Table of Content - limun.org.uk · PDF fileTopic A: The Rohingya Crisis ... History of the...
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LONDON INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2017
Table of Content
United Nations Security Council London International Model United Nations 19th Session | 2018
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Table of Contents Letters from the directors ................................................................................................................. 3
Introduction to the UNSC ................................................................................................................. 4
Topic A: The Rohingya Crisis........................................................................................................... 5
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 5
History of the problem ................................................................................................................. 6
Statement of the problem .......................................................................................................... 10
The current situation .................................................................................................................. 15
Bloc Positions ............................................................................................................................ 19
Questions a resolution should answer ....................................................................................... 20
Bibliography............................................................................................................................... 20
Topic B: Topic A: Defining a “Doctrine of Security” for the UNSC .......................................... 27
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 27
History of the problem ............................................................................................................... 28
Statement of the problem .......................................................................................................... 31
The current situation .................................................................................................................. 34
Bloc Positions ............................................................................................................................ 35
Questions a resolution should answer ....................................................................................... 36
Bibliography............................................................................................................................... 37
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Letters from the Directors
Dear Delegates,
I‘m Chris Whitehouse, and I‘m honoured to be your Chair for UNSC at
LIMUN 2018. As a Londoner and graduate of Imperial, I‘ve always considered
LIMUN to be my home conference, so I‘m thrilled to be back.
This year‘s two topics are very different, but whether you choose debate the
complexities of a grave humanitarian crisis or the very purpose of the Council
itself, all delegates will have to be at the top of their game. Don‘t let us down!
Hello, my name is David-Jan Bosschaert ("DJ" for short) and I'm delighted to
be co-chairing this year's Security Council at LIMUN, where I've now had the
privilege of chairing since 2014. The Security Council was my very first
committee back when I started MUNing and has a special place in my heart. I
together with Chris will help to make sure that our debates are balanced and
our work running smoothly. We look forward to welcoming you at LIMUN
2018.
Contact: [email protected]
LONDON INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2017
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Introduction to the UNSC
Arising from the aftermath of the Second World War, the Security Council is
dominated by its Permanent Members, the major Allied powers of the war:
Russia, France, China, the UK and USA. The council primarily concerns itself
with matters of security. As the highest body of the UN, it is also the only body
that can pass resolutions which are legally binding. The UNSC will first try to
recommend parties come to an agreement. To support this, the UNSC can1 set
forth principles for such an agreement; undertake investigation and mediation;
dispatch a mission or appoint special envoys; or request the Secretary-General
to achieve a settlement of the dispute.
The UNSC can also attempt to deescalate conflicts by issuing ceasefire
directives, or dispatch military observers or peacekeepers. Failing that, the
UNSC can opt for harsher measures, including1:
economic sanctions, military embargoes, financial penalties and
restrictions, travel bans, blockade;
severance of diplomatic relations;
or even collective military action.
1UN, 2017. What is the Security Council? Accessed November 17, 2017. http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/.
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Topic A: The Rohingya Crisis
Introduction
Burma (renamed Myanmar in 1989) is a country in Southeast Asia of
approximately 55 million people. By the 19th
century, various ethnic groups
and corresponding states existed within the borders of what is now Myanmar2.
The region was conquered by the British and incorporated into the British Raj
as a new province. Burma gained its independence in 1948.
The focus of today‘s topic is the plight of the Rohingya, a mostly Muslim
ethnic minority who mostly live in Myanmar‘s Rankine (formerly Arakan)
province, on the border with Bangladesh. There they account for nearly a third
of the local population. Their religion, ethnicity and language make them
distinct from the mainly Buddhist ethnicities of Myanmar3. The Rohingya
claim to be natives to Myanmar, but the Burmese state (and most Burmese
2 CIA. 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html.
3 Albert, 2017. The Rohingya Crisis. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis.
(Getty
Images, 2017)
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people generally) reject their claims and consider them ―Bengali‖
immigrants. They have suffered persecution for decades.
Violence and ethnic tension in the region are not new, but the situation
escalated after the 25th of August 2017, when Burmese security forces
launched a sweeping counter-insurgency operation in retaliation for ―Arakan
Rohingya Salvation Army‖ (ARSA) attacks on police stations in Rakhine4.
Hundreds of thousands have fled. It is up to the UNSC to decide the
international response to the crisis.
History of the Problem
A short history of Muslims in Burma
The territory of what is now Myanmar has historically been
mostly Buddhist. However, parts of the region had contact
with Muslim civilisations, and small numbers of Muslim
sailors, traders, mercenaries and former POWs settled in the
region. The influence of the Muslim Kingdom of Bengal in
the region grew after 1430, when the Bengali King
intervened to restore a deposed Arakanese prince to the
throne, and gained him as a vassal. Arakan‘s newfound
connection to the Muslim west led to greater Muslim
immigration and cultural influence, though Buddhism still
dominated5. It is from this mixing between Muslim,
Arakanese and Burmese civilisations that the Rohingya
claim their lineage.
In 1785, the Kingdom of Burma conquered the Arakanese kingdom. Burma
would expand further, conquering the Kingdoms of Manipur and Assam,
4 BBC. 2017. Myanmar: Who are the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army?
5 Yegar, Moshe. 1972. The Muslims of Burma: A Study of a Minority Group. Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden.
Figure 1: The British conquest
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thereby creating a border with British India. The resulting border
friction (and British concerns about the Burmese threat to India) led to the
three Anglo-Burmese wars (1824–26, 1852, 1885), which would eventually see
Burma totally annexed by Britain and incorporated into the Raj as its newest
province6
Immigration in the colonial era
Despite being the largest single province in India, in 1909 Burma only had 9
million inhabitants, versus nearby Bengal, home to 75 million7. With the
border between India and Burma erased by the conquest, there was large scale
Indian immigration to Burma, particularly to commercial centres. The
immigrants were varied, drastically changing the socio-economic and religious
makeup of Burma8. The new Indian community‘s clout (by 1931 Indians
constituted 6.9% of Burma‘s total population and paid 55% of Rangoon‘s
municipal taxes) caused bitter resentment among Burmese: in 1930, anti-Indian
riots ravaged Rangoon9. This Burmese hostility to Indian (particularly Muslim)
immigrants bled into attitudes toward some Muslim Burmese groups. It is
during this colonial period of immigration that the Burmese state accuse the
―Bengali‖ Rohingya of settling in the country (a view widely backed by most
Burmese), as opposed to the Rohingya‘s pre-colonial claims.
The legacy of WW2
During the Second World War, the Japanese advanced into British Burma,
routing the British and causing hundreds of thousands of Indians to flee
towards India, and most would never return. The war was a catalyst, sparking
terrible violence in Arakan. Arakanese Buddhists in the South sacked Muslim
villages, driving Muslim refugees north sparking reprisals by Muslims in the
6 Encyclopedia Britannica. 2017. Anglo-Burmese Wars. https://www.britannica.com/event/Anglo-Burmese-Wars.
7 Imperial Gazetteer of India. 1909. ―Administrative Divisions.‖ Vol. 4. Oxford University Press. 46.
8 Egretau, Renaud. 2015. ―Indian and Chiniese communities in contemporary Burma: A comparative analysis of their
presence and influence. 9 Bhaumik, Subir. 2003. ―The Returnees and the Refugees: Migration from Burma.‖
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North, further dividing Arakan into a Muslim North and Buddhist
South10
. Further, both British and Japanese recruited and equipped auxiliaries.
Muslim Arakanese (including Rohingya) were the main recruits of the British
stay-behind ―V-force‖, while Japanese auxiliaries tended to be Buddhist. These
troops were accused of attacking ―rival‖ communities.
The Rohingya post-independence
In 1948, Burma gained its independence from Britain. The new country‘s
citizenship act included the Arakanese as a ―indigenous race of Burma‖, but
pointedly did not include the Rohingya11
. The law itself was partly a legacy of
colonial immigration: indigenous status for ethnic groups was defined in terms
of before and after 1823; i.e. the first Anglo-Burmese War. However, those
Rohingya with proof of family descent in the region (easier said than done)
could claim ID cards and certain rights.
In the chaos following the end of the war and independence, rebels sprung up
all over Burma, including Arakan. ―Mujahids‖: Muslim Arakanese who fought
for a separate state, or for the annexation of North Arakan to Pakistan. Though
these rebels did not have the total support of the Muslim population, they were
initially successful in securing North Arakan, helped by the government
offending many locals by replacing Muslim officials with outsiders. However,
the rebellion‘s cause was doomed when Pakistan refused to annex the region,
and this initial rebellion was crippled by government offensives in the mid-50s,
and finally totally crushed in 196110
.
10
Yegar, Moshe. 1972. The Muslims of Burma: A Study of a Minority Group. Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden. 11
The Union of Burma, 1948. The Union Citizenship Act, 1948
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The military coup, and its aftermath
Instability, ethnic insurgency and weak government led
to a military caretaker government between 1958 and
1960. The 1960 general election winner promised to
grant statehood to Arakan. In response, Arakan Muslim
and Rohingya organisations made a concerted attempt to
negotiate a separate, Muslim North Arakan region; they
feared being at the mercy of a hostile, Buddhist
dominated Arakanese state government. The proposals
went nowhere, and were anyway rendered moot when
General Ne Win launched a coup during a period of renewed instability.
The new military junta‘s ideology was heavily influenced by
Burmese nationalism, and their experience of ethnic tension
and insurgency. The army considered federalism and autonomy for ethnic
groups a existential threat to the unity of the country. Coup leader Ne Win
stated: “Federalism is impossible; it will destroy the Union”12
. This bode ill
for the Rohingya, who suffered further political repression as a result.
Their position was further damaged when the junta introduced a new
citizenship law in 1982. This went further than the 1948 law, further reducing
the Rohingya‘s previous rights and effectively rendering them stateless1314
.
(Calamur, 2017) (Union of Burma, 1982). This was the context of repeated
crackdowns and waves of repression, that saw hundreds of thousands of
Rohingya leave Burma/Myanmar since the late 1970s15
(Albert, 2017). As
before, the best the Rohingya could do was apply for limited identification
documents, ―white cards‖, registering as temporary residents.
12
Smith, M., 2002. Army Politics as a Historical Legacy: The Experience of Burma 13
Calamur, K., 2017. The Misunderstood Roots of Burma's Rohingya Crisis. 14
Union of Burma, 1982. Burma Citizenship Law. 15
Albert, E., 2017. The Rohingya Crisis.
Figure 2 General Ne Win, coup leader
(Oxford Burma Alliance, n.d.)
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The situation since the democratic transition
Hopes were high as Myanmar opened up towards free elections, and the
international community repealed sanctions that had choked the country‘s
economy for decades. But Myanmar‘s ongoing transition to democracy did not
solve the Rohingya question. A UN-backed census which would have
recognised the Rohingya came under the pressure of Buddhist nationalists, and
the category was changed to ―Bengali‖. This was bitterly opposed by the
Rohingya16
. Further, the government rescinded the ―white cards‖ ID,
effectively disenfranchising the Rohingya just before the 2015 election that
saw Aung San Suu Kyi‘s party come to power.
The communal violence is not new, even recently. Similarly large clashes
flared in 201217
when a young Buddhist woman was raped (allegedly by
Muslim men), and in 2016, when ARSA struck Burmese security forces for the
first time. It was the 2016 violence that led to the establishment of an advisory
commission on ethnic strife led by Kofi Annan.
Statement of the Problem
Violence by government
forces, deliberate ethnic
cleansing?
The crisis is a direct result
of the counterinsurgency
―clearance‖ operations
undertaken by government
16
al-Jazeera, 2014. In Pictures: Myanmar's census bars Rohingya 17
BBC, 2014. Why is there communal violence in Myanmar?
Figure 3: Burmese soldiers in Rakhine
(AFP, 2017)
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security forces. These operations are meant to establish the location of
insurgents and drive them out. It should be noted that the military has barred
aid agencies and press access to most affected areas, citing security.
Following the 2016 operation, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) released a flash report in February 2017, where they
interviewed 204 refugees, spread over 8 camps. Over half of those interviewed
reported witnessing beatings, killings and arson, while 43% reported seeing
rape. Detention and ―disappearing‖, particularly of men and boys, was also
reported. The authors considered the above numbers an underestimate of the
violence‘s scale18
. The testimony noted the indiscriminate nature of the
violence (the use of grenades, etc) and was consistent in noting the forces‘ use
of weapons and accelerants to start fires. The same report notes stories of
Buddhist Rakhine villagers, sometimes known to the refugees, joining the
security forces as auxiliaries in the violence.
During this year‘s clearance operation, NGO Amnesty International cited
refugee interviews and satellite imagery as evidence of an ―orchestrated
campaign‖ to burn Rohingya villages19
. Testimony described examples of the
army operations. In some cases they‘d surround a village; fire weapons in the
air or randomly at residents, then burned their homes as they fled. Other
testimony claimed that they were forewarned by officials that security forces
would be coming to burn their villages, and were urged to leave before their
arrival, suggesting premeditation. Further, Amnesty argues that the evidence
suggests that Muslim homes are being specifically targeted, while known
Buddhist homes were left alone. Amnesty has also received credible but
unverified reports of Buddhist Rakhine villages burned by Muslim militants.
18
OHCHR, 2017. Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar. 19
Amnesty International, 2017. Scorched Earth Campaign fuels Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya from Rakhine State
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The government and Burmese have accused Rohingya militants of being
behind the arson, as scorched earth tactics to impede government progress.
However, this seems unlikely, and BBC reporter Jonathan Head was even able
to speak to Buddhist Rakhine villagers, who confessed to torching an
abandoned Muslim village with the tacit support of police20
.
The organised nature of the violence, seemingly designed to drive out and
prevent the return of refugees, have led to many concluding the operations are
a campaign of ethnic cleansing. The UNHCR Zei‘id Ra‘ad Al Hussein
described the operations as a ―textbook example of ethnic cleansing‖21
. In
September of this year, his Office (the OHCHR) launched a rapid response
mission to Cox‘s Bazar, Bangladesh, to interview some recent arrivals. The
mission corroborated other reports, including that previously authored by
OHCHR. It is worth quoting it at length22
:
―…credible information gathered indicates that the destruction of Rohingya
villages in Northern Rakhine… were executed in a…systematic manner. [They
were] committed against the Rohingya… by the Myanmar security forces often
in concert with armed Rakhine Buddhist individuals…
…the manner [of the destruction] points to it being coordinated, thus
challenging the assertion that it was merely collateral damage of the military
security operations…
…the Myanmar security forces purposely destroyed the property of the
Rohingya, scorched their dwellings and entire villages… not only to drive out
the population but to prevent the victims returning to their homes. The
20
BBC, 2017. Rohingya Crisis: Seeing through the official story in Myanmar 21
UN, 2017. UN human rights chief points to "textbook example of ethnic cleansing" in Myanmar. 22
OHCHR, 2017. Mission report of OHCHR rapid response mission to Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh
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destruction by the Tatmadaw (army)… render the possibility of the
Rohingya returning to Northern Rakhine almost impossible…
[Reports] also indicate that the security forces targeted teachers, the cultural
and religious leadership, and other people of influence in the Rohingya
community… to diminish Rohingya history, culture and knowledge…‖
The report also argues that even prior to the incidents of 25 August, a strategy
was being pursued by the army to:
1) Arrest and detain Rohingya men of fighting age
2) Arrest and detain Rohingya community leaders
3) Deprive Rohingya villagers of access to food and livelihood
4) Commit repeated acts of violence and humiliation to drive out Rohingya
5) Instil deep and widespread fear and trauma through brutality
Further, the report argues that it was ―highly likely‖, based on injuries treated
by doctors, that the army had placed landmines along the border since the
operation‘s start to prevent returnees.
The hostility towards the Rohingya within Burmese society
Over the past few years, Myanmar
has democratised, with Aung San
Suu Kyi‘s party coming to power
in the 2015 elections. However,
this has not saved the Rohingya.
For one, the military still wield a
great deal of power within
Burmese society: it appoints one
Figure 4: Buddhist monk displays an anti-Muslim
message (AFP, 2017)
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quarter of parliamentary seats, and retains exclusive control of the
home, border affairs, and defence ministries23
. It is the military, not the civilian
government that exercises control over these operations. Some think that the
Commander in Chief of the Burmese Armed Forces, Min Aung Hlaing, ought
to feature more heavily in international discussion of the Rohingya crisis.
However, Suu Kyi‘s government has echoed the military‘s line, that the
violence is the work of ―extremist terrorists‖, and she herself has not used the
word ―Rohingya‖, referring only to ―Muslim Rakhines‖. Though Suu Kyi‘s
private thoughts can‘t be known, her public stance is as popular within
Myanmar as it is condemned outside it. Her followers have supported her
against foreign critics with political rallies, and such a small minority of
Burmese are sympathetic to the Rohingya that one activist remarked that
they‘d not dare launch a solidarity march24
(Guardian, 2017). This hostility is
grounded in the resentments dating back many decades, fanned over time by
military and Buddhist chauvinists (including extremist monks). Francis Wade,
a journalist focused on Myanmar, notes: ―There‘s been a longstanding fear of
Islamic cultures encroaching on Burma and weakening a national identity
centred on Buddhism…‖25
. A former American ambassador to Myanmar adds,
that many Burmese see calls for rights for the Rohingya as a separatist agenda
that infringes Burma‘s sovereignty and threatens the unity of the country,
harking back to the mujahid fighting after WW226
.
Uncertainty for Rohingya in Bangladeshi camps
Finally, on top of the hostility and the devastation of home, Rohingya‘s lack of
recognition by the government means the vast majority would not be able
return through proper means, even if they wanted to. Suu Kyi and the
23
Albert, E., 2017. How Myanmar's military wields power from the shadows. 24
Guardian, 2017. "A lot of fake news": Burmese back Aung San Suu Kyi on Rohingya Crisis. 25
Freeman, J., 2017. Can Anyone Stop Burma's Hardline Buddhist Monks 26
Calamur, K., 2017. The Misunderstood Roots of Burma's Rohingya Crisis
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government‘s assurances that they are ready to organise repatriations
have been dismissed by many as hollow promises: the process Suu Kyi
references covers only refugees registered by Bangladesh, and requires
documentation proving long-term residence in Myanmar27
. Furthermore,
Bangladesh feels the pressure of the sheer number of people, and doesn‘t want
to host them permanently28
. Many have been stuck in the limbo of the camps
for decades, and are now faced with the newest influx.
In summary, the Rohingya face the following pressing problems:
They‘re being pushed out of Rakhine by army ―clearance operations‖;
Those who escape to refugee camps face deprivation and uncertainty;
Even if the operations were to pause, deliberate destruction has made
returning to their villages impossible in many cases;
The government‘s position means that most have no way of proving
their right to return to Myanmar;
The underlying, deep-seated hostility of the Burmese government and
people means their position would be precarious if they returned.
Current Situation
The UN response thus far
After the outbreak of violence in
August 2016, Burmese leader
Aung San Suu Kyi invited Kofi
Annan to lead a commission on
the situation in Rakhine state.
The majority of the committee
27
Bennet, J., 2017. Rohingya refugees say Aung San Suu Kyi's promise to allow their return is hollow 28
Bennet, J., 2017. Rohingya asylum seekers fleeing Myanmar face limited welcome in Bangladesh.
Figure 5: Kofi Annan's Rakhine Commission takes questions (Voa News, 2017)
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was made of respected Burmese human rights activists and community
leaders, and the rest were UN grandees. The commission‘s mandate was to
provide recommendations to improve the communal situation in Rakhine in the
medium to long term29
. Its final report made many recommendations including
improved development, education, review of citizenship laws, resettling those
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within camps in Myanmar, softer security
enforcement, and better access to justice. It also called for unrestricted
humanitarian and press access to North Rakhine.
The commission was already something of a compromise. The report, at the
Burmese government‘s behest, never uses the word Rohingya, and the
commission did not have the mandate to investigate individual abuses. Suu
Kyi‘s office welcomed the commission‘s contributions, and has established an
implementation committee30
. However, the most recent crackdown came
almost immediately after the Final Report, throwing into question the
government and military‘s sincerity. A recent internal probe by the Burmese
military claimed that their forces hadn‘t committed arson, rape, beatings, or
used ―excessive force‖31
.
Though the Commission didn‘t investigate individual abuses and press/aid
agencies are barred from areas of active operations, other UN and other aid
agencies do have access to refugee camps in Bangladesh, and they‘re working
to provide aid and gather reports on the situation in North Rakhine.
The UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, opened a Security Council
meeting on Myanmar with a Presidential Statement at the UNSC meeting on
the 28/09/17. He called for ―swift action—to protect people, alleviate
suffering, prevent further instability, address the root causes of the situation,
29
Rakhine Commission, 2017. Advisory Commision on Rakhine State. 30
Office of State Counseller, 2017. RAKHINE: MYANMAR OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THE KOFI ANNAN REPORT 31
Reuters, 2017. Myanmar military denies atrocities against Rohingya, replaces general.
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and forge, at long last, a durable solution.‖32
Further, he called for: an
end to military operations; unrestricted access for humanitarian support; and
the assurance of ―safe, voluntary, dignified ad sustainable return of refugees to
their areas of origin‖. The statement was notable for its strong wording, but
unlike a Resolution, is not binding.
The UN in Myanmar: dysfunction?
While pondering what the UNSC‘s response, it is worth asking questions about
the UN‘s handling of the Rohingya question more generally. The persecution
of the Rohingya stretches back decades. The riots of 2012, 2013 and 2014
might‘ve indicated that the situation was getting worse, not better.
Some current and former aid and UN officials have strongly criticised the
UN‘s approach leading up to the beginning of the violence in August 2017. In
a BBC report on the issue, sources claimed that the United Nations Country
Team (UNCT) Renata Lok-Dessallien had33
:
Tried to stop human rights activists from travelling to North Rakhine,
Sidelined officials who wanted greater human rights priority,
Attempted to stifle public advocacy for the Rohingya,
Isolated staff who warned of ethnic cleansing.
The UN in Myanmar rejected these claims. The critics argue that these
problems were the result of an approach that sought to maintain government
goodwill and cooperation, to focus on a long-term strategy that prioritised
development. Further, Buddhist Rakhine resentment of aid to the Rohingya
(including blocking/looting aid convoys) complicated efforts, further
discouraging Rohingya advocacy. Leaked to the BBC, an internal UN report
32
UN, 2017. Secretary-General's remarks at open debate of the Security Council on Myanmar [as delivered] 33
Fisher, J., 2017. UN Failures on Rohingya revealed.
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from 2015, titled ―Slippery Slope: Helping Victims or Supporting
Systems of Abuse‖ was damning33
:
―The UNCT strategy with respect to
human rights focuses on heavily on
the over-simplified hope that
development investment itself will
reduce tensions…‖
Another, independent report was
commissioned by Dessallien in May 2017, entitled
―The Role of the UN in Rakine state‖, written by
analyst Richard Horsey. According to the Guardian, who obtained a copy, the
report predicted a ―serious deterioration‖ in the six months following its
submission, and warned that the army would be ―heavy handed and
indiscriminate‖34
. However, sources claimed that the report was ―spiked‖ by
the leadership. When Guterres became Secretary General in April, he
commissioned a short memo which assessed the UN in Myanmar to be
―glaringly dysfunctional‖33
.
Some, like former top UN Myanmar official Charles Petrie (who wrote a
critical report of the UN in Sri Lanka), argue that lack of coordination in
strategy was a problem33
: ―… the key lesson for Myanmar from Sri Lanka is
the lack of a focal point… a senior level addressing the situation in its totality,
the political, the human rights, the humanitarian and the development. It
remains diffuse, and means… there‘ve been almost competing agendas.‖
The perhaps distorting priority for development is likely because the UN
Development Program is empowered to appoint UN Resident Coordinators for
34
Stokes, E. & Holmes, O., 2017. Rohingya Crisis: UN "suppressed" report predicting its shortcomings in Myanmar.
Figure 6: Antonio Guterres, UN SG, addresses the UNSC on
the Rohingya question (AP, 2017)
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countries where the UN operates.35
. Guterres has been pushing for a
reform that would ―delink the functions of Resident Coordinators from UNDP
Resident Representatives…‖36
. It‘s clear that the UNSC‘s response to the crisis
will have to be stronger and more focused than the UN‘s interventions thus far.
Bloc positions
The “West”
The countries of the democratic West, like the UN, have been caught off guard
by the Rohingya crisis. With Myanmar‘s move to free elections, the west led
the international community in removing sanctions on the country. Further,
Western leaders had heavily invested in Aung San Suu Kyi politically, and
thus have been relatively muted in criticism of her. This is also due to a desire
to not push her closer to the Burmese generals.
However, in the wake of the most recent violence, their criticism has grown
stronger. Both the UK and US commented in November that the crisis looks
like ―ethnic cleansing‖3738
, and both countries have suspended all military aid
to Burma. US Ambassador Haley has called for prosecutions, and both the US
and EU are looking at possible targeted sanctions on the generals39
.
Russia and China
Russia and China have been less troubled by the recent violence. Both nations
are longstanding partners of Myanmar, cooperating on both economic and
military issues. However, as the greater economic power and a neighbour of
Myanmar, China wields more influence in the country.
35
Lynch, C., 2017. For Years UN was Warned of Threat to Rohingya in Myanmar. 36
UN, 2017. Secretar General's remarks to Economic and Social Council on Repositioning the UN Development
System to Deliver on the 2030 Agenda. 37
CNN, 2017. UK says Rohingya crisis "looks like ethnic cleansing". 38
Reuters, 2017. US Envoy to UN demands Myanmar Prosecutions. 39
Reuters, 2017. EU may shun Myanmar generals in new sanctions: draft
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In March 2017, the two nations vetoed a UNSC statement that expressed
concern for the Rohingya39
. Since the most recent violence, Myanmar has
openly said that it is negotiating with Russia and China to prevent the
Rohingya crisis becoming an issue at the Security Council40
.China has said that
it ―understands and supports‖41
Myanmar‘s efforts to protect national security,
condemns the ARSA attacks, but sympathises with refugees. It has also
suggested that the international community could foster ―peace talks‖, and
encourage cooperation on the crisis between Bangladesh and Myanmar.
Questions a Resolution Should Answer
What can the UNSC do to stop the violence?
What can the UNSC do for displaced Rohingya facing uncertainty in
refugee camps?
How can the UNSC ensure that recommendations made in the Kofi
Annan report are implemented on the ground?
Can and should the UNSC take steps to punish those responsible for the
violence? How should it go about doing so?
What can the UNSC do to improve the workings of the UN on the
ground?
What can the UNSC do about the Rohingya‘s long term prospects in
Myanmar?
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Topic B: Defining a ―Doctrine of
Security‖ for the United Nations
Security Council
Introduction
The specific scope of intervention by the UN Security Council remains a hot
topic of debate. Often the scene of high politics and allegations of double
standards, the method by which a situation is deemed to be ―maintenance of
international peace and security‖42
is rather unclear. It is therefore of
paramount importance that the United Nations Security Council defines a more
workable definition of when any type of intervention is warranted, reckoning
with both international law as well as practical arguments.
At present any intervention (or decision, for that matter) from our body is
subject to a majority of 9 votes, including the absence of a veto by a Permanent
42
Art. 24.1 United Nations Charter
LONDON INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2017
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Member. This in practice heavily relies on the political goodwill of
those 5 Permanent Members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the
United Kingdom and the United States). Several ways out of this possible
deadlock have been found in the past, but it still remains difficult to act in
specific circumstances when a Permanent Member wishes to use their veto:
even a mere announcement of a possible blockage (the so-called ‗pocket veto‘)
can already have a major chilling effect on many topics that are nevertheless of
importance for international peace and security.
The only way out of this is for the Security Council to clearly define its own
‗Doctrine of Security‘ on the conditions, methods and elements to be fulfilled
in a possible United Nations Security Council intervention. We will thereby
take an academic look at the requirements and constituent elements of such a
doctrine, if one exists at all.
However, is there a framework within which this use of force can be justified?
Are there any criteria (beyond ad hoc politics) under which an intervention can
be warranted? Let us try to define a more theoretical approach to this "Doctrine
of security" under this topic
History of the Problem
The right of the Security Council to intervene in a given situation of concern to
international peace and security has been clearly established by the United
Nations Charter.43
However, it has shown not to be absolute in all matters.
Defining the ―Doctrine of Security‖ for our council therefore requires a deeper
understanding of the blockages that arose at times in the past.
43
Art. 24.1 United Nations Charter
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A first major break in the absolute veto power of the Security Council
took place on 3 November 1950, when the Soviet Union repeatedly vetoed
interventions warranted by the United Nations in the Korean War. This process
frustrated the other member states of the United Nations at that time. They
came up with the so-called ―Uniting for Peace‖ resolution 377 A of the
General Assembly.44
In this resolution a fallback option was formulated in case the Security Council
has failed to act as required to maintain international peace and security
because of a veto of a Permanent Member. The General Assembly may
thereupon immediately consider the matter. It shall do so ―with a view of
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures,
including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of
armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and
security‖.45
This important precedent will be a major part of our possible ―Doctrine of
Security‖, since it stipulates both conditions and methods of intervention in
case a Permanent Member exercises his veto power. As a condition this veto
needs to have been exercised. As a method this resolution of the General
Assembly even authorises ―the use of armed force when necessary‖. It is
therefore an important precedent for document.
A second important step in the history of a possible ―Doctrine of Security‖ was
made by another General assembly resolution. The so-called ―Responsibility to
Protect‖ incorporated in the 2005 World Summit outcome presented an outline
44
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 377 A, 3 November 1950,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/377(V) 45
Art. 1, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 377 A, 3 November 1950,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/377(V)
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LONDON INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2017
of when the United Nations should intervene when preventing or
responding to the most serious violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law.
The General Assembly approved these findings in resolution A/RES/60/1 of 16
September 2005.46
This document outlined the fact that ―no State can best
protect itself by acting entirely alone and that all States need an effective and
efficient collective security system pursuant to the purposes and principles of
the Charter‖.47
This resolution also stressed the role of both the Security Council and the
General Assembly in maintaining international peace and security: ―We also
reaffirm that the Security Council has primary responsibility in the
maintenance of international peace and security. We also note the role of the
General Assembly relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter‖.48
The so-called ―Responsibility to Protect‖ is therefore an element that
historically influenced a possible ―Doctrine of Security‖ as we are trying to
formulate. It was featured in Security Council resolution 1674 of 28 April
2006,49
as well as in resolutions on Libya,50
Ivory Coast,51
Yemen52
and
Sudan53
in 2011.
46
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/pdf/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement 47
Art. 72 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005, https://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/pdf/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement 48
Art. 80 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005, https://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/pdf/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement 49
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1674, 28 April 2006,
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/security-council-resolution-1674-2006-on-protection-of-civilians-in-
armed-conflict 50
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1970, 26 February 2011,
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/s/res/1970-%282011%29; United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1973,
17 March 2011, https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/s/res/1973-%282011%29. 51
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1975, 30 March 2011,
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/s/res/1975-%282011%29.
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On Syria the ―Responsibility to Protect‖ was equally invoked in 2012 in a draft
resolution which ended up being vetoed by the Russian Federation and
China.54
This confirms the pre-existing ―Uniting for Peace‖ doctrine that after
an initial veto by a Permanent Member, the United Nations General Assembly
can be called upon to take action instead.
From this brief historical overview we can therefore state that some initial
limitations have taken place of the Security Council‘s mandate according to the
United Nations Charter. The possible ―Doctrine of Security‖ should therefore
ideally incorporate these two existing limits on this council‘s powers whilst
also trying to look for new horizons in the process.
Statement of the Problem
Let us now take a closer look at the constituent parts of a possible ―Doctrine of
Security‖ of our council. Among other elements warranting the establishment
of for instance a peacekeeping operation we can clearly see some other criteria
emerging. The absence of a veto is a given, albeit a very politically charged
element. This first possible element can however be relatively easy
circumvented by working with the General Assembly after a veto in the
Security Council.
This document would ideally point out the conditions, the methods and the
elements of any possible Security Council intervention. Each of these
constituent parts deserves a closer look in their own right.
52
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2014, 21 October 2011,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014(2011) 53
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1996, 8 July 2011,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1996(2011) 54
Outreach programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations, The Responsibility to Protect. Who is
responsible for protecting people from gross violations of human rights?,
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/bgresponsibility.pdf, p.3.
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Conditions of intervention
Intervention is normally only allowed upon agreement of 9 out of 15 members
of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the Permanent
Members.55
However, if the General Assembly votes in favour of an
intervention after an initial Security Council veto this condition can also be
met. We can therefore conclude that there is a fair amount of flexibility when it
comes to the conditions of intervention.
A United Nations warranted intervention of any sorts would need the approval
of either of these two bodies in order to be considered legitimate. It can
however be further discussed if other preliminary conditions of interventions
should be added to our potential ―Doctrine of Security‖ in order to make sure
that international law is upheld through a targeted United Nations intervention
in a given situation.
Methods of intervention
A very clear outline of the way in which the Security Council can intervene
can be found in the United Nations Charter. It authorises this council to take
measures involving the use of armed force or not.56
However, in case the
Security Council should come to a gridlock through the veto of a Permanent
Member, it befalls upon the General Assembly to bypass this by using the
aforementioned ―Uniting for Peace‖ precedent of 1950. This even allows for
the ―use of armed force when necessary‖.57
55
Art. 27 United Nations Charter. 56
Chapter 6 and 7 United Nations Charter. 57
Art. 1, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 377 A, 3 November 1950,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/377(V)
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We can therefore state that at present both the military and non-military
method of intervention are allowed. Whereas originally the use of armed force
was restricted to the Security Council acting under Chapter 7 of the United
Nations Charter, this method can now also be invoked by the General
Assembly acting under ―Uniting for Peace‖ or under the Responsibility to
Protect‖, as outlined before.
When an intervention is therefore authorised by either United Nations body,
there is a broad scope of possible methods of intervention. This ranges from
restrictive measures to use of armed force, and reflects the variety of options
found in the United Nations Charter. Additional specifications or limitations –
if needed in the opinion of the member states present at the Security Council
table – would have to be included in the possible ―Doctrine of Security‖
document that will be put forward.
Elements of intervention
Finally, we need to outline which elements of intervention would be required
as part of our possible ―Doctrine of Security‖. The methods of intervention
don‘t fully take into account the elements on the ground. Whether or not to
have a field mission, a peacekeeping mission or another element of
intervention on the ground is currently not codified: it depends on political
choices made in New York by those in the Security Council or in the General
Assembly.
This last of the three constituent parts is perhaps the least defined. It dwells
upon extra modalities not captured by either the conditions or the methods of
intervention. In a possible ―Doctrine of Security‖ the members of the Security
Council will therefore be free to add whatever extra elements they would deem
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necessary to curtail the intervention of the Security Council in the
future. This part of discussion will thereby arguably be the most controversial.
Current Situation
Up until now the decision to intervene or not was always made on a case by
case basis. We have however seen in the previous chapter that some dents were
made in this principle throughout the United Nations‘ history. Let us therefore
see what the current state of play is on formulating a possible ―Doctrine of
Security‖ for our council.
Any measures so far - whether under Chapter 6 or Chapter 8 of the UN Charter
- constituted an ad hoc response to a given situation. Distinguishing
characteristics for a United Nations intervention mandated by the Security
Council thereby led to a large 'grey zone': similar situations warranted different
responses, while mandates were copied from one situation to another, despite a
large set of different elements. Was there however an underlying doctrine
warranting more of our attention?
As mentioned before very clear indication of this possible "Doctrine of
security" was the ―Uniting for Peace‖ resolution adopted by the General
Assembly. This document clearly demonstrated a fallback option for the
General Assembly: in case a case would have been blocked by a Security
Council veto, the option exists to take it to the General Assembly. The latter
can then decide to take some actions in its own right which the Security
Council was unable to pass.
In case of a peacekeeping mission we can however clearly see how this UNGA
resolution has made a difference. Different operations were mandated which
failed to get approval in the Security Council. On the downside, a single
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fallback option like this one hardly amounts to a "Doctrine of security"
as promised by this topic's title.
It is therefore very much up to the United Nations member states currently
serving on the Security Council – including the powerful Permanent Members
– to state what they would like to see included in a possible ―Doctrine of
Security‖ valid for our council and the United Nations as a whole. Whilst such
a progression to a single document might look logic, its very existence might
already prove to be controversial for some members. Our council should
therefore carefully reflect on the necessity of having it in the first place,
followed by a discussion on its contents in terms of conditions, methods and
elements of intervention.
Bloc positions
A first block of countries would be formed by the Permanent Members of the
Security Council. Their interests are confined to maintaining the status quo in a
possible ―Doctrine of Security‖. Some might even believe there is no need for
such a document, undercutting the efforts of the other members of this council
significantly.
On the other side of the argument the non-permanent members would be
found: some of them see a need for a comprehensive ―Doctrine of Security‖ to
make sure the Security Council is kept in check and possibly bypassed if
certain conditions are met. This will increase the power of the General
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LONDON INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2017
Assembly and consequentially their own power within that United
Nations body.
Some Permanent Members might however be emboldened by the 1950
precedent of ―Uniting for Peace‖, allowing a bypass of the Security Council in
exceptional circumstances (e.g. a veto by a Permanent Member). This will
make things potentially easier for those non-permanent members seeking to
formulate a more complete document on this topic.
Questions a Resolution Should Answer
Is there a need for a comprehensive ―Doctrine of Security‖ for the Security
Council or for the United Nations as a whole?
Can common criteria be formulated for such a doctrine?
What conditions should be met before the ―Doctrine of Security‖ kicks in?
Which methods of intervention shall be allowed?
Which other elements should be present in this document in order for it to
be operational, practical and realistically achievable?
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LONDON INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2017
Bibliography
Art. 24.1 and 27, Chapter 6 and 7 United Nations Charter
Art. 1, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 377 A, 3 November
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