T5 B68 Commission Report Comments Fdr- Entire Contents- Withdrawal Notice- Chp 10 Draft- 2 Emails...

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICERG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Mem orial Com missionsSERIES: 9/11 Comm ission Team 5, FRC Box 31

NND PROJECT NUM BER: 51095 FOIA CASE NUM BER: 30383WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/06/2008

BOX: 00009 FOLDER: 0008 TAB: 1 DOC ID: 31205007COPIES: 1 PAGES: 9

_ _ RESTRICTED]The item iden tified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Commission Report CommentsDOCUMENT DATE: 07/06/2004 DOC UM ENT TYPE: DraftFROM:TO :SUBJECT: Chapter 10 , Version 7/1/04

This document has been withdrawn for the follow ing reason(s):9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE


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Flights o f Saudi Nat ionals Leav ing th e United StatesDuring the morning of September 11, the FAAsuspended all non-emergency air activity in thenational airspace. While the national airspace was closed, decisions to allow aircraft to fly weremade by the FAA working with the Departmentof Defense, Department of State, U.S. SecretService, and the FBI.17 The Department of Transportation reopened the national airspaceeffective 11:00 a.m. on September 13,2001, for flights out of airports that had implemented theFAA's new security requirements.18Wehave investigated allegations that Saudi nationals were allowed to fly within or out of theU.S. on chartered aircraft while the national airspace was still closed and that these specialflights were permitted because of political intervention from the White House. Uponinvestigation, we found no credible evidence to support either of these allegations. Because theallegations have been sowidely circulated and have produced numerous questions to us fromconcerned members of Congress, webelieve it is necessary to summarize the relevant details inthis reportAfter 9/11, many government decisions were coordinated bypersonnel working in the variousagencies' emergency operations centers. FBI personnel working in their operations center, forexample, spent long hours working with a shifting arrayof personnel from other agenciesoftenby video teleconferenceto address issues that arose, One of the issues dealt with primarilythrough this process was whether flights of Saudi Arabian nationals shouldbe allowed todepartthe United States after 9/11.Within days of September 11, fearing reprisals against Saudi nationals, Rihab Massoud, thedeputy chief ofmission at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC, called Dale Watson, the FBI'sassistant director for counterterrorism and asked for help in getting some of its citizens out of thecountry. As Richard Clarke explained to us, this is acourtesy that the U.S. sometimes requestsfrom other countries in order to protect Americancitizens.19At about the same time, MichaelRolince, chief of the FBI's international terrorism operations section, also heard from an FBIofficial in Newark about a proposed flight of Saudi students out of the countryfunded by theSaudi Embassy.20 Rolince says he told the Newarkofficial that the students should not beallowed to leave without having the names on their passports matched to their faces, and theirnames run throughFBI case records to see whether theyhad surfacedbefore.21 Rolince and

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Watson briefed Robert Mueller, the director of the FBI, about the issue and how they werehandling it. The State Department played a role as well, in flights involvinggovernment officialsormembers of the royal family.22 23 State apparently coordinated with the FBI and FAA to allowscreening by the FBI of flights with Saudi nationals on board. A Saudi flight carrying thedeputy defense minister and an official delegation did leave without screening after the airspacereopened, but there is no evidence that State tried to limit the screening.25The issue came up in one of the many video teleconferences of the interagency group Clarkechaired. Clarke said he had already heard about the issue, either from the State Department orsomeone at the White House, but that he approved how the FBI was handling it when it came upfor interagency discussion at his level.262 Clarke told us, "I asked the FBI, Dale Watson ... tohandle that, to check to see if that was all right with them, to see if they wanted access to any ofthese people, and to get back to me. And if they had no objections, it wouldbe fine with me."Clarke said "I have no recollection of clearing it with anybodyat the WhiteHouse."28 We foundno evidence that anyone at the White House above Clarke participated in these decisions.Although White House chief of staff Card remembered someone telling him about the Saudirequest shortly after September 11, he said he had not talked to the Saudis and did not askanyone to do anything about their request. The President and Vice President told us they werenot awareof the issue at all until it surfaced much later in the media. The Saudi ambassador,Prince Bandar, told us he did not call anyone about theproblem. None of the officials weinterviewed recalled receiving any intervention or direction on the issue from any politicalappointee,29The FBI effectively approvedthe Saudi flights, at the level of a section chief.30 The Bureaufacilitated the Saudi departures. Having an opportunity to check the Saudis was useful to theFBI, This was because the U.S. government did not, and does not, routinely run checks onforeigners who are leaving the United States. This procedure was convenient, as the Saudis whowished to leave in this way would gather and present themselves for record checks andinterviews, an opportunity that would not be available if they simply left on regularly scheduledcommercial flights. The Saudi government was advised of the requirements the FBI wanted metbefore the flights could leave, and agreed.31 The FAA representative working in the FBIoperations center made sure the FBI was awareof flights of Saudi nationals and were able toscreen the passengers before they were allowed to depart.32 33After the airspace reopened, six chartered flights with 142people, mostly Saudi Arabiannationals, departed from the United States between September 14 and 24. Every airport involvedin a Saudi flight was open when the flight departed, and no inappropriate actions were taken toallow these flights to depart. These flights were screened by law enforcement officials, primarilythe FBI. For example, one flight, the so-called Bin Ladin flight, departed the United States onSeptember 20 with 26passengers, most of them relatives of Usama Bin Ladin. Screening of thisflight was directed by an FBI agent in the Baltimore Field Office who was also a pilot,34 Thisagent, coordinating with FBI headquarters, sent an electronic communication to each of the fieldoffices through which the Bin Laden flight was scheduled to pass including the proposed flightmanifest and directing what screening should occur.35 He also monitored the flight as it movedaround the countryfrom St. Louis to Los Angeles to Orlando to Washington-Dulles, and toBoston-Logancorrecting for any changes in itinerary to make sure there was no lapse in FBI

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screening at these locations.36 Again, each of the airports through which the Bin Ladin flightpassed was open and no special restrictions were lifted to accommodate its passage.The Bin Ladin flight and other flights w e examined were screened in accordance with policiesset by FBI headquarters and coordinated through working-level interagencyprocesses. Thirtyofthe 142people on these six flights were interviewed by the FBI, including 22 of the 26 people(23 passengers and 3 private security guards) on the Bin Ladin flight. Many were asked detailedquestions. None of the passengers stated that they had any recent contact with Usama BinLadinor knew anything about terrorist activity. Two of the passengers on this flight had been thesubjects of preliminary investigations by the FBI, but both their cases had been closed, in 1999and March2001, respectively, because the FBIhad uncoveredno derogatory information oneither person linking them to terrorist activity. Their cases remained closed as of September 11,2001, andwere not reopened before they departed the countryonthis flight, nor since then.37The FBI checked a variety of databases for information on the Bin Ladin flight passengers andsearched the aircraft Because it was not clear to the Commission whether the TTPOFF terroristwatchlist was checked by the FBI, at our request prior to our hearing inApril 2004, tie TerroristScreening Center checked the names of individuals on the flight manifests of these six Saudiflightsagainst the current TTPOFF watchlist There were no matches.38 At our request, theTerrorist Screening Center in June 2004, rechecked all the names of individuals believed to be onthese six flights, and the names of individuals on three more flights (including scheduledcommercial flights) that journalists have alleged are suspect39 There were no matches.The FBI has concluded that nobody was allowed todeparton any of these flights who the FBIwanted to interview in connection with the 9/11 attacks, or who the FBI later concluded had anyinvolvement in those attacks. To date, we have uncovered no evidence to contradict thisconclusion. Thus, it is our view that theFBIhandled the screening of these flights in aprofessional manner consistent with the other pressing priorities they faced after September 11,oarticularly the need to prevent future terrorist attacks many then feared were imminent40


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L aw Enforcement Privacy

Tom Eldridge

p

F V < 3 > m : Tom EldridgeSeni Friday. July 09, 2004 5:30 PMTo: \e DunneCc; pan Marcus; Chris Kpjm; Susan Ginsburg; Yoel TobinSubject: Proposed edits to Chapter 10

Steve- \\1Detainees

Based on corrtments by DOJ that I think are on point, I would propose the following changes to the two detaineeparagraphs:In the first paragraph, delete". New regulations made it easier to keep detainees in custody longer," and change"until such time as they" to "until such time as the detainees...."In the second paragraph, Change the last sentence to read, "The Inspector General of the Justice Departmentfound some of the9ildetainees suffered physical and verbal abuse." And then move this sentence up to followthe sentence ending".. .U.S. Marshals Service." This is more accurate than the previous sentence that referredto abuse of "fights." . .Saudi Flights(Using the version produced by Yoel Tobin with my responses to his bolded comments)Endnote 19: In response to the comment, thevCRU Special Interest Cases" list was produced to the Commissionin an interview of QHS attorney! Ton March 15, 2004; however, it would be better if we did notidentify her as the source. The date on the list is 9/16(03.Endnote 21: The citation in support of the verbal and physical abuse of the 9/11 detainees (discussed above) is:DOJ report, Office of the Inspector General, "The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of AliensHeld on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks," Apr. 2003, pp.142-150. \Endnote 26: It should read "Deputy Defense Minister" as suggested; I have the LAX citation support and willforward it to you; add after Logan International Airport "and Hanscbm Airfield". The QFR response referred toboth. Add at the end"; Pc-rt Authority of New York and New Jersey/Newark Airport, Response to SupplementalQuestion for the Record, July 9, 2004." I will forward to you this supplemental email. Change "Perez" to"Ramirez." Change sentence about the phantom pilot to read: The plane's pilot told us there was 'nothingunusual whatsoever" about the flight other than there were few airplanes in the sky." The FAA has confirmed thattheir records are in "Zulu" time, sowhat appears to be "8:38" really is "4:38", If you want, I can send the emailconfirming Zulu time.Endnote 28: Should read "Deputy Defense Minister". Rolince, Clarke andl Iall support theconclusion thatthese decisions were made through a working-level interagency process, so we could cite their interviews aswellMFRs have already beeri provided. Iwould change the FBI citation to: "FBI report of investigation,interview of Mohammed Saleh Bin Ladin, Sept. 13,2001." On the question about Massoud, he said that theSaudi embassy was formally involved in only two flights, one of which was the Bin Laedn flight.Endnote 32: Should read: "Tim flI interviews (Apr. 12,June 30, and July 9, 2004)." C| Ihas confirmed thatthey have checked the names of passengers on all 10 flights against TIPOFF.

-Tom

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Tom EldridgeFrom: Philip ZelikowSent: Tuesday, June 22, 2004 11:32 PMTo: Tom EldridgeCc: Stephanie KaplanSubject: RE: Saudi Flights

T o m

If yo u come by K Street, you can review ho w we've digested your excellent work for a portion of draftchapter 10.Of the three points you're still working, you may already know that #3 is the one Moore fell back towhen quizzed by Stephanopoulos on Sunday. Moore didn't cite the Tampa flight in the brief excerpt.Philip

Original MessageFrom: Tom EldridgeSent: Tue 6/22/2004 10:34 AMTo : Philip ZelikowCc:Subject: Saudi FlightsPhilip -By now I hope you received the latest writing on this topic.Please let me know if and when you need more information.I continue to research the following issues:1. The screening if any of the 9/13 Defense Minister flight (with FBI and Saudi Embassy officials);2. Whether an yone of interest is on the Judicial Watch list of passengers (with DHS and FBI);3. Whether there were any restrictions on charter or other flights still in effect once the airports andairspace were reopened (with TSA).TSA has been ve ry d ifficult to get answers from.-Tom

6/24/2004

T5 B68 Commission Report Comments Fdr- Entire Contents- Withdrawal Notice- Chp 10 Draft- 2 Emails...

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