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Economic History Association

Two Views of the British Industrial RevolutionAuthor(s): Peter TeminSource: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 63-82Published by: Cambridge University Presson behalf of the Economic History AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951107

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TwoViewsof the BritishIndustrialRevolutionPETERTEMIN

Thereare wo viewsof theBritish ndustrial evolution n the literatureoday.Themore raditionalescriptioneesthe Industrial evolution s a broad hange n theBritish conomy ndsociety.Thisbroad iew of the Industrial evolution asbeenchallenged y CraftsandHarleywhosee the Industrial evolution s the resultoftechnical hangenonlya fewindustries.This articlepresents test of theseviewsusingtheRicardianmodelof intemationalradewithmanygoods.British radedataare used to implement he test and discriminate etweenthe two views of theIndustrial evolution.There are woviewsof theBritishndustrialevolutionn the iteraturetoday.The more raditionalescriptions representedythe views ofT. S. Ashtonand David S. Landes. t sees the IndustrialRevolutionas abroadchange n the British conomyandsociety.InAshton'smemorablephrase, A wave of gadgets weptoverEngland. 2hisbroadview of theIndustrial evolution asbeenchallenged ecently yN. F.R. Crafts ndC.KnickHarley.Thisnew schoolof thought ees the Industrial evolution sa much narrower henomenon, s the resultof technical hange n a fewindustries.Thenew industries, bviously,were cottonand ron.All otherswere mired npremodem ackwardness.3Itmayseemasif thechoicebetween hese wo viewsis a matter f taste,since the literatures almostexclusivelyabout he two modem ndustriessingledoutbythenarrow iew of theIndustrial evolution. hatappearsobe how thischoiceis treatedn theliterature.nfact,theloosenessof ourcurrent onception asencouragedfewpeopleto takethe viewsof CraftsandHarleyo theextreme.RondoCameronrgueshat hechangenotedbytheseauthorswas so smallrelative o the wholeeconomy hat t no longerdeserves he title of Industrial evolution.4

The Journal of EconomicHistory,Vol. 57, No. 1 (Mar. 1997). c The EconomicHistoryAssociation.All rights eserved. SSN0022-0507.Peter Temin is Professor,Departmentf Economics,Massachusettsnstituteof Technology,Cambridge,MA, 02139.This s a shortenedersion f theworking aper fthesame itle,NBERHistorical aper 1 (March1996).I thankWilsonW.Thai or research ssistance ndparticipantsn seminars t Harvard, ale,andthe University f BritishColumbiaorhelpful omments.2Ashton, ndustrialRevolution, . 42.3Mokyr, Editor'sntroduction, p. 6-7, distinguishesourviews of the Industrial evolution.Mydivisioncorrespondsoughlyo his macroeconomicnd echnologicalchools.4Cameron, onciseEconomicHistory,pp. 16567.

63

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64 TeminBut it is seldom that an empirical question cannot be tested. True,productivityindexes are hard to calculate for obscure industries. It is

necessary to search for other data that will let the historiandiscriminatebetween these two views. Tradedataprovidethe informationneeded todiscriminatebetween these two views.I will use a Ricardianmodel of internationalrade o formulate testablehypothesisabout he natureof the IndustrialRevolution.Inthismodel, thetraditional iew of the Industrial evolutionmplies hatBritain houldhavebeen exportingothermanufactures-thatis, manufactured roductsotherthan cotton textiles andiron bars.In the more modernview, by contrast,Britain houldhave beenimportinghese samegoodsin theearlynineteenthcentury.Tradedataallow us to see which is thecase.The plan of this article s as follows. The firstsectionargues hat herearetwo distinctviews of theIndustrial evolution n the literature.The secondsection will describe he Ricardianmodel of internationalradewithmanygoods and formulate he hypothesisto be tested. The third section willdescribe the British trade data and implementthe test of the previoussection.A final section concludes.

TWOVIEWSOFTHEINDUSTRIAL EVOLUTIONThetraditional iew of the BritishIndustrialRevolutioncanbe foundincountless exts. T. S. Ashton'sclassicexpositionclearlydescribeda generalchange in British economy and society. He was very expansive in hisdescriptionsof technicalchange: Inventors,ontrivers, ndustrialists, ndentrepreneurs-it s not easyto distinguishone from anotherat a periodofrapid change-came from every social class and from all parts of thecountry. xpandinghe statement uotedaboveabout a waveof gadgets,Ashtonsaid, Itwasnot only gadgets,however,butinnovationsof variouskinds-in agriculture, ransport,manufacture, rade, and finance-thatsurgedupwith a suddennessor which it is difficult o find a parallelat anyothertime orplace. 5This view was widespreadduringthe 1950s and 1960s. David Landes

expressed it well in an authoritativebook.6 The well-known growthestimates of Phyllis Deane andW. A. Cole confirmed he view of wide-spread change and appeared o provide a firm basis for the qualitativeexpositions.7Morecurrentworkby JoelMokyrsupports hepervasivenessof technological hange n Britainat this time.8Butin a recentsurveyof the5Ashton, ndustrialRevolution,pp. 13,42.6Landes,PrometheusUnbound,pp.41, 105.7Hartwell,IndustrialRevolution;Matthias, First Industrial Nation; Deane, First Industrial

Revolution;and Deaneand Cole,BritishEconomicGrowth.8Mokyr, Lever, chap. 10.

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Two Viewsof the IndustrialRevolution 65TABLE1CONTRIBUTIONS O NATIONALPRODUCTIVITYGROWTH,1780-1860(percentage er annum)

Sector McCloskey Crafts HarleyCotton 0.18 0.18 0.13Worsteds 0.06 0.06 0.05Woolens 0.03 0.03 0.02Iron 0.02 0.02 0.02Canalsandrailroads 0.09 0.09 0.09Shipping 0.14 0.14 0.03Sum of modernized 0.52 0.52 0.34Agriculture 0.12 0.12 0.19All others 0.55 0.07 0.02Total 1.19 0.71 0.55Sources: McCloskey, Industrial evolution, . 114; Crafts,BritishEconomicGrowth,p. 86; andHarley, Reassessinghe IndustrialRevolution, p. 200.literature, atrickK. O'Brienlabeledthis view old-hat conomichistorythat is still being readand continuesto be writtenby an unrepentant utelderly generationof Anglo-American conomichistorians. 9The growthrate of the Britishnationalproductwas adjusteddownwardin a gradual rocess.C. KnickHarley evised hegrowthrateof manufactur-ing downward n 1982. N. F. R. Crafts extended these estimates into arevisionof Deaneand Cole's estimatesof theBritishnationalproductn his1985 book. Craftsand Harleypresented heir final versionin 1992.10The implicationsof the new estimatesfor the conceptualization f theIndustrialRevolution can be seen in an exercise introducedby D. N.McCloskey. 1He calculated he productivitygains of what he called themodernized ectorsfromindustry ources. Then he weightedthe gains bythe share of the industries in gross productionand added them. Theproductivity gain of all other sectors (except agriculture,which wasestimated eparately)was obtainedby subtractinghis totalfromthe rate ofgrowthof productionn theeconomyasawhole.The calculations reshownin the first column of Table 1.CraftsreproducedMcCloskey'scalculations n his book and noted thatthe bottomline, the estimatedrateof growthof the economyas a whole,came from DeaneandCole. Since Craftswas revising these estimates,hesubstitutedhis new estimatesas shownin the second columnof Table 1.None of the industryestimates were changed;only the growth of theunidentified, residualsector.As can be seen, the contributionof other

90'Brien, Introduction, . 7. O'Brien'sexposition ocused on the growthrateduring he BritishIndustrialRevolution, but estimatesof income growth cannot be separated rom the underlyingconceptionof the IndustrialRevolution,as shown below.'0Harley, BritishIndustrialization ; eane and Cole, BritishEconomic Growth;Crafts,BritishEconomic Growth;Crafts,and Harley, OutputGrowth.McCloskey, Industrial evolution, . 114.

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66 Teminsectors o economic growthfell from 0.55 percenta year to 0.07 percent.In Crafts's words: [T]he term 'IndustrialRevolution'. . . shouldnot betaken to implya widespread, apidgrowthof productivityn manufactur-ing. pl2Quite the contrary.As Crafts repeatedthroughouthis discussion, theIndustrialRevolutionin this view was a decidedly localized affair. Theindustriesaffectedwere textiles, iron,andtransportation. ll else-othermanufacturesnd otherservices-were technologically tagnantor the firsthalf of the nineteenthcentury.This conclusioncontrasts tronglywith theassertionsof Ashton and Landes.

Craftsrecognizedthat his new estimates createda paradox.If Britishmanufacturingwas in general so backwardand British agriculturesoprogressive-as we know fromothersources-then why did Britainnotexport agricultural oods andimportmanufacturesn the earlynineteenthcentury?13It is importanto understandhe natureof thisparadox.The traditionalview impliedthat Britainhad a comparative dvantage n manufacturing.Craftshaddenied hepremiseof this traditionaliew by asserting hatmostBritishmanufacturing as backward nd inefficient.Evidencethat Britishagriculturewas moreproductive hancontinental henimpliedthat Britainhad a comparativeadvantage n agriculture. t is no wonder thatpreviouseconomichistorians ad not confrontedhisparadox;t does not exist in thetraditional iew of the IndustrialRevolution.The resolutionof the paradox came in two propositions.First, Craftsconfirmed he existenceof paradoxby reiteratinghatmost British ndustry

experienced low levels of labor productivityand slow productivitygrowth-it is possible that there was virtually no advance during1780-1860. Second, he resolved the problem by asserting that rapidgrowth in key manufacturing sectors . . . gave Britain a substantialcomparative dvantagenthose activities. 14notherwords, industrializingBritainhad a comparative dvantagen cotton andiron,not manufacturingas a whole.Theclear mplication f Crafts'sview is thatothermanufactures ere notexportedbecauseBritain ackeda comparative dvantagen manufacturingin general. nfact,thejuxtaposition f evidenceof a productiveagriculturewith that of backwardmanufacturingutside of textilesand ironprovidedevidence that Britain had a comparative disadvantagein these othermanufactures. hat s, Crafts's esolution f theparadox mpliesthatBritain

2Crafts, ritishEconomic Growth,p. 86, emphasis n the original.Crafts'sestimates educed heimplied ateof productivity hange n all othersectors rom0.65 percentper year to 0.08 percentperyear.He added n a footnote hateven this new,low estimate ould be an overestimate.13Crafts, British ndustrialization.I4lbid., . 425.

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Two Viewsof theIndustrialRevolution 67should have been importingothermanufactures long with agriculturalgoods.

CraftsandHarleyrecentlyrevised andrestated heirnew views in lightof the ensuing discussion. Their definitive views reduced the rate ofeconomicgrowthduring heIndustrial evolution venfurther hanCrafts'sinitial estimates.15Harleyincorporatedhese estimatesinto McCloskey'sexercise, as shown in the third column of Table 1. Harley revisedMcCloskey'sestimates fproductivityrowth nthe modem sectoras Craftshadnot done,reducingheiraggregate ontributiono economicgrowth.Butbecause herateof growthof thetotaleconomywas estimated o be so low,the contributionof other sectors fell to the vanishingpoint, from 0.07percentper year to 0.02 percentper year.16Harley embedded the Crafts-Harley iew into a computablegeneralequilibriummodel of theBritisheconomyin the earlynineteenthcentury.He distinguishedourproducing ectorsin Britain:modemmanufacturing,agriculture,ervices,and other ndustry. Thelatter wo sectorsare the allother ectorof Table1). Britainexportstheproductsof modernmanufac-turingand importsagricultural oods in this model; services and othermanufactures re not traded.7Harley assertedthat this model demonstrates he consistency of theCrafts-Harley iew. Butmanyproductsof othermanufactureswere easilytraded,as will emergebelow.Unless othermanufacturingtartedout froma position of greatcomparativeadvantage-a presumptionbelied by theabundant istorical videnceof theeighteenth enturyandexplicitlydeniedby Crafts-the ability to export other manufacturingwould have beenrapidlyerodedby technicalprogress n cotton, ron,andeven agriculture. fagricultural oods wereimportedn theearlynineteenth entury, herefore,thenothermanufactureshouldhave beenas well.Intheliteratureurveynotedabove,O'Brienseemedto conclude hat thegap between old-hat and new-fangledeconomic history can never bebridged. Theproblem s thatthedataneededto constructnational ncomeaggregatesdo not exist for many parts of British industry n the earlynineteenthcentury.Microeconomicandmacroeconomic tudies,O'Brienappeared o assert,will just have to go theirown ways.

CraftsandHarley, OutputGrowth.6Craftsecently reviseddownwardeven furtherhis estimateof productivity hange by takingaccount of the growthof humancapital.If Harleyestimated he rate of productivitychange ofindividualndustriesnTable1fromprices asMcCloskeydid),theseestimateswould notbe affectedby theconsideration f human apitalntheoverall otal.Thiswouldturn heresidual ategory f otheractivitiesnegative.Thischangemakesthetestproposedbelow evensharperhanwiththeestimatedrates n Table 1. Crafts, ExogenousorEndogenousGrowth?17Harley, Reassessing heIndustrialRevolution.

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Two Viewsof the IndustrialRevolution 69Britainis an,wherean is the numberof hours of Britishlabor neededtoproduce a single unit of the nth good. Following the convention ofinternational rade,a*n represents he hours of foreign labor needed toproduce he nth good in the foreigncountry.Theratioof the laborneededto produce hegood in the foreigncountryandin Britain s a *n/an. Thegoods canbe re-indexedby thisratio,startingwith the good for which the relativequantityof foreignlabor neededforproduction s thehighest(so theratio,a *n/an, is thehighest).

al /al>a2 la2>a3 /a3>>aN/aN (1)Thepattern f trade s detenninedbythe relative osts of producing oodsinthetwo countries.Andinthis Ricardianmodel costs aresimplythewagesof the sole factorof production:abor.Letw be the Britishwage; w*, theforeignwage. Then thecost of producinggood i in Britain s wai;the costin the foreigncountry,w*a*. Any good for which w*a* > wai will beproduced n Britainbecauseitsproduction osts are cheaper n Britain.Thisinequality anbe rewritten sa*i/ai > w/w*.Productionostsfor thisgoodare lowerin Britain;hegoodwill beproducedn Britainandexportedto theforeigncountry.Conversely, nygood,j, for whicha7*jaj < w/w*willbe producedn the foreigncountryand importedntoBritain.The number-ingschemeforgoodsensures hat here s apoint ntheordered ist of goodssuchthat all goods to the left with lowernumbersareproduced n Britain.All thegoodswithhighernumbersareproducedabroad.This is illustratedin Figure 1, wherethe downward-slopingcurve, A, shows a */a for each

good. Italso showsthe indexof the lastBritishexportat anyw/w*.The model needs a demandside to determinewages. Assume thatconsumers spenda constantshareof theirincome on each good and thattastes are the same in both countries.The wage in each country s deter-minedby thedemand orlabor,which is determinedn turnby therangeofgoodsproducednthatcountry. f therangeof domesticgoods increasesatanyrelativewage,thenthe demand or domestic aborrises. This raisestheratioof domesticto foreignwages, leadingto a positive relationbetweenw/w* andtherangeof goodsproduceddomestically.This is shownasB, theupwardslopingcurvein Figure1. CurveA shows the interactionbetweenthe numberof exportsand relativewages in the goodsmarket; urveB, inthe labor market.The division between exportedand importedgoods iswhere curvesA andB cross,atxo.22

22Capitalmovementsdo not affectthe allocationof productionn this model.Transportosts anduniform tariffsdo not affect theargument;heyonly introduce bandof nontraded oodsbetweenexportsandimports.Thepatternof tradedid notvarymuch at a time thattariffswerefalling rapidly,suggestinghat ndividualariffshad ittleeffecton the overallpattern f trade.Exportsof servicesareignored, ollowingHarley.

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70 Temina 5a,w/w

BB

exports x2 xO xI imports indexFIGURE

Considernow the effect of technical hange n Britain. assume hat hereis no technical change outside of Britain, that is, no change in laborproductivity n the foreign country.Alternatively,one could say that theIndustrialRevolutiondid not spreadoutsideBritain n the first half of thenineteenth century. This is roughly correct-at least for continentalEurope-and it connects he model to the estimatesof productivity hangereportedn Table1.23Therearetwo cases. If thetechnicalchange s general, hatis, it reducesai for all i, then t increasesa*,/a, or all i. CurveA in Figure1 shiftsupward,increasingherangeof goodsexportedby Britainatthesame relativewage.This is shownasA 'in Figure1. The point dividing mportsandexportsoncurveA, now A moves to the right.This increase n the rangeof goodsproduced n Britain ncreases he demand or laborin Britainand reducesthe demand or labor n theforeigncountry.Britishwagesconsequently iserelative o wagesinthe foreigncountry.A new equilibriums reachedwhere

231fproductivitywas growing uniformly n other countries, hen this rateof change needs to bededucted rom theratesderived romthefinalcolumn of Table1 to get relativerates.This does notchange he orderof change nthe various ectorsof the British conomy.LikeCrafts's ecentreductionin the overall ateof productivity hange n Britain, t only strengthenshe argument ere. Since thereis only one factorof production,otal actorproductivity nd aborproductivity rethe same. As notedabove,I am assuming hat labor standsfora Hicksiangood and thatthe relativepricesof differentfactorsof productiondidnotchangesubstantially.ee note 20.

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Two Viewsof theIndustrialRevolution 71curveB intersectshenewA 'curve,atx,. At the newequilibrium, ritainis exporting oodsthathadpreviously eennontradedrimported.

If, by contrast, echnical hange s restrictedo a few goods,thepictureis more complicated.The simplestcase is whenproductivity hangeisconfined o a goodalready xported y Britain.Assume, orexample, hatadvances n the British cottontextile industries ausedpeople to shiftdemand romothergoodsto British extiles.24 hen heB curveshiftsupand o the leftbecause radebalance tanyw/w* s achievedwiththeexportof fewerBritish oods.Thenew curve s shownas B 'in Figure1;the newequilibriums to theleft of theoriginalpointon curveA, atx2.A more complexcase is when the change n productivityhanges heorderof goodsalongcurveA,movinga goodfrom, ay,theimported angeto the exported.This changeforces us to renumber ll the othergoods,giving hemallhighernumbers. or hosegoodsclose to theintersection fA andB, this change n the ordercouldmove themout of the range ofexportsnto herange f importsornontradedoods).Intermsof thegoodsthemselves, heequilibriumas moved o the leftas in Figure1.Conversely,f a British ectorhasnegative echnical hange-that is, ifit stagnateswhilethe restof theeconomyprogresses-thenit will movetothe right n thearray.Depending n its starting ointandtheextentof itstechnical ag, it couldcrossthedividing ine in Figure1 andchange romexportto nontraded r import.Thiscasedescribes he CraftsandHarleyconclusion hownin the lastcolumnof Table1. The rateof productivitychange in other manufacturing as not only slower than in modemindustries ut also than n agriculture.f we assume hatproductivitywas

risingin othercountries,hen the absenceof productivityhange or 80years shown in the final column of Table1 surelywould have erodedwhatever omparativedvantage ritainmighthavehad nthesegoods.All of the subcasesof restricted echnicalchangemove in the samedirection.Britain xports ewernontextile oodsthanbefore,althoughherepresentationn Figure1 is too simpleto describeall of the subcases. tfollowsthat f therewere more hanone of thesedevelopments nderway,the effects would cumulate.Rapidadvances n Britishtextiles and noproductivityhangenothermanufacturinghenare woseparateauses orthenumber f British xported oodsto fall.Summarizing, niformand restricted echnicalchangehave oppositeimplicationsor themovementof dividingpointsin equation1. Generaltechnicalchangemoves thedividing ine betweenexportsandnontradedgoodsto theright; estrictedechnical hange, o theleft. Generalechnical

24Sincehe modelhas assumed onstanthares f income pentoneachgood,thisis equivalentosaying hat he demand or British extileswas elastic.

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72 Teminchange causes the list of exportsto rise, while restricted echnicalchangecauses it to fall. Thisdifferenceprovidesa test of historicalviews.

The test is which goods areexported nd mported, ot how muchof eachgood is traded.The conclusions ust reached efer o changes n the locationof equilibria longthis continuum f goods. The empirical vidence neededto discriminatebetween the two kinds of productivity hange consists oflisting exportedand importedgoods, not calculationsof theirmagnitudes.To discover changes in the lists of exports and imports, ists need to becompiledfor differentdatesduringBritain's ndustrialization.To createthis test we needto identifygoods in the arrayof equation1.Thereare threecategoriesof Britishgoods: exports,nontraded oods, andimports. Following Harley, we identify exports with modem Britishindustry,nontradedgoods with services not related o trade,and importswith agriculture.ButHarleyhas a fourthgood in his model that is the oneof most interesthere.Thequestion s wheretoput Harley's ourthcategory,othermanufactures.The discussion of the precedingsection implies that there are twodifferent answers.In the broad view of the IndustrialRevolution,othermanufactureswere similar o modemmanufactures;echnicalchangewaswidespread. Exports of many manufacturedgoods should have beenexpanding. nthenarrow iew, by contrast,othermanufacturesweredoingfar worse than agriculture.Harleyassumedthey were not traded n hiscomputable eneralequilibriummodel,but as notedabove,this is implausi-ble. Othermanufactureshouldhavebeenimportsn theCrafts-Harleyiewof theeconomy.There are several reasons why the Crafts-Harley iew implies othermanufactures ere imports.As cottonchanged roman import o an exportin theeighteenthcentury, herangeof othermanufacturesxportedshouldhave fallen.25Further echnicalprogress in cotton textiles that greatlyincreased heconsumption f theirproducts n thenineteenth enturyevenafter cotton textiles had moved to be first in the index of Britishgoodsmagnified this effect. And as the residual sectors stagnatedrelative toagriculturen the nineteenthcentury, heircosts of production n Britainmusthave risensharply elative o the costof growing ood in Britain.Sinceagriculturaloodswereimported,heproducts f theseothersectors-to theextent hat heywere traded tall-should havebeen imported s well.Evenif other manufactureswere not importedat the start of the nineteenthcentury,heratesof productivity hangeshownin the lastcolumnof Table1 surelywould havemadethemimportsby midcentury.TheRicardianmodelconsequently enerates simpletest to discriminatebetween the two views of the British IndustrialRevolution. Wereother

25Ashton, conomicHistoryof Britain,p. 154; and Cameron,ConciseEconomicHistory,p. 160.

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Two Viewsof the IndustrialRevolution 73manufacturesxportedor imported? fexported, henthe view that echnicalchange was widespreadamong British industries n the earlynineteenthcentury s confirmed.But if the othermanufactures ere imported, hen theconclusion that technical change was restrictedto a very few modemindustrieswhile other industriesstayed mired in premodem productiontechniques s confirmed.The pathof tradein other manufactures lso gives information. n theCrafts-Harley iew shown in the last column of Table 1, these activitieswere not experiencing echnicalchangein the firsthalf of the nineteenthcentury.The productivitygap between other manufactures nd agricul-ture-not to mention modem industry-was growing rapidly. Othermanufactures, ven if exportedearlyin the IndustrialRevolution,shouldhavefoundtheirrelativecosts risingand theirexportsfalling.Theyshouldhave gonefromexports o imports.Thisis nota statement bout herelativerate of growth of these exports; it rather is whether individual goodschangedfrom being exported o being imported.The two views of the IndustrialRevolution, herefore,can be testedbylookingatmarginalBritishexports.I do not claimthatthepatternof tradein thesegoodsdescribes he Industrial evolution, nlythat tprovidesa testbetween two views of this event. Was Britain losing its comparativeadvantage n othermanufacturingxportsat the marginor maintainingt?After industrializationadprogressedora while, were othermanufacturesexportedas the AshtonandLandesview impliesor importedas the Crafts-Harleyview implies?It may seem odd to test major views of the IndustrialRevolutionbylookingatmarginal ctivities.Not onlyshouldmajorhistoricaleventshavelargecauses,butthe tests about hem, t seems, should nvolve the principalactivitiesas well. Unhappily,his is notthecase.Different torieshave beenpresentedto explain the same events. To be plausible, they all have toexplain the majoraspectsof these events. It is only in the details thattheydiffer, although,as describedabove, these differencesmay imply other,moreimportantdisagreements.Thedevil, as theysay,is in the details.26

USINGTHEMODELTO DISCRIMINATEETWEENTWOVIEWSSome dimensionsof British radeas summarized y RalphDavis appearin Table2.27Thedominant laceof manufacturesn Britishexports s easilyapparentromthe firstrow. The important ndinitiallygrowingshareof

26This s the same argument used in a very differentcontext in Did MonetaryForces CausetheGreatDepression?27Davis,ndustrialRevolution.Davis also surveyedntermediateecades,with resultsclose to thoseshown in Table2.

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74 TeminTABLE

SHARES OF TOTAL AND MANUFACTURING EXPORTS(percentage)

Sector 1794-1796 1814-1816 1834-1836 1854-1856Manufacturing/total 86 82 91 81Cotton/manufacturing 18 49 53 42Woolens/manufacturing 27 21 17 15Iron/manufacturing 11 2 2 7Other/manufacturing 44 28 28 36Source: Davis, IndustrialRevolution, pp. 95-101.

cottonmanufacturesntotalmanufacturess clear rom he nextrow.Ironmanufactures,or all theirimportancen the narratives f the IndustrialRevolution,wereneveramajorpartof Britishmanufacturingxports.The questionhere is what was happening utsideof these dominantindustries.Manufacturingxportsother hancotton,woolens,and ronareshown nthe astrowof Table . Theywerequite ubstantial,nd heyshowno evidenceof beingpushedasideby cottonexports-as woolenswere.I went to theParliamentaryaperso find dataon exportsof individualcommodities.Not every year contained rade informationn detail. Iconsequentlyad o choseyears orwhichI founddetaileddata,whichdidnot alwayscorrespondo the yearsDavis hadsurveyed.Thetrends hownin Table2 were very clearin my dataas well, and I do not thinkanyinformationwas lost in the changeof dates.I used data for three-yearperiodsaround1810, 1830,and1850,anda few otheryearsbetween hefirsttwo to investigate hanges n the earlystagesof industrializationnd

during heNapoleonicWars.Table3 showsexports f othermanufacturesor threeyearscentered n1850,close to the endof theperiodof the calculations hown n Table1.Thetable istsallmanufacturingxports ther han hose dentifiedn Table2. Theyaresortedbythemagnitudef exports.Thequantities xported reshown for information nly. Theywere used to checkmy dataagainstDavis's buttheyarenotrelevant o the testperformed ere.Theevidenceto be cited n Table3 is the list of different roducts.Linenwas amajor xport.Silkmanufactureslso weresteadily xported.Turningto metals, we find hardwareand cutlery, brass and coppermanufactures,nd inandpewtercontinuingobe exported.Other xportsinclude arthenware,aberdashery,pparel, oap,andhats.The interest fthis list is the absenceof an organizing rinciple.Therewereexportsofmanydifferent orts.Table shows hecorrelationetween heexports f individualoodsforcategories hatexisted nbothyearsforseveraldifferent ears.There s asuspicion hatthecomposition f otherexportschangedmorein the two

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TwoViewsof theIndustrialRevolution 75TABLE

EXPORTSOF OTHERMANUFACTURES,850-1852Value

Export (pounds terling)Linens 4,694,567Hardwaresndcutlery 2,556,441Brassandcoppermanufactures 1,830,793Haberdasheryndmillinery 1,463,191Silkmanufactures 1,193,537Earthenwaref allsorts 975,855Machineryndmillwork 970,077Tinandpewterwaresand in plates 904,275Apparel, lops,andNegroclothing 892,105Beerandale 513,044Armsandammunition 505,096Stationary/stationeryf all sorts 373,987Apothecary ares 354,962Leadandshot 339,773Glass/glass f all sorts 296,331Plate,platedware, ewelry,andwatches 286,738Soapandcandles 275,200Painters'olorsandmaterials 237,880Books,printed 234,190Cabinet ndupholstery ares 155,407Cordage 155,127Leatheraddlery ndharness 121,401Hatsof all other orts 106,933Musical nstruments 85,006Umbrellasndparasols 72,928Carriagesf all sorts 57,018Spirits 52,843Fishing ackles 41,607Hats,beaverandfelt 34,351Mathematicalndopticalnstruments 34,289Spelter,wrought, ndunwrought 22,097Breadandbiscuit 15,529Tobacco manufactured)ndsnuff 14,762Source:U.K.,Parliamentaryapers,1852(196),vol.28, pt. 1.decadesbefore1831thanafter.The evidencedoesnot confinnthisview.28Breakingup the earlierperiod-critical years in both the IndustrialRevolutionandtheconversiono a peacetime conomy-into subperiodsgives the resultsshownin the lowerpartof Table4. Withthe possibleexception f theinitialyearsof peace, here s no evidenceof muchchangein thestructuref otherexports.This is truedespite heinclusionof Irishexports n thetotalsafter1826.Beforeconcludinghatmuchof otherBritishndustrywasnot backward,we needto lookatBritishmports. or f ittumsoutthat hesesamearticleswerebeing mported,ndespecially f theywerebeing mportedn greaterquantitieshan heywereexported,he conclusionwouldnotfollow.

28The ata rom1811to 1813are n officialvalues,whereashe laterdataare nrealvalues.Thisdoesnot seem ohaveaffectedhecorrelation,ut t ishard oknow.There lsoare ewerobservationsinthedata rom1811to 1813 because ewer ndividual xportswere dentified.

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76 TeminTABLE 4

CORRELATIONS MONGOTHERMANUFACTURINGEXPORTSNumberofYears Observations Correlation

1811-1813 and1830-1832 18 0.951830-1832 and1850-1852 28 0.931811-8113 and 1816-1818 15 0.781816-1818 and 1821-1823 21 0.901821-1823 and1826-1828 21 0.971826-1828 and 1830-1832 28 0.98Source:U.K.,Parliamentaryapers,1812-13 (100), vol. 11, pt. 1; ibid., 1818(147), vol. 12, pt. 1.;ibid., 1823 (220), vol. 12, pt. 1; ibid.,1828(130), vol. 16,pt. 1; ibid., 1831-32 (310), vol. 26, pt. 1;ibid., 1852(196), vol. 28, pt. 1.

Table5 shows the compositionof Britishimports n the same yearsasTable3. Theeffect of stagnating roductivity utside he modemsectorandagriculturehouldhave been mostevidentby 1850.But therewas, as notedfor exports n Table4, littlevariation n thecompositionof British mportsoverthe firsthalf of thenineteenth entury.Itcanbe seen easilythat heimportsare not of the samegoods thatwerebeing exported, with a few exceptions. Silk was importedin greaterquantities han it was exported.This was not an activityin which Britainmaintained comparative dvantage.Linenwas importedn theyears 1811to 1813, but Irishlinenswereno longercountedas importsby 1830, andtherewere few other inenimports.Mostof the flax shownas importsmusthave gone to Ireland.There s no mysterywhyBritain mported ugar, ea,orindigo.They,andthe manyother ropicalproducts onsumed n Britain,wouldnot havebeenexportedunderanyreasonable etof pricesorchanges n productivity.Theimportant griculturalmports or the test performedhere are corn,hides,andwool (sheep's). They were imported romwesternEuropeandcouldhave been exportedfrom Britain.29 hese productsare the productsthatBritain shouldhave exportedbeforeothermanufacturesn the nineteenthcenturyaccording o the Crafts-Harleyiew.30None of the myriadotherBritishmanufacturingxportswere importedat all. Britainmaintained clearcomparative dvantagen a wide varietyofmanufacturingndustrieshroughouthefirsthalfof thenineteenthcentury.Theyheldtheirown in the face of the spectacular rowthof cotton-textileexports during hose years.Thereis no hintthatthese othercommoditieswere being pushedoff the list of exportsby the growthof cottonexports.Exceptfor theNapoleonicWarperiod,theykeptpacewith cottonexports.

29Davis, ndustrialRevolution,pp. 114-24.30Not,however,according o Harley'sCGEmodelsince othermanufactures o not trade n thatmodel.

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Two Viewsof theIndustrialRevolution 77TABLEVALUEOFIMPORTS, 850-1852

ValueImport (pounds terling)

Wool,cotton 23,670,472Sugar 10,762,045Corn,meal,andflour 9,167,600Tea 5,796,086Silk 5,163,865Coffee 3,480,594Flax,and ow or codillaof hempandflax 3,123,329Wool, sheep's 2,049,348Hides,rawortanned 1,999,233Cochineal, ranilla, nddust 1,909,848Oil 1,793,320Madder,madder oot,andgarancine 1,687,568Guano 1,476,940Tallow 1,333,889Indigo 1,191,495Woodand imber 1,153,477Dye andhardwoods 1,104,308Hemp,dressed rundressed 990,917Spelter 957,540Wines 927,721Spirits 902,351Seeds 719,017Woollenmanufactures 710,414Rice,cleanedorinthehusk 668,585Bacon 653,214Potatoes 562,595Currants 559,919Cottonmanufactures 548,065Cheese 537,322Copper, nwroughtndpartwrought 477,778Butter 466,357Brimstone 383,691Tobaccoandsnuff 367,685SkinsandFurs 367,269Saltpetrendcubicnitre 355,564Iron nbars,unwrought 336,706Gum 298,147Oil seed cakes 296,993Glass 270,110Lard 258,790Ashes,pearlandpot 238,077Bark 213,708Turpentine 213,561Pork, altedor fresh 210,692Quicksilver 201,669Tin 200,801Sago 178,329Raisins 170,443Lead,pigandsheet 169,024Borax 164,565Terraaponicaandcutch 150,035Hairorgoats'wool,manufacturesf 148,473Cocoa,cocoa-nut usksandshells,andchocolate 145,973Tar 142,819Bonesof animals ndfish(exceptwhalefins) 140,049Cinnamon 132,648Beef,saltedorfresh 122,855Embroideryndneedlework 114,999Copper re andregulus 113,166

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78 TeminTABLE5-continued

ValueImport (poundssterling)Cloves 106,630Animals, iving; viz. oxen, bulls, cows, and calves 103,463Watches 95,928Safflower 94,911Boots, shoesand calashes,and boot fronts 94,779Pepp.er 93,744Lace, thread,and cushionor pillow lace 82,816Leathergloves 81,441Shumac 80,320Orangesand lemons 74,845Yarn,worstedor silk andworsted 73,690Clocks 73,661Rhubarb 70,912Whalefins 69,277Valonia 66,799Hair,horse 63,159Fish,of British aking 60,405Nutmegs 60,144Almondsof all sorts 59,705Linens 57,562Pimento 57,222Liquorice uice andpaste 54,153Senna 53,452Cork 53,196Rags,&c. forpaper 49,140Wax,bees' 46,160Teeth,elephants' 44,661Bristles 44,048Cassia ignea 43,735Mace 41,082Ginger 40,639Animals, iving;viz. sheepandlambs 35,144Books,bound or unbound 33,865Hams 28,935Annatto 25,468Isinglass 24,685Figs 22,812Barillaand alkali 2,122Source:U.K., ParliamentaryPapers, 1852(196), vol. 28, pt. 1.

It is not surprising hatBritainsold a wide varietyof manufacturesotropicalcountries.Theircomparative dvantagen tropicalexportswas solarge hat hey specialized ompletely.There s littlesurprise,herefore, hatBritainexportedhats to Australia n exchangefor wool. It is important,however,thatBritaindidthe sameforwesternEurope.31The shaping of hats was still done by hand at midcentury,but thishandicraft adbeen surrounded y mechanizationwell beforethen.A hat-maker n Londonemployed1,500peoplein 1840. Thepreparationf thefurand wool to makethefelt for hatswasthoroughlymechanized,usingsteam-powered machinery.And the dyeing of the finished hat was done on

31Davis,ndustrialRevolution, p. 101, 125. Davis's category s Hats,haberdashery,arments, ndso forth, so it is not absolutelycertain hat hatswere exported o WestemEurope.I use it as myexample,althoughother temsof Davis's list couldbe citedas well.

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Two Viewsof theIndustrialRevolution 79machineryhatallowedover 100hatsto be dyedat once.Laborproductivityconsequentlywas high.32

There s anexception hatprovestherule.Table5 shows thatthereweresmallimportsof manufactured oolensandcotton.Buttheywereapproxi-matelyone-tenthheamountsof theexportsof thosecommodities howninTable2. Theyarehardly he exception.Furtherdown the list in Table5comewatchesandclocks.As Landesnoted nhisbookon that ndustry,heEnglishclockmakers ndwatchmakers erefallingbehind heircontinentalcompetitors in the nineteenthcentury.34 roductivitystagnatedin thisindustry,andit hadbecomean import ndustryby midcentury.35Theexportof mostothermanufactures,owever,was continuingmerrilyalong. The lesson of the constantrankorderof these exportsis thatthevariousindustrieswerekeepingpace with eachother.The shareof cottontextiles in total manufacturingxportspeakedin the 1830s as shown inTable2. Therewas a slightfall in theshare romtheperiod1814to 1816 tothe period1854 to 1856.Othermanufacturingxportsas a whole keptpacewith cotton exports during these 40 years, and exports of individualindustriesdid so as well.Although heempirical vidence n this testis the identityof exportsandimportsas shown in Tables3 and 5, the productivityadvancein Britishmanufacturing houldhave loweredtheirpricesrelativeto imnports.heydid.Albert mlahcorrectly ecognized his severedeterioration n thenetbartertermsof tradeas a signal of Britishsuccess, not distress.It is nosurprisethat the price of cottonmanufacturesell rapidlyin responsetoproductivitygrowth.But even the price of woolen manufactures,whichwere decliningas a shareof Britishexports Table2), fell almostas rapidlyas thepriceof exportsas a whole.36It follows, therefore, hatthetraditional old-hat iew of the IndustrialRevolutionis moreaccurate han the new, restricted mage.OtherBritishmanufactures ere notinefficientand stagnant, ratleast,theywerenot allso backward.Thespiritthatmotivatedcottonmanufactures xtendedalsoto activitiesas variedas hardware ndhaberdashery,rms,andapparel.It follows also that the calculations hownin the last columnof Table1

cannot be acceptedas authoritative.The low rateof productivitychangeshownfor otheractivities s too low. Theremust havebeenmoretechnicalprogressoutsidethe listedsectorsin Table1 to produce he resultsshownhere.32Dodd,Days.33Davis,ndustrialRevolution,p. 101.34Landes, evolution.35Dataor earlier ears han n Table5 show thatclocksandwatcheswerenotimported arlier n the

nineteenth entury.36lmlah, conomicElements,pp. 93-102, 211-12.

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80 TeminCONCLUSIONS

Thistestconfirms he traditionaliew that he Industrial evolution awchanges in more than a few industries.Technicalchange was hardlyuniforim-a pointconcededby everyhistorian-but it was widespread.Britain ecame heworkshop f theworld,not ustthe cotton actoryof theworld.Scattereddescriptionssuggest the existence of a patternin othermanufactures.36 ith few exceptions,therewere no factories ike thefamous otton actories.nsteadherewereneworganizationsf workalongthe lines identifiedby CharlesSabel and JonathanZeitlin.37 Flexiblespecialization asbeen hought f as a descriptionf Frenchndustrializa-tion.38 erhapst alsodescribes significant artof theIndustrialevolutionin Britain.Moreresearchwill beneeded o confirmor refute uggestionsike this.The testperformed ere shows that ncreasesn Britishproductivitywerenot confined o cottonand ron n thefirsthalfof thenineteenthentury. heold-hat iew of the Industrial evolution annotbebanished y calling tnames. t livesamongus,and t deservesmoreattentiono fill in its all tooevidentgaps.

36Forxample,Berg,Age.37Sabel ndZeitlin, Historical lternatives.38PiorendSabel,Second ndustrialDivide.

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