STRENGTHENING THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME FOR …€¦ · MS. SINGELEE: Excellent. Well, thank you...

STRENGTHENING THE NONPROLIFERATION

REGIME FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS:

A CONVERSATION WITH

AMBASSADOR SUSAN BURK

THURSDAY, APRIL 12, 2012

WASHINGTON, D.C.

MODERATORS:

Toby Dalton

Deputy Director of the Nuclear Policy Program

Carnegie Endowment

Meena Singelee

Executive Director

The International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists (INENS)

SPEAKER:

Susan F. Burk

Special Representative

of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation

Transcript by Federal News Service

Washington, D.C.

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery

[00:03:28] TOBY DALTON: Well, I think we’ll get started then. So good morning here in

D.C. and good afternoon in London. My name is Toby Dalton. I’m the deputy director of the Nuclear Policy Program here at the Carnegie Endowment.

And it’s our great pleasure to work with INENS and the U.S. embassy in London

and the State Department here to host this conversation on nonproliferation issues and specifically the NPT with Ambassador Susan Burk. Ambassador Burk is the special representative of the president for NPT issues, headed the U.S. delegation to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and will speak for a little bit today about how she sees this issue going forward, including in the upcoming NPT PrepCom that’ll start in Vienna later this month. And then we’ll have some back-and-forth, some Q&A.

Meena, did you want to take a few minutes to introduce – (inaudible) – to the group

here? [00:04:24] MEENA SINGELEE: Sure. Well, thank you, Toby, for the quick introduction

there. Can you hear us – MR. DALTON: Yup. MS. SINGELEE: -- or do I need to speak louder? MR. DALTON: Nope. MS. : Nope, we can hear you. MS. SINGELEE: Excellent. Well, thank you to Ambassador Burk for kindly

agreeing to take part in the event and to Carnegie as well for cohosting this event with us. We’re delighted to be hosting this over a videolink with Washington. And I’ll take a few minutes to explain a little bit about what we do and then explain what are we doing today in London.

INENS for those of you don’t know is a network that facilitates dialogue amongst

the next generation of experts. And we have about 400 members at the moment from about 55 countries. And most of them are young professionals with about one to 10 years’ experience in any relevant nuclear field. And INENS hosts events around the world, and we have various publications and working groups as well. And this event that we’re hosting in London is part of our multilateral policy and institutions working group. We’ve had a couple of events so far, and this is the first one in London that we’re hosting ahead of the PrepCom.

And this morning – well, this afternoon, we discussed disarmament and later on after

the session in Washington, we’re going to be discussing nonproliferation issues. So we’re hoping much of Ambassador Burk’s remarks will tie into what we’ve been discussing here in


London and feeding to our broader discussions that we’re going to be hosting in Vienna next month and later in the year as well. So I’ll keep it short, but I’ll head back to Toby now and look forward to Ambassador Burk’s remarks.

[00:06:03] MR. DALTON: Great. Thanks very much, Meena. So Susan, to you. SUSAN BURK: All right. Well, thank you very much. And it’s a little awkward

because the screen is behind me, so I’ve got people in front but I know you’re there. And it’s – I’m really happy to be here this morning – I know it’s your afternoon – to participate in this round-table discussion. And I really want to thank Carnegie and Toby, in particular, for facilitating this trans-Atlantic event – this is really helpful – and embassy of London for taking the initiative to get this thing going. I think this is the wave of the future, and it’s wonderful to be able to connect with you without costing the government any travel money, which is very important these days. So we should look to this as a model for the future.

I’m going to talk for, you know, 10 or 15 minutes. I want to describe the U.S.

approach to the first meeting of the preparatory committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, briefly review the progress to date on the 2010 action plan, and then just offer some thoughts on the role of the next generation in connection with these issues. And I think it’s particularly important. Meena and her compadres who have launched this INENS group – this is really important. And for those of us who are reaching the ends of our career, we’re very gratified to see all of this talent and enthusiasm and intellect being teed up to carry the ball forward.

[00:07:29] So to start off looking at the first PrepCom – and I’ll use shorthand – RevCon,

PrepCom – because it’ll shorten my remarks. I want to just take a minute and go back to two years to the 2010 review conference; seems like only yesterday. And at that meeting, the NPT parties – I – in my words, defied the skeptics and the cynics by producing, by consensus, a substantive and balanced action plan for progress on the NPT’s three pillars. And I know, Meena, you mentioned disarmament, but I’m going to cover all three pillars because they’re all critically important and they all depend on each other. And there was also a decision on the Middle East.

And while the review conference president’s report, which was a backward look at

the treaty, did not – did not reflect a full consensus, it did reflect very broad agreement, I think, and the views of many states. And it also reflected the extensive and constructive discussions by the parties on a – on a wide variety of very important NPT issues. One of the important ones for the United States was the issue of discouraging abuse of the NPT’s withdrawal provision using North Korea as the example of that as a – as a real issue, not a – not a theoretical one.

In 2010, the NPT parties demonstrated collective support for the treaty as well as a

greater understanding of the mutually reinforcing character of the treaty’s three pillars. And very importantly, to those of us who have been involved in multilateral diplomacy for many


years, they demonstrated the ability to reach across traditional political and regional groups -- I would say the traditional blocks -- to work cooperatively to find common ground. And this was really critical to the result and essential to the result.

The United States is now looking to use the 2010 result as our point of departure for the 2015 review cycle. And our collective goal should be to build on that result while acknowledging that there are very real challenges that the NPT is facing at this time. And we, as a collective group of NPT parties, need to look at how we can deal with those more effectively than in – perhaps we did in 2010. So as we’re preparing within the U.S. government for the PrepCom, we’ve been focusing on a careful review of the action plan. And we are preparing our interventions for the various different discussions during the PrepCom to report or provide information on the steps the U.S. has taken in the two years to implement the various actions in all three pillars.

[00:10:02] But we’re also approaching the PrepCom as an opportunity for all parties – not just

the nuclear weapon states, but non-nuclear weapon states alike – to describe their efforts to implement the action plan. And we’re looking forward to a comprehensive discussion and hopefully a reflection of the fact that all of the parties or at least most of the parties are taking the action plan as seriously as we are. And then since the PrepCom is in Vienna, we have really looked at this as a great opportunity to engage our Vienna missions and our IAEA experts more closely and to do more to highlight the role of the IAEA and the CTBTO in the action plan, and particularly the IAEA with its safeguards and technical programs, because of the two – two of the three pillars, when you read them, really require the action of our folks in Vienna in order carry out those goals.

And then last, in terms of preparations, we have been – I certainly have been since the review conference was over – continued to engage extensively with a very large number of NPT parties from all regional and political groups to continue the conversation about how we can strengthen this important treaty and move forward. And that outreach and that diplomacy, I believe, is really critical. These are conversations that have to take place forever. We can’t just do them in the run-up to a meeting and so forth. We have to engage with countries on a continual and persistent basis. And we need to be prepared to listen to other people as well as to share our own views with them. And that I think also contributed in large measure to the good atmosphere in 2010.

[00:11:43] So looking at the action plan, we joined consensus on the action plan because it was

a realistic and balanced agenda that supported achievement of the NPT’s basic provisions. And as I mentioned, we’re now working on our presentations to the PrepCom, which will review what we’ve done kind of on our summer vacation to make progress towards various actions and the commitments that we made. And again, we’re looking for others to come in with the same reflection of a commitment.

So on disarmament, let me just review very briefly -- and this will all be very familiar

to this group both in this room and in London. I was very gratified to see President Obama


in Seoul at the Nuclear Security Summit last month underline the importance, again, that he attaches to sustained U.S. leadership towards a world without nuclear weapons.

And his remarks, if you haven’t read them, are worth reading. They’re a very good

kind of update on where we are and I think confirms the very strong commitment of this president and this administration to this agenda that we all have been working to carry out. He noted, at that time, the important progress that’s been made with Russia under the New START Treaty, which, when implemented, will reduce U.S. and Russian deployed nuclear warheads to their lowest levels since the 1950s. And we are planning to have a side event at the PrepCom on New START implementation.

[00:13:07] He also drew attention to the changes in the Nuclear Posture Review, the – that was

from 2010. Specifically, he emphasized that the U.S. will not develop new nuclear warheads or new military missions for existing nuclear weapons. And it’s my personal opinion that the 2010 NPR, coming as it did so close to the start of the review conference, perhaps did not get the attention that it really merited given the very important elements in that document. And we will be trying to draw more attention to that as well. The U.S. has reduced and will seek to continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy. And our long-standing U.S. negative security assurance was updated to reflect a clear and unqualified commitment to NPT non-nuclear weapon state parties in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations.

On the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the U.S. administration has been engaging

with the U.S. Senate on the CTBT, laying the groundwork for positive Senate reconsideration of the treaty. And I would just remind the audience that the U.S. has not tested a nuclear explosive device since 1992; it’ll be 20 years in September. And the NPR reiterated the U.S. no longer requires nuclear explosive testing to sure the safety and effectiveness of its remaining nuclear weapons. So what we need to do now is ratify our signature – our signed treaty.

[00:14:33] On fissile material, the U.S. has not produced highly enriched uranium for weapons

since 1964 or produced plutonium for weapons since 1989. And we’ve worked unilaterally and in cooperation with Russia to remove from U.S. defense stocks HEU and plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons.

In July of last year the U.S. and Russia brought the plutonium management and

disposition agreement and its 2006 and 2010 protocols into force. And these commit each country to dispose of at least 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium. And we remain committed to working with our partners to find a productive path forward on a fissile material cutoff treaty. That has been a source of great frustration to us, that we have not been able to get that going in Geneva over the last couple of years.

And last but not least, the United States is actively engaged with its P-5 partners on a

process of P-5 engagement consistent with Action 5 of the NPT Action Plan. You know,


the U.S. and Russia have a long history of engaging on nuclear arms reduction doctrine and strategy, which can be usefully shared with the other P-5 members. And the P-5 have continued meeting and exchanging information on nuclear reductions in capabilities, verification and reporting with the understanding that such engagement will lead to better understanding and communication. And this will lay a foundation for increased transparency and eventual multilateral disarmament work.

And then finally the U.S. continues to lead in providing transparency about nuclear

weapons. And for those who followed the 2010 review conference, we did release stockpile numbers going back 30 years. And the aggregate numbers under the New START treaty were released last summer. And it is the U.S. view that increased transparency among all NPT states – nuclear-weapon states as well as non-nuclear-weapon states – will contribute to stability, and that can help create the conditions for future nuclear weapon reductions.

[00:16:34] Now let me just mention – talk a little bit about nonproliferation. Support for the

nonproliferation pillar really involves support for the IAEA and its indispensable safeguard system. It also – and I would note that the safeguards really provide credible assurance that states are complying with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. The 2010 action plan called upon all states which hadn’t done so to conclude and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. There’s a handful of states that haven’t completed the comprehensive safeguards agreements, and we’re working to help them do that.

And the U.S., working with the IAEA and partners in Vienna, is providing support

to states that seek assistance in that area and in – particularly in concluding and implementing their additional protocols, which provide the IAEA additional capabilities to monitor and verify compliance. At the moment – and this number was just updated I think this week – there are 115 states with additional protocols in force, and another 23 have signed the protocol but not yet brought them into force. So the numbers are growing, and we’re very gratified with that.

[00:17:45] The action plan also underscored the importance of compliance with

nonproliferation obligations. But let me just say – and my personal view is the language in the final document itself is understated to say the least, given the challenge that noncompliance poses to the integrity of the NPT. And it fails to identify specific cases of noncompliance as was done in the past. That was all that was possible, unfortunately, given the rule of consensus. But I think we need to be very mindful that the issue of compliance and noncompliance is one that really goes to the heart of this treaty.

And we are encouraging NPT partners to look for ways to take this up a little bit

more aggressively in the future. We want our NPT partners to encourage compliance and to make it clear that noncompliance is not acceptable. And we believe that the NPT parties have a responsibility to respond firmly to NPT violations, including those that involve abuse


or misuse of technical assistance that states may have received under the auspices of NPT membership.

[00:18:50] Under nonproliferation, let me mention the issue of nuclear weapon-free zones. We

believe that such zones, when they are properly crafted, can provide valuable regional reinforcement to the global NPT. And some regions have used these zones as a vehicle to promote related issues, including nuclear safety and security and environmental integrity. So they really can be very useful agreements.

Now again, as this group of cognoscenti know, the secretary of state announced at

the 2010 review conference that the U.S. was sending the protocols to the African and the South Pacific nuclear weapon-free zone treaty to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification. And this was done May 2nd of last year. And she further committed the U.S. to re-engage with the states in Southeast and Central Asia in an effort to see if the issues that have prevented our signature on those protocols could be addressed.

Well, last year the P-5 and the states parties to the Southeast Asian nuclear weapon-

free zone, the Treaty of Bangkok, successfully addressed the issues that had prevented signature of the protocol to that treaty. And we are now working with partners to carry out the technical steps that will clear the way for that – for our signature and the signature of the other P-5 this year. That was a treaty that was on the shelf for 10 years. I call it a Lazarus moment. But it just shows that you can go back and bring things back.

And we’re also engaged in fairly extensive consultations with Kazakhstan right now,

who was representing the Central Asian states to the Central Asian nuclear-free zone, the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, and with the P-5. And we are considering carefully internally at the moment what are the options available to overcome the obstacles to moving forward on that agreement. We do not have a position on that issue at the moment, but we are looking seriously at it.

And finally, on peaceful uses – and I know, Meena, you didn’t have this on your

agenda, but again, we think this is a key part of the – of the NPT and a key part of the nonproliferation regime – it’s one of the big benefits of a strong nonproliferation regime. The 2010 action plan affirms the central role of the NPT in fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place. That’s a quote from the action plan.

[00:21:09] Now the U.S. has long been the single largest contributor to the IAEA’s technical

cooperation programs. But to further underscore our support for this program, Secretary Clinton announced at the RevCon a five-year, $100 million Peaceful Uses Initiative. Now the U.S. has pledged $50 million to what we’re calling the PUI – it’s a little odd, but I guess it could be worse – which is over and above our annual contribution to IAEA technical cooperation activities. Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the Czech Republic – there are others; I don’t have them all listed here – several others have joined us in contributing to the


PUI. And we are working hard to encourage others to contribute in order to reach the $100 million goal.

Now as some of you probably know, the PUI focuses on providing developing

countries with training and equipment to apply nuclear technologies, particularly in the area of human health – and we’re especially focused on the cancer treatment, which was a big program in the IAEA a couple years ago – food security, water resource management and developing infrastructure for the safe and secure use of civil nuclear power. Since the initiative was announced two years ago – a little less than two years ago – the U.S. has already disbursed more than $18 million for IAEA projects for which funding was previously unavailable. And these projects are benefiting more than a hundred countries.

[00:22:35] When I was in Vienna last September, I was really struck by – I had many, many

bilaterals. And I was struck and really pleased at the number of countries that actually raised the PUI – these were mostly developing countries – who mentioned it voluntarily; I didn’t have to raise it – and indicated how important they saw this initiative and how they saw it as a reflection of support for the peaceful uses under the NPT. And so I think we’ve been using that as a – as a marketing tool too for others, that we are getting credit for this. It is being appreciated. The IAEA has now embraced this program; it’s the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative. But it’s a very important program, and it’s dedicated to really important areas.

Finally, let me just talk about the role of the next generation, and then we’ll open it

up for questions. You know, I – Erin and I have worked together for a long time, and I see her as part of the next generation. And when I speak to groups and student groups, I’m always encouraging them to get informed about these issues. You know, if you can, work in the area and work on these issues.

But get informed, be interested and let your voice be know – be known. And I think

that engagement by young people in the international nonproliferation regime, in national – in security issues, but certainly in WMD proliferation has really grown in recent years. And this is terribly important. These issues – they need your attention. And your governments need your support and your active engagement on these issues. I wish I could say we were going to get it all fixed before some of us retire, but we’re not. And there’s – this is a – this is the full JOBS Act.

[00:24:15] I have some statistics that Erin gave me that during 2004 – 2009 NPT meetings there

were estimates of the youth participation, defined as under 30 – I can’t even remember those days – included anywhere between 20 to 80 accredited NGO representatives for each meeting to include the PrepComs and the 2005 review conference. And then for the 2010 review conference, it was estimated that there were approximately 450 accredited youth – again, under 30 – from 16 NGOs out of a total of 2,000.

Since the 2010 review conference there’s been a number of new NGOs and

networks created to engage students and young professionals. And of course INENS is a


real model for this, Meena, and you and your colleagues deserve a lot of credit – as well as the European Youth Delegation, sponsored by the EU. And we understand that all of these groups are going to participate actively in the 2012 PrepCom, and we look forward to talking to you when we’re in Vienna.

[00:25:14] At the State Department we’ve also initiated our own efforts to engage with the next

generation of nonproliferation specialists. So this has really been an initiative of our strategic communications office. We have Erin and Margo Squire, who are here. Since 2009 we’ve hosted an annual conference which we’re calling Generation Prague, which I think is really cool. And that has focused on the role of young people in fulfilling President’s – Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons. This year we’re going to host this event on June 4th, and we’re welcoming participation of folks here and elsewhere.

So achieving the vision that President Obama set out in Prague and that he – and he

recently reinforced in Seoul of strengthening the NPT and moving down the spectrum of nuclear disarmament towards elimination of nuclear weapons – it’s going to take time, and we need to be very realistic. I sometimes find in these meetings I’m, you know, having to bite my tongue so I don’t blurt out, you know, let’s get real and deal with the real world. And therefore it’s really incumbent that the next generation take some responsibility for achieving these goals, because it is going to take time. And it’s going to be on your watch and maybe even beyond.

We’ve been very encouraged by the enthusiasm of the Prague generation to take up

these challenges. And as I said in – you know, before, that gives me a lot of comfort to know that there is so much enthusiasm and intellect that is being rallied to take these issues on in the future. So let me end there, after running through my outline. And I’m happy to take any questions.

MR. DALTON: Thanks, Susan. I think that was a really comprehensive but still

detailed tour of all of the NPT issues and even more. So the way this’ll work is we’ll sort of alternate, where I’ll start by asking a question,

we’ll take a couple from London, then a couple here, and we’ll alternate that way. I would remind everybody to please state your name so that we know who you are, particularly for folks in London who – we can sort of see you, but we’re not with you. And polemics are welcome as long as they’re short. Questions are encouraged. (Laughter.)

[00:27:28] So maybe I can start, Susan. You mentioned a little bit of – about the P-5

engagement process that’s been encouraged in the action plan. Before the review conference there was actually a P-5 statement that was done. I – was that the first time that that was done? I don’t know that there was one in 2005. But in any case, I think it’s – you know, it’s clear that there’s a little bit more of a P-5 process going on now. There was a meeting that the French hosted this last year. Could you explain a little bit more about how


that process is going and, you know, what some of the concrete outcomes might be and what also some of the hurdles are?

MS. BURK: All right. Well, thanks; that’s a great question. I don’t know if there

was a P-5 statement in 2005. I had – I had nothing to do with 2005. There – we did negotiate a joint P-5 statement to the 2010 review conference. And that has been something we’ve done in the past – we were able to do that again – to show P-5 unity on a range of issues and reflect the agreement.

[00:28:29] Now in 2009 the British government hosted a meeting in London, in September of

2009, that brought the P-5 together in discussions on confidence-building and verification transparency measures. I was able to participate in that conference because we had meetings on the side on the NPT review conference. But it was quite an effective meeting, bringing in experts from the different governments – in our case, from the Department of Energy labs and so forth – to have fairly technical discussions and briefings.

That led to our decision at the review conference to – for this Action 5, which called

on the P-5 to engage on a – on a series of items, but that would bring the P-5 together in a conversation on issues that frankly, as I said, the P-5 haven’t engaged in as a group. It’s been the U.S. and Russians, and now expanding as to talk about some of these issues. The French – after the review conference, the French offered to host the first P-5 conference following the review conference, and that was held last year. And the U.S. will be hosting the conference this year. The dates have not been set yet, but we’re planning on that already.

There was a press release out of that – the French meeting. There was a very brief press release out of the London meeting. And there was a public statement out of the France – the meeting in France that detailed some of the things that we were doing. And I don’t have it with me at the moment.

For obvious reasons, these conversations are largely confidential. And they are

confidential at the request of a (umber of the P-5 who would prefer to have these discussion, you know, outside of the public view. But it did describe some of the achievements, agreements to start – set up working groups and various things. And I can tell you that progress is being made in implementing those decisions and following up on those – on those meetings, and that the next meeting will carry – attempt to carry the ball further.

[00:30:27] Our – the U.S. goal is to institutionalize a regular process of P-5 engagement on

these issues; as I say, to build this foundation of confidence and understanding so that we can move to the next level. As the president said in Prague, the U.S. and the Russians need to work on reducing their numbers further to get down to levels. But then he envisions a time where those numbers will be at a level that we can then multilateralize that disarmament process. And we’re now laying the groundwork for that.

MR. DALTON: Good.


Meena, you want to take a couple questions from London? MS. SINGELEE: Sure. Go ahead. Q: Sure, I’ll start. Chris Ross (sp) from King’s College London. Ambassador Burk,

you mentioned the crucial role the IAEA plays in the two pillars of nonproliferation and peaceful use. I was wondering whether you saw a greater future role for the agency in the third pillar of disarmament. There was a trilateral technical study completed in the early 2000s between the agency, Russia and the United States on verifying nuclear warhead dismantlement. And I wondered whether an instrument like this might be something that the U.S. would consider revisiting in the future.

[00:31:31] MS. BURK: Well, I know there have been discussions of this, and I don’t know – I

don’t know whether the U.S. would consider it. I think at the moment, you know, we’re at a stage where we and the Russians are working on nuclear reductions. And the president’s made it clear what we would like to see the next phase of our nuclear arms reductions with Russia cover. And the verification for that is going to be bilateral verification.

But as I mentioned on the plutonium disposition agreement, I mean, we are looking

at – some of these agreements that involve fissile material and so forth do involve the IAEA. I just think we’re not at a stage now where we’re looking at the IAEA to verify disarmament. But I appreciate that there is a lot of interest in that. I hear about that.

MS. SINGELEE: Jenny (sp). Q: Hi, Jenny Nielsen (sp) – (inaudible). In your recent outreach with the non-

nuclear weapons states, particularly the NAM states, could you provide us with an overview of atmospherics leading up to the 2012 PrepCom? And also, in your recent dialogue with the Middle East states, to what extent are they linking the 2012 WMD-free zone conference to the 2015 NPT review process?

[00:32:51] MS. BURK: OK, great to see you, Jenny (sp) – (chuckles) – over the – over the line.

On the outreach, I – let me just say, generally in my conversations with other NPT parties, especially non-nuclear weapons states, I get a general sense that there is a very strong desire to sort of sustain the mood that, without exception, countries and government representatives believe that 2010 did represent a positive step. And it was a positive move and a good outcome.

And we’ve all been talking about how we can build on that result and continue to

operate – I would say not as business as usual, but as business as we saw in 2010. And so that kind of commitment to keep the – you know, stay the course, if you will, I think is a really – is a really positive element. But I would also say that none of us – no one that I’ve


talked to, and certainly not in the U.S. – is under any illusions that this is going to be easy. But at least if we’re all committed to a general approach, I think that’s a good idea.

[00:34:01] On the Middle East, I’m not personally involved in the Middle East issue. But I

would say that the Middle East has been a central element in NPT discussions since 1995. And there’s no reason to believe that that will not continue to be the case.

MR. DALTON: Daryl. Q: (Inaudible.) MR. DALTON: Yeah. Q: Thank you. Good morning. Daryl Kimball with the Arms Control Association.

Ambassador Burk, because you’re so good at what you do, I’m going to ask a hard question –

MS. BURK: (Chuckles.) OK. Q: – or what might be considered a hard question. I mean, you mentioned the

importance of compliance and – as a priority of the United States in going through this PrepCom review process. My question is, as the United States views that part of the review, does that apply to – (inaudible) – one, two, three, four and six alike?

And I ask that because, I mean, there are questions that have come up over time

about indirect support for nuclear weapons programs. For instance, through technical cooperation with non-NPT states, parties like Pakistan, through the IAEA, have – you know, has that technical assistance been used, for instance, to support their weapons program – because the assistance was technically focused on projects that have dual use, like their heavy water reactor, uranium mining, et cetera.

[00:35:31] So I mean, as the United States views this, does it apply to all of these core NPT

commitments? And specifically on Pakistan, is this something that the United States has looked into, has a view about, regarding the past technical cooperation and the financial support by the U.S. and the IAEA to Pakistan for those activities?

MS. BURK: Well, you know, I know – I think you and I have had exchanges on this

issue before. I would say on compliance, you know, yeah, when we talk about compliance it’s got to be compliance with all the aspects of the treaty, all right? And the U.S. and the nuclear weapons states, you know, get accused of not complying with, you know, Article 6. You know, I can – I don’t agree with that, and I think the president has laid out an agenda that makes it very clear he’s very committed to the NPT and to doing what he can to do this.


And you know, I’m not going to do an advertisement for James Acton here, but I mentioned that he has a – he has – and this is not a U.S. government endorsement of the article, but I have shared it with a number of colleagues, including in the Pentagon. He wrote a piece in the – in the Washington Quarterly just recently that I saw that talks about some of the difficulties for disarmament. And I would commend it to your attention. Scott Sagan’s article a couple years ago – (inaudible) – on shared responsibilities is also important too. I mean, we need to deal with the real world.

I think right now the U.S. is firmly committed and is making every effort to move

the ball forward. And if we could achieve the elements of the Prague agenda, I think we would be in a much better place to then go the next – the next round. So compliance on all the things – we’re not suggesting we don’t have to comply and others do. In the NPT context, what we’re really focusing on is NPT parties in compliance with their obligations. Are they – are they doing what they need to do to provide assurance on the non-nuclear weapons states that their activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes? Iran, for example, you know, has not satisfied that requirement in the minds of most.

[00:37:42] Discussions on the IAEA and Pakistan, I have to say, haven’t come up, and I think

because Pakistan’s not an NPT party. But you know – and I – and we tend to focus on just the groups that are, you know – and I would also say, India and Pakistan don’t get a lot of attention in the NPT review conference. I’m not going to say whether that’s a good or a bad thing, but they tend not to get the same attention as some other nonparties.

Q: But I think – I raise that because NPT parties have an obligation under Article 1

not to provide assistance in any way to (on ?) any state whether they’re in the NPT or outside the NPT. And so they have an obligation to assure that their assistance to any party is not being used for weapon purposes. So that’s not an Article 6 issue; it’s not an Article 2 or 3 issue; it’s an Article 1 issue. So I raise that because it’s not something that often comes up, and I’m just wondering whether that philosophically is within the scope of what you’re talking about when you’re – you raise the question of compliance.

[00:38:43] MS. BURK: I have to say, when I think about this in the NPT context, I haven’t

thought about it in that way, but I’ll definitely look into that issue. OK. MR. DALTON: Please. Q: My name’s Bill Root (sp). I’ve been involved in export control since 1964.

When COCOM was first established in 1950, there was a single multilateral agency for munitions, for dual-use and for atomic-energy items. Over the years this has become atomized. There’s a separate regime now for nuclear suppliers group and for Zangger and for missiles. And in the U.S. it’s even worse than that; there are many different agencies involved.


The president has, for the first time in decades at that level, addressed the export control issue and export control reform. And Secretary Gates took the lead. And it (has abbreviated ?) into four singles: a single list, a single agency for this and a single agency for that. Unfortunately the details to put that into effect have seemed to have (accept ?) the skepticism that we could ever achieve any of those singles. I was wondering if – in terms of compliance, it is extremely difficult for exporters to comply with this multiplicity of different approaches. And we were welcoming the idea of the four singles but wondering if we’ll ever get there.

MS. BURK: Well, I appreciate your question. And I have to say that I am not

enough of an expert, and certainly in the last several years have had really not much to do with – had nothing to do with that issue, to be able to offer you a competent answer. I mean, I take your point, and I understand your concern. But I’m not sure that I can answer it in any way that would be authoritative. I’m sorry.

[00:41:01] MR. DALTON: Fair enough. Back to London. MS. SINGELEE: Right. I’ll take this time then to maybe feed in a little bit about

what we’ve been discussing here. And there were a few questions that came up, and perhaps Ambassador Burk would like to comment on some of those. One of the issues was on engaging non-nuclear weapons states and their role and what role they can play in enhancing confidence-building measures that will help feed into the disarmament agenda as well. So I wanted to ask Ambassador Burk on her views on that. And secondly, on what can be done on progress relating to the – to India, Pakistan and Israel in terms of, should disarmament be separately discussed outside the P-5 discussions that are taking place at the moment, or whether it should be a broader meeting to bring them in as well.

[00:42:06] MS. BURK: All right. Well, Meena, that’s a great question. And on the non-nuclear

weapons states – and I wish I had refreshed my memory here – this was Scott Sagan’s article on – (inaudible) – a couple years ago on shared responsibilities. He really talks a lot in that article about the things that non-nuclear weapons states can do to contribute to security. But I think when we talk about this, number one, it’s, you know, meeting their responsibilities in terms of safeguards, export controls, whatever the requirements are; supporting the IAEA both politically and through other – and through, you know, financial and other means.

I think a lot of the issues that – the real – the problems that kind of plague the

regime are in regions where there’s instability and insecurity. And these are areas where regional states and non-nuclear weapons states need to contribute to some basic security and confidence-building in some of these regions in order to be – have a better – be better able to handle the WMD piece of it. And so I think that that’s part of it.


And then I’ll come back to compliance. Again, the issue of compliance – whatever compliance we’re talking about – it’s not – it’s not a P-5 issue alone. It’s not a U.S. issue alone; it’s not a P-5 issue. These are issues that all the non-nuclear weapons states could contribute to, you know, greater encouragement of compliance. So those are just a few. I do think that, as you look through the action plan, there are a number of different actions that non-nuclear weapons states could take.

The Article 4, for example – it talks about promoting the fullest possible access to

the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Well, it’s not – it – Article 4 – and I hear this occasionally, and sometimes often – that this Article 4 is an obligation on the – on the nuclear weapons states. Well, it’s not an obligation on the nuclear weapons states; it’s an obligation on all parties, or it’s an obligation for all parties to facilitate the fullest access. So I think that’s another area where non-nuclear weapons states can contribute and are contributing to ensuring that countries, especially in the developing world, do have access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

[00:44:20] So there are – there are a number of provisions in the treaty that commonly get

ascribed as being obligations only for the nuclear weapons states, and they really are to all. In the action plan, for example, there’s an Action 20 that calls on all states to report. And there’s an Action 21 that calls on the nuclear weapons states to report. I’ve heard Action 20 interpreted by some as, well that really means the nuclear weapons states too. So I think, again, if the health and vitality and durability of the NPT is up to just the nuclear weapons states, and the – and the other 184 parties see themselves as having no particular role, I think we’re in trouble. On India, Pakistan and Israel, you know, that – the issue – I don’t – I don’t have a comment or a view on the disarmament process. To my mind, the FMCT negotiations, if we could ever get them going in Geneva, is the best opportunity to begin to bring together countries in the NPT and out of the NPT in a discussion on – of a negotiation that will significantly enhance the move towards disarmament. And so for – you know, for us and certainly the way I would look at it, if you want to bring in the states that are outside the treaty into a real, you know, arms control and nonproliferation agreement, the FMCT would be the way to do it. And we have not given up trying to break the deadlock on that. We’re still working hard to try to find a way to get that thing going. But I know that most of you know where the obstacles are, and they (are/aren’t ?) NPT parties.

[00:45:58]

Q: If I could just follow up on the FMCT question. You know, there’s been some discussion, rumor for some time now of – some might even characterize it as a threat – to move that discussion out of Geneva. Can you give us a sense about where things are with that at this point?

MS. BURK: Well, you know, I – there are proposals being made – and they’re not being made by the U.S. – to move this out. And these are being made by other countries that would like to see this negotiation done.


Now I think our view is that the CD is the best place to do that, and we’re working hard to try to to find a way to get it unhooked so that we can go. But we – there are proposals being made by some other key non-nuclear weapons states in the G-77 and others to move it to the U.N. or elsewhere, and we’ll have to see where it goes. So the frustration is building across the board, and you know, we are trying to see what we can do to just get it started in a way that would, you know, produce a meaningful negotiation and a meaningful treaty. And we are prepared – as I said, we have not been producing fissile material for many, many years, and the president’s commitment is to make that a legal commitment and to accept verification. This is a pretty big deal. And you know, it would be great to get it done. So –

[00:47:20]

MR. DALTON: Paul, did you have a question?

Q: I guess I – first of all, it’s very nice to see you here, and also Erin (ph) and all of our colleagues – (inaudible) – back in State. The – I had another tough question, I guess, following up on Darrell’s (sp) statement. You know, the NPT and the whole non – nuclear nonproliferation regime is still very much perceived as a discriminatory regime, particularly by the non-nuclear parties. And one of the ways we’ve – we obviously know we can help to overcome that is to make major steps forward, particularly in Russia and the United States, and as you’ve said, break down the nuclear weapons stockpiles. My question is, you know, what’s progress going to be like? Are you optimistic on CTBT ratification in the next year or two, particularly after the elections this year?

I asked Rose Gottemoeller this, too. Rose and I have had conversations on this and –

MS. BURK: What’d she say? (Laughter.)

[00:48:16]

Q: She said: I’ll wait until next year to see. She was – she actually was not at all very optimistic during an election year like this.

Secondly, you know, deeper cuts in nuclear weapons, beyond the New START treaty, which we all know is a great step forward, but still inadequate in the eyes of many of the NPT states’ bodies.

And thirdly, how about – how about tactical nuclear weapons? I mean, there’s an issue I think that’s ripe for positive movement. Are we going to see some sort of NATO agreement that we can indeed move these out of Europe and begin to rid the world of forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons? I think it would be a great step forward for the next five-year review.

And my name is Paul Walker with Global Green USA.

Thanks, Toby.

MS. BURK: These are all great questions. And you know, I have to – they’re all great questions that I can’t answer. I think in an election year, you know, when I get asked


about some of these things by foreign partners, you know, I – most folks understand that in an election year, these kinds of things are very difficult, and for all sorts of reasons. We’re all preoccupied with other things. And I couldn’t possibly speculate. It really will depend on, you know, next year, what happens, what are we dealing with. I don’t think – there’s no reduction in the commitment of this administration to move forward on these issues. So you know, we’ll have to wait for next year on that.

Same way with deeper cuts, I think, and the same way with tac nukes. You know, the president, you know, said it in Prague, that, you know, the first phase and the next phase he wants to bring in the nonstrategic nuclear weapons. So we’ve been on the record for wanting to do that. And you know, what’s on the record, how – that’s going to be tough. And I can’t – I can’t possibly speculate on what NATO will do either.

[00:50:05}

So you know, what we have out there is what the administration is committed to and what – and how it has sketched out the agenda for the future. And you know, time will tell. I think it’s a great agenda and I hope we’ll have an opportunity to pursue it and to make more achievements before 2015, but I couldn’t speculate right now.

MR. DALTON: So the gentleman there.

Q: I’m Carlton Stoiber with the International Nuclear Law Association. This is a softball question for you.

MS. BURK: Thank you, Carl. (Laughs.)

Q: You mentioned the NPT, but you hadn’t mentioned another relatively important international binding agreement on nuclear nonproliferation, which is U.N. Security Council 1540. And that binds all U.N. member states – and there are binding commitments in that. How do you see the relationship between the NPT Review Conference process and what is going on or might go on with the 1540 Committee in the Security Council?

MS. BURK: But Carl doesn’t do softball questions, but I – let me – let me answer that this way. As I’ve been, you know, continuing to consult with, you know, foreign partners and people now that I’ve gotten to know quite well so that we can have very – you know, we’d have real conversations, you know, you no talking points – when we’ve talked about, you know, implementing the action plan and that – you know, everybody can – everybody can contribute to this. It’s not just up to the P-5 to do all these things.

[00:51:45]

And asking – you know, well, there are things you could do. What has come up is 1540. For some countries, all of a sudden the light bulb goes on and they’re like, well, we’re implementing 1540. And – exactly. OK, that’s good. Why don’t you come to the PrepCom prepared to talk about what you’re doing to carry out the 1540 mandate in your area? Because all of these – you know, these Security Council resolutions and various things, this all makes up the global nonproliferation architecture, if you will. You know, we like to say the NPT is the cornerstone, but there are all of these other things that we’ve built up as an


international community over the last, you know, 40, 50 years – the IAEA, its different programs, the safeguards, additional protocol(s), 1540.

[00:52:27]

So that now – I – that caused me to go back, because I was in – I was in the nonproliferation bureau when 1540 was first negotiated, and that caused me to go back and kind of review it and get briefed up on it and say, oh yes, OK, this is relevant, and the activities that countries are carrying out in support of that mandate – yes, you should draw attention to that, because this is all contributing to this larger good and (strengthening ?) the regime.

So I don’t know that 1540 – so I don’t think there’s a segment on it, but we’ve now incorporated the 1540 mission into, you know, our thinking about it. And I do raise it with other countries, too; when they’re little stymied, I’m thinking, well, what can we do. Well, you remember 1540: Do that. So it – I think some of this is just connecting the dots and helping other people connect the dots. And in this case, some foreign official connected the dots for me.

MR. DALTON: London, more questions?

Q: Hi, Ambassador. My name’s Matthew Harries. I’m from King’s College London.

MS. BURK: Nice to see you again.

Q: My question is – my question is that you talked about the fact that the language on compliance in the 2010 final document is fairly moderate and you also talked about your occasional desire to shout to people to get real and to deal with the real world. What confidence do you have that the NPT review process is capable of dealing with real-world problems? And in that context, what would you like to see come out of this PrepCom? What would be a useful outcome?

MS. BURK: All right. Well, Matthew, it is good to see you. We met in Washington, didn’t we? Yeah.

Q: Right.

MS. BURK: Well, you know, first of all, out of this PrepCom the one – the one nice thing about this PrepCom is nothing has to come out of it. So I’m pretty relaxed, actually. (Laughs.) You know, the PrepCom doesn’t – you know, we don’t have to produce a document. He chairman has made it clear he’s going to produce a report, but we don’t have to negotiate a document. So that’s one relief.

[00:54:33]

Q: I think what we’d like to see come out of the PrepCom is what I’ve said before. You know, this’ll be an opportunity to determine whether or not most of the other parties are coming in with – you know, prepared to really kind of, you know, sustain the mood, continue to want to collaborate and to cooperate, have a good comprehensive discussion about what everybody’s been doing since 2010 to, you know, keep the faith on the action


plan and to carry it out. And you know, we’ll know when we hear the statements, you know, whether or not they’re – you know, we do have that mood and whether people are similarly committed.

[00:55:13] You know, I think for the – you know, we need to look at this as the first of a series

of PrepComs. You know, it is only the PrepCom. Things will build up over the time leading to 2015. But it would also be good, I think, to – if countries indicated their desire to – or the importance they attach to full compliance with the treaty. I mean, again, these are just things that you would hear in statements. There’s not any written product or that sort of thing that we would be looking to do.

And I – again, it’s – you know, I understand the limits of consensus. I – and I think

when you – when you look at consensus, you know, a lot of – you know, we’d been engaged in this debate – is it a glass – the final document – a glass half full or a glass half empty? Well, it depends on your perspective. I think it’s a glass half full, without a doubt. But if you’re negotiating a document and you want consensus with – I think there were 172 countries that showed up at the meeting – you know, it’s – let’s get real. You can’t – everybody can’t get everything in there that they want. You know, you get – you get the common – you know, you get the common ground.

So – but I do think on compliance, that the parties – their unwillingness or maybe

conflict diverse or, you know, whatever – I think we need to address that as a real issue that we need to care about. And I think when it comes to compliance, the nuclear weapon states’ compliance seems to be fair game in the discussion on whether or not the P-5 are complying. There’s no problem with that. But when it comes to compliance by other states that are not nuclear weapon states, then that seems to be one that people are hesitant to talk about. And I just think whether it’s discriminatory, nondiscriminatory, it’s a product of its time.

You know, I continue to believe that we – it stood the test of time. And I think if

we tried to recreate the NPT today, we couldn’t do it. So I’d like to – I think the NPT is too big to fail, and we just have to find a way to work within the framework. So –

MR. DALTON: Another question from London? [00:57:18] MS. SINGELEE: I think we’ll head back to D.C. MR. DALTON: OK, good. So you had a question, ma’am? Q: Thank you. MS. : (Off mic.)


Q: OK, thank you. My name is Tuya. I’m a currently visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution. I am –

MR. DALTON: Can you speak a little louder, please? [00:57:41] Q: Yeah. My name is Tuya. I’m currently a visiting fellow at the Brookings

Institution, originally from Mongolia. And I wanted to ask about the – Mongolia, as you know, has what we call a nuclear weapon-free status, which is not a full-fledged nuclear weapons-free zone apparently. But then I understand there was a statement back in 2010 regarding their status by the U.S., which said that the – that U.S. will be – will continue to engage with Mongolia on the ways in which it could consult and cooperate with Mongolia on what is called institutionalizing this status. And has there been any engagement between the – Mongolia and the U.S. and other – the P-5 in the period since?

And my second related question, I guess, would be about the – there have been press

reports recently regarding the interest of the government of Mongolia to build the nuclear power plants, something like that in Mongolia and of the non-negligible uranium resources that the country has apparently discovered. And so my question is would you see any potential proliferation risk if Mongolia develops this nuclear energy policy and pursues that policy? Thank you.

MS. BURK: That’s a – that’s a great question. And in response to your question if

there’ve been consultations, I just tossed – talked to your ambassador in Vienna a couple weeks ago when I was there. And I meet with him every time I’m in Vienna, and we are email buddies. So we’re in – we’re in regular contact on this issue. And the – you know, the U.S. has now for the last year, we’ve been trying to – we’ve been in touch with him very regularly – I met with your ambassador also in Geneva – looking at what we could do to respond to this Mongolian desire.

There was a statement in 2000 that the P-5 issued, and that’s sort of the baseline.

And we’re looking at what else we can do that is not legal – we’re not – we don’t – we’re not looking at a legal agreement – we’re getting around doing that – but what kind of a political statement. And we’ve been discussing this with the – with the P-5. And I think your ambassador in Mongolia now has been reaching out. When I talked to him recently, I asked him: Are you talking to the other P-5 or only us? And he said it was only us. And I said: Why don’t you talk to the others. (Chuckles.) So that we’re seeing what we can do. We’re – we’ve got it under – you know, we’ve got it under review and we’re in regular contact.

[01:00:30] On the power reactor, I don’t – I don’t know. I can’t comment on that. I would

just say Mongolia has, you know, strong and excellent nonproliferation credentials. And as a party – a non-nuclear weapon state party of the NPT in good standing, and I think that’s a fundamental criteria. But beyond that, I don’t have any comments on your power plans.

MR. DALTON: Sir.


Q: (Inaudible.) It wasn’t too long ago we had an event here on Scotland’s possible succession from the U.K., with their nuclear weapons all being in Scotland, the problem that would be for the U.K. in that unlikely event it happened. So my question is would the U.S. welcome the U.K. leaving the nuclear club and joining the non-nuclear nations?

[01:01:33] MS. BURK: London? (Laughter.) Let me just say, and then I would kick it to

London. Is there Josh there? You know, listen, the United States and the United Kingdom are the closest allies. And I – you know, I’m – I – I’m not going to answer that question. (Laughter.) But –

MR. DALTON: What was it you were saying, Susan, about not wanting to get in

trouble towards the end of your – MS. BURK: Yeah, towards the end of my career. No, I can’t answer that question.

And you know, I would just say that our relationship is broad and deep on all issues, including these. And they’ve been an incredible and essential partner certainly in this NPT business. I have to say, my British colleagues have just been – have been rocks in all this, and rock stars, too. You can pass that – pass that along. (Laughter.)

MR. DALTON: Sir. Q: Thank you. George Dragnich (sp) with Northcourt Limited, which is a new

nuclear energy insurance firm out of London. The question I have is on reprocessing of nuclear fuel. From a(n) environmental perspective – and we’re talking civil uses – it’s very attractive because it dramatically reduces the amount of waste at the end when it can’t be processed anymore. But of course, the problem as I think everybody here knows is that at every step in the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel, you bring it closer to weapons-grade plutonium. And so the NPT restrictions have meant that the United States does not reprocess.

The problem, of course, is that everyone else does. And our interlocutors in London

would know that the U.K. is one of the global leaders. In fact, all of the nuclear fuel used and reprocessed in Japan originates in the U.K. so that the severe restrictions that President Jimmy Carter imposed in the 1970s are very basically null and void because it has no effect globally because everybody else reprocesses. And I know that the U.S. position is evolving on this; there is a review of this. I wonder if you might address that, Ambassador Burk? Thank you.

[01:03:41] MS. BURK: Well, I’m not going to address the review, but I would – I would kind

of question your assertion that “everyone else does.” I’m not so sure that’s true. And I – there may be others in the room that are more expert than –

Q: (Off mic) – large players.


MS. BURK: Yeah, well, I – you know, I think you said at the – Q: (Off mic.) MS. BURK: Yeah, well, you said at the beginning, you know, reprocessing is one of

those technologies that – you know, I always get a little itchy when I hear people say that enrichment and reprocessing are not sensitive technologies. I’m not a physicist, but I do know that the end product of those processes is material that could be used for peaceful purposes or nonpeaceful purposes, and so it makes sense to have some controls over them.

I’m not really familiar with the review on this issue. But I just – I – even the big

players, that in itself does not translate into everyone else does it. And I do think that, you know, as we talk about multilateralizing the fuel cycle in Vienna, which is what we’re engaged in – it’s a really interesting idea that some of us and some of my colleagues here – Carl and Dean Rusk and others – go back – this goes back to the ’70s. It wasn’t – it wasn’t time then. But now we’re talking about trying to multilateralize and internationalize these kinds of activities. And that’s being done for economic reasons but also for nonproliferation reasons. So –

[01:05:01] MR. DALTON: Tristan. Q: Good morning, Ambassador. Tristan Volpe, George Washington University.

I’d like to stick with the fuel cycle for a second. I think as the current dynamics in the Middle East demonstrate, the spread of latent nuclear technology, specifically the nuclear fuel cycle, generates a severe challenge for the nonproliferation regime. What concrete steps can we take today to strengthen the NPG – NPT regime to deal with this very tricky issue? Thank you.

MS. BURK: Well, I think what we’re – you know, again, I’ll go back to one of the

initiatives now that has gained traction in Vienna is the idea of multilateralizing the fuel cycle for exactly that reason and also for the economics of this. I think, you know, these are national, you know, decisions to pursue these activities. But if there could be a viable alternative, instead of, you know, creating your own fuel cycle, to find viable economic alternatives to that, that would be the way to go.

[01:06:04] The other thing is I’m not a technical person and I’m not a fuel cycle person,

although I do know the back end from the front end. In all of this discussion – and I – when I first came back in 2009 to look at this, I was reading through all the reports and that kind of thing – nowhere is there any acknowledgement of the challenges of dealing with the back end of the fuel cycle. Everybody’s talking about the sexy front end of enrichment reprocessing. Now again, I’m not the – I’m not the scientist, but, you know, I know that at the end, you know, you got – you got a big problem.


And we have that in our country as well. We don’t know what to do with spent fuel and waste and that sort of thing. And I would just say, as a nontechnical person looking at this, I think they’re missing a big piece of this and that they need to look at the whole thing. I had the occasion to be at a dinner with Secretary Chu – I’m not dropping names, but it was pretty cool – and this issue came up. This was in Vienna. And this issue came up about the back end. You know, and I – he made a comment: Yeah, well, we can tell them about the back end.

[01:07:05] So I do think as we talk about this, again, some of this – these discussions – and this

is Susan Burk saying – we’re talking about these at this sort of high political level. We need to bring it down to ground and turn them over – you know, don’t do this at home, leave this to the experts, let the experts talk about some of these things. So I know it’s political. I mean, I’m not dismissing that. But then I think at some point you got to bring it down to ground and figure out what are we doing with this. And that’s the one thing I – when I look at the enrichment reprocessing debate, I’m concerned that there is not – doesn’t seem to be much attention being given to after you build all this stuff, what do you do with all the stuff that pops out at the other end that you can’t use? And I’m not sure reprocessing is the only answer to that. So I leave it to other people much more informed than I am on that.

[01:07:50] MR. DALTON: Other questions here in Washington? I had a follow up question, Susan. Do you like to wager? Do you like to bet? MS. BURK: No. I just say, if I were a betting person, I would bet. But no, I don’t. MR. DALTON: So if you were a betting person – (laughter) – MS. BURK: Yeah. MR. DALTON: -- fast-forwarding to 2015, you know, coming out of the 2010

review conference where – MS. BURK: Yeah. MR. DALTON: -- things really sort of came down to the last day. And we weren’t

sure whether there would be a final document or not. In the end, there was. MS. BURK: Yeah. MR. DALTON: You know, how do you feel about this review cycle going forward?

Do you think that in 2015 there will be a final document? What do you think that document might say?


MS. BURK: OK. I wouldn’t even say if I were a betting person, I think that – and I’m not the only one that has this view – I think 2015 is more of a challenge than 2010, OK, and for these reasons. If you’re following on the heels of a conference that is widely seen as not being very successful, to be charitable, then you can say you can only go up. So that coming into this, I’d look back, and as I talked to my foreign partners and got their perspective on it, I thought, OK, we can only go up. And in fact, we did. But now having achieved, you know, a pretty decent outcome, you know, with consensus and had a very good discussion and created a mood that was very collaborative and overcome some tough issues that had not been resolved in the past, we’re – the bar is higher. So we’re going to have to jump higher in 2015. So that’s one big challenge.

Beyond that, there are – there are a number of things that are, you know, kind of

percolating or not – or maybe they’re boiling, and we don’t know what the punch line is. And so it’s hard to – and I – and I wouldn’t even begin to predict. So I think we have to watch all the things that are going on, these developments that could impact in various ways. But I’m really focused on taking it one meeting at a time, you know, building on the result. I am a firm believer that if – we need to engage consistently and regularly with our foreign partners. We need to keep these lines of communication open. And we need to have real conversations because we are not going to be able to deliver a result on our own. The P-5 aren’t going to be able to deliver it on our (sic) own. We have to do this as a group.

[01:10:20] And I think that the more we – the more we encourage our partners to see this as a

collective effort in which we are all stakeholders, and it’s not up to one state or group of states to sort of do this, we all have a responsibility – I’ll share my bumper sticker, I should make T-shirts. You know, I’ve been talking about shared ownership of the treaty, shared responsibility for the treaty and shared accountability.

Now if – clearly for the U.S. and the nuclear weapon states, we are responsible for

making progress on nuclear disarmament because we are the possessors of nuclear weapons. President Obama is committed to doing that. But all the other states have responsibilities too, and they also have ownership of this treaty.

[01:11:02] So if we could just kind of change the way we approach this, and not seeing it as a

zero-sum game or it’s – you know, it’s up to a certain group or so forth and get more of a collaborative approach to this that carries over into 2015, I think we’ll have a much better shot of producing a result then that will reinforce the treaty and the regime and take us, you know, down the road to the next step so that we can make more progress – and in all pillars, on disarmament, on nonproliferation and on peaceful uses. So that’s my hope.

MR. DALTON: So you mentioned there’s a shared responsibility. I think – and you

also – in your remarks you suggested some statistics that there was a lot more participation from NGOs and particularly, you know, younger analysts and so forth who are becoming more interested in these issues at the 2010 Review Conference. You know, what can groups


like Carnegie, like some of the other civil society organizations that are here do to help with this sort of shared responsibility part going forward?

[01:12:01] MR. BURK: Great question. I think the role of civil society and NGOs and groups

of young people and others are critically important. You know, I’ve been in public service for 36 years, and I see that as serving the public. And if we’re not serving civil society and being responsive to NGOs – and as Daryl knows and others, you know, when the NGOs are on your side, they can be a tremendous force multiplier. So – and I’ve had the good fortune of working on a couple of NPT review conferences where that’s been the case.

I think it is important. I think Carnegie and other groups, you can do this kind of

thing where you bring people together, ask the tough questions. I mean, I have my notes here. You know, if we don’t have good answers, if the government folks who are doing this stuff don’t have good answers, let us know. Sometimes questions get raised that we haven’t thought about. We can go back and think about it.

So I think by facilitating the dialogue between the government officials who have to

go off and represent governments and make decisions that bind governments and the public, the civil society and the informed NGOs and so forth, you know, we have a better partnership there. So I would just say, continue to do this.

And I – again, I think getting information out about these issues – on all the issues;

not just NPT but the others – so that there is a forum to inform people who want to be informed about these issues is critically important. I think involvement on these issues – and I feel that as long as I’ve been in this business working on these issues, we don’t have a natural constituency for our issues.

Everybody here and in London is seized with these issues and, you know, believes

they’re important, but I think in terms of the national discourse these kinds of issues are sort of niche issues and they’re not issues that, you know, dominate the news cycle. And so it makes it harder to – sometimes to move forward when you don’t have a natural constituency. So you have to be that, and help us get the message out and get the support we need to move forward on all of these agenda items.

[01:14:00] MR. DALTON: You mentioned your record of public service. In our “quadrennial

silly season” – that’s the presidential election process here – I think public service bureaucrats are often denigrated. You know, advice for younger folks who are entering this field, involved with groups like INENS or the PONI process here in D.C., on how to formulate a career on these issues. You’ve had a number of different experiences with ACDA, with the State Department, with the Defense Department. You know, how did you think about your career and, you know, your reflections on it?

MS. BURK: Well, looking back, I – (chuckles) – I never would have imagined today

– or 36 years ago where I would be here now, today. So it sort of has unfolded in ways, and


it hasn’t been very calculated, so sometimes things just happen. I do think, you know, government service I think is terribly important. It is hard to get into government service, and it’s going to become harder as, you know, the government is reduced.

[01:15:04] And I – you know, as many of us in the room who have been in government, you

know, we kind of get used to be maligned as lazy bureaucrats. I know – you know, that we’re not. But I think it is – it is very important to look – to look at it as a career. And I found a quote recently, and this was more relevant to me in my last – or two positions ago. And it was by a career civil servant who said they saw the role of the career, you know, seniors to speak truth to power and to be the continuity and to provide the advice as the political people came in.

I’m in a – I’m in a presidential appointment right now, which I have to say I would

never have imagined I would have been in. But throughout my career, it’s – the role that we play as the career bureaucrats in terms of being the ones there who sort of know where the bodies are buried, can provide the advice. Your leaders may not take that advice, but your responsibility is to give them the best advice. And I think that’s an important role that we play, and I think it has to continue to be played. And there’s a real need for some continuity. Sometimes knowing a little history is not a bad thing.

MR. DALTON: So we’ll look forward to your book on where all the dead bodies

are buried. (Laughter.) Meena, any last questions or comments from London? MS. SINGELEE: Yes, we’ve got a few – yeah, Jenny (sp), do you want to – Q: Sure. Ambassador Burk, this is Jenny again (sp). MS. BURK: Yeah. Q: Just while we have you, if you have any advice on how to prevent frustrating

procedural delays in adopting an agenda at the PrepCom, so as not to repeat the 2007 NPT PrepCom delays.

[01:16:48] MS. BURK: Well, what – for our part, what we did when we saw the agenda was I

went back to Washington and said this looks good. It allows us – it covers everything we’re interested in. We shouldn’t make any changes. And so that’s our position. We’ll see if others will take that position as well. I think the chairman has done a very good job in laying out an agenda that is clean and comprehensive, and laying out a timetable for the PrepCom that provides an opportunity for everyone to talk about everything. And at least for our part, the United States has – is not prepared to niggle over words when we – when we’re quite confident that we have a vehicle to discuss all of the issues that we care about at that meeting.


And in some meetings that I’ve been in overseas, I get the sense that this may be the attitude of the vast majority of NPT parties, that they are not at all interested about a big procedural flap. I’m not sure that view is shared by everyone, but we’ll know when we get to Vienna. But for our part, we’re ready to just get – you know, get this adopted and move on and lets start talking about the substance and what we need to do to take this forward. And I think that’s probably the British view, as well.

[01:18:12] MR. DALTON: So is there a question here? Yeah. Q: Hi. This is Josey Ballenger, from the U.S. Government Accountability Office. I

appreciate your comments about lazy bureaucrats, just to start out with. (Laughter.) MS. BURK: We’re not lazy. See these bags under my eyes? Q: That’s right. (Laughter.) You talked a lot about the need for NPT countries to

step up their efforts regarding noncompliance. And you briefly touched on U.S. support to IAEA and its safeguards program. I’m wondering if you can talk a little bit more about the specific areas where you think IAEA has a bigger role to play, where it could possibly build up some expertise or resources to address safeguards, and what steps IAEA’s already taking, how U.S. is supporting that and so on.

MS. BURK: Gosh, well I think one of the things that the IAEA did in 2000 was its

members negotiated the Additional Protocol, which was a response to what they learned in Iraq. And you know, interestingly enough, the Additional Protocol was adopted unanimously by the IAEA membership. And now the goal is to get all the states to, you know, negotiate an additional protocol for themselves and bring it into force. So that’s a big issue.

[01:19:42] There is working going on in the IAEA, looking at safeguards. I think the IAEA is

continually looking at ways of making sure that the safeguards are as comprehensive but as economical as possible, and efficient. But I can’t really speak to the specific issues. I’m not – I’m not – I know that there are efforts underway; the U.S. government is involved with its experts and its various folks. I know we have people from our DOE labs that participate in this as experts. But I can’t speak to the specific issues because I’m not familiar enough with all the details.

You know, we’re a huge supporter of the IAEA. I think, you know, in international

organizations it’s – you know, in the old – at least in the old days, the IAEA and NATO were the two – the two international organizations that the U.S., you know, sees as essential for its national security. So we are very supportive of the program.

Carl (sp) two-finger? (Chuckles.)


Q: I do a lot of work with the IAEA so I would just like to make a comment. I think one areas that the agency is moving into that could be extremely important is dealing with illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, dual-use items and the like. They maintain what’s called an illicit trafficking database. It’s an imperfect instrument right now because, of course, transferring sensitive information to a multilateral organization always raises certain policy issues.

But I think with the additional protocol and the reporting requirements under that,

the agency is acquiring a great deal of information about what countries are doing. And so I think the illicit trafficking area is one that the agency could really expand its work in and should be supported by the United States.

MS. BURK: Yeah. Thanks for mentioning that. I – that didn’t come immediately

to mind, but I know that that is a – that’s a big issue, that and nuclear safety and other issues. Particularly as more and more countries move into the area of nuclear energy and other sorts of things, these kinds of programs are going to be critically important to ensure that all of this is viable.

MR. DALTON: Sir, in the back. [01:21:52] Q: Ms. Burk, I concern myself with the building of the natural constituency for

these issues. Beyond the level of Carnegie, Brookings, the major think tanks here in the city and elsewhere, there is a lower level of community-based organizations that need to know what their interests are in these matters. And I’m concerned that beyond my participation, my peers and colleagues don’t know enough about this issue and how we can best engage beyond the level of the established NGOs.

MS. BURK: And who are you and what is your organization? Q: I’m the Washington representative for Mayors for Peace. MS. BURK: OK. Q: And I was at the NPT in 2010. And this is a big issue for me and some of my

colleagues, but it’s hard to get it out. MS. BURK: Yeah. Well, thank you for coming today and for raising that issue. I

mean, that’s exactly the point – it is hard to get it out. I – you know, I’ve had – I’ve had the great pleasure of being invited to speak, you know, at world affairs councils. I went to Alaska, to Anchorage and Juno, and Milwaukee, and I spoke to a group here. And you know, I think Margo here is the head of our strategic communications office. Since she’s come on board, they’ve been working very hard to try to get people out and do that. I think that’s the one way to do it, is to look for opportunities for speakers to get out.

[01:23:28]


You know, there are other things too, with Margo – I mean, you know, people could write op-eds and that sort of thing. But – and I’ve seen in the past where U.N. associations or Mayors for Peace or others could sponsor – I mean, you could always sponsor some sort of event, you know, with people and come to Washington or, you know, elsewhere and try to get a speaker to come and speak to the group. I don’t know any other better way to do that. You know, and there’s – because there’s a lot of good news out there too. I think what people see is the bad news and it gets, you know, funneled through in certain ways.

But getting out that information – you’ve got to have people that are interested in

hearing the information, and I don’t think there would be any difficulty in getting informed U.S. officials to come and speak to groups. It’s – I – you know, I love that. I particularly love it when it’s college campuses and things like that. The fact that anybody’s interested in hearing about this is great.

So you know, you’re putting your finger on a really important point. And I did

mention that as well, it’s been something I’ve been very keenly aware of for many years, that this is one of those issues that – you know, a congressman is not going to say, oh, I better vote for the CTBT of I won’t be re-elected. OK? So I – I’ll stop there. (Laughter.)

[01:24:42] MR. DALTON: London, any further questions? MS. SINGELEE: We’ve got one final question. Chris (sp) – Q: OK. Chris Holmes (sp), Kings College, London. This question actually relates

back to the fuel cycle discussion you were having in Washington a little bit earlier. I’ve got quite a specific question regarding the 123 agreements between the United States and South Korea, which is under discussion at the moment.

The South Koreans trusted in a future fuel cycle, including false reactors and power

processing to get their energy security needs and sort of waste storage issues. I just wanted to ask how this is progressing on the U.S. end and what you thought their prospects were as a multilateral facility in South Korea on power processing.

MS. BURK: I’m not sure I heard the question. MR. DALTON: So the question was about whether in the U.S.-South Korea 123

whether to deal with South Korea’s interest in power processing or fast reactors or other sort of, you know, newer fuel cycle technologies, or whether a multilateral facility might be imagined.

[01:25:40] MS. BURK: Yeah. You know, I’m not going to comment on that agreement

because I – on the content of that. It’s a – it’s an ongoing negotiation and I’m – and I frankly am not entirely certain. But I do think that is a negotiation that’s going on right now, and all of these issues are certainly, you know, on the table. But I can’t provide any answer


on how it is – both because I don’t know, but I think even if I knew I probably couldn’t. So –

MR. DALTON: Good. Any last questions here? Well, Meena, do you want to have

the final word from London? MS. SINGELEE: Sure. It’s just to say thank you, really, for hosting the event and

for moderating, and to Ambassador Burk for coming to the event today and providing some remarks to the U.S. audience and to the audience in London here, as well.

Just a quick follow-up about what we’re doing here in London, we’ll be publishing a

brief about our discussion here, which will reflect some of the recommendations that we will put forward from the event for the PrepCom and beyond. And that will be on the website next week. So those of you who are interested in D.C., please have a look at our website next week.

[01:26:52] And the – and as always we look forward to future engagement with Carnegie, with

State. And that we’re hoping to be at – (inaudible) – (Prague ?) conference in June. We’ll be working with Erin (sp) as well to see if we can be there. And I also just want to say thank you to our members. I know there’s quite a few who are attending the event in D.C. today. So we’re glad that they’re participating. And then finally, just to say thank you to Carnegie for hosting and for Toby for the excellent moderation.

MS. BURK: Can I? And, Meena, can I just say, we’ll look forward to seeing you in

Vienna. And I know that there is an afternoon that will be in the PrepCom that’s going to be devoted to presentations by NGOs. I don’t know whether you’ll be speaking, but we’ll look forward to doing that. And I think engagement with NGOs – our delegation was very engaged at the review conference and they are all ready to interact with you when we’re in Vienna. So come find us; let us know where you are. And maybe we can go out for a beer. (Chuckles.)

[01:27:50] MS. SINGELEE: Absolutely. Looking forward to it. And we’re also hosting two

events during the week. One is on strengthening interagency cooperation between the IAEA and the CTBT, which will be in the second week of the PrepCom. And following up in the afternoon that same day we’re hosting another event on the status of the implementation of the Treaty of Pelindaba, and it’s got the commissioner for – the (African ?) Commission, who will be speaking there as well. So we look forward to the U.S. delegates being there as well.

MS. BURK: Yeah, well, we’ll look forward to being ther

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