T1 B26 Matt Levitt Fdr- Draft MFRs- Emails- Notes- Withdrawal Notice 628

8/14/2019 T1 B26 Matt Levitt Fdr- Draft MFRs- Emails- Notes- Withdrawal Notice 628

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Page 1 of 4

Yoel TobinFrom: Yoel Tobin [[email protected]]Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 1:34 PMTo: '[email protected]'Subject: Levitt MFR

I have made a few additional changes. I have shown deletions by using strikeout, and additions by usingbold. Let me know if you are ok with these changes. Thanks!

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDEvent: Interview of Matthew LevittDate: October 28, 2003

Classification: UnclassifiedPrepared by: Yoel Tobin & Dan ByrnanTeam numbers: 1 and 3Location: K Street, Conference RoomParticipant: Matthew Levitt, Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies at theWashington Institute fo r Near East PolicyParticipants - Commission: Dan Byman & Yoel TobinBackgroundMr. Levitt is currently a Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies at the Washington Institute fo r NearPolicy. Before that, he served as a counterterrorism analyst at the FBI from November 1998 throughNovember 2001. At the FBI, he focused primarily on Palestinianterrorist groups, but also worked on issues relating to Osama bin Laden and AlQaeda.Combating Terrorist Financing

Mr. Levitt commented on the efforts by the United States Government (USG) to combat terroristfinancing. He said that the USG has "a far way to go," although the situation has improved somewhatsince 9/11.Mr. Levitt said that there should be no distinction between material supporters of terrorism and thosewho pull the trigger or activate the bomb, i.e., there they are all equally culpable.Mr. Levitt emphasized the permeable borders between terrorist groups and the need to crack down onterrorist financing across the board, rather than restricting our efforts to Al Qaeda. He believes thatsupport networks for Al Qaeda frequently support other Islamic terrorist groups, as well, and gave

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M E M O R A N D U M F O R T H E R E C O R D P a g e 2 o f 4

examples of overlapping assistance to both Hamas and A l Qaeda. He also believes that it is a moralimperative to have a consistent, across-the-board counterterrorism po licy against groups that targetcivilians.The FBILevitt was critical of the FBI in several respects. He said disapprovingly that before 9/11 DOJ and FBImanagement would only prosecute persons who gave money to terrorist groups if there was proof thatthe donor know ingly intended to finance a terrorist attack. He also stated that the FB I is poorlyorganized and that for bureaucratic reasons it insists on pigeonholing cases into discreet categories b yterrorist group, w hen in fact the boundaries between groups are often fluid. He noted that theinformation sharing problems of the FBI missed the point: the FBI often did not share information withitself, let alone with the rest of the government. In addition, he asserted that the FBI sometimeswithheld relevant inform ation from its analysts, and that there was a dearth of strategic analysis becausegood analysts w ere often pulled into operational units. During crisis periods, senior analysts weresometimes assigned secretarial duties because m anagers were reluctant to ask secretaries to work late atnight. He believes that many of these problems persist today.With regard to the Government's post-9/11 efforts against terrorist financing, Mr. Levitt praised theefforts of Treasury's outgoing General Counsel David Aufhauser. A t the same time, he criticized theUSG's structure as cumbersome (e.g., persistence of different terrorist lists) and said that the USGneeds a senior official who focuses on terrorist financing and chairs the PCC dealing with that issue.Also, the USG needs a culture change so that everyone is working to contribute to the overallinteragency effort.Mr. Lev itt also thought that there were additional entities that should have been shut down, evenallowing for the fact that in some cases nonaction was justified because of ongoing intelligenceinvestigations. In addition, many of the terrorism lists are not com plimentary, with radicals on one listbut not another.Saudi ArabiaMr. Levitt also addressed the role of Saudi A rabia in financing terrorist groups. He stated that theKingdom is not doing everything it can and should be doing to choke off terrorist financing. Much ofthe Kingdo m's clerical elite is sympathetic to Bin Ladin. He singled out Prince Naye f, the SaudiInterior Minister, as amajor problem. He charged that Prince Nayef does not cooperate with the USG,that he is aware of some extremist financing, and that he consciously shields himself from in form ationthat he does not agree w ith or want to hear. M r. Levitt also asserted that much of Saudi A rabia'sreligious establishment was sym pathetic to parts of Bin Laden's agenda, and that Saudi diplomats havebeen linked to charities that operate as fronts for terrorist groups.Mr. Levitt gave exam ples of inadequate Saudi action against terrorist financing. Although the Saudisshut down tw o branches of the A l-Haramain charity, those branches later reopened, and in any case theSaudis should have taken action against the entire organization. He also expressed concern about theInternational Islamic Relief O rganization (IIRO), the Muslim World League (M W L), the WorldAssembly of Muslim Youth (W AM Y), and Saudi businessman Wael Jalaidan. (Jalaidan was apparentlythe subject of a joint U.S.-Saudi terrorist designation, which Prince Nayef then disavowed).Mr. Levitt also criticized other Saudi actions, including alleged Saudi funding of mosques used byterrorists, Saudi efforts to spread Wahab i ideology, an d what he said were proactive efforts by Saudiofficials to undermine counterterrorism investigations in other countries through, e.g., the issuance of

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MEMORAND UM FOR THE RECORD Page 3 of 4

T ^ ^ ^ ^ c ^ r s ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ n j C c ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ T ^ r c C T r v T i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ T r T i k J T ^ c n ^ T T i r i ' c i r T v T t r k j T T i T C ^ T i T[deleted last sentence as redundant]There was not a major change in Saudi coo peration after September 11. The Kingdom launched apublic relations cam paign and denied charges but did not fulfill provinces promises related to afinancial intelligence unit or giving FBI and IRS people on the ground direct access to the data theSaudis receive. As a result, we d on 't know what we are not getting. It focused on its im age, not theproblem . Mr. Levitt has not seen a marked im provem ent in Saudi actions since the May 12, 2003bom bings in Riyadh.The FBI needs to be em powered and tasks tasked to run a strategic analytic review of Saudi links tointernational terrorism cases in the United States. The B ureau needs to know the scope of the problemand the details of groups and institutions w ith links to the Kingdom.Mr. Levitt suggested that we speak w ith USG officials Cofer Black, David Aufhauser, and StephenHadley to learn m ore about the lack of Saudi cooperation on terrorist financing. He added that therewere no simple answers to the problems with Saudi Arabia since the Saudi government is essentiallydysfunctional.HAMAS, PIJ, and the Muslim BrotherhoodHAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad are not part of the al-Qa'ida "family," but it is impossible todisentangle their logistics networks. Do th organizations have tremendous legitimacy, an d Our Arabpartners refuse to delegitimate their use of terrorism by HAM AS and PIJ, focusing instead on thecause itself which is legitimate if peacefully articulated. M ore broadly , the international com m unityneeds to delegitimate terrorist tactics and should help fill the gaps in Palestinian society that H AM ASand PIJ fill meet the social and economic needs in Palestinian society so that Palestinians will notneed to rely on H AM AS and PIJ to meet those needs.Levitt believes the Muslim Brotherhood should be designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization.Brotherhood members call for jihad and otherwise aid violence.Hizballah and IranHizballah is an extremely capable terrorist group that gets tremendous support from Iranian intelligenceand the Islam ic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as from Syria (which is less involved inHizba llah's global network). Some al-Qa'ida m embers trained with Hizballah and learned aboutspectacular attacks and how to do prcoccupational preoperational surveillance. There were alsomeetings - but they did not progress e to operational cooperation. Hizballah has close ties to thePopular Resistance C om m ittee in Gaza and is otherwise aiding various anti-Israel groups. TodayHizballah is building up its international capacity. This is now latent, but it could be turned on if thegroup wan ts to use it. Iran shelters al-Q a'ida leaders, but the relationship is tactical, not intim ate.Iraq and SyriaAl-Qa'ida and Iraq were always involved, and the current "open door" wo rks well for the organization.For monthsjihadis have crossed from Syria, and it is documented that money and supplies are comingin. The Syrians are allow ing entry into Iraq and perhaps facilitating it. Even before the war, Syriaallowed Al Qa'ida operatives to transit Syrian territory on their way to Ansar al-Islam camps inIraq. Saddam Husayn probably had a liaison with al-Qa'ida but not necessarily sponsorship. The warwith Iraq m ay not have been the best use of resources.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Page 4 of 4

RecommendationsU.S. diplomacy in the war on terrorism is poor. The United States cannot do everything on its own -cutting off funding or otherwise isolating groups requires worldwide help. The Bush administration isunnecessarily unilatera l. The Arab states also are necessary to give cover on the peace process. Publicdiplomacy is abysmal. The MEPI is a good first step, but small.Dom estic intelligence should be made separate from the FBI . DHS ' role in intelligence is not clear.

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Policy. Beforethat, he served as a counterterrorism analyst at the FBI fromNovember 1998

> through November 2001. At the FBI, he focused primarily on> Palestinian> terrorist groups, but also worked on issues relating to Osama bin> Laden and Al> Qaeda.

> Combating Terrorist Financing>> Mr. Levitt commented on the efforts by the United States> Government (USG) to> combat terrorist financing. He said that the USG has "a far way> to go,> although the situation has improved somewhat since 9/11.>> Mr. Levitt said that there should be no distinction between> material supporters> of terrorism and those who pull the trigger or activate the bomb,> i.e., there> are all equally culpable.>> Mr. Levitt was critical of the FBI in several respects. He said> disapprovingly> that before 9/11 DOJ and FBI management would only prosecute> persons who gave> money to terrorist groups if there was proof that the donor> knowingly intended> to finance a terrorist attack. He also stated that the FBI is> poorly organized> and that for bureaucratic reasons it insists on pigeonholing cases> into> discreet categories by terrorist group, when in fact the> boundaries between> groups are often fluid. In addition, he asserted that the FBI> sometimes> withheld relevant information from its analysts, and that there> was a dearth of> strategic analysis because good analysts were often pulled into> operational> units. During crisis periods, senior analysts were sometimes> assigned> secretarial duties because managers were reluctant to ask> secretaries to work> late at night. He believes that many of these problems persisttoday.>> With regard to the Government's post-9/11 efforts against> terrorist financing,> Mr. Levitt praised the efforts of Treasury's outgoing General> Counsel David> Aufhauser. At the same time, he criticized the USG's structure as> cumbersome> (e.g., persistence of different terrorist lists) and said that the> USG needs a> senior official who focuses on terrorist financing and chairs the> PCC dealing> with that issue. Also, the USG needs a culture change so that> everyone is> working to contribute to the overall interagency effort.>> Mr. Levitt also thought that there were additional entities that> should have> been shut down, even allowing for the fact that in some cases> nonaction was


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justified because of ongoing intelligence investigations.>> Mr. Levitt also addressed the role of Saudi Arabia in financing> terrorist> groups. He stated that the Kingdom is not doing everything it can> and should> be doing to choke off terrorist financing. He singled out Prince> Nayef, the> Saudi Interior Minister, as a major problem. He charged that> Prince Nayef does> not cooperate with the USG, that he is aware of some extremist> financing, and> that he consciously shields himself from information that he does> not agree> with or want to hear. Mr. Levitt also asserted that much of Saudi> Arabia's> religious establishment was sympathetic to parts of Bin Laden's> agenda, and> that Saudi diplomats have been linked to charities that operate as> fronts for> terrorist groups.>> Mr. Levitt gave examples of inadequate Saudi action against> terrorist> financing. Although the Saudis shut down two branches of the Al-> Haramain> charity, those branches later reopened, and in any case the Saudis> should have> taken action against the entire organization. He also expressed> concern about> the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Muslim> World League> (MWL), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and Saudi> businessman Wael> Jalaidan. (Jalaidan was apparently the subject of a joint U.S.-> Saudi terrorist> designation, which Prince Nayef then disavowed).>> Mr. Levitt also criticized other Saudi actions, including alleged> Saudi funding> of mosques used by terrorists, Saudi efforts to spread Wahabi> ideology, and> what he said were proactive efforts by Saudi officials to> undermine> counterterrorism investigations in other countries through, e.g.,> the issuance> of visas.>> Mr. Levitt has not seen a marked improvement in Saudi actions> since the May 12,> 2003 bombings in Riyadh.>> Mr. Levitt suggested that we speak with USG officials Gofer Black,> David> Aufhauser, and Stephen Hadley to learn more about the lack of> Saudi cooperation> on terrorist financing. He added that there were no simple> answers to the> problems with Saudi Arabia since the Saudi government is> essentially> dysfunctional.>> Mr. Levitt emphasized the permeable borders between terrorist> groups and the> need to crack down on terrorist financing across the board, rather> than> restricting our efforts to Al Qaeda. He believes that support

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networks for Al'Qaeda frequently support other Islamic terrorist groups, as well,'> and gave> examples of overlapping assistance to both Hamas and Al Qaeda. He> also> believes that it is a moral imperative to have a consistent,> across-the-board> counterterrorism policy against groups that target civilians.>> [rest for Dan]


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Page 1 of 1

Yoel TobinFrom: Daniel Byman [[email protected]]Sent: Monday, November 03, 2003 10:39 AMTo: [email protected]: [email protected]: Levitt info

W e interviewed Matt L evitt, largely abou t terrorist logistics, last week. He just sent us this bit ofinformation that he had passed on to the 9/11 Joint Inquiry.I thought it would be of interest to your team.Dan

Original MessageSubjectralso FY IDaterMon, 03 N ov 20 03 10:23:43 -0500From:"MATT LEVITT" To:, Thanks for having me in last week to give you the world according toMatt. I apologize for having to run back to the office.Thought you'd find the attached interesting and perhaps useful , Isubmitted it to the Congressional joint inquiry at their request asfollow up to the interview I gave them. It still stands true.Matt

Matthew A. LevittSenior Fellow in Terrorism StudiesThe Washington Institute for Near East Policy1828 L Street, NW Suite1050Washington, DC 20036Tel. 202-452-0650Fax 202-223-5364mat11@washingtpninsti tute.orgwww. washingtoninstitute -_

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Yoel TobinFrom: MATT LEVITT [[email protected]]Sent: Monday, November 03, 2003 10:24 AMTo: [email protected]; [email protected]: also FYI

Joint 9-11 inquiryletter.doc...Thanks for having me in last week to give you the world according to Matt. I apologizefor having to run back to the office.Thought you'd find the attached interesting and perhaps useful, I submitted it to theCongressional joint inquiry at their request as follow up to the interview I gave them.Tt~ C? 1~ 1 "I 1 e^ i--a T-I C! f- - v~^ t s~ \ t still stands true.

Matt

Matthew A. LevittSenior Fellow in Terrorism StudiesThe Washington Institute for Near East Policy1828 L Street, N W Suite 1050Washington, DC 2 0 0 3 6Tel. 202-452-0650Fax 202-223-5364mattl@washingtoninstitute.orgwww.washingtoninstitute.org


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July 23, 2002Ms. Eleanor Hill, Director of the Joint Inquiry StaffFord House Office Building, Room H2-167Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear M s. Hill,In response to your staffs request, I submit to you this statement for the record offeringmy assessment of the how FB I analysts are trained, used, and regarded. As someone whoserved as an FBI cou nterterrorism intelligence analyst (an Intelligence ResearchSpecialist, or IRS) from Novem ber 1998 through November 2001, it is my pleasure toprovide this first-hand account of some of the central problems hindering the intelligencefunction and the analy tical process at the FBI. I should note that there are a number ofpositions at the FB I that can be described as "analysts." My statement uses the term todescribe the IRS position, which most closely resembles the pure intelligence analystposition common in other US government agencies.How analysts are trained: They are not. Un like Special Agen ts, who und ergo specializedtraining prior to assuming their posts, FBI analysts are given no training whatsoever uponentry into the FBI. Training opportunities arise over the course of one's career, includingadministrative training on the use of FBI and other computer systems, courses on specificarea studies, substantive courses on particular fields such as counterterrorism analysiscourse, butnothing is offered - let alone required - upon entry onduty (EOD ) andbeforeassuming responsibility for specific programs. The FBI's database is cumbersome andnot user-friendly, but analy sts learn to use it on the job. The vast majority of analystsjoin the bureau with general degrees in International Affairs, but with little substantiveknowledge or expertise in international terrorism in general or the specific regions, states,or groups they are assigned to cover. That too is learned on th e job. There is nolanguage training offered for analysts, nor is there any travel requirem ent for areafamiliarization as there is for an alysts in practically every other U.S. intelligence agency.In one instance, analysts who requested such area familiarization were rebuked by FBImanagement for trying to get the FBI to "pay for their vacation." In another, analystscovering Middle Eastern terrorist groups requested Arabic language training and weresimilarly rebuked for trying to get the FBI to "pay for their education." An alysts weretold - by managers w ith nounderstanding or appreciation of analysis - that they had noneed for language training to provide analysis, and that any translations they neededcould be accomplished by an FBI language specialist (LS ). The training that analysts doreceive over the course of their careers is provided in nearly every instance by outsideagencies such as the CIA, DIA , and others. As such, it is relevant and important, bu tdoes not necessarily address FBI-specific issues and circumstances.Analy sts should be trained, upon entry into the bureau and throug hout their careers, in theart of analytical thinking and writing. They should be provided guidance in the processof absorbing tremendous quantities of information, sifting through it all, picking out the


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significant information, an d packaging that information in a way that best suits the needsof the recipient audience/s. Analysts should receive language training and incentives toengage in such train ing, as well as be required to travel to the regions they cover for areafamiliarization an d briefing tours every 1-2 years. And they should receive trainin g inareas studies, issues in intelligence and law enforcement, and substantive training ininternational terrorism, coun terterrorism, specific terrorist groups, fronts and sponsors.Counterintelligence analysts should receive similar training particular to their field.How analysts are used: There is no uniform procedure for using analysts or incorporatingtheir function into the overall operational function of the FBI. The flow of information iscontrolled by the sub stantive operational unit, which determines if, and how , to use theiranalytical counterparts. There is no mandated requirement to include analysts in the teamtasked w ith a specific area of responsibility, an d as such some analysts are brought tomeetings and given access to information such as asset reporting and FISA wiretaps andothers are not. Often there is tension between the purely analytical IRS and theIntelligence Operations Specialist (IOS) sitting in the operational unit. The use ofanalysts is driven primarily by the individual relationships analysts establish withoperational counterparts at FBI headquarters and in FBI field offices. The few attemptsto standardize and man date the terms, responsibilities and requirements of analyticalsupport to operational units, including on e effort which I was tasked to help write afterthe Millennial threat in December 1999 an d January 2000, failed miserably afteroperational units summarily disregarded them.How analysts are regarded: Analysts are considered "support staff," no different thansecretaries or other non-specialized personnel. Analysts' professional experience andadvanced degrees are resented more than respected among many Special A gents andlOSs, and they are regularly sidelined. Agents frequently choose not to seek theanalytical input of the their respective professional analysts, and have been know n toreject analysis out of hand when it didn't suit their needs. Asset validations, which arenot employed as frequently as required and are often ignored when critical of an Agent'sasset, are a critical example of this phenomenon . The FBI in general, and managemen tand operational units in particular, are Agent-driven societies. Individuals w ith little orno experience in intelligence, terrorism, a nalysis or the particu larly region of world inquestion are the ones making decisions about the relevance, quality, significance an dapplication of intelligence analysis provided by analytical units. Being an analyst at theFBI is a frequently demeaning an d frustrating experience, especially difficult for youngprofessionals with a dvanced degrees w ho chose employment in the public sector overmore lucrative private sector employment in the hopes ofmaking a difference.Picture of career progression: While the IRS position at FBI headquarters goes up to theGS-14 level (it is lower in the field offices), little distinction is made - if any- betweenthe responsibilities an d expectations at different GS levels. In my own experience, Istarted as a GS-11 and left as a GS-13 an d served the same functions, with the sameresponsibilities and no additional expectations or opportunities throughout. At age 31,1faced the prospect of earning my G S-14 and plateauing at my ow n glass ceiling. Thereare very few management positions for analysts, since the Bureau is so Agent-centric. In


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most cases, those management positions available to career analysts are purelyadministrative, while management positions available to career Agents are substantive.In short, there is no structure, no management, whose sole purpose is to see to theintegrity of the intelligence function and the analytical process. There is no mechanismthat ensures, or even facilitates, analysts' access to information an d their timely analysisof that information. Analysts who ingratiate themselves with their operationalcounterparts, often by playing by whatever rules the operational unit delineates, may beable to position themselves to analyze source information, highlight intelligence gaps,connect seemingly unrelated pieces of information and give form to the overall picture ofa specific case or provide an overall assessment of a terrorist group. Others will not.Analysis needs to be recognized as a critical commodity, not an optional andparenthetical product that can alternatively be recognized or ignored. Intelligence andanalysis should not be subservient to operations, nor should they be run or managed byindividuals with no or little expertise an d exposure to intelligence, analysis and thesubstantive subject area (counterterrorism, counter-intelligence, etc).I hope yo u find these comments useful.Please feel free to contact m e with an y additional questions.Yours,

Matthew A. LevittSenior Fellow in Terrorism StudiesThe Washington Institute fo r Near East Studies1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050Washington, B.C. [email protected]


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"Sent Items: first part of draft MFR for Levitt Page 1 of 2

I 93.14MB /476.84MB (19.53%)Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2003 14:42:41 -0500From: "" 4|F

To: "" 41first part of draft MFR for Levitt

Below is a partial draft of the MFR for Matt Levitt. Please review whathave done and complete it atyour convenience. Also, if you don't mind, Ilike to review your portion before we inalize it.y the way, haye you seen Matt's Sept. 10, 03 testimony? itfleshes out some(seengtoninsti tute.org/media/1evitt/1evitt091003.htm)

MEMORANDUM FO R THE R EC O R Dinterview of Matthew Levitt

October 28, 2003unclassified

Yoel Tobin & Dan Bymannumbers: 1 and 3

K Street, Conference RoomMatthew Levitt, senior Fellow in Terrorism studies at theinstitute for Near East Policy- commission: Dan Byman & Yoel Tobin

Levitt is currently at the Washington Institute for Near Policy. Beforehe served as a counterterrorism analyst at the FBI from November 1998November 2001. At the FBI, he focused primarily on Palestiniangroups, but also worked on issues relating to Osama bin Laden and Al

Terrorist FinancingLevitt commented on the efforts by the united States Government (USG) toterrorist financing. He said that the USG has "a far way to go,"

the situation has improved somewhat since 9/11.Levitt said that there should be no distinction between material supportersthose whopull the trigger or activate the bomb, i.e., thereal equally culpable.Levitt was critical of the FBI in several respects. He said disapprov inglybefore 9/11 DO J and FBI management would only prosecute persons who gaveto terrorist groups if there was proof that the donor knowingly intendedterrorist attack. He also stated that the FBI is poorly organizedthat for bureaucratic reasons it insists onpigeonholing cases intocategories by terrorist group, when in fact the boundaries betweenare often fluid, in addition, he asserted that the FBI sometimes

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i t Items: i r s t a rt of draft MFR for Levitt Page 2 of 2

, i h e l d r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n f ro m i t s a n a l y s t s , a n d t h a t t h e r e w a s a d e a r t h o fVategic a n a l y s i s b e ca u s e g o od a n a l y s t s w e r e of te n p u l l e d i n t o o p e r a t i o n a ln i t s . D u r i n g c r i s i s p e r i o d s , s e n i o r analysts w e r e s o m e t i m e s a s s i g n e dt a r i a l d u t i e s b e c a u s e m a n a g e r s w e r e reluctant to ask secretaries to w o r ka t n i g h t . H e b e l i e v e s t h a t m a n y o f t h e s e p r o b l e m s p e r s i s t t o d a y .r e g a r d to the Government's post-9/11 efforts a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s t f i n a n c i n g ,p r a i s e d the efforts of Treasury's o u t g o i n g G e n e r a l C o u n s e l D a v i dAt the s a m e t i m e , he c r i t i c i z e d the use's s t r u c t u r e as c u m b e r s o m e

p e r s i s t e n c e of different t e r r o r i s t lists) an d s a i d t h a t the use n e e d s ao f f i ci a l w h o f oc us es o n t e r r o r i s t f i n a n c i n g a n d c h a i r s t h e P C C d e a l i n gt h a t i s s u e . A l s o , t h e U S G n e e d s a c u l t u r e c h a n g e s o t h a t e v e r y on e i sto c o n t r i b u t e to the o v e r a l l i n t e r a g e n c y effort.r . L e v i t t a l s o t h o u g h t t h a t t h e r e w e r e a d d i t i o n a l e n t i t i e s t h a t s h o u l d h a v eallowing for the fact t h a t in some cases nonaction wasb e c a u s e o f o n g o i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s .r . L e v i t t a l s o a d d r e s s e d t h e r o l e o f S a u d i A r a b i a i n f i n a n c i n g t e r r o r i s tH e s t a t e d t h a t t h e K i n g d o m i s n o t d o i n g e v e r y t h i n g i t c a n a n d s h o u l de d o i n g t o c h o k e o f f t e r r o r i s t f i n a n c i n g . H e s i n g l e d o u t P r i n c e N a y e f , t h ei n t e r i o r M i n i s t e r , as a m a j o r p r o b l e m . He c h a r g e d t h a t P r i n c e Nayef doesot c o o p e r a t e w i t h the USG, t h a t he is a w a r e of s om e e xt r e m i s t f i n a n c i n g , andconsciously s h i e l d s h i m s e l f f r o m i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t h e d o es n o t a g r e eo r w a n t t o h e a r . M r . L e v i t t also a s s er t ed t h a t m u c h o f S a u d i Arabia'se s t a b l i s h m e n t was s y m p a t h e t i c to p a r t s of Bin Laden's a g e n d a , an dd i p l o m a t s h a v e b e en l i n k e d t o c h a r i t i e s t h a t o p e r a t e a s f r on t s f o rr . L e v i t t g a v e examples o f i n a d e q u a t e S a u d i a c t i on a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s tA l t h o u g h t h e S a u d i s s h u t d o w n t w o b r a n c h e s o f t h e A l - H a r a m a i nt h o se b r a n c h e s l a t e r r e o p e n e d , a n d i n a n y c a s e t h e S a u d i s s h o u l d h a v en a c t i o n a g a i n s t the e n t i r e organization. He a l s o e x p r e s s e d c o n c e r n a b o u the i n t e r n a t i o n a l Islamic R e l i e f O r g a n i z a t i o n (IIRO), the M u s l i m world L e a g u ethe w o r l d Assembly of M u s l i m Y o u t h (WAMY), an d S a u d i b u s i n e s s m a n w a e lOalaidan was a p p a r e n t l y the s u b j e c t of a j o i n t U . S . - S a u d i t e r r o r i s tw h i c h P r i n c e N a y ef t h e n disavowed).r . L e v i t t also c r i t i c i z e d o t h e r S a u d i a c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g a l l e g e d S a u d i f u n d i n gf m o s q u e s u s e d by t e r r o r i s t s , S a u d i efforts to s p r e a d w a h a b i ideology, and

e s a i d w e r e p r o a c t i v e efforts b y S a u d i o f f i c i a l s t o u n d e r m i n ei n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s t h r o u g h , e.g., t h e i s s u a n c ef v i s a s .r . L e v i t t h a s n o t s ee n a m a r k e d i m p r o v e m e n t i n S a u d i a c t i o n s s i n c e t h e M a y 1 2 ,b o m b i n g s in R i y a d h .r . L e v i t t s u gg e s te d t h a t we s p e a k w i t h USG officials C of er B l a c k , D a v i da n d S t e p h e n H a d l e y t o l e a r n m o r e a bo u t t h e l a c k o f S a u d i c o o p e r a t i o nt e r r o r i s t f i n a n c i n g . H e a d d e d t h a t t h e r e w e r e n o s i m p l e a n s w e rs t o t h ew i t h S a u d i A r a b i a s i n c e t h e S a u d i g o v e r n m e n t i s e s s e n t i a l l yr . L e v i t t e m p h a s i z e d t h e p e r m e a b l e b o r d e r s b e t w e e n t e r r o r i s t g r o u p s a n d t h et o c r a c k d o w n o n t e r r o r i s t f i n a n c i n g a c ro ss t h e b o a r d , r a t h e r t h a n

o u r efforts t o A l Q a e d a . H e b e l i e v e s t h a t s u p p o r t n e tw o rk s f o r A lf r e q u e n t l y s u p p o r t o t h e r I s l a m i c t e r r o r i s t g r o u p s , a s w e l l , a n d g a v eof o v e r l a p p i n g assistance to b o t h H a m a s and Al Qaeda. He alsot h a t it is a m o r a l i m p e r a t i v e to h a v e a c o n s i s t e n t , a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r dp o l i c y a g a i n s t g r o u p s t h a t t a r g e t c i v i l i a n s .[rest for Dan]

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QUESTIONS FOR MATT LEVITT

You've called Al Qaeda a "network of networks" in one of your articles.Can you elaborate? How do you understand the nature of A l Qaeda pre-9/11? Post-9/11?The recent policywatch you authored suggests that Islamic terroristsand their networks cross group lines and that it is a mistake to focuson , say, Al Qaeda, to the exclusion of Hamas or Hezbollah. Can youelaborate?

o How do we set priorities under this approach? What wou ldyou say to those who assert that Al Qaeda represents thereal threat to the US and that we shou ld focus our resourceson it?W hat were the links, if any, between Al Qaeda an d Hezbollah prior to9/11? How have they changed post 9/11?

o You wrote in February 2003 that "although Hezbollah and AQ donot appear to share operational support, they have engaged inlogistical cooperation on an ad hoc and tactical basis, as well ascooperative training."

o How significant was this cooperation? Did Hezbollah contributesignificantly to Al Qaeda's capabilities? Did AQ contributesignificantly to Hezbollah's capabilities?o How did AQ and Hezbollah bridge the Sunni/Shia divide? W ill thatdivide limit future cooperation?o W hat can the US do to prevent these groups from cooperating?

What about links between Iran and AQ ?o Would Iran necessarily have been aware of any AQ -Hezbollahcooperation?o In your May 29, 2003 article on Iran, you cite U.S. intelligence reportsthat Bin Laden operatives approached Iranian agents in 95 and again in96, "offering to join forces against the United States." Can youelaborate on this? How did the Iranians respond?o Post 9/11: In your May 29, 2003 article, you accuse Iran of

"sheltering" AQ leadership figures. Can you elaborate? Press


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reporting has been somewhat inconsistent an d uncertain on whetherIran has arrested these m en, or whether it is allowing them to operate.Is it possible that these men are in fact sitting in Iranian jails?o If Iran is harboring AQ, is it possible that rogue elements areresponsible fo r this? Or can we assume that such actions would not be

taken without the approval of Kham eini?o Same question re: past Iranian support.

o As with Hezbollah, does Shia/Sunni divide limit cooperation?o What can the US do to pressure/entice Iran to hand over Al Qaedamen within its borders and to end any cooperation with AQ?

In your judgment, doUS troops in Iraq face a serious threat from groupslike Ansar al Islam, Hezbollah, and/or AQ? Or is the primary threatfrom ex-Baathists? W hat should the US do to minimize the threat to ourtroops from Islamic terrorists?Who do you suspect killed the 3 Am erican guards in Gaza recently? AQ?Hizballah? A Palestinian group? Members of a hard-to-categorizeinformal network? Does this presage a shift in tactics by Islamicextremists in Israel and the territories toward U.S. targets?o Do you see signs that AQ is focusing more on Israeli and/or Jewish targetsthan it has in the past?If you were serving on the Comm ission, what policy recommendationswould you make?


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Questions for M att Levitt

1. You have been c ritical of the US G effort to combat terrorist financing. If you were incharge, what concrete steps would you take, and how would those steps improve ourefforts.2. In particular, you have been critical of Saudi Arabia and the US G effort to persuadeSaudi Arabia to crack do wn o n terrorist financing.

Describe your various criticisms? Post-9/11 change? To the extent you have been able to follow the changes in the Saudi's approach toterrorism following the M ay 12, 03 Riyadh bombings, how do you evaluate those

changes?3. What concrete m etrics w ould yo u propose for evaluating (1) the success of the effortsto com bat terrorist financing; and (2) Saudi Cooperation in those efforts?4. Yo u have written, "since there is significant overlap between terrorist groups in thearea of financing, failure to deal with the financing of groups like Hamas underminesefforts to stem the flow o f funds to al-Qaeda." Jerusalem Post, August 03 .Although that is certainly true of entities shown to finance both groups, why is that truewith respect to entities only funding Ham as? In other words, if we have evidence aperson is a Hamas financier but no evidence that person fu nds al-Qaeda, how doescracking down on that person help combat al-Qaeda [setting aside the independent valuein addressing Hamas fundraising]?5. How do you respond to an argument that addressing Hamas fund-raising actually hurtsthe effort to m aintain a unified international front against al-Qaeda fund-raising becauseof the support Hamas enjoys in much of Islamic world, and parts of Europe?6. As a former FBI analyst, you have been critical of the FBI's analytical program. Haveyou followed the F BI's efforts to improve an alytical capability in the terrorist financingarea? If so, are they on the right track?7. How do you target terrorist log istics cells more effectively? Why did the UnitedStates not do so pre-911?


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[Classification] Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Background briefing on Afghanistan and the TalibanType of event: BriefingDate: August 1,2003Special Access Issues: NoneUnclassifiedPrepared by: A. AlbionTeam Number: 3Location: K Street, Conference RoomParticipants - Dr. Larry Goodson, U S Army W ar CollegeParticipants - Commission: Alexis Albion, Scott Allan, Tom Dowling, NicoleGrandrimo, Mike Hurley, Yoel Tobin

Dr. Goodson addressed the following areas:1. The Rise of the Taliban and al Qaeda

Goodson dates the foundations of the Taliban to the culture wars (Islamism vs. modernization) ofthe mid-late 1960s at Kabul University, which themselves grew out of two critical points inAfghanistan's history:1. The struggles of the 1920s between modernizing forces and resistance to modernization; and2. The period of post-British withdrawal from the region in the early 1950s, and what Goodsoncharacterized as the U.S. decision not to step in but rather to leave A fghanistan to the Soviets.

1960s sees the emergence of Islamism, spiking again with the Iranian revolution. After 1979 Islamism and Soviet expansionism into the region are two major regional areas ofconcern for the U.S. Afghan-Soviet war leads to a number of transformative factors in the region:

1. Involvement of Arabs in the war:Arab fighters in Afghanistan seen as "completely useless" and largely disliked by Afghans,mostly kept in camps not far from Pakistan border and kept out of most o f the lighting;

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/ification] Page 2 of 5//' -Influx ofArab money (from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE ), tending to fund Islamist projects(mosques & madrasas); Saudi money (through NG Os) continued after the war as they sought tocounter Iranian ambitions in Afghanistan.2. Socioeconomic changes that transfo rm traditional society:

--Traditional Afghan social structures disrupted and new, (artificial) structures emerge, eg. tribalelders replaced b y younger elites with different sources of authority (mullahs; military leaders); Refugee camps: an artificial environment; increasingly radical version of Islamic teachingbeing taught to refugee children; stricter adherence to some tribal practices (eg. veiling ofwomen).

The Taliban itself grows out of both the Afghan-Soviet war (and the involvement in it of Arabradicals) as well as regional factors (rise of Islamism in South A sia and the Midd le East),eventually laying the foundation for al Qaeda. In 1997, Taliban "shifts" to the right, controlled by Mullah Omar.

2. Pakistan as a Critical Factor in the Rise of the Taliban Afghan-Soviet war changes the strategic calculus fo r Pakistan w ith respect to Afghanistan.

- Pre-1979, Pakistan views A fghanistan as an area to be denied to India; ISI is only m oderatelyengaged in Afghanistan, conducting small operations (but opening the door for greaterengagement); With start of the war, P akistan becomes fully engaged, and plays the U.S. for whatever it canget.

Involvement of ISI: "the war is an ISI show": ISI officers run the resistance in Afgh., fighting, training and distributing CIA weapons; Individual relationships of trust between ISI, key Afghans and Afghan Arabs develop acrossthe porous Pashtun border over a number of years; familiar connections on both sides of theborder; Unique border relationship continues today: field grade and lower ISI officers probably knowwhere 2nd tier al Qaeda officers are.

By the late 1980s, Pakistan had invested an enormous amount in Afghanistan:~ shift in geo-strategic thinking (Afgh. as area of direct Pakistani involvement);~ quiet, forward engagement (training, armed support); deleterious side-effects on Pakistan politics, economy and society: deeper sectarianism,- upset of ethnic balance (huge influx ofAfgh. refugees),

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Ossification] Page 3 of 5/~ rampant heroin problem,~ corruption in government,-- deepening Islamization.

Post-war conditions lead Pakistan to play theTaliban card:~ Pakistan gives itself the credit fo r defeat of Soviets in Afgh. and fall of Soviet empire;~ But in post-war period Afghanistan is in chaos and Pakistan is not benefiting from the openingof ex-Soviet markets;~ Taliban emerges as pro-Pakistan, offering a degree of stability that will allow transit trade andpossibly a pipeline to go through Afghanistan;

Taliban emerges as a vehicle by which Pakistan can make Afghanistan pay off its huge investmentin the region. Oil/gas in Central Asia was a secondary "downstream" issue. Was the Taliban its own indigenous movement or a creation of Pakistan? According to Goodson,Taliban was an indigenous group (and not an ISI creation though ISI ha d ties with groupsinvolved in Taliban). At some point early on, Pakistan made a conscious decision to shift it ssupport to the Taliban, which then grew into something less pliable than anticipated.

3. U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan/Taliban 1989-1996: U.S. policy of abandonment/disengagement toward Afghanistan (and Pakistan);

~ mid-late 1994, rise of Taliban and continued requests from Pakistan for U.S. engagement inthe region; 1996: U.S. begins to pay attention, because:

1. Taliban looks as if it can bring stability to the region, and consequently seems to have somepopular support;2. Taliban is clearly being backed by the Paks and Saudis.

By 1997, after Pakistan recognizes the Taliban government, U.S. is very close to doing the same(existing predisposition to follow the Pakistan lead), but held back by the 4 issues driving USGpolicy:1. human rights issues, especially treatment of women (though Goodson sees this as a symbolic issue

only);2. concern about opium-heroin production (though mainly a European and Pakistan problem);3. notion of necessity fo r broad-based government, involving all regional groups;4. terrorism and UBL: a real strategic concern for the U.S.

-- Late 1990s, widely spread and believed rumors throughout the region that the U.S. wouldtarget UBL if it could;



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ossification] Page 4 of 5

~ 1998-2001, rumors that U.S. had some kind of asset (hum an or electronic) by which it waskeeping its eye on UB L. 1998-2001, U.S. view s Afghanistan/Taliban as a problem best managed by keeping it contained:USGtakes a calculated decision to put UBL in a box unless there areopportunities to target himthat involve an acceptable risk (eg. cruise m issile attacks); according to G oodson, U S popu lationwould not have supported "boots on the ground"; US G uses traditional methods (diplomacy, UN sanctions) to lean on TalibanTaliban responds toa limited extent. USG also pressures Saudis/ Paks to press the UBL issue with the Taliban.~ Note regional context: Taliban/UBL threat overshadowed by other South A sian concerns withinUSG in late 1990s: India-Pakistan rivalry; Pakistan's internal instability; nuclear threat; Kargil crisis.~ According to Goodson, UN OC A L did not have a decisive influence over US policymakers.

4. Where Did We Go wrong? Taliban-al Qaeda nexus not fully understood by USG: UB L primarily seen as financier of terrorism;-- USG did not distinguish al Qaeda message from typical radical Islamic rhetoric; Importance of internal shift within T aliban not appreciated:

> decline of moderate Mullah Rabbani faction and rise of hardline leaders by 2000/1, withregional aspirations (Islamization);> closer relationship between UBL and Mullah Om ar; UB L gaining more influence over Talibanleadership.

failure to perceive the 'newness' of the Taliban-al Qaeda nexus, ie. a break in the pattern of state-sponsored terrorism toward new model of terrorism emerging from failed states. Afghanistan under the Taliban was not a state (and the Taliban was not a government) in the senseunderstood by USG:~ autonomous, sub-state actorseg. family networks, cross-border tribal tiesincom patible withstrong central leadership;~ U.S. lacked people on the ground in the region, with regional expertise and specialization;

range of instrumen ts being used to try to influence the T aliban (eg. UN sanctions) had little influence;were we pushing the levers in the right way?were we pu shing the right levers? Eg . traditional approaches in A fghanistan to entice the localpopulation to cooperation w ith U.S. programs through payment (eg. crop substitution, buy-backStinger program ) hadn't worked in the pastwhat made us think a bounty on UB L's head w ould beany more successful? (Goodson thinks the bounty ~$5M was just too low).was the USG using a box of old toolsgeared toward state-sponsorship of terrorismto dismantle a

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/assification] Page 5 of 5

completely new m odel?COMMISSION SENSITIVE

4COMM ISSION SENSITIVE



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WIT H DR AW A L NOT IC ERG: 148Box: 00010 Folder: 0026 Docum ent: 59Series: Team 1 FilesCopies: 1 Pages: 8

ACCESS RESTRICTEDThe item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Matt LevittDocument Date: 08-01-200 3Document Type: Briefing SlidesSpecial Media:From:To:

Subject' Briefing on Afghanistan and Taliban by Army War Coliege, with notes

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it isrestricted. Res trictions on records in the National Archives are stated ingeneral and specific record group restriction statements w hich are availablefo r examination.

NND: 281W ithdrawn: 06-03-2008 by:RETRIEVAL #: 281 00010 0026 59System DocID: 2578

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(ail:: INBOX: Re: Interview notices Page 1 of 1

85.18MB /476.84MB (17.86%)Date: Tue, 21 Get 2003 14:15:51 -0400From: Daniel Byman 4|

To: ""


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vlail:: Sent Items: Re: Interview notices Page 1 of 1

85.09MB /476.84MB (17.85%)Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2003 10:52:29 -0400From: "" ^

To: Daniel Byman M a r q u i t t i a ,> C o u l d you p l e a s e s e nd out n o t i c e s to the o t h e r t e a m s for t h e s e two *> i n t e r v i e w s : ' " > 1. M a t t Le v i t t , a t e r r o r i s m e x p e r t at the W a s h i n g t o n Institute for N e a r "^> E a s t P o l i c y (Tuesday, O c t o b e r 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street). />> 2 . Professor G r e g cause, a l e a d i n g e x p e r t o n S a u d i A r a b i a , T h u r s d a y , *> N O V . 6 t h , a t 2:00. T h i s i n t e r v i e w W I L L B E D O N E B Y P H O N E .> F o r M a t t , I w i l l n e e d t o r e s e r v e a r oo m ( P h i l i p ' s office w o u l d b e f i n e ,> if the conference r o o m is not available). For G r e g , I w i l l also n e e d a ;> r o o m , a n d a n office w o u l d b e p r e f e r r e d s o I c a n u s e t h e p h o n e e a s i l y .>> T h a n k s .> Dan

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Aa.il:: INBOX: Interview notices Page 1 of 1

85.09MB/476.84MB (17.85%)Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2003 08:38:45-0400From: Daniel Byman ^

To : "" 4PCc: "" 4f,"" 4|

Subject: Interview noticesMarquittia,Could yo u please send out notices to the other teams fo r these twoi n t e r v i e w s :1. Matt Levitt, a terror ism expert at the Washington institute for NearEast Policy (Tuesday, October 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street).2. Professor Greg Cause, a l e a d i n g expert on S a u d i Arabi a, Thursday,N o v . 6th, at 2:00. This interv iew WILL BE DONE BY PHONE.F o r Matt, I w i l l need to reserve a room ( P h i l i p ' s office would be fine,i f the conference room is not available). For G r e g , I w i l l also need aroom, and an office would be preferred so I can use the phone easily.Thanks.D a n

T1 B26 Matt Levitt Fdr- Draft MFRs- Emails- Notes- Withdrawal Notice 628

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Transcript of T1 B26 Matt Levitt Fdr- Draft MFRs- Emails- Notes- Withdrawal Notice 628