Targeting and Intelligence at the Company Level- Lessons Learned From a CoIST in Afghanistan

8/12/2019 Targeting and Intelligence at the Company Level- Lessons Learned From a CoIST in Afghanistan

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Targeting and Intelligence at the Company

Level: Lessons Learned from a CoIST in

AfghanistanBy Christopher G. IngramJournal Article |Jun 18 2013 - 1:30am

Although the mission in Afghanistan is drawing to a close, lessons learned from this fight will shape

preparations for future counterinsurgency efforts. This fight is often a small-unit battle, with Company-

sized elements requiring organic intelligence capabilities to leverage information into tactical success.

This article seeks to build on experiences operating a Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) within

a Stryker Brigade in southern Afghanistan. Company-internal intelligence-gathering and targeting, along

with how the company interacts with battalion in this process, is addressed in an attempt to avoid

mistakes already made, and streamline the efforts of future CoISTs. Given resource and manpower

constraints within any element, the key to a successful CoIST becomes building the right team and

developing tailored pre-deployment training. CoISts are at a disadvantage, upon arrival on a

counterinsurgency battlefield, and need to focus targeting priorities and manage the volume of incoming

information to provide Commanders and Soldiers with actionable intelligence that will protect Soldiers

and defeat enemy networks. How to focus those efforts and turn intelligence gathered into disruption

tactics, as a prelude to clear, hold, build will also be addressed.

A principle in counterinsurgency is that units, especially at the Company level, must organize themselves

for intelligence[1]. In counterinsurgency operations, where each Company (and in many cases, Platoons)

has their own Area of Operations and every Soldier is a sensor[2], the role of Company Intelligence

Support Team (CoIST) in synchronizing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and

integrating this with the targeting process is critical to successful effects on the battlefield. The purpose of

the article is to present lessons learned by a CoIST operating in southern Afghanistan within the paradigm

of current Army doctrine and manning. Company-internal intelligence gathering and targeting, along with

how the company interacts with battalion in this process is addressed in an attempt to avoid mistakes

already made, and streamline the efforts of future CoISTs. My own experiences operating a CoIST within

a Stryker Brigade in southern Afghanistan form the basis of this article, intended to provide future leaders

a road map of friction points and best practices. Though the mission in Afghanistan may be drawing to a

close, the lessons learned from this modern counterinsurgency fight will shape the preparation for future

conflicts.

The Right Team

If effective operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at

the lowest possible level,[3]then a successful company requires a CoIST that is properly manned

properly and trained, capable of critical thinking, and efficient in its execution. Though the Army

continues to debate providing dedicated CoIST manning in Company headquarters, it is critical to choose
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the right Soldiers for the job. While the Army recommends six personnel to man the CoIST, enabling 24-

hour operations[4], we were able to effectively operate with as few as three or four well-trained personnel

for most of the deployment.

Manning the CoIST with the right skill-sets requires a trade-off with other elements in the company andbattalion. Some units assign the CoIST to the Fires Support Officer (FSO), while others prefer assigning a

Maneuver Officer to the role. With FSOs increasingly tasked with non-lethal targeting in

counterinsurgency conflicts, this choice has the benefit of integrating all of the targeting under the

responsibility of one individual. Assigning a maneuver platoon leader with the task limits maneuver

capabilities for the company. In our battalion, the Mobile Gun System Platoon Leader received the

additional duties of Headquarters Platoon Leader and CoIST Officer, providing a maneuver Lieutenant to

the Company Command Post to assist in Command and Control and integrate ISR into operations. This

choice allows the Battalion Commander to put an officer in the position who possesses a solid

understanding of small-unit tactics. Assigning a junior intelligence officer at the Company-level may not

be the answer to this dilemma, given the limited experience and understanding of the tactical-level fight

most intelligence Lieutenants would bring to the table. Until the Army prioritizes CoIST to the point ofproviding additional manning to company-level operations, this will continue to be a costly choice.

Choosing Soldiers to man the CoIST requires taking intelligent Soldiers with the capacity for critical think

and analysis from the maneuver platoons to provide their skills to the company as a whole. Additionally,

though the battalion intelligence shop may be hesitant to provide one of its analysts to each company, this

decision is consistent with pushing intelligence analysis to the lowest level and is one of the most effective

ways to provide the battalion with an accurate understanding of each company battle space. The trained

intelligence analyst provided to our CoIST by the battalion brought technical skills to the company level

and improved communication with battalion, making him critical to our success on the battlefield. The

infantry Soldiers assigned to the CoIST had their ability to think critically, operate digital systems, and

execute projects independently.

Pre-Deployment Training

The CoIST officer and analysts received additional training for almost a year prior to deployment on

intelligence doctrine, systems, and CoIST operations. At this nascent stage in the development of CoISTs,

the military needs to place additional emphasis on developing doctrine, standardized training, and training

exercises I order to prepare CoISTs for deployment. Training in targeting, ISR integration, technical

systems (such as Palantir, TIGR, etc), and information management is critical to an effective CoIST.

These are perishable skills, which require regular training exercises in the classroom and in the field.

Developing interactive simulation training that forces CoISTs across the brigade to integrate systems they

will be using in combat and coordinate horizontally and vertically would be a realistic and invaluable

exercise.

The last phase of this training should also provide CoISTs pre-deployment real-time capabilities to

interact with the CoISTs that they will be relieving in theatre to begin gaining an understanding of their

future battle-space. The limited look our CoISTs received provided the best insight into the battles ahead.

By the time we deployed, our Soldiers brought both the understanding of ground warfare tactics,

techniques, and procedures learned through years of infantry training and a basis for the knowledge of

how to effectively operate as CoIST. Improved pre-deployment training would facilitate troops hitting the

ground without a loss of forward momentum.

Target the Terrain

When entering unfamiliar terrain on an asymmetric battlefield, it is easier to determine from where you


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are being attacked, than to know precisely who is committing that hostility. In targeting, it is most

tempting for CoISTs to try to identify the individuals by name and fixate on these individuals as targets.

Figuring out who is in command and targeting that individual can reap great benefits but takes time. Old

techniques like terrain analysis to identify likely enemy avenues of approach, chokepoints susceptible to

IED emplacement, and possible points of origin for small arms fire, can be more effective for CoISTsearly in deployment to a new area of operations. Combining these classic analysis techniques with current

persistent ISR capabilities and historical data from previous unit SIGACTs can provide CoISTs the ability

to develop actionable intelligence that is useful a patrol stepping outside the wire.

In southern Afghanistan, we found that Taliban consistently used well-established ambush positions that

provided cover and concealment, were within range of likely friendly avenues of approach, and allowed

for quick exfil. Many of these positions had probably been used for similar harassing fire on the Soviets

decades prior. Identifying these positions, made possible by sorting through historical SIGACTs and

targeting them with ISR, was effective, especially when combined with deceptive patrolling techniques

such as a feint. On numerous occasions, we were able to use dismounted patrols in a feint towards the

enemy objective to identify their ambush positions and observe their arming of IED positions, allowingfor follow-on exploitation. This could be accomplished with a patrol in conjunction with persistent ISR

and close combat air, held at a distance until the enemy committed to their fighting positions.

The previous unit in our area of operations regularly took contact whenever their surveillance aerostat was

brought down in daylight, often from the same fighting position. Placing additional assets, such as

snipers, in towers to respond was not effective, and placing mounted patrols outside the wire each time the

aerostat needed to come down for weather was a drain on resources. By focusing on the point of origin as

the target, we were able to confirm enemy fighting positions and pattern of life. The fighting position had

adequate cover that the fighters felt safe from the direction of the combat outpost. By emplacing our own

ambush position behind the identified fighting positions, using the cover of darkness the previous night,

our unit lowered the aerostat after daylight, triggering the enemy response, which we successfully engaged.

Individuals as targets are high payoff but are better to be considered as targets of opportunity than the

priority. In our experience, terrain was a more effective and certainly a more efficient target. It is

possible to render key enemy leaders ineffective when by denying IED emplacement locations, fighting

positions, and lines of communication. Understanding enemy networks and focusing on valuable nodes,

such as a particularly skilled IED maker, should still be a goal that is attainable as the CoIST becomes

familiar with the area of operations, but the unit is most vulnerable in the first days in the area or the first

days of the fighting season, when an effective offense of terrain denial and interdiction can be the best

defense.

Manage Information

Time in sector and use of persistent ISR (aerostats, unmanned aerial vehicles, and fixed cameras on

outposts, combined with signals intelligence) will allow the CoIST to develop and improve its

understanding of the battlefield and of enemy patterns of life. Disseminating this intelligence vertically

and horizontally will facilitate operations and serve as a force multiplier. This knowledge is useless if it is

not shared with the Soldiers to the lowest level, wasted if it not shared with units in adjoining areas of

operations, and limited in its potential if not shared with higher headquarters for analysis in the broader

context with additional assets. While this seems simple in concept, it becomes complicated by multiple

communication and analysis platforms. The sheer volume of data, from intercepted communications to

persistent ISR video feeds can be overwhelming to manage and digest, but attention to this pays dividends

by disseminating the data to levels where the resources to analyze may exist and eliminates the time

required to retrieve data when needed.


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PowerPoint provides the ability to effectively portray informational graphically, but limits the ability to

analyze information across multiple events. Additionally, ISR audio and video data is useful for

dissemination and analysis, but difficult to transmit across platforms with limited bandwidth. Information

management and dissemination is one of the more daunting challenges a CoIST may encounter. The

primary audience, Soldiers and Platoon/Company leadership, may best digest information on one platform(maps, videos, or even a whiteboard) while higher headquarters is likely to require information in a

different format for their products. This is a time-consuming challenge that degrades the ability of the

CoIST to focus on gathering and analyzing additional information.

It is critical, at all levels, to develop a seamless system to manage the information of operations and

intelligence. The debate between Distributed Combat Ground System and Palentir is only one facet of

this challenge (note: we used Palentir exclusively and found it more-user friendly and effective).

Communication between all levels of command (from Division to Company) prior to deployment to

develop standard reporting criteria and information management procedures can minimize the time wasted

on duplicate efforts in combat that divert the focus of an overwhelmed CoIST. This is an especially acute

source of friction early in a deployment, when command and control systems are being adjusted andestablished, CoISTS are attempting to understand the enemy situation, and squads are maneuvering in

unfamiliar terrain.

Disruption First

Moving in to our combat outpost, it became immediately clear that we had a large area of operations but a

much smaller battle space. While our Company area of operations may have extended several kilometers

from our outpost, the security bubble established by previous units was limited to primary lines of

communication and less than a few hundred meters from each piece of tactical infrastructure. Doctrinally,

the key approach to counter-insurgency is clear, hold, build. The primary tasks of the first phase of this

approach are to provide continuous security for the local populace and eliminate insurgent presence.

This population-centric denial of strongholds is a key to success, but as doctrine points out, some cases

may require attacks to disrupt such strongholds, even if counterinsurgents cannot clear and hold the area[5]

.

Persistent ISR and indirect capabilities provide friendly forces the ability to affect the battlefield beyond

that which manning/resources/enemy situation allow for clearance operations. This facilitates disruption

as a key task to set the conditions for clear, hold, build. Just as the value of clearance is lost when not

followed by hold and build, disruption alone cannot defeat an insurgency. FM3.90 notes that disruption is

never an end, it is the means to an end.[6]The integration of indirect fires, used to disrupt an enemys

operational tempo on the battlefield and reduce enemy capabilities can be critical to setting the conditions

for follow-on clearance operations.

Disruption, prior to clear/hold/build, can degrade enemy capabilities, provide valuable information on

enemy patterns of life, and identify enemy fighting positions/caches/IED hotspots. Disruption integrates

intelligence, maneuver, and indirect fire assets to interdict enemy lines of communication or IED

emplacement prior to clearance operations. MAJ John Kennelys article Insurgency Disruption for the

Warfighter[7]reinforced the tactics our Company employed and refocused our thinking on tactics we

could use to set the conditions for future operations. In a village within our persistent ISR coverage, local

Taliban had established a defensive network of over 30 IEDs blocking all likely avenues of approach. A

clearance operation of the village would have entailed navigating precariously through this belt. However,

by targeting the terrain, utilizing persistent ISR and calling in indirect fire assets during IED emplacement

and maintenance activities, we were able, over time, to identify the entire IED belt, degrade the enemys

ability to maintain these defensive obstacles (IEDs were turned on/off daily to allow local farming), and


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undermine Taliban influence in the area. This village, that the Taliban was intent on holding and used as a

point of origin for attacks on our combat outpost was effectively marginalized, attacks ceased, and the

IED belt was negated. The best argument for utilizing disruption effectively to set the conditions for

clearance operations is the reduced risk to friendly forces on the ground.

Exploit with Minimal Resources

Successful operations provide the clues for the first steps in the direction of the next intelligence find or

operation. Finding an IED or a weapon and destroying it may degrade enemy capability temporarily, but

exploiting that successful operation to identify the supplier is the role of the CoIST. However, the CoIST

itself is both unlikely to be at the point of retrieval or have the capability to fully exploit the asset. This

requires the CoIST to facilitate training Soldiers in the company and its partners in tactical site

exploitation, and to transport materials to higher headquarters for proper exploitation in a timely manner.

At the tactical level, taking the time and care necessary to properly exploit evidence is far simpler in

training than in combat. Additionally, the tactical site exploitation supplies that units are advised to use[8]

are often cumbersome when combined with all the other counter-IED, communications, medical, andother gear Soldiers are required to carry. Soldiers are already burdened with enough gear. Training in

tactical site exploitation combined with identifying and minimizing the critical supplies to accomplish this

task will improve its implementation. Squads are not likely to carry tactical site exploitation backpacks

with every possible tool for a Hollywood-style crime scene investigation, but they can bag, tag, and

document a cache sufficient to get the information needed for exploitation with proper training. Soldiers

already wear gloves and carry a pen, so a pouch with a camera, plastic bags, and note-cards can

successfully accomplish most tactical site exploitation activities. Combined with a biometric enrollment

device and chemical detection kit, there is little else that a well-trained squad on the ground will need for

tactical site exploitation and tactical questioning of suspected insurgents.

Costly Lesson Shared

Although the preference would be to claim that this article is based on a flawless record, these lessons are

not comprehensive and all came at a cost. A comparison of the enemy situation template prior to our

arrival and upon our transfer of authority to the next unit paints a picture of enviable success. However,

along that path enemy forces exploited our limited maneuver capability to engage fixed positions, emplace

IEDs along critical lines of communication, and draw friendly forces into defensive IED belts with small-

arms fire. As a CoIST, the goal is to avoid those sacrifices by knowing the enemy, predicting their

activity, and providing friendly forces with the intelligence to guide successful operations. Friendly

casualties are an emotional jolt to CoIST members who will question if they could have predicted and

avoided these losses. The answer is probably not; the enemy, regardless of our efforts, will always have a

vote. However, sharing these lessons learned will hopefully build on the growing understanding of therole intelligence plays at the tactical level, and avoid the friction and mistakes that degrade our

warfighting capabilities.

[1]Kilcullen, David, Dr. (LTC) Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level

Counterinsurgency

[2]FM 3-21.75 Chapter 8, Every Soldier is a Sensor

[3]FM3-24


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[4]Center for Army Lessons Learned 10-20: Company Intelligence Support Team Handbook

[5]Paragraph 5-53, FM 3-24

[6]Paragraph B-50, FM3.90

[7]Kennely, John, Insurgency Disruption for the Warfighter, Small Wars Journal, August 2012

[8]Center for Army Lessons Learned 07-26: Tactical Site Exploitation and Cache Search Operations

About the Author

Christopher G. Ingram

1LT Christopher G. Ingram is an Infantryman. Prior to joining the Army he served

as a foreign policy advisor in the United States Senate and taught courses in

international conflict at Louisiana State University, where he is currently writing his

PhD dissertation. He holds a MA in International Affairs from American University,

Washington DC, and a BA in International Studies from Troy University, Troy AL.

Most recently, he served in Maiwand District, Kandahar Afghanistan as a Platoon

Leader and Company Intelligence Support Team Officer in Bravo Company, 4th

Battalion 23rdInfantry Regiment, 2ndBrigade 2ndInfantry Division (Stryker

Brigade Combat Team). The views expressed in this article do not represent the

views of the Department of Defense.

Available online at : http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/targeting-and-intelligence-at-the-

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Targeting and Intelligence at the Company Level- Lessons Learned From a CoIST in Afghanistan

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