Sanh AAR, p. 7 Cs); Bernard B. Fall,The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Frederick A. Praeger1965 ed.), p. 3.

(7) Westmoreland Comments.

(8) 3d Marines, Khe Sanh MR, p. 12 (s).

(9) Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt Interview with Histori-cal Branch dtd 17Dec68 and 14Jan69 CS).

(10) 3d Marines Khe Sanh AR, pp. 7-30 (s).

(11) Ibid

(12) Ibid., pp. 32-33 CS).

(13) FNFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam, May67, p. 11 (5).

(14) Ibid., pp. 7-10, 19 (5).

(15) FMFPae HistSum, pp. 7-17 (5).

(16) FHFPac Marine ns in Vietnam, Jul67, pp. 9-13 CS).

(17) Ibid.

(18) FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam Sep67, pp. 52-73 (5); 3dMarDiv ComdChron, Sep67, p. 25 Cs); Chaisson Comments;Personal observations of the author.

(19) Westmoreland Comments; Metzger Comments.

(20) FMFPac, Marine Opns in Vietnam, Oct67, pp. 24-36 Cs).

156

(21) Metzger Comment s.

(22) 26th Marins Omdhron, May67, p. 4 (s).

(23) Ibid.

(24) 26th Marines mdChron, Jun67, p. 4 CS).

(25) Ibid., Jul67, p. 4 (S).

(26) Col Lownds tape No. 801 674/4 (S); 26th Marines CmdChron,Aug67, p. 4 (S); Metzg Comments.

(27) Wilkinson Comments.

(28) Col Lownds Tape No. 801 674/4 Cs); 26th Marines CmdChron,Aug67, p. 4 (s), Brown Comments.

(29) 26th Marines CmdChron, Nov67, p. 4 (S).

(30) cushman Comments; Hoffman Comments.

(31) 26th Marines CmdChron, Dec67, p. 4 CS).

(32) Alderman Comments.

(33) Bohr Comments.

(34) Hudson Comments.

(35) FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam, Jan 68, pp. 8, 9; IIIMAF cmdChron, Jan and Feb68 Cs); 26th Marines mdOhron,Feb68, p. 60 Cs); Lownds Interview CS).

(36) Lownds Interview Cs); 3/26 mdChron, Jan68, p. 10(S); Caulfield Comments.

(37) Lownds Interview CS); 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68,p. 4 Cs).

(38) 3/26 CmdChron, Jan68, p. 3 CS).

(39) 2/26 CmdChron, Jan68, p. 2 CS).

(40) Ibid.; Breeding Comments; Caulfield Comments.

157

(41) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); LowndsInterview (S).

(42) FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam, Jan68, p. 10 (S).

(43) 26th Marines mdChron, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 Cs); 3L26 CrndChron,Jan68, p. 3 Cs); Alderman Comments; Dabney Comments;Caulfield Comments.

(44) Ibid.

(45) Dabney Comments.

(46) Ibid.; 26th dchron, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 Cs); 3/26 cndChron,Jan68, p. 3 (S); Alderman Comments; Dabney Comments.

(47) Ibid.

(48) cushman Comments; Tompkins Interview Cs); o4! 2Interview CS); Wilkinson Comments; Pipes Comments; 26thMarines cmdChron, Jan68, p. 5 (5).

(49) Caulfield Comments.

(50) Alderman Comments.

(51) Caulfield Comments.

(52) Ibid.

(53) 3L2 CmdChron, Jan 68, p • 3 Cs); Caulfield Comments.

(54) Lownds Interview Cs); Interview with Major MatthewP. Caulfield, USMC dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral HistoryCollection, HistBr, HQMC) Cs); Caulfield Comments.

(55) Dabney Comments; Caulfield Comments,

(56) Ibid.; 26th Marines cmdchron, Jan68, p. 4 Cs); LowndsInterview; White Comments,

(57) Pipes Comments.

(58) Wilkinson Comments,

(59) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, p. 4 CS); Hudson Comments.

158

(60) Interview with First Lieutenant William L. Everhart,dtd 10Feb68 No. 2535 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,HQMC) (S); Hennelly Comments.

(61) 26th Marines mdChron, Jan68, p. 9 (S); FMFPac MarineOpns in Vietnam, Jan68, p. 11 (S); Tompkins Interview(S); Hudson Comments.

(62) Lownds Interview (S).

(63) 26th Marines Cmdhron, Jan68, p. 9 (S).

(64) ushman Comments.

(65) Ibid.; Westmoreland Comments.

(66) Westmoreland Comments.

(67) Ibid.; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on The War, p. 163.

(68) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 4, 11 (S); Lownds

Sel Interview (S).

(69) Lownds §2 Interview (s); Baig Comments.

(70) Wilkinson Comments.

(71) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, p. 4 (S); LowndsInterview; Wilkinson Comments.

(72) 26th Marines mdChron, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (5); III MAFCmdChron, Jan68, pp. 3-10 (S).

(73) Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on The War, p. 158.

(74) Presentation of Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman,Jr., USMC, in 1968 General Officers Symposium Book,dtd 15Jul68 (S).

(75) Sullivan, et al,, The Vietnam War, pp. 101-104.

(76) Ibid., Sharp and Westrnoreland, Report on The War, p. 235.

(77) Ibid.

(78) Sullivan, et al., The Vietnam War, p. 99.

159

(79) Ibid.

(80) L2ds Jul Interview (s).

(81) Ibid.

(82) Ibid.; CG FMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 200327Z Mar68 Cs).

(83) Lownds Jul and Interviews (S).

(84) Dabnejr Comments.

(85) Ibid.

(86) Ibid.

(87) Ibid.; Caulfield Comments.

(88) Dabney Comments.

(89) Lownds Jul. Interview (s).

(90) Mitchell Comments.

(91) Lownds Jul and Interviews CS); Tompkins Interview (S).

(92) Ibid.; Mitchell Comments.

(93) 26th Marines mdChron, Feb68, p. 8 (S); Interview withCaptain Earl G. Breeding, USMC, dtd Jul68, No. 2121(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S): BreedingComments.

(94) Ibid.

(95) Ibid.

(96) Ibid.; Dabn Comments.

(97) Ibid.

(98) White Comments.

(99) 26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, pp. 8-10 (S); TompkinsInterview CS).

160

(100) Ibid.; Lownds Jul Interview (S); Hennelly Comments.

(101) Hennelly Comments.

(102) Hudson Comments.

(103) Wilkinson Comments.

(104) Lownds Interview; Caulfield Comments.

(105) Arider son Comments.

(106) Westrnoreland Comments; White Comments; 26th MarinesCmdCh'ron, Feb68, pp. 4-8 (s).

(107) DIA IntBul.

(108) 26th Marines mdChron, Feb68, pp. 8, 48 (S); MitchellComments.

(109) Ibid.

(110) Lance Corporal Michael A. Barry Interview with HistBr,dtd 17Feb69.

(111) ibid.

(112) 26th Marines rndChron, Feb68, pp. 8, 48, 49 (S);Mitchell Comments.

(113) 26th Marines ndhron, Feb68, p. 49 CS).

(114) ibid., p. 51 Cs).

(115) Air Force Historical Comments; 1st MAW CmdChron, Feb68,p.8(S).

(116) Wilkinson Comments; White Comments.

(117) 26th Marines CrndChron, Feb68, p. 51 Cs); Kashiwahara,tiLifeline to Khe Sanh".

(118) Ibid.; Lownds Interview CS).

(119) VMGR -152 CrndChron, Feb68, p. 4 Cs); Gregerson Comments.

161

(120) Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh"; Meyers Comments;

Brown Comments; Air Force Historical Comments.

(121) Ibid.; Lownds Jul Interview (s).

(122) Ibid.

(123) Information provided by the Marine Corps Command Centeron 19Feb68.

(124) Ibid.

(125) 1st MAW cmdhron., Jan, Feb, Mar68 (S); Wilson Comments.

(126) Ibid.

(.127) Dabney Comments.

(128) Ibid.

(129) Wilson Comments.

(130) DC S/Air Comments.

(131) Breeding Comments.

(132) See 1st MAW CmdChron, Jan, Feb, Mar68 (5); CG FMFPacmsg to CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68 (5).

(133) Wilkinson Comments.

(134) CG F1'WPac Msg to CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68 (5); Lownds JulInterview (5).

(135) See 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan, Feb, and Mar68 (s).

(136) Lownds Interview (S).

(137) 26th Marines cmdChron, Jan, Feb, and Mar68 (S); LowndsInterview; Interview with Major William J. Sullivan,

USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection,Hi stBr, HQMC) (S); Hennelly Comments; Gregerson Comme!;Air Force.Historical Comments.

(138) 1st MAW CmdChron, Jan and Feb68 (5).

162

(139) Ibid., Debrief Sheets (s).

(140) Dabn Comments.

(141) 1st MAW CmdChron, Feb 68, p. 2-2 Cs); jes Comments.

(142) Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Hagaman,USMC, dtd 2Mar68, No. 2548 (Oral History Collection,HistBr, HQMC) (C).

(143) Information sup1ied by U. S. Air Force Public Informa-tion Office, 16Oct68 (U); Chaisson Comments; Air ForceHistorical Comments; Brofft Comments.

(144) Tompkins Interview Cs).

(145) Ibid.; Lownds Interview Cs); Kashiwahara, "Lifelineto Khe Sanh."

(146) Air Force Historical Comments; 26th Marines Cmdhron,Jan, Feb and Mar68 Cs); Tompkins Interview, Bai,g Comments.

(147) Gregerson Comments.

(148) Lownds Jul Interview (S); Interview with Major WilliamJ. Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral HistoryCollection, HistBr, HQMC) CS); Gregerson Comments.

(149) Lownds Interview CS); Interview with First Lieu-tenant James M. Alexander, U5MC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621(Oral History Collection, HistBr, 1-IQMC) CS). Henne]yConiments.

(150) Interview with Major William J. Sullivan, USMC, dtd26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,HQMC) (S); Interview with First Lieutenant James M.Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 COral HistoryCollection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); 26th Marines cmdchron,Jan, Feb and Mar 68 CS); Greerson Comments.

(151) Ibid.

(152) Ibid.

(153) Lownds Interview; Hennelly Comments.

163

(154) Hennelly Comments.

(155) Bai Comments.

(156) Hennelly Comments.

(157) Ibid.; 26th Marines CrndChron, Jan, Feb and Mar68 (S);

Bag Comments.

(158) Ibid.

(159) Baig Comments.

(160) Ibid.

(161) Ibid.

(162) Ibid.; Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. A.Castagna, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral HistoryCollection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Colonel Robert D. Heinl,Jr., USMC, Soldiers of the Sea (Annapolis: United States

Naval Institute 1962 ed.) p. 563.

(163) Ba Comments.

(164) Six Month Evaluation Report, HQ USMACV, 31May68 (5);

Interview with Colonel Franklin N. Pippin, USMC, dtd24Jun68, No. 2907 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,HQMC) (s).

(165) 1/26 OmdChron, Jan and Feb68 (S); CG FMFPac msg to CMCdtd 200327Z Mar68 (S); InEormation provided by Research,Development, and Study Division, HQMC, 8Nov68 (U);Lownds Jul Interview (S).

(166) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan and Feb68 (S); Lownds Juland Interviews (S).

(167) 26th Marines ndchron, Jan, Feb and Mar68 (s).

(168) Dabney Comments.

(169) Ibid.

(170) Lownds Interview (S); Interview with Sergeant Timothy

B. Keady, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral HistoryCollection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).

164

(171) Baltimore Sun, 25 May, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U).

(172) Interview with First Lieutenant James M. Alexander, USMC,dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,HQMC) (S); Interview with Major William J. Sullivan,USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History CollectiOn,HistBr, HQMC) (S); Interview with Colonel Johnnie C.Vance, Jr., USMC, dtd 20Jun68,No. 2909 (Oral HistoryCollection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Interview with Major JohnA. Shepherd, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral HistoryCollection, HistBr, HQMC) (5).

(173) Shepherd Comments.

(174) Lownds Interview (S).

(175) Lownds Jul Interview (S).

(176) Ibid.; Tkins Interview (s).

(177) Keller Comments.

(178) Wilkinson Comments.

(179) 26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, End 1 (5).

(180) Ibid.

(181) Lownds Interview (S); Interview with 1-1113 Class

Frank V. Caizia, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral HistoryCollection, HistBr, HQMC) (5).

(182) Ibid.; Interview with Captain Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC,dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,HQMC) (s).

(183) Ibid.

(184) Ibid.; 26th Marines cmdChron, Feb68, End 1 (S).

(185) Lownds Jul and Interviews (S).

(186) Ibid.; 26th Marines CmdChron, Mar68, p. 4 (S); BaigComments.

(187) 26th Marines cmdhron, Mar68, pp. 3, 4 (S.); WilkinsonComments.

165

(188) Ibid.; Lownds Interview.

(189) 26th Marines crndChron, Mar68, p. 8 (s).

(190) Ibid., pp. 11, 12.

(191) Ibid., p. 7.

(192) Ibid., pp. 7, 8.

(193) Ibid., p. 6.

(194) Ibid., p. 10 (s)

(195) Ibid.; White Comments.

(196) Ibid.; McEwan Comment s; Pipes Comments.

(197) 26th Marines ndChron, Mar68, pp. 9, 10, and End 1.

(198) Ibid.; Baig Comments.

(199) MCCC, Status of Forces, Apr 68 (S); Lowndsview (S); PEGASUS AAR, pp. 1-4.

(200) PEGASUS AAR, End 1 (C); Westmoreland Comments; CushmanComments.

(201) Ibid.

(202) Tolson Comments.

(203) Ibid.

(204) PEGASUS AAR, End I (C); Rosson Comments.

(205) Ibid.

(206) Ibid.

(207) Ibid.; Lownds Jul and Interviews (S).

(208) PEGASUS AAR, End 1 (C).

(209) Ibid.

166

(210) Ibid.; Lownds Jul and Interviews (s); TolsonCoimnents.

(211) PEGASUS MB, pp. 13, 14 Cc).

(212) Ibid., End 1.

(213) Ibid.

(214) 3/26 crndChron, Apr68, p. 4 Cs); Studt Comments; ersComments.

(215) Ibid.; Caulfield Comments.

(216) Ibid.; Dabney Comments.

(217) Caulfield Comments.

(218) Meyers Comments.

(219) 3/26 rndChron, Apr68, p. 4 Cs); Meyers Comments; Studt

Comments.

(220) Caulfield Comments

(221) PEGASUS MR.

(222) Ibid.; 26th Marines dChron, Apr68, p. 4 (5); CaulfieldComments.

(223) Baltimore Sun, 25May68, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U);Washington Star, 25May68, p. 13 (Early Bird) (U).

(224) Ibid.

(225) Olson Comments.

(226) Cushman Comments.

(227) Alderman Comments; Caulfield Comments.

(228) Baig Comments.

(229) Tompkins Interview; Lownds Jul and § Interview CS).

167

(230) Westinoreland Comments; Cushman Comments; Ros sonComments.

(231) Ibid.

(232) Ibid.

(233) Washington Star, 9Jun68, p. 1-E (Early Bird) (U).

168

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

AAR After Action Report

ABCCC Airborne Command and Control Center

A-4 Skyhawk A single-seat, lightweight, jet attackbomber in service with Navy and MarineCorps squadrons. Built by Douglas.

AN/PRC-25 U. S.-built, short-range, portable, fre-quency-modulated radio set used to pro-vide two-way communication in the 30 mega-cycle to 75.95 megacycle band.

AN/TPQ-lO U. S.-built, ground-based radar systemused to guide aircraft on bombing missions.

A-i Skyraider U. S.-butlt, prop-driven, attack aircraftbuilt by Douglas.

Atc Light Operational name for B-52 strikes in SouthVietnam.

ARVN Army of The Republic of Vietnam.

A-6A Intruder U. S. Navy and Marine Corps twin-engine,low-altitude, jet attack bomber specifi-cally designed to deliver ordnance ontargets completely obscured by weather ordarkness. Carries a heavier and morevaried load than any other U. S. navalattack aircraft. Built by Grumman.

ASRT Air Support Radar Team

BDA Battle Damage Assessment

Bde Brigade

B-52 Stratofortress USAF eight-engine, swept-wing heavy jetbomber. Built by Boeing.

BLT Battalion Landing Team

169

CAC Combined Action Company

CACO Combined Action Company Oscar

CavSqd (e.go 1/9) 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry

C-4 Plastic explosives

CG, 1st MarDiv Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

CG, FMFPac Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,Pacific

CG, 3d MarDiv Commanding General, 3d Marine Division

CG, III MAF Commanding General, III Marine AmphibiousForce

ChiCom Chinese Communist

CH-53A Sea Stallion U. S.-built, single-rotor, heavy assaulttransport helicopter powered by two shaf t-turbine engines with an average payloadof 12,800 pounds. Full-sized rear openingwith built-in ramp permits loading of105mm howitzer and carriage. Externalsling will accommodate a 155mm howitzer(towed). Carries crew of 3 plus 38 combattroops or 24 litters. Built by Sikorsky.

CH-46D Sea Knight U. S.-built, medium transport, twin-turbine, tandem rotor helicopter withan average payload of 4,800 pounds. Hasrear loading ramp and external slingmount. Carries crew of 3 plus 25 combattroops or 15 litters and 2 attendants.Built by Boeing.

CIDG Civilian Irregular Defense Group

Claymore U. S.-built, directional antipersonnelland mine employed above ground andnormally in an upright position.

CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps

170

CrndChron Command Chronology

CO Commanding Officer

ComUSMACV Commander, U. S. Military AssistanceCommand, Vietnam

CP Command Post

CS Designation for tear gas

DASC Direct Air Support Center

D-Day Day scheduled for the commencement of anoperation.

DIA IntBul Defense Intelligence Agency IntelligenceBulletin

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

EC-l2l Super USAF and USN four-engine, prop-driven,Constellation long-range, heavy transport modified with

special equipment for radar early warningpatrols and electronic warfare duty.Built by Lockheed.

FADAC Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer

FDC Fire Direction Center

F-8 Crusader U. S. Navy and Marine Corps supersonic,single-seat, single-engine, jet fighterwith afterburner. Primarily used in SouthVietnam in an attack role. Carries air-to-air and air-to-ground ordnance. Builtby LTV Vought Aeronautics.

F-4B Phantom II U. S. Navy and Marine Corps twin-engine,two-seat, supersonic fighter/attack jetwith afterburners; has dual role of inter-ceptor and bomber. Of all U. S. navalattack aircraft, F-4B carries secondlargest payload. Built by McDonnell.

F-4C U. S. Air Force model of the Phantom II.

171

1st ACD 1st Air Cavalry Division

1st MarDiv 1st Marine Division

1st MAW 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

FOB-3 Forward Operating Base 3

F-100 Super Sabre Single-engine, jet (with afterburner)sweptwing, supersonic fighter-bomber; inproduction since 1953, the F-lOO was thefirst supersonic operational fighter de-veloped for the U. S. Air Force. Carriesair-to-air and air-to-ground ordnance.Built by North American.

F-105 Thunderchief U. S. Air Force supersonic, single-seat,single-engine, jet fighter/bomber withafterburner. Built by Republic.

FMFPac Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

FD Forward Observer

FSCC Fire Support Coordination Center

GCA Ground Controlled Approach

GPES Ground Proximity Extraction System

Grenade Launcher, U. S.-built, single-shot, break-open,M-79 breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires

40mm projectiles and weighs approximately6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sus-tained rate of aimed fire of 5-7 roundsper minute and an effective range of 375meters.

Gun, 100mm M1944 Soviet-built, dual purpose field and anti-tank gun introduced toward the close ofWorld War II; it weighs 7,628 pounds, is30.9 feet in length and has a muzzle ye-1oity of 900 meters per second. Maximumrange is 21,000 meters and maximum rateof fire is 8-10 rounds per minute. Is

recognizable by long tube, double-barrelmuzzle brake, dual wheels, and sloping shield.

172

Gun, 130mm Soviet-built fieldpiece which utilizeseither a limber for transport or is self-propelled. Towed weapon weighs 19,000pounds, is 38 feet in length, and has amuzzle velocity of 930 meters per second.Maximum range is 27,000 meters and maxi-mum rate of fire is 6-7 rounds per minute.Tube has a multi-perforated muzzle brake.

Gun, 175mm U. S.-built, self-propelled gun whichweighs 62,100 pounds and fires a 147-pouidprojectile to a maximum range of 32,800meters. Maximum rate of fire is 1/2 roundper minute.

Hand Grenade, U., S,-manufactured, hand-thrown bomb,

Fragmentation whthh weighs approximately one pound,

M-26 and contains an explosive charge in abody that shatters into small fragments;it has an effective range of 40 meters.

H&I Harassment and Interdiction

H&S Co Headquarters and Service Company

HistBr Historical Branch

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

Howitzer, 105mm U. S.-built, towed, general purpose light

M2A1 artillery piece; the weapon is mountedon a carriage equipped with split boxtrails and pneumatic tires. On-carriage

sighting and fire control equipment areused both for direct and indirect fire.The piece weighs 4,980 pounds, is 19.75feet in length, has a muzzle velocityof470 meters per second, and a maximum rangeof 11,155 meters. Maximum rate of fireis 4 rounds per minute.

Howitzer, 155mm U. S.-built, towed, medium artillery pieceMl mounted on a two-wheel, split-trail carriage

with detachable spades. The howitzer isfired from a three-point suspension, withthe trails spread and the carriage resting

173

upon an integral firing jack, the wheels

being clear of the ground. The pieceweighs 12,700 pounds, is 24 feet long,has a muzzle velocity of 560 meters persecond and a maximum range of 15,080meters. Maximum rate of fire is 3 rounds

per minute.

Howitzer, 8-inch U. S.-built, self-propelled heavy artillery

M-llO piece; 37 feet long tracked carriage isidentical to that of 175mm gun. M-110 has

a maximum range of 16,930 meters and a

rate of fire of 1/2 round per minute.

HQMC Headquarters, United States Marine Corps

IFR Instrument Flight Rules

KBA Killed By Air

KIA Killed In Action

KSCB Khe Sanh Combat Base

LAPES Low Altitude Proximity Extraction System

LSA Logistics Support Area

LZ Landing Zone

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MAC Marine Aircraft Group

Machine Gun, U. S.-built, belt-fed, recoil-operated,.50 Caliber air-cooled automatic weapon, which weighs

approximately 80 pounds without mount orammunition; it has a sustained rate offire of 100 rounds per minute and aneffective range of 1,450 meters.

Machine Gun, M-60 U. S.-built, belt-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled, 7.62mm automatic weapon, whichweighs approximately 23 pounds withoutmount or annminition; it has a sustainedrate of fire of 100 rounds per minute andan effective range of 1,100 meters.

174

_____

Marines Designation of Marine regiment

MATCU Marine Air Traffic Control Unit

Medevac Medical evacuation

Mortar, 60mm U. S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded,single-shot, high-angle of fire weapon,which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembledand fires an assortment of high explosiveand pyrotechnic rounds; it has a maximumrate of fire of 30 rounds per minute andsustained rate of fire of 18 rounds perminute; the effective range is 2,000 meters.

Mortar, 81mm U. S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded,single-shot, high angle of fire weapon,which weighs approximately 115 poundswhen assembled and fires an assortment ofhigh explosive and pyrotechnic rounds;it has a sustained rate of fire of 2 roundsper minute and an effective range of2,200-3,650 meters, depending upon theammunition used.

Mortar, 82mm Soviet-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded,single-shot, high-angle of fire weaponwhich weighs approximately 123 poundswhen assembled and fires high explosiveand pyrotechnic rounds; it has a maximumrate of fire of 25 rounds per minute anda maximum range of 3,040 meters.

Mortar, 120mm Soviet-or Chinese Communist-built, smooth-bore, drop or trigger fired, single-shot,high-angle of fire weapon, which weighsapproximately 606 pounds when assembledand fires high explosive and pyrotechnicrounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of15 rounds per minute and a maximum rangeof 5,700 meters.

Mortar, 4.2 inch U. S.-built, 107mm, rifled, muzzle-loaded,

M2 drop-fired weapon consisting of tube, base-plate and standard; weapon weighs 330pounds, is 4 feet in length, and has a

175

maximum range of 4,020 meters. Rate offire is 20 rounds per minute and utilizesboth high explosive and pyrotechnicammunition. (Five M2s were employed at

KSCB)

Mortar, 4.2-inch U. S.-built, 107mm, rifled, muzzle-loaded,M98 Howtar mortar; a towed weapon, the howtar is

mounted on a carriage with two pneumatictires. Tube and carriage weigh 1,289pounds; maximum range is 5,500 meters.

•

(Two Howtars were employed at KSCB)

M-16 U. S.-built, magazine-fed, 5,62mm gas-

operated, air-cooled shoulder weapondesigned for either semiautomatic or fullautomatic fire; fully loaded weighs 7.6pounds, fires a maximum rate of 150-200rounds per minute, and has a maximumeffective range of 460 meters.

9th MAB 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade

9th MEB 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

NVA North Vietnamese Army

O1-E U. S.-built, single engine, two-seat,prop-driven light observation aircraftbuilt by Cessna.

Ontos U. S.-built, lightly-armored trackedvehicle armed with six coaxially mounted106mm recoilless rifles. Originally de-signed as a tank killer, the Ontos isprimarily used in Vietnam to support theinfantry.

PCV Provisional Corps, Vietnam

PF Popular Forces

PMDL Provisional Military Demarcation Line

RC-292 U. S.-built, elevated, wide-band, modifiedground-plane antenna designed to operate

176

with and increase the distance range ofvarious radio sets.

Recoilless Rifle, U. S.-built, single-shot, recoilless,106mm, M4OA1 breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438

pounds when assembled and mounted forfiring; it has a sustained rate of fireof 6 rounds per minute and an effectiverange of 1,365 meters. The weapon canbe singly or Ontos mounted.

RF Regional Forces

RLT Regimental Landing Team

Rocket, 122mm A Soviet-built, four-piece, fin-stabilized,9-foot long rocket weighing 125 pounds;maximum range is approximately 17,000meters. Launcher tube and mount weigh121 pounds and are 8.1 feet in length.

RPG-2 A Soviet- and Chinese Communist-builtantitank grenade launcher; a smooth-bore,muzzle-loaded, shoulder-fired, recoillessweapon which fires a 40mm spin-stabilizedround. The weapon weighs 6.3 pounds, is3.2 feet in length, has a muzzle velocityof 84 meters per second, and an effectiverange of 100 meters. Maximum rate of fireis 4-6 rounds per minute utilizing HighExplosive Antitank ammunition.

SLF Special Landing Force

S-2 Intelligence section or officer

TA-4 Two-seat trainer model of the A-4 Skyhawk

TAC(A) Tactical Air Controller (Airborne)

TAFDS Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System

Tank, PT-76 Soviet-built, 15.4-ton, amphibious tankwith a crew of 3; primary armament isturret mounted 76mm gun and maximum thick-ness of armor is 0.6 inches.

177

Tank, M-48 U. S.-built 50.7-ton tank with a crewof 4.; primary armament is turret-mounted90mm gun with one .30 caliber and one.50 caliber machine gun. Can be con-figured with water fording equipment.Maximum road speed of 32 miles per hourand an average range of 195 miles.

TAOR Tactical Area Of Responsibility

TET Vietnamese Lunar New Year

3d MarDiv 3d Marine Division

III MAF III Marine Amphibious Force

TIO Target Intelligence/Information Officer

TOT Time On Target

UHF Ultra High Frequency

UH-1E A single-engine, Marine, light attack!Huey Gunship transport helicopter noted for its

maneuverability and firepower; carries acrew of three with seven combat troops orthree litters, two sitting casualties anda medical attendant, or 3,000 pounds ofcargo. It is armed with air to groundrocket packs and fuselage mounted, electri-cally fired machine guns.

UH-34D A 3ingle-engine, Marine, medium transportSea Horse helicopter with a crew of three; carries

16-18 combat troops or 8 litters or anormal 5,000 pound payload.

USAF United States Air Force

USA United States Army

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

VC Viet Cong

178

VFR Visual Flight Rules

VHF Very High Frequency

Viet Mirth The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam,Doe Lap Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-ledcoalition of nationalist groups whichactively opposed the Japanese in WorldWar II and the French in the early yearsof the Indo-China War.

VMA Marine Attack Squadron

VMFA Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron

VMGR Marine Mrial Refueler TransportSquadron

VMO Marine Observation Squadron

VNAF Vietnamese Air Force

VT Variable Timed fuze for artillery shellwhich causes airburst over target area.

179

APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY

1962

Aug U. S. Army Special Forces establish CIDG camp atKhe Sanh.

1966

Apr ill sweeps Khe Sanh plateau during OperationVIRGINIA.

Oct 1/3 occupies KSCB; CIDG displaces to Lang Vei.

1967

Feb 1/3 replaced by single company, E/2/9.

15 Mar Company B, 1/9, replaces E/2/9 as resident defensecompany.

20 Apr Combat assets at KSCB pass to operational controlof Col Lanigan's 3d Marines which commences Oper-ation PRAIRIE IV.

24 Apr B/l/9 patrol engages large enemy force north ofHill 861 and prematurely triggers attack on KheSanh; "Hill Fights" begin.

25 Apr 213 and 3/3 airlifted to KSCB to counter enemy drive.

28 Apr After heavy prep fires, LtCol DeLong's 2/3 assaultsand seizes first objective- -Hill 861.

2 May LtCol Wilder's 3/3 seizes Hill 881S after four daysof heavy fighting.

3 May 2/3 repulses strong enemy counterattack south of88lN.

5 May 2/3 secures final objective- -Hill 88lN.

180

11-13 "Hill Fights" terminate with 940 NVA and 155 MarineMay KIA. 3d Marines shuttled to Dong Ha as 26th Marines

(FWD) and 1/26 move into Khe Sanh.

13 May Col Padley, CO 26th Marines (FWD), relieves ColLanigan as Senior Officer Present at Khe Sanh.Elements of 1/26 occupy combat base, Hills 881S,861, and 950. Operation CROCKETT commences.

13 Jun Due to increasing enemy contacts, LtCol Hoch's3/26 airlifted to KSCB.

16 Jul Operation CROCKETT terminates with 204 NVA and 52Marines KIA.

17 Jul Operation ARDMORE begins.

12 Aug Col Lownds relieves Col Padley as CO, 26th Marines.

13 Aug Due to lack of significant contact around Khe Sanh,Company K and L, 3/26, transferred to 9th.Marinesand Operation KINGFISHER.

17 Aug Khe Sanh airfield closed to normal traffic forrepair of runway.

3 Sep Remainder of 3/26 withdrawn to eastern Quang TnProvince.

27 Oct Air strip reopened to C-123 aircraft.

31 Oct Operation ARDMORE terminated with '113 NVA and 10Marines KIA.

1 Nov Operation SCOTLAND I begins.

28 Nov MajGen Tompkins assumes command of 3d MarDiv.

13 Dec LtCol Alderman's 3/26 returns to Khe Sanh becauseof increased enemy activity in Khe Sanh TAOR.

21 Dec 3/26 conducts five-day sweep west of base and uncoversevidence of enemy buildup around KSCB.

181

1968

2 Jan Five NVA officers killed near western edge of mainperimeter.

Intelligence reports indicate influx of two NVAdivisions,, and possibly a third, into Khe Sanh TADR.

16-17 LtCol Heath's 2/26 transferred to operational controlJan of 26th Marines and arrive KSCB; 2/26 occupies Hill

558 north of base.

ASRT-B of MASS-3 displaces from Chu Lai to Khe Sarihto handle ground controlled radar bombing missions.

17 Jan Team from Company B, 3d Reconnaissance Battalionambushed near Hill 88lN,

19 Jan While searching ambush site, patrol from 1/3/26 comesunder fire from estimated 25 NVA troops and with-draws under cover of supporting arms. Two platoonsfrom M/3/26 helilifted to Hill 881S as reinforce-ments for 1/3/26 which prepares for sweep toward88lN the next day.

20 Jan Capt Dabney's 1/3/26 attacks and, with the aid ofair and artillery, badly mauls NVA battalion en-trenched on southern slopes of 88lN; 7 Marines and103 North Vietnamese KIA.

On strength of testimony of captured NVA lieutenantthat enemy attack is imminent,I/3/26 is withdrawnto 881S and base placed on Red Alert.

DASC of MASS-3 displaces to Khe Sanh.

20-21 Estimated NVA battalion attacks K/3/26 on Hill 861.Jan After penetrating southwestern portion of Marines'

perimeter, the enemy is repulsed leaving 47 dead; NVAreserves are hit by heavy air strikes and artilleryfire.

182

21 Jan KSCB comes under heavy mortar, artillery, and rocketattack which destroys main ammunition dump. NVAbattalion attacks and partially overruns Khe Sanhvillage before CAC and RF companies drive off enemy.After second attack, Col Lownds withdraws defendersto confines of combat base.

22 Jan ComUSMACV initiates Operation NIAGARA to providemassive air support for Khe Sanh.

LtCol Mitchell's 1/9 arrives KSCB and takes up po-sitions which encompass rock quarry southwest ofcombat base.

E/2/26 is relocated from Hill 558 to prominent ridge-line northeast of 861 as covering force for flank of2/26; E/2/26 passes to operational control of 3dBattalion. New position is called 861A.

23-28 Large number of tribesmen and families are evacuatedJan from Khe Sanh area to avoid hostile fire.

27 Jan 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion arrives KSCB and takes uppositions in eastern sector of combat base.

30 Jan Communists launch nation-wide TET Offensive.

5 Feb NVA battalion attacks E/2/26 on Hill 8&1A in concertwith heavy shelling of KSCB. Enemy gains footholdin northern sector of Company E perimeter but isdriven out by savage counterattack; 109 NVA and 7Marines KIA.

7 Feb Special Forces camp at Lang Vei overrun by enemybattalion supported by PT-76 Soviet-built tanks;first use of NVA tanks in South Vietnam.

8 Feb Some 3,000 indigenous personnel, both military andcivilian, from Lang Vei move overland to Khe Sanh.After being searched and processed, several hundredrefugees are air evacuated.

183

8 Feb A/l/9 combat outpost 500 meters west of 1/9 perimeterhit and partially overrun by reinforced NVA battalion.During three-hour battle, reinforcements drive NVAfrom Marine position and with aid of supporting armskill 150 North Vietnamese; Col Lownds decides toabandon outpost and units withdraw to 1/9 perimeter.

10 Feb Marine C-130 of VMGR-152, hit by enemy fire duringapproach, crashes after landing at Khe Sanh and sixare killed.

Feb- Paradrops, low-altitude extraction systems, andApr helicopters are primary means of resupplying 26th

Marines due to bad weather and heavy enemy fire.

21 Feb After heavy mortar and artillery barrage, NVA companyprobes 37th ARVN Ranger lines but withdraws afterdistant fire fight. It is estimated that 25-30 NVAwere killed.

23 Feb KSCB receives record number of incoming rounds fora single day--l,307.

First appearance of enemy trench system around KSCB.

25 Feb B/l/26 patrol ambushed south of KSCB; 23 Marines KIA.

29 Feb- Estimated NVA regiment maneuvers to attack 37th ARVN1 Mar Ranger positions but fail to reach defensive wire.

6 Mar USAF C-123 shot down east of runway; 43 tJSMC, 4 USAF,and 1 USN personnel killed0

7 Mar Large groups of refugees begin to filter intothe combat base and are evacuated.

8 Mar ARVN patrols attack enemy trenchline east of runwayand kill 26 North Vietnamese.

15 Mar American intelligence notes withdrawal of major NVAunits from Khe Sanh area.

23 Mar KSCB receives heaviest saturation of enemy rounds forthe month of March--l,109.

184

24 Mar A/l/9 patrol kills 31 NVA west of 1/9 perimeter.

25 Mar 1/9 CavSqd, 1st ACD begins reconnaissance in forceoperations east of Khe Sanh in preparation forOperation PEGASUS.

30 Mar B/l/26 attacks enemy fortified position south of combatbase and kills 115 North Vietnamese; 9 Marines are KIA.

Operation SCOTLAND I terminates with 1,602 confirmedNVA and 205 Marines KIA; estimates place probableenemy dead between 10,000 and 15,000.

Task Force KILO launches diversionary attack alongGio Linh coastal plain to divert attention away fromCa Lu where 1st ACD, and 1st Marines are staging forOperation PEGASUS.

1 Apr Operation PEGASUS begins; 2/1 and 2/3 (1st Marines)attack west from Ca Lu along Route 9. Elements of3d Bde, 1st ACD conduct helo assaults into LZ Mikeand Cates. Joint engineer task force begins repairof Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh.

3 Apr 2d Bde, 1st ACD assaults LZs Tom and Wharton.

4 Apr 1/5 CavSqd moves northwest from LZ Wharton and attacksenemy units near old French fort; 1st Battalion, 9thMarines moves southeast from rock quarry and assaultsHill 471.

5 Apr 1/9 repulses enemy counterattack on Hill 471 andkills 122 North Vietnamese.

1st Bde, 1st ACD departs Ca Lu and assaults LZ Snapper.

6 Apr One company of 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force airliftedto KSCB for the initial link up with defenders.

Elements of 2d Bde, 1st ACD relieve 1st Battalion, 9thMarines on Hill 471; 1/9 commences sweep to northwesttoward Hill 689.

185

6 Apr 1st Bde, 1st ACD helilif ted north of KSCB. 2/26 and

3/26 push north of combat base; Company G, 2/26 en-gages enemy force and kills 48 NVA.

8 Apr 2/7 CavSqd links up with 26th Marines and conductsofficial relief of combat base. 1/26 attacks tothe west.

3d ARVN Airborne Task Force air assaults into LZ Snakewest of Khe Sanh and kills 78 North Vietnamese.

10 Apr LtGen Rosson arrives Khe Sanh and directs LtGen Tolsonto disengage and prepare for Operation DELAWARE inA Shau Valley.

11 Apr Engineers complete renovation of Route 9 and road isofficially opened.

Elements of 1st ACD begin withdrawal to Quang Tn Cityin preparation for Operation DELAWARE; 37th ARVNRanger Battalion airlifted to Da Nang.

12 Apr Col Meyers relieves Col Lownds as CO, 26th Marines.

14 Apr 3/26 attacks Hill 88lN and kills 106 NVA; 6 Marinesare KIA,

15 Apr Operation PEGASUS termtnated; Operation SCOTLAND IIbegins.

18 Apr 26th Marines withdrawn to Dong Ha and Camp Carroll.

23 May President Johnson presents the Presidential UnitCitation to 26th Marines and supporting units duringWhite House ceremony.

23 Jun Although forward fire support bases are maintained inKhe Sanh area, the KSCB is dismantled and abandoned,LZ Stud at Ca Lu is selected as base for air mobileoperations in western DMZ area.

186

APPENDIX D

TASK ORGANIZATION AT KHE SANH, 24 APRIL - 13 MAY 1967

A. 3D MARINES (—) (REIN) 24APR—13MAY67

HEADQUARTER S COMPANY 2 4APR- 1 3MAY67

2D BATTALION (REIN) 26APR-13MAY67HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY(-)(REIN)

DET, HQBN, 3D MARDIVDET, HQCO, 3D MARDET, B BTRY (REIN), 1ST BN, 12TH MARDET, 15TH DENTAL CO2D CLEARING PLT (REIN), CO B, 3D MED BN1ST PLT (-) (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D MT BN1ST PLT (-) (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BNDET, LSU, FLC

COMPANY E (REIN)1ST SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLTFAC TEAMDET, MED PLTDET, INTELLIGENCE SECDET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/121ST SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BNDET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN

COMPANY F (REIN)DET, H&S CO2D SECI 81MM MORTAR PLTFAC TEAMDET, MED PLTDET, INTELLIGENCE SECDET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/122D SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BNDET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN

COMPANY G (REIN)DET, H&S CO3D SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLTDET, MED PLTDET, INTELLIGENCE SECDET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12

COMPANY H (REIN)DET, H&S CO4TH SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLTFAC TEAMDET, MED PLTDET, INTELLIGENCE SEC

187

DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/123D SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), Co A, 3D ENGR BNDET, 1ST PLT: (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN

COMPANY A, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

COMPANY D, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

COMPANY E, 2D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

3D PLT (REIN), CO B, 1ST AMTRAC BN

2D PLT (REIN), CO A, AT BN

3D PLT, CO B, 3D RECON BN

2D PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D TANK BN

106MM RR PLT

3D BATTALION (-.) (REIN)COMMAND GROUP "A"

COMPANY KFO TEAM, BTRY C, 1/12DET, H&S COFO TEAM, 81MM MORTAR PLTFAC TEAM (-)DET, MED PLT

COMPANY M

FO TEAM, BRTY C, 1/12FO TEAM, 81MM MORTAR PLTSCOUT/DOG TEAMSCOUT TEAM, 3/3

COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

COMPANY K, 3D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

COMPANY M, 3D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

COMPANY F, 2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES

COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

COMPANY A, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

188

11—1 3MAY67

11—13MAY67

13 MAY 67

11—13MAY67

12—13MAY67

25—27APR67

27APR-1MAY67

25—27APR67

2 5 APR—i 3MAY67

29APR-1 3MAY67

1MAY- 3MAY67

5— 13MAY67

1 2—13MAY67

BASE DEFENSE/RESERVE

COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 24-27APR67

COMPANY F, 2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES 27APR-1MAY67

COMPANY E, 2D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 1-12MAY67

COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 4-5MAY67

1ST BATTALION, 26Th MARINES 12—13MAY67

SUPPORTING UNITS

DIRECT SUPPORT

BATTERY F (REIN), 2/12 24APR-13MAY67BATTERY B, 1/12 27APR-.11MAY67

BATTERY A, 1/12 13MAY

189

TASK ORGANIZATION AT KHE SANH, 20 JANUARY - 1 APRIL 1968

A. 26TH MARINES

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 2OJAN- 31MAR68

1ST BATTALION 2OJAN-31MAR68

2D BATTALION 2OJAN-31MAR68

3D BATTALION 2OJAN-31MAR68

B. ATTACHED AND SUPPORTING UNITS

(1) U. S. MARINE CORPS

1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES (LESS CO "C") 22JAN-31MAR68

CO "C", 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 23JAN-31MAR68

1ST BATTALION, 13TH MARINES 2OJAN-31MAR68

1ST PROV, 155MM HOWITZER BTRY 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, 1ST SEARCHLIGHT BTRY 12TH MARINES 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, 3D ENGINEER BATTALION 2OJAN-31MAR68

COMPANY "B", 3D RECON BATTALION 2OJAN-31MAR68

3D PLATOON, COMPANY "D", 3D RECONBATTALION 2OJAN-31MAR68

1ST PLATOONS COMPANY "A", 5TH RECONBATTALION 2OJAN—31MAR68

COMPANY "A" (-) 3D ANTITANKBATTALION (REDESIGNATED ANTITANKCOMPANY (-), 3D TANK BATTALION) 2OJAN—31MAR68

COMPANY "A", 3D SIORE PARTY BATTALION 24JAN-31MAR68

DET, H&S COMPANY, 3D SHORE PARTYBATTALION 24JAN-31MAR68

2D CLEARING PLATOON, COMPANY "C"3D MED BATTALION 24JAN—31MAR68

190

OTTER PLATOON, H&S COMPANY3D MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, COMPANY "B", 9TH MOTORTRANSPORT BATTALION 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, COMPANY "A", 9TH MOTOR TRANSPORTBATTALION 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, SU#1, 1ST RADIO BATTALION 2OJAN—31MAR68

DET, 3D DENTAL COMPANY 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, HEAD-QUARTERS BATTALION, 3D MARINEDIVISION (POSTAL, PHOTO, EXCHANGE,ISO, AO' S, STAFF AUGMENT) 2OJAN-31MAR68

COMBINED ACTION COMPANY "0"3D COMBINED ACTION GROUP, III MAF 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, COMM CO, HEADQUARTERS BATTALION,3D MARINE DIVISION 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, 5TH COMM BATTALION 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, 7TH COMM BATTALION 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND 2OJAN-31MAR68

SUB-TEAM #1, 17TH INTERROGATOR-TRANSLATOR TEAM 2OJAN-31MAR68

COMPANY "B", 3D TANK BATTALION, 3DMARINE DIVISION 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET "01", HEADQUARTERS & MAINTENANCESQUADRON, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-16 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET "01", MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON,MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-16 15MAR-31MAR68

DET "2" MARINE AIR SUPPORT SQUADRON3, MARINE AIR CONTROL GROUP-18 16JAN-31MAR6B

DET, HEADQUARTERS & MAINTENANCESQUAI)RON-36, MARINE AIRCRAFTGROTJP-36 2OJAN-31MAR68

191

DET, MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT-62,MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-36 2OJAN-31MAR68

(2) U. S. NAVY

DET "B", CONSTRUCTION BATTALION,MOBILE UNIT-3O1 2OJAN—11FEB68

DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-iC 2OJAN-19FEB68

DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-53 2OJAN—13FEB68

DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-5 2OJAN-24JAN68

(3) U. S. ARMY

DET. A-1O1, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, 44TH ARTILLERY 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, 65TH ARTILLERY 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, 2 38TH COUNTER—MORTAR RADARUNIT, 108TH FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP 22JAN-31MAR68

DET, 1ST PLATOON (SMOKE), 25ThCHEMICAL COMPANY 9FEB-31MAR68

544TH SIGNAL DET, 37TH SIGNALBATTALION 2OJAN—31MAR68

(4) U. S. AIR FORCE

DET, (OPERATING LOCATION AJ), 15THAERIAL PORT SQUADRON 2OJAN-3 1MAR68

DET, 366TH TRANSPORT SQUADRON, 366THCOMBAT SUPPORT GROUP 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET, 9O3D AERO MED EVAC SQDN 2OJAN-31MAR68

DET "A", 834Th AIR DIVISION 2OJAN-31MAR68

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM

37TH ARVN RANGER BATTALION 27JAN- 1APR68

192

APPENDIX E

COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 3D MARINES, 24 APR - 13 MAY 1967(Period covered during "The Hill Fights")

3D MARINES

Commanding Officer Col John P. Lanigan(24Apr67—l3May67)

Executive Officer LtCol Jack Westerman(24Apr67—l3May67)

S—i WO Charles M. Christensen(24Apr67—l3May67)

S-2 Capt Adolfo Sgambeliuri(24Apr67—7May67)Capt James D. McGowan(8May67—l3May67)

S-3 Maj Floyd A. Karker(24Apr67—l3May67)

S-4 Maj Howard L. Long(24Apr67—l3May67)

Communications Officer Capt Curtis G. Arnold(24Apr67—lMay67)Capt George W. Brooks(2May67—l3May67)

2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES

Commanding Officer LtCol Earl R. DeLong(24Apr67—l3May67)

Executive Officer Maj Wendell 0. Beard(24Apr67—l3May67)

S—i 2dLt Billy L. Heaton(24Apr67—l3May67)

S—2 Capt Robert N. Bogard(24Apr67—l3May67)

S—3 Capt Douglas W. Lemon(24Apr67—l3May67)

S-4 Capt Robert R. Green(24Apr67—l3May67)

193

Commanding OtficerHeadquarters and Service Company Capt Stuart R. Vaughan

(24Apr67—13May67)

Commanding OfficerCompany "E" Capt Alfred E. Lyon

(24Apr67—3May67)'lstLt John F. Adinolfi(4May67-12May67)Capt Alfred E. Lyon(13May67)

Commanding OfficerCompany "F" Capt Martin Sorensen

(24Apr67—9May67)

Commanding OfficerCompany "G" Capt James P. Sheehan

(24Apr67—13May67)

Commanding OfficerCompany "H" Capt Raymond C. Madonna

(24Apr67—l3May67)

3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES

Commanding Officer LtCol Gary Wilder(24Apr67.—l3May67)

Executive Officer Maj Rudolph S. Sutter(24Apr67.-l3May67)

S-l 2dLt John C. Ralph(24Apr67—llMay67

S—2 2dLt Evander R. Mclver III(24Apr67—llMay67)2dLt Michael T. Montgomery(1 2May67—l3May67)

S—3 Capt Thomas A. Stumpf(24Apr67—l3May67)

S—4 SSgt William T. Pope(24Apr67-3OApr67)lstLt John H. Admire(lMay67—13May67)

194

Commanding OfficerHeadquarters and Service Company Capt Robert W. Poolaw

(24Apr67 -13May67)

Commanding OfficerCompany "I" Capt Christian L. Harkness

(24Apr67 -13May67)

Commanding OfficerCompany "K" Capt Bayliss L. Spivey, Jr.

(24Apr67 -13May67)

Commanding OfficerCompany "L" Capt John W. Ripley

(24Apr67 - 13May67)

Commanding OfficerCompany "1' Capt William R. Griggs

(24Apr67-l3May67)

195

APPENDIX F

COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 26TH MARINES, 20 JAN - 1 APR 1968

(Period covered in Presidential Unit Citation)

26TH MARINES

Commanding Officer Col David E. Lownds(l2Aug67—lApr68)

Executive Officer LtCol Louis A. Rann(28Sep67-lApr68)

S—i lstLt Robert J. Mariz(29Jan68—29Jan68) (KIA)Capt Arnold R. Nelson(30Jan68—8Feb68)Capt Anthony V. Làtorre, Jr.(9Feb68—lApr68)

S-2 Capt Harper L. Bohr, Jr.(lAug67—7Feb68)Maj Jerry E. Hudson(8Feb68—l7Mar68)Capt Thorvald P. E. Hoirn(l8Mar68—lApr68)

S-3 Maj Wayne M. Wills(lAug67-22Jan68)LtCol Edward J. A. Castagna(23Jan68- 1Apr68)

S-4 Maj Aubrey L. Lumpkin(17Mar68 -1Apr68)

Communications Officer Maj John A. Shepherd(16Nov67— 1Apr68)

1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

Commanding Officer LtCol James B. Wilkinson.(5Jul67—29Feb68)LtCol Frederick J. McEwan(lMar68—lApr68)

Executive Officer Maj Charles E. Davis III(23Dec'fS7—3lJan68)Maj Howard J. Mccarty(lFeb68—lApr68)

196

S—i lstLt Stephen A. Fitzgerald(l3Dec67—3lJan68)istLt William J. Ferral(lFeb68-lApr68)

S—2 lstLt Anthony E. Sibley(6Dec67 —13Feb68istLt Ernest E. Spencer(14Feb68-iApr68)

S—3 Maj Bruce A. Greene(23Dec67—29Jan68)Maj Charles E. Davis III(30Jan68-lApr68)

S—4 Capt Robert C. Onslow(6Nov67 — 1Apr68)

Commanding OfficerHeadquarters and Service Company lstLt Robert A. Brown

(20Dec67—l6Feb68)lstLt Paul G. Lojkovic(l7Feb68—20Mar68)Capt Lajon R. Hutton(21Mar68-lApr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "A" Capt Ray G. Snyder

(l5Dec67.-lApr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "B" Capt Kenneth W. Pipes

(20Dec67-lApr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "C" Capt David L. Ernst

(15Jan68—15Feb68)2dLt Paul W. Bush(l6Fëb68-2Mar68)Capt Walter J. Egger(3Mar68—2 2Mar68Capt Lawrence E. Seaman, Jr.(23Mar68—lApr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "D lstLt Ernest . Spencer

UAug67—l3Feb68)Capt Edward J. Hughes, Jr.(l4Feb68—lApr68)

197

2D BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

Commanding Officer LtCol Francis J. Heath, Jr.(Jan68—lApr68)

Executive Officer Maj Royce L. Bond(Jan68— 1Apr68)

S—i istLt Richard J. Gustaf son(l6Jan—lApr68)

S—2 lstLt Edwin R. Matthews(Jan68—liFeb68)SSgt Horace E. Roland(1 2Feb68—9Mar68)lstLt John- C. Wainio(iOMar68-iApr68)

S-3 Maj Gerald F. Kurth(Jan68-lApr68)

S—4 Capt Erwin J. Martikke, Jr.(Jan68-l8Mar68)Capt Earle G. Breeding, Jr.(l9Mar68-lApr68)

Commanding OfficerHeadquarters and Service Company Capt Stanley M. Hartman

(Jan68-lApr68)

Comnanding OfficerCompany "Efl Capt Earle G. Breeding Jr.

(Jan68—8Mar68)lstLt Joseph R. Meeks(9Mar68—lApr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "F" Capt Charles F. Divelbiss

(Jan68—iApr68)

Commanding OfficerCpmpany "G" Capt Lee R. Overstreet

(Jan68—lApr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "H" Capt Charles 0. Broughton

(Jan68- 1Apr68)

3D BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

Commanding Officer LtCol Harry L. Alderman(2lAug6 7—i4Mar68)

198

LtCol John C. Studt(l5Mar68—lApr68)

Executive Officer Maj Joseph M. Loughran, Jr.(9Sep67—lApr68)

S—i lstLt Edward J. Paurazas Jr.(2iDec67—lApr6B)

S-2 2dLt Jay G. Marks, Jr.(14Jan68—iApr68)

S-3 Maj Matthew P. Caulfield(24Nov67—lApr68)

S-4 istLt Jack A. Brage(16Nov67 -1Apr68)

Commanding OfficerHeadquarters and Service Company Capt Alfred Lardizabal, Jr.

(29Nov67-lApr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "I" Capt William H. Dabney

(24Nov67-lApr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "K" Capt Norman J. Jasper, Jr.

(23Nov67—22Jan68.)istLt Jerry Saulsbury(23Jan68—27Jan68)Capt Paul L. Snead(28Jan68—iApr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "L" Capt Richard D. Camp, Jr.

(30Jun67—29Jan68)Capt William F. Hurley(30Jan68—iApr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "M" Capt John J. Gilece, Jr.

(29Nov67—31Jan68)istLt John T. Esslinger(iFeb68-2 3Mar68)Capt Walter R. Jenkins(24Mar68—lApr68)

199

1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

Commanding Officer LtCol John F. Mitchell(lJan68-3lMar68)LtCol John J. H. Cahill(1Apr68)

Executive Officer Maj 'Joseph A. Donnelly(lJan68—lApr68)

S-i lstLt Peter A. Woog(lJan68—lApr68)

S—2 lstLt Robert J. Arboleda(lJan68—lApr68)

S-3 Maj Edward M. Ring ley(lJan68—16Feb68)Capt Charles B. Hartzell(l7Feb68—lOMar68)Maj Ted R. Henderson(llMar68-lApr68)

S-4 lstLt John M. Georgi(lJan68—lApr68)

Commanding OfficerHeadquarters and Service Company lstLt Michael J. Walker

(9Jan68—i3Feb68)Capt John W. Cargile(14Feb68—31Mar68)Capt Edward R. Miller, Jr.(1Apr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "Afl Capt Henry J. M. Radcliffe

(iJan68—3lMar68)Capt Henry D. Banks(1Apr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany UBII Capt Robert T. Bruner

(lJan68-26Jan68)lstLt Arthur N. Mangham, Jr.(27Jan68—2Feb68)Capt John R. Williams, Jr.(3Feb68—lApr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "C" Capt John W. Cargile

(9Jan68—13Feb68)Capt Ralph H. Flagler(14Feb68—iApr6 8)

200

Commanding OfficerCompany "D" Capt Don F. Schafer

(lJan68—3lMar68)Capt John W. Cargile(1Apr68)

1ST BATTALION, 13TH MARINES

Commanding Officer LtCol John A. Hennelly(lODec67—lApr68)

Executive Officer Maj Ronald W. Campbell(13Jul67-1Apr68)

s—i 2dLt Daniel W. Kelly(l9Nov67—lApr68)

S—2 lstLt Walter K. Jones(2lDec67—4Mar68)lstLt Leslie M. Palm(5Mar68-lApr68)

S—3 Capt Lawrence R. Salmon(13Jul67—8Mar68)Maj Gerald R. Houchin(9Mar68—lApr68)

S—4 lstLt Harold P. Klunk(1Dec67 —20Feb68)Capt Tommy J. Hicks(2lFeb68-lApr68)

Commanding OfficerHeadquarters Battery lstLt Ralph W. Dunn, Jr.

(2Aug67-20Feb68)lstLt Walter K. Jones(21Feb68—l5Mar68)Capt Jerome P. Rogers(l6Mar68—21Mar68)lstLt Jacob W. Hughes, Jr.(22Mar68—lApr68)

Commanding OfficerBattery "A" Capt Dennis L. Pardee

(Aug67—29Feb68)Capt Victor B. Snider(lMar68—lApr68)

Commanding OfficerBattery "B" lstLt George G. Wood

(2lJan68—29Feb68)Capt James C. Uecker(iMar68—lApr68)

201

Commanding OfficerBattery "Ca Capt William J. O'Connor

(28Nov6 7-lApr68)

Commanding OfficerMortar Battery Capt Michael T. Pierson

(5Jan68—lApr68)

Commanding Officer1st Provisional 155Howitzer Battery, 3/12 Capt Joseph Taylor

(5Jan68—29Feb68)Capt Stephen J. Hayes(lMar68—lApr68)

ATTACHED UNITS

Commanding OfficerCompany "A", 3d AT Battalion Capt James 0. Lea

(2OJan68-lApr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "B", 3d Tank Battalion Capt Daniel W. Kent

—24Jan68)Capt Claude W. Reinke(25Jan68—lApr68)

Commanding OfficerCompany "A", 3d Shore PartyBattalion lstLt Robert L. Singleton

(28Jan68—4Mar68)Maj Howard W. Wahlfeld(5Mar68—lApr68)

202

UNIT SIZE UNIT SYMBOLS

PLATOON LIII USMC UNIT (WHEN UNITSUSMC OF OTHER SERVICES SHOWN)

I COMPANY INFANTRY

II BATTALION ENGINEER/PIONEER

III REGIMENT AIR CAVALRY CP

X BRIGADE AIR CAVALRY

EXAMPLES

326 3d BATTALION, 26th MARINESUSMC

IIJFMF 11th ENGINEER BATTALION,USMC FLEET MARINE FORCE

3 ACD 3d BRIGADE,1st AIR CAVALRY DIVISION

1st SQUADRON, 7th CAVALRY

APPENDIX G

203'A U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1977 O24666I

The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest militaryinsignia in continuous use in the United States. It firstappeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in1804. With the stars changed to five points, this device hascontinued on Marine buttons to the present day.