Technological Nationalism

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Prepared by: Jecelle Paul C. Cruz


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Technological Affected by or resulting from scientificand industrial progress.

Nationalism Devotion to the interests or culture of aparticular nation; the belief that nations will benefitfrom acting independently rather than collectively,

emphasizing national rather than international goals;aspiration for national independence in a countryunder foreign domination.


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Technological nationalism is a critical concept thatscrutinizes how nationalist rhetoric is used to justifytechnological choices taken by state elites.

Technological nationalism is a form of ideology thatfunctions at three levels: integration, legitimation, anddistortion.


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First, it has integrative effect through the use of nationalsymbols and identity.

Second, it provide a legitimation for state elites to pursuetheir interests.

Third, as it serves only the interests of state elites, itcould lead to distorted technological decisions thatoverlook immediate needs of the public.


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The ideology of technological nationalism:

1. Technological nationalism functions as a medium ofintegration that unites socially and culturally diverse peoplein a nationalist sentiment through the sublime oftechnological systems and artifacts. Technologicalnationalism dissolves both horizontal and verticalboundaries between people in which all national elementsare homogenously fluid. In this light, technology is seen notmerely as a physical object but is constituted by collectivesymbolism through which social and cultural materials such

as language, histories, myths, and utopias are blendedtogether. Within such a repertoire, technology becomes amedium of an imagined community.


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2. Technological nationalism mediates political andcultural interpretations of nationalist spirits, itlegitimates all technological endeavors and

actions pursued under the label of collective andnational interests. Technological nationalismforges a social trust for nationalist actions intechnological development. This legitimizes

technological elites who bring in the idea oftechnological development using nationalistrhetoric.


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3. Technological nationalism is a rhetorical strategy togain political power through discursive registers inwhich technological projects are associated with the

people. As a rhetorical strategy, technologicalnationalism encourages people to fully trusttechnological elites, thus giving elites exert tremendouspower to pursue their interests. Technological

nationalism evokes a feeling of pride, yet at the sametime hinders people from being critical to the choicesand actions of technological elites.


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It is through these multiple effects thattechnological nationalism performs itsdistortion function. Using an

anthropological tool, I present historicalnarratives of Indonesian aviation andexamine within those narratives the

intertwined presence of the threeideological characteristics of technologicalnationalism outlined above.


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Indonesian Aviation:

The embryo of Indonesian aviation has grown

since the early days of independence in 1945. Itbegan when three young men in a junior aeroclubNurtanio Pringgoadisurjo, WiwekoSoepono, and R.J. Salatun decided to join the

newly formed Indonesian Air Force inYogyakarta. These young men were concernedthat the condition of the Air Force fleet was toodependent on imported parts.


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In 1946, in an early effort to create locally madeaircraft, Nurtanio and Wiweko constructed aglider called NWG-01 entirely out of local

materials. The glider flew successfully andcaught the attention of their superior whoauthorized a small order for the glider to be usedfor training purposes. Two years later, Wiweko

created a modest airplane made out of metal andwood and using a Harley Davidson engine.Named RI-X, this was the first motor-poweredplane produced by an Indonesian.


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The next step toward creating more advanced aircraft wasimplemented after Nurtanio returned from his study atFEATI Institute of Technology in the Philippines inSeptember 1950. He was assigned to the Air Forces

Flight Maintenance Depot in Bandung. In 1957, this smallworkshop became the Aircraft Research, Experiment,and Construction Depot (DPPP). Assisted by a fewtechnicians at DPPP, Nurtanio developed a series of

single-seat aircraftKumbang (Beetle), Belalang(locust), and Kunang (firefly).


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Nurtanio tested all the planes he designed.Nurtanios success attracted the attentionof Sukarno, Indonesias first president. In

1960, the Sukarno government formed thePreparatory Agency for Aviation Industry(LAPIP), which was meant to be the start

of an aircraft producer.


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Under the supervision of the Air Force, LAPIPoperated as an expanded version of Nurtaniosresearch depot. In 1961, with a loan of US$ 2.5

million from the Polish government, LAPIP built amanufacturing facility at nearby Husein

Sastranegara Airport in Bandung. With a licensefrom Polish Cekop, it started producing a

modified version of PZL-104 Wilga namedGelatik (rice bird) used for agricultural purposes,light transport, and by the aero club.


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Nurtanios career at LAPIP was unfortunately

short-lived; he died in 1966 in an accident whileflying one of his modified airplanes. His tragic

death caused deep grief throughout theIndonesian Air Force. In honor of his legacy, theAir Force renamed LAPIP to LIPNUR afterNurtanio.


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During the harsh times of the early 1970s, LIPNUR struggledto survive. It could only afford to produce a small number ofGelatiks, mostly for Air Force use. This diminished vitalitylingered through the mid-1970s until the arrival ofBaharuddin Jusuf Habibie, which marked a watershed in

the history of the Indonesian aviation industry. UnlikeNurtanio, who built his career in the military, Habibie is acivilian industrialist. He received a doctoral degree inaeronautical engineering from Technische HochschuleAachen in Germany in 1965, and he worked for over 10

years for Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) where hereached the position of vice president and director fortechnology application. In 1974, Habibie returned toIndonesia after President Suharto asked him to join his

cabinet.


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At that time, the New Order regime began bringingin economic development and industrializationnever seen in the Sukarno regime. With oil prices

skyrocketing, the Suharto government couldafford to finance capital-intensive projects. GivenHabibies prior relationship with Suharto, whenhe joined the New Order government, he

became Suhartos most trusted lieutenant. Notsurprisingly, Habibie was granted enormousprivileges by the regime leader.


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In 1978, Habibie was named State Minister forResearch and Technology, a position he held for20 years. Although Habibie was given the task of

handling technology development in general, hisagendas focused primarily on developing theaircraft industry. Assisted by a group ofIndonesian engineers he had trained at MBB,

Habibie soon developed a plan to establish amodern aircraft industry.


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Despite criticism from many economists, thisinitiative gained full support from Suharto whowas very enthusiastic about high technology. He

once said, We have to make a long-term plan toanticipate the future, which will determined byour own mastery of modern science and hightechnology. This statement illustrates Suhartos

conviction that high technology was a strategictool for the country, a belief that was imposedupon the national development agenda.


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With economic and political support from Suharto,Habibie and his team began to implement theplan. Initially, they decided to build an aircraft

industry in Pondok Cabe on the outskirts ofJakarta. This plan changed when the Air Forceofficials approached Suharto offering LIPNUR inBandung for Habibies plan with the condition

that he would retain Nurtanios name. Habibieand the Air Force then made a deal.


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On April 5, 1976, Suharto launched decree no. 12, whichmerged all the available assets of the state-owned oilcompany Pertamina, with LIPNUR, into a newcompany named Industri Pesawat Terbang Nurtanio

(IPTN) and headed by Habibie as president director.

On August 23, 1976, IPTN officially started operating,marking a new era for modern aviation industry in

Indonesia. At that time, IPTN consisted of two smallhangars (11,000 m2) located on a 45,000 m2 site with860 employees.


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Ten years after IPTN began its operations, Habibieunilaterally decided to change the corporatename from Nurtanio to Nusantara, thus

breaking the deal he had made with the AirForce. This action outraged the Air Forcecommunity. Yet with Suhartos approval, Habibiewas certain that the new name was necessary to

create a better image of IPTN as a nationalcorporation. The new name was also an attemptby Habibie to break IPTN away from its historicalpast.


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Habibie argued that what he had done with IPTN was not acontinuation of Nurtanios legacy but a new page inIndonesias aviation history.

What distinguishes Habibie from Nurtanio? In terms of

nationalist vision, Habibie and Nurtanio both shared adesire to make Indonesia independent of foreigntechnology. However, Nurtanios technical practicetended to emulate bricolage, a process of constructingdifferent versions of technology. Unlike Nurtanio,Habibies technical practice went beyond constructingtechnology and situated IPTN in the larger context ofnational development involving capital, power, andnationalist ideology.


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For Habibie, IPTN was not merely a manufacturingindustry but a machine of social change thatcould transform Indonesian society from an

agricultural to an industrial culture. Based on hisown experiences during the post-war Germaneconomic miracle, Habibie saw that socialevolution is a process that could be deliberately

accelerated.


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In this light, Habibie prescribed a shortcuttrajectory to accelerate the processes of socialevolution through a scheme of technology

transfer encapsulated in Habibies famousphrase berawal dari akhir, berakhir di awal(starting from the end, ending at the start). Itrefers to the process of mastering Western

technology via four steps: importing technologymodifying existing technology, designing newproducts, and conducting basic research.


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Mastering Western technology

IPTN operations began with agreements with MBB

and Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. (CASA)of Spain. These two European companiesprovided technological assistance to IPTN duringits infancy.


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As a startup, IPTN produced under licenseMBBs BO-105 helicopters and CASAs 12-passenger C-212 Aviocar. It took 3 years

for IPTN technicians to learn how toconstruct an aircraft down to its smallestparts. This process required both technical

and administrative skills, for every part hadto be drawn and documented.


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During the first decade, IPTN grew rapidly in terms ofemployee numbers and projects. Several joint ventureswith Western corporations were signed. For example,IPTN and French Aerospatiale agreed to produce the

PUMA SA 330; IPTN and Bell Helicopter Textronmanufactured 100 Bell-412 helicopters.

In 1986, IPTN succeed in getting an order from General

Dynamics to manufacture F-16 components.


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In 1979, IPTN and CASA agreed to jointly developa new propeller aircraft called CN235. This 35-seat aircraft was designed for medium-range

distance based on the US FAR Part 25. It costUS$ 20 million, a cost shared equally by IPTNand CASA through ownership of AircraftTechnologies Corporation (AIRTEC) based in

Madrid.


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During the project, IPTN engineers flew back andforth to Spain to learn from and work togetherwith their counterparts at CASA. The CN235 was

designed to suit two different purposes. ForIndonesian purposes, IPTN wanted to use it inmilitary operations in remote areas. It wasintended to replace the C130 Hercules, which

was used extensively by the Indonesian military.


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For its part, CASA needed an aircraft that couldtransport a F-16 engine in order to fulfill itsbusiness strategy of maintaining American

aircraft in Europe. For more than a year,engineers from the two companies and bothnations engaged in a design process filled withtension and negotiation.


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The result of this collaboration was a wide-body airplaneequipped with a ramp door that would facilitate allpurpose transport. Its basic configuration was 35passenger seats, extendable to 44. The construction

sections were equally divided into two groups, oneproduced by CASA, the other by IPTN.

CASA was responsible for the center and forwardfuselage, wing center section and inboard flaps, and

engine nacelles; IPTN built the outer wings and flaps,ailerons, rear fuselage, and tail unit.


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After 4 years, the CN235 project resulted in fourprototypes, two for each company. CASAs InfantaElena and IPTNs Tetuko were used for flight tests,the other two for static testing.

On December 29, 1983, Tetuko made its maiden flightin Bandung a month after Infanta Elena did inMadrid.

After completing more than 500 flight hours, on June21, 1986, CN235 was granted an airworthinesscertificate by the Joint Certification Board ofIndonesia and Spain.


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On December 3, 1986, the US FAA certified CN235, butonly Spains CASA prototype because all of CN235sflight hours witnessed by the FAA used Infanta Elena.This unexpected result was especially disappointing to

IPTN because the Indonesian civil aviation authorityhad no bilateral agreement with FAA. Consequently,IPTN had to go elsewhere to get certification for theIndonesian-made CN235 s. Eventually IPTN obtained

an airworthiness certificate from the British aviationauthority, making Indonesias CN235 s marketable incertain countries.


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Technological independence

The CN235 project taught IPTN valuable lessons, not onlytechnical but political. The certification mishap was just

one among several. Although IPTN and CASA madeequal contributions to the project, IPTN eventuallybenefited less than its Spanish partner. Despite a market-sharing agreement between the two, many customers

preferred to purchase CN235 from CASA because of thebackward image of developing countries associated withIPTN.


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Thus, a year after the completion of CN235project, IPTN embarked on another project. Thistime it proceeded alone, with no foreigncounterparta risky endeavor given that IPTNwas a relative rookie in the business.

The risk of failure aside, however, Habibie believed

the time had come for IPTN to develop its owntechnology independently, and he felt certainIPTN engineers were capable of carrying outsuch a mission.


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In addition, he wanted IPTN to build a commercialaircraft that would be competitive in the civilian airlineindustry, as building solely for the military market didnot produce enough profit.

In 1987, a small team of IPTN engineers conducted asurvey of the emerging market in regional flights with arange of 800 miles. The team learned that many of theFokker 27 airplanes used by Indonesian airlines were

about to be phased out. A moderate estimatesuggested 400 mid-range airplanes, with possibly ahigher number in foreign markets.


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In the early stage, the new project sought todesign a 30-seat aircraft, hence the titleN230. Later, the project was renamed

N25011 after further study revealed thatthe market wanted a 50- seat aircraft. Atthe 1989 Paris Air Show, Habibie publicly

announced the N250 project to theinternational aviation community.


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The N250 is a propeller aircraft that cruises at speedsup to 330 knots, the fastest propeller airplane in thesubsonic class. It relies on a fly-by-wire flight controlsystem that provides fully powered, electrically

controlled hydraulic service for both primary andsecondary control surfaces of an airplane. TheN250s flyby- wire covers three axesdirectional,lateral, and longitudinala great innovation

considering similar systems covered only one or twoaxes.


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IPTN engineers later extended the N250sstructure to accommodate 70 seats withoutadditional engine power, making it more

attractive in the market. Habibie wasconfident that the N250 would becompetitive in the world market.


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To penetrate the North American market, IPTN openeda branch office in Seattle. It also planned to build amanufacturing plant in Mobile, Alabama. Thesuperiority of the N250s technical features became

a source of pride for the whole country. Claimed tobe entirely created by Indonesian engineers, theN250 marked what Habibie called the stage oftechnological independence which helped to prove

that IPTN had the capability to master sophisticatedtechnologies and move forward in the developmentof new ones.


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The N250 was the symbol of technologicalnationalism that Habibie and his engineers atIPTN had relentlessly advocated. Consideringhow the N250 was represented by the NewOrder elites, it is intriguing to examine how sucha product of technical rationality was transformedto represent the grandeur ofIndonesias national

identity.


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The two main attributes of the N250 that embody the traitsof technological nationalism:

1. The airplanes name.

The first prototype of the N250 was nicknamed byPresident Suharto after Gatotkaca, a heroic flyingcharacter in HinduJavanese mythology. In the Javanese

tradition, the story of Gatotkaca and other stories inMahabrata are performed as wayang (shadow puppets)in an all-night performance led by a dalang (storyteller)and accompanied by gamelan music.


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Like most Javanese, Suharto enjoyed watching wayang,both as entertainment but also as a source ofphilosophy and virtue in his life. In fact, many ofSuhartos political decisions were inspired by wayang

stories. It was Suhartos great love of wayang thatmotivated him to name CN235 after Tetuko12 and tofollow later with a series of the flying heros names forthe four N250 prototypes: Gatotkaca, Koconegoro,

Krincingwesi, and Putut Guritno. IPTN itself was oftenmetaphorically called Candradimuka Crater, a placewhere, in the story, Gatotkaca obtained his power.


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Naming the aircraft after the flying hero was not a

matter of personal taste. It was driven by a set ofperceived values and virtues defined in the myth. Inthis light, the mythology serves to bestow symbolicmeanings on the technology itself. Seen from such

an anthropological perspective, Gatotkacas name isnot just an attempt to resurrect the flying hero; it alsocombines two separate worlds, similar to the wayPartha Chatarjee describes the nature of post-

colonial culture. One world is material, the other oneis spiritual.


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The former is characterized by rationality, physics, andWestern cultural facts from which modernity wasderived. But the embrace of modernity, asexemplified by the development of aircraft industry in

Indonesia, does not necessarily mean that Indonesiais, or wants to be, fully Western. The technologyabsorbed from the West must be wrapped in aspiritual force that will strengthen it as an indigenous

creation.


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This is the underlying purpose of the Gatotkacasymbolism: bringing virtues, values, and essenceto balance the dominance of technologicalmateriality. By attaching the mythology of theflying hero to the N250, the aircraft is no longerspiritless. Rather, the N250 has a soul thatreflects a state of perfection while combining

Western and Eastern cultures.


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2. Rollout ceremony

Another form of nationalist symbolism attached to the N250 isthe rollout ceremony, which was held on November 10,1994. The N250 roll out was not ordinary, as it wasconducted in a traditional ceremony comprised of sequentialprocesses in an atmosphere that elicited feelings of pridefrom the audience. The sacred ceremony began when thetwin doors of the hangar that housed the N20 were slowlyopened, allowing blue and yellow smoke to drift out frominside. After the smoke completely dispersed, the front of

the N250 appeared. Two lines of 16 men walked out of thehangar together, holding a rope tied to the airplane,seeming to pull Gatotkaca by hand. All the while, a choirwas chanting Syukur, a national prayer of thanksgiving.


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The plane stopped in front of a two-meter high platform

where President Suharto waited, accompanied byHabibie and Vice President Try Sutrisno. The New Orderleader poured flower-scented water over the N250s nosefrom a jasmine-decorated earthenware pitcher. When the

pitcher was empty, he released his grip, letting it fall andbreak into pieces on the ground. In the Javanesetradition, this act signifies a relationship between Suhartoand the N250, symbolizing a father blessing his baby andpraying that the baby will be safe, healthy, prosperous,courageous, and long-lived. This ceremonial processionattached a cultural meaning signifying that the N250project of technological nationalism was achieved via ablend of mythology and modernity imposed on the

artifact.


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Another important feature of the N250 rollout ceremony isthat it was deliberately scheduled for Patriots Day. Thewhole ceremony of the N250 roll out was intended toevoke patriotic feelings among those witnessing the

event. It was symbolically linked to the historic day ofNovember 10, 1945 in Surabaya, when thousands ofpeople died fighting the Dutch who were attempting toreoccupy the archipelago in the aftermath of World WarII. This memory was reinforced by Habibies speech,which emphasized the N250 as an endeavor that wouldsustain the patriotism of generasi (the generation of the1945 revolution) through generasi penerus (succeedinggeneration).


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As part of the succeeding generation, Habibie said thatwhile the old generations mission was to claim freedomfrom the colonial power at the cost of blood and lives, itwas the task of the succeeding generation to fill that

freedom with prosperity through technologicaldevelopment. In this context, IPTN engineers weretreated as patriots who deserved a salute for theirstruggle in achieving technological independence byproducing an advanced technological artifact fully on theirown. The intertwining of symbolism and ceremonyattached to the N250 roll out serves the rhetoricalpurposes of constructing identity and mobilizing popularsupport.


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Three elements of nationalist rhetoric delivered through theN250:

A first element is the use of HinduJavanese symbolism.

Putting HinduJavanese symbolism on the technologicalartifacts of IPTN is a form of revivalism that reflects a firmconviction in the virtues of ancient Javanese civilizationsin which contemporary Indonesian culture is rooted. This

implies that Indonesia found its technological superioritythat had been lost for hundreds of years.


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In an interview with Republika Daily, Habibie said:Indonesian sons and daughters are best qualityseeds. But they did not have opportunities toblossom and grow. Why? Because for 350 years

they had been hindered from growing by amanipulative force [of colonialism]. During those 350years, we were shaken and humiliated [bycolonialists power] so appallingly that it took away

our confidence that we are equal to other nations.


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This statement clearly shows how Habibieimaginatively linked this technological project withthe long history of colonialism in Indonesia. Heaccused the colonialists of having destroyed all the

opportunities Indonesian people had to become agreat nation.

He further blamed colonialism as the cause of theinferiority overwhelming the Indonesian people

today. Finally, he argued that the Indonesian peopleare, in many ways, equal to Western nations.


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Such an assertion creates an entry point for a thirdrhetorical element whereby high technologyindustry was proposed as a prescription forregaining national glory. This is where lies thesignificant cultural meaning of IPTN.


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As Habibie relentlessly advocated, IPTN was a vehicle forthe bright future of the nation; it was a bridge to reachmodernity and grasp a measure of prosperity that wouldin time strengthen Indonesia to become a fully sovereign,

respected nation in the world. This rhetoric producespowerful effects. The rhetoric of technological nationalismhas great power to persuade its audience to joincollective actions. Emphasizing the symbolic andceremonial attributes of the N250, the rhetoric oftechnological nationalism was an effective means ofgenerating peoples enthusiastic support for the NewOrders technological nationalist projects.


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Enabled by the psycho-political effect oftechnological sublime, Habibie and his devoteesemployed that rhetoric in efforts to securepopular consent. Such popular consent wasreinforced by the events of August 10, 1995,when the N250 Gatotkaca successfullycompleted its maiden flight.


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Despite apprehension stirred by a report inAsiaweek magazine, which predicted Gatotkacawould fall, thus ruining the New Ordersreputation, Gatotkaca took off and flewperfectlya great relief to everybody, butespecially to Habibie and his engineering team.


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As Habibie intended, the N250s first flight was amemorable present for the fiftieth anniversary ofIndonesian independence. The euphoria of theN250s successful flight test gave a tremendous

boost to Habibies reputation. It vindicated his high-technology project, rescuing it from skepticism andcynicism. As many press headlines confirmed, theeuphoria also created great joy and pride in the

Indonesian people.


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Accepting a proposal from the Indonesian EngineersAssociation (PII) and United Islam (Persis), the NewOrder government then designated August 10 asNational Technology Awakening Day. This gave the

N250 extraordinary significance in modernIndonesian history. In the name of the special day,the word awakening suggests that the time hascome for Indonesia to wake up from its long sleep

and regain its lost grandeur.


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In this light, the N250 is viewed as thecommencement of the resurrection of thenations past supremacy. It bears a distinctivemeaning for the nations dignity and self-determination. As Habibie put it, the N250successful flight enables us to walk tall and equalto any nation.


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Depriving the forest

The N250 was clearly a colossal project. The humanresources devoted to it grew from a team of 30 to more

than 1500 engineers. IPTN sent its brightest employeesabroad to study aircraft-related subjects at universities inEurope and North America. When they returned, theywere expected to bring home with them new knowledge

of advanced technology encompassing structuralengineering, material science, avionics, control systems,and more.


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Additionally, IPTN developed new researchfacilities including a wind tunnel, flight testsimulator, bird impact laboratories, and othersindispensable to the success of the project.Compared to the CN235, the N250 program hada much larger budget. An initial budget proposalreached US$ 600 million, which Habibie revealed

to the public.


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But as the airplane gradually developed, newrequirements kept coming, and spending alsorose. Later costs for the N250 programscompelled IPTN to revise its budget to $1.2billion, which included certification, trainingprograms, and manufacturing facilities.

Although this money was technically justifiable for

a project with the scale of the N250, some of thefunding overrun was also caused by inefficiency.


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As the N250 first prototype neared completion, IPTNdesperately needed cash to finish construction.Habibie had planned to demonstrate the N250 tothe public as a present for Indonesias fiftieth

anniversary in August 1995. Troubled by slowbureaucratic processes in the Finance Department,Habibie went straight to Suharto, requesting quickcash for the project.


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On June 2, 1994, Suharto allowed IPTN to take an interest-free loan of 400 billion rupiahs (then approximately US$200 million) from the Dana Reboisasi (reforestation fund)in the Forestry Department to support completion of

Gatotkaca. In return, a 5% royalty from sales of the N250would go to the Forestry Department. The reforestationfund was created in 1990. Collected from every forestconcessionaire, this fund was meant to finance programsthat would preserve and rehabilitate the Indonesian

forest.


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In 1992, the fund had reached 2.4 trillion rupiahsdeposited in Bank Indonesia certificates. In 1992,the interest alone from this deposit amounted to825 billion rupiahs from which money forGatotkaca was taken.


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One month after the presidential decree, thescandalous use of the reforestation fund by IPTNwas revealed to the public, and it attracted enormouscynicism and commentary from the mass media.

Soon a group of environmental NGOs joinedtogether to file a lawsuit against President Suharto atthe State Administrative Court (PTUN) in Jakarta.But PTUN eventually dismissed the charge on the

grounds that it had no adequate authority to examinethe Presidents policies.


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According to the PTUN, the President isaccountable only to the Peoples Consultative

Assembly (MPR). The case was closed. A yearlater, the loan from the reforestation fund wasconverted into government shares in IPTN,eventually releasing IPTN from any obligation toreturn the money.


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One can speculate as to why Suharto decided togive the N250 project precedence overenvironmental concerns. Was the N250sufficiently significant to override reforestationendeavors? This is indeed a puzzling question,one that can only be answered by noticing thefactors of power from which many of Suhartos

arbitrary decisions were drawn.


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One important factor concerns the connectionbetween the N250 prototype and the historicalevents of Indonesias fiftieth anniversary. Asnoted previously, the reforestation funds wereused because Suharto and Habibie were eagerto give a grand birthday present to the nation. Atfirst glance, the two leaders wanted to celebrate

the nations golden year.


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However, they also sought to achieve a reverseimpression: that it was the fiftieth anniversary thatgave special meaning to the N250. By presenting theN250 as part of the fiftieth year celebration of

Indonesian independence, Suharto and Habibieimposed nationalistic meaning upon the wholeprocess of the N250s creation. The hidden goal ofthis machination was to legitimize the N250 project,

for it was deemed as a symbol of sovereigntymarking the nations technological independence.


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The N250 project was the stage at which IPTNproved its ability to produce designs of its own.From this perspective, then, the damage done tothe forests by the reckless decision to use thereforestation fund was driven by a passion tocreate an allegedly indigenous artifact that wouldfunction as a medium for nationalistic

imagination.


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Concluding RemarksThis report examines the workings of nationalist

rhetoric manifested through the realm of a nationalartifact. The analysis presented focuses on theconcept of technological nationalism as vividlydescribed in the case of IPTN and its epic project.

As shown throughout this report, technologicalnationalism works as a form of ideology to create ashared feeling of national identity and pridethrough technological artifacts.


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What distinguishes IPTN as a technologicalnationalist project of a Third World country fromsimilar projects in developed countries lies in theimagination of post-colonial modernity. From thisperspective, IPTN not only represents the historyof technology in Third World countries, but alsothe cultural history of a postcolonial nation

seeking to break way from its colonial past.


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Looking at the level through which the ideology oftechnological nationalism is materialized, Idiscussed the N250 project as an amalgamationof technical rationality, the rhetoric ofnationalism, and the cultural meaning ofmodernity. This revealed the underlying logic thatconnects the material and symbolic realms

vividly blended in the creation and representationof the N250.


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Equally important in this account is the attachmentof national identity to IPTN products, whichconfirms technological development as a culturalpractice. This is demonstrated in the use of

traditional nomenclature and ceremonialpractices in the N20 project meant to reflect thepast glory of Indonesia.


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The use of nationalist rhetoric in technology is notwithout consequences. As a rhetorical strategy,technological nationalism has far-reachingimplications. The tension between the N250 and

the denigration of environmental preservationindicates how technological nationalism canproduce a paradox.


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On the one hand, there is a spirit of liberation thatdrives the desire to be technologicallyindependent. Here, technological independencebears great economic, political, and cultural

significance. It refers to self-sufficiency, self-determination, and self-identity.


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On the other hand, technological nationalismcreates a dilemma, for it governs decisionmaking from the basis of ideological interests.The effect of this approach, is to affirm a

distorted rationality that guides those acting onthe rhetoric of technological nationalism tonarrowly define the meaning of liberation.


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In the case of the N250 project, liberation wassignified by the prestige and glamour of atechnological artifact while disregarding crucialethical considerations and at the same time

distorting any reasonable hierarchy of humanneeds. From this distorted view, an airplaneseems to have become more important than

environmental protection and the well-being ofthe Indonesian people.


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. Technology is like a big magic. It offers anexcitement of progress that seems to beinevitable for modern society. Yet, a blindembrace of high technology generates illusions

that have the potential to divert peoplesconsciousness from ethical concerns in theirdecisions and actions.


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References:

www.stswiki.org/index.php?title=Technological_Nationalism

The American Heritage Dictionary

Nationalist rhetoric and technological development:The Indonesian aircraft industry in the New Order

regime by Sulfikar Amir


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Technological Nationalism

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