Subsidies and Dumping - UiO

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Subsidies and Dumping Study case N6

Transcript of Subsidies and Dumping - UiO

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Subsidies and DumpingStudy case N6

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Relevant information from the case

• Auto-solutions wants to market a new car in Servia

• Servia has significant tax credit that promote the sale of hybrid cars, therefore, Auto-solutions gave up its efforts to enter the market.

• Servia’s government invested heavily in research to promote the development of hybrid cars, the project was held by the Technical University of Servia

• The University transferred the technology it had developed to the newly established Servian car producer Future-Cars for free.

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Relevant information from the case

• Future-Cars was owned partly by the University (20 %) and partly by private investors (80 %).

• The production of hybrid cars was very successful, and the new car became extremely popular in Servia. Currently, it has 80 % of the Servian car market

• the hybrid car was also exported to Monia, where it captured 25 % of the car market during two years. During the same period, the sale of Auto- solutions’ cars in Monia was reduced by 15 %.

• 5 years have passed since the market exploration of Auto-solution.

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Questions

-How Auto-solutions should proceed with such a case

-What kind of factual information Auto-solutions should be

prepared to provide.

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Is it dumping or subsidy?

• It is not dumping!

• Why?

• Because it is a subsidy!

• why?

• Let’s find out!

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SUBSIDIES TWO TRACKS

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Tax credits on sales of hybrid cars

• Financial contribution Art 1 (a) SCM-Agreement• Government revenue, otherwise due, is foregone?

• „otherwise due“ -> depends on rules of taxation of member (US – FSC)

• Comparison of general tax rates and the lower tax rate

• Does scope of exceptions undermines the existence of a general rule? (US –Large Civil Aircraft, 2nd complaint)

• by a government or a public body

• conferring a benefit Art 1 (b)

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• Specificity Art 2 SCM-Agreement• Enterprise or industry specificity Art 2 (a), Industry: Producers of certain types

of products (US – Upland Cotton)

• Prohibited subsidy? Art 3 SCM-Agreement

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• Actionable subsidy? Art 5 SCM-Agreement• Must have adverse effects to interests of other members:

• Serious prejudice Art 6 (a): Effect of subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like product of another Member into the market of subsidizing member

• Like product: Competition relationship and substitute

• Impedance: Import where hindered by the subsidized product (US – Large Civil Aircraft, 2nd complaint)

•-> no injury to domestic industry. It can only be challenged by WTO dispute settlement under Art 7 SCM

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Transfer of technology

• Financial contribution Art 1 (a) SCM-Agreement• Government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure

• Inputs with financial value (US – Softwood Lumber IV)

• Reasonably proximate relationship between action of government providing the good and enjoyment of the good by the recipient (US – Carbon Steel)

• General infrastructure: Available for all entitys (EC – Large Civil Aircraft)

• By a government or public body• Public body: Entity performing governmental functions, Governmental

functions ordinarily classified as governmental in the legal order of the member (US – Carbon Steel)

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• Conferring a benefit Art 1 (b)• Art 14 (d) No benefit when there is a adequate remuneration

• Specificty Art 2 SCM-Agreement• SCM only applys to specific subsidies

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• Prohibited subsidies are not relevant to our case

• We have come to the conclusion that the issue referred to in our case is an example of actionable subsidy

• Due to the fact that it provoques adverse effects on the interests of another member.

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Art 5 SCM Agreement

Paragraphs a to c of art 5 of the SCM Agreements distinguish

between 3 types of adverse effects:

(1) Injury to the domestic industry of another member (article 5a)

(2)Nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or

indirectly to other Members under the GATT. 1994 (art. 5.b)

(3)Serious prejudice

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The effects resulting from the subsidy that Future Cars is

benefiting from, identifies with the type : Injury to the domestic

industry of another member

This refers to :

• material injury to the domestic industry (which is Monia’s car

industry)

• producing the product that is "like" (cars in general)

• the subsidized product (hybrid cars produced by Future Cars)

• imported into the territory of the complaining Member

(imported into Monia, who is the complaining member)

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Remember!

As we already said:

We need to have the preconditions of like product!

- SCM-Agreement- GATT

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• Provisions of the WTO Agreement referred to? Articles I:1, III:2

and III:4 of the Gatt 1994.

• In establishing likeness this elements are important!

1. Physical characteristics

2. End uses (substitutional?)

3. Consumer habits and preferences (substitutional?)

4. Tariff classification

Indonesia- Autos(1998) Panel says:

‘characteristics closely resembling’ includes but is not

limited to physical characteristics.

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So...

The like products in this case are ‘cars in general’ (In Monia)

and ‘hybrid cars’ (produced by Future Cars)

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Art.16 defines domestic industry as

Domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products

All car produces in Monia are domestic producers which conforms the domestry industry.

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InjuryDefinition must pursuant to art 15.1 of the SCM Agreement, be

base on positive evidence and involve an objective of examination

of:

FIRST: the volume of the subsidised imports and the effects on

the subsidised imports on prices in the domestic market for like

products (subsidised imports takes 25% of market)

SECOND: the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic

producers of such products (-15% of sales of Auto-Solutions in

Monia)

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Referring to art 15.2 we must ask ourselves:

Has been a significant increase of the subsidised

imports?

Article 15.2 especially focus and contemplates an inquiry into the

relationship between two variables:

• subsidy imports

• domestic prices. Nonetheless in this case we are not given any

price information

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Causation issue of non attribution

Art. 15.5 requires that the subsidized imports are, through the effect of subsidies, causing injury to the domestic industry.

Art. 15.4: for examining the effects of subsidised imports, comprise:

1. Whether there has been a significant increase in subsidised imports2. Effect of the subsided imports on prices 3. Consequent impact of the subsised imports on the domestic

industry

-> Since the subsised car entered the market in Monia, Sales of Auto-Solutions dropped by 15% and sales of Future-Cars increased up to 25% in two years

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SUBSIDIES TWO TRACKS

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