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An assessment of the UNDP-CHTDF project on Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts relating to

implementation of the CHT Accord 1997

Submitted by Ashok Kumar Chakma Development worker

Rangamati

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Sl Table of Contents Page

Executive Summary

1 Introduction

1.1 Background of the study

1.2 Objectives of the study

1.3 Specific objectives

1.4 Methodology of the study

1.5 Limitations of the study

1.6 Definition of the terms

2 Contexts of Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding in CHT

2.1 The CHT Conflict: Causes and dynamics

2.2. Peace Process and the CHT Accord of 1997

2.3 Development in Chittagong Hill Tracts

2.4 Priorities for development and peace-building in the post-Accord period

3 Key findings of the UNDP-CHTDF Project

3.1 Background of the UNDP-CHTDF project in CHT

3.2 UNDP-CHTDF‟s Project: Problem analysis, development goal and

strategies

3.3 Key areas of the CHTDF activities and outputs

3.3.1 Economic Development

3.3.2 Education

3.3.3 Health Program

3.3.4 Community empowerment

3.3.5 Confidence building

3.3.6 Capacity development

3.3.7 Gender mainstreaming

4 Assessment of the Impacts of the CHTDF project

4.1 Impacts of the region-wide initiatives on education, health, economic

development and gender equity

4.2 Impacts of the core components of the CHTDF project

4.2.1 Impacts of community empowerment

4.2.2 Impacts of Capacity Development

4.2.3 Impacts of Confidence Building

5 Gaps between the people‟s priorities and CHTDF‟s intervention in the

post-Accord period

6 Exit/future plan of the CHTDF project

7 Conclusions and recommendations

Bibliography

Annexure

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Acronyms

ADB Asian Development Bank

ADP Annual Development Plan

AFG Adivasi Facilitator‟s Group

AL Awami League

ARI Acute respiratory infections

BNP Bangladesh National Party

CB Confidence Building

CD Capacity Development

CDP Capacity Development Plan

CEP Community Empowerment Project

CF Community Facilitator

CHSW Community Health Services Worker

CHT Chittagong Hill Tracts

CHTC Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission

CHTDB Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board

CHTDF Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility

CHTRC Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council

CHTRDP CHT Rural Development Project

CHTWoN Chittagong Hill Tracts Women‟s Network

CIDA Canadian International Development Agency

CIPD Centre for Integrated Program and Development

DC Deputy Commissioner

EC European Commission

ED Economic Development

EU European Union

FFS Farmer field Schools

GoB Government of Bangladesh

GoC General Officer Commanding

HDC Hill District Council

ICDP Integrated Community Development Project

IDP Internally Displaced People

IGA Income Generating Activities

ILO International Labour Organization

IWGIA International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs

LoA Letter of Agreement

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MG Mothers Group

MLE Multi-lingual Education

MoCHTA Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs

MoPME Ministry of Primary and Mass Education

NCCHT National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts

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NGO Non Governmental Organization

NSC National Steering Committee

PCJSS Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti

PDC Para Development Community

PNDG Para Nari Development Group

ProDoc Project Document

QIF Quick Impact Fund

SMC School Management Committees

TAC Technical Advisory Committee

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNDRIP United Nations Declaration on Right of Indigenous Peoples

UnFC Union Facilitation Committee

UNICEF United nations Children Fund

UP Union Parishad

UzAC Upazila Advisory Committees

VAW Violence Against Women

WFP World Food Programme

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Acknowledgements

This study has been carried out with support from the Centre for Integrated Program and Development (CIPD) with an objective to provide the community leaders and civil society organisations including the development agencies with the first hand information of UNDP-CHTDF‟s project on Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in Chittagong Hill Tracts‟, which had been the largest project in terms of budget allocation in the post-Accord period. This project is going on for about 10 years since 2003. This study makes an attempt to assess how far the CHTDF‟s project has contributed to overall implementation of the CHT Accord.

For this study, the data were collected both from the primary and secondary sources. During the field work, the study team received cordial support from para development committees (PDCs), partner NGOs workers, traditional and elected leaders. Thanks go to them for their kind support.

I would also like to express thanks and appreciation to Nyo Hla Mong Marma, who gladly took the responsibility to conduct the field works and interviews with PDCs in Khagrachari and Bandarban. I owe much to him for his kind support and valuable inputs into this report. Thanks also go to the CEP partner NGOs colleagues and the Adivasi Facilitator‟s Group (AFG) members for their support during the field work. Special thanks go to Nae Prue Merry for her support to connect me with UP Chairmen and members.

Finally, I would like to accord thanks to all those who provided valuable comments and inputs to finalise this report. Ashok Kumar Chakma Development Worker Rangamati November 2013 E: ashok.chakma@gmail.com

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following the CHT Accord in 1997, new hopes and aspirations have emerged among the people in CHT for peace and development. In the post-Accord situation, many international development agencies have come forward to support development interventions in CHT. In terms of budget allocations and long-term presence, UNDP-CHTDF was the largest development partner in CHT in the post-Accord period. The CHTDF‟s project of „Promotion of development and confidence building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts‟ was set out to achieve “accelerated and sustainable socio-economic development”, with a particular focus on confidence building among the people and CHT institutions to promote long term peace in the CHT region. Since 2003 until today, UNDP-CHTDF has implemented various activities covering a wide range of issues such as community empowerment, local economic development, basic services (health and education) and confidence building. Now the CHTDF project is about to phase out.

On this backdrop, this study, by looking at the ground reality of the CHTDF project, aims to provide an account of what have been done and achieved so far by the UNDP-CHTDF‟s project towards promotion of development and peace-building vis-a-vis implementation of the CHT Accord. It is also expected that based on the assessment of the study, CHT people, especially civil society members and development organisations will make advocacy and lobby with UNDP as other international development partners to address the „critical issues‟ of the CHT Accord in the future course of development intervention in CHT.

To carry out the study, data were collected both from the primary and secondary sources. The key grassroots stakeholders – Union Councils‟ chairmen and members, traditional leaders and PDCs (village development committees) officials, local partner NGOs executives and frontline workers, relevant CHTDF officials and CHTRC Councilors were interviewed to gather data from the primary source. Apart from interviews with the key grassroots stakeholders, project documents, evaluation reports and annual reports of UNDP-CHTDF were reviewed. Academic journal articles and daily news paper reports were also consulted to understand the core issues of CHT.

The study shows that the major causes of the CHT conflict resulted from the continuous denial of identity, self-rule system and development aggression by successive regimes from the British period to the present Bangladesh times. In the post-independence of Bangladesh, the struggle of indigenous peoples got a momentum when their identities and cultures have been denied by the newly emerged state. To protect their own distinct national and cultural identities, indigenous peoples of CHT led by PCJSS waged guerilla warfare against the government of Bangladesh.

In response to the guerilla warfare, the government of Bangladesh (GoB) conceived an economic solution. To bring the CHT into development, the GoB, since the mid „70s through establishing the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board (CHTDB), has implemented various development projects on social, economic and infrastructural development. These economic development projects could not bring to an end to the guerilla warfare rather served the purpose of counter-insurgency operations, by facilitating military mobility across the whole CHT. Later the GoB was seen to implement the two radical measures – military intervention and transfer of Bengali settlers from the plain region to the hills. Apart from militarisation of the whole CHT region, some 400,000 Bengali settlers from the plain region were transferred into CHT under the aegis of the government. To resist these ill moves of the government, PCJSS took up arms. The armed conflict between the GoB forces and PCJSS continued until 2 December 1997 when the CHT Accord was signed.

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In the post-Accord period, UNDP-CHTDF has come up with the package of “promotion of development and confidence building” in CHT financed by the European Union and other donors. This project had been designed under the five key strategic areas: Capacity building of CHT institution; Service delivery (on education, health and economic development); Community empowerment (CE); Confidence building (CB) and Enhancing the UNDP-CHTDFs operational and infrastructural capacity. Of these components, the capacity building of CHT institutions and CB were the core components which were expected to directly support implementation of the CHT Accord vis-a-vis political empowerment, while the rest components were expected to do with economic and social development in the post-conflict situation.

The findings of the study suggest that the components on basic services (health and education) and economic development are quite visible and the achievements seem to be fairly on track as per the project plan. Through these components, CHTDF provided development services to some 3257 remote village communities across the whole CHT. On any aspect, this coverage should be treated a grand success. However, the sustainability of these components after the CHTDF‟s withdrawal remains a big concern.

The core components such as the capacity development (CD) and confidence building (CB) were expected to deal with the “critical issues” of the CHT Accord implementation, e.g. resolution of land disputes, rehabilitation of internally displaced persona (IDPs), returnee refugees and ex-combatants, devolution of authority to CHTRC and HDCs, election of HDCs, demilitarization of CHT, and formation of mixed police force etc. But UNDP-CHTDF could not touch on any of these critical issues due to a host of reasons, such as lack of political will of the government, and lack of capacities of the CHT institutions (MoCHTA, CHTRC, and HDCs). On the other hand, UNDP was allegedly remained too lenient to surrendering to the government policy on the question of implementing these critical issues of the CHT Accord. As such, the CHTDF project could not bring in tangible results in peace building vis-à-vis implementation of the CHT Accord.

The study suggests that for peace building or implementation of the “critical issues” of CHT Accord, it needs structural changes to the state policies. To bring in such changes depends on the political will of the government. Given the present complex political situation in Bangladesh, this study gives an emphasis on drawing political support from different stakeholders like political parties, members of parliament, civil society, and academics including civil and military bureaucrats. Taking all these factors into account, the following recommendations are made to support the confidence building measures vis-a-vis implementation of the CHT Accord:

To the CHT institutions (MoCHTA, CHTRC and HDCs)

Work together to reach a common understanding on the recognition of indigenous peoples in the constitution of Bangladesh;

To draw a common vision, political consensus and guidance on development and implementation of the CHT Accord;

High level policy advocacy led by MoCHTA and CHTRC to influence decision-making at the national level with regards to CHT affairs.

Continuous goal oriented policy dialogues with the key stakeholders on CHT affairs, particularly on the „critical issues‟ such as resolution of land disputes, devolution of authority to CHTRC and HDCs, demilitarization of CHT, and formation of mixed police force etc.

Strengthening the MoCHTA including appointment of officers who are sensitized with indigenous issues. In case of appointment, indigenous persons should be given preference.

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Sensitization of the civil and military bureaucrats on CHT issues.

To UNDP and donor community

All development programs/projects must support implementation of the CHT Accord. Before designing the projects/programs, a proper analysis of conflict should be carried out.

To support implementation of the CHT Accord, specific projects should be designed to work on the critical issues that include land dispute resolution, rehabilitation of IDPs, returnee refugees and ex-combatants, preparation of electoral roll for HDCs, and formation of mixed police force in CHT.

To involve civil society organisations and local NGOs in implementation of all development programs in CHT.

To explore the opportunities to work in partnership with other national bodies such as Bangladesh National Human Rights Commission to protect human rights violations in CHT.

To explore the opportunities to work with the members of parliaments, who might uphold the interest of indigenous peoples and give political support for peace building in CHT. For instance, the Parliamentary Caucus on indigenous peoples headed by the Worker‟s Party chief Mr. Rashed Khan Menon, worked on constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples during the constitutional amendment by the current grand alliance government. This experience of the Parliamentary Caucus might be replicated in the future work.

Support media campaign on specific issues to remove people‟s misconceptions or ramifications on implementation of the Accord. For example, mass people in plain region do have a general misconception that „Bengalis‟ cannot buy land in CHT or „adivasi‟ identity will tell upon the state‟s sovereignty etc. Media campaign should be launched to remove such misconceptions about specific issues related to implementation of the CHT Accord.

To Civil society and local development organisations

Civil society organisations (CSO) and NGOs can play a watchdog role. They can monitor the development activities including the UNDP-CHTDF program in CHT;

CSOs and NGOs can publish annual status report on the development and peace building activities in CHT.

Organise community based organisations (CBOs) to articulate people‟s perspectives on development and peacebuilding in CHT.

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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is situated in the south-eastern part of Bangladesh. It is geographically, politically, socially and culturally different from other parts of the country. CHT, a home to 11 indigenous communities, is the only region in Bangladesh, where the majority of the indigenous peoples is found. Since the mid 1970s, the indigenous peoples of the CHT under the leadership of PCJSS, the indigenous political party, have waged an armed struggle for the right of self-determination. This armed struggle continued until 2 December 1997, when an accord, popularly known as the CHT Peace Accord was signed between the government of Bangladesh and PCJSS. The CHT Accord ended the decade-long armed conflict in the region by recognizing the special governance systems under the indigenous leadership such as CHT Regional Council, and 3 Hill Districts Councils alongside the traditional administrative systems. The CHT Accord lays down a framework for overall development in the CHT.

As the CHT Accord created an enabling environment for peace and development, many international development agencies have come forward to support development interventions in the post-Accord period. Of them UNDP-CHTDF has come up with the first ever largest development package of USD 160.5 million to implement a project titled „Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. This is a multi-sectoral project focused on a wide range of development issues such as capacity building of CHT institutions, local economic development, community empowerment, region-wide development initiatives (health and education), and confidence building for sustainable development and peace in the CHT region. Since 2005 until now, the project covered 3257 para communities (villages) across the CHT.

Now this project is at the phasing out stage. Unofficial sources indicate that the CHTDF project will be wrapped up by 2013 followed by a new phase in 2014. The National Steering Committee of the project in its last meeting held in March 2012 approved an extension to the project until September 2015. However, there is no clear information about the phase out plan of the UNDP-CHTDF program; whereas from the CHTDF-UNDP‟s side, as of now, no initiative has been seen to consult with the indigenous peoples, civil society members and CHT institutions. As such, the civil society, development organisations and CHT institutions are in the dark about the future CHTDF program.

On this backdrop, CIPD (Centre for Integrated Program and Development), a non-government development organization, has supported this study with an objective to provide better understanding of what have been done and achieved so far by the UNDP-CHTDF‟s project on “promotion of development and confidence-building” in the post-Accord period. Within this objective the study also makes an attempt to assess whether the CHTDF‟s development interventions were supportive to implementing the CHT Accord, and whether it promoted the local people‟s perspective on self-determined development in accordance with the principles of the CHT Accord and international laws and policies related to indigenous peoples.

The final output of this study is also expected to be used for lobby and advocacy with donors and development agencies on the future work of UNDP in CHT region. 1.2 Objectives of the study

The overall objective of the study is to assess how far the UNDP‟s program of „promotion of development and confidence-building‟ has contributed to implementation of the CHT Accord. In particular, the study will assess whether the UNDP‟s intervention has contributed to addressing

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the core issues of development and special governance systems vis-à-vis peacebuilding as envisioned in the CHT Accord. 1.3 Specific Objectives: The specific objectives of the study are:

1. To assess the CHTDF‟s intervention what have been done and achieved so far for „development and confidence building‟ in the post-Accord situation;

2. To assess the UNDP‟s program whether it has been relevant and effective to addressing the fundamental issues of self-determined development and special governance system in the CHT in line with the CHT Accord;

3. To assess the impacts of the UNDP‟s program activities on the overall situation of indigenous peoples, with a particular focus on economic, social, political, ethnic and gender relations.

1.4 Methodology of the study

This study is largely drawn on the qualitative methods for collecting data to assess the CHTDF project. These include the review of literature, key informant interviews, field visits to PDCs, and focus group discussions with PDC officials.

The documents of the CHTDF projects, annual progress reports (2006 to 2011), project evaluation reports, survey reports, project completion reports and briefing papers produced by the CHTDF were reviewed to get the whole picture of the project‟s achievements. To gather information about the issues of conflict, and development priorities for the CHT in the post-Accord period, the documents published from various sources e.g. articles, research reports and journals, the CHT Accord, the Rangamati Declaration, UNDRIP etc. were consulted.

To gather data from the primary sources and also to verify the information gathered from the literature review, the researcher supported by two research assistants visited 30 para communities (Para Development Committees – PDCs) in three hill districts (see Annex – A: the list of PDCs). During the community visits, PDC officials were interviewed. Focus group discussions were held with key PDC executives (e.g. president, general secretary and treasurer and PDC members). To gain an in-depth understanding of the impacts of the CHTDF program, particularly CEP component, a few cases were also recorded.

Apart from visits to communities, key informants who include Union Council Chairmen and members, CHTDF officials, NGO Executive Directors, Community Facilitators (CF), Project Coordinators and social leaders were interviewed to understand their views and perception about the overall achievements and impacts of the CHTDF program at the community level. To understand the policy issues and strategic guidance of the project, CHTDF high officials, and CHTRC councilor and HDC councilors were interviewed (see Annex B: the list of persons interviewed).

While collecting data, the lead researcher was supported by the Adivasi Facilitation Group (AFG), and the NGO staff. Data also were collected from the M&E data on CEP activities prepared by the partner NGOs in three hill districts.

On the preliminary findings of the study, a briefing session was organised in Dhaka attended by civil society members from CHT.

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1.5 Limitations of the study

The CHTDF intervention is a multi-sectoral program, of which each component may need in-depth investigation to assess the impacts at community and policy levels. Given the time constraints and objective of the study, it was not possible to do in-depth assessment of each component.

Political instability such as frequent hartals interrupted the field work and interview schedules with many of the key informants. As a result, the study team could not talk to the Councilors of three HDCs and MoCHTA as per the study plan. As such, their views and perceptions about the CHTDF‟s project on development and peace-building are still missing.

Randomly 30 PDCs were visited in the three hill districts, but it was not possible to cover all indigenous communities. Therefore, views and perceptions from different ethnic groups as to the CHTDF‟s project are also missing.

1.6 Definition of the terms used in the study

In this study a few terms such as „confidence building‟, „self-determined development‟ and special governance system have been used. These are blanket terms, which have elastic meanings. Therefore, it is necessary to define some of the terms used in this study in order to avoid conceptual ambiguity.

Confidence building1 is a fluid concept equated with peace-building in the post-conflict situation, whereas academics and practitioners do not have consensus on the concept of peace-building as well. For working definition, the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali puts post-conflict peace-building as “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (An Agenda for Peace, 1992: para 21). According to GTZ (2001) peace-building refers to “medium- and long-term measures aimed at setting up mechanisms of peaceful conflict management, overcoming the structural causes of violent conflicts and thereby creating the general conditions in which peaceful and just development can take place”. These definitions suggest that peacebuilding measures aim at preventing recurrence of violent conflict once the existing violence has been halted. In this study, confidence-building or peacebuilding is interchangeably used to refer to the „CHT Accord implementation‟.

The concept of self-determined development2 is very broad but must be elaborated and operationalised in the spirit of the „right to self-determination‟ as recognized by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). By virtue of this right, indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own social, economic and political status.

1 Interviewed G. K. Chakma, who stated that peacebuilding has a political connotation, which might be

sensitive to the government in any ways, while the term „confidence-building‟ has a positive meaning. It was stated that due to the conflict situation over the past decades, „real development‟ could not take place in CHT. As such, confidence-building measures should be there to boost mutual trust and confidence of the CHT people and CHT institutions by creating socio-economic development opportunities at grassroots levels. 2 See Tauli-Corpuz, Victoria (2008). „the Concept of indigenous peoples‟ self-determined development or

development with identity and culture: challenges and trajectories‟, Tebtebba Foundation Inc. and UNESCO, available at

http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/37745/12197591975Concept_paper_Indigenous_Peoples__Development_with_Identity.pdf/Concept%2Bpaper%2BIndigenous%2BPeoples%2B%2BDevelopment%2Bwith%2BIdentity.pdf

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To operationalise this right, ILO Convention 169 underscores the right to decide priorities for development (Article 7). This study refers the „self-determined development‟ to the principle of the right to self-determination, by which indigenous peoples have the right to decide own development priorities through their representative institutions, for instance, in case of CHT, they are the three Hill District Councils (HDC), CHT Regional Council (CHTRC) and MoCHTA alongside the traditional institutions - Karbaris, Headmen, and Circle chiefs.

Special governance system3 refers to the decentralized institutions established under the CHT Accord, such as the three Hill District Council (HDCs), CHTRC and traditional governance structures.

3 Unlike other parts of Bangladesh, the CHT Accord 1997 provides decentralized District Councils for the

three hill districts – Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban with delegated authority over 33 subjects such as health, education, agriculture, land and land management etc. For details, see the 1st Schedule of the HDC Acts (amendment), 1998.

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SECTION 2: THE CONTEXTS OF CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT AND PEACEBUILDING IN CHT

To understand the CHTDF‟s project of development and confidence-building in the post-conflict situation, first it is necessary to have a look at the contexts of conflicts and development in the CHT region. This section briefly touches on: the causes of conflicts and dynamics; development paradigms in CHT; and the concept of development and confidence building as conceived by UNDP-CHTDF in the post-accord situation.

2.1 The CHT Conflict: causes and dynamics

Indigenous peoples of CHT led by PCJSS started movement for autonomy to protect the distinct national and cultural identities, and protect themselves from the perceived exploitation and misery that they had been subjected during various regimes from the British colony to Bangladesh period (Jamil and Panday: 2009; Uttaran, 1985). Later this struggle took the violent form.

The roots of the CHT conflict could be traced back into its political history. Before colonization the CHT region was administered through the traditional rajas (chiefs) without external interference (Larma, 2003; Roy, 2004a). With colonization by the British, the freedom of the traditional rajas had been curtailed, although the colonial rulers maintained autonomous administrative status of CHT through legislative measures4.

Then the Pakistani regimes undertook different destructive policies for CHT. Firstly, the „Excluded Area‟ status of CHT was diluted into the „Tribal Inhabited Area‟ in 1962, and then in 1964 it was completely scrapped off from the constitution of Pakistan to open CHT for outsider settlers. Secondly, in 1960s the Kaptai Hydro-electric dam was constructed in the name of „development in the national interest‟. The dam led to massive natural resource appropriation and destruction on one hand, and human sufferings knew no bounds on the other. The cumulative effects of the hydroelectric dam were very colossal on the lives of indigenous peoples in CHT.

In the newly independent Bangladesh, the state-building process took a different turn as Bangladesh was declared a „mono-national and mono-cultural‟ state based on Bengali nationalism by denying ethnic identities, religion and cultures of others (Chakma, 2010a). Equally the constitution made Bangladesh a „unitary‟ republic, leaving no room for autonomy in CHT. This denial of the newly independent state contributed to the creation of a sense of “otherness” – politically, culturally and socially. Consequently indigenous peoples in CHT resorted to armed resistance for autonomy in CHT.

In response to the demand for autonomy, the successive regimes of Bangladesh undertook various radical measures that included military intervention and transfer of Bengali settlers into CHT in 1980s under the state‟s sponsorship. These two measures took the structural root of the violent conflict in the CHT. As means of military solution to the CHT issue, the government of Bangladesh increased military camps across the CHT. Although no actual official figure was available, some sources estimated that 1 soldier for every 5-6 indigenous persons (Levene, 1999 cited in Chakma, 2010 b: 289), and 1 security force for every 10 indigenous persons had been deployed during the period from 1982 to 1990 (CHT Commission, 1991:35). Apart from military authority, the army was also given power to have control over civil affairs in CHT through the military order like Operation Uttoron (IWGIA, 2012). 4 The „Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation I of 1900‟ was enacted by the British for administration of CHT.

By this regulation, the CHT was given an „Excluded Area‟ status, barring outsiders from buying land and settling down permanently in CHT..

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In aid of the military forces, the government brought more than 400,000 Bengali settlers in three phases – the 1st phase (1978 – 81), the 2nd phase (1981 – 1982) and the 3rd phase (1982 – 1984) from plain districts into CHT (CHT Commission, 1994: 26; Chakma, 2010b). This population transfer program has drastically changed the demographic composition between the Bengali settlers and indigenous peoples. Over the past decades, the joint forces of the Bengali settlers and the military served the purpose of “ethnic cleansing” in two ways: eviction and land grabbing; and total extermination e.g. massacres jointly perpetrated by the army and settlers (Chakma, 2010a and 2010b). Backed by the military and civil administration, the Bengali settlers forcefully occupied lands from indigenous villagers. On the other hand, the Bengali settlers and the military forces jointly carried out more than one dozen systematic massacres5 and communal attacks on indigenous people from 1971 to 1993 (PCJSS, 2005; Chakma, 2010b). As a result, thousands of people, mostly indigenous, got killed and displaced from their lands. Violent conflicts between the Bengalis and indigenous people continued until signing the CHT Accord in 1997.

2.2 Peace process and the CHT Accord of 1997

To find out solution to the CHT problem, dialogues between PCJSS and the government of Bangladesh took place in two phases: first, with military-backed autocratic regimes from 1976 to 1990, and then with democratically elected governments from 1991 to 1997. First, military-backed Ershad government (1981 to 1990) recognized the need for solution to the CHT problem through a political means (Larma, 2003). To communicate with the guerillas, the government formed a 3-member CHT Liaison Committee with Upendra Lal Chakma, MP in 1984. Subsequently 6 rounds of talks were held between PCJSS and the Ershad government, but ended in without any tangible results.

In 1990 through a mass upsurge the country saw a democratic transition from military rules. Through national election in 1991, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) came to power. As a good gesture to the BNP government, PCJSS declared a unilateral ceasefire on 10 August 1992. In response to it, the BNP government formed a Parliamentary Committee on the CHT issue with Col. (Rtd.) Oli Ahmed, Minisiter for Transport and Communication. The Parliamentary Committee held 13 rounds of talks with PCJSS from 1992 to 1995, but no substantial progress could be achieved due to lack of strong political commitment of the BNP government (CHTC, 1997; Larma, 2003).

In 1996 Awami League (AL) came to power. To draw the attention to the AL government, PCJSS extended ceasefire unilaterally. Accordingly, the AL government responded to this call positively. Through a National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts (NCCHT)6, the AL government held six rounds of talks with PCJSS and finally both parties agreed to a peace agreement – popularly known as the CHT Peace Accord, which was signed on 2 December 1997 in Dhaka by ending the long-standing armed conflict in the region.

5 To name a few of the massacres on indigenous peoples in CHT were the Kaukhali-Kalampati massacre

on 25 March 1980, the Barkal massacre on 31 May 1984, the Panchari massacre on 1 May 1986, the Matiranga massacre in May 1986, the Commilla tilla/Taindong massacre on 18-19 May 1986, the Hirachar, Sarbotoli, Khagrachari, Pablakhali massacres on 8-10 August 1988, the Longadu massacre on 4 May 1989, the Malya massacre on 2 February 1992, the Logang massacre on 10 April 1992 and the Naniarchar massacre on 17 November 1993 etc. 6 An 11 member NCCHT was formed on 1 October 1996 taking members of parliament headed by Abul

Hasnat Abdullah, Chief Whip. To assist NCCHT, a 10-member Advisory Committee was also formed with co-opt members from among former army officials and civil society members.

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The CHT Accord includes some basic features that recognises “political, social, cultural, educational and economic rights” of CHT people, while paving the way for peace-building and socio-economic development in the region. The main features of the Accord are:

Recognition of the CHT as “tribal inhabited region”;

Strengthening self-government system through establishing three Hill District Councils (HDCs), CHT Regional Council (CHTRC) and Ministry of CHT Affairs (MoCHTA) under indigenous leadership;

Dismantling military camps except six cantonments7;

Resolution of land-related problems through: a) establishment of a Land Commission on resolution of land disputes, b) establishment of a Task Force for rehabilitation of the refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); c) Land administration authority of three HDCs; d) recognition of customary laws of indigenous peoples;

Socio-economic development by under guidance of HDCs and the CHT Development Board (CHTDB) under the supervisory authority of the CHT Regional Council.

The CHT Accord ended the long-standing armed conflict between guerillas and government forces, but real peace-building is very much contingent upon implementation of the CHT Accord in letter and spirit.

2.3 Development in CHT

The development history of CHT can be divided into two periods: „before‟ and „after‟ the Accord of 1997. Development experience of the CHT people „before the Accord‟ period was very painful. A classic example of such painful case was the Kaptai Hydroelectric dam, which inundated 40% of the best arable land and resources, apart from triggering off adverse social, economic, political and ecological impacts on the lives of the people in the region. In fact, this dam sowed the seed of conflict. Behind the idea of such development program was economic growth through industrialization for „national interest‟ of the state (Pakistan).

Then next spate of development in CHT was initiated by the CHT Development Board (CHTDB) since mid 1970s onwards. The key focus of the CHTDB development programs was on social, economic and infrastructural development. In the beginning, the Asian Development Bank (ADB)8 and UNICEF9 financed CHTDB to implement various development projects. CHTDB was headed by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Chittagong until the CHT Accord in 1997. As such, indigenous people hardly had opportunity to decide on development priorities. The key areas of the CHTDB‟s intervention were road construction, telecommunication and resettlement of population along with provisions of social services like education, and water and sanitation. In fact, all these development projects had been instruments of the government and military to serve the purpose of counter insurgency operations in the CHT (CHT Commission, 2000)

7 These are the three district headquarters in the three hill districts and three cantonments in Alikadam,

Ruma and Dighinala.

8 In 1979 ADB financed the CHTDB to implement a project titled „The Chittagong Hill Tracts Multi-sectoral

Development Project‟ comprising eleven components, one of them was the Upland Settlement Project to settle 2000 landless „tribal‟ families by providing 6.25 acres of hilly land to each family for horticultural and rubber gardens.

9 UNICEF started financing CHTDB since 1980 for the project of „Integrated Community Development

Project (ICDP)‟ on reduction of child and maternal mortality, elimination of malnutrition, reduction of water

borne diseases, expansion of basic and primary education. As of 2011, ICDP–II was completed under the

GoB-UNICEF collaboration.

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After signing the CHT Accord, new prospects have emerged for social and economic development with people‟s participation through the decentralized institutions like HDCs and CHTRC. In the post-Accord period, international development agencies like European Union, UNDP, UNICEF, and ADB, among others, have come ahead to support development and peace-building in CHT. Supported by EU and other development partners, UNDP-CHTDF initiated a project on „promotion of development and confidence building‟ with an investment of US$ 160.00 million, while ADB financed US$ 60.00 million for Chittagong Hill Tracts Rural Development project (CHTRDP). In terms of budget allocation, they were the largest development partners in CHT in the post-Accord period.

Apart from international development agencies, local NGOs and national NGOs have come forward for social and economic development in CHT in the post-Accord period.

2.4 Priorities for development and peace-building in the post-Accord period

What are the priorities for development and peace-building in the post-Accord period in CHT? In response to this question, different views and perceptions came out from the respondents interviewed. However, a common answer came out from almost all of them was: “full implementation of the CHT Accord”. They generally view „full implementation‟ of the CHT Accord as the pre-condition for all development and peace-building activities in the post-Accord period. In concrete terms, their views and perceptions of „full implementation‟ could be explained in two ways: as principles and priority areas for action:

a) As principles of development: any development program should follow these principles

all development programs must support implementation of the CHT Accord;

full and effective participation of the people and CHT representative institutions e.g. HDCs, and traditional institutions at all levels of development;

free, prior and informed consent of the concerned people to development programs that may have impact on their lives;

beneficiary selection: indigenous peoples and “non-tribal permanent residents10” of CHT as defined in the CHT Accord, with a particular attention to internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnee refugees, ex-combatant families, forest villagers, jumia families, the families affected by the Kaptai Dam, the most disadvantaged and the small indigenous communities11, and landless and marginal families below the poverty line.

b) Following priority areas12 have been identified by the respondents for development and peace-building/confidence-building in the post-Accord period:

strengthening the self-rule government system (CHTRC and three HDCs) as per the CHT Accord;

10

To be eligible as “non-tribal permanent resident”, i) s/he is not a “tribal”; ii) must have legal lands and generally live in hill districts at specific addresses.

11 These groups include Bawm, Chak, Khumi, Lushai, Pangkhua and Mro, who are the more

marginalized, should get preferential treatment for development programs.

12 See the Rangamati Declaration 1998 adopted by CHT local NGOs including women‟s rights activists,

community leaders and ethnic Bengali people. Also see Chakma, M. K. (2003) „The UNDP‟s Development Program in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and relevant issues‟, The Keokradong (a Bengali news bulletin), Bulletin 3, 30 June, Hill Students‟ Council, Dhaka: Pp 2-2; and PCJSS Follow-up Report on the UNDP‟s Project (2004).

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resolution of land disputes through the Land Commission;

rehabilitation of IDPs, returnee refugees and ex-combatants through a Task Force;

demilitarisation/dismantling of military camps as per the Accord;

constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples and the CHT Accord.

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SECTION 3:

KEY FINDINGS OF THE UNDP-CHTDF PROJECT

This section looks at the CHTDF‟s project on „promotion of development and confidence-building‟ activities and outcomes achieved so far.

3.1 Background of the UNDP-CHTDF project in CHT

Immediately after signing the CHT Accord, UNDP fielded a three member „Need Assessment Team‟ in 1998 to have a preliminary idea of the development needs of the CHT people. In 2002 a „Joint GoB/UNDP Risk Assessment Mission‟ was assigned to assess overall security situation for donor-funded development intervention in the region. As the said Risk Assessment Mission reported positively on overall security situation, UNDP started the pilot phase of the project styled as „Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts‟ in 2003 and continued until 2005. By drawing on the experience from the pilot-phase, the full-fledged project was launched from 2005 to 2009 followed by an extension for four years from 2010 to September 2013. In its 7th meeting held in March 2012 the National Steering Committee (NSC) approved no-cost extension until September 2015.

In the post-Accord period in CHT, the CHTDF‟s project was the largest development project in terms of budget allocation with an amount of US$ 160.5 million. The European Union is the highest contributor (59%) to this fund followed by CIDA, DANIDA, AusAID, and UNDP (see the table 1 below).

Table 1: Funding from development partners

Development Partners USD (in million) Percentage

OVERALL BUDGET 160.5

EU 94.8 59.07%

CIDA 14 8.72%

DANIDA 3.7 2.31%

UNDP 13 8.10%

Other sources 35.2 21.93%

Source: CHTDF Project Factsheet, 2012 Other donors include Japan, NORAD, and USAID which supported the CHTDF project in the pilot phase.

UNDP-CHTDF has been working in 20 Upazilas (sub-districts) out of 25 in the three hill districts (see the map). Of them 8 are from Rangamati and 6 respectively from Khagrachari and Bandarban districts. Some 3257 para (village) communities have been brought under the project coverage.

The direct beneficiaries of the project are twofold: “peoples” of CHT; and the CHT institutions concerned with or mandated for development (Prodoc, 2005, Annual Report, 2011). The indirect beneficiaries include NGOs, private sector, line department officials and technical staff.

UNDP has been implementing this project through the

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Direct Execution (DEX) mode, while MoCHTA is the lead national agency. To implement the project, different committees have been set up at national, regional, district, upazila, union and para levels involving different stakeholders. At the national level, the National Steering Committee headed by the State Minister of the MoCHTA is the apex body for overall policy guidance to the project. To advise NSC, Technical Advisory Committees (TACs) on specific issues such as health, and education have been set up. Memberships to both committees have been drawn from CHT institutions – CHTRC, HDCs and the Offices of the Circle Chiefs, and relevant government line ministries and other agencies, while the regional, district, upazila and union level committees have been headed by respective chairs, and members are taken from the cross sections of society and departments.

3.2 UNDP-CHTDF’s project: problem analysis, development goal and strategies

To intervene for development, UNDP has identified the “profound and pervasive poverty” as the major development challenge in CHT. Several factors such as – “the scarcity of cultivable land; low levels of education and health; weak development institutions; high under-and unemployment; and low incomes” have been identified as the contributing factors that deepen and make worse poverty situation in the region (ProDoc, 2005: 5).

In the post-Accord period, UNDP also observed that the people and CHT institutions had a strong commitment to resumption of development assistance and their willingness to participate in the development efforts. With regards to development goal, as stated by UNDP in its project document, the people and CHT institutions had a consensus on: a) poverty reduction should be an overarching goal of development; and b) development should be based on a “model of small scale and community-initiated development activities” supported by effective development institutions.

Following the CHT Accord, the three Hill District Councils (HDCs), the CHT Regional Council (CHTRC), and the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs (MoCHTA), the offices of traditional Circle Chiefs and the CHT Development Board (CHTDB) have turned out to be the most relevant development institutions in CHT. However, these institutions are beset with low development capacities and with a considerable degree of ambiguity as to their respective authorities and mandates. For instance, the government did not devolve power to the HDCs over the 33 transferrable subjects as per the provision of the CHT Accord. Moreover, due to lack of subsidiary legislations, CHTRC and HDCs cannot exercise their authority to coordinate and supervise the development programs in CHT. Hence, these hill councils are yet to be capable of delivering desired development results to the people.

Keeping these issues into account UNDP-CHTDF its started project of „promotion of development and confidence building‟ with a goal of “accelerated and sustainable socio-economic development based on the principles of self-reliance and decentralized development initiative”. However, its main focus was on poverty reduction in CHT through resumption of a significant scale of international development assistance, and confidence-building measures among the people and CHT institutions that promote long-term peace.

To achieve the above-stated project‟s goal, the CHTDF sets project operational strategy that focuses on the five key outputs (for details, please see Annex C)

capacity building of CHT institutions;

region wide initiatives (on health, education and economic development);

community empowerment;

confidence-building; and

UNDP-CHTDF‟s operational and infrastructural capacity to support CHT development

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In the end of the project, following qualitative results were expected:

enhanced development capacities;

improved socio-economic development;

improved capacity of the CHT institutions;

grassroots communities in charge of own development;

improved environment and long-term peace attract further donor‟s support for development;

Finally, the CHTDF project expected to create a “new sense of optimism and hope for the future development” to all communities, with practical opportunities for individual economic and social gain. This “new optimism and opportunity” will lead to a more stable and prosperous Hill Tracts.

3.3 Key Areas of CHTDF activities and outcomes

As part of development and peace-building activities, the CHTDF project focused on the following components:

3.3.1 Economic Development (ED): With an objective of creating „alternative source of income‟ for PDCs and PNDGs, this ED component since 2008 onwards supported various income generating activities e.g. mushroom cultivation, honey production, bio-briquette production, ginger processing and medicinal plant cultivation. Other activities were: training conducted for 18 weavers groups on marketing, costing and value addition; and 2 CHT Awards of Excellence (in 2009 and 2011) were organised. In collaboration with HDCs, youth skills development training course were offered to the youth, and market sheds (total 5) and collection points (total 4) were renovated and constructed.

In 2010, through the Agriculture and Food Security component, Field Farmers Schools (FFS) were introduced to train farmers on improved crop farming, fisheries and livestock etc. Towards ensuring food security „Rice Banks‟ were supported under this component.

3.3.2 Education: Since 2008 this component supported construction of 300 primary schools in 12 Upazilas, covering 4 Upazilas in each district. Of these schools, 72 were renovated, while the rest were completely new schools set up by this project. Some 20,000 children have enrolled in these project schools – thus it has improved access to education in remote areas both at pre-primary and primary levels. The project also introduced pre-primary mother tongue education (in 8 indigenous languages) in 131 project schools. This component focused on improved school facilities, improved teaching quality, relevant learning materials (including MLE materials) and strengthened school management systems through mobilizing the school management committees (SMCs) and mothers groups (MGs).

With continued advocacy with the high level policy makers, already some tangible success achieved, especially in terms of relaxation of criteria for setting up primary schools in CHT. For example, the Prime Minister already approved de-reservation13 of land for 44 non-government primary schools, 30 decimal for each, in the Reserved Forest areas in CHT.

3.3.3 Health Program: This component aims to increase people‟s access to quality health care through sustaining and expanding the provision of medical services to the communities and

13

See the Daily Prothom Alo, dated 07 May 2013.

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enhancing the capacity of health workers and institutions of CHT. This component is being implemented through the concerned HDC under the LoAs between the CHTDF and HDCs. This intervention spreads over 15 Upazilas across CHT focusing on i) Network of Community Health Services Workers (CHSWs) across the region. The project supported approximately 1000 CHSWs, who provide basic health care and advice to the communities; ii) provision of mobile medical clinics – consisting of 16 mobile medical teams operating in 80 weekly satellite clinics; and c) referral systems – emergency cases were referred to the Upazila and district level government hospitals. The services include free/highly subsidized ambulance service to the emergency patients. So far, about 1.8 million patients received health care service through the CHSWs, and a total of 1300 cases were referred to Upazila and/or district health complexes from the remotest areas.

3.3.4 Community empowerment: Based on the idea of “small scale self-reliant development at community level”, CHTDF in partnership with local NGOs has been working on community empowerment with para (village) communities across the three hill districts. So far, a total of 3,257 para communities from all ethnic groups, in addition to 1492 Para Nari Development Groups14 (PNDGs), have been brought under community empowerment activities (please see the figure 1). To implement CE activities, each para community is organised through a Para Development Committee (PDC)15. Each para community was provided with Quick Impact Fund (QIF) of Tk. 400,000 to plan and implement community-managed small projects by the villagers. The major components of CE activities were: livestock followed by agriculture, horticulture, fisheries, small enterprise etc.

In addition to QIF amount, the best performing PDCs were awarded with an extra amount of Tk. 200,000 which was exclusively managed by female groups through PNDGs. Later selectively some paras were provided with other grants16 for implementation of non-FFS ADP, FFS-ADP and rice bank activities. It was estimated that on an average each PDC was allocated a sum of money with Tk. 550,000 – thus the total disbursed amount of money to PDCs and PNDGs accounts for Tk. 1792 million. On any accounts this was the first ever largest cash transfer to the remote communities in the CHT.

14

Para Nari Development Group (village women‟s development group) is formed exclusively with female members with an objective of mainstreaming gender issues into development programs in selected paras.

15 Para Development Committee (village development committee) constitutes with 9 -11 members, taking

members from cross-sections of the people in the village, of them one-third is women‟s representatives.

16 Under LoAs with the three HDCs, CHTDF channeled funds to each HDC to assist implementation of its

agricultural development plan (ADP). One of ADP activities was Field Farmer‟s Schools (FFS). The communities not covered by FFS were also allocated funds. These activities are commonly known as Non-FFS ADP. Selected para communities are allowed to implement projects according to their needs, such as cow rearing, vegetable gardening etc with the Non-FFS ADP funds.

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Apart from QIF, PDCs and PNDGs were offered capacity building training on different subjects such as PDC management, financial management and basic book-keeping, organizational development, participatory monitoring and evaluation; gender and entrepreneurship skills development. Government line departments such as agriculture, livestock and fishery also provided technical support and training to the para communities for CE activities.

To raise awareness on basic services and rights, information dissemination workshops were organised at upazila and union levels. National and international days e.g. national Independence Day, national victory day, international mother language day, and the international day of the World‟s indigenous peoples etc. were celebrated to enhance awareness of basic rights.

3.3.5 Confidence building program: The confidence building component was a core component of the CHTDF project to assist implementation of the CHT Accord. The overall objective of this component is to facilitate a process for building mutual trust and confidence among the communities and the CHT institutions. The purpose of this initiative is to provide the CHT communities with an opportunity for socio-economic development in an environment of peace and stability.

In the initial project plan following activities were proposed for confidence building in CHT

(ProDoc, 2005, p.15 – 17).

Box 1: Confidence building activities in the initial project plan

Facilitation of dialogue and partnership among (the relevant stakeholders) for joint actions

Study tours on innovative development and confidence building experiences

Exchange visits (of the grassroots communities and other stakeholders) across the CHT

Support to the GOB initiatives for land dispute resolution through the Land Commission

Piloting community managed forestry

Support to the Police Force working in the CHT

Advice and support to the GOB electoral initiatives

Promotion to minority Interests and cultural diversity

Support to incentive programmes

Support to GOB initiatives for returned refugees, internally displaced peoples and ex-combatants

The most „important and urgent‟ activities related to the CHT Accord implementation e.g. support to Land Commission, Police Force and rehabilitation of IDPs and ex-combatants have remained untouched upon. So far, the key confidence building activities implemented by CHTDF were: cultural festival, exchange visits (domestic), international study tours, small grant support to local partners (e.g. observation of BOISABI, international day of the world‟s indigenous peoples etc), policy dialogue on CHT development, support to local crisis (e.g. rodent crisis in 2008), local level workshops on peace and development, sports for peace (through the CHT Regional Council and Regional Sport Association), meetings of local consultative groups (LCG), scholarships (AusAID) and logistic support to CHT institutions.

From 2007 to 2012, „national cultural diversity festivals‟ were organised in Dhaka with a view to drawing a broad based support and understanding among the mainstream people about the cultural diversity of the CHT people. Several international study tours to the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Guatemala were organised for the policy-makers and senior officials from MoCHTA, CHTRC, HDCs, traditional administration and civil society members. This component also supported exchange visits across the CHT and plain regions with representatives from PDCs, traditional leaders, union councils‟ chairmen and

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members, teachers and line department officials and staff of partner NGOs. These exchange visits aimed at sharing development experiences and appreciation of cultural diversity of different communities. To promote human development, exclusive scholarships were provided to indigenous students to study in Australia along with short courses for leadership development.

Under this component, MoCHTA, CHTRC and HDCs were supported to organise several dialogues on policy issues concerning development priorities for CHT. At local level only 3 workshops were held on peace and development in 2009 respectively at Thanchi (in Bandarban) Panchari (in Khagrachari) and Bagahaichari (in Rangamati) in order to identify the common understanding of the CHT Accord. These workshops were attended by the government officials, Upazila and Union leaders, NGO workers and local community representatives.

3.3.6 Capacity Development: The Capacity Development component provides support to CHT institutions - CHT Regional Council (CHTRC), the three Hill District Councils (HDCs) and the three traditional Circles offices in order to strengthen the decentralized governance system and enhance their management and operational capabilities. Under the Letters of Agreements (LoAs), CHTDF provided CHTRC, the three HDCs and the three traditional Circle Offices with logistical support that included vehicles, motorbikes, IT equipments (computers, printers, digital camera, scanner, UPS, and photocopier) and furniture etc. This support was also extended to the CHT Land Commission and the Task Force on rehabilitation of the IDPs and returnee refugees.

Apart from logistical support, CHTDF provided capacity development training to CHTRC and HDCs staff on specific subjects such as financial management, basic office management, project management, advanced and basic English, human rights and gender development etc. In collaboration with the Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC) a CHT specific public administration module was developed (CHTDF Annual Report, 2011, 2010).

3.3.7 Gender mainstreaming Gender had not been included as a separate component in the initial project document. Later as part of gender mainstreaming, this component had been included as cross-cutting issue among all component. To mainstream gender issues into development programs and policies, several activities were carried out under this component: 1492 PNDGs (exclusive female groups) had been formed across CHT. In every PDC, one-third seat has been reserved for women. Grassroots women‟s organisations were organised through a network called Chittagong Hill Tracts Women‟s Organisation Network (CHTWoN). CHTWoN is registered with the joint stock company. Staff members of the key CHT institutions, PDCs and NGOs were given basic awareness training on gender.

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SECTION 4: ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF THE CHTDF PROJECT

This is a multi-sectoral project, which included 33 intervention areas under the five key objectives (please refer to Annex – C). These intervention areas could be categorized into two: the core and cross-cutting and the region-wide initiative (RWI). Community empowerment (CE), capacity development (CD), and confidence building (CB) fall under the first category, the latter two components are directly related to implementation of the CHT Accord.

The RWI includes the components: health, education, economic development and gender mainstreaming - the first two components are linked with the mandated subjects of the three HDCs. Being a multi-sectoral project, the results of the CHTDF project could be shown in huge quantitative figures in addition to descriptive language. However, this section, within the scope of the study, makes a general assessment of the CHTDF project, with a particular focus on the core components as they are relevant to implementation of the CHT Accord.

4.1 General impacts of the region wide initiatives on education, health, economic development, and gender equity

As stated in section 3.2, the CHTDF project diagnosed “profound and pervasive poverty” as the key development challenge in CHT in the post-Accord period. Hence, as part of the solution to this problem, the project included provision of basic services of health and education, which were termed as “peace dividends” by the CHTDF officials interviewed. The CHTDF project conceived „confidence building‟ through connecting the rural communities with extended “peace dividends” on health, education and economic opportunities coupled with technical support from the government line agencies for agriculture, horticulture, livestock, fisheries, civil works etc. The key general impacts of the RWI were:

a) The education component improved access to education for some 20,000 children in rural areas through supporting 300 primary schools in the remote areas, where either there were no schools or virtually non-functional, if any. It means that the largest majority of these children would not have got the opportunity of education if these project schools were not established. To contribute to quality education, and decentralized governance at local level, the project provided training to teachers, and mother groups (MGs) and the school managing committees (SMCs). As per the CHT Accord, education in mother tongue at primary level was one of the key development priorities for indigenous children. The CHTDF project worked to this end by introducing multi-lingual education (MLE) in 8 languages in 131 project schools.

Despite these successes in education, sustainability of many of these schools is a big concern. Many of these project schools cannot fulfill the criteria17 to be eligible for government registration. Until and unless these schools are not registered and taken over by the government, their sustainability after the project is a very less possibility. The largest number of communities cannot pay teachers‟ salaries if the CHTDF‟s funds is stopped.

b) The health component made health care facilities – medicines and prescription services available to rural communities in selected Upazilas through: i) provision medical services; ii)

17

There are common criteria which stand as barrier to registration of a non-government primary school in CHT. These include population size 2000, and number of students (150) in the catchment area, and conditions for land registration etc. Given the villages in CHT are scattered here and there, it is difficult to meet all these criteria to set up a primary school. To relax these criteria, three HDCs sent letters to the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MoPME), such as reduction of population size (from 200 to 700) and number of students (from 150 to 50) for CHT.

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capacity enhancement of community health workers and CHT institutions; and iii) referral system. In terms of patients‟ turnover (over 1.8 million), this component had brought in substantial success by treating the major diseases like malaria, diarrhea and acute respiratory infections (ARI) (UNDP, 2011). However, continuation of this success is very much pending on availability of funds either from the government or development partners. The project also trained more than 1000 community health service works (CHSWs), who provide basic health care and advice to the communities across CHT. As these CHSWs will stay in hills, they are the great asset and may bring in long-term positive impacts to communities, if at all, after the CHTDF project has been wrapped up.

c) Economic development (ED) component, parallel to community empowerment (CE), was initiative to create “alternative sources of income” through various income generating activities (IGAs) like mushroom cultivation, beekeeping, ginger processing and medicinal plant cultivation. Although CHTDF claims success of this component in terms of „increased income and market linkages‟, the respondents of local NGOs and PDCs confirmed that the impacts of these IGAs are very limited or hardly visible. The factors behind the failures of this component were that they were introduced on a pilot basis in a small scale. Secondly, these products could not be linked with markets properly.

d) Gender was a cross-cutting issue in the CHTDF‟s program; hence the impacts of this component should be assessed across all components. However, a few key results of this component, as stated by the respondents are: women‟s participation in different stages of the project, and increased awareness on gender issues among different stakeholders. Through establishing exclusive platform – PNDGs for women, they had opportunity to decide on the project activities at the community level. At the same time, the provision of one-third seats for women in PDCs created space for them to participate in development activities. These measures contributed to raising women‟s voices at community level.

CHTDF assisted to set up a network of women‟s organisations (more than 50), known as the CHT Women‟s Network (CHTWoN) at CHT level to make advocacy on women‟s issues at the policy level. Issue-based campaigns e.g. violence against women (VAW) were carried out across CHT. However, some of the respondents questioned the effectiveness of CHTWoN on certain grounds: first, it was rather an „imposed body‟ created by CHTDF, and as such, it was dependent on CHTDF‟s funding for its activities. Second, CHTWoN so far could not work on the „tough issues‟ vis-à-vis rape and killing of indigenous women across CHT.

4.2 Impacts of the Core components of the CHTDF project

In this category, the major components were: community empowerment, capacity development and confidence building.

4.2.1 Impacts of community empowerment

The CHTDF‟s idea of empowering communities was based on the vision of “small scale self-reliant development” at community level. To this end, the CHTDF project provided supports to communities: seed money, known as quick impact funds (QIF), capacity building training for PDCs, PNDGs and partner NGOs; technical support from the upazila line departments, and awareness raising on basic rights. From investigation into the PDCs/PNDGs activities, the following impacts were observed:

Increased income and social well-being from QIF investment: Each para community was provided with a cash grant of Tk. 400,000 to implement community-demand driven small scale projects. From visits to the communities it was found that the largest numbers of

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schemes implemented were on livestock (37.9%) followed by horticulture, fishery, agriculture, well-being services (water and sanitation, solar panel, rice-bank etc) and small enterprises etc. However, the schemes vary from one place to another, given the geographical locations of the communities. As per the respondents of PDCs/PNDGs, the livestock schemes were most successful than other projects. This is confirmed by Arun Chakma, Moghban Union Council chairman – “cow rearing projects are still visible, but other components such as ginger, turmeric, and fishery had already gone without success”. The reason behind the success of cow rearing schemes was that they gave the project beneficiaries more „individual benefits‟ than the schemes implemented on other components18. Although it is difficult to generalise, it was found that many para communities have been able to amplify and diversify their income sources through recycling or re-investment of the QIF funds. At the same time, they have developed their savings habit. The increased income and savings ensured a small financial safety-net at community level. Because of such social safety-net, in many villages, PDCs have been able to ensure social well-being e.g. access to safe drinking water and sanitation, and medical treatment.

Increased community capital assets: Out of QIF, para communities purchased different assets like cattle, agricultural equipments, solar panels, horticultural crops, nurseries and fruits gardens etc. Due to the increased return from this investment, many of the PDCs were able to re-invest more capital, which ultimately led to the increasing community capital assets in the villages.

Coverage of remote communities: CHTDF project organised 3,257 para communities through PDCs and some 1492 PDCs, with priorities to the most remote communities in 20 Upazilas (out of 25 Upazilas) across the CHT. The largest portion of these remote communities has first ever received development support from CHTDF. Through QIF and other grants they have been planning and implementing project for economic development at community level.

Enhanced capacity of PDCs and PNDGs: Because of the training on various subjects, PDCs were able to enhance their capacities, especially for keeping the meeting minutes, book keeping, dealing with the banks, and contacting the service agencies. The technical training has created pools of community technicians, who are now capable to give solutions to many problems related to livestock management, agriculture and fish culture. Equally the level of awareness about basic rights and social services has increased among community people.

Linkages established with the service agencies: As claimed by the PDCs, CHTDF officials and Union council chairmen that through CE activities, PDCs have been able to establish

18

CHTDF encouraged PDCs to implement the schemes through collective efforts; a sort of „commune

system‟ was tested in the name of promoting collective values of indigenous peoples. Cattle purchased

with the QIF money were kept in long sheds, and by rotation every household was to share labour for

grazing the cattle. After some time, it was found difficult to manage the cattle in one shed. Even many of

the households lost interest to contribute labour. Later cattle were left at the personal disposal of

individual households under a profit sharing contract agreement between the PDC and the individual

household. Cattle were raised easily by the households, as they possessed indigenous knowledge of cow

rearing; whereas other projects such as on ginger and turmeric could not be successful for a variety of

reasons: price manipulation of produces by the intermediaries, and many households were reluctant to

participate in collective farming.

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linkages with the service delivery agencies. As such, PDCs/PNDGs are now aware of and can access the services provided by the GoB line departments and NGOs.

Multi-stakeholders involvement in development: One of the remarkable aspects of the CEP project was involvement of various stakeholders like PDCs, NGOs, GoB line departments, and local government institutions.

In contrast to the positive results as stated above, a good numbers of „divider impacts‟ were observed during the field investigation, such as:

Drop-out of households from PDCs: UNDP-CHTDF claimed that it reached to as many as 3,257 para communities across CHT, but in practice, this success was questioned due to high drop-out rate from PDC activities. The field data show that 34% - 40% HHs were excluded from PDC interventions (see the figure 2). It was found that two categories of people faced off from PDC activities: most marginalized people, who were wage labourers, widow, and old-aged persons; and village elite or well-off families, e.g. solvent farmers or headmen, who either did not need support from PDC or were not interested in giving „collective labour contribution‟ to PDC activities. A long list of reasons behind their exclusion from PDCs have been identified, such as:

idea of collective action19 not properly understood and applied (see box 2);

non-refunding of money to the PDC after selling out a cow or asset received from QIF funds;

disagreement over the selection of project components. Village elites dominated over project selection, for which more marginalized people‟s (e.g. wage labourers) aspirations were not reflected in project activities;

frustration or distrust in PDC activities following either a failure in certain components or misuse of funds by the key officials of PDCs;

monthly savings – some could not pay monthly savings, for which they withdrew themselves from the PDC activity;

old age – old people could not contribute labour to PDC‟s collective initiatives;

lack of proper monitoring.

19

PDCs were encouraged to implement projects through collective efforts, where every household had to contribute either labour or money as trade-off. If any household fails to attend the PDC work, he or she has to pay money equal to the amount of wage per day for his/her absence. For wage labourers and unit family, it was difficult to contribute labour to the „collective work‟. Consequently, they lost their interest in PDC‟s collective works, and they dropped out.

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Practices of corruption and impunity: A good number of malpractice or corruption cases had been reported by the respondents. Corruption or misappropriation of money was committed by the powerful officials of PDCs, largely by the President, the General Secretary or the Treasurer. For example, the President and the General Secretary of Jidi Para PDC in Khagrachari together misused the PDC money (see box 3). In Rangamati, “only 3 families at Ogoichari Moan PDC, who are close relatives with one another, misused the whole PDC funds” (UP Chairman, Moghban Union Council).

Another way of malpractice took place through procurement of goods/materials, e.g. cattle, fingerlings, seeds of ginger and turmeric. It was reported by some of the PDCs visited that in practice, the prices were lower, but the bills were charged at higher prices than the actual prices occurred by showing over-invoices.

Box 2: Imposed collective initiative

Bijoy Giri Chakma, now chairman of Balukhali Union Council, was elected as

president of the PDC in his village in 2004-2005. Through a participatory project

planning exercise, villagers came up with two proposals – fruits gardening and teak

tree plantation. For implementing these activities they would need to buy grove

land for the community, but CHTDF officials rejected these two proposals of the

community. Instead the PDC was asked to take up a cow rearing project.

As per UNDP‟s “big bosses” (boro babu) suggestions, the PDC took up a cow

rearing project. With QIF funds, they bought 43 cows. These cows would have to

be raised together, and in no way be left to the individual family. “To look after

these cows is a big challenge for the PDC. At least two caretakers are necessary to

graze these cows, but who will pay wages for the caretakers?” Many of the families

were neither willing to pay money nor contribute labour to graze cows by turns.

Every family wanted to have a cow at own disposal. Consequently, the PDC could

not move further with such collective idea of cow rearing.

Then all cows were divided among individual families. Later some of them sold out

the cows, but did not return the profit share to the PDC as per the agreement.

Following them, no one family was interested to deposit the profit share to the PDC

funds. Ultimately the PDC collapsed.

Source: Interview with Bijoy Giri Chakma, Chairman, Balukhali Union

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As reported by the respondents, in some cases no effective measures could be taken against the persons who were involved in misuse of money either due to their „political power‟ or influence in the locality or absence of mechanism for legal measures.

4.2.2 Impacts of Capacity Development

To enhance capacity of CHT institutions - CHTRC, and HDCs and the three traditional Circle Offices, CHTDF provided with logistical, technical and financial support under LoA arrangements.

As part of this support, capacity assessments of MoCHTA, CHTRC, and HDC were already done. However, implementation of capacity development plans (CDP) remains unattended.

To enhance project management, implementation and monitoring skills, CHTDF delegated some of its program components like health, education, and agriculture and food security to the HDCs. Among other activities, CHTDF also supported three HDCs to set up NGO Coordination Unit within the concerned HDC for enhanced coordination between NGOs and HDC.

4.2.3 Impacts of Confidence Building

For confidence building, a list of intervention areas (please see Box 1 in section 3.3.5) had been proposed in the initial project design. In practice, the “critical issues” such as Land Dispute Resolution Commission, Task Force on IDP and refugees, and preparation of electoral roll remained untouched upon, except a few “software” activities that included exposure visits, cultural festivals, response to crises (e.g. Mahalchari incident in 2003, and rodent crisis in 2008), workshop on peace and development, and support to CHT institutions (CHTRC, HDCs and Circle Chief offices). As the “critical issues”, which were at the centre of conflict resolution, were bypassed, the impacts of these “software” activities remained invisible. However, according to CHTDF, following were some of the impacts derived from the confidence building measures.

Box 3: Misappropriation of money by the Chairperson and the Secretary at Zidi Para, Khagrachari

Zidi Para Development Committee (PDC) with 9 members was established in 2006. This is a Marma community under Khagrachari Union. The village has 124 households, of whom now only 38 households are registered as beneficiaries of PDC activities. When the PDC was established, the chairperson was a Union Council member (now Karbari – village head), and the secretary was a local leader (of Awami League). Since its establishment, the election of PDC did not place.

PDC received an amount of QIF (Quick Impact Fund) Tk. 399,577.00 from UNPD-CHTDF. With the consent of PDC, Tk. 370,000.00 out of the total QIF amount was invested for fish cultivation, cow rearing and water and sanitation projects. Later from the sale of cows and fish, they bought one jeep (Chander gari) for Tk. 293,400 (of which Tk. 229,031 from QIF and Tk. 64,369 was community contribution). From the investment on jeep, the return was Tk. 149,810. Then the jeep was sold out for Tk. 170,000. Out of this amount, some Tk. 70,000 was spent to take 2 kanis (40 decimal) of land on lease, and the rest amount was misappropriated by the PDC chairperson and the Secretary.

Following misappropriation of PDC funds by the chairperson and the secretary, community people lost confidence in PDC. Partner NGO and CHTDF officials tried to get back the money from them, but no tangible success was achieved so far. Now PDC does not have any activity. When the partner NGO workers try to contact the chairperson and the secretary, they fight shy of them.

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increased nationwide exposure of CHT people and their distinct cultures through the cultural diversity festivals, and created recognition for the artists from hills;

high level policy dialogues on peace and on development under the leadership of MoCHTA, involving key stakeholders from line ministries and donor communities.

created space for policy advocacy: the project set up Technical Advisory Committees (TACs) on four sectors agriculture, health and education, local governance. These TACs under the MoCHTA leadership have created a space for policy advocacy involving the key stakeholders from the relevant line ministries, Planning Commission, local government, and development partners. Through the TAC meetings, the CHT institutions - MoCHTA, CHTRC and HDCs - had been able to bring the CHT issues to the policy makers at national level - thus supporting implementation of the CHT Accord.

increased understanding among the government officials and policy makers as well as donors and international actors on the CHT issues. Donor‟s commitment stands in favour of the greater development for CHT, e.g. EU is committed to support capacity development of the CHT institutions – CHTRC and HDCs including Upazila Councils and traditional institutions.

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SECTION 5:

GAPS BETWEEN THE CHT PEOPLE’S PRIORITIES AND CHTDF’s INTERVENTIONS IN

THE POST-ACCORD PERIOD

What should be the priorities for the development intervention and peacebuilding in the post Accord situation? To this situation, different views and priorities came up from the respondents. Some of them expressed their views in a simple sentence – “to bring the situation back to normalcy plus functional special government system20 as per the CHT Accord”. This aspiration indicates that the post-conflict measures should include those activities that prevent recurrence of violent conflict on one hand, and representative CHT institutions – CHTRC and HDCs are fully functional to deliver services to the people, on the other. By analyzing respondents‟ views, following were the top priorities for development and peace-building as per the CHT Accord:

Strengthening self-government system;

Land dispute resolution through: a) activating Land Commission; b) rehabilitation of internally displaced persons and returnee refugees through a Task Force;

Demilitarisation: to withdraw all temporary camps as per the provision of the Accord;

Constitutional guarantee of the CHT Accord;

Constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples.

Against these priorities, CHTDF has taken up a huge package of interventions, which can be clumped into the following key outputs/components (see table 2: CHTDF‟s intervention areas). For details of each component, please see section 3.3.

Table 2: CHTDF‟s intervention areas

Sl Key components/outputs

Key activities implemented

1 Economic development (including Agriculture and Food Security)

Support for IGAs on mushroom cultivation, beekeeping, bio-briquette production, ginger processing and medicinal plant

training to 18 weavers groups on marketing, costing and value addition

CHT Awards of Excellence (2 times organised in 2009 and 2011)

Training courses on youth skills development

Training to Field Farmers Schools (FFS) on improved crop farming, fisheries, and livestock etc.

Rice Banks

2 Basic Education Policy advocacy with relevant stakeholders (e.g. MoCHTA, MoPME) on primary education in CHT

Strengthening governance systems – school registration with DPEOs, activating SMCs, Mother‟s Groups etc.

Access to education – supported construction and renovation of 300 primary schools;

Quality education – training on child-friendly methods and materials, and supply classroom facilities and supplementary teaching aids/materials etc.

Multilingual education – material development in 8 indigenous languages, and MLE in 131 project schools.

3 Health Establishing network of Community Health Service workers (CHSW) –

20

Regarding the post-conflict development intervention, G.K. Chakma, Councilor, CHT Regional Council, in an interview stated that the CHT leaders had consensus on two interrelated issues: economic development; and strengthening special governance system in line with the CHT Accord.

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trained 1000 CHSWs across CHT;

Mobile Clinics – 16 mobile teams operating in 80 weekly satellite clinics

Referral systems – emergency cases referred to government hospitals at district and upazila levels.

4 Community empowerment Quick Impact Fund (QIF) of Tk. 400,000 for each PDC for implementation of community managed small projects;

Capacity building training on: PDC management, financial management and basic book-keeping, participatory monitoring and evaluation, entrepreneurship skills development and gender etc.

Technical support from government line agencies e.g. agriculture, livestock, fisheries etc.

Awareness raising on basic rights and services offered by GoB and NGOs.

5 Confidence building Exposure visits within the country for community leaders, PDCs and local elected leaders

international study tours for high government officials and policy makers.

Cultural diversity festival

Policy dialogue on CHT development

local level workshops on peace and development (3 Upazilas: Thanchi in Bandarban, Panchari in Khagrachari, and Baghaichari in Rangamati) – government officials, elected leaders, NGO workers and community representatives

Sports for peace

Scholarship to indigenous students (in Australia)

Crisis management (rodent crisis in 2008, support to Mohalchari victims)

Logistical supports to Task Force on IDPs and returnee refugees

6 Capacity Development Logistical support: IT equipments, furniture etc

Capacity enhancement training: financial management, office management, project management, human rights and good governance, gender etc.

Financial grants: to organise workshops, and publication/compilation of CHT laws, preparation of rules and regulation of CHT institutions (CHTRC, HDCs and Circle Chief Offices) etc.

7 Gender This component cuts across all other components. However, the key activities include

establishment and channeling of funds to female headed development groups, called PNDGs at community level;

establishment of a network of the grassroots women‟s organisations

basic awareness training on gender to key CHT institutions including PDCs and NGOs.

A closer look at the CHTDF‟s project components clearly shows the gaps between CHTDF‟s intervention and the priorities21 expressed by the CHT people.

21

For this study, UP Chairmen and members, community leaders and CHTRC councilor were

interviewed. The CHTRC Councilor, who for CHTRC also participated in the planning stage of the

CHTDF project, said that there were series of discussion to decide on the priorities for promotion of

„development and confidence building‟ in the post-accord period. That time, the CHT leaders were of the

opinion that to sustain economic development in CHT, the newly established hill councils – CHTRC and

HDCs along with traditional institutions must be strengthened first.

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Apparently it looks that CHTDF largely focuses on economic (IGAs, agriculture, food security etc), and social (education, health and gender) aspects of development. In the war ravaged society, economic and social services are essential. However, as expressed by the local leaders interviewed that strengthening the newly established special government institutions – CHTRC and HDCs within the framework of the CHT Accord was considered a top priority to deliver and sustain these social services. In other words, political empowerment was the first and foremost condition for sustaining development in the post-Accord period.

The two components – Confidence Building (CB) and Capacity Development (CD) are directly linked with political empowerment or addressing the “critical issues” of the CHT Accord. These critical issues include – resolution of land disputes, rehabilitation of IDPs, returnee refugees and ex-combatants, devolution of authority to CHTRC and HDCs, and demilitarization of CHT. Settling down of these “critical issues” was strongly emphasized by the respondents to bring in lasting peace and development in CHT. But none of the key activities of the CD and CB components implemented by CHTDF dealt with those critical issues. To have a strengthened and decentralized local government, the first and foremost condition is to ensure devolution of authority and transfer of subjects to HDCs and CHTRC as per the provisions of the CHT Accord, but CD activities were not directed towards this end, except some logistical and technical support to them.

On the other hand, CB activities were concerned only with “software” supply side through exposure visits, study tours, discrete dialogues, and cultural festivals, without clear objectives and targets. International study tours to different countries, and exchange visits within the country might be helpful to gather knowledge and experience about the issues, but they ended up „pleasure trips‟ with CHTDF‟s project money.

Of the CB activities, recently the cultural diversity festival created controversy with the question of identity of indigenous peoples – “indigenous versus tribal”. In many of the CHTDF‟s reports (e.g. ProDoC, 2005:17, CHTDF Annual Report, 2011) the terms “tribal minorities” or “ethnic minorities” have been used to refer to indigenous peoples in CHT. As UN agency, this position of UNDP has been seriously criticized by some of the respondents, and is not consistent with the indigenous peoples‟ aspiration to be recognised as adivasi (indigenous peoples).

CB component was supposed to initiate dialogues to find out durable solution to some of the long-standing disputes. High level policy dialogues were very much essential on critical issues such as resolution of land disputes resolution, demilitarization, transfer of subjects to HDCs, preparation of electoral roll, and establishing mixed police force etc. In practice, CHTDF could not initiate such dialogues with relevant actors, except a few local level dialogues (organised only 3 workshops on peace and development) and cultural diversity festivals, which were passed for policy dialogues with national level stakeholders. As such, the CHTDF‟s confidence building measures fall short of the CHT people‟s expectations and priorities in the post-conflict situation.

A closer look into the above issues clearly indicates, there was a gap between the CHT people‟s priorities and UNDP-CHTDF‟s intervention. CHTDF‟s main focus was on “poverty reduction” through small-scale self-reliant community development, whereas the CHT people‟s key priority was on political empowerment, and conflict resolution.

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SECTION 6:

EXIT/FUTURE PLAN OF THE CHTDF

The current phase of the CHTDF project was supposed to be completed by 31 September 2013. Then what is next? In response to this question, no respondents exactly could tell the researcher any exit or new phase plan of the current project. However, the current project has been extended by the NSC with no-cost up to September 2015. As indicated, this no-cost extension period will give some respite for preparation of the next phase. In the meantime, the project, as NSC decided, will focus on the following areas during the no-cost extension period:

high level support to MoCHTA;

continued support for implementation of the CHT Peace Accord including capacity building the CHT institutions to manage and deliver their services;

support to strengthening local police in CHT

continue and further support to local partner NGOs for confidence building with key areas of support

cluster of PDCs to manage and implement their own community development project

According to local partner NGOs, as part of the exit strategy, UNDP-CHTDF already started wrapping up some of its activities. Partnership agreements with local partner NGOs would be ended by 31 September 201322. As indicated by respondents that CHTDF‟s project may be wrapped up in two ways: first, delegation of responsibilities for some components to the concerned HDC. For instance, under LOA with HDCs, health and education components had been delegated to HDCs with funding support from UNDP-CHTDF. By doing so, these components could be mainstreamed with the regular activities of HDCs. Second, capacity development of the CHT institutions, particularly CHTRC, HDCs and traditional institutions, which are relevant development institutions to deliver development services to the people.

International development agencies including the European Union are committed to supporting capacity building of CHT institutions alongside the confidence building measures in support of the CHT Accord implementation. The government policy makers, e.g. NSC members are also in agreement with the idea of institutional capacity building of the CHT institutions. It indicates that the future phase of the CHTDF, if any, will focus on this area towards strengthened local government systems in support of „peaceful development‟ in CHT. Until the CHT institutions are ready and capable of doing planning, implementation and delivering services, donor communities‟ support may continue. However, what will be the modalities are not clear yet.

22

The researcher had an opportunity to attend a meeting called by local partner NGOs in Rangamati at Taungya Office on 18 June 2013, when they discussed the strategies for supporting communities in the aftermath of CHTDF‟s withdrawal after September 2013.

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SECTION 7:

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As discussed in preceding section 2, the major causes of the CHT conflict are: continuous denial of identity, self-rule system and development aggression by successive regimes from the British period to the present Bangladesh times. In the post-independence of Bangladesh, the indigenous people‟s movement got momentum as the newly independent Bangladesh was declared as mono-national and mono-cultural state by denying identities and cultures of others. To protect own distinct national and cultural identities indigenous peoples under the leadership of PCJSS demanded autonomy for the CHT region.

To check the indigenous movement in CHT, the Government of Bangladesh tried a solution of economic development. To this effect, through CHTDB headed by a military bureaucrat – GOC of Chittagong, the government implemented various development projects focusing on social, economic and infrastructural development. These economic development projects rather served the purpose of counter-insurgency operations in CHT, by facilitating military mobility across the whole CHT. Eventually economic interventions could not bring in a solution to the CHT issue.

Later the government undertook the two radical measures – military intervention and transfer of Bengali settlers from the plain region to the hills. The government increased the number of military camps across CHT. Simultaneously the government brought some 400,000 Bengali settlers from the plain region into CHT. The population transfer program terribly worsened the situation leading to break-down of demographic balance between indigenous peoples and Bengali population on one hand, and conflict increased over land and resources, on the other. To grab land of indigenous peoples, the joint forces of the military and Bengali settlers committed a series of massacres on indigenous peoples. To resist the government forces and land occupation by the Bengali settlers, indigenous peoples led by PCJSS took up arms since the mid 1970s onwards and continued until 2 December 1997, when the CHT Accord was signed.

In the post-Accord period, the people‟s aspiration was simple: to bring the situation back to normalcy, and effective functioning of the CHT institutions established under the Accord. This aspiration could be broken into several key areas – a) strengthened self-government system; b) land dispute resolution, c) rehabilitation of IDPs, returnee refugees and ex-combatants.; d) dismantling all temporary military camps; and e) constitutional recognition of the CHT Accord and indigenous peoples. All these priorities relate to political empowerment.

On this backdrop, UNDP came up with a development project of “Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in CHT” which identified poverty as the main development challenge. As a solution to poverty and confidence building, UNDP-CHTDF came up with five key strategic components: Capacity building of CHT institution; Service delivery (on education, health and economic development); Community empowerment; Confidence building and Enhancing the UNDP-CHTDFs operational and infrastructural capacity.

So far, UNDP-CHTDF implemented components on service delivery (basic education, health and economic development), community empowerment, capacity development and confidence building measures. Among these components, only the latter two directly relate to implementation of the Accord i.e. political empowerment and other components do with economic and social aspect of development.

Findings suggest that among the aforementioned components, the service delivery and economic development activities are quite visible and the achievements seem to be fairly on track as per the project plan. In the post-conflict situation, these economic and social services

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are fairly relevant to ensure basic services to the disadvantaged rural communities, but the sustainability of these services is still a big question. After withdrawal of UNDP-CHTDF, these services are unlikely to sustain largely due to lack of funding support either from donors or the government. On the other hand, for a variety of reasons, the relevant CHT institutions, in particular HDCs are not competent yet to take over these services from CHTDF (although it intends to hand over to them): first, HDCs are not formed through direct elections, for which political commitment and leadership direction remain weak; second, HDCs are beset with resource constraints and lack of capacity to plan and manage projects of their own.

In contrast, the Capacity Development (CD) and Confidence Building (CB) components were highly politically sensitive. Implementation of these components is pending on the political will of the key stakeholders, especially the MoCHTA, CHTRC and HDCs including the invisible stakeholders, e.g. the military administration. Despite „all good intention‟ of UNDP and donor communities, the CHTDF‟s program had not been able to address the „critical issues‟ that include: resolution of land disputes, rehabilitation of IDPs, returnee refugees and ex-combatants, devolution of authority to CHTRC and HDCs, demilitarization of CHT, and formation of mixed police force. The underlying factors are:

a) that overall, the government of Bangladesh does not specific policy on its ethnic, cultural and linguistic minorities. Concerning the CHT issue, the government policy also not been changed even after the CHT Accord. All governments either led by Awami League or BNP hold the same view as to recognition of indigenous peoples and their rights as “conspiracy” against the national interests23.

b) the CHT issue is still viewed from „security‟ lens for which the military order has not been lifted yet. Still the military holds substantial influence over civil administration and policy-making with regards to CHT (IWGIA, 2012). For instance, it was alleged by a CHTRC councilor that Bengali settlers were included on the list of IDPs at the dictation of the military intelligence agency, violating the CHT Accord. And now the Task Force on rehabilitation of IDPs and returnee refugees remains dysfunctional;

c) “inherent limitations24” of the CHT institutions – MoCHTA, CHTRC and HDCs, for which they could not stand together on the same position with regards to addressing the „critical issues‟ of the CHT Accord;

d) „Anti-indigenous mindset‟ of the civil and military bureaucrats who want to remain in the control of political, administrative and development process in CHT.

Under these circumstances, UNDP- CHTDF did not have much scope to go with the confidence building program. In other words, UNDP-CHTDF had initiatives to sensitize on CHT issues through “software” supply, but it did not work on addressing the root causes of conflict. Still in the post-Accord period, communal attacks and human rights violation by the Bengali settlers and the military continue unabated. So, in a true sense, the CHTDF project could not bring in tangible results in peace building vis-à-vis implementation of the CHT Accord. On the contrary, it

23

See „AL-BNP rare consensus on „Advivasi‟ label‟, the daily Dhaka Tribune, 19 September 2013.

24 Inherent limitations referred to: CHTRC and HDCs cannot execute power due to lack of subsidiary rules

and regulations, non-transfer of subjects to HDCs, and unelected HDCs are not accountable to the people, rather dictated by ruling party.

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was also alleged that UNDP remained too lenient to surrendering to the government policy25, although it could have played an active role in conflict transformation in the post-Accord period.

Recommendations

Peace building or implementation of the CHT Accord involves structural changes to the state policies. Until and unless the structural root causes of conflict are addressed properly, peace and development will remain a far cry in CHT. Given the present complex political system in Bangladesh, there is no clear-cut answer to how to solve the root causes of conflict. However, it is a fact that structural solution largely depends on political will of the government. At the same time, it is also urgent to draw political support from different stakeholders like political parties, members of parliament, civil society, and academics including civil and military bureaucrats. Taking all these factors into account, the following recommendations are made to support the confidence building measures vis-a-vis implementation of the CHT Accord:

To the CHT institutions (MoCHTA, CHTRC and HDCs)

Work together to reach a common consensus or understanding to assert the right to be recognised as indigenous peoples in the constitution of Bangladesh;

To draw a common vision, and provide political guidance to development and implementation of the CHT Accord;

High level policy advocacy led by MoCHTA and CHTRC to influence decision-making at the national level with regards to CHT affairs.

Continuous goal oriented policy dialogues with the key stakeholders on CHT affairs, particularly on the „critical issues‟ such as resolution of land disputes, devolution of authority to CHTRC and HDCs, demilitarization of CHT, and formation of mixed police force etc.

Strengthen MoCHTA including appointment of officers who are familiar and sensitised with indigenous issues. In case of appointment, indigenous persons should be given preference.

Sensitisation of the civil and military bureaucrats on CHT issues.

To UNDP and donor community

All development programs/projects must support implementation of the CHT Accord. Before designing the projects/programs, a proper analysis of conflict should be carried out.

To support implementation of the CHT Accord, specific projects should be designed to work on the critical issues that include land dispute resolution, rehabilitation of IDPs, returnee refugees and ex-combatants, preparation of electoral roll for HDCs, and formation of mixed police force in CHT.

25

See PCJSS (2011) „UNDP-CHTDF engaged in anti-IP interest in Bangladesh‟, CHT Voice, E-mouth piece of PCJSS. Accessed on 10 July 2013, available at http://chtvoice.blogspot.com/2011/11/normal-0-false-false-false.html

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To involve civil society organisations and local NGOs in implementation of all development programs in CHT.

To explore the opportunities to work in partnership with other national bodies such as Bangladesh National Human Rights Commission to protect human rights violations in CHT.

To explore the opportunities to work with the members of parliaments, who might uphold the interest of indigenous peoples and give political support for peace building in CHT. For instance, the Parliamentary Caucus on indigenous peoples headed by the Worker‟s Party chief Mr. Rashed Khan Menon, worked on constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples during the constitutional amendment by the current grand alliance government. This experience of the Parliamentary Caucus might be replicated in the future work.

Support media campaign on specific issues to remove people‟s misconceptions or ramifications on implementation of the Accord. For example, mass people in plain region do have a general misconception that „Bengalis‟ cannot buy land in CHT or „adivasi‟ identity will tell upon the state‟s sovereignty etc. Media campaign should be launched to remove such misconceptions about specific issues related to implementation of the CHT Accord.

To Civil society and local development organisations

Civil society organisations (CSO) and NGOs can play a watchdog role. They can monitor the development activities including the UNDP-CHTDF program in CHT;

CSOs and NGOs can publish annual status report on the development and peace building activities in CHT.

Mobilise community based organisations (CBOs) to articulate people‟s perspectives on development and peacebuilding in CHT.

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Chakma, Bhumitra (2010b) „Structural Roots of Violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts‟, Economic and Political Weekly, XLV (12): 19 – 21.

Chakma, M. K. (2003) „The UNDP‟s Development Program in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and relevant issues‟, The Keokradong (a Bengali news bulletin), Bulletin 3, 30 June, Hill Students‟ Council, Dhaka: Pp 2-2; and PCJSS Follow-up Report on the UNDP‟s Project (2004).

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Roy, R. D (2004a) „Salient Features of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord of 1997‟ in Tauli-Corpuz. V. and Carino, J. (edits) Reclaiming Balance – Indigenous Peoples, Conflict Resolution and Sustainable Development, Tebtebba Foundation Inc. Philippines: 293 – 301.

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Roy, Rajkumari Chandra (2000) Land Rights of the Indigenous Peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Copenhagen, Denmark.

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Tauli-Corpuz, Victoria (2008). „the Concept of indigenous peoples‟ self-determined development or development with identity and culture: challenges and trajectories‟, Tebtebba Foundation Inc. and UNESCO.

UNDP (2005) „Bangladesh: A Critical Review of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord‟. Working Paper No. 2, the Role of Parliaments in Conflict and post-conflict in Asia, Regional Office in Bangkok, UNDP.

Uttaran, Shree (1985) „A Genesis of the Movement for Self-determination of the Jumma People of Chittagong Hill Tracts and Its Future‟, In Remembrance of the 10th November 1983 (in Bengali), Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), pp. 34 – 46.

Project documents and reports

UNDP (2005) Promotion of Development and Confidence building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), 1st Project Document.

UNDP (2011) „Progress Report – Improving Health, Nutrition and Population in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, UNDP-CHTDF, Dhaka.

UNDP (2012) „Project Completion Report – Improving Health, Nutrition and Population in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, UNDP-CHTDF, Dhaka.

UNDP-CHTDF (2009) Project Proposal – Strengthening Basic Education in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Phase II, UNDP-CHTDF.

UNDP-CHTDF (2010) Annual Report 2010 – Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, UNDP-CHTDF, Dhaka.

UNDP-CHTDF (2011) Annual Report 2011 – Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, UNDP-CHTDF, Dhaka.

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Annex A: List of PDCs visited

Sl No Name of PDC Union Community

1 Manikchari Purba Bangali Para

Sapchari Union Bangali

2 Kutukchari Upor para Kutukchari Chakma

3 Kutukchari Headman Para Do Chakma

4 Kutukchari Upor Para Do Chakma

5 Duluchari PDC Moghban Tanchangya

6 Kamilachari Do Chakma

7 Sapchari PDC Sapchari Chakma

8 Kuki Para Banduk bhanga Chakma

9 Kaguttya PDC Do Chakma

10 Sagu Para Do Chakma

11 Vacchuri Beel PDC Ranagamati Municipality

Tanchangya

Khagrachari District

1 2 No Prokalpa Para Khagrachari Sadar

Union

Chakma, Marma,

Tripura

2 Bichitola DP Do Chakma

3 Fanindra Para Do Chakma

4 Jidi Para Do Marma

5 Mongaram Para Do Tripura

6 Jamtali Para Perachara Union Chakma

7 Khammar Para Do Tripura

8 Kripa Roaza Para Do Tripura

9 Mayung Toiklu Para Do Tripura

10 Pratap Para Do Marma,

Chakma,Santal

Bandarban District

1 Bakichara Lamer Para Khuhalong Union Marma

2 Kyaba Para Do Marma

3 Notun Charui Para Do Marma

4 Purba Muslim Para Do Bangali

5 Toungkhyang Para, Do Marma

6 Dakhin Guwaliyakula Para Bandarban sadar

Union

Bangali

7 Lulain Purnabashan Para Do Marma, Tanchangya

8 Shamukjiri Purnabashan Para

Do Marma, Tanchangya

9 Raisha Senior Para, Do Tanchangya

10 Talukder Para Do Marma

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Annex B: List of persons consulted

1. Arun Chakma, Chairman Moghban Union

2. Bijoy Giri Chakma do Balukhali Union

3. Barun Kanti Chakma do Bandukbhanga Union

4. Arun Kanti Chakma do Sapachari Union

5. Santu Bikash Chakma do Kutukchari Union

6. Bimalendu Chakma Project Coordinator, CEP CIPD

7. Champa Chakma Upazila Facilitator, Rangamati

Sadar

UNDP-CHTDF

8. Jhuma Dewan Cluster Head, Gender and

Local Confidence Building

Program

UNDP-CHTDF

9. Gautam Kumar Chakma

Councilor Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council

10. Bihita Bidhan Khisa CEP District Coordinator,

Rangamati

UNDP-CHTDF

11. Biplob Chakma Executive Director Taungya

12. Jana Lal Chakma Executive Director CEP

13. Nanda Kishor Chakma Program Coordinator SAS

14. Lalit C. Chakma Executive Director SAS

15. Sushil Chakma Upazila Coordinator Hile Hilly

16. Nae Prue Marma Ex-Secretary CHTWoN

Bandarban

17. Sanu Prue Marma Chairman Khuhalung Union 18. Kya Sing Swe Marma Chairman Rajbilla Union

19. Ushing Mong Chowdhury

District Community Empowerment Officer

UNDP-CHTDF

20. Jumlian Amlai President Bawm Social Council

21. Mong Re Marma Executive Director Ta Zing Dong

22. Moung Moung Shing Executive Director Humanitarian Foundation

Khagrachari

23. Amey Marma Chairman Sadar Union

24. Supan Khisa Do Kamalchari Union

25. Sanjib Tripura Do Perachara Union

26. Ela Rani Chowdhury District Education Expert UNDP-CHTDF

27. Suvas Chakma District Governance Officer UNDP-CHTDF

28. Alo Chakma Upazila Coordinator UNDP-CHTDF

29. Shefalika Tripura Chairperson Khagrapur Mahila Kalyan Samity (KMKS)

30. Ripan Chakma Executive Director Trinamul Unnayan Sangstha

31. Mathura Tripura Executive Director Zabarang Kalyan Samity

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Annex C: Hierarchy of results of the CHTDF project

Accelerated and sustainable socio-economic development based on the principles of self-reliance and

decentralized development initiative, in order to reduce poverty across the region. This goal is

complemented and reinforced through creation of a conducive development environment based on (a) the

resumption of a significant scale of international development assistance to the CHT; and (b) confidence-

building measures among the people and institutions of the CHT that promote long-term peace.

1. Capacity building of the institutions of the CHT to effectively plan, manage and technically support

bottom-up community-based development initiatives

2. Special region-wide initiatives that address cross-cutting development priorities and peace-building

opportunities.

3. Empowerment of Para communities for self-reliant development based upon self-assessment of

development opportunities, and design and management of small-scale development activities

supported through QIF (Quick impact fund)

4. Facilitate confidence building to solve long-standing problems to development and peace in the

CHT.

5. UNDP operational infrastructure and capacities enhanced to support CHT development

1. Capacity building of CHT institution

CHT development vision and strategy development

Institutional self-assessment and management system reforms

Strengthening human resources

Technical and logistic support to CHT institution

Regional/multi-community planning and programming

Information and communication technology (ICT) Infrastructure

Community outreach and support System

Institutional research, policy and advocacy

2. Special region-wide initiatives

Youth Employment

Marketing system and rural infrastructure for CHT products

Facilitation to private sector investment

Environment protection and management

Disaster preparedness and management

Critical health interventions

Support to basic education

3. Community empowerment for self-reliant development

Community empowerment process and Quick Impact Fund (QIF)

Community management and technical capabilities

CHT ‘Best Practices for small project development

Capacity development of NGOs, Community Facilitators (CF) and UNVs

Strengthening the development role of the traditional and elected leaders

Gender mainstreaming

4. Confidence building

Dialogue and partnership among (the relevant stakeholders) for joint actions

Study tours on innovative development and confidence building experiences

Exchange visits (of the grassroots communities and other stakeholders) across the CHT

Support to the GOB initiatives for land dispute resolution through the Land Commission

Piloting community managed forestry

Support to the Police Force working in the CHT

Advice and support to the GoB electoral initiatives

Promotion of minority interests and cultural diversity

Support to incentive programmes

Support to GOB initiatives for returned refugees, internally displaced peoples and Ex-combatants

5. UNDP operational infrastructure and capacities to support CHT development

UNDP infrastructure and capacities

Technical services

Donor coordination

Outcome/

dev. goal

Output

Activities