Taylor System and Quality Control JMJuran 94

Selected Papers nº 15, 1973 1 Copyrights 1994 TPOK/Juran Institute

The Taylor System and Quality Control

Dr. Joseph M. Juran

The Taylor System and Quality Control Early in the 20th century, an American engineer, Frederick W. Taylor, proposed a revolutionary approach to management, based on his experience as a manager and as a consultant. Taylor's proposals may be summarized as follows: the methods for doing work should be based on scientific study, not on the empirical judgment of foremen or workmen, the standards of what constitutes a day's work should likewise be based on scientific study, selection and training of workmen should also be based on scientific study, piece work payment should be employed to motivate the selected and trained workmen to use the engineered methods and to meet the standards of a day's work. To make these proposals effective, Taylor separated work planning from execution. Next, he created industrial engineers and other specialists to prepare work methods and standards of a day's work. He then limited the foremen and workmen to "control," i.e., to execute the plans and meet the standards. The system "worked" – it achieved spectacular improvements in productivity. Under Taylor's competent advocacy, the system was widely adopted by American industry, took firm root and remains as the principal base on which our managerial structures have been erected. Now, more than half a century later, we are able to identify with clarity the then existing premises behind the Taylor system: the foremen and workmen of that day lacked the technological literacy needed to plan work methods, to establish standards of a day's work, etc. The standard of living was so low that piece work incentives could provide a powerful stimulus to employees to meet standards the economic power of the employers was sufficient to prevail over employee resistance to such a system of management. These premises were quite valid in Taylor's day, but they have since become increasingly obsolete. Today's foremen and workmen are well educated, including education in technology. Rising standards of living have sharply diminished the influence of piece work as an incentive to productivity. The rise of labor unions has required that many decisions affecting productivity be based on collective bargaining rather than on unilateral planning. Despite this obsolescence of Taylor's premises, we retain the Taylor system, with all the detriments inherent in use of a system which is based on obsolete premises. The most obvious and serious of these detriments is the underemployment of the intelligence and creative capacity of millions of human beings. All of the foregoing has profoundly influenced our management of the quality function. The Taylor system provided a strong impulse to the movement to separate inspection from production, i.e., to use full-time inspectors for product inspection and process control rather than to rely on the workmen. The proliferation of Taylor's piece work systems was a strong influence in the decisions to create independent inspection departments to take over the command of inspectors (who had previously been under the command of production foremen). The evolution of quality specialists (quality control engineers, reliability engineers) was again an extension of the concept of separation of planning from execution.


At the time these and other steps were taken, there was a logic to support them. Now we suddenly find the system to be suspect. It is under attack from within as evidenced by a growing resistance of employees, especially young employees, to spend years of their lives doing work which poses little challenge, which makes little use of their education or their creativity. The system is also under attack from the outside, as we discover that there are entire industries in which we are outperformed by countries which operate under different systems. It seems clear that we need a counterrevolution, and I believe that this has already begun. Because of the massive forces involved, today's quality managers and specialists will very likely spend a lifetime dealing with this counter-revolution as it affects the quality function. In the remainder of this article, I will identify some of the major steps being taken to dismantle the outdated aspects of the Taylor system. In future issues I will discuss these steps individually and in some detail. 1. We are returning some of the work of job planning to the operators, inspectors and still other

nonsupervisors at the bottom of the company hierarchy. This is a direct reversal of the Taylor concept.

2. We are continuing to abolish Taylor's piece work incentive. Piece work was indeed effective in

those days of low standards of living. Since then, our growing affluence has demonstrated that piece work does not remain viable once human physiological needs have been met. However, while we have largely abandoned use of piece work, we have yet to agree on a universal form of industrial motivation applicable to an affluent society. We are clear on what we want to abandon but not on what we want to adopt.

3. We are engaged in some useful experimentation on new forms of participation and motivation,

not merely for meeting standards, but for quality improvement as well. 4. We are in the early stages of returning product inspection to the production force. This is not to

be confused with a transfer of the inspection department to production. In the latter transfer, the same people continue to do the same work they have been doing, but under a different chain of command. What is happening is rather an abolition of full-time inspectors, with the work of inspection being taken up by production operators.

5. We are beginning to look to the assignments of our quality staff specialists so that they will

turn to unsolved problems while delegating solved problems to the line organizations. 6. We are looking for new ways of organizing the broad quality function to be responsive to

modern needs, while at the same time getting rid of outworn and outdated organization machinery.

In discussing these steps it is well to refer back periodically to the nature of the Taylor system and to the premises on which it was based. To a degree far greater than is generally realized, our managerial approach is rooted in the Taylor system. The fact that we must now dismantle the system will be no discredit to Taylor. He was an uncommonly incisive thinker, a forceful doer and a persuasive advocate. His advocacy of a technocratic industrial society was in any case doomed in a political democracy, but for the most part, his system was a logical response to the forces prevailing in his time. Our present dilemma is mainly the result of Taylor's followers (ourselves) having retained the system despite the obsolescence of its premises. I doubt that so objective a man as Taylor would have retained the system as long as have his followers. The Redelegation of Quality Planning "Science, not rule of thumb." Such was the motto under which Frederick W. Taylor established his


system of "scientific man agreement." The methods of doing work should be planned scientifically. However the foremen and workmen of that day lacked the technological literacy needed to plan scientifically. Hence Taylor took the job of planning away from these men and turned it over to engineers. In the decades which have followed, the technological education of the foremen and workmen has been greatly expanded, and now constitutes an enormous potential as set for the industrial companies. However this asset is seriously under employed in many companies. This underemployment deprives the companies of a huge source of knowledge and creativity. At the same time it breeds discontent among many employees who have a good education but are denied the opportunity of using it on the daily job. One way of utilizing this education on the job is to assign some of the planning to be done by the workmen and foremen. This is common practice in the recognized "trades'' for which the workman undergoes a qualifying apprenticeship. It is also common practice in the "autonomous" departments which prepare finished products from basic materials and purchased components. The job shop and the tool room are examples of such autonomous departments. The Taylor system never invaded such autonomous departments to the degree that prevailed in other forms of manufacture such as: a the multidepartmental "assembly tree" in which numerous departments make components

which then converge into assembly departments, and b the multidepartment "procession" in which the product progresses serially through numerous

departments, each of which adds further processing. It is obvious that the "anatomy of the process" strongly influences the approach to planning. The assembly tree and the procession, being extensively interdepartmental in character, demand a coordinated interdepartmental form of planning which, in practice, must be performed by the managers and the staff specialists. However, it is not at all mandatory that planning for the individual departments likewise be done by these same interdepartmental coordinators. Instead for these individual departments there arise the alternatives of delegating the departmental planning to: (1) departmental planners (2) departmental supervisors (3) departmental nonsupervisors Before planning can be done by departmental supervisors or nonsupervisors, there must take place: 1. A willingness by the managers to make the delegation. This step is resisted on all sides, and

for a variety of reasons. It is resisted by:

• the established planners, who regard such a delegation as a threat to their monopoly (I will examine this more fully in a future issue.)

• the labor unions and the employees who, while favoring an opportunity for making the jobs

more meaningful, usually demand higher grades, pay, etc., for the expanded jobs • the managers themselves who are skeptical about departing from a pattern with which they

are fully familiar.

2. A willingness by the nonsupervisors to accept the delegation, with its implications of training and responsibility. When this willingness is examined, it soon becomes clear that we are dealing with a spectrum of attitude. Some employees welcome such a step; others are


indifferent; still others reject the idea. A sensible solution in such cases is to make the delegation only to those individuals who exhibit a clear willingness to accept the training and responsibility, and to avoid any rigid concepts of "all or none."

The related matter of job grade must also be faced. Any analysis by conventional job grading

methods is bound to support the contention that the employee who plans his own work merits a higher grade than the employee who merely executes plans prepared by someone else. In addition, study of the economics involved usually makes clear that it is less costly for the employee to plan his own work than for two people to be involved, and that the savings are easily able to cover the training and upgrading costs.

3. A training program in how to do the planning. This is an essential step, but it poses no real

difficulties once the attitude hurdles have been cleared. In some companies much of the time of the quality control engineering departments is devoted to routine preparation of detailed quality plans: inspection methods sheets, test programs, process control schedules, patrol beats, etc. A good deal can be done to standardize such planning so as to minimize the effort of training, delegation and subsequent audit.

(On a more sophisticated level is the planning done by quality specialists for "line specialists."

Some of the work done by reliability engineers could be done by product designers, given training in reliability planning. Some of the work done by quality control engineers, e.g., process capability studies, could be done by the manufacturing planner. I will elaborate on this in a future issue dealing with the changing role of the quality staff specialists.)

We can be sure that so deeply rooted a practice as separation of planning from execution will not be changed based solely on logical reasoning. Managers who are considering such a change seldom are convinced by the logic alone: rather, they are convinced by seeing living examples in which men are planning their own work and yet are successfully meeting the needs of the enterprise. Even in companies which remain strongly wedded to the Taylor system, it is not difficult to find such living examples. They abound in such nonproduction departments as maintenance or tool room. They can also be seen in departments which have not been fully engineered, e.g., foundry. In interpreting these and other living examples, care must be taken to avoid equating effective planning with formality in planning. Some informal planning is well done, while in other cases the informality conceals the fact that no one is doing the needed planning. For example, one chemical processing plant encountered excessive downtime due to elevators being out of service. There was a regular schedule for elevator inspection, but the instructions to the mechanics consisted solely of "Check elevator." The checking, while well planned as to safety matters, was not well planned as to economic matters such as downtime. Yet the mechanics had the capacity for doing the latter planning well, provided they were given access to the downtime data and were trained in their use. Beyond living examples in his own company, a manager responds well to examples of proven success in other companies, and especially in competitors: companies. Perhaps the most dramatic examples in this category are the Japanese QC Circles. While I will elaborate on these in a future issue, I can note here that the projects worked out by these Circles include thousands of cases in which teams of nonsupervisors prepared formalized quality plans embodying the results of study of their own jobs. In those companies where neither "living examples" nor practice of other companies succeeds in triggering a change, the approach must be one of experimenting. A venturesome manager (one of the minority who is willing to act on logical reasoning) is enlisted into trying out a new delegation of planning. If he succeeds in getting good results, these results become the living example.


Inspection Returns to Its Origins While product inspection is indispensable and timeless, the full-time inspector is neither. In early centuries, before the rise of the modern factory, product inspection was performed by the workman himself, e.g., the village shoemaker, or by the master of the small shop. When large factories were organized, the same concept of inspection as a part-time job was retained, so that inspection was performed either by the foreman of a shop department, or by those workmen whom the foreman felt could be relied upon to do their own inspection. As shop departments became larger, and as products became more complex, the amount of needed product inspection expanded beyond the part-time capacity of the shop foreman. To meet the expanded need, the foremen appointed men to serve as part-time inspectors, and (with further expansion) as full-time inspectors. Such was the situation prevailing when the Taylor system was born. The Taylor system changed this arrangement extensively. Under the Taylor system, methods of doing work, process specifications, standards of a day's work, etc., were established by various specialists. The job of the foremen and workmen was shrunk to one of meeting the multiple standards established by the various specialists. The effect on quality was decidedly not beneficial. In many cases the work methods made no provision for meeting the criteria of operator self-control as applied to quality, i.e., the operator was not provided with the specifications, or the gages, or the means for adjusting the process, or any of these. For example, it was common practice to assign the setting up of machines to specialists ("setup men"), leaving the workman only the job of feeding the machine and removing the processed work. Such workmen properly felt no responsibility for product quality, since they lacked the means for self-control. Of the prevailing multiple standards, that of quantity of production was unquestionably of the highest priority. Improving productivity was widely regarded as the main and even the sole reason for adopting the Taylor system. This was underscored by the nature of the piece work incentive, which was based on meeting the standards for quantity of production, to the virtual exclusion of all other standards. This emphasis on quantity lowered the priority attached to quality,1 and stimulated a movement to relieve workmen and foremen of the job of product inspection, and to turn this job over to full-time inspectors. Of course, there was a logic behind all this. The conviction of Taylor and his followers was that the foremen and workmen of that day lacked the education needed in a technological society to make use of the concept of self-control. To guard those standards to which the piece work incentive gave short shrift, Taylor set up specialists whose aspirations were oriented to these standards. Hence the use of full-time inspectors to guard the quality standards. As an extension of this same logic, the inspectors were later (roughly during the 1920s and 1930s) moved out of the jurisdiction of the production foremen and given an "independent" status under newly created inspection departments. Now, in the final decades of the Taylor system, we are witnessing a worldwide movement to abolish the full-time inspector category and to return the job of product inspection back to the production worker. This movement is not one of abolishing product inspection. Neither is it one of transferring full-time inspectors from one department (inspection) to another (production). The movement is rather one of abolishing full-time inspectors and assigning the work of product inspection to be done part-time by the workers who make the product. There are several forces which urge this new approach: 1. Economic. A successful transfer results in elimination of about 75 percent of the full-time

inspectors. The rest (or their equivalents) are retained for audit and for related matters. (There is no proportionate increase in the work of the production operators, since they are already


engaged in product inspection for the purpose of process control.) 2. Organizational. With rare exceptions. the creation of full-time inspectors and of separate

inspection departments has been followed by strained and even hostile relationships between inspection and production. These strains have exhibited great endurance, and companies are understandably interested in abolishing such sources of abrasion.

3. Behavioral. Redelegating the job of inspection to production workers is a most dramatic form

of "job enrichment." It is not only an enlargement of scope and responsibility; it is a vote of managerial confidence in the worker on a matter of the highest sensitivity.

One may well inquire: If returning product inspection to the operators is so meritorious, why have we waited so long, and why is there not an immediate stampede to do it universally? We have waited so long because several prerequisite steps had to take place first: 1. The education of the foremen and workmen has expanded remarkably, enabling them to

accept a much greater degree of responsibility on technological matters. 2. The growth of affluence has reduced the effectiveness of piece work as an incentive for

productivity, thereby reducing the imbalance of emphasis on quantity vs. quality. 3. Our new approaches to process planning have provided for building quality capability into the

process at the outset (as well as productivity via automation), thereby making it easier for the worker to turn out both quality and quantity.

4. The gathering awareness that "inspection" has really involved two separate decisions, (a)

conformance to specification and (b) fitness for use, has made it easier to delegate the conformance decision to production operators. (The fitness-for-use decision is not delegated to production operators.)

5. The extension of the concept of surveillance and audit to the quality function has made it

possible to delegate product inspection while retaining an audit of decisions. Despite the forces which urge a redelegation of inspection, and despite the prerequisite steps which have been taken, there will be no stampede, at least in the United States, where this movement is in its very early stages 2. The reason for the slow pace is in part technological, i.e., in many companies the prerequisite steps have not progressed sufficiently. In part the reason is a lack of mutual confidence between the company and the men. And in part the reason is cultural – managers who have lived a lifetime under the Taylor system have too extensive a vested interest to enable them to re-examine its premises objectively. For those companies who are in process of making the redelegation, the sequence of events has identified itself, and exhibits great commonality among companies and countries. The steps followed are somewhat as follows: 1. Create an atmosphere of mutual confidence between the company and the men. Managers

will not make such a delegation to men whom they do not trust. Neither will the workers accept such a delegation from managers whom they do not trust.

2. Provide a capable process. The managers must invest in the technology needed to provide

processes which have the capacity for holding the tolerances. 3. Reduce the level of management-controllable defects to an economic minimum. This is the

industrial equivalent of coming to the workers with clean hands. 4. Create a state of worker self-control. This consists of providing him with (a) the means for


knowing what he is supposed to do, (b) the means for knowing whether he is doing it, and (c) the means for regulation of the process in the event that what he is doing does not conform to what he is supposed to be doing.

5. Create a state of self-inspection. Here it is necessary to distinguish carefully between the

inspections performed for two different but related purposes:

(a) inspection performed to enable the worker to regulate the process, (b) inspection performed to enable the worker to judge whether the product conforms to

specification. In some cases, what is done under (a) will also serve to accomplish (b). However, this should

not be taken for granted, and positive steps should be taken to assure that the inspection performed by the worker is able to accomplish both (a) and (b).

6. Identify which workers make valid decisions on product conformance to specifications and

which do not. This identification is done from data provided by the full-time inspectors, who, at this stage of the program, are duplicating the product inspection performed by the workers.

7. Issue "licenses" to those workers who have demonstrated that they make sound product

approval decisions. These licenses authorize the workers so qualified to approve their own product, without the need for inspection by the full-time inspectors.

8. Institute an "audit of decisions" to provide data on whether the license holders are making

valid use of their licenses. This audit of decisions consists of a periodic check of product, plus review of any alarm signals which may question the performance of the license holder. The real purpose of this product check is not to see if the product is good or bad; the real purpose is to see if the workers' decisions are good. Hence the term "audit of decisions."

9. For workers who fail to qualify for the license, continue product inspection by the full-time

inspectors. Experience has shown that workers who qualify for the licenses demand some recognition in the form of higher grade, pay or whatever. The managers do provide this recognition, since the overall economics are nevertheless favorable. There are, of course, numerous details of application, and these vary with the culture and the company. However, there is little variation in the basic approach. The Motivation to Meet Quality Standards Under Frederick W. Taylor's system of scientific management, the motivation for workers to meet standards was based on varying the worker's pay in accordance with his performance. An invariable form of this motivation was the piecework formula of more pay for higher production. However, some of the piecework plans included subincentives for quality as well. These were mostly in the form of penalties for poor work, and several kinds of penalties were used: 1. Defective work was not paid for, or 2. Defective work was paid for, but only at day rates, or 3. The worker was required to repair the defects on his own time. In some cases, the penalty system also docked workers' pay for material spoiled. Although the bonus and penalty plans were intended to keep quantity and quality in balance, the realities of administration intervened to upset this balance. A focal point for employee grievances was the responsibility for defects. The superior economic power of the companies often gave rise to


arbitrary disposition of these grievances, and converted them into smoldering resentments. When the social revolution of the early 1930s opened the way to industrial unionization, these resentments flared up violently, resulting (among other things) in abolition of the penalty provisions for poor quality. The penalties have remained virtually extinct, and this will continue for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the growing affluence has moved most workers into the middle class, economically speaking, and has made piecework itself increasingly obsolete. In abolishing piecework the companies have retained some form of establishing standards for a day's work, either through industrial engineering study (as before), or through the built-in pace of the process. However, the method of securing this day's work from the workers is now based on supervisory leadership or discipline, rather than on the self-motivation provided by the piece rate. (The effect of this shift in method of motivation has probably been beneficial to quality, though we cannot be sure. We do know that the piecework systems gave a higher priority to the quantity standards than to quality. However, we also have cases today in which workers on the paced assembly line complain that they cannot do a satisfactory quality job because the pace does not permit it.) A further major development of the intervening decades has been the rise of the behavioral scientists. These specialists have begun to unravel the tangled skein of motivation in an industrial society. Their findings are making clear that the empirical approaches long used by practicing managers are too simplistic, and fail to take into account some of the major drives with which each member of the human species is born, and which remain a lifelong blessing or curse. Interpreting the findings of the behavioral scientists is a problem in its own right, since their conclusions lack unanimity and, all too often, are surrounded by a dense shrubbery of professional jargon. Hence I will present one man's interpretation of what I believe to be their most significant findings as applied to problems of product quality. A. The Hierarchy of Human Needs. This concept, traceable to Maslow3 states that there is a

priority list of human needs, somewhat as follows:

1. Physiological needs of basic survival, which in an industrial society, demand minimal subsistence income.

2. Safety needs, which demand a secure, continuing income. 3. Social needs, which are met by "belonging" to human groupings and being accepted by

them. 4. Ego needs, which require self respect and the respect of others. 5. "Self-fulfillment" needs which are met by opportunity for creativity and self expression.

In the United States we have gone most of the way toward meeting the physiological and safety needs. Hence, (according to Maslow) these satisfied needs no longer motivate behavior. Hence, further motivation must be based on the remaining needs, which have meanwhile risen to the top of the priority list.

B. Theory X and Theory Y. This concept4 examines the conflicting views of managers who

observe (for example) poor quality performance by workers: blunders, omissions, lack of interest. One set of managers explains these observed phenomena on the theory that the work force has gotten soft, has lost the will to work, has lost their pride in quality, etc. Hence, conclude these managers, we must combat this human degradation with skillful use of the carrot and the stick. Such is theory X.


A second set of managers, though observing the identical phenomena, reaches a totally different explanation, namely that what has changed is not the work force but the organization of work. This organization of work, by giving men monotonous, meaningless jobs, is what causes them to lose interest and exhibit the observed phenomena. Under this theory Y, the solution is for the managers to reorganize work so as to restore those features of work which permit the timeless human instincts of workmanship and creativity to assert themselves.

C. Hygienic factors and motivators5. This incisive concept asserts that job satisfactions and job

dissatisfactions are not opposites. Responses to job dissatisfactions e.g., guards on unsafe machines, increases in pay, improvements in job security, are called "hygienic factors." Once applied, these stimuli may reduce job dissatisfaction, but they do not motivate behavior. What motivates behavior (i.e., provides job satisfaction) is related to what the worker does, and the motivation comes from the doing. "Motivators," then, are such things as responsibility for planning, opportunity for creativity, participation with groups, etc.

Since we have not yet reached a meeting of the minds on the validity of these and other

theories, each manager is left to reach his own conclusions, based on his personal experience. My own experience leads me to accept Maslow's hierarchy of human needs. I reject theory X and accept theory Y, despite the fact that I have yet to see data which establishes that management under theory Y can outperform management under theory X as measured by the usual criteria of productivity, quality, profit, etc. Also, I accept Herzberg's assertion that job satisfaction comes from the doing and not from the remedies applied to grievances. All these beliefs are, again, the result of one man's experience.

If these beliefs are well founded, we are faced with the need to re-examine the organization of

work, and with finding ways to make the daily job more meaningful, interesting and challenging. Actually, a gratifying extent and variety of such re-examinations is taking place. The emerging clinical data may well paint to a general solution which is widely compatible with our culture.

The forms of job revision undergoing test are designated by such names as job enrichment,

job enlargement, participative management, etc. So great is the interest in these studies, and so great is the potential for growth, that the practitioners and consultants in the field are coining "private labels" to designate specially the type of approach they advocate – a sure sign that the aroma of profit is in the air.

The principal species and subspecies of experimental job revision have meanwhile become

clear. They include:

1. The management initiates no change in the organization of the work, but provides information on the why and how of meeting the quality specifications.

2. Again, the management initiates no change in the organization of work, but provides a form

of employee participation on job related matters, such as:

a The conventional voluntary suggestion system. b Personal solicitation of employee ideas. Here the initiative (on opening a direct

discussion) is taken by the supervision. c Joint planning, in which workers (or committees of workers) are asked toparticipate with

the supervisors on how best to do the job. d Creation of teams of workers to facilitate employee involvement. e Special training of workers in how to solve quality problems, followed by working on

projects. (The Japanese QC Circle concept has used this approach.)


Obviously, all of the foregoing may lead to proposals for reorganizing the work.

3. The job is changed "horizontally," e.g., the large assembly line is broken up into several

small assembly lines, or even abolished. Such changes appear to have a negative effect on productivity, while yielding dramatic improvements in quality.

4. The job is changed "vertically;" e.g., the production worker is given "nonproduction" duties

such as tool control, product inspection, inventory control, record keeping, etc. He becomes a minimanager for his work station.

In terms of theory of motivation, these approaches go beyond mere rejection of the

outmoded premises of the Taylor system. They include also an inquiry into the spectrum of human needs beyond the sheer survival needs which, in Taylor's day, loomed so large as to obscure all else. As a corollary, the new approaches also go beyond the management-initiated motivational campaigns undertaken by many government contractors during the 1960s. We may be sure that the mainsprings of human motivation are far more complex than those assumed to be present by the colorful but simplistic spectacles of that decade.

The Motivation to Improve Quality In this series of articles I have separated the discussion of motivation into two major components: a. The motivation to meet quality standards. This was the subject of the preceding paper in this

series (QP Aug. 73 – p. 41). b. The motivation to improve quality, which is the subject of the present article. All human societies evolve standards or norms of social conduct and impose on their members the responsibility for meeting these norms. This concept of law and order applies to all members of society, without exception, and is fundamental to the very concept of a society. The industrial enterprise adheres strictly to this same concept and formally sets out standards for quality,, schedule, cost, etc.. along with making clear to all employees their responsibility for meeting these standards. The Taylor system was a firm adherent to this same rule, especially as applied to worker productivity. In contrast to the universal responsibility imposed for meeting standards, the responsibility for making ’’improvements" is generally severely restricted, being limited to the few rulers in power plus their most trusted henchmen. (Historically, these rulers were wary of "improvements" because of the risk that unforeseen consequences might weaken the power of the rulers themselves.) Here again, the industrial enterprise has followed the customary practice of society and has reserved to the managers and their specialists the last word on making improvements. The Taylor system was an extreme example of this restriction since one of its major premises was that the foremen and workers lacked the education needed to make competent decisions on technological matters. Obviously, these jurisdictional boundaries do not shut off human creativity. Employees at all levels of the enterprise do generate ideas for improvement and, within the limits imposed, have been able to make many of these ideas effective. (Some of the most fascinating industrial literature relates instances in which frustrated employees resigned and then launched spectacularly successful new enterprises from the very ideas rejected by their former employers.) However, there has also been a gathering awareness that the creative capacity of the employee body is something of awesome proportions and that successful harnessing of this source of creative energy might handsomely compensate for the effort and risk involved. By far the most dramatic demonstration of the potentialities inherent in employee creativity has been the Japanese QC Circle. This is a group of a dozen or so workers and work leaders within a


single company department. It is formed, on a voluntary basis, for the purposes of (a) training the members in how to study and solve quality problems, and (b) undertaking solution of several actual projects per year. This QC Circle movement has had a fantastic growth since its beginnings in 1962. Within a decade, the QC Circles numbered about 400,000, with a membership of about five million. Based on the average attainment of three project solutions per year, I estimate the number of projects completed during this decade at over five million6. The average savings (as reported to the QC Circle conventions) runs to about $5000 per project, Multiplied by five million projects, this constitutes a huge sum. Even more significant may be the effect of the experience of QC Circle participation on the caliber of tomorrow's foremen and managers. Those who wish to apply the QC Circle concept to an American company must be careful to distinguish the universal elements from those which apply specially to the Japanese culture. The universal elements which appear to be contained within the QC Circle movement are set out below. 1. The managers, union and employees must agree on the basic principle of utilizing the

creativity of the work force as a means of making improvements in company performance.

There are severe obstacles to reaching such an agreement in American companies. Many

managers, even if they allay their fears of interference with management prerogatives, are reluctant to wade through numerous employee ideas on the chance that among the many small caliber and even naive proposals there will be some major benefits. The employee and especially the union obstacles are even more severe since their feeling is widespread that they have no responsibility for improving company performance.

Here we encounter a sharp contrast between Japanese and American practice. The Japanese

union, like the American union, contests with company management on how to divide up the company's income. However, when it comes to devoting effort to increase of the company's income, the Japanese union accepts considerable responsibility, whereas the American union has remained indifferent. (The growing loss of jobs to foreign competitors may be causing the union to reexamine this traditional viewpoint)

2. Both the supervisors and the employees must be trained in the techniques of qualify

management. For the Japanese, this came "naturally," since they started their training in such matters at the

very top of the companies and then worked their way down7. The Americans have applied such training only to the quality specialists.

If the Americans do decide to undertake such training programs, the real limitations will not lie

in techniques of training, i.e., text materials, instructors, etc. (Most industrial companies have extensive experience in job training methods, and some have experience in training employees in problem solving.) Rather, the limitations will arise from two other directions:

(a) The supervisors must be trained before training is given to the nonsupervisors. Any other

sequence will look to the supervisors that they are being bypassed. This must not happen, since the supervisors' role is vital.

(b) The training must be done mostly on company time. The Japanese have done this mainly

out of hours, but their basic relationship between company and workers differs from that prevailing in the West.

3. The approach to making quality improvements must be specially designed to fit the

national culture.


Here we need to experiment until we hit upon a design which yields results and yet is compatible with the traditions of our institutions. As yet we have not discovered an approach which is widely accepted.

(In a sense. we do have such an approach – the Suggestion System – but most companies

are not satisfied with it. It is offered to employees individually, thereby skirting around the union hierarchy as well as the supervisory hierarchy. Despite the seeming haphazard nature of so voluntary a device, some companies, through skillful propaganda and substantial awards, have made it a hardy perennial. The remaining approaches, profit sharing, Scanlon Plan, etc., have never attained so wide a following.

When universals such as the foregoing are proposed, it is natural for a departmental manager

to wonder how can one department deal with such company-wide forces? Dealing with such massive forces is beyond the capacity of one department – it requires a company-wide approach. Here again the Japanese approach is a challenge. The QC Circles were at the outset devoted solely to quality problems. With experience, it soon became evident that the real innovation was unrelated to quality; the real innovation was a new approach to harnessing the energy and creativity of the work force. Once this was grasped, the QC Circles increasingly took on non-QC problems. So extensive has this broadening become that the Japanese iron and steel industry has coined a new name which reflects the universal nature of this employee team effort (Jishu Kanri, meaning, roughly, self-motivation).

So there are solutions without waiting for top management to clear away the big obstacles. It is

unlikely that they will. The sequence is often the other way about. Some new solution is tried out in one department or function. It works, and the results are then used to energize the other departments and functions to such a point that a company-wide solution emerges.

The Future of the Inspection Department While inspection is an ancient activity, the modern inspection department is mainly a 20th century phenomenon. In our mechanical and electronic industries all inspection and test personnel now report, through intermediate supervision, to a manager who commands such work for an entire division. This manager's title varies, but in this paper I will refer to him as chief inspector to make his title descriptive of these command duties. (Often he has other responsibilities as well, and therefore, a broader title.) In the process industries, the organization form has been different, there being two hierarchies of "inspection": (a) the inspection for noncritical qualities, which heads up to a chief inspector who is responsible

usually to the head of the manufacturing department. (b) the testing for critical qualities, which heads up to a laboratory director who is responsible to

some director in the technical department. The evolution of the central inspection department owes much to the revolution known as the Taylor System. By creating an imbalance in emphasis on quantity vs. quality of production, the Taylor System contributed first to the creation of full-time inspectors, and then to the transfer of these inspectors out of the jurisdiction of the foremen and into central inspection departments. This transfer took place in an atmosphere of bitter debate. The foremen and production managers who lost out went to their graves convinced that a serious mistake had been made. In a sense, the debate about jurisdiction over the inspectors has never stopped. The rise of the quality staff specialists required creation of quality control engineering and other staff quality departments, with an associated broadening of the scope of the top manager in the quality function. Customer insistence on inspection "independence," the logistical problems of multi-plant locations,


and still other considerations, including power politics, have all contributed to the fluidity which has characterized jurisdiction over the inspection department. Currently we seem to be in the early stages of dismantling some of this structure by abolishing full-time inspectors and returning the job of inspection to the production worker. If this grows into a significant movement (as I believe it will) the companies involved will need to look more closely at some matters which have been largely taken for granted. Generally, the debates about inspection "independence" have failed to distinguish between two very different decisions about quality. 1. The decision as to conformance to specification. This decision is based on measuring the product, comparing this measurement to the

specification, and judging whether there is conformance or not. To make this decision requires (a) ability to read and interpret the specification (b) ability to use the instrument, and (c) ordinary objectivity in reaching a conclusion as to conformance or non conformance. Study of these requirements makes it clear that this decision can be successfully delegated to the nonsupervisory level (either inspector or production operator) since the prevailing state of education makes these employees able to accept training in (a) and (b), and since any significant departure from objectivity can be discovered through conventional auditing. In many cases it is feasible to go even further and to delegate the conformance decision to automated instruments.

2. The decision as to fitness for use. This decision is normally needed only on nonconforming

products, which constitute a small minority of the total. (Conforming products, which represent the great majority of all products, are assumed to be fit for use until subsequent field performance shows otherwise.)

The fitness for use decision is properly a community decision based on consideration of all the pertinent facts: To what use will this lot be put? Has such nonconformance nevertheless been fit for use in such applications? What are the comparative costs of scrap, repair, use as is? What is the urgency, and will users be out of service if the lot is not shipped? What will be the effect on customer relations? Do we need a prior waiver from the customer? To secure these and other pertinent facts requires inputs from multiple departments: technical, marketing, production, quality control. accounting, etc. reaching a decision based on these inputs requires an inter-departmental form of deliberation. Clearly, the decision on fitness for use is too complex to be delegated to individuals in the nonsupervisory level, or even to a single company department. Awareness of the vital distinction between these two decisions is helpful in unifying company thinking on some perplexing problems: delegation of decision making on quality, quality planning, "independence" of inspection. The delegation problem concerns a pyramid of three layers: (1) A huge base of decisions on conformance to specification. These run to such enormous

numbers that they must be delegated to the very lowest levels in the organization. (2) A small apex of decisions on fitness for use of products which are nonconforming as to critical

or major quality characteristics. These decisions are each so important that they cannot be delegated to the lowest levels or even to some single department. Hence these decisions must be reserved to higher levels on some interdepartmental basis of deliberation.

(3) An intermediate layer of decisions on fitness for use of products which are nonconforming as

to minor quality characteristics. In the absence of a published seriousness classification of


characteristics, these cases become a threat to the whole system of delegation. To delegate these decisions "to the troops" is to risk uninformed decision making on critical characteristics. To reserve these decisions solely to the interdepartmental machinery is to clog it hopelessly. The fundamental solution is to do the job of seriousness classification and to delegate disposition of minor nonconformance to some intermediate level such as an inspection supervisor or a quality specialist.

A related clarification is seen in the area of test planning. A debate on who should supervise the qualification testing of certain development samples can easily obscure the two very different questions present: (a) What should be the test program? i.e., what characteristics to test, what environment to apply,

what criteria to use for judging fitness, etc. These questions are clearly related to fitness for use, and hence demand a form of interdepartmental planning of the test program.

(b) Who should supervise the technicians conducting the test? Here we are back to conformance,

i.e., the testing is a means of judging whether the samples meet the criteria of the test program. Hence, so long as we retain an audit on objectivity, it is not critical as to whether the technicians (conducting the test) report to department A or to department B.

What has long been discussed as the "independence" of inspection is likewise seen to consist of two different elements: (a) The integrity of the judgment of conformance to specification. Under the Taylor System, the

intense, incentive on quantity of production, coupled with the lack of audit controls, resulted in widespread erosion of this judgment when made by inspectors dominated by production foremen. Transfer of the inspectors to a separate department significantly improved this integrity. If, however, the conditions causing erosion have meanwhile been removed and if audit controls are established, the compelling reasons for retaining an independent inspection department have thereby been greatly weakened.

(b) The validity of the decision as to fitness for use. Here the problem is the reverse. When this

decision has been left solely to the inspection department, our experience has been that many of them have tended to equate nonconformance to specification with unfitness for use. Such tendencies have resulted in costly perfectionism for the companies involved, and in maddening frustration to other managers. The simple rule is that when the stakes are substantial, no single department, quality control or anyone else, should have the sole voice on what is fitness for use. In such cases the "independence" of the inspection department has too often led to unassailable perfectionism.

As we get on with returning the inspection job to the production worker, we are heading into uncharted waters so far as organization for inspection is concerned. However, we have all the instruments needed for safe navigation. These include such tools as: • the concept of self-control, which is the key to control by production workers • the concept of qualification for self-inspection through proof of ability to make sound product

inspection decisions • the concept of audit of decisions which provides a managerial control on the proper use of the

self-inspection "license" • the separation of the decision on conformance to specification from that of fitness for use, as a

fundamental device for selective delegation • the seriousness classification of characteristics and defects as a device for further selective

delegation, of decisions on fitness for use.


Given the judicious use of tools such as these, we should be able to do the inspection job more promptly and at lower cost while retaining and even improving product fitness for use. The Quality Staff Specialist – an Emerging Role Frederick W. Taylor's system of "scientific management" featured a separation of planning from execution. The planning was assigned to various functional specialists, one of whom was the forerunner of the modern industrial engineer. This specialist planned the sequence of operations, designated the machines and tools to be used established the work methods, fixed the quota for a fair day's work, etc. In Taylor's time, the emphasis was on production and productivity, with little formal attention being paid to inspection and quality. The published examples of direct application of the Taylor system to the latter problems were in those days limited to such cases as establishing piece work rates for inspectors of ball bearings. When the centralized inspection departments were established, some of the new chief inspectors undertook more formal planning of the jobs of inspectors. This planning was done either by inspection supervisors, or by assistant supervisors, or by inspection specialists working out of the office of the chief inspector. The resulting planning sheets paralled those prepared by the industrial engineers, and set out the list of inspection operations to be performed, characteristics to measure, gages to be used, etc. As often as not, the planning sheets included standards for a day's work. The chief inspectors also took the initiative (or were urged) to get into other problems requiring the use of staff specialists: field complaint investigation, shop scrap investigation, shop troubleshooting, etc. While the job category of quality staff specialist emerged (under numerous local titles), the men assigned to the jobs were seldom engineers. More usually, they were appointed based on their shop experience and their demonstrated aptitude for analysis work. Not until the statistical quality control era did the idea emerge that the work of quality staff specialists might demand use of mathematicians and engineers. What happened since is within the memory of most of us. The engineers (not the mathematicians) took over the staff quality specialty jobs, and they invaded virtually all other company departments in pursuit of ways to improve the effectiveness of the quality function, somewhat as follows: Function Examples of staff quality activity Inspection Inspection planning, gage control Marketing Field complaint analysis Manufacture Process capability studies, process control techniques, defect prevention studies Purchasing Vendor surveillance, vendor quality rating Accounting Quality cost analysis Product development and design Reliability studies and improvement Industrial relations Quality motivation programs In the vernacular of commerce, the quality specialists have been enlarging their "product line" by offering an ever-broadening list of services to their clients. The analogy deserves careful


consideration, since products become obsolete, and so do staff services. In fact, the life cycle of a staff service follows a consistent, predictable path: 1. A new concept is evolved as an aid to solution of problems. 2. New techniques are designed to do scientifically what had previously been done empirically. 3. The new techniques are tested out, and yield results which are superior to the traditional. 4. The results are publicized, creating a broad demand for similar programs and for skilled staff

manpower which can aid in the design and installation. In response to this demand, the staff specialty department is enlarged, and undertakes design and application of the new techniques on an expanded scale.

5. The expanded application requires some standardization of the new techniques along with

training aids and other devices to simplify indoctrination of line people on a broad scale. 6. The line people acquire experience in application, use and maintenance of the new techniques

(which increasingly are no longer "new"). This experience sets the stage for a transfer from the staff to the line. The staff retains some residual duties of consulting and auditing.

7. The transfer is accomplished by a further program of standardization and training. The

techniques are simplified and reduced to standardized methods, tables, charts, etc. Training courses are designed to enable the line people to make future applications as part of their day-to-day work, without staff assistance other than occasional consultation.

Our staff quality specialties now include a number of services which are candidates for such transfer. An earlier paper in this series noted that "in some companies much of the time of the quality control engineering department is devoted to routine preparation of detailed quality plans: inspection methods sheets, test programs, process control schedules, patrol beats, etc." A close look at this planning makes it clear that much of it could be done by the line personnel, given a prior program of standardization and training. The term "transfer" requires some elaboration. I do not mean a transfer of the staff quality specialist to the line. In such a case the same man continues to do the same work as before, but under new management which is usually detrimental, since the tendency is to channel the specialist into day-to-day problems rather than long-range problems. Neither do I mean creation of a line department specialist to do what the staff department specialist had been doing. This may represent a saving due to the salary differential, but does not get at the heart of the problem which is that there is no longer any need for two separate men to be involved in the job planning. What I do mean is that the line department nonsupervisor – the production worker, the inspector, the designer – takes over and uses daily, as a matter of course, techniques which heretofore were a monopoly of the staff specialist department. Staff department managers have no quarrel with the theory of such transfers. (One of the more noble stated policies of staff departments is "It's our job to work ourselves out of a job.") However, in practice, managers are most reluctant to reduce their product line unless they have new products available to replace those made obsolete. Any other course appears to carry a risk of economic suicide. What then, are the potentialities for new additions to the product line of the staff specialists? A look into my (fallible) crystal ball suggests that the potentialities are very great, since they include: 1. Studies of the effect of quality on company income. The potentialities inherent in such studies

exceed, in my experience, those inherent in quality cost studies. 2. Evolution of programs which respond to the "consumerism" movement as it affects quality.


3. Development of programs for dealing with product safety and liability. 4. Development of programs for dealing with government controls in their various forms. 5. Development of programs for establishing self-control and self-inspection as a way of

organizing work and providing "job enrichment." 6. Training of all levels and all functions in the nature of quality and in the role to be played by

each in order to improve the company's effectiveness. 7. Draft of proposals for quality policies for review and approval by various functional managers

and by top management. 8. Evolution of the concept of an annual quality program which parallels the annual financial

budget, as a means of bringing upper management into participation in establishing quality objectives.

9. Development of an appropriate battery of upper management reports on quality to provide a

feedback of results against objectives. These reports, together with associated quality audits and surveillance, constitute a vital part of "quality assurance" to upper management.

A review of the foregoing projects makes clear that they are company wide in scope and that they involve participation by all major company departments as well as by top management. As a corollary, such projects require a broad business orientation on the part of our quality staff departments. This orientation has yet to be developed, since these departments have traditionally devoted themselves mainly to the technological problems of product design, manufacture and test. To qualify themselves to participate in these broad programs will, in any case, require that these departments accept the concept that the principal quality problems of the enterprise are of a management, business and social nature rather than being primarily technological in nature. In addition, the quality staff departments would do well to seek out and acquire some of the training which is available as to the "management, business and social nature" of our quality problems. Such training opportunities are already in existence. Beyond preparing themselves to take on their new activities, these same staff departments will need to take the initiative in identifying those activities which they are carrying on but which could be transferred to the line departments. These transferable activities are not limited to the comparatively routine quality planning now so widely prevalent. (The very term "routine planning" should be a flag warning them of the presence of obsolescence.) The transfer should (in my judgment) extend to some of those activities which are widely considered to be "elements of quality control engineering." For example, a good deal of work associated with achieving reliability is largely carried out as a staff activity by reliability engineers: reliability prediction, reliability apportionment, reliability data bank management, etc. In contrast, the corresponding activities associated with properties of materials are largely carried out by the line designers. The structural designer predicts the ultimate strength of his design, allocates the loading among the structural elements, makes use of published data on strength of materials, etc., all with little intervention by staff specialists. In like manner, the manufacturing engineer is quite at home with many aspects of the machines and tools of production – their load capacities, productivity, costs, etc. As to such matters, he seems to have little need for staff specialists. However, in the case of "process capability" (for holding quality tolerances) the manufacturing engineer usually requires collaboration from some quality control engineer. Yet process capability is a comparatively simple and readily transferable concept. We can, on philosophical grounds, make out a plausible case for the quality staff department to change its grand strategy. Have no fear of the mortality of your present activities; the birth rate of all


those new exciting activities will keep your department immortal. Get rid of routine planning and other solved problems – they are unworthy of the time of engineers. Hunt up the unsolved problems on which no one is working – there lies the opportunity. It is all very logical, and may well be irrefutable in the long view. However, the men faced with such proposals also face some very hard realities determined by the views of their colleagues, the orders of their superiors, the depth of the roots they have put down in their community and not least, their own merchantability in case of stormy weather. The realities are necessarily decisive for the short run. The Emerging Quality Control Department The preceding papers in this series have dealt with review and prognosis of various aspects of the quality function. Now let us look at the overall quality function and especially at the likely role of the specialized staff department which is set up to assist the company to carry out that function. My conviction is that the enterprise of the future will continue to require the services of a specialized "quality department." This department will play multiple roles whose outlines have already emerged, some clearly, some dimly. However, the detailed fleshing out of these outlines will result in quality control departments which will differ considerably from those which have prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s. We can best understand the nature of these departments of the future by examining the role or activities which they will be performing. 1. The role of judging conformance. This is the role of inspection and test, of comparing the

results with the specification and of judging conformance. As noted in an earlier paper in this series, "Inspection Returns to Its Origins," we have already begun to delegate this activity back to the production work force, to be done by them as an integral part of the job of making the product. We will be able to delegate most of the work of inspection to the production work force. However, there will remain a critical residue, notably the final functional inspection and test, which will continue to be performed by full-time inspectors. In my judgment, the command of such full-time inspectors is best retained by the quality manager rather than being turned over to the production manager.

2. The role of judging fitness for use. Here the problem is to judge whether products which fail

to conform to specification are nevertheless fit for use. This judgment involves (a) collecting the pertinent multiple inputs, i.e., customer application, urgency costs, etc., and then (b) making a judgment on whether to use the product as is or to make some other disposition. In all likelihood the job of collecting the inputs will continue to be made by some specialist in the "quality department." Certainly, the quality manager will continue to participate in the judgment of fitness for use, and in designated cases he will play the leading role.

3. The role of planning and coordination of quality. The bulk of quality planning has to date

been at the departmental level. I believe that this departmental planning role must in the future be turned over to the numerous departmental chiefs of the "line" organizations, i.e., technical, manufacture, marketing, etc. At the same time, the quality manager must shift his priorities to the interdepartmental or company wide quality planning.

A parallel is seen in the finance function. The preparation of the company's annual financial

budget involves extensive financial planning and coordination by the central budget office. However, the departmental budgeting is done by the numerous line departments using the guidelines and staff assistance of the budget office.

The quality equivalent of the annual financial budget is the "president's audit' as practiced by

many Japanese companies. The concept is one in which each company department prepares


a quality plan within a uniform framework. These plans are summarized and reviewed at progressively higher levels, the final review being by the company president (hence the term "president's audit"). The quality manager plays a role in developing the uniform framework, in giving consultation service to the departments, in summarizing the results, and in aiding the various managers to optimize the emerging plans.

4. The role of scorekeeping. Here again we can learn from the financial analogy. The

managers of the enterprise require not only a coordinated financial plan: they require also a regular reporting of results attained so that they can take appropriate action if the financial goals and plans are not met. The central financial staff plays the leading role in design, preparation and publication of these reports.

We now have quality reports in all companies, and the quality manager plays a leading role in

their preparation. As the concept of the annual quality plan takes hold, the scorekeeping will require a change in priority. Instead of being dominated by technology (i.e., reports on the technological properties of the product and process), the reports will be dominated by the business and social aspects of quality, i.e., effect on costs, sales, income, profit, safety, pollution, etc. This changeover will demand quite a reorientation of emphasis by the quality manager, but I believe he will remain as the quality scorekeeper.

5. The role of quality auditing. The finance function makes use of both internal and external

auditors, and the purpose is to answer two vital questions:

(a) are the financial plans and systems such that if followed, they will meet the financial goals and will correctly reflect the financial condition of the enterprise, and

(b) are the plans and systems being followed?

In the quality function the concept of auditing is vague, and even the terminology is confused.

Quite aside from the terminology, we need to parallel what the finance function does. We need a relatively independent means of judging whether our quality plans and systems are sound and whether we are following them. The purpose of such quality audits (the word "audit" should be reserved to designate such independent reviews) is to detect tendencies for our basic structure to disintegrate, and to discover other basic shortcomings.

To a considerable extent, our internal audit can provide early warning signals of these

tendencies and shortcomings. Our current audits are largely of this early warning nature. It seems to me that we can continue to assign the conduct of these internal audits to our quality managers.

The external quality audit is a rarity at present, and it is time to get this question out in the

open. On the record, our internal audits have mostly failed to identify some major external forces which should have commanded our attention. Instead, a mixed bag of outsiders has taken over: reformers, government regulators, outside test laboratories and the rest. The consumer is deriving some benefits from the agitation set up by these outsiders. The consumer is also paying a price for these benefits. At present we know that the price is high and is growing. In contrast, we have no measure on how much benefit the consumer is receiving. Here I venture to predict that when we do finally sum up the costs and the benefits, the consumer will be infuriated. At that point the consumerism movement will go into a convulsion, and the present leaders will all go down the drain – not only the many quacks but the useful ones as well.

Meanwhile it behooves us to think through the problem of external audit and to mobilize to set

it up on a sound, objective basis. While our quality managers will properly participate in the design of the external audit, I cannot conceive of turning the leadership of such an activity over to the quality manager. Some new approach must be evolved.


In this connection it would be most interesting if some of our companies were to experiment by setting up a quality advisory council consisting of some well-selected outsiders as well as insiders, to meet periodically and discuss the problem of quality audit in its broadest sense. In addition, I would like to see some of the professional societies set up committees to explore the subject.

It would also be useful for our quality managers to look more closely at a related role – the role

of "liaison with the outside." The company's quality problems necessarily interface with those of other companies in the industry. Creation of industry quality committees can be a constructive force in such interfaces. A second liaison is with the standardization bodies and the related governmental bodies. A third is with the professional societies, those oriented to science, to engineering and to the quality function itself. A fourth form of liaison is to related enterprises: customers, vendors, service shops. There are still other forms: journalists, critics, regulators. Collectively, such outside contacts provide useful current inputs to the enterprise while broadening the horizon of the quality manager and preparing him to assume the broader roles that lie ahead.

6. The role of diagnosis of quality problems. Preventing defects from happening requires two

diagnostic journeys:

(a) The journey from symptom to cause. The inability to carry out defect prevention is most usually traceable to the fact that no one has the combination of responsibility time and skill needed to make this journey. Of this combination, that of lack of clear responsibility is the most widely prevalent. There are many managers who indulge in the premise that the line supervisors have this responsibility. However, this premise is invalid as to the long-standing chronic defects which cause most of our quality troubles. Not only is the responsibility vague; to do the diagnosis requires time and skills which are beyond the capacity of most line supervisors.

(b) The journey from cause to remedy. This journey is comparatively easy because the

responsibility is clearly on the line departments, and because they usually have the technological capability to do the job.

For the foreseeable future, the journey from symptom to cause, as applied to the

interdepartmental quality problems, will continue to be made by trained quality specialists. When these men are commanded by a central staff department, they can attack either the intradepartmental or the interdepartmental quality problems. When these same men are commanded by the various line departments, they can easily become diverted to intradepartmental troubleshooting with the result that the main quality problems (which are always interdepartmental) go on and on. This consideration suggests that these staff specialists remain attached to a central quality staff department.

7. The role of consulting in the quality function. Being specialists, the quality manager and

his team are properly internal consultants to the rest of the company on quality matters. Here the quality specialists have given a good account of themselves on the technological aspects of their trade: statistical methodology, planning techniques, data systems, measurement. On the business aspects, a long and useful step has been taken by development of the quality cost concept and the related structured approach to project identification. This is a good beginning, but most quality managers have a long way to go before they can be regarded as experts on the relation of quality to the business goals of the enterprise. In the case of the social goals of the enterprise, the contribution of the quality managers has been minimal, and the need to develop expertise is at its greatest. Until quality managers do develop the needed expertise on the relation of quality to the business and social goals of the enterprise, they will be unable to play their proper role as consultants to top management.

To carry out the foregoing roles requires a structuring of the "quality department" along organizational lines such as the following:


• a planning office dedicated to evolution of the annual quality plan as well as to

interdepartmental quality planning on a project basis. • a quality reporting office whose main role is to prepare the reports needed by upper and

middle management to compare results achieved with the goals established in the plans. • an auditing office to carry out the internal auditing and to help evolve the external auditing

required. • a team of trained specialists to provide diagnostic and consulting services, mainly on a project

basis. Collection of inputs needed to make fitness-for-use decisions would be one of the regular responsibilities of such a group.

• a residual body of inspection and test personnel to handle that conformance testing not

delegated to production. There is also the perplexing problem of what name to give to this emerging department as well as the sensitive matter of what title to give to the department chief. It is a fact that the breadth and emphasis of the new departmental activities differ importantly from those prevailing in the predecessor departments. Such differences have sometimes been a basis for changing departmental names, e.g., inspection to quality control; sales to marketing; production to manufacture; purchasing to materials management. But still other instances can be cited in which change in breadth has left the departmental names unchanged. A few years ago I examined this question (see "Activities and Labels; Functions and Names," Industrial Quality Control, Nov. '67, pp. 248-250). I have little to add to that discussion. I am quite aware that some organizations have begun to use the term "quality assurance" to designate a broad based department. As a matter of dictionary meaning, the term "assurance" could refer to the inspection, test, scorekeeping and audit functions, but hardly to the planning, diagnostic and consulting services. Since there is no limit to human ingenuity, we may yet see a term coined which connotes more completely the new assortment of activities. As to a title for the chief, it seems to me that the unqualified word "quality" retains great merit as the descriptive core of the title, e.g., quality manager, quality director, quality vice president. I would prefer to see the term "quality" retained in these titles as the generic shorthand label for "fitness for use" despite the continuing changes in content and emphasis of the parameters which collectively define fitness for use. Society at large has long accepted the word "quality" as a generic term, and we would lose an asset of considerable value if we threw the word overboard or diluted it to a point such that it became overshadowed. There are numerous cases in the language in which a generic term goes on and on despite changes in the species themselves. The words "food," "medicine," "weapons" go on and on as generic terms despite many successive technological changes in the specific ingredients of these terms. References 1 Today we are aware that quantity and quality need not be antagonistic if the tools and skills of

defect prevention are applied. However, these tools and skills had not yet been well developed in Taylor’s time.

2 In Europe this movement is much further along, with the Eastern Europeans employing a

formalized approach. The most advanced state is in Japan, where the movement is allied with the QC Circle concept. (The pace is of course influenced by the extent to which the Taylor system had been adopted and no country went so far in this adoption as did the United


Stated.) 3 A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, Harper & Bros., New York, 1954. 4 Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1960. 5 Frederick Herzberg, Bernard Mausman and B. Snyderman, The Motivation to Work, John

Wiley L Sons, New York, 2nd Ed, 1959. 6 Reported by Prof. Kaoru Ishikawa in “Quality Control Starts and Ends with Education,” QP

Aug. 72-p. 18 (on the occasion of accepting the Grant Award for 1971). 7 The seed courses were those I conducted during my first visit to Japan (1954). Dr. J. M. JURAN, Dean of American consultants on quality control, was a pioneer in the development of principles and methods for managing quality control programs. He is a veteran of over four decades of international experience in management at all levels. His clients have included industrial giants as well as small companies and government departments. He has conducted several hundred courses in all pans of the world, not only on QC management but on other managerial subjects as well. Dr. Juran is the author of ten books including 'Quality Planning and Analysis', (with F. M. Gryna), 'Managerial Breakthrough' and 'The Quality Control Handbook', which has been translated wholly or partly into several languages and which has become the international standard reference work in the field of QR. (1973)

Taylor System and Quality Control JMJuran 94

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