SYMBIOTIC VOTING: AN INTERVIEW WITH ALLIANCE … · investments and an endorsement of existing...
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www.proxyinsight.com
September 2017Volume 4, Issue 8
VOTING NEWS
PROXY MONTHLY
SYMBIOTIC VOTING: AN INTERVIEW WITH ALLIANCE BERNSTEIN’S LINDA GIULIANO
PELTZ’S LATEST GAMBLE: COMPARING TRIAN’S PROXY CONTESTS AT P&G AND DUPONT
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This month has seen Proxy
Insight concentrate on the
N-PX filings, with our analysts
working around the clock to import the
US mutual fund disclosures into our
system. We can once again say that
Proxy Insight has beaten its record, as
our team finished going through the
N-PXs by mid-September.
The topic of diversity has dominated
North America this month. In the
US, the New York Comptroller, Scott
Stringer, has written to 151 companies
asking for disclosure of their policies
regarding board diversity and
independence. As part of this effort, Mr
Stringer has requested that these firms
include the race and gender of board
directors in their reporting processes.
Similarly, in Canada, some
of the country’s largest asset
managers – including BMO Global
Asset Management, CIBC Asset
Management, the Ontario Teachers’
Pension Plan and the Canada
Pension Plan Investment Board –
have joined together to call for greater
representation of women on boards
and among company executives.
Dubbed the ‘30% Club Canadian
Investor Group’, the coalition has
called for 30 percent of all directors
and executives in S&P/TSX composite
index-listed companies to be female
by 2022. The coalition explains that it
perceives 30 percent representation
as approximately the critical mass by
which the contributions of a minority
group are no longer ascribed to that
group, but rather to the individuals that
carry them out.
The environment has also featured
heavily in this month’s news. Most
recently, the UK government has
announced new measures designed
to support environmentally-friendly
investment. These measures include a
new set of voluntary standards for green
investments and an endorsement of
existing recommendations on climate
risk reporting, which was published
earlier this year by the Financial Stability
Board’s Task Force on Climate-related
Financial Disclosures.
On the topic of climate change, an
investor group representing over $1
trillion combined assets has recently
written to 60 of the world’s largest
banks in order to urge them to
confront the risks associated with
temperature increases. In particular,
the group has asked banks to
remain compliant with the 2015 Paris
Agreements and provide details of
the climate risks to which they are
currently exposed, and their plans to
manage them.
Finally, the ongoing debate over dual-
stock structures continues, with some
commentators echoing W. Robert
Main III’s sentiments in our July issue
by advocating sunset provisions.
These provisions require founders
to surrender their superior voting
rights after a specific time period. It is
hoped this will bridge the gap between
advocates of corporate governance
best-practice and the monetary
interests of stock exchanges and
indices.
Our headline interview this month
is with Alliance Bernstein’s Head
of Responsible Investment, Linda
Giuliano. We discuss with Linda
how Alliance Bernstein approaches
diversity and ESG issues, as well as
the main corporate governance issues
facing the asset manager during this
year’s proxy season.
This month’s article compares the
upcoming Procter & Gamble proxy
contest with Nelson Peltz’s earlier
attempt to get on DuPont’s board in
2015. The article not only summarizes
the similarities and differences
between the two proxy contests, but
also underlines the likely factors that
could swing it in favor of either P&G’s
management or Mr Peltz.
Proxy Insight is the only tool to offer
the voting intelligence necessary to
navigate today’s investor relations
market. If you are not a client and
would like to take a look, we would be
delighted to offer you a trial. Please get
in touch.
Proxy StatementNick Dawson, Co-Founder & Managing Director, Proxy Insight Limited.
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Could you give our readers a brief
outline of how AllianceBernstein
approaches its proxy voting
responsibilities?
We think of proxy voting as an integral
part of being an active manager and
owner, since voting directly impacts our
overall investment process. We take a
principles-based approach to proxy
voting, supporting strong corporate
governance structures, shareholder
rights and transparency. We are also
transparent as a firm in what we do,
and make our proxy voting policy
and records publicly available on our
website.
But, primarily our proxy voting
procedures involve close co-
operation between our analyst
and corporate governance teams
throughout the voting process. Our
corporate governance team brings
the expertise in corporate governance
best practices, whereas our analyst
team brings their comprehensive
knowledge of issuers to the table. For
us, this binary partnership between
the teams results in the best-informed
proxy voting decisions.
From a governance perspective, we
also have a proxy and governance
committee that I chair, which includes
members of our governance,
investment, legal and operations
teams. The committee oversees our
voting policy and processes to make
sure that we are addressing issues
as they arise, and that our policy
and processes evolve over time. The
committee meets at least several times
a year to formally review and update
the policy.
Finally, it should be mentioned that
our process involves extensive
engagement with issuers throughout
the voting process. Our analysts
attend many company meetings every
year and the corporate governance
team engages with issuers on a
regular basis, frequently alongside the
analyst team.
Would you say there are any areas
where AllianceBernstein differs
from the average asset manager
with regards to proxy voting and/or
corporate governance?
Well, there are basic standards of
corporate governance that most asset
managers adhere to in proxy voting. I
think there are differences, certainly in
terms of how different firms evaluate
specific items based on their own
policy and analysis.
Executive compensation, contentious
director elections and shareholder
proposals are generally the areas
where I believe you would see more
divergence among asset managers.
For instance, various firms approach
shareholder proposals on ESG
issues differently depending on their
respective evaluation frameworks and
perspectives.
For example, we are very strong
supporters of transparency on
shareholder proposals where we
believe that information can add value
to the investment process and we
generally will support such a proposal.
Other asset managers may not take
the same approach.
In your 2017 policy, you updated
your section on board diversity.
Could you give us a brief overview of
how AllianceBernstein approaches
diversity?
We think of diversity in the broadest
terms, and ultimately want cognitive
diversity. So, when we are reviewing
a board, we assess whether its
members bring a broad skill set
to effectively oversee the strategic
direction of the firm, including having
the right management in place. More
specifically, the things that we look
for are whether a board has members
with direct industry experience, strong
financial expertise and is diverse in
gender, age and tenure.
Symbiotic VotingDiscussing the synergy within AB’s proxy voting process with its Head of Responsible Investment, Linda Giuliano
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I think there are differences, certainly in terms of how
different firms evaluate specific items based on their own policy and analysis.”
“
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We also look at board diversity from a
geographical standpoint. For instance,
if we are looking at a multi-national
corporation, is it bringing in people with
broad international experience and,
even better, directors who reside in a
market where the corporation has a
strong presence?
The main change in our voting policy
with regards to board diversity is how
we think about board refreshment. At
AllianceBernstein, we really want to
understand how a board is evaluating
the skills of its current members, and
whether or not their skills match the
board’s current needs, i.e. where are
the skill gaps?
And most importantly, what is the
process by which the board attempts to
fill those gaps, and how are they going
about ensuring that they have a diverse
pool of prospective board candidates?
I would also add that along with
our transition to a digital economy,
cybersecurity has become increasingly
important for boards. While we can’t
expect every board to have a cyber
expert – there just aren’t enough – we
do expect boards to take this issue
seriously and look at a variety of ways
to ensure they get access to that
expertise.
So, it really comes down to process
in understanding how a board
approaches diversity.
With 2017’s proxy season coming
to a close for most countries, could
you outline the corporate governance
issues that AllianceBernstein has
focused on most this year?
The obvious issues that continue to be
discussed are around executive pay,
director elections, board composition,
shareholder rights and, as I mentioned
earlier, cybersecurity.
Shareholder rights during this proxy
season have continued to be a big
topic, as more companies have been
adopting proxy access. As of mid-
proxy season, approximately 425
companies have adopted proxy access
since 2013, including over 60 percent
of the S&P 500.
Shareholder proposals on
environmental and social issues saw
a slight uptick from 2016. Climate
change, as expected, continues
to be an important issue for many
shareholders. This was the first year in
which we saw a shareholder proposal
on climate risk reporting get a majority
vote at ExxonMobil.
Diversity was the main topic for social-
related proposals – diversity at the
board level and staff level, including
more focus on the gender pay gap. I
anticipate that these issues are going
to continue to get more attention,
not only in terms of the number of
proposals put forward, but also the
time and focus required to evaluate
them as they evolve.
Interestingly, while on the surface many
shareholder proposals sound very
simple – e.g. disclose your company’s
pay based on gender – they usually
involve very complex issues requiring
thought by both the company and its
shareholders. For example, how is
the compensation calculated, how to
normalize across different geographies,
etc. Indeed, we ask ourselves, how will
this disclosure help us evaluate the
company, provide greater insight and
ultimately drive shareholder value?
As the Head of Responsible
Investment, could you outline how
AllianceBernstein approaches ESG
issues?
At AllianceBernstein, we believe that
responsible investment is best done
through active management, with an
analyst team that has considerable
knowledge of the companies and
industries in which we invest.
Our overall framework involves taking an
integrated approach to environmental,
social and governance issues in our
investment decisions across our equity
and fixed income products.
It is the primary responsibility of our
analysts, given their expertise, to
assess the material ESG issues that
a company or industry may face,
and subsequently to factor that into
their research process. Ultimately,
this feeds into the portfolio decision-
making through research reviews
and discussions with the portfolio
managers who make the final
investment decisions.
We also have a subset of clients that
want to go beyond integration of ESG
issues, and we provide solutions across
asset classes for those investors who
want their capital to work towards a
better tomorrow. Over the past few
years, we have developed responsible
investment-focused solutions for
clients who want to do more.
5
“THIS BINARY PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE [ANALYST AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] TEAMS RESULTS IN
THE BEST-INFORMED PROXY VOTING DECISIONS.”
Cybersecurity has become increasingly important for
boards.”“
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“
“IT IS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF OUR ANALYSTS, GIVEN THEIR EXPERTISE, TO ASSESS THE MATERIAL ESG
ISSUES THAT A COMPANY OR INDUSTRY MAY FACE.”
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Local best practice is...an ongoing discussion
that we continue to have and re-evaluate as regional standards change.
“AllianceBernstein’s voting policy
contains many sections that apply
only to specific markets. Given how
much corporate governance dif fers
from market to market, do you find
it dif ficult to keep up to date with
regional best practice? Would it not
be better to divide your global policy
into several regional ones?
This is a very interesting question
from my standpoint because as of
a few years ago our voting policy
had no regional carve-outs. We
basically had a broad policy with
a philosophy that there are strong
corporate governance practices that
we believe that all markets should
adhere to. The policy was generally
written with that concept in mind.
Since then, we have added extra
sections for particular markets,
as we have evolved our thinking
to modify policies to address local
market standards. However, those
markets with lower standards
are also the ones where we try to
engage with issuers to influence
their behaviors.
A good example is Japan, where we
have seen a significant increase in
the number of companies adding
independent directors to their
boards. So, we try to find the right
balance between driving strong
governance policies in markets
that are less developed in their
governance practices, and adhering
to our own principles of good
corporate governance.
Local best practice is therefore an
ongoing discussion that we continue
to have and re-evaluate as regional
standards change.
The past few years have seen
considerable improvements in
corporate governance worldwide.
However, some countries/regions
have seen more improvements than
others. Are there any countries/
regions that you believe require a
similar renaissance in corporate
governance?
We are starting to see steps taken in
‘developing’ markets, particularly by
some stock exchanges, to improve
transparency. For instance, we
have seen the Johannesburg stock
exchange put forward some strong
corporate governance practices
in their listing rules, with a comply
or explain principle. This is a good
first step, as it illustrates that there
are certain practices that listed
companies are expected to at least
work towards.
If I had to pick regions, I would say that
Latin America and Asia have room to
improve. I think what investors are
looking for is more transparency
across the board, including better
financial transparency. So, I do think
we have a way to go in emerging
markets.
Thank you Linda.
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Procter & Gamble (P&G), with a market
capitalization of over $220 billion, recently
became the largest company ever to face
a proxy fight following a bid for a board
seat by Trian Fund Management. With
the contest coming up next month, we
thought we would take this opportunity
to compare it with Trian’s last record-
breaking proxy battle, the 2015 clash with
DuPont.
The P&G proxy contest began when
Trian purchased a $3.5 billion stake in
the company in February 2017. David
Taylor, CEO of P&G, said in June that the
company was in “ongoing constructive
talks” with Trian. Then, in the same
month, Trian said it was seeking to put
Nelson Peltz on the board and P&G
rejected the proposal. Evidently, the five
months of negotiations were not enough
to reach a compromise.
The contest with DuPont began in the
latter half of 2015. Trian accused the
chemical giant of underperforming,
and sought to have several directors
elected to the board. As with the current
battle, potential compromises were
discussed but neither side managed to
propose something that the other would
accept. Trian’s argument was that the
conglomerate structure was unwieldy
and a burden on results. The activist
wanted to split DuPont’s seven business
lines into three companies: one aimed
at agriculture and nutrition, another
for industrial materials and a third for
performance chemicals.
Trian is not seeking a breakup of P&G and
the company even agrees with some of
its changes, such as cutting costs and
restructuring management. However,
Trian believes P&G has failed to move fast
enough to arrest its market-share losses
and convert cost cuts into profit.
Similarities and Differences
Aside from the activist involved, there are
a number of similarities between the two
campaigns. For example, in both cases
the objectives of Trian are partly aligned
with management. DuPont was already
planning to spin off its performance
chemicals unit, but did not support a
further break-up as it felt that its various
businesses benefited from integrated
research and sales efforts.
Similarly, P&G agrees with some of Trian’s
ideas, but does not wish to pursue the
level of aggressive cost-cutting that
has been proposed. According to a
statement, “The board is confident that
the changes being made are producing
results, and expresses complete support
for the company’s strategy, plans and
management.”
Of course, both campaigns stand out for
their scale, though there is also a sizeable
gap between them. P&G is now the single
biggest company to face a proxy battle
and, with a market capitalization of $67.5
billion, DuPont was among the largest
ever targets of a proxy fight by an activist
investor at the time. However, DuPont’s
market cap was less than a third (around
31 percent) of P&G’s current $220 billion,
highlighting the increased scale of Trian’s
ambitions. Trian owned around 2.7
percent of DuPont’s shares at the time of
the proxy contest, compared to roughly
1.5 percent of P&G’s today.
While the two contests may have some
similarities, there are also differences. In
particular, it is interesting that Trian sought
to add not just Peltz, but three other
directors to the board of DuPont. This
time, Peltz is the lone candidate. None
of the DuPont nominees were ultimately
elected, but it was Peltz who came
closest. It could be that Trian learnt from
this, and that is why they are only seeking
to add Peltz to Procter & Gamble’s board.
Trian began its campaign more amicably
this time. The battle against DuPont was
launched alongside accusations that
acquisitions had not brought rewards and
expenses were too high. The campaign
became personal when Trian claimed
that performance had been disappointing
during the reign of CEO Ellen Kullman.
At P&G, Trian may have accused the
company of not doing enough to cut
costs, but has also expressed its support
for CEO David Taylor and the company’s
11 directors. If Trian wins the proxy
contest, it promised to expand the board
and re-nominate Ernesto Zedilio, who
Peltz is seeking to replace. Nonetheless,
these amicable beginnings have recently
devolved into a tit-for-tat between Trian
and P&G’s management.
Peltz’s Latest GambleComparing Trian’s proxy contests at P&G and DuPont
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“IF TRIAN WERE TO GARNER SIMILAR LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR THIS PROXY CONTEST, THEN PERSUADING
JUST ONE OF THE THREE BIGGEST SHAREHOLDERS COULD TIP THE SCALES IN THE ACTIVIST’S FAVOR.”
Factors at Play
Procter & Gamble has no single
shareholder that could do much to swing
the vote. The activist’s $3.5 billion stake
represents less than 1.5 percent of the
consumer goods giant’s outstanding
shares. Vanguard, BlackRock and State
Street, the three largest shareholders,
have positions of 6.9 percent, 6 percent
and 4.5 percent respectively. Bank of
America, Capital World Investors, BNY
Mellon, Fidelity, Northern Trust, Geode
Capital Management and, of course, Trian
follow with stakes of between 1 percent
and 1.7 percent.
However, these investors could still
be crucial if it comes down to the wire
as it did at DuPont. Peltz received 43
percent support at that meeting, despite
Vanguard, State Street and BlackRock
all voting in favor of the management’s
slate. If Trian were to garner similar levels
of support for this proxy contest, then
persuading just one of the three biggest
shareholders could tip the scales in the
activist’s favor.
Trian recently gained the support of ISS,
Glass Lewis and Egan-Jones. Obviously,
winning the support of leading proxy voting
advisers could be key to the success
of Trian’s attempt to install Nelson Peltz
on the board of P&G. However, proxy
adviser support may not be sufficient. As
Proxy Insight data has shown in the past,
gaining proxy adviser recommendations
is not the be-all and end-all. At the DuPont
meeting, Trian gained partial support from
ISS, Glass Lewis and Egan Jones but this
was not enough to secure victory.
The correlation of Vanguard, BlackRock
and State Street’s votes in proxy contests
with the recommendations of ISS and
Glass Lewis is modest. Of the three,
BlackRock follows the main proxy
advisers most often. Yet, since 2011, the
asset manager has still done the opposite
of what ISS and Glass Lewis suggested
36.4 percent and 30.8 percent of the time
respectively. Usually, P&G’s three largest
shareholders back management even if
proxy advisers are siding with the activists.
The opposite only happens rarely.
None of the consumer goods giant’s
top 10 shareholders are prejudicially
opposed to activism, but they side with
management more often than not. Geode
Capital was an exception in 2015, using
dissident proxy cards to cast its votes on
more than half of all possible occasions.
In the 2017 proxy season, BlackRock and
State Street voted using the dissident’s
proxy card in Engaged Capital’s proxy
contest at Rent-A-Center, Richmond
Brothers’ proxy contest at Rockwell
Medical and Macellum Advisors’ proxy
contest at Citi Trends. State Street also
backed Land & Building at Taubman
Centers. Both asset managers backed
management in the board battles at Fiesta
Restaurant Group, Buffalo Wild Wings,
Consolidated-Tomoka Land, Innoviva and
Immunomedics. BlackRock also backed
management at Senomyx and Cypress
Semiconductor.
Engaged, Richmond and Macellum all
had at least partial support from ISS and
Glass Lewis. Like Trian at P&G, they did
not seek control of the majority of the
board.
The fact that the majority of the Top 10
P&G shareholders in Table 1 supported
Trian at DuPont illustrates the high level
of support Peltz received. Hopefully,
this will provide some comfort to Trian
because, with the exception of Capital
World which has only voted at five
proxy contests, the average level
of support from these investors for
dissidents is fairly low. However, the
encouragement Trian can draw from
this is limited. P&G’s top three investors
all supported management at DuPont,
and the combined stakes of any two
of them outweigh the remaining seven
put together. Measured by actual votes
instead of individual investors, using
DuPont as an indicator suggests a
strong bias towards management.
Of course, DuPont is not necessarily
a firm indicator, and the fact that only
a small number of investors account
for the difference should, in theory at
least, make it easier for Trian to reverse
the situation. Once again, this suggests
that winning over even one more
investor could make the difference in a
close-fought battle.
Ultimately, with Peltz having come
so close to success at DuPont, the
question is whether he will be able
to push himself just a bit further this
time around. He might hope that his
relatively amicable approach to this
contest could be the factor that pulls
that off, though this may be hampered
by the fact that his dialogue with the
company has soured somewhat since
his challenge first launched.
If Trian can also conquer retail
shareholders – one of the most hard-
fought battlegrounds of the contest
– this group could also collectively
make the difference. And, once again,
so could winning over even one of the
three top investors. Ultimately, these
look like the main deciding factors, and
it is hard to say how any one of them
will go. It looks like whoever wins may
only secure victory by a narrow margin,
but with things being so close, it is
impossible to say who that will be.
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“IF TRIAN CAN ALSO CONQUER RETAIL SHAREHOLDERS...THIS GROUP COULD ALSO COLLECTIVELY MAKE THE
DIFFERENCE.”
Investor Shares Held Slate Supported at DuPont % Times Voted Dissident Card
Vanguard Group, Inc. 180,730,770 Management 23.7
BlackRock 156,361,011 Management 30.1
SSgA Funds Management, Inc. (State Street) 114,947,577 Management 24.1
Capital World Investors 38,986,037 Dissident 60.0
Northern Trust Investments 33,510,076 Dissident 25.9
Fidelity Management & Research Co. (FMR) 31,835,998 Dissident 28.6
BNY Mellon 31,722,606 Management 31.4
Geode Capital Management 25,923,937 Dissident 47.0
Norges Bank Investment Management 22,813,845 Dissident 28.6
Wells Fargo Advisors LLC 21,744,314 Dissident 38.6
Table 1: Voting of the Top 10 P&G investors at the DuPont proxy contest Source: Proxy Insight
Both sides claim superior shareholder returns – 16-Aug-17
The spat began with Procter & Gamble saying it has outperformed companies where Peltz serves as director. P&G said that “since the CEO transition on November 1, 2015, our team has delivered total shareholder returns... of 27% – well above the vast majority of peers selected by Trian.” Over the same period, P&G said, “the weighted average return of the companies where Mr. Peltz serves as a board member has been only 8%.”
Trian questioned Procter & Gamble’s calculations, particularly the weighting of stocks by market capitalization. The activist said consumer products companies where Peltz has been a director outperformed Procter & Gamble over similar periods by 10%, and beat the S&P 500 index by 8.8% while delivering higher earnings growth. Trian also favored a ten-year timeframe, while P&G prefers to measure returns from the point when the company changed leadership. Whether investors credit the company with beginning the turnaround is likely to be a central issue in this proxy contest.
Peltz accused of having outdated view of P&G – 28-Aug-17
P&G then criticized Peltz for not understanding the company today. It pointed out that Peltz’s view of the company relies on the experience of Clayton Daley, a former executive who left P&G nearly a decade ago. “Mr. Peltz’s argument that P&G should be targeting the same organic growth targets today as it did in 2005 shows a misunderstanding of the significantly different global economic conditions and industry dynam-ics today,” the company said in a lengthy letter to shareholders. Trian, which prefers to be described as a “highly engaged shareowner” instead of an activist investor, believes the firm’s organic growth has trailed its peers over the past five years, resulting in subpar total shareholder returns. In a relatively small presentation, Peltz suggested he will lobby for cost cuts, better allocation of capital and increased investment.
Trian proposes restructuring in white paper – 06-Sep-17
Trian then released a 94-page presentation on Procter & Gamble, laying out its case at length for the first time. The activist focused its fire on the company’s operating performance and also aimed a shot at CEO David Taylor. Taylor has led a vigorous campaign against Peltz’s candida-cy for the board, despite the activist saying it did not want to topple him as part of its proxy contest. “We are committed to working with David Taylor but good governance mandates robust succession planning,” Trian said.
Trian accused the consumer products giant of fudging reorganizations designed to make its global business units more accountable. It said that centralized selling and marketing operations groups had created additional reporting lines and pushed costs down the chain of command, leading to “near worst-in-class international margins.” While emphasizing that it does not intend to push for a breakup, Trian believes that the business should be restructured into three units with roughly equal revenues: Beauty, Grooming & Health Care; Fabric & Home Care; and Baby, Feminine & Family Care.
As the date of the meeting draws closer, news on this proxy contest has devolved somewhat into a mud-slinging match. Through
reports and counter-reports, each side is criticizing the other for not acting in the best interest of the company.
Heating Up
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“NONETHELESS, THESE AMICABLE BEGINNINGS HAVE RECENTLY DEVOLVED INTO A TIT-FOR-TAT BETWEEN
TRIAN AND P&G’S MANAGEMENT.”
P&G says restructuring plan is precursor to breakup – 07-Sep-17
In the middle of a nine-page rejoinder focused on its achievements, P&G claimed that Peltz’s ultimate goal is to carve up the company. “[Peltz’s] playbook appears to be code for another restructuring and a precursor to a breakup of the company - his ‘cookie-cutter’ plan,” the company said in a statement. P&G also said it had studied “numerous organizational design struc-tures,” including the one proposed by Peltz, and concluded that his approach “would result in higher costs, lower efficiency, reduced profits and an added layer of management complexity.”
“Today, as a result of the actions we have taken over the past several years, P&G has an even more granular and more account-able structure,” P&G said. The company then reiterated that its board is “best-in-class,” and said Peltz was not filling a current need for experience in “digital, health care [or] global.”
Trian says restructuring plan is not precursor to breakup – 08-Sep-17
Nelson Peltz rebuffed Procter & Gamble’s claim that he wants to split the company into three. In an interview with CNBC, the activist said, “They can say whatever they like, we point very clearly that we are not suggesting a company breakup.” Peltz has proposed a “very lean” holding company, and said all the geographies, the R&D and sales and marketing have to report to one of the three global business units. He told CNBC that his proxy contest at DuPont was not a loss, just “a minor setback.” The company recently merged with Dow Chemicals, leading Peltz to say he lost the proxy battle but won the war.
P&G releases 85-page criticism – 12-Sep-17
P&G then filed an 85-page presentation outlining its strategy and criticizing the activist’s proposals. P&G said Trian’s proposal to create a holding company to oversee its entire structure is the activist’s only idea, “and it is a bad idea.”
Peltz claims P&G will spend $100m on proxy contest – 18-Sep-17
Peltz said Procter & Gamble will spend more than $100 million to keep him out of the boardroom. “The company is spending a huge amount of money on an army of lawyers, bankers and other advisers. All of P&G’s costs related to this proxy fight are coming out of P&G shareholders’ pockets,” Peltz said in a letter to investors on September 18. “Just think what that $100+ million could do if put to work to regain lost market share.” By contrast, the activist noted that Trian will pay the costs associated with the proxy battle from its own pocket, suggesting it will not ask for reimbursement from the company if it wins the fight.
In August, P&G said in its proxy statement the fight would cost $35 million. Chairman and CEO David Taylor reiterated the num-ber in a September 11 interview with CNBC, calling Peltz’s claim “preposterous.” Trian itself is expected to spend around $25 million on the proxy contest.
P&G sends shareholders 8-page letter – 20-Sep-17
Procter & Gamble has also published an eight-page letter to shareholders detailing why Pelt’s addition to the board could cause “harm.” Apparently, shareholders questioned what the harm would be in adding Peltz to the board, given that he will be only one voice among 12 directors. “‘What’s the harm?’ is a horribly low and irresponsible standard for board governance,” the com-pany said, before criticizing Peltz for his lack of desirable skills. Procter & Gamble also noted that Peltz has “a history of behavior and hidden agendas that result in derailing companies.”
P&G reiterated that it had talked with numerous CEOs, executives and directors who had worked with Peltz and “positive rec-ommendations were not forthcoming. People would only speak candidly about their experiences with Mr. Peltz if those discus-sions were kept confidential, for fear of retribution,” the company said. This is despite Trian already saying it had contacted the 13 CEOs and chairmen who had worked with Peltz, and all of them said they had not talked with P&G.
Trian says criticisms are false – 20-Sep-17
Trian responded to the letter with a statement saying it was “disappointed that P&G has been inundating its employees, retirees and alumni with misleading communication materials about Nelson Peltz’s track record and intentions.”
In a letter, Peltz added, “When I serve on a company’s board, we hold our investments for an average of seven years, which is longer than many mutual funds and enough time to help achieve real improvement... The current focus of the board and management is to sell brands, cut advertising, cut jobs and erode local capabilities, all while preserving a highly centralized and matrixed corporate structure that impedes market share growth.”
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New Dutch corporate governance code
approved
The Netherlands has recently approved
an updated version of its 2008 corporate
governance code. The new code’s most
important change is its emphasis on
long-term value creation, which compels
Dutch companies to disregard strategies
that rely too heavily on short-term value
creation.
The code also stresses the importance
of corporate culture. According to the
updated code, members of both the
management and supervisory boards
will be expected to formulate a corporate
culture based on the value of integrity.
It is now obligatory that the company’s
corporate culture be explained in its
management report.
Asset managers get more aggressive on
US pay
Proxy Insight data shows that major
investors got tougher this year in their
voting on US pay resolutions. All of the
top ten asset managers voted more
aggressively this year than last on say-
on-pay proposals in the S&P 500.
In the twelve months leading up to the
end of June, all of the ten largest asset
managers reduced their support for
S&P 500 advisory compensation votes
compared to the previous period. The
biggest increase in aggression came
from JPMorgan, which cut its support
by 2.2 percent, followed closely by State
Street with a drop of 2.1 percent.
Interestingly, things were more of a mixed
bag in the UK’s FTSE 350. Some of
these asset managers showed a similar
reduction in support for say-on-pay. For
example, State Street and BlackRock
both cut their support for advisory
compensation votes by 2.0 percent.
Others, however, actually increased their
support by an even larger margin, with
the biggest shift being a 3.5 percent
increase from JPMorgan.
On average, support for S&P 500 advisory
compensation votes from the top ten
investors fell by 1.4 percent this year. They
supported 91.8 percent of resolutions,
compared to 93.2 percent last year. In
the FTSE 350, by contrast, their support
for the same kind of proposal increased
by an average of 0.8 percentage points,
hitting 94.0 percent this year.
Corporate governance in Singapore
According to the head of Securities
Investors Association Singapore (Sias),
David Gerald, more needs to be done
to improve the corporate governance
culture in Singaporean companies.
Speaking at the launch of the 8th
Singapore Corporate Governance Week,
Mr Gerald declared that an analysis
conducted by Sias of 200 annual reports
disclosed by companies based in
Singapore – mainly mid and small caps –
found relevant disclosures lacking.
Mr Gerald’s speech follows an earlier
survey, which found that just 11 percent
of chief executives in Singapore received
long-term incentive plans. This underlines
a failure to align executive remuneration
and company performance. Moreover,
31 percent did not even pay their chief
executives bonuses during the 2016
fiscal year.
UBS ups support for climate resolutions
UBS has increased its support for
shareholder proposals on climate issues
this year, according to the Swiss asset
management giant’s head of sustainable
investing research, Christopher
Greenwald.
Speaking in an interview with Bloomberg,
Mr Greenwald said that UBS is “now
voting for a large majority of resolutions
requesting companies to report CO2
emissions, or to explain climate change
risk to investors, or to explain what
initiatives they are taking for a 2-degree
global warming scenario in the future.”
The decision to step up support on
climate resolutions, he said, stemmed
partly from work with UK pension fund
National Employee Savings Trust (NEST),
which placed a large chunk of its assets
in UBS’ climate-aware fund earlier this
year.
13
News summaryA round-up of the latest developments in proxy voting
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“TWO THIRDS OF VOTES FROM INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS THIS PROXY SEASON SUPPORTED CLIMATE CHANGE
PROPOSALS. BY COMPARISON, ONLY 13 PERCENT OF RETAIL SHARES VOTED IN FAVOR.”
Although Mr Greenwald did not give
specific figures, Proxy Insight data
backs up his claim that UBS has
significantly stepped up its support for
environmental proposals. The asset
manager voted on eight proposals
to assess the impact of a 2 degree
scenario between 1st July 2015 and
30th June 2016, and only supported
three (37.5 percent). In the same
period from 2016-2017, UBS voted on
11 such proposals and supported all
of them.
Plans to create non-voting shares at
Facebook abandoned
Mark Zuckerberg’s plans to create a
new class of Facebook stock with no
voting rights have been abandoned.
The new shares were intended to
allow Mr Zuckerberg to sell stock to
fund his philanthropy without losing
his majority voting power.
Facebook already uses a dual-stock
structure which allows Mr Zuckerberg
to retain control of the company
through superior voting rights.
However, the company does not
currently offer any stock with no voting
rights at all. Mr Zuckerberg hoped that
creating such a share class would
allow him to fulfill a charity pledge to
give away 99 percent of his stock,
yet maintain his current control of the
company.
The idea of creating non-voting
stock did not go down well with
shareholders, however. Critics claimed
that it would lead to dilution, and that
only Mr Zuckerberg stood to benefit
from a measure designed to maintain
his voting power as he decreased his
stake. A group of Facebook’s investors
launched a court challenge against
the move, in which Mr Zuckerberg had
been due to give evidence.
Deutsche Boerse announces pay cap
The Deutsche Boerse has recently
declared that it is imposing a cap of
€9.5 million on executive pay. This
cap includes all fixed and variable
remuneration elements and will come
into force this year.
Commenting on the new cap,
chairman of Deutsche Boerse’s
supervisory board, Joachim Faber,
said that: “In the interests of our
shareholders, we want to continue to
offer the executive board of Deutsche
Börse AG competitive incentives for
good performance and sustainable
corporate success, while at the same
time avoiding possible and unwanted
fluctuations. This is achieved with
the upper limit in the adjusted
remuneration model.”
Report shows divide between retail
and institutional ESG voting
A report by Broadridge and PwC has
shown a wide gap between the way
retail and institutional investors vote
on ESG issues. Both climate change
and board diversity resolutions
demonstrate the divide.
Two thirds of votes from institutional
investors this proxy season supported
climate change proposals. By
comparison, only 13 percent of
retail shares voted in favor of these
resolutions. The split is less marked
but still present when it comes to
board diversity. These proposals
were supported by 31 percent of
institutional votes and 14 percent of
retail shares.
The report also highlighted several
other statistics, including some
changing trends in proxy contests.
There were 38 proxy contests in
the first half of this year, down from
47 over the same period in 2016.
This year’s campaigns were also far
shorter, lasting an average of 44 days
in the first half of this year compared
to 109 days across 2016.
Divide over Saudi Aramco listing
continues
The stand-off between London’s
square mile and various corporate
governance institutions continues,
with the former supporting new rules
to attract the listing of Saudi Aramco,
whereas the latter opposes them.
The City of London Corporation has
declared that it has no problem with
the formulation of new listing rules for
state-owned companies put forward
by the Financial Conduct Authority
(FCA). It is hoped that the rules would
boost the chance of Saudi Aramco
listing on the London Stock Exchange.
According to the corporation’s policy
chairman, Catherine McGuinness:
“Good corporate governance is one
of the City’s real selling points in the
global economy. We see no problem
with adding a properly regulated and
transparent category to the LSE’s
already diverse range. This proposed
category reflects the special nature of
sovereign entities.”
However, elsewhere support for the
new listing rules has been limited,
with several corporate governance
institutions coming out against the
new regulations, including the Institute
of Directors (IoD), the Investment
Association and Aberdeen Standard
Investments.
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