Taking Stock: New START Implementation and Outlook€¢ RS-28 (Sarmat): to replace ... • ABM...
Transcript of Taking Stock: New START Implementation and Outlook€¢ RS-28 (Sarmat): to replace ... • ABM...
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HansM.KristensenDirector,NuclearInforma7onProjectFedera7onofAmericanScien7sts
Phone:202-454-4695Email:[email protected]
Presenta7ontoNuclearThreatIni7a7ve
Washington,DCAugust24,2016
Taking Stock: New START Implementation and Outlook
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NuclearArsenals:GlobalInventoriesMorethan125,000warheadsproducedsince1945
Peakof64,500stockpiledwarheadsin1986(70,300ifincludingre7redwarheads)
• USstockpilepeakedearly(1967)• Russianstockpilepeakedlate(1986)
Enormousreduc7onssince1986peak:
• ~54,000warheadstockpilereduc7on• ~47,000+warheadsdismantled
~10,000warheadsinstockpiles(~15,000ifcoun7ngre7redwarheadsawai7ngdismantlement)
USandRussiapossess90%ofglobalinventory(94%ifcoun7ngre7redwarheads);eachhasmorethan47mesmorewarheadsthanrestofworldcombined;157mesmorethanthird-largeststockpile(France)
Decreasing:US,Russia,Britain,France
Increasing:China,Pakistan,India
Israelrela7velysteady;NorthKoreatrying
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NuclearArsenals:Trends Withmorethan90%ofworldinventory,USandRussiahavespecialresponsibilitytoreduce
Reduc7onofdeployedstrategicwarheadsfromsome23,000in1989to3,700in2016(NewSTARTcounts3,216)
Readinesslevelofremainingstrategicforcesishigh:about1,800warheadsonpromptalert
Noofficialde-aler7ng,butsignificantreduc7onofoverallalertnumbers:heavybombersde-alerted,USICBMsandSLBMsdownloaded,non-strategicforcesde-alerted
Trend:paceofreduc7onsisslowing
UScutonly400warheadsin2010-2014,comparedwith3,500warheadscutin2005-2009
Russiacutanes7mated1,100warheadsin2010-2014,comparedwith2,600in2005-2009
Insteadofcon7nuingpaceorincreasingreduc7ons,USandRussianstockpilesappeartobelevelingoutforthelonghaul;newemphasisonmoderniza7on
Newini7a7vesneededtopreventstallingofarmscontrol
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
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History:
April8,2010:Signed
December22,2010:SenateAdviseandConsent
February5,2011:EntryIntoForce
February5,2018:EntryIntoEffect
February5,2021:Expires(unlessextendedfor5years)
February5,2026:Expires(ifextendedfor5yearsfrom2021)
NewSTARTTreatySummary
Threeaggregatelimits(nosub-limits):
Nomorethan800totalstrategiclaunchers
Nomorethan700deployedstrategiclaunchers
Nomorethan1,550warheadsondeployedstrategiclaunchers(actualwarheadnumbersonICBMs/SLBMs,fakecountofonebombsperbombers);significantuploadcapacityremains
DataExchange:
Everysixmoths:forcestructurestatus
No7fica7ons:11,436(asof7/28/16)
Inspec7ons:
SimplerversionofSTARTinspec7onregime
18on-siteinspec7onsannually(10todeployedforcesand8tonon-deployedforces):201inspec7onsconductedsince2011(asof7/28/16)
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SinceFeb2011:reduc7onof141deployedlauncherswith319warheads.41deployedand37non-deployedlauncherstogo.
Droppedbelowwarheadlimitinlate-2015
2011-2015:PhaseOne-eliminated“phantomlaunchers”(B-1B,B-52G,emptysilos)
2015-2018:PhaseTwo-reduc7onofrealweapons:
• Bombers:De-nuke30opera7onaland12non-opera7onalB-52Hs.Leaving41nuclearfortotalof60deployednuclearbombers
• ICBM:Offload50MM3sfromsilos,leaving400(allsinglewarhead;½cans7llMIRV)
• SSBN:Reducetubesfrom24to20,leavingnomorethan240deployedSLBMson12opera7onalsubmarines
USImplementa7onStatus
Imagestop-down:lastB-52Gdestroyed(111re7redB-52svisibleatDavis-MonthanAFBasofend-2015);ICBMsiloelimina7onatMalmstromAFB;ICBMsremovedfrom50silos;firstB-52Hde-nuclearizedatBarksdaleAFB;SSBNtubestobereducedfrom24to20persub.
100Russianinspec7onsofUSforcessince2011
NewSTARTisalsolong-termplanningforcelevel
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SinceFeb2011:reduc7onof0(zero)launchersandincreaseof198warheads
Russiawasbelowtreatylimitforlaunchersandwarheadswhentreatyenteredintoforcein2011
Russiacurrentlyhas220deployedlauncherslessthantheUnitedStatesand179lessthantreatylimit
Noreduc7onofdeployedlaunchersrequired,but56non-deployedlaunchersmustbeeliminated(currently39%ofRussiantotallaunchersarenon-deployed;USra7ois16%)
Deployedwarheadlevelhasincreasedby375from1,400in2013to1,735in2016
Reduc7onof185deployedwarheadsneededtomeetlimitby2018
Mighthavetocreateformalhedgeofnon-deployedmissilewarhead
101USinspec7onsofRussianforcessince2011
RussianImplementa7onStatus
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Despitewhatyoumighthear,Russiannuclearforcesarenotina“build-up”
RussiaisphasingoutSovieteralaunchers(SS-18,SS-19,SS-25,SS-N-18)andreplacingthemwithfewernewones;processbeganinlate-1990s
BecauseRussiahasfewerdeployedlaunchers,itiscompensa7ngforthedisparitybydeployingmorewarheadsoneachlauncherthantheUnitedStates;implica7onsforcrisisstability
Trends:greatershareofICBMwarheadsmobile;greatershareofwarheadsatsea(mighthavetocreateformalSLBMwarheadhedgetostaybelowNewSTARTlimit)
RussianForceStructureOutlook
Es7matedRussianICBMs
Es7matedRussianICBMWarheadTypes
Es7matedRussianSLBMWarheads
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UnitedStates:
• Limitonlaunchers(break-outpoten7al)
• Importanceofverifica7onregime
• “providingpredictabilityabouttheRussiannucleararsenalata7meofcon7nuedpoorrela7onswithMoscow.”(Go;emoeller2016)
• “moreimportantnowthanwhenitwentintoeffect.Itgivesustheconfidenceandlevelofoversightweneed–andcouldnototherwisehave–byallowingU.S.inspectorsunprecedentedaccesstoRussiannuclearfacili7es.”(Kerry2016)
• Wouldliketoseemorereduc7ons
• ArmscontrolopponentsinCongressusingtechnicalimplementa7onissuestoargueagainstreduc7ons
RussianFedera7on:
• CorrectedSTART2treaty;NewSTART(START3)seenasmorebalanced(especiallyremovalofICBMMIRVban)
• Doesn’tlimitRussianmoderniza7onprogram(alreadywellbelow)
• LimitsonlaunchersimportantgivensignificantUSwarheaduploadcapability(breakoutpoten7al)
• Valuesinsightprovidedbyverifica7onregime
• Notinterestedinnewtreatyun7lNewSTARTisimplemented;willlikelylinkotherstrategicissuestonextround
Percep7onsofTreatyValue“Basedontheinforma7onavailableasofDecember31,2015,theUnitedStatescer7fiestheRussianFedera7ontobeincompliancewiththetermsoftheNewSTARTTreaty.”
“TheUnitedStatesdoesnotassessthatthereisastrategicimbalancebetweentheUnitedStatesandtheRussianFedera7on.”USDepartmentofState,AnnualReportonImplementaJonofTheNewSTARTTreaty,January2016
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Noimportantstrategicstabilityissues,but
Largedisparityindeployedstrategiclaunchersfuelsasymmetricpostures(warheadandlauncherdistribu7on)
Russianincreaseofdeployedwarheadssince2013givesimpressionthatRussiaisnotdemonstra7nggoodfaithandfuelsuncertaintyaboutperiodarer2018
USreten7onoflargewarheaduploadcapacityand“warm”ICBMsilos,especiallywhenseentogetherwithadvancedconven7onalweaponsandgrowingmissiledefense,seenasdestabilizing
Overallstrategicmoderniza7ons,especiallyincontextofnewpoli7calcrisis,fuelsuspicionandworst-casescenarioplanning
US-Russiaagaininofficialadversarialrela7onship;bothareadjus7ngnuclearplanningaccordingly
StrategicStabilityIssues
EvenifRussiadeployedaddi7onalstrategicwarheadstoconductadisarmingfirststrike,evensignificantlyabovetheNewSTARTTreatylimits,it“wouldhaveli;letonoeffectsontheU.S.assuredsecond-strikecapabili7esthatunderwriteourstrategicdeterrenceposture.”
The“RussianFedera7on…wouldnotbeabletoachieveamilitarilysignificantadvantagebyanyplausibleexpansionofitsstrategicnuclearforces,eveninacheaJngorbreakoutscenarioundertheNewSTARTTreaty…”
DOD,ReportontheStrategicNuclearForcesoftheRussianFederaJon,2012
Problem!
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ICBM• SS-27Mod2(mobile):replacingSS-25satNovosibirsk,Tagil,Yoshkar-Ola• SS-27Mod2(silo):replacingSS-19satKozelsk• SS-27Mod2(rail):envisionedbutuncertain• RS-26(compactSS-27):toreplaceSS-25satIrkutskandVypolzovo• RS-28(Sarmat):toreplaceSS-28satDombarovskyandUzhur
SSBN/SLBM• SS-N-23SLBMlife-extension(Sineva/Layner)inDeltaIVSSBN• BoreiSSBN:8planned(possibly10-12)• SS-N-32(Bulava):fielding
Bombers• UpgradesofsomeTu-160(Blackjack)andTu-95(Bear)• Newbomber(PAKPA)indevelopment• NuclearALCM(Kh-102)indevelopment
Tac7cal• Tu-22M(Backfire)upgradeunderway• Su-34(Fullback)fielding(replacingSu-24)• Yasen(Sverodvinsk)SSGNfielding• SLCM(SS-N-30,Kalibr)fielding• GLCMtest-launched(notdeployed)• SSM(SS-26,Iskander)fielding(replacingSS-21)• SAM(S-400/SA-21)fielding(nuclear?)• ABM(A-135)upgradeplanned
RussianModerniza7on
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ICBM• MinutemanIIIlife-extensioncomple7ng• Warheadfuzes/interoperablewarheadplanned• GBSD(ICBMreplacement)indevelopment
SSBN/SLBM• TridentIID5SLBMlife-extensionproduc7on• SSBNreplacementdevelopment(12planned)• EnhancedW76-1warheadlife-extensiondeploying• W88-1warheadlife-extensiondevelopment
Bombers• UpgradeofB-2andB-52underway• B-21next-genera7onbomberindevelopment• B61-12guidedstandoffbombindevelopment• LRSO(ALCMreplacement)indevelopment
Tac7cal• F-35Anuclearcapabilityindevelopment• B61-12guidedstandoffbombindevelopment
Infrastructure• UraniumProcessingFacility(secondaries)construc7on• Plutoniumproduc7onfacili7es(primaries)construc7on• Warheadsurveillance/simula7onfacili7esupgrades
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide
USModerniza7on
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ObstaclesandPossibili7es Arerfullimplementa7onin2018,withcurrentemploymentstrategy,theUnitedStateswills7lldeployone-thirdmoreweaponsthanmilitarysaysitneedsforna7onalandinterna7onalsecuritycommitments.
ImplementaJonnotindoubt
Obstaclestoarmscontrol:
• Accusa7onsoftreatyviola7ons(INFGLCMandNewSTARTSS-25dismantlement)
• Moderniza7ons:howtolimitdynamic,avoidincreasingroleandnuclearweapons
• East-Westcrisis:erosionoftrustandresurgentofmilitarystandoffandadversarialrela7onshippolluteseverything
• GrowingconcernaboutRussianlimitednuclearusescenariosandUS“WestofLaunch”strategies(preven7onorpreemp7on)
Possibili7es(dependingonpoli7calclimate/will):
• Incen7ves:Evenifnewbi-lateraltreatyisnotpossiblenow,bothsideshaveclearna7onalintereststolimitforcesandopera7onstoreducecostsandrisksandtonedownrhetoric
• Treatyextensionbeyond2021un7l2023(2026?).ExtensionwouldnotbesubjecttoadviceandconsentoftheUSSenate• Execu7veorder(orhand-shakefollow-onagreement)tocutthroughbureaucracy,suspicion,andworst-casemindsets(ex:NFU)
• NextNewSTART:~500launcherswith~1,000warheads(wouldnotrequirechangestoUS(andprobablynotRussian)strategy• AnotherTreaty:~500launchers,~500warheads,noorlimitedMIRV,noorlimitedALCMs(MIRV-like).InvolvementofChina?
• DreamTreaty:limitsonstrategicdeployed,non-strategic,non-deployed,readiness,exercises(size,frequency,loca7on),moderniza7ons.
Russia“wouldnotbeabletoachieveamilitarilysignificantadvantagebyanyplausibleexpansionofitsstrategicnuclearforces,eveninacheaJngorbreakoutscenarioundertheNewSTARTTreaty…”
DOD,ReportontheStrategicNuclearForcesoftheRussianFederaJon,2012
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QUESTIONS?
Addi7onalinforma7onandresourcesfromFASNuclearInforma7onProject:
FASStatusofWorldNuclearForcesOverviewhwps://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/
FASNuclearNotebookSeries(ColumninBulle7noftheAtomicScien7sts):hwp://thebulle7n.org/search/feature-type/nuclear-notebook
FASStrategicSecurityBlog:hwps://fas.org/blogs/security/
FASNuclearRelatedPublica7ons:hwps://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-informa7on-project-publica7ons/