THE AGENDAFOR ACTION

JANUARY 2009

T H E A G E N D A

There have been many comparisons made be-tween 9/11, the airborne terrorist attacks onManhattan’s iconic Twin Towers and thePentagon in Washington, and 26/11, the equally

devastating attacks on Mumbai by seaborne terrorists.For America, its leaders and its citizens, 9/11 was a piv-otal moment in the country’s history. It shatteredAmerica’s myth of invincibility and changed thecountry in profound, unforeseen and far-reachingways, especially in terms of their response to maketheir cities and citizens more secure against the threatof global terrorism. The United States reacted to theattacks by launching a War on Terror, tighteninginternal security, enacting the Patriot Act, creating anew Department of Homeland Security, strengtheninganti-terrorism legislation and expanding law enforce-ment powers. Average citizens willingly accepted thenew impositions on their personal freedom. Sevenyears and three months later, the results of thoseefforts have been quite dramatic and educational.There has not been a single terror attack on Americansoil since September 2001.

For many Indians, the December 2001 attack onParliament was seen as the most serious terroristattack so far, aimed as it was at the most obvioussymbol of Indian democracy. Yet, for India and theIndian Government, 26/11 has easily eclipsed theParliament attack as the most serious security threatto the country short of a conventional war. One reasonwas the sophistication, training and entry by sea whichwas almost comparable to hijacking an aircraft, as in9/11. Besides the terrible loss of lives, it was the au-dacity of the attack which has made us all feel very vul-nerable. It seemed nothing was impossible for theterrorists. Clearly, the bar has been raised to unprece-dented and challenging levels and the response needsto be equally unprecedented. 26/11 exposed the flawsand failures in the system which allowed such aheinous attack to take place. Understandably, the offi-cial reaction has been largely Pakistan-oriented butother measures have followed since heads rolled inMumbai and Delhi, and a new minister has takencharge of the crucial Ministry of Home.

There has been some movement on the part of theGovernment: increased security, changes in anti-ter-ror laws, ordering of new equipment, new commandohubs and new government agencies for better coordi-

nation and response to terror threats, but are thesemeasures enough? Already, we are seeing the pro-posed National Investigation Agency (NIA) and the newanti-terror laws become victim to Centre-state friction.In addition, the main opposition party, the BJP, has lostno opportunity to politicise the issue and criticise theGovernment’s response to the Mumbai mayhem. Evenwithout those disquieting signals, there remains a wor-rying question mark over India’s ability to improve se-curity and intelligence, bring major reforms in thepolice forces, put laws in place that are not open to mis-use and bring about durable and desirable change inwhat is loosely referred to as “the system”. ManyIndians, and with good reason, view our politicianswith cynicism and foresee a time when the currentsabre rattling and promise of action ends and it’s backto business as usual. Or, no business as usual.

The reason for the pessimism is obvious. After theshocking attack on Parliament, a terror plot thattargeted the most potent symbol of Indian democracy,much was expected from the government of the day.Instead, there is an unsettling sense of deja vu. Similarpressure was put on Pakistan, the two nuclear-armedneighbours put their forces on alert and moved themcloser to the borders and tough new laws wereenacted. Only one perpetrator was arrested and still awaits punishment thanks to the flaws in thecriminal justice system, official procedures andpolitical manipulation. The “system” was shaken up for a few weeks and then returned to its somnolent,bureaucratic ways, a euphemism for making sure nothing changed.

Mumbai was the result of our callous approach tosecurity. The systemic failures were shown up in starkand shameful ways: the poorly equipped police clearlyuntrained to tackle terror strikes of such magnitude,the lack of proper security, a fatal lack of coordinationamong security agencies, the refusal to share intelli-gence and, even when it was shared, to act decisivelyon it, with just one Central force equipped and trainedto tackle heavily armed and highly motivated terror-ists based at faraway Manesar in Haryana, a crucialnine hours away from the scenes of terror and de-struction. There were politicians who failed and fum-bled, bureaucrats who twiddled their thumbs andawaited orders from above which never came, andmost alarming, a city that was the pride of India,

5

From the editor-in-chiefAROON PURIE

MUMBAI’S ICONIC TAJHOTELIN FLAMES AS26/11 UNFOLDED

T H E A G E N D A

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rendered so utterly vulnerable and held hostage by just10 men for almost 60 hours. It was a nationally-tele-vised display of incompetence, almost frightening in itsscale and depth. The questions we asked then are stillrelevant. Why was it allowed to happen? Who wasresponsible? What can be done to prevent it? Cananything be done?

Those are the questions everyone is asking allacross India and many have taken to the streets toprotest against the Government, to demand change inthe system and pledged to make their voices heard andtheir actions count in the war on terror. The citizens’movement in the wake of the Mumbai attacks has beenunprecedented in scale and involvement. A majoritywere ordinary people who, perhaps for the first time,feel not only a sense of fear and helplessness but alsoanger. That is quite understandable and even desirablein the present context but most of them are sure of onething: they want change but are not quite sure how toachieve it, individually or collectively. There is consid-erable hope invested in the upsurge of patriotism, senseof nationalism and desire to get involved.

That reaction is but natural. What the Mumbaiattacks represented was a national crisis of unprece-dented magnitude. 2008 has seen the largest numberof terror attacks on the country—Ahmedabad, Jaipur,Delhi, Hyderabad and Bangalore, to name the mostprominent. Six cities were targeted in nine separate ter-ror attacks that claimed the lives of nearly 1,600 peo-ple. Mumbai was the ultimate horror. We have, since theMumbai attacks, seen a spate of seminars and discus-sions on the issue of tackling terror with counter-ter-rorism experts discussing threadbare the optionsavailable to the Government and people in these chal-lenging times. But it is worthwhile to channelise thatpublic anger and outrage and think of ways to con-tribute to the anti-terror movement in meaningful waysand help to catalyse the process of change. Not justchange for the sake of change. As Barack Obama’s cam-paign slogan put it, we need “change we can believe in”.

As part of that effort, we at the India Today Group,have put together our own recommendations for anaction plan in the form of a White Paper. This is a logi-cal extension of our ongoing campaign, Declare War onTerror, in which we invited the public to send sugges-tions to a panel of experts on the best ways to tackle thegrowing terror threat. In order to make the campaignmore focused and comprehensive, our joint team ofeditors drew up a list of 12 critical areas where we feltmajor changes and modifications were required.

Journalists with the requisite expertise were taskedwith consulting leading experts in their respectiveareas of concern and then drawing up a detailed, time-bound plan for implementation.

The 12 areas we have chosen are as follows: 1 Securing the Home Front: A total revamp of theHome Ministry and related agencies for coordinatedresponse to terror threats.2 Tackling Pakistan: A major global diplomaticthrust to expose Pakistan’s complicity as well as that of other countries like Bangladesh that harbourterror groups.3 Overhauling the Police: The men in khaki are thefootsoldiers in the battle against terror, and majorchanges are urgently required to equip them witheffective equipment, training and motivation.4 Modernising the NSG: The NSG is our main weaponagainst terrorists but it needs to be expanded andequipped to meet all future exigencies.5 Upgrading Intelligence: To change the existingset-up for better intelligence gathering and dissemi-nation among the multiplicity of agencies.6 Safeguarding Megacities: We need to build asecurity fortress around our major cities.7 Plugging Vulnerable Zones: The Mumbai attacksexposed new areas of vulnerability. We need tosecure our coasts, airports, railways, nuclear sites, oilinstallations and other symbols of our democracy andeconomic progress.8 Toughening the Law: The existing laws need to bemodified to speed up the criminal justice system.9 Squeezing Terror Funding: What needs to be doneto track movement of explosives and chemicals andplug the flow of illegal money to the terrorists.10 Strengthening the Armed Forces: What thearmed forces need to do to meet the new challenges.11 Winning Kashmir: How to win hearts and mindsin Kashmir and counter the fundamentalist threat.12 Citizens Charter: What we all can do individuallyto be responsible citizens and raise awareness.

The purpose of this document is not to point fingersat those who failed in Mumbai but to bring to the pub-lic domain an agenda for action. The war on terror hasno expiry date and requires the general public’sengagement. Public opinion is the greatest force forchange in a democracy and media. We can bestcontribute by providing well informed proposals foraction. Hopefully, we have learnt our lessons from theMumbai tragedy and will make this country moresecure for our future generations.

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T H E A G E N D ACONTENTS

07Securing theHome FrontWanted: A revamp of the Home Ministryand a unified internal security set-up toguard India against major terror strikes

04From the Editor-in-Chief

40PluggingVulnerable ZonesIndian borders continue to be porous. Nowwith attacks even from the sea, we needwatertight coastal security strategy

46Tougheningthe Law The legal framework of the country needsto be hardened in order to make the perpetrators of terror pay heavily

52Closing the Terror TapClamping down on the money flow thatnourishes the monster and keeping a closewatch on explosive substances is needed

57BeFastand PreciseIndia’s armed forces must modernise and move to hi-tech precision strikes totake on non-state as well as traditional adversaries

63WinningKashmirIndia needs to tackle the Valley’s discon-tent by winning hearts in Kashmir andcountering the fundamentalist threat

68BetheChangeAs citizens, we can help bring about thechange we want by fulfilling our dutiesand pressing the Government to deliver

35Guarding theMegacityWe need to build a security fortress aroundour major cities for any kind of emergency

13TacklingPakistanIn its efforts to neutralise Pakistan, Indianeeds to use coercive diplomacy to mountextreme pressure on multiple fronts

19Overhaulingthe PoliceOur men in khaki need better equipment,training and motivation for them to become weapons against terror

25Modernisingthe NSG The Mumbai attacks exposed the inadequacies of our best anti-terror force.The shortfalls need to be addressed. Now.

30Beefing upIntelligenceIf terror strikes have to be thwarted,intelligence gathering and disseminationhas to be coordinated and actionable

SECURING THEHome Front

Wanted: A revamp of the Home Ministry and a single, unified internal security set-up to guard India against major terror strikes

ISSUE

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REUTERS

PRIME MINISTER MANMOHAN SINGH WITHHOME MINISTER CHIDAMBARAM (L)

PRIME MINISTER MANMOHAN SINGH WITHHOME MINISTER CHIDAMBARAM (L)

Union Minister of HomeAffairs P. Chidambaram isacutely aware that he hasvery little time to deliverwith the general elections

due in May 2009. In a way it is for-tuitous because what India needsafter the Mumbai attacks is action,and fast. In the saddle for just overa month, Chidambaram, at ameeting of chief ministers on in-ternal security on January 6, saidhis immediate priority was to raisethe level of preparedness to meetthe increasingly sophisticated ter-rorist threats. Equally importantwas to enhance the speed and de-cisiveness of the response to a ter-rorist threat or attack.

Both these measures are thekey to inspiring confidence of thecountry that has been severelypunctured after the Mumbai at-tacks. In the first flush of histenure, Chidambaram has movedswiftly to get a NationalInvestigative Agency (NIA) set up toinvestigate terror cases across thecountry and has also ensuredgreater co-ordination and sharingof information among intelligenceagencies by reactivating the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and making itaccountable. He has also made itcompulsory for top intelligenceagencies to hold a meeting with thehome minister everyday. His focusnow is firmly on preventionthrough enhanced intelligence co-ordination and sharing.

But even as Chidambaram getscracking on the stiff agenda he hasset for himself and theGovernment, he needs to examinethe functioning of his Ministrymore closely. The Ministry ofHome Affairs (MHA) has to play apivotal role if the war on terror hasto be won. But in the past few

years, the ministry exemplifieswhat has gone wrong with thecountry’s management of internalsecurity. In the six months, pre-ceding the Mumbai attacks, therewere blasts in Delhi, Jaipur,Bangalore, Ahmedabad andGuwahati that killed 215 and in-jured 1,000. Typically, after theseattacks, there were “security re-view” meetings which saw thebuck being passed from one au-thority to another and no respon-sibility being fixed. Routine alertswere sent to states to tighten theirsecurity with no follow-up.

After Mumbai, it became evi-dent that the MHA had no option butto bring about a radical change inits approach. It has it hands in justtoo many issues. Apart from inter-nal security and terrorism, its

mandate is to tackle insurgency inJammu and Kashmir (J&K) as wellas the North-eastern states, Leftwing extremism, border manage-ment, immigration, foreign fund-ing, Centre-state relations, UnionTerritories, managing the IndianPolice Service (IPS) and Centralparamilitary forces, police mod-ernisation and policy planning.Experts say, the ministry has overthe years grown into a behemothand is difficult to manage, hasdragged its feet on key proposalslike police modernisation, didnothing to sort out turf battles be-tween various intelligence agen-cies both at the level of the Centreand the states and has failed tocome up with an effective anti-ter-ror policy. Chidambaram has awhole host of issues that need to be

T H E A G E N D A

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addressed urgently:Streamline the Ministry: After

9/11, the Bush administration de-cided that what it needed was a hu-mongous Homeland SecurityDepartment that would, in theAmerican President’s view, “makeAmerica safer because our nationwould have one department whoseprimary mission is to protect theAmerican homeland.” Bush de-cided that there would be only onedepartment that will secureAmerican borders, transport sec-tor, ports and critical infrastruc-ture, apart from synthesising andanalysing homeland security intel-ligence from multiple sources,training and equipping first re-sponders and managing a federalemergency response.

Clearly, India can learn a lotfrom the American review of itshomeland security. Given that bu-reaucracy tends to create moremuddles in India, perhaps the solu-tion lies in segregating the internalsecurity aspect from other func-tions of the Home Ministry. The USHomeland Security Departmentdoes not deal with issues pertainingto police modernisation, procure-ment and other executive work. Soit would probably help if there is afull-time cabinet minister to lookafter internal security, segregatedfrom the MHA.

Personnel Revamp: TheGovernment could start by lookingat the composition of those whohead the Home Ministry. Of theeight special and additional secre-taries in the ministry, and 20 jointsecretaries, only two are careerpolice officers. Starting from secre-tary Madhukar Gupta, almost all in

Mandate of the MHA

Learning from the US

India’s Ministry of HomeAffairs has its finger in toomany pies that make it highlyunwieldy and ineffectiveagainst terror strikes.

Among the MHA’s major tasksare law and order,police modernisation,border management,Centre-state relations, officiallanguages policy apart fromJammu and Kashmir, North-east insurgency and MaoistExtremism.

In 2008 alone, there were 64terror attacks across India.

In 2002, US President George Bush created a single, unified Department of Homeland Security to protect America.

The new department has onlyfour divisions with a clearfocus: border and transporta-tion security, emergency preparedness and response,information analysis and infrastructure protection and counter measures against WMDs.

Since its formation, the USfaced no major terror strike.

US Homeland Security

THE NORTH BLOCKTHATHOUSES THEUNION MINISTRYOFHOME AFFAIRS

key positions are IAS officers withno experience of handling securityissues. All officials handling keydesks, including Kashmir, theNorth-east, Naxals and BorderManagement are administrativeservice officers. Modernisation hassuffered because most officershandling the issue lack knowledgeand field experience. The imbal-ance needs to be urgently ad-dressed. The internal securitydivision should be transformedinto a body of experts capable ofdealing with terrorism, insurgencyand illegal infiltration.

The MHA also needs to set theagenda on training of police per-sonnel and counter-terrorist (CT)units. It can consider having atrained commando of the army orthe Central paramilitary force to bea part of the ministry as an adviser.Being conversant with field situa-tions, he would bring with him abetter understanding of opera-tional requirements. He can also betasked to devise a training curricu-lum for the police forces in generaland the anti-terrorist units in par-ticular to ensure a more effectiveresponse. There should be a propercoordination mechanism with thestates to ensure that their policeforces are enhancing their trainingand tactics on a regular basis, rightto the level of the constable.

Even the process of moderni-sation has suffered because mostofficers handling the issue in theministry lack knowledge and fieldexperience. The result is that pro-posals sent by various state policeforces and Central police forcesare hardly treated with the neces-sary urgency. For example, theproposal for Grade-4 bulletproofjackets—needed to face the burstsfrom AK series rifles that the ter-

rorists have been using—has beenpending with the ministry for thepast five years. Similarly, the pro-posal for procuring high-resolu-tion baggage screening equipmentfor enhancing airport security hasnot evinced any response from theministry. Also pending is the re-quest for the purchase of parallelprocessor-type telecom monitor-ing systems, which can keep trackof 1,000-odd calls at one go, anddetect two or more cellphoneseven if the carrier is mobile.

National ID card system:There is still has no system in place

which can identify and weed out il-legal immigrants. Starting in 2002,attempts were made to issueMultipurpose National IdentityCards (MNIC) to all bona fide citizensto enhance national security, man-age citizen identity and facilitate e-governance. With an estimatedbudget of Rs 5,000 crore then, theGovernment has managed to issueonly 12 lakh identity cards in thefirst phase of the pilot project.These cards should serve as theprimary document to prove iden-tity instead of a ration card, pass-port and others. According to

government sources, the project isstuck due to turf wars among theministries of information and tech-nology, home and also the ElectionCommission. MNIC should be issuedto all citizens within a fixed timeframe. It should be the primarydocument to prove identity, in-stead of a ration card, passport,driving licence or PAN card.

However, complete cautionneeds to be exercised while issuingthe identity card. It should be doneonly after verifying the an-tecedents and claims of the personthoroughly. It should be a foolproof

process, completely out of theambit of political interference andinfluence. Once issued, the identitycard should be treated as sacro-sanct and should be used to carryout all transactions, and the data-base updated whenever the indi-vidual shifts residence or job,something like the Social Securitycard in the US.

Police modernisation: Thetardiness of the response of the po-lice and security personnel was ev-ident in the Mumbai attacks. Whatis needed is urgent infusion offunds to beef up the existing police

forces. The MHA had set aside Rs1,300 crore for the modernisationof state police forces in 2008-09,an amount that has nearly doubledover the past five years. Thismoney is meant to be spent on bet-ter mobility, modern weaponry,communication system, training,infrastructure facilities, forensicscience facilities, strengthening ofintelligence branches, securityequipment, construction of build-ings of police stations, and con-struction of residential buildingsfor lower level police personnel.

The problem is that there is no

T H E A G E N D A

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zz Create capacities for decentralised Counter Terrorism (CT) responseacross the country

zz Single counter-terrorismcentre that deals with in-telligence gathering, dis-semination & coordination

zz A full time cabinet minis-ter to look after internalsecurity, which should besegregated from the MHA

zz The National ID cardscheme should now be implemented within the next six months

zz MHA should also have itsrepresentatives in majorcountries, similar to theDefence Ministry

zz A National Anti-Terrorism Agency onthe lines of HomelandSecurity in the US

zz Create an effective security leadership at thefield levels for independ-ent CT responses

zz Well-trained andequipped Quick ReactionTeams at vital installationsand strategic locations

zz A director of national intelligence to head asuper agency to monitorand supervise all agencies

zz Federal coordination onreal time basis of leads,intelligence inputs, inter-rogations. Proactive NIA.

zz Ministry should have aR&D wing and procure-ment officers should knowabout latest technology

zz Accountability has to be fixed. No power or responsibility without accountability.

zz Establish institutionsand training curricula foreffective CT skills acrossthe security apparatus

zz Using imaginative and innovative tactics to stayahead of terrorists. Aplatoon-sized unit is enough

zz A dedicated cadre of officers who specialise in national security to beposted in key ministries

zz Divide effort and localiseresponse to terror. Onlystate police can eliminateterror, so empower it.

zz MHA officers should understand operational re-quirements and be conver-sant with field situations

zz Special forces in allstates like the GreyHounds in Andhra Pradesh.Use NSG only for back-up.

zz Have an enveloping intel-ligence, strong local net-works and effective covertcapacities across borders

zz Use technology as a forcemultiplier—CCTVs, nightvision equipment—andhelp from software experts

zz NSA should coordinateand monitor on behalf ofCabinet Committee onSecurity (CCS)

zz Bring in meritocracy,specialisation and enhance Special TaskForces

zz MHA is the nodal agencyof all paramilitary forcesand should stress on theirmodernisation

zz The NationalInvestigative Agency must be given more teeth

zz Keep CT policies and responses free of partisanpolitical considerationsand influence

zz Need a clear-cut com-mand structure so thatleadership is purposefuland meaningful in a crisis

zz CCS should be briefedevery fortnight about theintelligence situation for apre-emptive response

zz In the end, technologyalone would give us theedge, so use more modernequipment and methods

zz Tabs should be kept onhow the money for mod-ernisation of the police is spent by the states.

zz MHA officials should begiven basic training inpolicing, CT and internal security

G.C. SAXENA K .P.S . G ILL GOPAL SHARMA K SUBRAHMANYAM VED MARWAH K . PADMANABHAIAH

FormerR&AWchief

FormerDGP Punjab

FormerDGP J&K

Securityexpert

FormerDG NSG

Formerhome secretary

Former top police officialsand intelligence experts want an overhaul in the country’s security

ExpertSpeak

accountability on part of the statesor, for that matter, the Centre.There is no system of a follow-upor to check what the states aredoing with the funds. The MHA

should have an annual auditwhereby senior officers personally

visit the states to see and inspecthow the states have used theirmodernisation funds. This wouldalso introduce accountability atthe level of various secretaries andjoint secretaries of the ministry.

Accountability: A foolproofsystem of fixing responsibilityneeds be put in place. The re-

sponse of agencies and officialsafter the Mumbai terror attackswas typical—passing the buckamong various agencies startingfrom the IB and R&AW to navy andthe coast guard. Till date it is stillnot certain who goofed up where.By now, accountability shouldhave been fixed and some headsrolled. Ideally, there should havebeen a time-bound commission ofinquiry—much like what the USdid following 9/11—to probe whatwent wrong and why the attackcould not be prevented. Also, whatmeasures need to be taken to pre-vent such attacks.

Not sparing anybody, the com-mission should push for actionagainst officials who were slack inperforming their duty. This wouldcover all agencies including the IB,R&AW, Maharashtra Police, navyand the coast guard. Even politi-cians should be called in, if needbe. The time has come to start tak-ing punitive action against theguilty officers and bureaucrats,and that does not mean only atransfer. What is needed is theSword of Damocles to hang on theheads of bureaucrats—perform orperish. Unless tough action istaken, the MHA will lurch from cri-sis to crisis and the Indian Statewould suffer.

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GET experts and career police officers, with experience in security and counter-terrorism, tohead crucial departments in the Home Ministry,including the top job of the home secretaryACT on reports on police reforms and also implement multipurpose national identity cards

ENSURE co-ordination among intelligence agencies and send a clear message that a terror strike must beavoided at any cost or heads will roll RED TAPE needs to be cut in making purchases for internal securitySACK top officials for negligence leading to terror strikesSEGREGATE internal security from the other functions of the Home Ministry

ActionPlan

n

A COMMISSION OFINQUIRY SHOULD

PROBE WHATWENTWRONG AND WHY

THE MUMBAIATTACKS COULD NOT

BE PREVENTED.

AMULTIPURPOSE NATIONALIDENTITYCARD SHOULD BE THE MAIN ID

TACKLINGPakistan

In its efforts to neutralise Pakistan, India needs to use coercive diplomacyto mount extreme pressure on multiple fronts.The buzz is ‘smart’strategy.

ISSUE

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AFP

PAKISTAN PRESIDENTASIFALI ZARDARIWITH ARMYCHIEFASHFAQ PARVEZ KAYANI

PAKISTAN PRESIDENTASIFALI ZARDARIWITH ARMYCHIEFASHFAQ PARVEZ KAYANI

Those who do not remember thepast are condemned to repeat it—George Santayana

History has a tendency ofrepeating itself in rela-tions between India andPakistan—too often forcomfort. In just 16 years,

the two countries have had fivemajor confrontations, includingthe one developing over Mumbai26/11. These have either broughtthem close to war or resulted in asharp border conflict as in Kargil.

The core issue had been Kash-mir for many years and, more re-cently, because of the spread ofIslamic fundamentalism it hastaken on religious undertones too.Kashmir, in many ways, had be-come a proxy for the larger ideo-logical battle that resulted in thePartition. The Indian nation withits secular, democratic foundationhas always been anathema to aPakistan that projects itself as an Islamic Republic.

If the 1971 war settled thequestion of religion being the

main binding force for nation-hood, it left deep scars in the psy-che of Pakistan. The humiliatingdefeat of its army in the East atthe hands of the advancing Indian forces, the sundering ofEast Pakistan and the formationof Bangladesh saw revenge be-coming a leitmotif of Pakistan, es-pecially for its armed forces.

More so recently when Indiawith its phenomenal GDP growthhas emerged as a major power inthe region with even the US want-ing an enhanced strategic rela-tionship with it. In sharp contrast,Pakistan’s economy is in sham-bles, it is riven with internal dis-sent and sectarian warfare and isa haven for Islamic terror groups.The Pakistan Army, which di-rectly ruled the country throughdictatorships for more than halfof its 61 years of existence, wasbeing reviled by its own populace.Former president PervezMusharraf’s brazen attempt tomuzzle the judiciary and the as-sassination of Benazir Bhutto hada direct impact on the Pakistan

Army’s credibility. Even thoughMusharraf had to step down asarmy chief in 2007, the stain re-mained and, with the army con-trolling most of civiliangovernance, inefficiencies andworse corruption had become theorder of the day.

Meanwhile, the US hadstepped up pressure to fight anunpopular war on the Afghanfront to subdue the Taliban. Itwas viewed by Pakistan’s people as an American waragainst their Islamist brethren.For the first time in its history thePakistan Army had desertionsfrom its ranks.

Mumbai 26/11 was an asser-tion of the Pakistan Army’s newgameplan to grab centrestage andrestore its supremacy. TargetingIndia is a tried and tested way forthe Pakistan Army. It launched its“war of thousand cuts” to bleedIndia in 1990, the year it acquirednuclear weapons capability. Thatdevelopment saw India’s over-whelming superiority in conven-tional warfare being nullified andthe confidence that a full-scalewar is almost ruled out as it wascertain to take on nuclear dimen-sions. So Pakistan began its low-intensity warfare that did enough

to hurt India but not enough forNew Delhi to declare war.

When targeting Kashmiralone didn’t have the desired im-pact, the terror strikes moved tothe rest of India where it not onlyattacked religious shrines butalso hit at its economic interests.As Prime Minister ManmohanSingh pointed out recently, “Pak-istan has utilised terror as an in-strument of state policy.”

Mumbai 26/11 is now increas-ingly being seen as a diabolicalplan of the Pakistan Army whichserved several ends. If Indiaratcheted up the war rhetoric, asit initially did, it gave the PakistanArmy an excuse to start moving1,00,000 soldiers from theAfghan front and pitting themagainst India. That would also seethe people bind strongly behindthe army, marginalising the newdemocratic coalitions holdingpower. It would propel to the fore-front Pakistan Army Chief Gen-eral Ashfaq Parvez Kayani whocould even stage a bloodlesscoup, if he so decided. It wouldalso unite the country against acommon enemy and hopefully theseparatists and sectarian forceswould cool down.

The Pakistan Army operateswith such brazen confidence be-cause it knows that India wouldhesitate to use the military optionbecause of the nuclear shadow. Inthe midst of the gravest provoca-tion following the border intru-sions in the Kargil sector, Indiachose to fight a limited war toevict the intruders from theheights rather than launch an assault on its western borders.Even after the attack on Parlia-ment in 2001, India hesitated al-though it launched Operation

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n

THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY

SHOULD BE TOLD IFTHEY DON’T GETPAKISTAN TO ACT

AGAINSTTHE TERRORNETWORK, INDIAWILL.

THATDÈJÀ VUFEELING

2001 After the attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-basedterrorists, India mounted its biggest-ever deployment of forcesagainst Pakistan known as Operation Parakram, which ended after 10 months when the US made Pakistan take some cosmetic measures to check cross-border terrorism.Outcome The standoff cost India Rs 6,500 crore and Pakistan Rs 4,500 crore. While the exercise was aimed at putting diplomaticpressure on Pakistan, it failed to achieve its purpose.

1999 India launched Operation Vijay to drive out Pakistani troopscamouflaged as militants that had intruded into Indian territory.Outcome As the threat of escalation grew and with clinching evidence that Pakistani regulars were involved, the US summonedPakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif to Washington and asked him to withdraw the infiltrating forces.

1990 India and Pakistan engaged in an intense crisis over growingterrorism in Kashmir. While Islamabad stepped up its support to mili-tants, temperatures rose, and the Indian and Pakistani militaries werepartially mobilised amid nuclear threats from Pakistan.Outcome The two sides backed off following the twin restraints of nuclear deterrence and US intervention.

1987 New Delhi and Islamabad were enmeshed in a long crisis emanating from India’s Brass Tacks military exercises and Pakistan’sthreat of nuclear attack. It set off a chain reaction of military deploy-ment by both sides along the border and almost sparked a war.Outcome As tensions increased, the hot line between the two countries was activated. In February 1987, Pakistan’s PresidentGeneral Zia ul Haq travelled to India, on the pretext of watching a cricket match, where he held talks with the Indian leadership to defuse the crisis.

The standoffs between India and Pakistan havealways ended in a diplomatic truce

SHAILESH RAVAL

SOLDIERS ON PATROLALONG THE INDIA-PAKISTAN BORDER

Parakram—the largest ever mil-itary build-up on the borders. Af-ter a 10-month standoff, Indiaand its prime minister Atal BihariVajpayee backed off and resumedpeace talks with Pakistan.

Nor has coercive diplomacyborne much fruit. After the Par-liament attacks, to avoid a con-flict with India, presidentMusharraf promised to rein in thejehadis. But within months, theyresumed operations under differ-ent names. Only now, they begantargeting Musharraf too. In 2002,India had broken off diplomaticrelations and banned all civilianflights coming in from Pakistan. Italso cut off economic and culturalties. But that would soon provecounterproductive and, after ayear or so, diplomatic relationswere restored.

After the Mumbai attacks In-dia is now in the unenviable posi-tion of being reduced to a binaryoption: launch a limited war thatcould escalate into a nuclear con-flict and bring international in-tervention or watch withincreasing frustration as Pak-istan denies every charge beingmade against it and does nothingagainst terrorism.

There are lessons that Indiashould learn from the 1971 con-flict that was a result of carefulstrategy and planning which in-cluded major diplomatic ma-noeuvres (the Indo-Soviet Treatysigned to neutralise American in-fluence in the region), covert op-erations (the support to the MuktiBahini in East Pakistan) andarmy preparedness (the decisionto strike in winter when Chinacould not open another front onIndia’s border because of adverseweather conditions).

What the current situationcalls for is a similar massive effortwith a clear end goal in sight. Ifthe 1971 objective was to dis-member Pakistan then the 2009gameplan should be to neutralisePakistan so that it can no longerpose a threat to India.

The buzzword is ‘smart’ strat-egy that calls for India to work onmultiple pressure points to forcePakistan into taking action to dis-mantle its extensive terror net-work. So India must work onseveral fronts at the same time.ll Support Pakistan’s democraticforces: It must work tostrengthen the civilian demo-cratic set up and contain theinfluence of the PakistanArmy over governance.That must mean bufferingup the current politicalcombinations and engagingthem in a dialogue even whilewarning them of the conse-quences of doing nothing.Democracies have a way of making nations benign as it hasdone with India.ll Highlight Pakistan’s internaldivisions: India has never reallyfully utilised the divisions in Pakistan to prove gross humanright violations in Baluchistanand also encourage separatist

trends in Pakistan-occupiedKashmir. Even if it does not en-gage in covert operations todestabilise Pakistan, it could usediplomatic channels to highlightthe human right violations as Islamabad does over Kashmir.ll Drive a wedge between theArmy and jehadis: It must cease-lessly build international pres-sure to get the Pakistan Army toact against jehadis. For a while,Musharraf had become the target of the jehadis though theLashkar-e-Toiba scrupulouslykept out of such attacks. Now In-dia should get the international

T H E A G E N D A

16

ExpertSpeak

zz We have to tell thePakistanis firmly that weare not going to take thislying down. At the momentwe are talking too much in different voices fromSouth Block each contradicting the otherand the impression that isgaining ground is that it issimply verbal anger. Weneed to demonstrate firmness and prepared-ness for action. We shouldtry diplomacy but mustmake it clear to the inter-national community that if they fail to disciplinePakistan we will do it.However, we have to do iton our own, no third coun-try is going to pull out ourchestnuts from the fire.

zz Pakistan is waging a lowintensity conflict. We needto build covert capabilitiesin Pakistan and mount apsychological war. Weshould not shy away frompolitical destabilisationand inflicting economicdamage to Pakistan. Weshould stop dialogue andmake it clear that we re-serve the right to paythem back in the samecoin. A major change inour Afghan policy will alsohelp. The time has comefor us to say thatPakistan’s border withAfghanistan is disputed;we should frame our pol-icy taking into account theaspirations of Afghan peo-ple on the Durand Line.

zz We have handed over theinitiative to third partiesthat may not be able to de-liver, as they have muchlarger geostrategic inter-ests in Pakistan. We mustask the US to benchmarkPakistan on action againstterrorism and insist on atimeframe. At the Friendsof Pakistan meeting laterthis month we should en-sure that all economic as-sistance becomesconditional. The compos-ite dialogue and joint ter-ror mechanism should bescrapped. We should con-sider trade sanctions,withdrawal of the highcommissioner and discon-tinuing sporting and peo-ple-to-people contacts.

zz Sustained diplomacyand not any military strikeis the answer. We mayknow the location of ter-rorist camps but a surgicalstrike may not prevent another attack. Besidesthere is a risk of collateraldamage with a nuclear-armed country. Pakistan is in a financial mess,President Zardari hasasked for a huge bailout.We should ask the interna-tional community to tiethis aid to Pakistan dismantling the terror infrastructure. It can befollowed with a trade sanction. We may alsostart a global campaign to designate Pakistan aterrorist state.

zz To regard terrorism as alaw-and-order problem isto do what the terroristswant—to sap yourstrength. Between the twoextremes—continuing in-action and militarystrikes—lie a hundred op-tions, including diplo-matic, economic andpolitical actions. Israel'sheavy response to how-ever small a provocationand India's non-responseto frontal attacks on itssecurity make these countries polar opposites.Yet, as the internationalreaction to Mumbai andGaza illustrates, it is themeek that get counselledwhile the intrepid wage action unhindered.

M.K . RASGOTRA BRAHMA CHELL ANEYKANWAL S IBAL G. PARTHASARATHYL ALIT MANSINGH

FormerForeignSecretary

StrategicAnalyst

FormerForeignSecretary

FormerEnvoy toPakistan

FormerForeignSecretary

community to bring the Lashkarchief to book over the Mumbai at-tacks, even seek his extradition toAmerica first and then to India.India could also push for the ar-rest and extradition of DawoodIbrahim—a third country in theGulf could be used to facilitate it.ll Keep Pakistan engaged in bat-tling the Taliban: It must allow Pakistan to continue to bat-tle on the Afghan front and worktowards ensuring a stableAfghanistan that does not bringback the Taliban of yore. Gettingthe Pakistan Army to fight therenot only depletes its force

strength on the Indian border, butkeeps the Afghan mercenariesaway from Kashmir. ll Make the fight against terror-ism the core issue: Providingdiplomatic teeth to India’s terror campaign is essential for India tokeep the focused international attention on combating terror-ism. While India introduced acomprehensive convention on international terrorism at the UNin 1996, not enough diplomatic efforts were made to make it acentral issue. Similarly despitehaving almost two dozen jointworking groups on terrorism, our

strategy to mount a sustainedglobal campaign has not workedso far. India needs to play a leadership role in creating aware-ness about the scourge of terror-ism. There is a need for a changeof gears and terrorism should notbe a mere footnote in joint state-ments or policy statements. Itshould be at the top of India’sdiplomatic focus. With this as thecentral focus, we should alsomake use of the available instru-ments like the SAARC convention ofterrorism to put pressure on Pakistan and Bangladesh to handover wanted fugitives to India.

n

INDIA NEEDS TOKEEP PAKISTAN

ENGAGED IN BATTLING TALIBANFORCES. ITTAKES

PRESSURE OFFJAMMU & KASHMIR.

Seasoneddiplomatsand strategicanalysts offer theirviews on how to putpressure onPakistan

18

ll Tying economic ties toprogress on terrorism:There should be enoughlevers like the eco-nomic ones for Indiato use. India contin-ues to give Pakistanthe most favoured na-tion status for trade de-spite lack of reciprocity. Itshould discontinue this and alsouse international pressure to stop aid from international financialinstitutions to countries like Pakistan that are seen as spon-sors of terrorism. ll Effective border managementpolicy: The real problem for Indiais that in the absence of an effec-tive border management policy,infiltration of terrorists becomesmuch easier. For the 3,325-kmIndia-Pakistan border, sensorsare needed to be installed tocheck infiltration. In fact, as partof its new strategy to increase de-niability, the ISI is trying to ensurethat terrorists are sent throughthird countries like Nepal andBangladesh where the bordersare completely porous. Thereneeds to be enhanced surveil-lance and better intelligencealong the border and at bordercheck posts. Special provisions

are required to ensure thatchecks and balances are in placeto monitor those who guard theborders to ensure that corruptionin their ranks can be checked.Satellite monitored sensors needto be installed along the sensitiveinfiltration points on the India-Pakistan border and the India-Bangladesh border to begin with,which can be followed up with theborder with Nepal. ll Stringent visa screening procedures: India needs to put inplace a state-of-the-art visascreening system at all its foreignmissions to ensure that those ap-plying for visas can be screened.In fact, a common database canbe shared with other countries tocheck the credentials of a visa ap-plicant to weed out the suspectedcategories. To prevent corruptionin issuance of visas the Govern-ment needs to have a monitoringmechanism in place with toughpunishment. An example of thelaxity is that India issued over70,000 visit visas to Pakistani na-tionals to visit. Many thousandsdid not return.ll Making preparations for a lim-ited military strike: If all peace-ful measures fail to bringPakistan around, India shouldconsider various scenarios—lim-ited strikes or the possibility of afull-scale military confrontation.That involves boosting intelli-gence so that if India hits a terrorist leader, Pakistan wouldbe under tremendous pressurefrom the international commu-nity to restrain its response. It’san option fraught with risks forIndia but something that Delhimust keep open. Pakistan mustknow that if there is another ter-rorist strike, it would mean war.

T H E A G E N D A

n

INDIA MUSTSTRATEGISE WHATKIND OF PAKISTAN

ITWANTS AND WORKSYSTEMATICALLY

TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL.

MOUNT a sus-tained diplomaticcampaign to buildinternationalpressure, espe-cially from the

US, by providing evidence of Pakistan’scomplicity.The messagemust go out: if they failto bring Pakistan around,India is ready for war.EXPLOIT the divisionswithin Pakistan and expose its weaknesses in Baluchistan, the FATAand PoK. Drive a wedgebetween the army andthe jehadis.Also win over the moderate democratic forces.EXPLORE a range ofdiplomatic and economicsanctions, including withdrawing mostfavoured nation status,scrapping the joint terror mechanism andkeeping on hold sportsand cultural links.SET a timeline forPakistan to dismantle terror infrastructure.Use legal instrumentssuch as the SAARC convention on terrorismto extradite the perpetra-tors of Mumbai 26/11.

ActionPlan

OVERHAULING The Police

There’s an urgent need to change the image and the status of the men in khaki for them to become weapons against terror

ISSUE

3T H E A G E N D A

19

AFP

MUMBAI’S POLICEMEN DURING THE 26/11 ATTACKSMUMBAI’S POLICEMEN DURING THE 26/11 ATTACKS

Education A constable is requiredto have just a high school certificate

Salary Paid between Rs 3,200 andRs 4,900, around that of a semi-skilled worker

Promotion He can expect onlyone promotion in his lifetime andgenerally retires as a head constable.Can never hope to rise to stationhouse officer (SHO).

No application of mind All in-vestigative powers are with the SHO

leaving the constable as an automa-ton carrying out orders with no per-sonal initiative. Emphasis on brawnrather than brain dehumanises him.

Orderly system Constables alsoserve in homes of senior officials asdomestic servants further erodestheir self-esteem

Numbers Constables form over 87 per cent of the police force and account for the largest number of vacancies

Meagre metro allowance He is expected to live with his family ina metro with a meagre allowance like Rs 100 in New Delhi

Short of leave Shortage of unfilled vacancies means that constables cannot take frequent leave,and suffer from physical and psycho-logical exhaustion

Poor equipment No personalprotection during riots or terrorstrikes. Policemen use obsoleteweapons and rarely get to fire them.

Housing facility He has to livein rented accommodation in big cities.

A constable is the first line of defenceand often the weakest link in the chain

Constabulary is the KeyFrom its introduction into the British Empire in1895—just two years before the completion of theVictoria Terminus station,

now the Chhatrapati ShivajiTerminus—right up to the timewhen it gave way to self-loading ri-fles in the 1960s, the .303 Lee-Enfield rifle was an out-standing weapon.

Today, this antique rifle whichhas to be manually loaded aftereach shot, and is standard issuefor India’s policemen symbolisesthe asymmetry between them andthe terrorists they must face: anageing, outmoding weapon pittedagainst the AK-47 that can spit 30 bullets in one automatic burst.

Locomotives of India’s growthstory, the six metros are magnetsfor investment and prime targetsfor terrorists. Booming growth has outstripped investment in security infrastructure over theyears, with the police force havingbeen nibbled away by corruptionand systemic neglect. When facedwith a threat like urban terrorism like in Mumbai, it collapses like

a house of cards. As security experts will tell you, you cannothave a first class counter-terror-ism response within a third classpolice force.

India’s police forces are grosslyunderstaffed. The country has oneof the lowest policemen per popu-lation ratio in the world, just 142per lakh people compared to theratio of 250 per lakh in the western countries. The 40,000-strong Mumbai police force isshort by 15 per cent of its man-power. This is the case in mostmetros. Policemen are inade-quately trained and crucial

departments like intelligence arenot only understaffed but alsotreated as dumping grounds forundesirable officers or merelyused as tools to collect informationon political adversaries.

The forces don’t have modernweapons, communication sets orvehicles, no personal protectionlike bullet-proof jackets and helmets and, worse, no specialisedteams to deal with heavy assaults.

In India’s Silicon Valley,Bangalore most police stationsfunction from rented places andsome of them are not big enoughto even have lock-ups or stockweapons. The seven police sta-tions in the north-east division ofBangalore including the NewInternational Airport, lack full staffand infrastructure. One stationsub-inspector, for example, hasjust 28 policemen to look after anarea that consists of nearly 100 in-dustries, commercial establish-ments spread over nearly 30villages. At any given time at leastfive of them should be in the policestation and just 24 of them cannotbe manning the entire area. Somestations don’t have wireless gadg-ets. Some don’t have staff to pre-pare charge-sheets on time and ifcharge-sheets are not filed within90 days for lack of staff, it createslegal problems.

There is also an asymmetry between the Centre and stateswhen it comes to technology andfighting terror. Part of this has todo with the legacy of the 1980swhere terror was essentially confined to north India—Punjab,Jammu and Kashmir and Delhi. The Home Ministry createdthe National Security Guard (NSG),a one-stop shop to deal with hi-jackings, bomb threats and urban

T H E A G E N D A

n

INDIA HAS ONE OFTHE LOWEST RATIOS

OF POLICEMEN TOPOPULATION IN THE

WORLD,ATJUSTTHREEPER 2,000, LESS THAN

HALFTHE NUMBERCOMPARED TO THE US.

AP PHOTO/CHANNI ANAND

20 21

Graphic by PRASHANT CHAUDHARY

Courtesy: Ministry of Home Affairs

ALL INDIA VACANCIES Constables1.13 Lakh

Sub Inspectors18,654

Dy SPs2,099

CCoouunnttrryy PPoolliiccee ppeerr llaakkhh PPooppuullaattiioonn

India 142

Japan 175

UK 200

Germany 300

Australia 290

USA 315Courtesy: Ministry of Home Affairs

1 lakh Level III bullet-proof jacketRs 300 crore

1 lakh automaticcarbines to replace.303 / SLR riflesRs 5,000 crore

1 lakh KevlarhelmetsRs 100 crore

URGENTLY NEEDED

State-wise Police-to-Population Ratio Police-to-Population Ratio inSelect Countries

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Mad

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assaults. With terrorism spreadinginto the hinterland, as it has overthe last three years, and the newspectre of suicide commandos,metro police forces have beencaught unprepared.

Metros are now abjectly de-pendent on distantly located forceslike the NSG not only for the SpecialForce personnel but also for bombsquads and post-blast forensic in-vestigations. Thanks to the shortshrift given to training and a short-age of ammunition, even themandatory annual firing given topolicemen is not insisted upon andsometimes a police constable cango through his career without fir-

ing a single shot. Even funds areleft unutilised. For instance, in2006-07, states spent just over 60per cent of liberal Central grants,returning unspent money even asthe backlog of basic equipmentlike X-ray machines, modernweapons and communicationtools, piled up.

There is little that has not beenalready said about the crying needto reform the police force. At leastfive police reform committeessince 1998 headed by JulioRibeiro, Justice Malimath,Padmanabhaiah, Soli Sorabjee

and Veerappa Moily have said re-peated ad nauseum. “It would beprudent for the policy makers torealise that the present-day chal-lenge to internal security, espe-cially those posed by covertdesigns of Pakistan’s ISI or Maoist-Marxist extremist groups are ofsuch a nature that to meet themmeaningfully and effectively, thecountry needs a highly motivated,professionally-skilled, infrastruc-turally self-sufficient and sophisti-catedly trained police force,” thePadmanabhaiah Committee notedpresciently in 2000.

Two years ago, the SecondAdministrative Commission

headed by Veerappa Moily notedthat inadequate training and infrastructure for the police was one of a dozen weaknesses inthe legal framework.

To see the difference trainingand infrastructure can make to thepolice force, one has to visit theCounter Terrorism and JungleWarfare School at Kanker inChhattisgarh where state police-men undergo a six-month coursewhich completely reorients themfrom law and order policy into of-fensive counter insurgency andcounter-Naxalite operations.

Besides equipping them to usemodern weapons, the trainingphysically conditions them, sharp-ens their reflexes and trains themto take the initiative in ambushes.The results are there to see. A kill ratio of five policemen for every Naxalite has been reversedto one policeman for five Naxalitesin three years. The HomeMinistry’s plan to set up 20 suchschools all over the country is a vindication of the need for sucha reorientation.

An ideal place to begin wouldbe the police control room, per-haps the most overlooked aspect ofmetro policing. In military strategyand business parlance theObserve-Orient-Decide-Act or theOODA loop is said to be the most crit-ical aspect of a fast unfolding situ-ation: an entity that could take aquick decision could rapidly out-pace their opponents.

Police control rooms need to beimmediately upgraded into largemilitary-like command and communication hubs equippedwith secure communication,phones, faxes and the Internet.They should be linked with otherarmed forces, intelligence agen-cies and receive feeds from CCTVsall across the city. These controlrooms are meant to feed decision-makers with all the inputs to forma rapid picture of an emerging situation and thereby plan speedy responses.

These control rooms need to bemanned round-the-clock by energetic officers with rapid decision-making ability. Thesecontrol rooms, which could become hubs of security forces in a crisis, should have largeGoogle Earth-like digital map projections of the city and a fleet of

T H E A G E N D A

22

ExpertSpeak

Security experts offer an insight into what can be done to ensure greater safety

n

THE FORCES DON’THAVE MODERN

WEAPONS,VEHICLESAND PERSONAL

PROTECTION LIKE BULLETPROOFJACKETS

AND HELMETS.

zz Immediate filling up of vacancies in police force

zz Stop using po-lice force to pro-tect criminal-politicians. It hasa criminalising ef-fect on the police.

zz Special WeaponsAnd Tactics (SWAT)teams should beset up in allmetros

zz Beefing up ofintelligence at thestate and districtlevel. Focus onhumint ratherthan techint.

zz Effective controlrooms in all citiesto ensure a three-minuteresponse time.

zz Leaders shouldbe carefully se-lected from a listof empanelled of-ficers whose reco-rds are monitored

zz The Governmentmust exercise AllIndia Service Rul-es to prevent inef-ficient men fromrising to the top

zz Senior officersshould be givenoperational freedom

zz The investigationagency should beseparated from thelaw and order machinery

zz Public participa-tion in policing.People who are non-political shouldinteract with the police.

zz Invest in polic-ing as a planned outlay. Power, andaccountabilitymust be augmented.

zz Utilise existingcapacities moreefficiently by re-training and rede-ploying the forcein the states

zz Massive man-power augmenta-tion to bringpolice-populationratios in line withrequired norms

zz Intelligencecapacities withinthe state policemust be estab-lished to securefull coverage

zz Technical capabilities of theinternal securityapparatus must bebrought in line withglobal standards.

zz Retrain thepolice force forterrorism and internal security duties

zz Restoration ofthe beat system toensure grassrootsintelligence

zz Metros to haveanti-terror cellwith twin tasks ofinvestigation andundertaking com-mando operations

zz Upgrade community policing by increasing police-public interface

zz Tough laws likeMCOCA and fasttrack courts todeal with cases ofterrorism.

zz A federal agencyto offer intelli-gence to keystates is the needof the hour

zz For any contin-gency, the policeforce should bestrengthened sothat the armyneedn’t step in

zz The leader ofthe police forceshould only be aperson who hashands-on experi-ence of policing

zz New senior postsshould be created,pay scales shouldacknowledge thework of the con-stabulary

zz A specialisedforce like the ATSshould be allowedto investigate mat-ters in a free andfair manner.

zz Policemen haveto be combatised.Their physical fitness has tobe raised.

zz Trained in reflexshooting for acounter-terrorismenvironment

zz Replace old rifles with moderncarbines like theMP-5

zz Improve policeleadership at the ASI, SI and SP level

zz Introduce cou-rse in counter-ter-rorism and junglewarfare at Nati-onal Police Acad-emy, Hyderabad

PRAKASH S INGH

FormerDG, BSF

JUL IO R IBEIRO

FormerDGP,Punjab

AJAY SAHNI

ED,CentreforConflictStudies

AJAY RAJ SHARMA

FormerCom-mis-sioner,DelhiPolice

ARVIND INAMDAR

FormerDGP,Maha-rashtra

Director,CTJWS,Kanker

BRIG . B .K . PONWAR

REUTERS

23

fast police cars capable of reachingany trouble spot in the citywithin five minutes.

Trained and heav-ily armed SpecialWeapons and Tactics(SWAT) teams of around100 personnel withspecial weapons, com-munication devices, ar-moured vehicles and helicoptersshould be immediately raised in allthe major metros to ensure quick reaction teams for 24x7emergencies. They should not bediverted for VIP security, a trap thatmost similarly raised elite forcesusually fall into.

There are quick wins to re-placing the vintage rifles. Eversince the CRPF and the BSF switchedover to the INSAS rifles a few yearsago, over five lakh SLRs are lyingunused in their armories. TheHome Ministry can immediatelyhand these guns over to the metropolice forces. New technology likefacial recognition software andday-night CCTV cameras needs tobe embraced fast to plug in thegaps wherever possible.

Police forces in metros must fillvacancies and begin reorientingtheir personnel in basic anti-terrorand first-aid drills. Buying com-munications equipment and wea-ponry off-the-shelf is only one partof the challenge—cutting throughbureaucratic red tape to spendmoney in time will prove to be a fargreater one. That’s not all.Training a policeman to use modern weapons is another challenge because an untrainedpoliceman armed with a sophisticated Heckler and KochMP-5 sub-machine gun is as goodas unarmed.

Another measure would be to

identify major landmarks and notonly guard them but also regularlypractise counter-terrorism drills inthem. Digital blueprints of allmajor landmarks including hotels,IT parks, shopping malls and large

offices must be kept by the policeto help plan for eventualities likehostage situations. The policeforce must also identify and trainits officers to act as negotiators.Negotiators fulfil a vital function ofallowing the security forces to buytime and assess the vulnerabilitiesof their opponents.

Intelligence branches need tobe staffed with career officers.There’s a need to create intellige-nce analysis units dedicated to analysing inputs received fromstate and Central intelligence agencies. Not being proactive onpolicing will prove to be an invita-tion to terrorists to strike at our engines of growth.

T H E A G E N D A

24

CONTROL rooms manned round-the-clock by ener-getic young officers.And a fleet of police vehicles toensure one reaches the scene of an incident in lessthan five minutes.SWAT teams of 100 men in each city capable of with-standing heavy assaults, hostage situations and

building intervention. City SWAT teams to be given combatexperience with the army in counter-insurgency operationsin J&K and the North-East.INCREASE in manpower. Filling up of vacant posts.SETTING up intelligence analysis units, to be manned round-the-clock to sift through intelligence inputsBETTER training for all personnel. Frequent access to police firing rangesTRAINED in on-ground operational exercises for high building interventions in various actual locations like malls,multiplexes and hotelsALL POLICE units in cities to be given at least two twin-engine transport helicopters for swift deployment of personnel in an emergency

ActionPlan

n

POLICE FORCES INMETROS MUST FILL

VACANCIES ANDBEGIN REORIENTINGTHEIR PERSONNEL INBASIC ANTI-TERROR

AND FIRST-AID DRILLS.

T H E A G E N D A

MODERNISINGThe NSG

The Mumbai attacks exposed the inadequacies of our best anti-terror force. The shortfalls need to be addressed. Now.

ISSUE

4

25

AP

NSG PERSONNELRAPPELDOWNFROM AN IAFHELICOPTER

They called it the NationalSecurity Guard (NSG) whenthe force was raised on thelines of Germany’s GSG-9and Britain’s famed SAS 25

years ago to be India’s elite anti-hi-jacking, anti-terror and bomb dis-posal force. Today, it is betterknown as a force that provides se-curity cover to VVIPs and is besetwith the usual problems thatIndia’s uniformed personnel haveremained mired in for decades.

The Mumbai attacks put thefocus back on NSG’s preparednessand capabilities. Though it is onstand-by, NSG took 12 hours toreach Mumbai’s terror hotspots.Once there, the limitations in theirequipment and training were feltat every step during the operation.

Set up in 1986, the NSG comesunder the Ministry of Home Affairs(MHA) and draws men from boththe army and Central paramilitaryforces. Its counter-terror arm, theSAG, or rather 51 SAG as the unit iscalled, is manned entirely by armypersonnel, and so is the 52 SAG, theanti-hijack squad.

It’s a sad tale of neglect that hasbrought the nation’s top-notchfighting force to this pass. The gov-ernment’s apathy towards the NSG

is appalling. Equipment, man-power, training—you name it, andthe NSG is lagging behind. The lar-ger part of their equipment is age-ing. Despite being authorised formany years, the sniper rifle that SAG

uses, the Heckler and Koch PSG1,have not been replaced or up-graded since NSG inception. In con-trast, Germany’s GSG-9 uses latestversions of the weapons and up-grades it routinely.

Basic equipment like collapsi-ble ladders have been authorisedfor purchase but not procured asyet. That’s one thing that com-mandos missed in Mumbai. TheHE-36 hand grenades are of WorldWar II fame; even the army usestechnologically better versions.One reason for such apathy couldbe what NSG officers say—out ofsight, out of mind. Unlike otherparamilitary forces, the NSG ispressed into action only in anemergency situation, like in

Mumbai they were operationallydeployed after six long years.

Even the equipment procuredis not in sync with the nature of theassigned task. The 51 SAG is a spe-cialised force to combat terror andrescue people under very restric-tive settings of ‘urban warfare’,what is called a ‘troop intensive’and ‘high casualty’ approach incontrast to the army where ‘de-struction is a prime method to gainsupremacy’. “But the NSG has sameequipment as army commandos.Ask them (MHA) how much havethey spent on our equipment?”says a senior NSG personnel.

Factor inordinate delays inprocurement and the dismal pic-ture is complete. The pending listof demands include specialisedboots for desert, water, jungle andstealth operations, and knee andelbow supports in the overalls thatcommandos wear. NSG men areclothed in cotton for all seasons,while specialised forces in othercountries use fireproof clothing.

Bulletproof combat helmetsthat are now available have visualimage display and night vision.They are light and equipped with avoice recognition microphone foreffective communication but theNSG still doesn’t have them. “The

demand for better helmets wasmade three years ago but the oneswe got are heavy, uncomfortableand can’t resist the high-velocitybullets that terrorists use,” says anNSG major. “Who should be decid-ing what to buy? We, who put ourlife on the firing line, or the MHA,that has neither the expertise northe willingness?” he adds.

The bulletproof jackets usedare heavy, restrictive and of thesame quality as provided to otherparamilitary forces. Another NSG

major says, “We would have savedboth our men in Mumbai opera-tions if we had state-of-the-artequipment.” That’s a serious alle-gation but the MHA exudes familiarbureaucratic apathy. “Why wouldany official go out of way to securespeedy procurement? It is inter-preted as the vested interest of theofficer dealing the matter,” says ajoint secretary of the ministry.

The MHA quagmire doesn’t help

as the internal security divisiondoes not deal with the police whilethe police division does not dealwith police modernisation andprocurement. Then how can afractured ministry assure internalsecurity? It seems to have an explanation: the NSG is a smallerforce compared to other paramili-tary forces like the BSF and sellersmay not be in a position to supplysmall quantities, so the NSG de-mand has to be clubbed with wish-list of other forces. But that cannotbe the reason for not acting, giventhat former home minister ShivrajPatil promised on the 23rd RaisingDay parade of the NSG in October2007, “Wehave to simplify the pro-cedure for buying arms and otherequipment for various forces sothat they are fully equipped. Timesare changing and the challengesare new. We cannot let our forceslag behind terrorists.” But the NSG

continues to lag.

More than 600 hostages wererescued in 48 hours during theMumbai operation and eight well-trained and equipped terroristswere ‘taken out’ in a highly re-strictive urban environment,under live media coverage, withtwo NSG casualties. But the NSG

officers are disturbed over the‘avoidable delay’ in reaching thescene, saying, “That happenswhen you do not have proper re-sponse mechanism in place and itsramifications were felt during theoperation.” But the Government issilent over the delay and the NSG isnot supposed to divulge much.

Also, the force does not havean aircraft at its disposal. Thoughit carried out a seven-day exercisewith the Indian Air Force in Marchlast year with emphasis on “swiftdeployment”, but when the timecame to deliver, it just didn’t workout. Some NSG officers say theplane, an IL-76, that brought 51

T H E A G E N D A

26 27

n

A SPECIAL FORCELIKE THE NSG

SHOULD BE KEPTUPGRADED IN TERMSOF EQUIPMENTANDTRAINING BUTTHATIS NOT HAPPENING.

WEAPONRY is archaic. The NSG doesn’t not have Cornershot guns and low-recoil rockets whichare a must for urban restrictive warfare. There is an urgent need toupgrade the H&K PSG1 sniper riflesand HE-36 hand grenades.

TRANSPORT is pathetic; theforce does not have a dedicatedplane or armoured vehicles for oper-ations in an urban environment

FIRE and tear resistant Nomexclothing is missing. No basics likeblastproof eyewear, Kevlar tacticalgloves, elbow and knee pads or even

rubber-soled tactical footwear.

CAMERAS worn on body to capture images of the operation and relay them real-time to the operations commander.

LIGHT bulletproof vests (Level 3)to protect against AK-47 rounds; bulletproof helmets with in-built communication devices to allowhandsfree operation; Night visiongoggles are also missing.

FREEFALL parachutes for dropping commandos at specific locations during open-countryoperations.

RADAR imaging equipment to seethrough walls, listening devices todetect movement. Anti-material rifles to penetrate them.

BETTER situational awarenessequipment like radio sets with in-built GPS chips to enable squadron/team leaders to control operations inmultiple corridors

SMALL or medium explosivecharges to blast holes in walls andblow up locks for strategic entries

MOBILE command posts for instantly setting up communicationand command posts on site

COLLAPSIBLE and light metalladders for better manoeuverabilityand hydraulic rams for building inter-vention are also unavailable

WHATTHE NSG LACKSIndia’s elite anti-terror force has a long way to gobefore it can join the list of the world’s best

AN NSG COMMANDO DURING THENARIMAN HOUSE OPERATION

SAG personnel to Mumbai had towait for some VVIPs whowere to travel on thesame flight. “You cancheck the flight recordto know where theplane was when it wascalled for service,” saysa senior NSG officer, rub-bishing that the plane wasnot available in Delhi. The NSG alsosuffers from around 50 and 20 percent vacancies in its SRG and SAG

wings respectively. During theMumbai operation, the 51 SAG fellshort of the numbers and 52 SAG

was summoned for reinforcement.This raises another question: If asimilar attack was simultaneouslycarried out at some other place,what would the response be? “Wedon’t have an answer,” says a lt-colonel of the NSG.

The Home Ministry has al-ready decided to set up regionalNSG centres at Kolkata, Hyderabadand Mumbai or Nagpur. Butsourcing the required 4,000 menfrom the army and other Centralparamilitary forces for these cen-tres is another challenge for theMHA. The army is already grap-pling with a shortage of soldiersand sources say it will be difficultto provide manpower on thatscale. However, Home Minister P.Chidambaram is optimistic andsays the army chief didn’t expressany inability to help set up new NSG

hubs, though he did emphasisethe need to draw more people intoNSG and train them.

“We are constantly redesigningcourses with changing situations.Lessons from Mumbai have al-ready been incorporated in ourtraining drills,” says a senior officerdealing with training. However, in-siders agree that the training is

very inward looking with no newideas being inducted by interact-ing and learning from the experi-ences of specialised anti-terror

squads from other countries orelse NSG operations would be pre-dictable like it happened inMumbai. An NSG officer says, “InMumbai operation, the terroristsknew how we operate. That’s whythey could hold us for so long.”There is movement on that front aswell. Talks are in progress withGermany’s GSG-9 to help upgradethe NSG and train it better.

This is a wake-up call from themembers of disgruntled force thatcannot be ignored. The NSG is thesword arm of the nation’s war onterror and it’s got to be sharp, andmore than ever before.

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ExpertSpeak

zz The biggest mis-take was to transferNSG to the HomeMinistry which now causes bureaucratic delays

zz There is no coor-dination betweenthe Central intelli-gence agencies,like RAW and IB,and NSG.

zz The Mumbai operation wascarried out like an infantry operationwith no priorgameplan for it

zz With very seniorsofficers around,operational com-manders cannothave free hand inoperations

zz Unlike the casewith NSG, theSpecial Grouphad an earmarkedplane, an AN 12,in readiness

zz In India, the NSGis not allowed toperform clinicallylike a specialforce. They do nothave the freedom.

zz Equipping andupgrading a spe-cial force like theNSG is a constantprocess that maynot be happening

zz The procure-ment process is soslow that some-thing that shouldtake three monthstakes seven years

zz The force is notused too often.It is importantthat it is regularly deployed in actualsituations.

zz Interaction withsimiliar foreignagencies like theMossad is nothappening at thedesired levels

zz Only volunteerswho undertakehazardous mis-sions in the SAGshould be allowedto join

zz Stringent selec-tion proceduresshould be followedas laid down in thequalitative requirements

zz Need for a per-manent nucleusof 25 per cent ofpersonnel to ensure combatskills are not lost

zz Regular deploy-ment in counter insurgency opera-tions in Jammu &Kashmir and North-east combat

zz Need for con-stant upgrada-tion of equipmentto keep it at parwith internationaltrends

zz We need a cen-tralised specialoperations com-mand which hasits own air andnaval components

zz To transform theNSG, we need tohave a more ratio-nalised commandand control forbetter operations

zz The operationalemployment hasbeen very spora-dic. NSG’s last deployment was inAkshardham in ’02.

zz The emphasison the VIP protec-tion need to behived off and begiven a special police orientation

zz CT operationsin an urban envi-ronment is a spe-cialised taskcarried out bymilitary forces

zz The Mumbai operation was long drawn and the fatigue element wouldhave set in

zz The responsehas to be quickerin such contin-gency situationswhere time is thekey element

zz Slow procure-ment is an issue.The need of thehour is to carrythis out fast andtransparently

zz The live cover-age of the Mumbaioperation was objectionable.Somebody shouldhave taken a call.

zz Equipment isanother issue.Electronic equip-ment would havenullified in thisenvironment

zz The NSG shouldexclusively beused for anti-terror operationsand not for VVIPprotection duties

zz The police com-ponent should bespecially trainedso that it can be-come a full-fledgedanti-terror outfit

zz NSG hubs shouldbe set up at care-fully chosen cities,especially in thesouth, west andeastern regions

zz Mock drillsshould be con-ducted at regularintervals to keepthe force in fight-ing condition

zz The trainingtechniquesshould be up-dated and shouldinclude Metro(train) drills

COL . CHOUDHARY

Trainedthefirst lotof NSG

T.R . KAKKAR

FormerDG,NSG

MAJ. GEN. DAT TA

Part oftheSpecialGroupteam

MAJ. GEN. BAKSHI

FormerGOCRomeoForce,J&K

ARUN BHAG AT

FormerIBchief

R.S . MOOSHAHARY

FormerDG, BSF andNSG

SETTING up a ‘Special Operations Command’ on the lines of the US or Israeli model with its own dedi-cated aircraft, helicopter in readinessSPEEDY task-based procurement of equipment andweaponry for NSG, like it is done with RAW, IB and theSpecial Protection Group, should not be clubbed with

the general procurement for other paramilitary forcesCOUNTER-TERROR operation in a built-up urban environ-ment is a highly specialised military task which calls for intensive training in real situations and a lot of interactionwith such parallel forces across the worldBALANCED command and control is needed. Counter-terrorand anti-hijack units are manned only by army commandosbut the DG, IG and DIG are IPS officers with little experiencein counter-insurgency and counter-terror operations.GREATER and frequent operational deployment of the NSGin real situations is required.The Mumbai operation camesix years after the Akshardham operation in 2002.COMING up of regional centres should not lead to the forcebeing spread too thin, simultaneously ensuring that the required additional 4,000 men are inducted following the selection procedures laid down in qualitative requirements

ActionPlan

n

SETTING UP OFREGIONAL CENTRESIS A GOOD STEP BUT

SOURCING THE REQUIRED MEN FROMOTHER FORCES WILL

BE A CHALLENGE.

The NSG commandos spearheading the Mumbai operation suffered because of poor equipment and

weaponry. Here is what needs to be done.

When P. Chidambaramtook over as homeminister in the wakeof the Mumbai at-tacks, he felt the key

to raising the level of preparednesswas in gathering and sharing ofintelligence. But he was in for ashock when he reviewed the stateof India’s intelligence gathering.The multiplicity of organisationsinvolved in intelligence gatheringrefused to share the informationdespite the establishment of aMulti-Agency Centre (MAC) to act asa nodal point as far back as 2001.Most agencies hadn’t even appoin-ted their representatives to theCentre. So among the first thingshe did was to make the MAC func-tion on a 24x7 basis and made itlegal requirement for it to share in-telligence with all other agencies,both at the Centre and in states.

That would be among themany shortcomings thatChidambaram would rapidly haveto fill. Like in every other thing,India has not learnt its lessons. TheKargil Review Committee, whichwent into the massive failure ofintelligence that saw Pakistaniintruders take the mountainheights without the Indian Armyknowing, stated: “There is noinstitutionalised mechanism forcoordination or objective-orientedinteraction between intelligenceagencies and consumers at differ-ent levels. Similarly, there is nomechanism for tasking the agen-cies, monitoring their perform-ance and reviewing their records.Nor is there any oversight of theoverall functioning of the agen-cies.” Despite its report, reform inintelligence agencies was slow incoming. So we had Mumbai 26/11.

The problem is that nearly a

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If terror strikes have to be thwarted, intelligence gathering has to be coordinated and actionable

ISSUE

5

SIPRA DAS

BEEFING UPIntelligence

NNAATTIIOONNAALL SSEECCUURRIITTYY AADDVVIISSEERR

Collates the armedforces’ intelligence to re-duce their dependenceon Central agencies.

DDEEFFEENNCCEEIINNTTEELLLLIIGGEENNCCEEAAGGEENNCCYY

Apex agency fornational security.Functions as NSA’ssecretariat. Has threedeputy NSAs.

NNAATTIIOONNAALLSSEECCUURRIITTYY CCOOUUNNCCIILL

Headed by one of the deputy NSAs.Analyses intelligencefrom all agencies.

JJOOIINNTTIINNTTEELLLLIIGGEENNCCEECCOOUUNNCCIILL

Multidisciplinary body set up to providethe NSC with long-term analysis.

NNAATTIIOONNAALLSSEECCUURRIITTYYAADDVVIISSOORRYY BBOOAARRDD

Intelligence-sharing forumestablished in 2001 butrevitalised only after 26/11Mumbai attacks with controlroom and mandatoryintelligence sharing.

MMUULLTTII--AAGGEENNCCYY CCEENNTTRREE

Central body to investigate allterror related cases across thecountry. Has been set up thismonth. It will also have the power to prosecute but no control over intelligence.

NNAATTIIOONNAALL IINNVVEESSTTIIGGAATTIIOONN AAGGEENNCCYY

Functions under theFinance Ministry.Tracks violation of fiscal laws.

DDEEPPAARRTTMMEENNTTOOFF RREEVVEENNUUEEIINNTTEELLLLIIGGEENNCCEE

Eyes and ears of thestate government andpolice. Are understaf-fed and underfunded.

SSTTAATTEEIINNTTEELLLLIIGGEENNCCEEBBUURREEAAUUSS

M.K.NARAYANAN

He is the single point security adviser to the PM. Most of the intelligence agencies,including RAW, IB and NTRO, report to him.

RREESSEEAARRCCHH AANNDDAANNAALLYYSSIISS WWIINNGG

IINNTTEELLLLIIGGEENNCCEEBBUURREEAAUU

NNAATTIIOONNAALLTTEECCHHNNIICCAALLRREESSEEAARRCCHHOORRGGAANNIISSAATTIIOONN

India’s externalintelligence agency.Also has the Aviation ResearchCentre (ARC).

Internal securityorganisation.Collects informa-tion on terroristorganisations.

Repository of all elec-tronic and technicalintelligence .

ASHOK CHATURVEDI RAJIVMATHUR K.V.S.S.PRASAD RAO

LOSTIN THE MAZEIndia’s intelligence establishment features an alphabet soup of agencies, which operate in silos and have little accountability

VIP SECURITYPERSONNELVIP SECURITYPERSONNEL

dozen Indian intelligence agenciesoperate side-by-side in silos whereintelligence follows a down-upapproach. The agencies rarelyever communicate and jealouslyguard their turf. In Jammu andKashmir, one intelligence opera-tive says, it had the unintentionallyhilarious consequences of one in-former blithely taking paymentsfrom the Intelligence Bureau (IB),Research and Analysis Wing(R&AW), BSF and Military Intel-ligence for providing the same in-formation: he was unlikely to everget caught because he knew nei-ther agency spoke to each other.

The National TechnicalResearch Organisation (NTRO),India’s premier technical snoopingagency, is jokingly called theNational Tired and RetiredOrganisation. Obdurate govern-ment norms mean the NTRO can hireonly retired personnel for its topposts. It has no spy planes becauseof a turf war with R&AW, and todayits hapless state personifies every-thing that is wrong with the intelli-gence set-up. A nationalinformation repository exchange, aWikipedia for Indian spooks, wasshot down because one of the agen-cies refused to share information.The Joint Intelligence Council (JIC)was set up to collate the intelligence

from various organisations, butnever did so. Like the MAC, it be-came another well-intentionedbody that turned into a parking slotfor government officials.

The R&AW was set up four dec-ades ago on the lines of the CIA—aneclectic collection of experts fromvarious fields and by the late 1970shad even penetrated Pakistan’snascent nuclear weapons pro-gramme. R&AW has languishedfrom an inability of the chief exec-utives to understand the vital roleplayed by intelligence. Nearlythree decades ago, prime ministerMorarji Desai told General Zia the

T H E A G E N D A

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name of the R&AW mole withinPakistan’s nuclear weapons pro-gramme and later, recalled R&AW

operatives from that country. Itscovert capability, which took over adecade to re-establish insidePakistan, was abruptly terminatedon the orders of then prime minis-ter I.K. Gujral in 1996. The organ-isation needs to be revived withofficers posted as per their capa-bilities and interests. R&AW alsoneeds to adopt a more proactiveapproach in operations overseas.The external mandate must in-

clude the development of effectivecovert capabilities to undermineterrorist networks and their sup-port establishment—state andnon-state—in the neighbourhood.

To avoid any turf wars amongagencies and make coordinationeasier, there is an urgent need forconvergence of all available intelli-gence. The Government must worktowards development of a Centraldatabase of intelligence inputswhich can be accessible to allintelligence units . This is both forcurrent information and pastrecords which are very essential tostudy behavioural patterns of

ExpertSpeak

Seasonedspies offertheirviewpointson the vitalissue ofrevampingIndia’sintelligencesystem

zz Remedying the agencieswon’t work unless the sys-tem is fixed to curtail wast-age of collected information.

zz Implement all thefindings of the KargilReview Committee’s taskforce on intelligence.

zz Executive order, to giveintelligence agencies alegal sanction and legalcover for operatives.

zz More than coordination,the problem is of the focusof intelligence.Tackling ter-ror should be the priority.

zz It is not coordination butconvergence of intelligencethat is required. The systemshould be so connected thatif a terrorist is being interro-gated in Jaipur, whatever hesays should be available toall concerned. Every bit ofinformation should becollected and put into thedomain with due systems offilters and firewalls.

zz Revise the charters of IBand R&AW, and upgradethe priority for collection ofterror-related intelligence.

zz Set out a long-term roadmap with clear targets torevitalise the nation’sespionage set-up.

zz Create a national information repositoryexchange to pool intelligencefor all security agencies.

zz Greater autonomy infunctioning for agencies.Every other reform willfollow from this.

zz Vacancies in theintelligence agencies need to be filled up on a priority basis.

zz Set up a common data-base on terror-related intel-ligence to be coordinatedand supervised by IB.

zz Hire the best talent—linguists, domainspecialists—from the open market.

zz Make a single agencyresponsible for analysingand fusing intelligencefrom various sources.

zz Parliamentary oversightby a select committeewith impeccablecredentials.

zz Human intelligence has to be improved tocorroborate technicalintelligence.

zz Set up a similar commondatabase relating to ac-tion taken by all agencieson the intelligence inputs.

zz The agencies must focus on human intelli-gence and make it a long-term commitment.

zz This one agency shouldbe held accountable for the holistic analysis it would provide.

zz Provide greater incen-tives for personnel to jointhe agency. Recruit fromthe open market.

zz The quality of agentsand assets on the groundneeds to be hugelyimproved.

zz A Central intelligencecadre of officers should beset up which will beunified above the rank ofjoint secretary with inter-intelligencepostings. The chief of anagency should be a personwho has done a stint in the other agency too.

zz Integrate all technicalfacilities available with theagencies for the collectionof technical intelligence.

zz Strong leadership isneeded but it shouldemerge from within the organisation.

zz Move forces, act pre-emptively on intelligenceinputs without waiting for“actionable intelligence”.

zz Supervisory authority to enforce coordinationbetween the variousintelligence agencies.

zz The agencies need to be more proactive and not wait for intelligence to fall into their laps.

zz Set up a common pool of terrorism expertsavailable in differentagencies.

R.S . BEDI V IKRAM SOOD A .S . DUL AT A .K . VERMA B. RAMAN AJ IT DOVAL

FormerNTROChief

FormerR&AWChief

FormerR&AWChief

FormerR&AWChief

SecurityAnalyst

Former IB Chief

POLICE CONTROLROOMS NEED TO BEMODERNISED DESPERATELY

n

THE SYSTEM SHOULDBE SO CONNECTED

THAT IFATERRORIST ISBEING INTERROGATEDIN JAIPUR,WHATEVERHE SAYS SHOULD BEAVAILABLE TO ALL.

insurgent activities over time. The “Gary” Saxena

Committee on intelli-gence revamp had rec-ommended that atleast 30,000 personnelbe engaged in field dutyin the IB. The actualfacts, however, are shock-ing. The total strength of the IBis 25,000, of which almost one-third comprise drivers, peons, ad-ministrative and secretarial staff.The field strength is 3,500, of whicha large number is engaged in polit-ical intelligence. In a country with1.2 billion people, it is likely to benear ineffectual. There is an urgentneed to get at least 6,000 morespies within the next three months.

While talking of intelligencegathering agencies the impor-tance of the local police, especiallythe beat constable, cannot beundermined. He is the most cruciallink in the chain since he is the onewho has greatest interface withthe people. The local police and itsintelligence units need to be beefedup for better and groundedinformation. Men from the localpolice station should be encour-aged to go out in plainclothes andmingle with the people.

Over the years, the focus hasshifted more on technical intelli-

gence with human aspect not beingpaid too much importance. Effortsto infiltrate terrorist outfits need tobe intensified. This is not to say thattechnical intelligence should be ig-nored. In fact, the country shouldmake use of the best availablebrains in the country—even if theyare outside the government—toupgrade cyber intelligence.

To improve intelligence at alllevels, innovative ideas need to beinfused in the system. The re-sponse of intelligence agencies isbecoming predictable. So whilethe terrorists keep changing theirmodus operandi and technology,the intelligence officials have re-main boxed in with their old bu-reaucratised way of thinking. Thecapability to surprise and alsodeter the terrorist is missing.

Another important aspect ofenhancing intelligence is ensuringthat existing agencies work to theiroptimum. In addition to filling upvacant posts—both, in administra-tion and field—it is imperative thatthese agencies have the bestpeople and technology.

With enhanced capabilities interms of human and technical in-telligence, the next step is to en-sure that all intelligence is madeactionable. Standard parametersmust be established to grade thequality of intelligence inputs fromsources on the basis of credibilityand effectiveness. The inputs fromsources need to be graded as perthose parameters. The informa-tion or inputs that rate very highshould be fed simultaneously at acentral pool of information tofacilitate sharing of informationacross agencies. Beefing up India’sintelligence capability is vital if wehave to gain the upper hand in thewar on terror.

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n

THE LOCAL POLICESTATION IS THE BEST SOURCE OF

INFORMATION AND ITNEEDS TO BE ATTHE

CENTRE OFTHEINTELLIGENCE SET-UP.

RECRUIT at least6,000 more spiesto the IB withinthe next threemonths.REVIVE covert

operations by R&AWand IB for them to infil-trate terrorist networks.MAKE all the informationgiven by intelligenceagencies actionable andaccountable by gradingthe inputs. For this,establish standardparameters to facilitaterating of information.DEVELOP a centraldatabase of inputs which can be accessibleto all intelligence unitsand be a reservoir forinformation.STRENGTHEN theintelligence gatheringability of the local police stations.EQUIP intelligenceagencies the army—for a 24x7 readiness for a covert battle.REVISE the charters of the IB and the R&AW and upgrade the priority for thecollection of terrorism-related intelligence.

ActionPlan

GUARDING THEMegacity

Build a security fortress around Delhi and Mumbai so that they are capable of tackling any kind of emergency independently

ISSUE

6T H E A G E N D A

35

SHRIYA PATIL SHINDE

RAFPERSONNELONGUARD OUTSIDE

MUMBAI’S TAJ HOTEL

Terror, said that merchantof death Adolf Hitler, wasthe war of the future, itsaim to demoralise theenemy from within. That

future has arrived and India’scities today have become thefrontlines of that war.

Now, urban India carries withit an unspoken, perennial dreadabout where the next unexpectedbut all too predictable strike willoccur. It unconsciously readiesitself to absorb this next blow. This is a numbing fatalism, bornout of the truth left that lingersafter 26/11: that India’s UrbsPrima—and India itself—could beheld hostage for 60 hours by 10men. If it can happen to Mumbaithen, the thinking goes, theneveryone is vulnerable.

Of all the Indian metros, it isMumbai and Delhi that are prizedtargets for terror. They are India’stwo leading “megacities”, the termused to describe those cities with apopulation of above 10 million.

Something other than popula-tion size makes Mumbai and Delhi the most vulnerable of ourmetros. It is what they stand for.Delhi is its power and the heft of thestate, Mumbai, its wealth andworldly confidence. India needs toshow that it can protect these twonerve centres of its democracy or itwill convince few, least of all its en-emies, that it has the will and the re-sources to safeguard its democracy.

The challenges of securingMumbai and Delhi in an age ofterror are doubled by geographyand demographics. Both citiescover large areas, Mumbai’s 468sq km compounded by a 560-kmlong statewide coastline that leadsto its door.Delhi’s 1,483 sq km con-tains more high-value targets than

any other Indian metro and issurrounded by equally crowdedurban hubs that call for compli-cated policing. For example, afloating working force of 9 per cent(just over one million people) en-ters and leaves Delhi every day.

The overall press of their pop-ulation (Mumbai’s population den-sity is 29,042 people per sq km andDelhi’s 9,294 people per sq km) istoo large for their undermannedand demotivated police forces.Mumbai’s 40,000-man police forceworks with 15 per cent vacancies.If, for example, every Mumbaipoliceman due for some leave wasgiven a single day off, one-seventhof the force would be off duty.

There is also no hiding from the fact that the image of the policein both cities has hit rock bottom,and is salvaged only by the deedsof a few of its most brave. For the rest, the proximity of the policeforce to the political establishmentof both cities is now widely recog-nised as a corrupting influencewhich has had its impact on theperformance of the police and itspublic image. The Mumbai Police’sreputation for neutrality andefficiency took a severe beatingduring the Mumbai riots of 1992-93, and is highly doubtful whether

it has managed to recover thatprecious lost ground. Governmentinterference in postings have led topolice being used by their “godfa-thers” in the administration todetermine what the thoroughnessof any investigation.

Yet, acceptance of this desul-tory status quo is not an option forIndia. These are not the medievalages, where a city protects itself bypulling up a drawbridge, shuts thegate and send its soldiers up to thetop of its walls, armed with boilingoil. The megacity’s borders keepexpanding and it must counterenemies whose motivations risefrom events taking place hundreds

of miles from those borders. Theonly soldiers our city possesses areits policemen and Mumbai sentthem into battle with .303 riflesand lathis against machine guns.

Our megacities must now be-come virtual fortresses. They mustturn into citadels constructedbrick-by-brick from the on-groundintelligence of the beat-constableand fortified further by technology,in weapons, surveillance and in-vestigation equipment. As ArvindInamdar, former Maharashtra DGP,puts it, “For any contingency situ-ation the police are the first line ofdefence and the army is the last.One should strengthen the first line

of defence so that the second neednever step in.”

The key to understanding, de-tecting, pre-empting and respond-ing to terror will come from aspecialised compartmentalisationand separation of the task fromother aspects of policing themegacity. It is imperative to createa state-level or even a megacity-centric fighting force comprisingarmed police, trained and re-served only to tackle combat situ-ations. Former Maharashtra DGP

D.S. Soman explains, “The reflexesof a civil police and an NSG like bodyare totally different.” This forceneeds to be highly trained and mo-

tivated, well-equipped and re-warded. Setting up and readying ateam of a minimum of 100 men,will take no more than six months.

Similarly, the investigation ma-chinery of the city police must beseparated from the general lawand order ranks in order to ensurespeedier crime-detection, investi-gation and conviction. The settingup of a centralised command cen-tre and a specific chain of com-mand in case of a terrorist attackis of paramount importance giventhe chaos that followed in the firstfew hours of Mumbai. These con-trol rooms should be seamlesslyintegrated with an intelligent traf-fic management network (said tobe put in place in Delhi by the timeof the 2010 CommonwealthGames) to track suspicious move-ment and pre-empt aggressors.

The Mumbai attacks alsodemonstrated with disturbing bru-tality the damage that can becaused by a lack of intelligence in-tegration. After every terroriststrike, the state police and theIntelligence Bureau (IB) indulge inpetty, unseemly shadow-boxing.The leaks information about its“alerts” to the media while thestates maintained they did notreceive “actionable” information.This has to stop.

The police are the executives ofthe security machinery and ac-countable to our legal system (nei-ther the IB nor the R&AW are), a factthat must be respected. For theirpart, the police need to workgreater contact with other depart-ments like customs, income tax andintelligence departments. Infor-mation about offenders caught bycustoms or IT departments must be

T H E A G E N D A

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n

ESTABLISH SPECIALWEAPONS AND

TACTICS TEAMS INCITIES TO ENSURETHERE IS NO WAIT

FOR THE NSG INEMERGENCIES.

MANDAR DEODHAR

THE MUMBAI POLICE IS GETTING BYWITH A15 PER CENTSHORTFALLIN MEN

37

T H E A G E N D A

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shared with the police. BothMumbai and Delhi have ac-tive crime syndicates andthe link between organ-ised crime, money-laun-dering and terrorism hasbeen all too clearly estab-lished. The security agen-cies’ shadow-boxing,turf-protection that follows anattack is in real terms an abdicationof responsibility and a dereliction oftheir national duty.

At ground zero, a primary com-ponent of megacity policing is theimmediate identification of the 50most vulnerable spots in a city, giv-ing clarity and focus to the securityforces. These would include her-itage buildings, government andcorporate offices, airports, railwaystations, hospitals, hotels. Teams offive officers should be deployedround the clock for each spot.

A clear and frequent chain ofcommunication needs to be estab-lished between the regular ranksof police and local security agen-cies involved in protecting high-density targets like cinema halls,malls, banquet halls. Liaising withtraders’ co-operatives and housingsocieties in Mumbai and RWAs inDelhi is also a key component of theon-the-ground contact betweencitizens and the men in uniform.

Former Delhi police commis-sioner Arun Bhagat believes “beef-ing up basic policing” is moreeffective than upgrading technol-ogy or increasing weaponry. Eachpolice station can selectively traina few men to wield weapons.London provides the best exampleof proactive policing, where evenafter the July 2005 bombings, only10 per cent of the metropolitanpolice routinely carry arms.

“Basic policing” involves reviv-

ing the informer network that hadgiven Mumbai’s police its formida-ble reputation and efficiency rate.Funds must be specially allocated topay those informers. Revitalisingthe mohalla committees in Mumbai(actively undermined by a formerjoint commissioner of police no less)and making RWAs in Delhi moreproactive in their own security willfill in the gaps for the local police.

There is another radical solu-tion that may exacerbate the al-ready-frosty relations between thestate home departments and thepolice force but could certainly ful-fill the essential premise of thisplan: that a specific threat needs a

specific and specialised response.Soman suggests that the state homesecretary must come from ranks ofthe IPS rather than the IAS, given hisexperience in the security arena.

These largely common sensemeasures will only work if appliedswiftly. As late as November 2008,senior home ministry officials wereasked how a megacity policingscheme introduced in 2005-06could be fast-tracked. Just overthree weeks later, 10 terroristsheld India’s most mega of cities ina death grip for 60 hours. All rea-sons, valid or otherwise, for delaysin securing our megacities havejust been vapourised.

ExpertSpeak

Former policemen’s views on improving megacity surveillance

zz A special forceshould be set up onthe lines of NSG asthe reflexes of civilpolice and NSG aretotally different.

zz Every year, atleast a week-longtraining workshopshould be organ-ised for all menand officers.

zz An IPS officershould be higherthan home secre-tary.All postingsshould be done bythe commissioner.

zz More modernequipment andweapons arerequired. But everypoliceman shouldnot be armed.

zz Revive thedismantled crimeand specialbranches.Theinformer networkneeds revival too.

zz Creation of aspecial strikeforce which isreserved only for tacklingemergencies.

zz Identify 50 vulner-able points. Eachshould have teamsof five officers avail-able for securityround-the-clock.

zz Technologydriven systemslike GPS andsatellite systemsshould be mannedby trained people.

zz Proposals sentfrom the homedepartment mustbe discussed andcleared withimmediate effect.

zz There should bea clear leadership.Dual leadershipleads of confusionand conflict ofegos and interest.

zz Setting up afederal agency to offer intelli-gence to keystates is the need of the hour.

zz Police are the firstline of defence. Itshould be strength-ened so that thesecond doesn’tneed to step in.

zz The police forceshould be led bysomeone who has a hands-onexperience ofpolicing.

zz New senior postsshould be createdin the force. Payscales should ack-nowledge the con-stabulary’s work.

zz State ATS unitsshould be allowedto investigate in afree and fairmanner as it isbetter equipped.

zz It is high timethat politicalinterference inpostings andtransfers shouldbe stopped.

zz Deployment ofmen should bedone effectively.Better trainingwill increase their efficiency.

zz The coastlineshould be mannedby separate coastaland harbour police.Set up a villagedefence force.

zz Maharashtramust have a spe-cially trained strikeforce. Its absencehas crippled thecivil police.

zz Various stateagencies shouldwork together andinformation mustbe shared on areal time basis.

zz Leaders must beselected from alist of empanelledofficers whoserecords are moni-tored and verified.

zz Make proper use ofthe All India ServiceRule which says thatgovernment can getrid of officers after20 years of service.

zz Leaders shouldbe given freedomto transfer to post peopleaccording to theircapabilities.

zz The investiga-tion agencyshould beseparated from the law and ordermachinery.

zz There should bepeople in every policestation who are non-political and publi-cally accepted tointeract with the cops.

zz Federal Police, anidea languishing in files since 2001,is desperatelyneeded in theIndian context.

zz Setting up intelli-gence integrationcentres wherebyCentral agenciescan disseminate in-puts to other units.

zz Establish cityspecial weaponsand tactics teams toensure that oneneedn’t wait for NSGin emergencies.

zz A“nationalalignment” of ter-rorist methodol-ogy by central andstate police needsbe set up too.

zz Evolving newmodus operandi toprevent further at-tacks like 26/11just like it has beendone in the US.

D.S . SOMAN

FormerDGP, Maha-rashtra

Y.C. PAWAR

FormerJointCom-mis-sioner

ARVIND INAMDAR

FormerDGP,Maha-rashtra

V. RANG ANATHAN

FormerChiefSecre-tary,Maha-rashtra

JUL IO R IBEIRO

FormerDGP, Punjab

V. BALACHANDRAN

FormerSpecialSecre-tary, R&AW

CREATE a city-level force comprising armed police,trained and reserved only for combat situations.

SEPARATE and compartmentalise the understand-ing, detecting, pre-empting and responding to ter-

ror from other aspects of policing the megacity.

PETTY shadow-boxing after every terror strikebetween the state police and the IB must stop.There is aneed for greater intelligence integration.

IDENTIFY and move to protect the most vulnerable spotsin a city, including putting them under CCTV surveillance.

ESTABLISH a centralised control room to monitorsuspicious activity.

THERE is a growing need on the police’s part to work in agreater contact with other departments like income tax,customs and intelligence.

BEEF up basic policing by reviving and strengthening theinformer network. It is more effective than upgradingtechnology or increasing weaponry.

REVITALISE the mohalla committees in Mumbai and makethe Delhi RWAs more proactive in their own security.

ActionPlan

T H E A G E N D A

41

That India is a maritime na-tion is a truism. But itneeds frequent repetitionbecause of the sea blind-ness that afflicts us after

centuries of looking out towardsour land borders. We have a legacyof over a millennium of invaderspouring in across the land fron-tiers. Even today, India has unre-solved borders with three of its sixneighbours through which infiltra-tion, and not trade, takes place.These contested borders not onlydrain national security resourcesbut fill our mindspace. It is, how-ever, the 7,600-km coastline thatholds the key to the nation’s pros-perity. The 13 major ports and 183minor ports—maritime gatewaysto 90 per cent of India’s trade byvolume and 75 per cent by cost andall its imported crude oil— are themaritime gateways without whichIndia’s economic miracle wouldnot have been able to get off theground. Sixty-six per cent ofIndia’s domestic crude comes fromthe sea. India is the third-largestfish producing nation in the world,with over three lakh fishing boats.

There is thus an inextricablelink between our maritime com-merce, maritime security, nationalprosperity and national security.This link was fiendishly exploitedon November 26 by the terroristswho sailed into India’s economiccapital using a commandeeredfishing trawler to wreak havocover three days. It was economicterrorism at its worst. The targetschosen were not only geographi-cally disparate but from diversesectors—tourism, hospitality,economy, diplomatic relations andinvestor confidence. It alsobrought to the fore a cruel conun-drum—the gateways to India’s

prosperity were ajar, unpatrolledand unpoliced with even theworld’s fifth-largest navy and coastguard and a theoretical marine po-lice not adding up to much.

The terrorists had easily pen-etrated a twin layer of security—the shoreline up to 12 nauticalmiles patrolled by the state po-lice, 12 to 200 nautical miles po-liced by the Indian Coast Guard.This was because these two agen-cies simply did not have the assetsto patrol the vast coastline. Themarine police, a concept estab-lished after the 1993 Mumbai se-rial blasts for which explosiveswere smuggled in via the sea, isyet to take off in the nine coastalstates. This is not only due to therecalcitrance of authorities to in-vest resources in policing thecoast. Maharashtra, for instance,has just six speedboats, some ofwhich are deliberately sabotagedby the police to avoid patrols thatinduce sea-sickness. Clearly, an-other case of policemen being de-ployed for tasks they are nottrained for. Other states like Ker-ala and Karnataka make do byhiring slow-moving fishing ves-sels. Again, random patrollingdoes not make sense becausepolicing the coast is totally differ-ent from policing a land frontier.India’s exclusive economic zoneis larger than its land mass andpolicing it is not easy. A conven-tional “checknaka” concept ofputting a police barrier across aroad does not work here becauseof the size of the sea.

The threat from the sea isenormous and multifarious. Thespate of pirate attacks off thecoast of Somalia has shown justhow simple it is for a boatload ofarmed miscreants to hijack a ship

ISSUE

7

AP PHOTO/GAUTAM SINGH)

MUMBAI’S LARGELYUNGUARDED SEAFRONTWAS AN OPEN INVITATION TO THE TERRORISTS ON 26/11

PLUGGINGVulnerable Zones

Indian borders continue to beporous. With attacks from thesea posing the latest threat,there’s a need for watertightcoastal security strategy.

40

the size of a supertanker. A singlecargo ship with 40,000 tonnes ofa fertiliser like ammonium ni-trate has the potency of a 40-kilo-ton nuclear weapon or nearlytwice the size of the bombsdropped on Hiroshima and Na-gasaki. Blowing up a hijackedship of this size at the JawaharlalNehru Port Trust (JNPT) could de-stroy the gateway through whichover half of India’s container traf-fic flows and cripple the economyfor months.

What is needed is a conceptcalled Maritime Domain Aware-ness (MDA) which emerged in theUS after the 9/11 attacks. TheDepartment of Homeland Secu-rity knitted all US assets—cus-

toms, coast guard and immigra-tion services—into a sensoryweb called MDA. It would knowabout the location of every singleboat, vessel and aircraft ap-proaching the US territory.Much like the concept of an airtraffic control (ATC) where all air-craft appear as blips on theradar with all their parame-ters—range, bearing, speed andidentity—that allow ATC authori-ties to manage air traffic.

A similar concept could workfor the coastline. Most ports andships are already fitted with Ves-sel Traffic Management Systemfacilities which are used by har-bour control authorities. In addi-tion there are several othermeasures including the Auto-matic Identification System which

work up to 100 nautical milesand Long-Range Identificationand Tracking Systems, whichwork up to 700 nautical miles.

Another priority is to equipIndia’s fleet of fishing trawlerswith beacons developed by theIndian Space Research Organi-sation. These beacons can notonly be used as a distress call butalso to transmit the position ofthe fishing vessel, allowing agen-cies like the marine police tomonitor their movement. A net-work of surveillance radars cankeep track of suspicious activityon the coast. The Indian CoastGuard, which patrols the belt ofIndian territorial waters from 12to 200 nautical miles has a fleetof just 74 ships, 44 aircraft and8,000 men for the task. It soundsimpressive but to illustrate howinadequate this is, take South Ko-rea. It’s a country the size ofChhattisgarh and has more coast

guard ships than the Indian Navyand Coast Guard put together.The coast guard needs to be aug-mented by at least four times ofits present strength if it is to betruly effective in guarding the In-dian coastline. As the state-owned shipyards are unable todeliver platforms in reasonabletime spans for reasons of ineffi-ciency and limited size, the Gov-ernment must encourage thesetting up of private sector ship-yards which can deliver thesevessels over the next five years.

While the platforms can bebought or wet-leased, institutionsand trained manpower cannot berolled out overnight. Back of theenvelope calculations show that ifall the nine coastal states were toraise marine police units as is

planned, they would need over10,000 personnel in a year. Anideal place to look for them wouldbe in the ranks of retired sailors.Each year, over 5,000 sailors re-tire, a majority of them in theirlate 30s and all of them trainedfor nearly two decades in mar-itime skills that would be a requi-site for the marine police force.The Government should considerre-employing retired naval per-sonnel into marine police units inthe coastal states.

India shares 3,323 km of bor-der with Pakistan, including thedisputed Line of Control. Of thetotal 2,308 km of border that needsto be fenced, about 1,900 km hasbeen done, but only 1,800 km hasbeen floodlit. With Bangladesh—another infiltration prone area—India shares more than 4,000 kmof a highly porous border but only2,500 km is fenced. Even out ofthis, 861 km needs to be replaced

T H E A G E N D A

42 43

CCEENNTTRRAALL IINNDDUUSSTTRRIIAALL SSEECCUURRIITTYY FFOORRCCEE (CCIISSFF) Has1,00,000 men. Needs 20,000 more

BBOORRDDEERR SSEECCUURRIITTYY FFOORRCCEE (BBSSFF) Has 157 battalions.Needs 26 more battalions in the short term. Needs 69more battalions to reduce present 4.5-km gap be-tween border posts to 2.5 km.

CCOOAASSTT GGUUAARRDD Has just 14 ships and eight Dornier patrol aircraft for the 3,300-km west coast. Needs atleast 30 more ships and 30 more aircraft. Needs sanction for more manpower.

BBAANNGGLLAADDEESSHH 1,500 km of border with Bangladesh yetto be fenced.A major infiltration and smuggling route.

FFOORRCCEE LLEEVVEELL RREEQQUUIIRREEDD

IINNFFRRAASSTTRRUUCCTTUURREE PPRROOTTEECCTTIIOONN

I N D I A

PA

KI S

TA

N

SSEECCUURRIITTYY EEVVAALLUUAATTIIOONN No government agencyto lay down or monitor security standards for private industry.

LLAAXX SSEECCUURRIITTYY Only basic security. No audits.Private sector extremely vulnerable to terror attacks.

DDAATTAALLIINNKKSS Coast Guard and Navy’s operational rooms not connected

NNEEPPAALL 1,690-km porous border is the new route forPakistani infiltrators

PPAAKKIISSTTAANN 408 km of 2,308-kmborder yet to be fenced

CHINKS INTHE ARMOURA look at thegaps in India’s border policing

PRASHANT CHAUDHARY

INFRASTRUCTURE,PUBLIC AS WELLASPRIVATE,NEEDS RIGOROUS POLICING

BHASKAR PAUL

state’s busiest port cities, Manga-lore, has a little more than a dozen poorlyequipped and lowlypaid police constablesto patrol a 60-kmstretch. With nospeedboats or evenhigh-speed vehicles,they have to travel by pub-lic transport such as buses.

Further inland from the vul-nerable coast is India’s eggshellfragile infrastructure. Its poten-tial unlocked by liberalisation,the country’s economy has ush-ered in an era of investmentsand industrial growth. But theinfrastructure in the world’ssecond fastest growing economyhas virtually no investment in se-curity. Before a businessman canlay the first brick on his powerplant, shopping mall or multi-plex, he has to go through asheaf of elaborate guidelinesand obtain multiple clearancesfrom local town planning andfire authorities.

Except for the civil aviationsector where the Bureau of CivilAviation and Security (BCAS)draws up a list of safeguards forairlines and airports, there is noagency in the Government whichperforms security evaluation ofthe nuclear energy plants, powerprojects, shopping malls, multi-plexes, IT parks and five-starhotels which are the new templesof post-liberalisation India. It isalmost as though the Indianeconomic miracle is one thatmiraculously ensures that its vul-nerable economic infrastructureis immune from any damage.This ostrich-like attitude is onlycompounded by the new spectreof economic warfare where ter-

rorists are not only trained in, but have meticulously recced,their targets like IT parks andports to paralyse the nation’scritical infrastructure vital to national security, governance,public health and safety, econ-omy and national morale.

Since 9/11, the US Depart-ment of Homeland Security hasmade critical infrastructure pro-tection the shared responsibilityof the Federal, state and localgovernments in active partner-ship with the private sector whichowns approximately 85 per cent

of the critical national infrastruc-ture in the US. No such collabo-ration on security engineeringexists at present in India and thisis one gap that needs to beplugged immediately. The CentralIndustrial Security Force (CISF),for instance, guards most Centralgovernment infrastructure, in-cluding airports and power plantsand religious institutions like theTirupati temple. It has a force ofaround one lakh personnel butneeds at least 20,000 more per-sonnel to protect vital areas andvital points. Without creating aseparate agency, the Governmentcan quite easily empower the CISF

to conduct detailed vulnerabilityassessments of major private sec-tor infrastructure projects andensure security is integrated intoprojects from their inception.Wherever possible, technology,like surveillance cameras, electronic perimeters and motiondetectors can be used to reducethe need for manpower-intensivesecurity. These guidelines couldgo a long way in preventing future attacks.

since it has been badly damageddue to weather conditions and re-peated submergence in water.

Long stretches of borders thatIndia shares with Nepal (1,751km) and Myanmar (1,643 km) arestill open and vulnerable to infil-tration and gun-running. Indiahad planned to set up IntegratedCheck Posts (ICPs) with the twocountries. This would have re-quired fencing of the borders, andkeeping only the ICPs open fortrade and movement, but only af-ter a thorough customs and im-migration clearance. This, too,

has been pending, lost in redtape. The Border Security Forcewhich has 157 battalions to guardthe entire western and easternborders of over 7,000 km says itis facing a manpower crunch andexisting troops are under severestrain. It urgently needs 69 morebattalions or at least 69,000 morepersonnel to plug the gaps (eachbattalion has 1,000 troopers). Ofthese at least 26 more battalionsare urgently required.

Three Coastal Security Policestations were inaugurated inMangalore, Malpe and Kumta

with fanfare in September lastyear to police the 320-kmKarnataka coastline betweenKarwar, home for Asia’s biggestnaval base Seabird that spreadsover close to 12,000 acres of landand geared to berth 50 navalships, and Mangalore. Thesecoastal stations were promisedhigh speed boats and their aimwas to check smuggling, drugpeddling, and illegal entry ofpeople through the sea, amongothers; the jurisdiction of CSPs wasup to 24 nautical miles on sea and500 metres on land. One of the

T H E A G E N D A

44 45

BORDER fencing to be completed on priority.VACANCIES in CISF and BSF to be augmented to enhance border protection and security of publicand private infrastructure projects.MAJOR vital installations to be identified and

protected and technology to be used to cut manpower.SECURITY engineering to be made mandatory for all projects before clearances are issued.COASTAL Command and the Central Maritime Adviser must liaise with the eight ministries that look after maritime issues.

ActionPlan

ExpertSpeakA lowdown on what can be done to ensure sound border security

zz New coastal command shouldbe under the navalcommands and must coordinatewith other agencies.

zz Marine policeforce should beset up for shoreand inshore patrolling of thecoastal areas.

zz Automatic electronic trans-ponders be in-stalled on all fish-ing vessels abovea certain size.

zz MaritimeCommission to coordinate betweenvarious ministriesand liaise with thearmed forces.

zz Seamless integration of thearmed forces with the Ministryof Defence must be ensured.

zz Funding for anIndian MaritimeDomain Aware-ness Grid shouldbe facilitated atthe earliest.

zz Hiring retiredsailors to man the CISF harbour patrols be consid-ered for augment-ing the forces.

zz Single window,accountable andprofessionalNational MaritimeAdviser to headMaritime Agency.

zz Anti-piracy devices on Indianships to preventtheir hijackingand use againstIndian ports.

zz Vessel TrafficManagementSystems for allIndian portsshould be in placeat the earliest.

zz Vulnerability assessments forall major privatesector as well aspublic sector projects.

zz Make securityengineeringmandatory. Nopermissions begiven unless aproject is secured.

zz Regulatoryagencies for infrastructureprojects, like BCAS

for civil aviationsecurity.

zz Induction oftechnology tosubstitute manpower wherever possible.

zz Increase security at ports as theyneed to be as secure as airports.

zz Seal the Nepal,Bangladesh andPakistan bordersand place themunder electronicsurveillance.

zz Induct moreshallow draughtvessels for thecoast guard to patrol closer tothe shore.

zz Border villagesto be cleared andresited behind thefence. BSF to beallowed to patrolthe zero line.

zz Political interference inborder fencing asis happening inWest Bengal must be halted.

zz Constantly mon-itor all cellphoneand satellitephone conversa-tions in neigh-bouring nations.

Formerchief ofnavalstaff

VICE ADMIRAL A.K. SINGH

formerDG,coastGuard

SIS AHMED

formerDGCISF,CRPF

E .N . RAMMOHAN

FormerDG,BSF

n

THE MARINE POLICE,A CONCEPT

ESTABLISHED AFTERTHE SERIAL BLASTS IN MUMBAI IN 1993,IS YETTO TAKE OFF

IN THE NINE COASTAL STATES.

ADMIRAL ARUNPRAKASH

The United ProgressiveAlliance Governmentdithered over strengthen-ing the law dealing withterrorists, but after the

Mumbai attacks, it swiftly read-dressed some of the anomalies.Parliament has passed theNational Investigation Agency Bill2008 and amended the UnlawfulActivities (Prevention) Act (UAPA)with broad unanimity. The amend-ments may get some breeze on theback of law enforcement agenciesbut the country still lack acomprehensive legal frameworkto defend against, prevent andpunish terrorism. Our laws arestill, it seems, a step behind theterrorists’ parade.

The two acts have manycommon provisions with the re-pealed Prevention of TerroristActivities (POTA) Act but attempt tobring in their ambit many newclauses that are current and, even,controversial. The new law ensuresthat terror suspects can be detainedwithout charges for up to 180 daysand police custody can stretch up to30-day limit and puts in place acarpet ban on bail for accusedbelonging to foreign countries. Thelaw will make anyone in India orabroad, directly or indirectlycollecting funds for terrorismpunishable. Such a person will bepunishable with a minimumimprisonment of five years and amaximum of a life-term.

According to the new law, any-body organising or facilitating ter-ror camps and those who recruitanybody for a terror act wouldattract penal provisions leading tojail for minimum of five years. TheCentre has also been empoweredto freeze, seize or attach proper-ties or economic resources held by

terrorists and their sympathisers.The proposed law for the first timeincluded “seizure of credit or debitcards” as evidence. The law hasmade it mandatory for everyone tofurnish information with regard toterrorists or terrorist organisa-tions to the police.

The Government has definedthe law in line with the UnitedNations Resolution, making it moreup to date while the POTA had basedthe definition on the 1973 report ofthe Law Commission. The law forthe first time refers to radioactive,nuclear or other substances, kid-nappings and abductions by anyperson to compel the governmentto do or not to do something. In the

Rajiv Gandhi assassination case,the Supreme Court held that it wasdifficult to establish that the assas-sination had been carried out witha plan to “overawe the state” asstated under the Terrorists andDisruptive Activities Act (TADA). Thenew law revisits the issue by defin-ing terrorist act as attempt to“overawe by means of criminalforce or the show of criminal forceor attempts to do so or causesdeath of any public functionary orattempts to cause death of anypublic functionary.”

The Government’s legal efforts,collapsing into two brieflydiscussed bills, cannot alwayswork as an effective detrimenttowards further terror attacks andcannot react instantly to terrorattacks. The legal plank shouldhave necessary tools for thegovernment to identify, incapaci-tate and even convict terroristsbefore they launch a strike. TheGovernment should begin immedi-ately to review legal and protocolregulations that limit the ability of the Multi-Agency Centre in theHome Ministry to cooperate withother central, state and local lawenforcement or intelligence organ-isations and connect the intelli-gence dots. Sharing of informationwith the Multi-Agency Centreshould be made mandatory or theentire range of intelligence effortsat various levels would turn into aworthless moving around ofbureaucratic boxes. Though theGovernment has issued an execu-tive order to streamline the effortsof intelligence agencies and theMulti-Agency Centre, the issueshould be discussed further inParliament to clear apprehensionsof the state governments andweaved into a law to ensure it hasenough weight.

The National InvestigationAgency (NIA), announced withmuch fanfare, needs to bestrengthened to meet the newchallenges. Armed with powersonly to investigate terror cases, thefangless body is at risk of beingreduced to a glorified police force,not much different from a SpecialCell of the Delhi Police or an Anti-Terror Squad of the MumbaiPolice. The only advantage ofhaving the NIA is that it takes awayfrom the states their discretion

T H E A G E N D A

4746

n

THE LEGAL PLANKSHOULD HAVE

NECESSARYTOOLS TO IDENTIFY,

INCAPACITATE ANDCONVICTTERRORISTSBEFORE THEY STRIKE.

TOUGHENING

THE LAW

The legal framework of the country needs to be hardened in order to make the perpetrators of terror pay heavily

ISSUE

8

AP PHOTO / MUMBAI MIRROR, SEBASTIAN D’SOUZA

AJMALAMIR KASAB,THE ONLYTERRORIST

CAPTURED IN THE MUMBAI ATTACKS

whether they want the centralagency to investigate a particularcase or not, like it is with theCentral Bureau of Investigation(CBI). Ideally, the NIA should havebeen armed with powers of both,the CBI and the Intelligence Bureau(IB), something along the lines ofFederal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) in the US.

The FBI serves both as thefederal investigative agency and adomestic intelligence agency.Though the FBI’s mandate is muchmore than investigating just ter-ror-related cases, the NIA’s shouldbe restricted to terrorism, leavingthe rest to the CBI. Following 9/11,the USA Patriot Act had increasedthe powers assigned to the FBI,especially in wiretapping andmonitoring of Internet activity. Infact, it even empowers the FBI inthe so-called “sneak and peek’’provision, which allows the agencyto search a house while the resi-

T H E A G E N D A

48 49

POTA VS UAPA: THE UNRESOLVED DEBATE

Applicable to Indians andnon-citizens.

Application Applicable to Indians andnon-citizens.

POTA made a majorchange to the definition bysubstituting ‘with intent tooverawe the government’with the phrase ‘with intent to threaten theunity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India.

Definition ofTerrorism Act

Widening the scopefurther, the definition nowincludes offences ‘relatedto radioactive or nuclearsubstances’ and even ‘attempts to overawe stateor public functionaries’

Chargesheet needs to befiled in 180 days. Hence accused can be heldwithout bail for that period.

Powers ofdetention

Chargesheet needs to be filed in 180 days butcourt can limit detentionto 90 days.

Confessions before apolice officer would beadmissible as evidence.

Confession Confessions before apolice officer would not beadmissible as evidence.

Admissible if authorised byjoint secretary at writtenrequest of SP rank officer

Intercepts Admissible withoutauthorisation

YesSpecial Courts Yes

Court to draw adverseinference if arms orexplosives recovered fromthe accused or fingerprintsof the accused found at thesite of the incident.

Presumption More stringent as the UAPA directs the courtto presume the accusedguilty in these casesunless proved otherwise.

ISSUE POTA* UAPA**

dents are away, and not requiringit to notify the residents for severalweeks afterwards. The NIA shouldhave been given charge of investi-gating all terror-related activitieslike funding, hawala transactions,fake currency, drug trafficking and misuse of communicationequipment like the Internetsatellite phones. The NIA chief, once

appointed, must closely coordinatewith the Multi-Agency Centre andother intelligence agencies. Merelycoming into the picture after theterrorists have struck is notenough. The NIA’s involvementmust be ensured on a regular basis.The anti-terror law should haveprovision for monitoring telep-hones and emails, regulating finan-

cial transactions to cut off illegalinflow of funds for terrorist activi-ties, regulating banking channels,strengthened immigration checksand also stringent measures tocheck money laundering.

The provisions have to bebacked by a comprehensive wit-ness protection programme to en-sure their safety and security.Along

* Prevention Of Terrorist Activities Act ** Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act

AP

K .T.S . TULSI

Senior Advocate

CHAKSHU RAI

Legislative Researcher

SHRIMOYEENANDINI GHOSH

Eminent Lawyer

zz Confessions made before the police have to be admissible as evidence in court.

zz The need is for co-ordination amongdifferent agencies for successful investigation and prosecution.

zz The Government needs to provideParliament with the likely expenditurerequired to implement the new laws.

zz A standard provision of protecting officersacting in good faith and penalising thosemisuse law is missing.

zz Confessional statements often become anexcuse to ignore the need for collecting otherevidence that will stand judicial scrutiny.

zz When a confessional statement is retracted,as it is in a high proportion of cases underPOTA, the entire police case falls apart.

ExpertSpeak

The call for an enhanced legalframework has resulted in divergent views among thelegal experts

PARLIAMENTATTACKACCUSED AFZALGURU

both bouquets and brickbatsfrom civil rights and legalactivists. Unlike in POTA,confessions before apolice officer would notbe admissible as evid-ence and the UAPA ismore stringent than thePOTA in at least one respect.While POTA required the courtsto take certain evidence as “adverseinference” against the accused withpossession of arms, UAPA directs thecourt to presume the accused guiltyin these cases unless provedotherwise. Also, POTA provided forreview committees to assess eachcase; this safeguard against misuseis not in the new UAPA.

The Government’s claims thatat no point it will impinge the civilliberties of the citizens ring a hollowsound, most say. AmnestyInternational slammed India’s newanti-terror legislation to beef uppolice powers and has appealed toPresident Pratibha Patil not toapprove the legislation, whichwould double the number of dayspolice can detain terror suspectsbefore filing charges, from 90 daysto 180, as well as boost theirpowers to conduct searches.“While we utterly condemn theattacks and recognise that theIndian authorities have a right andduty to take effective measures toensure the security of the popul-ation, security concerns shouldnever be used to jeopardisepeople’s human rights,” saidMadhu Malhotra, Asia PacificProgram deputy director at theAmnesty International.

Though the Government’sdecision to make confessions madeto police officials as admissible hascome under stiff resistance fromthe BJP, rights activists say this is a

move in the right direction.Opponents of this move argue thatwhile the Government is usingKasab’s telephone intercepts andhis confessions as evidence toimplicate Pakistan in Mumbaiterror attacks, his confessions arenot valid in Indian courts. Section26 of Indian Evidence Act and 162of Criminal Procedures Code statethat confessions in police custodyare inadmissible as evidence.

The flaws within the Indianpolice system allow torture tohappen routinely and it often

casts a doubt on confessions, evenvoluntary ones. In the UnitedKingdom, where confessions topolice are admissible, providesthey are not coerced or induced,the question of admissibility isdecided in a separate ‘mini trial’within trial. Only confessions that fall under elaborate judicialprinciples are admissible in

the trial. Whereas in the US, anyconfessions made in violation ofprocedure and made under duressare not admissible.

The danger associated withallowing concessions to the policeis that it incentivises theircomplacency and bad investiga-tion. The confessional statementoften becomes the piece deresistance of the police case, andworks as an excuse to ignore theneed for collecting other evidencethat will stand judicial scrutiny.This calls for a need for extensivereform of the police forces whichrely on scientific investigation andevidence collection methodsinstead of coerced confessionalstatements which can be retractedin the court of law. If we makesteady progress in police reforms,we can effortlessly incorporateprovisions allowing confessionsmade in custody as evidence underan oversight mechanism.

T H E A G E N D A

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CONFESSIONS made before a police officer, SP orabove, should be admissible as evidence in court withadequate safeguards and oversight committee.NO presidential pardon for those awarded deathpenalty in terror cases.GOVERNMENT should ensure that while

implementing anti-terror laws, the principles of federalpolity are not infringed upon.THE NIA should have been armed with powers of both theCBI and the IB, something along the lines of the FBI in the US.ANTI-TERROR law should have provisions for monitoringtelephones and e-mails, regulating financial transactions tocut off illegal inflow of funds for terrorist activities.PROVISIONS have to be backed by a comprehensive witness protection programme to ensure safety and security of the witnesses.

ActionPlan

with the new legislation, the NIA

has to effect a complete overhaulof the country’s criminal justicesystem. Scenes of terror attackshave to be sealed, and seizures andarrests video-recorded. Thereshould be mobile forensic unitswhich should rush to the spot withthe first dispatch of the police.They should be a part of the NIA,which should also have a forensiclab, equipped with the latest and

the best in the world.However, the national mood

that existed while Parliamentlegislated the new terror lawwithered away when various BJP-run states came out against NIA

saying that it was against theprinciples of a federal state. GujaratChief Minister Narendra Modi saidthat the setting up of the NIA was “an attempt at sidetracking” thestates in the fight against terror.

Incidentally, even the CPI(M)-runGovernment in Kerala joined Modiin attacking the Centre.

The legislations, as a rule, haveto prove its worth in practice.While implementing our policiesand formulating plans to fightterrorism we should achieve boththe coveted goals, liberty andsecurity, to an appreciable degree.There are at least two differencesin the amended UAPA, which brings

TERROR LAWS: A COUNTRY COMPARISON

Anyonearrested mustbe broughtbefore a judgewithin 24hours, and ajudge canextend it to 48 hours.

Can be heldfor four days,only after judi-cial consenton day two.The detaineecan contactlawyer onlyafter 72 hours.

Suspect canbe held for 28days withoutcharge. Aban-doned plansto extend into42 days afterHouse ofLords vote.

Any US citizenshould bechargedwithin sevendays ofdetention.Others can bedetained in-definitely.

Accused canbe held for180 dayswithout filingchargesheet.But court can limitdetention to90 days.

Period of detention

No specialcourts forterror cases.

Section of trialcourt speci-alises in ter-rorism. A localprosecutor de-cides whetherthe crime isrelated toterrorism.

Elaboratespecialcourts with closedhearing andspecialisedjudges.

Normalfederalcourts hearcases relatedto terrorism.

Specialcourts forspeedy trialas peramendedUAPA.

SpecialCourts

Law of FightingTerrorism is nota single piece oflegislation, buttitle given to anomnibus pack-age of amendedstatutes.

France hasprovisions toconvict its citizenseven for “in-direct associ-ation” underterror law.

Even encryp-tion regulationviolations canattract lifeimprisonment.

Enhance penal-ties for engag-ing in terroristactivities,funding andmembership ofterroristorganisations.

Enhancedpenalties for funding,supportingand engagingin terroristactivities.

SpecialConvictionProvisions

Don't relieve pros-ecutor from bu-rden of proof whentrying case withvalid confessions.

Confessionsin police cus-tody notadmissible as evidence.

Confessions to police areadmissible aslong as they arenot coerced.

Evidence, in-cluding confes-sions, againstprocedure isinadmissible.

Confessions inpolice custodyare not admis-sible in theIndian court.

Confessionin Custodyas Evidence

ISSUE GERMANY FRANCE UK US INDIA

0ne of the key targets ofterrorism, India has noprocedures in place yet tocheck the flow of terrorfunds into the country or

to regulate the movement and saleof explosive substances. Theamended Unlawful ActivitiesPrevention Act (UAPA) has providedfor freezing the accounts ofsuspected terrorists and seizingtheir properties. It continues to besilent on preventing these fundsfrom making their way into thecountry in the first place.

It is not a secret anymore thatthe inflow of funds for terroristoutfits and their operatives nolonger comes solely through theconventional hawala routes man-aged by the underworld. Regularbanking channels and wire trans-fers are increasingly being used forterror financing, according to thesecurity and intelligence agencies.

Credit and debit card transac-tions below the “threshold requir-ing proof of identity” are beingused to bring in or access fundswithout attracting attention. Themodus operandi is to send money

in small amounts, and thus slowlyto build up resources instead ofsending a huge amount of moneyin one transaction.

In addition, the traditionalmethods of financing terror alsocontinue to flourish. These includesmuggling, fake currency, drugrackets and gunrunning. Thereare intelligence reports aboutterrorists investing in the stock ex-change and real estate as well.Unfortunately, India has failed tocrack down on any of these. In fact,there is no estimate of the extent ofterror funds which are findingtheir way into the country.

The Home Ministry only tracksthe funding coming through legalchannels, which poses as aid beingprovided to non-governmentalorganisations (NGOs).

Monitoring the foreign fundingreceived by NGOs, they keep black-listing organisations which fail tosubmit their accounts or indulge insome suspicious activity. The min-istry cannot do much else but banthe organisation from acceptingany funding.

Other than this, there is nosystem in place to check the inflowof funds. That is one of the mainreasons why India has been denied

T H E A G E N D A

5352

Clamping down on the flow of money thatnourishes the monster and keeping a close watch

on explosive substances is now an imperative

ISSUE

9CLOSING THE Terror Tap

AP PHOTO

ARMYMEN WITH RDXAFTER KILLINGTHREE MILITANTSAND RECOVERING 345 KG OFEXPLOSIVES IN SRINAGAR

T H E A G E N D A

5554

membership of the Paris-basedFinancial Action Task Force(FATF)—the inter-governmentalbody mandated to devise and pro-mote measures aimed at combat-ing money laundering andterrorist financing. India has tofulfil certain criteria to make iteligible to join the exclusive 34-country organisation. The mainone is strengthening the provisionsof Prevention of MoneyLaundering Act (PMLA), 2002,

making it more effective in curbingthe financing of terrorist activities.The Government has been sittingon the recommendations for thepast two years, though HomeMinister P. Chidambaram prom-ised after the 26/11 Mumbai terrorattacks that he would bring it to theParliament soon. He should haveshown the same urgency in gettingthis Bill cleared as he did in thecase of UAPA and when setting upthe National Investigative Agency.Ironically, the new set of amend-ments were finalised byChidamabaram when he was the

finance minister.With some of the key amend-

ments to the PMLA, not only will in-ternational credit card trans-actions and money transfers comeunder the scanner but also a newcategory of offences with “cross-border implications”. This includesoffences which occur in anothercountry,which may or may not con-stitute an offence in that countrybut is an offence in India.

Even International PaymentGateways—Visa, Master Card andWestern Union—would be regu-lated via a ‘payment system oper-

ator’ that will come within theambit of ‘financial institutions’ andobliged to share any transactionover Rs 10 lakh with India throughthe Financial Investigative Unit(FIU). Some of the other key amend-ments also make it mandatory forlawyers, accountants, foreignexchange dealers, real estateagents, jewellers and gem dealersto report such transactions.

However, the PMLA amend-ments have failed to define suspi-cious transactions compre-hensively and left it to the discre-tion of banks and financial institu-tions to report to FIU what they feel

are questionable transactions.Though the banks report cashtransactions of Rs 10 lakh andabove to the FIU, they do not neces-sarily report all suspicious trans-actions and unexplained activity inan account.

Indian efforts at combating ter-ror financing have been found in-adequate by international stan-dards. That is one reason whyIndian banks like ICICI are findingit difficult to open branches inother countries. They are alwaysrefused permission on the groundthat the anti-money-launderinglaws in India are not good enough,

The Explosive Substances Actmust be amended to includeammonium nitrate, a com-monly used fertiliser with ex-plosive properties. After thefertiliser was used in the Delhiblasts last year, the Govern-ment announced the constitu-tion of a committee under thehome secretary. Since then, lit-tle information has flowed outof the ministry.

India should emulate the USwhich is still regulating its saleafter 9/11

Ammonium nitrate isproduced in large quantities by state-managed public sec-tor units such as IFFCO. Theseorganisations have large ruralnetworks. Even though theyhandle large quantities, regu-lating its movement is possible.

India is a leader in agricul-tural technology. The Govern-ment needs to promoteresearch urgently to find safer fertilisers.

FERTILISEROFDEATHA hawk eye needs to bekept on easily availableammonium nitrate

RAJA MENON

RetiredRearAdmiral

JOGINDER SINGH

FormerCBI chief

VI JAY SHANKAR

FormerCBI chief

zz Dog squads should be used todetect RDX, even at immigration.We don’t have a sufficient numberof sniffer dogs for this purpose.

zz The sale and movement of ammonium nitrate is impossible to regulate. Most retailers can’t even read or write.

zz An organised mechanism isneeded to check printing andsmuggling of fake currency

zz Securing the borders will helpcurb smuggling of explosives likeRDX into the country

zz Old acts like the Indian ExplosivesAct (1884) need to be amended andreplaced by efficient regulations

zz There is an urgent need to revisitlaws regulating monetary transac-tions. Money laundering bill needsto be amended.

ExpertSpeak

A lowdown on the options to curbthe availability and movement of

RDX and ammonium nitrate

ACHEMICALFERTILISER FACTORY(LEFT); SEIZED AMMONIUM NITRATEBEING DESTROYED

AP PHOTO/RAJESH NIRGUDE

AP PHOTO

and that they cannot takechances.

Another is theabsence of foolproofknow-your-customer(KYC) norms, notadhered to most banksby India. Half the battlewill be won if these normsare adhered to.

Most countries have becomevery stringent post-9/11. In the US,for example, bank accounts andfinancial transactions are closelymonitored by the authorities. It has become a norm to use creditcards routinely since paymentsmade using them can be traced. If an individual uses cash for two orthree consecutive payments or on aregular basis, he comes under acloud and is questioned. Creditcards, issued in the US, cannot beused in any other country withoutpermission from the issuer.

The Government must actquickly so as to meet FATF norms.

Setting up of the FIU—with themandate to receive, process,analyse and disseminate informa-tion relating to suspect financialtransactions—in 2005 was in conformity with the FATF

guidelines. FIU, however, has so far failed in its mandate in absence of PMLA amendments and also since it lacks a regular coordination with other intelli-gence agencies like theIntelligence Bureau and theResearch and Analysis Wing.

FIU too needs to be broughtunder the Multi Agency Centre forbetter coordination and action tocut off easily available funds.

T H E A G E N D A

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HEED the advice of the intelligence agencies which favour posting of revenue intelligence officials to embassies and high commissions of sensitive countries like Pakistan, UAE, US, UK,Nepal and Afghanistan.The purpose is to monitorfinancial transactions of terror outfits and ISI

agents based in these countries.ENSURE amendments to Prevention of Money LaunderingAct (PMLA) are passed soon, even if as an ordinance, to cutoff illegal transfer of funds for terrorist activities.THE FINANCIAL Investigative Unit should be broughtunder the umbrella of the Multi Agency Centre for better coordination with other intelligence agencies.WITH INTELLIGENCE inputs about terror outfits investing in the stock exchange and real estate, their linkage with various building and construction companiesneeds to be probed.PLUG the routes commonly used to smuggle RDX intoIndia, which include Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmarborders. Poor policing and corrupt border guards help in smuggling at the Bangladesh border, and open borders aid it in Nepal and Myanmar.

ActionPlan

AFP PHOTO

POLICEMEN COUNTFAKE CURRENCYNOTES RECOVERED FROM TERRORISTSNEAR THE NEPALBORDER

BE FASTANDPrecise

India’s armed forces must modernise and move to hi-tech precision strikes to take on non-state adversaries as well as traditional rivals

ISSUE

10T H E A G E N D A

57

AN INDIAN AIR FORCE SU-30MKION AJOINTEXERCISE

In December 2001, in the wakeof the terrorist attack onParliament, the Government or-dered the armed forces to mo-bilise for attack. But the process

was so slow, that by the time theforces were ready the next month,not only was the Pakistan Army mo-bilised, but Islamabad was ready togive guarantees that it would endall terrorist activity emanating fromPakistani soil. The moment passed.

The November 26 attack hasbrought on a sense of déjà vu. De-spite claims that the army had,since 2002, adopted a new “coldstart” doctrine, there are no signsof any movement by the armyother than the routine trainingmovements that take place at thistime of the year.

India enjoys a qualitative andquantitative edge over Pakistanin its air and naval assets, but thearmies of the two countries areevenly matched. On paper, India’s1.1 million-man army with morethan 3,500 tanks, artillery guns,rocket launchers and infantrycombat vehicles, is almost twicethe size of Pakistan’s 5,50,000-force with some 2,300 tanks andartillery guns. But one-quarter ofthe Indian army is involved incounter-insurgency operations,and a significant number arecommitted to defence on the Sino-Indian border. The Kargil reviewcommittee report had noted that“the heavy involvement of thearmy in counter-insurgency op-erations cannot but affect its pre-paredness for its primary role,which is to defend the countryagainst external aggression.”

This does not even begin tofactor the emergence of the newmodel People’s Liberation Army(PLA) of China as a high-tech,

highly mobile force. The Chineseare creating a world class armythat can take on any counterpart,including the United States. It hasfielded new long-range missilesand acquired advanced weaponsand continued to invest a signifi-cant proportion of its resources indomestic industry and scienceand technology.

The Chinese did have a majorlogistical problem in Tibet till re-cently. But now their road and railnetwork, built with great ingenu-ity and at great cost has trans-formed the situation. According tothe 2008 version of the US report,Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, “The PLA is pur-suing comprehensive transfor-mation from a mass armydesigned for protracted wars ofattrition on its territory to one ca-pable of fighting and winningshort-duration, high intensityconflicts along its peripheryagainst high-tech adversaries—an approach that China refers toas preparing for ‘local wars underconditions of informatisation.’”This “informatisation” could re-fer to what we call network cen-tric warfare, or it could be whatsome western analysts say is “un-restricted” warfare, involving cy-ber attacks by an army of civilian

“volunteers.” India clearly fallsamong the countries that will beaffected, that, too, in the short,rather than the long term.

The problem with Indianarmed forces lies in all three ar-eas—organisation, equipmentand doctrine, and, this is the jokerin the pack—higher political di-rection. To begin with, the doc-trine: in the early 1980s, thepolitical directive to the threeservices was that they were tomaintain “dissuasive deterrence”vis-à-vis Pakistan and “defensivedeterrence” in relation to China.This meant that they had to havethe capability of undertaking adeep offensive into Pakistan, but

with regard to China the policywas to have the kind of defensivestrength on this side of the India-Tibet border that would dissuadeBeijing from a military strike.Factor nuclear capability into theequation and the doctrine itselfchanges as was clear in the Kargilwar when India insisted in limit-ing it to the area of the incursion.There have been several efforts toamend it—the “limited war” ideaduring General V.P. Malik’s timeand the “Cold Start” doctrineraised during General S. Pad-manabhan’s tenure.

Whenever political directionhas been clear—1947, 1971,1999—the armed forces have per-

formed reasonably well. When-ever it has been confused or ab-sent, there is frustration anddisaster—1965 and 1962. No oneis sure under what political direc-tive the forces operate today. Butone thing is certain, just as in thepast, they are not treated as partof the Government of India, but anancillary department. Whichmeans that they may be consulted,but do not form part of decision-making. Efforts to remedy this byoverhauling the defence manage-ment of the country have failed.Key recommendations of theGroup of Ministers report on de-fence management have not beenimplemented because of barrack-

ing by the civilian bureaucracy.Since the primary function of

the Indian armed forces is to fightexternal enemies, its planningmust be based on potential ad-versaries who could be super-power like China, or anuclear-armed Pakistan to enti-ties like the LTTE or the Lashkar- e-Toiba—in other words, rangingfrom strong state to transnationalnon-state actors. What we arewitnessing, at least in so far asChina is concerned, is the emer-gence of a very modern and high-tech force. The Indian armedforces, too, must follow the imperatives of what is called the Revolution in Military Affairs

T H E A G E N D A

58 59

n

INDIA ENJOYS ANEDGE OVER

PAKISTAN IN ITS AIRAND NAVALASSETS,BUTTHE ARMIES OF

THE TWO COUNTRIESARE EVENLY MATCHED.

THE MILITARYBALANCEIndia maintains its traditional numerical superiority but nuclearisation of the subcontinenthas nullified that advantage

$ 26 BN $ 4.4 BN

11 LAKH 5. 5 LAKH

3,500 2,300

100 50

MILITARYBUDGET

TROOPS

TANKS

AIRCRAFTCARRIERS

SUBMARINES

FRIGATES

FLEET TANKERS

DESTROYERS

NUCLEAR*MISSILES

INDIA PAKISTAN

INDIA PAKISTANAIR FORCE

INDIA PAKISTANNAVY

INDIAARMY PAKISTAN

600 353

150 20

300 300

1 -

16 5

8 -

13 6

3 1

FIGHTERAIRCRAFT

TRANSPORTAIRCRAFT

HELICOPTERS

Graphic by MADHUMANGAL SINGH

by Sandeep Unnithan*Approximately

(RMA). Reduced to simple terms,such warfare today is called pre-cision, long-range warfare. In thepast, wars were won by manoeu-vre, while today, with high-techsurveillance and communicationsequipment, you can locate the en-emy forces before they come tothe battlefield. You can thereafterdestroy them by pinpoint attacksusing precision-guided muni-tions. RMA requirement for situa-tional awareness and precision

strike demand the control of theair and space. In the Iraq war, theUS forces used some 50 satellitesfor a variety of tasks ranging fromsurveillance, GPS for precise navi-gation and for guiding munitionslike the joint direct attack muni-tion (JDAM), communications,early warning of ballistic missilelaunches, and so on.

A newspaper report of 2002brought out what is the currentparadigm in military thinking. Itwas a report on a briefing of theParliament’s Consultative Com-mittee attached to the DefenceMinistry in 2002, which notedthat the three services, “in sepa-rate presentations in April 2002”,had pointed out that India’s su-periority over Pakistan wasbarely 1: 1.2, down from 1:1.7 obtained at the time ofthe Bangladesh war. An-other report of the samebriefing noted that the ratiothat stood at 1: 1.56 in 1990and had come down to 1: 1.22.

But this was only the man-power ratio. It did not reflectwhat really matters in modernwar—combat power that can bebrought in the old-fashioned waythrough manoeuvre and decep-tion, and in the modern way bymodern technology. Unfortu-nately for the Indian armedforces, they sometimes lack evenmiddle-level technology such asself-propelled artillery withoutwhich an armoured corps lacksvital fire-power. In 1999, duringthe Kargil War, the Indian Navyhad to keep some powerful newfrigates in safe harbour becausethe DRDO had not been able to provide the surface-to-air mis-siles they had promised that theywould make.

The doctrinal consequences ofsuch developments are primarilyon organisation, war-fighting andmanpower training. RMAtechnolo-gies are expensive and the best, indeed, the only way to use themis to integrate the functioning ofthe three services. However, serv-ices everywhere resist this and thekey impetus usually comes fromthe political leadership whichknows that it cannot meet the de-mands of military services formodern equipment given the ex-isting budget constraints.

Since Indian forces can be targets of such capabilities, ourforces must be reorganised into

smaller, more mobile

forces. Conventional massedtanks, artillery and stationaryforces will be sitting ducks. Thehigh-tech component means that the qualifications of the sol-diers and officers have to be up-graded sharply. The wholeintellectual culture of the armedforces needs to change to reflectthe need for integration as well as what are called 4th and 5thgeneration warfare.

For the past 50 years or so, In-dia has been content to build up“short-legged” capability thatwould provide offensive deterrentcapability vis-à-vis Pakistan anddefensive one with regard toChina. However, despite our best

efforts, we have not been able tomeet our goals. As India’s eco-nomic and cultural footprint in-creases, India confronts newerthreats and has to examine radi-cally different strategies to meetthem. Needless to say many ofthese challenges, such as terror-ism, are not just to India but to thecivilised world at large, but, if India seeks a certain standing inthe comity of nations, it must pullits own weight. The first lesson ininternational politics is that thereare no permanent friends or ene-mies, only permanent interests. Inother words, you have to pull yourown chestnuts out of the fire. Andthis is how we can do it:

n The armed forces should become part of the national secu-rity decision making process andshould be given clear politico-military directives. Politics anddiplomacy are key elements ofwar-fighting and it is vital that allthe three—politicians, bureau-crats and soldiers learn to respecteach other and work together. n The three services—the army,navy and air force—must be to-tally integrated. A chief of de-fence staff, who will be firstamong equals in the three serv-ices, should be in-charge of allplanning, provisioning and ac-quisitions. He should also headtraining institutions and the

T H E A G E N D A

60

n

THE INTELLECTUALCULTURE OF THE

ARMED FORCESNEEDS TO CHANGE TO

EMBRACE 4TH AND5TH GENERATION

WARFARE.

ExpertSpeak

zz Sensitise the politicalleadership to the nuancesof national security decision making; institu-tionalise the defence planning process; formu-late a comprehensive na-tional security strategy;ensure better civil-militaryintegration in the execu-tion of national securitystrategy at both the centre and state levels to enable a speedier response to Mumbai-like attacks; enhance the acquisition, dissemination of intelligence especiallyhuman intelligence forcounter-insurgency andcounter-terrorism

zz Our armed forces are primarily trained for pro-tecting territory and notfighting insurgency. Weneed to hone the domain expertise of thearmed forces. We need tocreate the software (readstrategy) and then apply itthrough human resource.Appropriate Technologyneeds to be introduced forthe air force to augmenttheir surveillance capabili-ties. This is also true forthe Indian Navy, whichmust be added with moreteeth against the back-drop of Pak-based terror-ists using sea route for theMumbai strikes.

zz What we need is equip-ping the forces with mod-ern day gadgets andweapons to fight modernday terror. What we alsoneed is streamlining ofprocedures between NSGand army and police andcivil forces. Streamliningof procedures will addmore teeth to the forcesand contribute to their ca-pabilities to fight the mod-ern day enemy.State-actors in Pakistanhave created variousforces over a period oftime and these are gettingout of control, which posea graver security risk forthe region.

zz Enhance military pre-paredness for instant execution of military operations with specifiedobjectives to respondmore quickly to mass casualty terror attacks;acquire more Aerostatradars, Unmanned AerialVehicles, AWACS and spysatellites to increase surveillance capability; deploy special forces foranti-terrorist operations;reorient armed forces tofighting terrorism, trainfor counter-insurgency operations; hire morehuman intelligence assets for cross-border intelligence

zz Dynamic environmentaltransparency to build upthe highest levels of capabilities, especially focused on challenges; a concentrated, organicand faster integrated decision cycle for crisissituations like terroriststrikes; a national operations room with acrisis centre for everystate government; creating synergies withthe media for greater national effect during crisis situations; engage-ment—don’t say no to cooperative security byletting the peace processwith Pakistan suffer

BRIG . GURMEET KANWAL A IR V ICE-MARSHAL KAPIL KAKGENERAL V.P. MALIK COMMODORE UDAY BHASKAR

Director,Centre forLand WarfareStudies

AdditionalDirector,Centre forAir PowerStudies

FormerArmyChief

FormerHead,IDSA

FormerWestern AirCommander

AIR MARSHAL P. S. AHLUWALIA

On how India canbuild astronger military

ON GUARD IN SRINAGAR

strategic command in-charge ofnuclear assets and over-see the process of inte-grating the forces.n RMA technologiessuch as satellites, UAVsand other sensors areexpensive and theymust be shared by thethree services. This forceshould be networked in a mannerthat a soldier on a battlefieldshould be able to bring on supportfire from either of the three serv-ices—an air force bomb strike, acruise missile launched from thesea, or an army artillery or ballis-tic missile strike. n The existing command andcontrol system with the western,eastern, southern and northerncommands of various services,needs to give way to the conceptof theatre commands with a single commander in-charge of allthe forces there. As a first step, theGovernment needs to identify, say,the southern command, and laydown a schedule for integratingits command and control struc-ture totally under, say, the navy. n Reduce the flag service to sevenyears for jawans. They should be 10+2 pass and thereafter betrained in the service. The army will be able to reduce its salaryand pension bill and get younger. After this service, the jawans canopt to remain as non-commis-sioned officers or move to theparamilitary services, other gov-ernment services or reserves. n Like the navy, the other serv-ices should, too, consider trainingtheir officers to higher level, withmost getting engineering or man-agement degrees at the outset tobe able to manage the modernbattlefield environment and the

equipment that goes into it. n The forces must encourage aculture of intellectual enquiryand academics in its higher com-mand officers. Qualifications likea Ph.D. should be included in thecriteria for higher command,rather than be a hindrance. n The armed forces must betaken out of all police functionswhich ought to be handled exclu-sively by the CRPF, BSF, ITBP, CISF,Rashtriya Rifles etc.n A vibrant defence R&D base andindustry must be created. For thepast 50 years, India has been try-ing to set up a defence industrial

base, yet we are not too far downthe road. There have been fourmajor requipment cycles 1950s,1965-75, 1985-1995 and 2000. Innone of these have indigenouslydesigned weapon systems playeda major role.n India must establish a militarywing of its capable space programme. The Indian SpaceResearch Organisation has beenan insistently civilian outfit thatshies away from participating inany military activity. Any RMA-ori-ented force will require supportfrom Indian made and operatedsatellite systems.

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INTEGRATE armed forces with the Union Ministry of Defence APPOINT a chief of defence staff,a single point military adviser to the Government FAST TRACK pending military purchases. Lay down

time-bound programme for acquisitions and cut itdown from the present six- to eight-year timeframe.

SET UP separate Ministry for Defence Procurement staffed by permanent specialists to smoothen the acquisition process CREATE Raksha Udyog Ratnas from the private sector giving them the status of defence PSUs to boost indigenous defence enterprise BUILD more greenfield shipyards within the country to encourage local shipbuilding and help the coast guard and marine police meet force levelsINDUCT satellites, UAVs and long-range spy planes to improve surveillance over land and seaPLUG gaps in defence air space by inducting radars ACQUIRE capabilities like precision strikes and night fight-ing than merely inducting platforms

ActionPlan

WINNING Kashmir

India needs to tackle the Valley’s discontent by deciding how much autonomyKashmir requires and working out a way to negotiate with Pakistan

ISSUE

11

63

T H E A G E N D A

AP PHOTO/DAR YASIN

POLICE PERSONNELON SRINAGAR STREETPOLICE PERSONNELON SRINAGAR STREET

The turnout and verdict inJammu and Kashmir’s2008 Assembly electionindicates that the politicalculture of the state

remains vibrant. This time ahealthy 62 per cent of the votersparticipated in the elections ascompared to just 44 in 2002. It issignificant that centrist andsecular forces like the NationalConference and the Congressparty have formed a governmentunder staunchly pro-India OmarAbdullah, the son of the formerchief minister Farooq Abdullahand the grandson of SheikhAbdullah. Omar’s sober and hard-headed leadership can play amajor role in resolving the tangledKashmir question.

Jammu and Kashmir has beena major national headache, fromthe tribal invasion of 1948 to thestate’s legal accession to the IndianUnion and the global powerpolitics that turned it into disputedterritory, to the undermining of the

state’s special powers. Theproblem has been exacerbated byPakistani covert interventionwhich in the last two decades hasinvolved sending in thousands oftrained militants into the state.The campaign has involved acts ofterrorism in other parts of India,including bomb blasts, taking ofhostages and an aircraft hijack.

The Jammu and Kashmirdispute is today seen as an identityissue. Pakistan, though an entirelyfalse reasoning, has declaredJammu and Kashmir to be the“unfinished agenda of partition.”In recent years, the Pakistanishave conveniently declared thatthey are for “self-determination”in the state. General PervezMusharraf came up with his four-stage plan involving identifyingsub-regions that needed resolu-tion, demilitarisation, self-rule inidentified regions and jointmanagement mechanisms tooversee the process. This soundsreasonable in theory, but would becomplicated in practice. The onereason for this is that India and

Pakistan do not follow the samenational ethos. India is a secularcountry. Things are, to put itmildly, not quite the same in Pakistan. Discrimination againstAhmadiyas and non-Muslims arewritten into Pakistani laws, as are those against women. Thestatus of the Shia community,constituting some 20 per cent ofthe country’s population is notparticularly good.

The Muslim community inIndia has steadfastly opposed theKashmiri separatist movement,notwithstanding its own grousesagainst the system. This is becausethey insistently see their future inthe secular Indian Union which forall its faults has the self-correctionmechanism of a democracy. Everyone knows that Jammu andKashmir is a tough problem toresolve. Not only is its statusdisputed between India andPakistan, but a large number ofKashmiris have taken up guns tofight for what they call “aazadi.”

A negotiated settlement of theproblem of Jammu and Kashmir isin keeping with India’s interna-tional and bilateral commitments.It represents India’s position ofstrength and the inability ofPakistan to alter the situation byforce. It is also a move towards ahumanitarian solution of theproblem. As for Pakistan, itsposition is not clear. At one time itdemanded that the state be part ofPakistan because of the religiousaffiliation of the majority of theKashmiris, later it began to back aplebiscite in the state. Morerecently, it claims that it is for“aazadi” and is merely providingdiplomatic and political support tothe separatists. Yet the facts arethat Islamabad has poured in a

T H E A G E N D A

64 65

huge amount of money and effortto back the anti-Indian armedinsurgency in the Valley.

According to the January 6,2004 agreement, Islamabad will

not permit its territory, or territoryunder its control, to be used foracts of terrorism against India. Inturn New Delhi has agreed toundertake a diplomatic resolution

of the issue through direct talks.Besides the official talks, New Delhiand Islamabad have undertaken anumber of back-door negotiationsthrough special representatives

ExpertSpeak

What needs to be done to win Kashmir and win over Kashmiris

zz Newly electedgovernment must giveproportionaterepresentation to all regions.

zz Dispel thenotion that theValley gets adisproportionateshare ofresources.

zz Show self-confidence indealing with theHurriyat.Encourage themto join dialogue.

zz Formulate a strongdeliverable develop-ment for schemeswhich are not en-tirely dependent oncentral assistance.

zz Partiallywithdraw securityforces from areaswhere the situa-tion hasimproved.

zz Attempts toinvolve the so-calledseparatists in thedialogue shouldbe continued.

zz Reports preparedby the NC govern-ment on Kashmir’sautonomy in 1999 should be re-considered.

zz The 5th WorkingGroup set up onrelationship withthe Centre shouldbe asked to expe-dite its report.

zz Dialogue withPakistan shouldalso take into con-sideration viewsof the new civilianGovernment.

zz The role ofUnited Statesshould be limitedto pressuringPakistan to stopterrorism.

zz Institute aReconcilliationand RehabilitationCommission to en-sure the return ofKashmiri Pandits.

zz Revamp thePM’s WorkingGroup and appointan expert group onautonomy andregional balance.

zz Give the Jammuand Kashmirpolice primaryresponsibility for combatingmilitancy.

zz Invest in skilldevelopment,vocationaleducation and re-training of theunemployed youth.

zz Generate a Vision—2015 for the state in consultation with stake-holders.

zz Trust must bebuilt between thepeople of eachregion of the state with each other.

zz Introspectionfollowed bydialogue betweenall segments ofthe politicalleadership.

zz 'Separatism' isincreasingly ananachronism as aconsensus is devel-oping that seces-sion is no option.

zz Increased traderelations betweenthe Indian andPakistani-admin-istered parts of J&K.

zz Militarypresence in civil-ian areas mustcorrespondinglybe reduced onboth sides of LoC.

zz Dealing with Pakistan is a complicated balancewhich requires putting pressure on it in amanner that doesn’t cause escalation.

zz We must get several balances right simultane-ously—between Srinagar and Delhi, the onebetween the sub regions of Jammu and Kashmir.

LT GEN V.G .PATANKAR (RETD)

Former ArmyCommander

SATISH KUMAR

AMITABH MAT TOO

Former V-C, Jammu University

Central Informa-tion Commissioner

VARUN SAHNI

Vice-Chancellor, Jammu University

AP

JAMMU AND KASHMIR’S NEWCHIEFMINISTER OMAR ABDULLAH

Editor, INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY

WAJAHAT HABIBULL AH

like Satinder Lambah and TariqAziz. Some proposals havebeen discussed throughthe device of non-pa-pers. Others have been put in the public do-main through themedia. Former PakistanPresident PervezMusharraf was quite adept atthis and sought to stretch thepolitical envelope, but for his partPrime Minister Manmohan Singhhas laid out the Indian bottomlinewhich is that no formal change ofexisting borders would beacceptable to India. Both India andPakistan have agreed that theborders between the two Kashmirsmust be softened to, as ManmohanSingh once said, “the point of irrelevance.”

The emergence of a newcivilian government in Pakistanhas brought a hiatus of sorts. TheMumbai massacre has created itsown problems. The originalintention was to situate theKashmir border formula within alarger opening up of the India-Pakistan border as a consequenceof the acceptance of a South AsianFree Trade Area. But while therehas been significant growth oftrade, progress in softening the

border in Kashmir, and someopening up of blocked transportcorridors in Punjab and Rajasthan,there has been little movementtowards SAFTA.

When Jammu and Kashmiracceded to the Indian Union, itoffered to put defence, foreignaffairs and communications intothe hands of the central govern-ment. Subsequently these issueswere spelt out in Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. In 1952, a Delhi Agreement signed betweenthe government of India and that of Jammu & Kashmir speltthese out in some detail. Sincethen, however, the state’s specialstatus and autonomy were under-mined systematically by the Union government. In 1994, thethen Prime Minister P.V.Narasimha Rao had declared thatthe “sky is the limit” as to theamount of autonomy India couldgive to the people of Jammu andKashmir. But when in July 2000the elected government of Jammuand Kashmir sent the report of thestate autonomy commission rec-ommending full autonomy to thestate except in the areas of finance,defence and foreign affairs, theUnion government shot it down.

India needs to tackle theKashmir problem on two fronts:first, to deal with Pakistan on theissue, and second, to resolve thestate’s autonomy problems. Indiashould not fear to offer Kashmir adegree of autonomy that wouldevolve the Valley to maintain its‘Kashmiriyat’. With Pakistan, whileit should not negotiate out of fear, itshould not fear to negotiate a wayout of the Kashmir impasse withoutcompromising on India’s sover-eignty and territorial integrity.

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History can be interpreted in several ways. So, is the casewith Jammu and Kashmir. Contrary to popular view, Indiadid not actively seek the accession of the state to the newIndian Union in August 1947. But an inadvertentconsequence of the partition massacres was that theMaharaja of Kashmir, the only man who could, under theBritish rules, decide the accession of the state, felt that his multi-ethnic, multi-religious state, albeit with anoverwhelming Muslim majority, would be better off with secular India.

However, the choice was not his. It was forced on himby a tribal invasion organised by the new government ofPakistan. At that time, Pakistan claimed that it had nocontrol over what happened. But subsequent history hasshown that Pakistani leaders, going all the way up to PrimeMinister Liaquat Ali Khan, were involved in the planning,organisation and execution of the invasion plan. As Indiansare now discovering, Pakistan was able to transform thisblatant act into one of victimhood. Kashmir was meant tobe a part of Pakistan, they argued, and notwithstandingthe causal somersault, insisted that India had seized it.

Then, as now, global power politics came to Pakistan’srescue. The British, leading the Americans by the nose,

insisted in the UN that the Kashmir grab was not the issuebut New Delhi’s decision to defend the territory that hadlegally, as per the rules the British themselves had made,acceded to India. The result is that almost the entire worldcommunity continues to see Jammu & Kashmir as adisputed territory. Initially, the world community sought aplebiscite, but when this proved unviable, they sought tomediate through the UN. However this, too, did not workand then, in the wake of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, Indiaand Pakistan had direct discussions on the issue and evendiscussed partition proposals. However, despite strongUS-UK backing, this process collapsed at the end of 1963.

Under the accession rules, J&K transferred defence, foreign affairs and communications to India.Subsequently, through an Article 370, it associated itselfwith the Union of India in a special category. Some of the special rights of the Kashmiris were spelt out in theDelhi Agreement of 1952. But the falling out betweenSheikh Abdullah and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru led to a systematic undermining of all the special powers that the state had retained. The centralisationprocess inaugurated by successive governments in New Delhi further exacerbated this.

Kashmir: Abrief history

n

INDIA SHOULD NOTNEGOTIATE OUT OF

FEAR, BUT IT SHOULDNOT FEAR TO NEGOTI-

ATE ON KASHMIRWHILE PROTECTING ITSNATIONALINTERESTS.

TAKE significantsteps towardsKashmiriautonomy.INVOLVE civilsociety, especially

women, in economicinitiatives.CONVINCE the world thata non-communal and non-sectarian solution is inthe best interests ofJammu and Kashmir.KEEP up dialogue withPakistan with a view toeliminate the infrast-ructure of cross-borderterrorism and to appearas a reasonable actor inthe international stage.CONTAIN and defeat theterrorist threat withmaintenance of adequatesecurity.OFFER an amnesty toKashmiri-origin militants.CREATE a truth commis-sion for missing persons.SOFTEN the border;actively engage people of PoK and the northern areas.RECOGNISE Pakistan’scontrol of ‘Azad’Kashmir in return for it accepting LoC as the permanent border.

ActionPlan

JAWAHARLALNEHRU (RIGHT) WITH SHEIKH ABDULLAH

AP

The citizens’ movement inthe wake of the Mumbaiattacks has been unprece-dented in scale and in-volvement. The public hit

the streets, and not just in Mumbaibut across the nation, to protestagainst the government, seekchange in the system, and vowingto make their voices heard andtheir actions count in the war onterror. The India Today Group’sDeclare War on Terror campaignsaw more than 95,000 people fromall sections of society pledging sup-port. The anger and the outragewas palpable as well as the senseof fear and vulnerability. Whatthey all feel is the desire for changebut most are not sure how to get toa safe new world, individually orcollectively. The big question oneverybody’s lips: Why was Mumbai26/11 allowed to happen?

There is more than enoughhope invested in the post-Mum-bai welling up of patriotism,sense of nationalism and the de-sire to do something. What isneeded is a channelling of thatpublic sentiment and findingways to be part of it as concernedcitizens. The War on Terror cannot be fought, or won, unlessordinary citizens internalise it.

It would be naive on our partto expect our security forces tokeep a watch on every suspiciousperson or movement 24x7. Ourresponsibilities as concerned cit-izens have increased in thesetroubled times. Do not postponethe police verification of servantsand tenants as tomorrow may betoo late. Similarly, with busy mar-ketplaces becoming terrorhotspots, increased vigilance willnot only generate greater publicawareness but also make you an

involved citizen. You can makethe difference by insisting thatyour residents welfare associa-tion beef up security in the im-mediate neighbourhood andwork out an emergency plan incase of an attack. You could insistthat your children’s school keep ablueprint of its layouts and exitsin case of emergency. You couldalso enrol in first aid classes sothat in times of a crisis you knowwhat to do.

It’s time you take the lead bypaying fines for violations thatyou commit. Don’t give bribes. Ata time when people are calling forcapital punishment for terroristacts, how many times have we decided to be part of the judicialprocess that can take these casesto their logical end? Many high-profile cases do notreach their logical conclusion,due to back-tracking by wit-nesses. We should, therefore, de-pose fearlessly before a court ifwe witness a crime.

Also, if you believe our politi-cians should be made aware thatvote bank politics can no longerbe employed to the detriment ofnational security, you need topressure them to change their at-titude. Our bureaucrats and thepolice too need to be told that halfmeasures will not do; we need afoolproof system that protects thecommon people.

Peoples’ movements are anincredibly powerful tool forbringing about change and thepowers that be are fully aware ofthe fact that the Indian public isangry and it demands systemicchange. You can help bring aboutthe change you want, the changewe need, the change we believein. It begins with you.

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BE THE Change

ISSUE

12

AP PHOTO/DINO VOURNAS

As citizens, we can helpbring about the change we want by fulfilling our duties and keeping the pressure on the Government to deliver

AWELLING UPOFNATIONALISM HAS

FOLLOWED THE MUMBAI OUTRAGE.

AWELLING UPOFNATIONALISM HAS

FOLLOWED THE MUMBAI OUTRAGE.

T H E A G E N D A

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Turn your concern into action. 20 simplethings you can do now, that can make a significant impact in our War on Terror:

1 MARKET SURVEYCheck whether markets you goto are secure. Start a boycottcampaign if they are not.

2 LEARN FIRSTAIDEnroll in a first aid course soyou can help in an emergencytill medical professionals arrive.

3 BADGER YOUR MLAPush your local MLA for morepublic security measures.

4 COMMUNITYWARDENSVolunteer to help in policingyour neighbourhood by report-ing suspicious activities.

5 DONATE FREELYLook out for genuine charitiesthat are supporting victims ofterror and donate generously.

6 TAB ON THE POLICEVisit your police station andcheck if it has proper facilities,manpower and equipment tomeet the challenge.

7 BE WELL PREPAREDUndergo a drill on how to dealwith terrorists. Check with yourcivic authorities where to go.

8 PROOF OF IDStart a campaign to have every citizen register under anational ID card system.

9 REJECT CRIMINALSPledge not to elect a candidatewith a criminal track record.

10 PAYYOUR FINESInstead of bribing officials, paythe fine if you are penalised.

11 MONITOR SECURITYUrge the management of your children’s school and your office to organise copies of the buildings’blueprints.

12 WATCH THYNEIGHBOURCreate a neighbourhood watch.Report suspicious activitiesand people to the police.

13 BE WELL-EQUIPPEDGet the details of yourResidents’Welfare Associationfor use in emergencies.

14 CREATE AN SOSHUBMake a list of the emergencycare centres in your area withaddresses, contact numbers.

15 BE DOUBLY SUREEmploy people or rent outhouses only after verification.

16 CREATE NODESDefine aggregation points inthe neighbourhood where peo-ple can collect in emergencies.

17 MAP IT OUTDevelop alternate routes to and from work and school.

18 COME FORWARDDepose as a witness if you have observed terror attacks.

19 BE PATIENTExpect delays and baggagesearches at public places andtravel facilities.

20 EMERGENCY PLANDevelop a family emergencyplan and practice it with friends.

CitizensCharter

Over 95,000 people have taken theIndia Today Group’s pledge against

terror.To sign up click onwww.indiatoday.in/war

WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA,DECLARE WAR ON TERROR TODAY.We face the gravest threat as a nation.We pledge toFIGHT against those who kill the innocentSUPPORT measures that ensure our safetyEXPOSE corruption and incompetence that endanger our securityDEFEAT the enemy by having zero tolerance of terrorELIMINATE the forces which propagate hateBE united in our resolve

TILL VICTORY IS OURS

THE

PLEDGE

T H E A G E N D A

For a full text of the document, click

www.indiatoday.in/war

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

War on TerrorThe Agenda for Action

was put together by the India Today Group’s

editorial team consisting of

INDIA TODAYRaj Chengappa

Bhavna Vij-Aurora Sandeep Unnithan

Saurabh Shukla Shafi Rahman

Mihir Srivastava Aditi Pai

Swati Mathur and bureau support

MAIL TODAYBharat Bhushan

Manoj Joshi Anupam Srivastava

Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury

INDIA TODAY GROUP ONLINEKalli Purie

Shailesh Shekhar

Designed and edited by the India Today team.

We also thank all the expertsfor sharing their views.