Strengthening the National Cash Transfer Programme in ...

Strengthening the National Cash Transfer Programme in Malawi: The role of Civil Society OrganisationsCONSOLIDATED RESEARCH REPORTInstitute for Policy Research & Social EmpowermentStoP aIdS now!

March 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 7

ACRONYMS 8

SECTION A - BACKGROUND 10

1.1 PovertyandVulnerabilityinMalawi 12

1.2 TheRoadtoSocialProtectioninMalawi 12

1.2.1 TheMalawiSocialCashTransferScheme 13

1.2.2 StrengtheningtheSCTSchemethroughTheSTOPAIDSNOW!Project 15

SECTION B - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 18

2.1 MethodologyfortheBaseline 20

2.1.1 Datacollection

2.1.2 Samplingmethod

2.1.3 Dataanalysis

2.2 MethodologyfortheActionResearch 21

2.2.1 Datacollection

2.2.2 Samplingmethod

2.2.3 Dataanalysis

2.3 MethodologyfortheLinkages’Assessment 22

2.3.1 Datacollectiontechniques

2.3.2 Dataprocessingandinterpretation

SECTION C - PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 26

3.1 KeyParametersoftheCashTransferSchemeinChitipadistrict 28

3.2 KeyInstitutionalChallengesandSolutions 30

i. HumanresourcecapacitychallengesoftheDistrictAssembly 30

ii. Challengeofsustainabilityoffinancialresources 30

iii. Challengeoflowertargetingpercentageandcut-offpoint 31

iv. LimitedinstitutionalizedlinkagesbetweentheSocialCash

TransferSchemeandothersocialprotectioninstruments 31

v. Thechallengeof(re-)targetingrelocatedbeneficiaries 32

vi. Challengesindefiningahouseholdandhouseholdheads 33

vii. Exclusionofhomelessorphansandothervulnerablechildren 34

viii. Challengeofpoliticalinterferenceatcommunitylevel 34

3.3 KeyAdvocacyChallenges 34

i. RelationofCivilSocietyOrganisationswithGovernment 35

ii. GovernmentconsiderationofCSOproposals 35

iii. Structureofthepolicyprocess 35

iv. Theroleofthepoliticaleconomy 35

3.4 CivilSocietyOptionsforChange 36

SECTION D - ADVOCAY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 40

Appendix1: ListofRespondents

(KeyinformantInterviewsforBaseline&linkagesstudies) 42

Appendix2: InterviewGuideatDistrictLevel(Linkages) 43

Appendix3: InterviewGuideAtCommunityLevel 45

Appendix4: InterviewGuideForGovernmentOfficialAtDistrictLevel(Baseline) 47

Appendix5: InterviewGuideForCSO/NGOAtDistrictLevel(Baseline) 48

Appendix6: GuidelineforSearchConference 50

Appendix7: THEFGDPROCESS 52

Appendix8: ProfileofPartnersinvolvedinthisproject 53

COLOFON 56

Table of Contents

2 ConSoLIdatEd RESEaRCH REPoRt STOP AIDS NOW! 3

Theoutcomesoftheprocesseshavebeenvery

encouragingwiththepartnershipmakinginroads

intowhatwasinitiallyseenasano-gozonefornon

governmentalinstitutions.TheGovernmenthas

takenintoconsiderationsomesignificantpolicy

positionswhilecompromisingonsome.This

subsequentlyoffersfreshchallengesforthepart-

nershiptoensurethatprogressthathasbeenmade

thusfarissustainedwhilestrategizingtoovercome

challengesforfuturepolicyadvocacywithparticu-

larreferencetotheMalawiSocialCashTransfer

Programme.

WhiletheSocialCashTransferSchemecontinues

tobearobservableadvantagesintermsofimproving

healthofbeneficiaries,improvingfoodsecurity,

increasingschoolenrollmentratesandreducing

childlabour,ithasalsoenhancedproductivity

ofbeneficiaryhouseholdsandcommunities,e.g.by

accumulationofproductiveassetsandlivestock.

Ontheotherhand,justlikeanyotherpublic

initiativetheMalawiSocialCashTransferScheme

standstofacechallengesinitsexecutionowedto

anumberofinternalandexternalfactors.Tothis

end,thisoneyearprojecthasuncoveredseveral

challengesintheSocialCashTransferScheme.But

asactionresearchentailslearningthroughdoing,

throughtheprocessofquarterlySearchConfer-

ences,theresearchprocessidentifiedsolutionsto

someoftheidentifiedbottleneckssomeofwhich

havesuccessfullybeenexecuted.

InordertomitigatetheeconomicandpsychosocialimpactofHIVandAIDS related illness and death of Orphans and Vulnerable Children(OVC)andtheircaretakers,fourMalawianregisterednongovernmentalorganisations,NOVOC,CEYCA,YONECOandIPRSE, inpartnershipwiththeChitipaDistrictAssemblyhavebeencoordinatingtheirefforts,withsupportfromSTOPAIDSNOW!Netherlandsintheimplementationofaone year project aimed at strengthening the Social Cash Transferprogramme in Malawi through linking and learning.The Institute forPolicyResearchandSocialEmpowerment(IPRSE)wasthereforechargedwiththeresponsibilityofleadingtheprocessesofconductingabaselinesurvey and implementing an action research to attain participatoryproblemidentificationinthescheme,participatorysolutiondevelopmentandparticipatoryimpactassessmentofkeystakeholdersintheprocessfromboththestateandnon-staterealmsofthesociety.

Executive summary

The following were the key challenges uncovered in

the research and the subsequent resolutions made:

1. humanresourcecapacitychallengesofthe

DistrictAssembly;resolutionsmadewerea.o.

a.trainingofextensionworkers,b.takingthe

districtteamonalearningtriptoothermore

experienceddistricts,andc.takingtheSocial

WelfareofficeronastudyvisittoBangladesh;

2. challengeofsustainabilityoffinancialresources;

advocacyforgovernmenttocontributetothe

schemeledtoanallocationofMK50million

budgetarysupporttotheSocialCashTransfer

Scheme;

3. challengeoflowertargetingpercentageand

cut-offpointinChitipadistrict,thennational

averages;governmentwillstartin2011with

proportionaltargeting;

4. limitedinstitutionalizedlinkagesbetweenthe

SocialCashTransferSchemeandothersocial

protectioninstrumentsinthecountry;this

remainsanadvocacychallenge;

5. thechallengeof(re-)targetingrelocated

beneficiaries;acasetorevisitthegraduation

processhasbeensubmitted;

6. challengesindefiningahouseholdandhouse-

holdheads;districtregardsguardianwho

residespermanentlyinthehouseholdasthe

headandthusrecipientofthecashtransfer,

irrespectiveofsexandage;

7. exclusionofhomelessorphansandother

vulnerablechildren;needforre-integration

programmeidentified;

8. challengeofpoliticalinterferenceatcommunity

level;amoreobjectiveselectingmethodandcase

managementframeworkareunderconsideration.

Sufficetoindicate,thisprogresshasbeenmade

possiblewiththeimprovingworkingrelationship

betweenthecivilsocietycommunitypartytothe

projectandtheGovernmentatboththedistrict

andnationallevel.Itishopedthatsucharapport

willcontinueparticularlyinthedevelopment

andimplementationoftheSocialCashTransfer

Programmein2011andbeyond.

Despite the changes that have been made within

the project life span, the research has the following

recommendations for further improvement of the

Social Cash Transfer Scheme:

1. thegovernmentshouldadopttheNational

SocialSupportPolicytoprovidealegitimate

frameworkforbudgetsupporttotheSocial

CashTransferScheme;

2. governmentshouldfurtherbuildthecapacityof

allimplementingbodiesatdistrictandnational

level;

3. deliberatemeasuresshouldbeputinplace

tolinktheSocialCashTransferbeneficiariesto

othersocialprotectioninterventions;

4. regularmonitoringandevaluationoftheSocial

CashTransferSchemeshouldbeputinplace;

5. targetedpercentagehastobedeterminedper

district;

6. amountstransferredneedtoberevisitedinline

withthechangingeconomiclandscape.


Acknowledgements

IPRSEparticularlyextendsitsthankfulnessto

STOPAIDSNOW!Netherlands;fortheirincalculable

financialandtechnicalsupportwithoutwhichthis

projectwouldnothaveevenstartedoff.Doortje

‘tHarthasbeenparticularlysupportiveduringthe

lifespanoftheproject;weextendourappreciation

toherandtheSTOPAIDSNOW!teaminNetherlands.

NetworkofOrphansandOtherVulnerableChildren

(NOVOC);whohavebeencoordinatingthework,

haveparticularlybeenawesome.ToCuthbert

NyirendaandJoshuaAinabyona,wordsfailus.

YONECOandCEYCAhaveinparticularcompleted

theformula,givingIPRSEtheadvantageofworking

inanorganizedpartnershipaswestrivetodefine

thepolicylandscapetotheadvantageofthe

disadvantagedinChitipaandtherestofMalawi.

Let’scarryonwiththegoodjobwehavestarted.

Boardmembersandresearchfellowsofthe

Institute,notablyAssociateProfessorBlessings

Chinsinga,Mr.HenryChingaipe,Mr.HappyKayuni

andMr.GeorgeVilili,needtobehailedfortheir

timelyandunrelentingtechnicalandadministra-

tiveguidance.TheBudgetandFinanceCommittee

oftheNationalAssembly,NationalAssembly

Secretariat,UNICEF,TheNationalWorkingGroup

onSocialCashTransfers,

TheSocialProtectionDepartmentintheMinistry

ofDevelopmentPlanningandCorporation,

TheNationalSocialCashTransferSecretariatin

theMinistryofGenderandChildWelfareandthe

NationalSocialProtectionTechnicalCommittee

alsodeserveoursincerethankfulnessfortheir

technicalsupportaswellascooperationinthis

verynoblemission.

Inaveryspecialway,gratitudeshouldgotothe

ChitipaDistrictCouncilwhohaveprovedtobea

veryreliablepartnerduringexecutionoftheproject.

Withouttheircollaborationtheprojectwouldhave

lackedaninstitutionalgroundtostandon.

Policymakingisapoliticalprocess,inwhichnoone

isanislandbutjustpartofthewholesystem.IPRSE

couldnothavethereforecomethusfarwithoutthe

supportandassistanceofsuchfellowpolicy

stakeholdersandentrepreneursandotheralliestoo

numeroustomention.Weacknowledgeyourmoral,

technicalaswellasmaterialsupport.

Kondwani Chikadza, IPRSE

Inthechallengingexpeditionthathasbroughtthisprojectintoconclusion,IPRSE has enjoyed enormous material, moral as well as technicalsupportandassistancefromdifferentorganisationsandindividualstoanextentthatwecannotexclusivelyclaimthesuccessthattheprojectisinthecourseofbearing.TheInstitutewouldthereforeliketoexpressitsprofoundgratitudeandthanksgivingtoallpartnersandallieswhocontinuetorendertheirpricelesssupporttowardsthiscause.


CBO Community Based Organization

CEYCA Centre for Youth and Children’s Affairs

CSO Civil Society Organisation

CSPC Community Social Protection Committee

DTT District Training Team

FGD Focus Group Discussion

IPRSE Institute for Policy Research & Social Empowerment

MEGS Malawi Economic Growth Strategy

MGDS Malawi Growth & Development Strategy

MK Malawi Kwacha (currency)

MPRSP Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

MSCTS Malawi Social Cash Transfer Scheme

NGO Non Governmental Organization

NOVOC Network of Organisations for Vulnerable and Orphaned Children

NSNP National Safety Nets Program

NSNS National Safety Nets Strategy

SCT Social Cash Transfer

SCTS Social Cash Transfer Scheme

SPC Social Protection Committee

TA Traditional Authority

YONECO Youth Network and Counselling

Acronyms


Section a - Background

10 ConSoLIdatEd RESEaRCH REPoRt

1.1 Poverty and Vulnerability in Malawi

Fromtheearly1980sMalawihaswitnessedpoor

economicgrowthanddiminishinglivingstandards

ofherpopulace.Severalstudiespointtothefuel

crisisofthelate1970sandunfavourablepolicies

imposedondevelopingeconomies,particularly

StructuralAdjustmentProgrammesasadvocatedby

theInternationalMonetaryFundandtheWorld

Bank,ascausesofthepredicament.Adoptionof

thesepoliciesasaconditionalityforaccessing

foreignaidresultedintoremovalofagricultureinput

subsidies,increasingcostoflivingduetodevaluation

ofthedomesticcurrency,risingunemploymentrates

owedtoprivatizationandcommercializationofstate

entitiesandgenerallypoorservicedeliveryinkey

sectorssuchashealthandeducationduetothe

government’sinadequatecapacitytooperate

efficientlyintheneworder.

AstudycommissionedbytheGovernmentof

MalawiincollaborationwiththeUnitedNationsin

1998foundthat65%ofthecitizenrywasliving

belowthepovertyline,computedatUS$1perday.

Asimilarsurveyconductedin2005,indicatedthat

52%ofthepopulacewaslivingbelowthepoverty

line.Muchasatfacevaluethetwosurveysseemto

suggestthatprogresshadbeenmadeovertheyears,

aragingdebateinpolicycirclespointedtothefact

thatthemarginaldifferencemighthavebeen

promptedbythedifferencesinmethodologiesthat

wereusedduringthetwoIntegratedHousehold

Surveys.StatisticsindicatedthatMalawiremained

oneofthepoorestcountriesintheworlddespite

undergoingsignificanteconomicandpolitical

reforms.Thecountrywasassertedasoneofthe

poorestcountriesintheworldwhetherjudgedby

GrossNationalProduct(GNP)percapita,theUNDP’s

HumanDevelopmentIndexoritsHumanPoverty

Index.

Althoughthesituationhadbeenthatdevastating,

theGovernmentanditsdevelopmentpartnershad

timeandagainattemptedtoreducetheseverityand

depthofpovertyinthecountrybyimplementinga

numberofpro-poorpublicpoliciesandprogrammes.

Amongstthem,themostoutstandingonesincluded

Vision2020in1998,TheMalawiPovertyReduction

Strategywhichwaslaunchedin2001,andthe

nationalSafetyNetsProgrammelaunchedin2002.

Nevertheless,despiteimplementationofthe

aforementionedinitiatives,Malawianscontinueto

liveinpoverty.

1.2 the Road to Social Protection in Malawi

Astocktakeofinitiativesimplementedwiththe

primarygoalofreducingpovertyandvulnerabilityin

Malawi,uncoveredthatanumberoffactorscontrib-

utedtothepoorperformanceoftheaforementioned

policyinterventions.Amongstthecriticaloneswere

lackofcapacityoftheimplementingpartners

particularlygovernmentinstitutionsatthedistrict

andlowerlevels.Inaddition,severalstudiespointed

outtothefactthatmostofthesepolicieswere

imposedonthehostnationbydevelopment

partnersasapreconditiontoaccessforeignaid.

Thesepolicieswerethusadoptedwithaonesize

fitsallapproachastheywereimposedondifferent

developingcountriesregardlessoftheirdiverse

political,socialandeconomicbackgrounds.Thus

Malawiendedupadoptingandimplementing

policiesthatweredevelopedwithnocriticalreflec-

tiononthesocial,politicalandeconomiccontext

withinwhichtheyweretobeemployed.Thesaid

interventionsproveddoingtheeconomymoreharm

thangood,adevelopmentthatfurtherworsenedthe

livingstandardsofthepopulacedespiteGovern-

mentanddevelopmentpartnersinvestinghuge

sumsofmoniesintheimplementationofthesame.

AnInstitutionalcapacityassessmentofkeypolicy

implementinginstitutionsbyIPRSE(2005)1indicated

seriouspolicyknowledgegapsatdistrictassembly

level.Theassertionthatdistrictofficialswere

expectedtoimplementprogrammeswhoseobjec-

tivestheydidnotunderstandledtofailureofsuch

programmesinasfarasthequesttoreducepoverty

andvulnerabilityinthecountryisconcerned.More

tothis,Chinsinga(2004:4)2singledoutlackofone

policytobringaboutcoordinationamongstmultiple

stakeholdersintheimplementationofpoverty

reductioninitiativesasacriticalcontributortothe

failureofthesame.Asaresultpoliciesandpro-

grammeshavebeenimplementedinanadhocand

uncoordinatedmannerresultingintoduplicationof

effortsinsomeareaswhilesideliningothers.

Itwasthereforeagainstthisbackgroundthatthe

GovernmentofMalawiandotherstakeholders

agreedtosetinmotiontheprocessofdeveloping

thecountry’sfirsteverNationalSocialProtection

Policyaimedataddressingtheuncoveredproblems.

SocialProtectionandDisasterRiskReduction

thereforefeaturedasathemeonitsowninthe

MalawiGrowthandDevelopmentStrategy(MGDS),

thesuccessoroftheMalawiPovertyReduction

Strategy,andtherelatedDevelopmentAssistant

Strategy(DAS).Thegoalofthesocialprotection

chapterwithintheMGDSframeworkis“toimprove

thesocial-economicindicatorsforthemostvulner-

able”.Thissubsequentlyencompassestheexpecta-

tionofimprovedhealthandnutritionalstatusfor

childrenundertheageoffive,schoolagechildren,

orphans,pregnantandlactatingmothersaswellas

destitutefamilies(MGSD:2005).Inordertoprovide

commitmentandguidancefortheestablishmentof

meaningfulsocialprotectioninterventionsespecially

infamilieshostingOrphansandOtherVulnerable

Children,theNationalPlanofActionforOrphans

andotherVulnerableChildrenwasinstitutionalized

tobeimplementedbetween2005and2009.

1.2.1TheMalawiSocialCashTransferSchemeTheNationalSocialProtectionPolicy,whichhas

subsequentlybeenrenamedtoNationalSocial

SupportPolicy,proposesanumberofsocialprotection

instrumentsaimedatreducingpovertyandvulnera-

bilitytargetingrespectivecategoriesofthepoorand

vulnerableasperthefindingsofthe2005Integrated

HouseholdSurvey(IHS2).Muchassocialprotection

appearstobeanewconceptinMalawi,thefactis

thatseveralsocialprotectioninstrumentshavebeen

implementedinthecountrybyacrosssectionof

stakeholdersovertime.Nevertheless,therearesome

instrumentsthatarerelativelynewinMalawi’s

context,themostoutstandingonebeingsocialcash

transfers.Muchasdifferentstakeholderssuchas

ConcernWorldwidehadimplementedanemergency

socialcashtransferprojectinDowadistrictbefore

2005,theirgeographicalscopeandprojectduration

wassomehowlimited,notbefittingthedefinitionof

socialprotectionbutrathercreatingsafetynets.

Section a - Background


Assuch,itwasdeemedimperativetomeaningfully

assessthepracticabilityofimplementingsocialcash

transfersonawiderscaleinMalawi’sunique

socio-economiccontext.InApril2006,amethodol-

ogyforapilotcashtransferschemewastherefore

designedandtestedinMchinjidistrictthrough

operationalresearchandfromSeptemberonwards,

apilotsocialcashtransferschemehasbeenimple-

mentedandrolledouttosixotherdistrictsnamely,

Chitipa,Likoma,Salima,Mangochi,Machingaand

Phalombe.

In order for a household to qualify for the scheme

they have to meet two criteria:

a) Ultra-poor;thismeansthehouseholdsarethe

poorestofthepoorandarenotabletomeet

theirmosturgentbasicneeds(onlyonemeal

perday,notabletopurchaseessentialnon-food

itemslikesoap,clothing,schoolutensils,andno

valuableassets).

b) Labourconstrained;ahouseholdislabour

constrainedwhenithasnoablebodiedhouse-

holdmemberintheagegroup19to64whoisfit

forworkorwhenithasonehouseholdmember

intheagegroup19to64years,whoisfitfor

work,buthastocareformorethanthree

dependents.

The objectives of the scheme are to:

1. Reducepoverty,hungerandstarvationinall

householdslivinginthepilotareawhichare

ultrapoorandatthesametimelabourcon-

strained;

2. Increaseschoolenrolmentandattendanceof

childrenlivingintargetgrouphouseholdsand

investintheirhealthandnutritionstatus;

3. Generateinformationonthefeasibility,costsand

benefitsandonthepositiveandnegativeimpact

ofaSocialCashTransferSchemeasacomponent

ofasocialprotectionprogrammeforMalawi.

Sinceinceptionofthepilotscheme,therehavebeen

anumberofstudiesassessingstrengthsandweak-

nessesoftheschemeinabidtorealizetheafore-

mentionedgoals.RHVP3(2008)aswellasMillerC,

TsokaM,andReichertK(2008)4highlightseveral

institutionaldeficienciesatcentralgovernment,

districtassemblyandcommunitylevels.

Based on the Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot, the

following improvements have been observed as

advantages of the Social Cash Transfer Scheme5:

• Improvedhealthwithfewerreportedsicknesses

amongadultsandchildren;

• Greaterdemandforhealthcareforchildrenand

adultsandhigherhealthcareexpenditures

• Increasedexpenditureonchildren’sschooling

• Reductioninchildlabour;

• Significantaccumulationofhouseholdand

productiveassets,basicnecessitiesandlivestock

• Increasedagriculturalproductionwithgreater

foodstores;

• Improvedfoodsecurityincludinghigherfood

expenditures,fewermissedmeals,fewerdays

withoutadequatefood,andgreaterfood

diversity.

On the contrary, the following challenges have also

been uncovered by similar research such that they

must be addressed for effective execution of the

Social Cash Transfer Scheme6:

• Inadequateoversightbycentralministriesand

DistrictassembliesoftheSCTS,resultinginalack

ofaccountability;

• Skillandmanagementdeficitsatthedistrictlevel;

• Challengesinthefinancialmanagementsystem;

thetwomajorconcernsare:(1)delaysinmoving

moneyfromtheNationalAIDSCommission

(NAC)totheDistrictand(2)irregularitieswithin

accountingfilesandrecords.;

• Themechanismsneededtoidentifymeasure

andpreventfraud,errorsandcorruptionare

inadequate;

• TheDistrict’smonitoringofthefinancialsystem

andvillagelevelactivitieshavebeeninadequate;

• InstancesofcorruptionamongCommunity

SocialProtectionCommittees(CSPC),ratherthan

acorruptsystem(76%ofrecipientsarecorrectly

targeted);CSPCsarerarelymonitoredand,while

trainingofcommunityvolunteersisimproving,it

isstillinadequate;

• Thereareimportantlimitationstothecurrent

systemoftargetingandapprovals.Onecritical

limitationisthelackofinformationonthe

numberofhouseholdsinvillagesandthe

demographicandeconomiccharacteristicsof

thesehouseholds.

IPRSE(2007)7indicatesthatlackofformallyinstitution-

alizedsystemsofgrievancereportingmakesitdifficult

forthecommunitytochanneltheirobjectionsand

complaintstothedecisionmakers,resultinginprolon-

gationofmalpracticesandill-systemsinthescheme.

Assuch,muchasitneedstobeappreciatedthatthe

socialcashtransferschemecontinuestobear

positiveresultsonthelivesofbeneficiariesandtheir

societiesatlarge,someinstitutionalpracticespose

challengesinasfarasmaximumrealisationofset

goalsisconcerned.

1.2.2StrengtheningtheSCTSchemethroughtheSTOPAIDSNOW!ProjectInordertomitigatetheeconomicandpsychosocial

impactofHIVandAIDSrelatedillnessanddeathof

OVCandtheircaretakers,fourMalawianregistered

Non-GovernmentalOrganisations;NOVOC,CEYCA,

YONECOandIPRSE8inpartnershipwiththeChitipa

DistrictAssemblyhavebeencoordinatingtheir

efforts,withsupportfromSTOPAIDSNOW!inthe

implementationofaoneyearproject(2010)

aimedatstrengtheningtheSocialCashTransfer

programmethroughlinkingandlearning.

The project envisaged realization of the following

outcomes at the end of the year:

1. Improvedmanagementandimplementation

capacityofoneDistricttodeliversocialcash

transfersinordertoincreasetheproductive

capacityofpoorandvulnerablehouseholds

byDecember2010;


2. Improvednational,districtandcommunitylevel

commitmentandsupportfortheimplementa-

tionandscaleupoftheSocialProtectionPolicy

andSocialCashTransfersbyDecember2010;

3. ImprovedlinkagesbetweenSCTSbeneficiaries

andothersocialservices(psychosocialsupport,

microfinance,livestockproduction,educationand

healthservices)byDecember2010.

TheInstituteforPolicyResearchandSocialEmpower-

ment(IPRSE)waschargedwiththeresponsibilityof

leadingtheprocessesofconductingabaselinesurvey

andimplementinganactionresearchtoattain

participatoryproblemidentificationinthescheme,

participatorysolutiondevelopmentandparticipatory

impactassessmentofkeystakeholdersintheprocess

fromboththestateandnon-staterealmsofthe

society.Thisreportispresentingthefindingsofthis

researchprocess.

1IPRSE(2005)Public Policy Knowledge Gaps Study: A Report to Trocaire Ireland,Lilongwe,Malawi

2ChinsingaB(2004)Poverty and Vulnerability in Malawi,

APaperPresentedtoaDialoguerSessionforParliamentariansinMalawi;UniversityofMalawi;Zomba

3RHVPstandsforRegionalHungerandVulnerabilityProgrammeandisaDFIDfundedprogrammeaimedatreducing

hungerandvulnerabilityintheSADCregion

4MillerC,TsokaM,andReichertK(2008).Operations Report-External Evaluation of the Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot;

Lilongwe,Malawi

5WahengaBriefnumber18,June2009

6MillerC;TsokaM;andReichertK(2008).Operationsreport.ExternalEvaluationoftheMchinjiSocialCashTransferPilot.August2008

7IPRSE(2007)ReportonConsultativeProcessfundedbyDFIDandtheWorldBank“Integrating The Voice of People into The Malawi Social Protection Policy Process”;

Lilongwe,Malawi

8Seeappendix8foraprofileoftheinvolvedorganisations


Section B - Research Methodology

18 ConSoLIdatEd RESEaRCH REPoRt

2.1 Methodology for the Baseline

2.1.1DatacollectionThebaselinestudyusedbothsecondaryand

primarydata.Thesecondarysourcesof

dataincludedresearchreportsonpovertyand

vulnerabilityinChitipadistrict,foodsecurity,rural

livelihoodsandthosespecifictothecashtransfer

schemelikemonthlymonitoringreportsand

operationalmanuals.Primarydatawascollected

thoughin-depthinterviews9andfocusgroup

discussions.

Two approaches were used:

• ParticipatoryVulnerabilityAnalysiswhen

collectingdataatcommunitylevel.

• TheHouseholdEconomyApproachtofood

securityassessmentandvulnerability

analysisathouseholdlevel.

Thisisalivelihoodsbasedframeworkfor

analyzingthewaypeopleobtainaccessto

thingstheyneedtosurviveandprosper.

2.1.2Samplingmethod10Forthein-depthinterviewsandthefocusgroup

discussionsthesamplingmethodwasnon-probabili-

typurposivesampling.Thusinformationwassought

frompeoplethattheresearchteambelievedcould

providetherequiredinformation.

Atthedistrictlevel,keyinformantinterviewswere

conductedwithAssemblyofficialsandtheSocial

CashTransferSecretariat.Atthecommunitylevel,

focusgroupdiscussionswereconducted

andvulnerabilityconceptsweredefined,

povertycategoriesdescribedandthepoorest

familiesinthecommunitywereidentifiedand

mappedout.In-depthinterviewswerethen

conductedwithhouseholdrepresentatives.

Theselectionofthevillagesfromwhichdata

1. a baseline to gauge the state of the SCt Scheme in Chitipa;2. three search conferences as part of the action research;3. one assessment to gauge current and potential programmes to

which beneficiaries of the SCt Scheme can be linked to.

IPRSEhasalsoduringtheyearmadeapresentationofitsfindingstoacrosssectionofpolicystakeholdersatCapitalHotelinLilongwe,beforesubmit-tingtechnicalsubmissionstotheNationalSocialCashTransferTechnicalWorkingGroupforincorporationintothe2011SCTprogramme.Thissectionsectiongivesanaccountofthemethodologythatwasemployedinconductingthefivekeyactivitiesoftheresearch.

Section B - Research Methodology

AspartoftheresearchcomponentoftheprojectIPRSEhasduringtheyear2010carriedoutatotaloffiveactivities.Theseare:

wouldbecollected,wasguidedbytheDistrict

AssemblythroughtheSocialCashTransferdesk

officerwhoreportedtothemembersthat,SCTwas

beingimplementedintwoTraditionalAuthorities,

namely;TAMwaulambiaandTAKameme,withboth

havinghadtheprocessesoftargetingofbeneficia-

riesdone,butwithonlyT.AMwaulambiahaving

receivedthetransfers.Itwasthusunilaterallyagreed

that,bothTAsbereachedtohavecomparative

results.Avillageclusterwaschosenfromeachofthe

twoTAsandthirtysixhouseholdswereinterviewed

fromthecluster.

2.1.3DataanalysisThedatacollectedfromthereviewswasanalyzed

usingcontentanalysis.Theinformationwascatego-

rizedaccordingtothemajoremergingthemes.

Thedatafrominterviewsandfocusgroupdiscus-

sionswasprocessedusingInterpretationalAnalysis.

Thisinvolvedsegmentingthedata,developing

categories,codingthesegments,groupingthe

categoriesanddevelopingthemesfromthedata.

Thustheverbatimtranscriptsfromtheinterviews

wereanalyzedandthemesweredeveloped.This

methodwasoptedforbecausetheintrusiveunstruc-

turedinterviewsresultedininformationthatneeded

organization.

Then,alltheinformationwasplacedunderrelevant

themesandcodes.Finallyadiscussionoftheresults

wascarriedout.Thisinvolvedrelatingfindingsto

theobjectivesofthestudyaswellaspickingpeculiar

orextremecasesthatwerenotinitiallytargetedby

thestudy.

2.2 Methodology for the action Research

Theactionresearchemployedqualitativeapproach,

whichenablesinvestigationoftheinterplayof

valuesinasocialphenomenon.Thishastherefore

helpedtheresearchteamtounderstandwhatthe

keystakeholdersintheSocialCashTransferscheme

do,whytheydowhattheydoandthevalues

underlyingtheenvironmentinwhichtheyinteract.

2.2.1DatacollectionTheactionresearchemployedaholisticapproachto

problem-solving,ratherthanasinglemethodfor

collectingandanalyzingdata.Thesevariousmethods,

whicharegenerallycommontothequalitative

researchparadigm,included:in-depthinterviews,

reviewoforganizationaldocuments,participant

observationrecordings,andconductingsearch

conferences.Muchasthefirstthreetoolsformedthe

basisforprimarydatacollection,searchconferences

havebeenthemainformofthedatacollectionand

analysisexercisefortheresearch.

Thisisowedtoitsparticipatorynaturethatfits

rightlywithintheactionresearchconcept.

The Search Conference11

Ofallofthetoolsutilizedinactionresearch,theone

thathasbeendevelopedexclusivelytosuitthe

needsoftheactionresearchapproachisthatofthe

searchconference,initiallydevelopedbyEricTrist

andFredEmeryattheTavistockInstitutein1959.

Forthisparticularresearchproject,searchingwas

carriedoutinagroupoftherelevantstakeholdersat

thedistrictlevel.


interviewsmoreconversationalwhilestillstructured

andcontrolled.Theflexiblemannersinwhichthe

interviewswerecarriedoutallowsfortheintervie-

weestoraiseadditionalorcomplementaryissues.

Thereasonisthatthisinterviewtechniqueusesopen-

endedquestionsthatpermitunexpectedbut

relevantissuestobefollowedupwitheitheraddi-

tionalquestionsorsystematicprobing.Wherever

thishappened,thesebecameanintegralpartofthe

findings.

(b) Focus Group Discussions

Focusgroupdiscussions(FGDs)providedavery

powerfulmeansofelicitingin-depthviewsofthe

participantsontheresearchtopicespeciallyatthe

communitylevel.ThreeFGDswereheld,inKameme,

MisukuandNthalirewitheachFGDcomprising

sevenmen,sevenwomen,threeboysandthreegirls

drawnfrombeneficiaryandpotentialbeneficiary

householdsselectedbyrespectiveCommunitySocial

ProtectionCommittees.

Likewise,theFGDswerecarriedoutusingspecially

preparedchecklists15

thatweredevelopedonthe

basisoftheresearchquestion.Thesechecklistswere

usedtofacilitatethediscussionofpertinentissues

totheassignmentwhilebeingmindfulofthefact

thatthebasicoperativeruleforFGDsrequiresthat

facilitationshould,asmuchasitispractically

possible,bekeptattheminimum.TheFGDsgenerated

nuanced,open-mindedandsometimesunexpected

responsesunderlyingwhatparticipantsthinkbut

alsowhytheythinkthewaytheydo.

(c) Search Conferences16

Somelessonslearnedfromthesearchconferences

thathavebeenconductedinChitipaunderthesame

project,formedacriticalbenchmarkforunderstand-

ingsignificantfeaturesintermsofpolicylinkages

betweenbeneficiariesoftheSocialCashTransfer

Schemeandtheaforementionedprogrammes.

(d) Literature Review

LiteraturemainlysourcedfromtheDistrictWelfare

Officeprovedimportantinuncoveringactivitiesof

otheractorsinsectorsthatcanpotentiallybelinked

toSocialCashTransferbeneficiaries.

(e) Observations

Observationswereakeyqualitativedatacollection

instrument.Observationsprovidedtheopportunity

toobservetheimplementationapproachesand

differentmethodologiesusedbydifferentstakeholders;

theinteractionbetweenbeneficiariesandbenefactors;

thecommunicationdynamicsbetweenthetwoand

thequalityandquantityofgoodsandservicesused.

2.3.2DataProcessingandInterpretationSincethestudyemployedaqualitativeapproach,

theanalysisofthedatapredominantlyinvolved

categorisingissuesaccordingtotherecurrentthemes

thatemergedacrossthevariouslevelsofdata

collectionandsampledsites.

Thegrouphasbeenmeetingquarterlyundersocial

islandconditionsfor2-3days.Thecontenthasbeen

contributedentirelybythemembers,withthe

researchersworkingasfacilitatorsonly.Theprocess

involvedlistingitemsinthefirstinstancewithout

criticismintheplenarysessionwhichwerethen

displayedonflipchartsintheroom.Thematerial

wasthendiscussedingreaterdepthinsmallgroups

andthecompositepicturecheckedoutintheplenary

session.Thegroupthenexaminedthesettingofthe

SCTSchemeinChitipaagainstthiswiderback-

groundandthenproceededtoconstructingapicture

ofadesirablefutureofthecashtransferscheme.

2.2.2SamplingmethodThestudyhadthreesearchconferenceswiththe

sameparticipantspurposelyselectedbothatdistrict

andcommunitylevels.Theycomprisedofofficials

fromChitipaDistrictAssembly,CivilSociety,

CommunityBasedOrganisations,CommunitySocial

ProtectionCommitteesandrandomlyselected

beneficiariesoftheSocialCashTransferScheme

2.2.3DataanalysisThedatacollectedfromtheSearchConferences

wasprocessedusingInterpretationalAnalysis.

Thisinvolvedfragmentationofthedata,aswellas

developingcategories,codingthefragments,

groupingthecategoriesanddevelopingthemes

fromthedata.Thisdatawascategorizedduringthe

searchconference.Alltheinformationwasplaced

underrelevantthemesandcodes.Finallyadiscus-

sionoftheresultswascarriedout.Thisinvolved

relatingfindingstotheobjectivesofthestudyas

wellaspickingpeculiarorextremecasesthatwere

notinitiallytargetedbytheActionResearch.

2.3 Methodology for the Linkages’ assessment

2.3.1DatacollectiontechniquesThemaingoalofthisassessmentwastostrengthen

theSocialCashTransferProgrammesothatitshould

beresponsivetothecurrentsituationandthatwill

presentaneffectivewayofreinforcingpositive

changeinthesocio-economicdevelopmentofthe

country.Themajortaskwasthereforetoaccurately

assessthecurrentstatusoftheProgrammeand

discernthebarriers,constraints,andchallengesthat

areexperiencedintermsoflinkingbeneficiariesof

thesametoothersocialservices.Thiswillfacilitate

theeffectivedeliveryofanintegratedstrategy

forlongtermmanagementofpovertyreduction

programmesinthecountry.Theprincipaldata

collectiontechniquesthatwereusedarelistedbelow.

(a) Key Informant Interviews12

Keyinformantinterviewswerecarriedoutatdistrict

andcommunitylevels.Individualsidentifiedaskey

informantswereprojectedtohaveparticular

insightsonissuesbeingresearchedandinvestigated.

TheseindividualsincludedtheDistrictCommissioner

forChitipa,DirectorofPlanningandDevelopment,

DistrictSocialWelfareOfficer,CommunitySocial

ProtectionCommitteeOfficials,ExtensionWorkers,

thecivilsociety,faithcommunityandrandomly

selectedbeneficiariesandpotentialbeneficiariesof

theSocialCashTransferProgramme13

.

Theseinterviewswerecarriedoutonthebasisof

speciallypreparedguidelines14

tailoredaccording

tothevariouslevelsatwhichtheassessmentwas

carriedout.Theseguideswerelargelyusedas

promptersinaflexiblefashionsoastomakethe


9SeeAppendices4and5foraninterviewguideatdistrictlevel

10SeeAppendix1foradetailedlistofrespondents

11SeeAppendix6foradetailedguidelineofasearchconferenceprocess

12Appendix3

13SeeAppendix1foradetailedlistofrespondents

14Appendices2and3

15SeeAppendix7

16Ibid


Section C - Presentation anddiscussion of findings


Section C - Presentation anddiscussion of findings

3.1 Key Parameters of the Cash transfer Scheme in Chitipa district

InChitipatheobjectivesoftheSCTSchemearethe

sameasintheotherdistrictsandalsothetargeted

householdsarethesame:theultra-poorand/or

labourconstrainedhouseholds.(see1.2.1)In2010

theSCTSchemetargeted2999householdsinChitipa

district.

AsperthemodusoperandioftheMalawiSocial

CashTransferSchemethemaininstitutionplayinga

keyroleintheChitipaSocialCashTransferSchemeis

theDistrictAssembly,workingincollaborationwith

CommunitySocialProtectionCommittees.

Atthedistrictlevel,thereisaSocialProtection

Committee(SPC)whichisasub-committeeofthe

DistrictExecutiveCommittee(DEC).Thecommittee

iscomposedofrepresentativesfromthedirectorates

ofhealth,education,socialwelfare,agricultureand

finance.Themembershipalsoincludesnon-state

actors:WorldVisionInternational,WorldRelief,

NationalInitiativeforCivicEducationandChildren

withHopeandDestiny.TheSPCisheadedbythe

DirectorofPlanningandDevelopmentandthemain

tasksarethesupervisionoftheSCTSSecretariatand

approval/disapprovalofapplicants.Ideally,theSPC

seekstoensurethattheschemeiscoordinatedwith

othersocialprotectioninstrumentsintheprogramme

soastorealisethemuchneededlinkagesof

beneficiariesoftheschemetootherprogrammes

likefreeprimaryschooleducation,psycho-social

support,schoolfeedingprogrammes,schoolbursaries,

agricultureinputsubsidyprogramme,micro-credit

loansetc.

TheSecretariatoftheSPCistheSocialCashTransfer

SchemeSecretariatwhichisestablishedinthe

DepartmentofSocialWelfare.TheSecretariathas

fourofficers:theDistrictSocialWelfareOfficer,two

AssistantSocialWelfareOfficersandaSocialWelfare

Assistant.Theteamworksincloseliaisonwiththe

DistrictTrainingTeam(DTT)thathasamembership

ofsixtrainers,allofthemmen.

TheDTTismainlyresponsiblefortraining

communities,monitoringimplementationofthe

schemeandtrainingCommunitySocialProtection

Committees(CSPCs)whichareelectedbythe

communitiestoserveasvolunteersresponsiblefor

overseeingimplementationoftheschemeatthe

Asindicated,IPRSEhasbeencarryingoutanactionresearchexerciseforaperiodofoneyearaimedatbuildingevidenceontheperformanceofoneofthemostnovelandpoliticallycontentioussocialprotectioninstrumentsbeingimplementedinthecountry;theCashTransferScheme.Theobjec-tiveoftheresearchcomponentoftheprojectwastogenerateknowledgeandevidenceonthecurrentstateoftheSchemeandtoidentifyinstitu-tionalgapsthatmightformthebasisforCSOadvocacyinitiativesintheprocess.TheresearchalsosoughttoassesspotentialprogrammeswherebeneficiariesoftheSocialCashTransferschemecanbelinkedto.

communitylevel.TheCSPCtakesaleadingrolein

targetingofbeneficiariesandmonitoringchangesin

householdstructurethatmightaffecteligibilityof

therespectivehouseholdtocontinuebeingonthe

scheme.Infigure1theflowchartoftheTargeting,

ApprovalandPaymentprocessispresented,inwhich

youcanclearlyseetheresponsibilitiesofthevarious

implementors.

Figure 1: Flow Chart of the Targeting, Approval and Payment Process

VDCCommunityselectCSPCmembersfromamongst

allvillages

CSPCmeetingmakesalistofultrapoorandlabourconstrainthouseholds

CSPCmembersvisitalllistedhouseholdsandfillin

Form1

HeadmanfromamongstthemanyintheVDCsignsthatthe

informationonForm1iscorrect

CSPCmeetingrankshouseholdsbasedon

Form1

Communitymeetingdiscussesranking

SCTSSecretariatrecommendsapprovalor

disapproval

SPSC,assistedbyrespectiveCSPC,approvesanddisapproves

SCTSSecretariatinformsdirectorofFinanceandCSPCon

approvalordisapproval

CSPCinformsapplicantsonapprovalanddisapproval

Beneficiariesaccessmonthlytransferpayments

atapaypoint


inbuildingtheadministrativecapacityofthe

implementingstakeholdersparticularlytheDistrict

SocialWelfareOfficewhichactsastheDistrictSocial

CashTransferSecretariat.Thisoverdependenceon

donorfundshasputintoquestionthesustainability

oftheSchemeespeciallyifandwhenthedonor

organisationsarefacedwithnegativeexternalities.

Atthetimeofthestudy,beneficiarieshadstayedfor

ayearwithoutreceivingtheirduesastheGlobal

FundhadnotdisbursedtheirallocationtoNACdue

toamongotherfactorstheglobalfinancialcrisis.In

theabsenceofGovernmentbudgetarysupport

towardstheschemethismeantnoshouldertolean

onforthebeneficiarieswhoareonthescheme.

Aspartoftheresearchcomponentoftheproject,the

projectpartnershipembarkedonanadvocacy

campaignurgingtheGovernmenttostartcontribut-

ingtowardsfundingtheSCTProgrammeinamore

meaningfulway.Consequentlyinthe2010/2011

NationalBudget,theGovernmenthasforthefirst

timeallocatedMK50millionbudgetarysupport

towardsimplementationofthescheme.Muchasat

firstvaluethisamountmightlooklittle,itshouldbe

takenasanimportantsteptowardstheright

directionconsideringthepoliticaleconomyofSocial

CashTransfersamongstkeypolicystakeholders.

Moresignificantly,thiscallforamoresustainable

fundingmodalityhaspromptedtheGovernmentto

startredesigningtheoriginalfundingsystem

towardsabasketone,wherebyallkeystakeholders,

includingtheGovernment,willbeputtingtheir

moniestogetherforexecutionoftheScheme.

Onasimilarnote,throughthesearchconference

processitwasurgedthattheDistrictAssembly

shouldnotlimititsoptionstotraditionaldonorsof

theSCTschemeinsolicitingresources.Consequently,

theAssemblyhasmanagedtosolicitavehicleforthe

implementationoftheScheme,raisingthenumber

fromonevehicleatthebeginningoftheprojectto

two,leavingadeficitofone.Thiswillcertainly

contributetowardsaquickerdisbursementrate.

iii. Challenge of lower targeting percentage and cut-off point

Thestudyuncoveredthatthetargetedpopulation

fortheschemeisguidedbythefindingsofthe2005

IntegratedHouseholdSurvey(IHS2)thatasserted

that10%oftheMalawipopulationwasultra-poor.

Assuch,theSocialCashTransferSchemeisdesigned

insuchawaythatittargets10%ofthepopulationof

eachgeographicalareawheretheSchemeisbeing

piloted.Consequently,theSchemetargets10%of

thehouseholdsineachclusterinthedistrict.

Consequently,districtswithlowerpovertylevelslike

Chitipahaveinclusionerrorswhilethosewithhigher

povertylevelslikeMangochihaveexclusionerrors.

AspartoftechnicalsubmissionstotheGovernment18,

theGovernmenthasindicatedinitsprogramme

proposaltotheGermanGovernmentthatitwill

duringtheyear2011startemployingproportional

targeting;wherebyeachdistrictwillbetargeting

beneficiariesaccordingtothedistrict’sultrapoverty

levelsasoutlinedbytheIntegratedHousehold

Surveynumberthree(HIS3),whosefindingswillbe

readybythen.

iv. Limited institutionalized linkages between the Social Cash Transfer Scheme and other social protection instruments

Justlikeanyothersocialprotectioninstrument,Social

CashTransfers,single-handedly,arenotadequateto

fullyaddresstheplightofthepoorandvulnerable.

The following are the levels of the transfers in

Malawi at the time of the study:

➜ 1 person household:MK600/app.4USD

➜ 2 person household:MK1,000/approx.USD7

➜ 3 person household:MK1,400/approx.USD10

➜ 4 person (and more) household:MK1,800/

approx.USD13

Forprimaryschoolgoingchildrenhouseholdsreceive

abonusofMK200,andforsecondaryschoolgoing

childrenMK400.

3.2 Key Institutional Challenges and Solutions

Onthebasisoftheaforementionedmethodology

andstudyobjectives,thesearchconferenceprocess

uncoveredthefollowingchallengesandmade

subsequentresolutionscommensuratewithavail-

ableresourcestotacklethesame.Someofthe

resolutionshavebeenexecutedwhileothersareyet

tobeaddressed.

i. Human resource capacity challenges of the District Assembly

Thestudyuncoveredthattherearesignificant

humanresourcecapacitygapsatdifferentlevelsof

thescheme.BytheendofthedaytheDistrict

Assemblyfindsitdifficulttoaccomplishtheirtasks

efficiently.Forinstance,inChitipadisbursementof

fundstakestheAssemblyeightdayswhichisavery

slowrateconsideringthefactthattheSchemewas

atthattimeoperationalinonlyoneofthefive

TraditionalAuthorities.Thequestionthatwasasked

wastherefore,“howlongwouldittaketheAssembly

todeliverthecashoncetheSchemerollsouttoall

theTraditionalAuthorities?”TheSocialCashTransfer

Secretariat,whichisessentiallytheDistrictSocial

WelfareOffice,isalsonotsparedofthehuman

resourcecapacitygaps.Thisismoreaggravatedby

thefactthatasthedistrictsocialwelfareofficethey

haveotherresponsibilitiesoutsidetheSCTFrame-

work.Aspartoftheactionresearchentailsdefining

solutionstoproblemsandputtingthemintoeffect,

anumberofresolutionsweremadetoreduce

ineffectivenesscausedbythisproblem.

Theseincluded:

1. Trainingofextensionworkers;

2. TakingtheChitipaDistrictteamtoothermore

experienceddistrictstolearnhowtheircol-

leaguesareimplementingthesameScheme

withsimilarhumanresourcechallenges;

3. SupportingtheDistrictSocialWelfareOfficer,

whoseofficeisthesecretariatfortheSCT

Schemeatdistrictlevel,onastudyvisitto

Bangladesh.

Asawayofensuringefficiency,theprojectalso

supportedtheprocurementofacomputerinthe

district’sDirectorateofFinanceanddesignofan

automateddatabasetoimprovethesituationas

originallyfileswerekeptandaccessedmanually.

ii. Challenge of sustainability of financial resources

ThestudyuncoveredthattheSchemeisprimarily

externallyfunded,lestformonthlyremuneration

packagesforgovernmentofficialsonthepublic

payroll.Otherwisethecashthatisactually

disbursedcomesasagrantfromtheGlobalFund

throughtheNationalAIDSCommission17.

Inaddition,UNICEFhasplayedaninvaluablerole


neighbouringoneandtheremainingsixwere

removedforvariousreasonsrevolvingaround

eligibilitycriteria.

Theproblemwithrelocationtoanotherclusteris

thatthehouseholdcannotbeonthebeneficiarylist

intheirnewclusterupuntilretargetinghasbeen

done.However,sincetheSchemestartedinMchinji

in2005,retargetinghasnotbeendonedespitethe

provisiontoretargetaftereverytwoyears.Thusthe

implicationisthatonceahouseholdrelocatesto

anotherclusterforwhatevervalidorinvalidreasons

theymighthave,chancesoffindingtheirwayback

ontotheSchemeareessentiallynonexistent.Acase

torevisitthegraduationprocesseshassubsequently

beensubmittedtotheNationalSocialCashTransfer

TechnicalWorkingGroupandstakeholdersareyetto

meettodiscussthesame.Itishopedthatpolicy

alternativestothiseffectwillbeputforwardfora

fairgraduationandremovalsystem.

vi. Challenges in defining a household and household heads

Thestudyuncoveredthatmuchasthesimple

definitionofahouseholdreferstopeopleliving

underoneroofandeatinginthathouse,thecasein

Chitipaisdifferentduetohigherlevelsofpolygamy

andstrongerbondsinextendedfamily.

Consequentlythereishaphazardandmorechaotic

movementsofindividualsfromonehouseto

anothertherebymakingitdifficultforonetodefine

thehouseholdintermsofnumbersasotherscan

moveinoroutofthesameanytime.Similarly,as

menwithmorethanonewifetrailfromonehouse

totheothertheconceptoffamilyheadbecomes

somewhatknottytooperationalise;ifamanleavesa

houseforsixmonthsdoeshecontinuebeingthe

headofthathouseholdorthewomanwhois

headingittakesover?Thisquestionbecomestricky

particularlyinapatrimonialsocietylikeChitipaas

themanisexpectedtocontinuebeingregardedas

thefamilyheadthustheonetobegettingthecash

transfersonbehalfofthehouseholdevenifheis

notphysicallylivinginthathousehold.Thussuch

challengesputintoquestionwhetherthecash

transferswillindeedreachtheintendedbeneficiaries

andhavetheintendedimpactonthesocioeconomic

statusoftheintendedhousehold.Tothisendthe

districthasresolvedtoregardtheguardianwho

permanentlyresidesinthetargetedhouseholdas

therecipientirrespectiveofsexandage.

vii. Exclusion of homeless orphans and other vulnerable children

SincetheSchemetargetshouseholdsasdefinedby

thecommunities,destitutechildren,roaming

prostitutes,homelessOVCwhoarenotlivingin

establishedhouseholdsareleftoutsidethetargeting

band.Theimplicationisthereforethatthesechildren

arelefttocontinuelivinginsuchconditionswithno

hopeofgraduatingandbeingsteeredintothe

mainstreamsociety.Iftheschemewasextendedto

suchchildrenthefirsttwoobjectivesofreducing

ultrapoverty,hungerandstarvationaswellasto

increaseschoolenrolmentandattendancewould

effectivelybeaccomplished.

However,withthecurrenttargetinglimitations,that

segmentofthesocietyisdeniedtheopportunityto

becomeproductivemembersofthesocietysomeday.

Withgrowinganimositytowardsintroductionof

“fosterhomes”inthecountryadvocacypositionthat

cameoutoftenisthattheGovernmentshould

embarkonamassivere-integrationprogrammeto

Tothisend,itisrecommendedthatimplementa-

tionofanysocialcashtransferprogrammeshould

beadequatelylinkedtoothersocialprotection

instruments.

Thestudyuncoveredthatthereistheaspirationto

drawpolicylinkagesintheimplementationofsocial

protectioninstrumentsinMalawiasenvisagedin

theMalawiNationalSocialSupportPolicy.

Theexpectationisthereforethatthereshouldbe

formallyinstitutionalizedmeasuresontheground

aimedatlinkingbeneficiariesoftheSocialCash

transferSchemetoothersocialprotectioninstru-

mentsbeingimplementedbyadiversesetof

stakeholdersinthedistrict.However,thestudy

uncoveredthattherearenodeliberatemeasures

whatsoeverlinkingbeneficiariesoftheSocialCash

TransferSchemetoothersocialprotection

programmesbeingimplementedinthedistrict.

Ascommonwisdomwoulddictate,forafamilythat

isdeemedlabourconstrainedbecauseofadepen-

dencyratiohigherthan1:3,itwouldbeappropriate

tosupportthecashtransferswithsomeproductivity

enhancinginstrumentssuchastheFarmInput

SubsidyProgramme(FISP),IncomeGeneratingPublic

WorksProgrammes,MicroCreditLoansetc.soas

togivethehouseholdsomefurtherpushoutofthe

ultra-povertyband.Similarly,itwouldevenmake

moresensetoprioritizesecondaryschoolgoing

childrenfrombeneficiaryultra-poorhouseholds

whenitcomestograntingeducationbursariesat

thedistrictlevelsoastomeaningfullycontribute

towardsobjectivenumbertwoofthecashtransfer

schemewhichaimsatincreasingschoolenrolment

andattendanceofchildrenfromultra-poorfamilies.

However,itwasuncoveredthatthereisnoformally

orinformallyinstitutionalizedpolicyatdistrictlevel

toprovideforsuchlinkagessotomeaningfully

contributetowardsreductionofpovertyandincreasing

schoolenrolmentandattendance.Actuallywhat

cameoutclearlywasthatbeneficiariesoftheSocial

CashTransferSchemearesidelinedbythecommuni-

tieswhentargetingisdoneforothersocialprotection

programmestoensure“equitablesharingofthe

publiccake”.Hastentosay,someofthebeneficiaries

havefoundthemselvessimultaneouslybenefiting

fromotherprogrammes,thoughnotbydesign.For

instance,acrosssectionofrespondentsinterviewed

athouseholdlevelindicatedthattheyarealso

beneficiariesoftheFarmInputSubsidyProgramme.

However,thishappenscoincidentallysuchthatitis

actuallyimpossibletogetstaticstothatrespect.

MuchastheDistricthasintervenedforinclusionof

SCTbeneficiariesduringtargetingofFarmInputs

SubsidyProgramme,andhassubmittedafunding

proposaltoUNICEFforapsychosocialsupport

programme,neithertheGovernmentnortheCivil

Societycommunityhasmadeconcretecommitment

atnationalandsub-nationallevelstoinstitutionalize

suchlinkages.Thisconsequentlycontinuestoremain

anadvocacychallengeforpolicystakeholders

withtheaspirationtoeffectivelyaddress

theplightofthepoorandvulnerableinChitipa

districtandbeyond.

v. The challenge of (re-)targeting relocated beneficiaries

Thestudyuncoveredthatsinceinceptionofthe

SchemeinChitipadistrict23householdshave

beenremovedfromthebeneficiarylistforvarious

reasons.Outofthe23,15wereonemember

householdswhichceasedtoexistupondeath.

Twohadrelocatedfromoneclustertothe


i. Relation of Civil Society Organisations with Government

ItwasfoundoutthattheCivilSocietyOrganisations’

accesstoinformationfromtheGovernmentis

usuallythroughinformalsourcesbecauseitis

difficulttogetinformationthroughtheformal

channels.Thestudyalsofoundthatsomequotasin

thepublicservicedonotwanttodiscloseany

informationregardingGovernmentexpenditureand

theprogramsbeingimplemented.Theabsenceof

access-to-informationlawaggravatesthesituation.

Consequently,thecivilsocietyreliesoninformal

channelswhichareoftentimesnotveryreliable.

Duringthecourseoftheproject,itwastherefore

resolvedtostrengthentheworkingrelationshipwith

Governmentbyamongstotherwaysstrengthening

thestrategicpartnershipwiththeMinistryof

WomenandChildWelfareandtheMinistryof

DevelopmentPlanningandCooperationwhose

officialsbecamepartandparceloftheproject.As

such,theseofficialsprovidednecessaryinformation

andclarificationsonpertinentissuesoftheSocial

CashTransferSchemeduringtheresearchprocess.In

turnweopenlysharedallinformationgatheredin

thisprojectwiththerelevantGovernmentbodies.

ii. Government consideration of CSO Proposals

Thestudyuncoveredthatthereisusuallyresistance

onthepartoftheGovernmenttoconsideradvocacy

proposalsfromthecivilsocietybecauseitdoesnot

wanttobetoldanythingtodowithpolicyissues,

accountability,transparencyandhowpublicresourc-

esareexpended.Thegovernmenttoleratesthecivil

societyorganisationsbutdoesnotreallyconsider

theirrecommendationsorpolicyoptions.The

Governmentreasonsthatthisisthecasebecause

theCSOsareafterservingtheirownagendas.

Reasonablepartnershipswithrelevantgovernment

officialsanddepartmentshaveprovedvitaland

possibletowardspolicyagendasettingduringthe

courseofimplementingthisproject,withreasonable

compromisesbeingmadeattimes.

iii. Structure of the policy processTheprocedureofpolicymakinginMalawiposes

anotherchallengetoparticipationofCSOsinpolicy

formulation.Bothcivilsocietyorganisationsandg

overnmentdepartmentsrevealthatmostpolicies

thatareimplementedatdistrictlevelareformulated

atthenationallevelwithlimitedornoinput

fromthedistricts.Assuch,CSOcapabilitytochange

thepolicylandscapeisonlymanifestedduring

implementationofthesame.Assuchtheextentto

whichCSOsatdistrictlevelcaninfluenceGovernment

decisionsistoagreaterextentlimitedtoresource

allocationwithinthepraxisofexistingpolicies.

iv. The role of the political economyThisisthemostcriticalchallengetopolicyadvocacy

withinthepraxisoftheMalawiSocialCashTransfer

Scheme.ConsideringthefactthattheSCTScheme

hasgreatlybeendonordependent,whilebeing

implementedwithintheframeworkofthe

Government’sdecentralizationsystem,twopolicy

stakeholderstendtohaveanundueedgeoverothers

indecisionmaking,i.e.theGovernmentandthe

donors.Thebiggestchallengehasthereforebeen

thattheagendasofthetwohavemainlybeendriven

byrigidideologiesratherthanneedsontheground.

Thecivilsocietyhashadto,andcontinuesto,sweat

inordertoputtheirpolicypositionsacross

incorporatethesewanderingOVCbackintothe

mainstreamsocietysothattheyalsostandto

benefitwhattheircolleaguesintraditionalhouse-

holdsaregetting.Whilethepracticabilityofsuchan

ambitiousinterventionremainsdebatable,the

positionofmostrespondentswasthat“itisbetter,

inMalawi’sruralcontext,totakethechildbackto

themainstreamcommunityratherthanputting

themininstitutionsorlettingthemwanderonthe

streetsastheynormallyrunawayfromtheirhouse-

holdsmainlyduetopoverty”19.

viii. Challenge of political interference at community level

Thestudyuncoveredthatmuchasthereareagreed

uponproceduresgoverningtargetinganddeliveryof

cashtransfers,theimplementingpartnersparticularly

atclusterlevelhaveoccasionallybeensubjectedto

unduepoliticalpressuresfromtraditionalleaders.

Oftentimestraditionalleadersexertpressureson

CommunitySocialProtectionCommitteestoinclude

beneficiariesonthelisteveniftheyarenoteligible

aspersetdownguidelines.Muchasthismight

soundsimple,itshouldbeunderstoodthatthesaid

committeeisacompositionofindividualswhoare

subjectsofthesametraditionalleaders.Assuch,if

thereareanyfearsorfeelingsofhatredbeing

propagated,suchoccurrences,particularlyifleft

unchecked,standtomakethelivesofthe

committeesunnecessarilytoodifficultconsidering

thepowerandroleoftraditionalleadersinvillage

politics.

TothiseffecttheNationalSocialCashTransfer

TechnicalWorkingGroupisconsideringaproxy

meanstestingmethodthatismoreobjectivethan

thecurrentone.Withaproxymeanstestingmethod,

qualificationwillbestrictlystatisticalwithno

subjectivejudgmentemployed.Thiswilltherefore

worktowardslesseningmalpracticesinthetargeting

process.However,thechallengeliesinprocesses

aftertargetinghasalreadybeendoneasregards

whatneedstobeputinplacetoensurethatbenefi-

ciariesindeedgetandwhollyenjoytheirentitlements

withoutanypersongettingbacktothemtogeta

shareofthesame.Tothiseffect,thepartnershipis

advocatingforagrievancereportingsystemandcase

managementframework.Accordingtothe2011

annualwork-planfortheSCTProgramme,the

Governmentwillbelookingatoptionsofinstitutio-

nalizingthetwo,inthequesttopromotedemocratic

governanceintheexecutionoftheScheme.

3.3 Key advocacy Challenges

Asactionresearchentailslearningthroughdoing,

oneoftheimplicationswasacontinuousadvocacy

withtheGovernmentatdistrictandnationallevels.

Since,theGovernmentatdistrictlevelwaspartof

thesearchconferences,i.e.datacollectionand

analysis,itwasveryeasytogetbuyinfromthem.

However,forchangestobeeffected,policyfeatures

atnationallevelneedtobechangesandthedistrict

assemblylacksthemandatetodoso.Assuch,policy

advocacywasequallyanimportantcomponentof

thisprojectaimedatstrengtheningtheMalawi

SocialcashTransferScheme.Thisexperiencehas

unravelledanumberofchallengeswhichmustbe

consideredwhendesigningadvocacyandcommu-

nicationstrategiesforfutureengagementbythe

civilsocietycommunity.Keytothesechallenges

arethefollowing;


thepolicytable.Thishasbeenmanifestedinsome

situationswherebyprofessionalcivilservantshave

rejectedpolicyrecommendationsbecausetheywere

presentedinthepresenceofdonors,politiciansand

themedia,onlytocomebacklateraskingforasilent

incorporationofthesame,includingincorporation

ofsomecivilsocietyorganisationsintokeydecision

makingforumsdraftingtheterrainoftheMalawi

SocialCashtransferProgramme.

Thechallengeisthereforetounderstandtheincen-

tives,relationships,distributionandcontestationof

powerbetweendifferentpolicystakeholdersand

entrepreneursandanalyzetheextenttowhichsuch

factorsimpactonoutcomesoftheMalawiSocial

CashTransferScheme.

3.4 Civil society options for change

Muchaspoliticalfactorshavetimeandagain

dictatedrestraintsontheextenttowhichCSOs

participateinpolicyprocesses,thereisevidencethat

partoftheresponsibilitylieswithCSOsthemselves.

Oftentimes,individualCSOsappeartoworkin

isolationleadingintopoorcoordinationofeffortsas

wellasgerminationofquestionsregardingtheir

legitimacyandaccountability.Anotherproblemis

thatCSOshavedemonstratedlimitedunderstanding

ofpolicyprocesses,adevelopmentthatmakesit

difficultforthemtoinfluencepolicyoutcomes.

Ontheotherhand,itissufficetoindicatethatsome

CSOshaveawiderepositoryofknowledgeincluding

realexpertiseinanissueareaoranunderstandingof

theconcernsmostimportanttotheirconstituents.

However,theextenttowhichtheirpolicyproposals

areevidencebasedremainsamyth;adevelopment

thatmakesitdifficultforpolicymakerstoacceptthe

saidproposals.Onanothernote,evenforthefew

CSOsthatengageinrigorousanalysisonpolicy

issuesandcomeupwithrealisticpolicyalternatives,

policymakershaveoftentimesbemoanedtheir

inabilitytomaketheirfindingsaccessible,digestible

andintimeforpolicydiscussions.Withinthis

context,akeychallengeforCSOsisoneofbetter

communication.Overcomingtheaforementioned

challengesisnoteasy.

CSOsneedtounderstandapolicycontext;access

andgeneraterigorousevidence;packageitfor

differentaudiences;engagewiththepolicyprocess;

andnetworkandcommunicatewithawiderangeof

partners.Forthistobeattainedthereisneedfor

financialinvestmentsandawiderangeoftechnical

capacities.Otherwise,smallerandindigenousCSOs

riskbeingcrowdedoutbytheGovernmentand

donoragencies,giventheirresourcedifferences.

17AtthetimeofthestudytheSCTSchemewasfundedbytheGlobalFundthroughtheNationalAIDSCommission.

From2011onwardstheSCTSchemewillbefundedbytheGermanGovernemntandfundswillgodirectlytothe

implementingMinistriesoftheSCTScheme,theMinistriesofGender,ChildrenandCommunityDevelopmentaswellasMinistryofDevelopmentalPlanningandCooperation.

18AsasittingmemberoftheNationalSocialCashTransferTechnicalWorkingGroup,

IPRSEtooktheprivilegeofsubmittingsomepositionstothegroupforconsiderationduring

theregularmeetingsheldintheyear2010

19PopularresponsephrasedinthewordsofMr.JWafwaaSCTbeneficiaryinKamemearea;Chitipadistrict


Section d - AdvocacyRecommendations and Conclusion


andwillbeofficiallyincorporatedinJune2011after

areviewoftheScheme,whilesomecontinuetobe

advocacychallengesforCSOsinMalawitoaddress.

Havingopenedthepolicywindowformeaningful

civilsocietyparticipationatthenationallevel,the

SCTprogrammemustinstitutionalizesimilar

windowsatthedistrictandlowerlevels.

Themostchallengingtaskattheendoftheproject

inChitipaistoensurethatcitizenparticipation

manifestsitselfinthedevelopmentoftheNational

SocialProtectionProgrammeaswellasintheimple-

mentationoftheseveralsocialprotectioninstruments

currentlybeingexecutedatthedistrictlevel.

Thedeparturefromelitistapproachestopolicy

formulationintothejointformulationofthe

NationalSocialProtectionPolicydemonstratesthat

itispossibletoadvanceadherencetoprinciplesof

goodgovernanceinMalawi’spublicpolicyprocesses.

Ofsignificantimportanceistheneedtocarryonwith

thiscommendablejobintheprocessofdeveloping

theNationalSocialProtectionProgrammethathas

justtakenoff,allthewaythroughtotheimplemen-

tationofthesame.Ontheotherhand,acritical

challengeremainstoensurethatpoliticalpledges

arematchedwithactions,byensuringthatthe

NationalSocialSupportPolicyisadoptedbyCabinet

andsubsequentlyenactedbyParliament.

ThegoodworkingrelationshipthattheChitipa

projecthaswitnessedblossomingshouldtherefore

betakenasawindowofopportunityforthecivil

societycommunitytoadvocateforevidence-based

positionsinourcommonaspirationtoaddressthe

plightofthepoorandthevulnerableinMalawi’s

largersociety.

1.TheGovernmentshouldfacilitatetheadoption

oftheNationalSocialSupportPolicytoprovidea

legitimateframeworkforputtingitscontribution

towardstheSocialCashTransferSchemethrough

thenationalbudgettoensureGovernmentowner-

ship,predictabilityandsustainabilityoftheScheme.

2.Governmentshouldstartmakingstrides

towardsfundingtheSCTProgrammethroughthe

nationalbudget,aspartofthedevelopmentbudget

whileawaitingenactmentofthe

NationalSocialProtectionPolicy.

3. Governmentshouldseriouslyembarkonahuman

resourcecapacitybuildinginitiativeforalldepart-

mentsanddirectoratesatthedistrictlevel,consider-

ingthemulti-facetednatureoftheproblemsbeing

addressedbytheScheme.

4.TheDistrictAssemblies,throughDistrictExecutive

CommitteesandtheDistrictSocialProtection

Committeesshouldputinplacedeliberatemeasures

thatlinkbeneficiariesoftheSCTSchemetoother

socialprotectioninterventionsatthedistrictlevel

likeschoolbursaries,psychosocialsupport,

AgricultureInputSubsidiesetc.sothattheymaxi-

mizethebenefitsofthecash.

5. TheGovernmentshouldsupportregularmonitoring

andevaluationoftheSchemeandreportsshouldbe

preparedandsubmittedaccordingtoplani.e.

monthly,quarterlyandannually.

6.Householdsheadedbyschoolgoingchildrenaged

upto25yearsmustbeconsideredlabourcon-

strainedduringtargeting.

7.Targetedpercentageineachdistrictmustbecom-

mensuratewiththeultrapoorpercentagepopulation

ofthatdistrict;notthecurrentuniform10%across

thecountry.

8.Transferredamounts,alongwithlunchallowances

forthetrainers,mustberevisitedinlinewiththe

changingeconomiclandscape.Asindicatedearlier

on,someoftheserecommendationshavealready

foundtheirwayintotheSCTScheme,

Section d - AdvocacyRecommendations and Conclusion

Basedontheoutcomeofthesearchconferencesdoneinthedistrict,IPRSEhaspresentedanumberofpolicyrecommendationstoboththeNationalSocialProtectionTechnicalCommitteeaswellastotheNationalAssembly,particularly Members of Parliament. To this end, the following are therecommendationsthathavebeensubmitted:


INSTITUTIONChitipaDistrictAssembly

ChitipaDistrictAssembly



RomanCatholicChurch

MalawiEconomicJusticeNetwork-ChitipaChapter

WorldVision–ChitipaDistrictOffice

TovwiraneYouthOrganization

NOVOC-Chitipadistrict

CatholicDevelopmentCommission(CADECOM)

NationalInitiativeforCivicEducation(NICE)

CommunitySocialProtectionCommittee-Misuku

CommunitySocialProtectionCommittee-Nthalire

CommunitySocialProtectionCommittee-Kameme

12SCTbeneficiaries

12SCTbeneficiaries

12SCTbeneficiaries

INTERVIEW GUIDE AT DISTRICT LEVELFor DC, DPD, DSWO and DSPC

NameofInterviewee: Position:

DateofInterview:

Brieflyexplainthepurposeandobjectivesofthisinterview,withintheframeworkoftheprojectaimed

atstrengtheningtheSCTSchemewithsupportfromSTOPAIDSNOW!Netherlands.

Section A: Programme Background1. WhenwastheSocialCashTransferSchemeintroducedinthedistrict?

2. Howhasthebeneficiarypopulationimproved/depreciatedovertime?

3. WhataretheobservablebenefitsoftheSchemesofar?(probeforasmanyaspossible)

•

•

•

•

•

4. MayyoukindlyoutlineobjectivesoftheSCTScheme?

5. Whatareotherobservableareasofimpactbeyondthestipulatedobjectives?

•

•

•

POSITIONDistrictCommissioner

DirectorofPlanningandDevelopment

DirectorofFinance

DistrictSocialWelfareOfficer

Priest

DistrictCoordinator

DistrictCoordinator

Director

Districtcoordinator

Districtdeskofficer

DistrictCoordinator

Chairperson

Chairperson

Secretary

Kameme

Nthalire

Mwaulambia

appendix 1:List of Respondents (Key informant Interviews for Baseline & linkages studies)

appendix 2:Interview Guide at District Level (for the linkages study)


Section B: Programme Linkages6. Howdotheseobjectivescrosscutwithothersectorsatimplementationlevel?

7. WhatarethesectorswithwhichtheSCTSchemecrosscuts?

(probeforasmanyaspossibleandlistthemdown;provideextrapaperifnecessary)

•

•

•

•

•

8. HowdoestheSCTpotentiallylinkwiththesectorsin6above(tallysectorbysector)

9. ArethereotherpotentialsectorswherebeneficiariesoftheSCTSchemecanbelinkedto?

(a) Yes (b)No

10.IfYeswhatarethey?(probeforasmanyaspossible)

•

•

•

•

•

11.HowdoestheSCTrelatetothesectorsin10above?(probesectorbysector)

Section C: Prospects for Linkages ( for each question, probe sector by sector)12.WhatopportunitiesarecurrentlyavailabletolinkSCTbeneficiarieswithsectorsabove?

TowhatextenthastheAssemblyutilizedtheseopportunities?

13.Arethereanydeliberatemechanismstoexploitsuchopportunities?

14.Whatcanbedonetomaximizeutilityoftheopportunities?

Section D: Challenges for Linkages15.Whatcanbesingledoutaskeychallengesundermininglinkingbeneficiaries

oftheSCTtotheaforementionedsectors?

16.Whatcanyoupresentastherootcausesofsuchchallenges?

17.Howcanthesechallengesbedealtwithbydealingwiththerootcauses?

18.Whoissupposedtodowhat,tosolvethesebottlenecks?

Kindly ask for supporting documents/literature for cross referencing

appendix 3: Interview Guide At Community Level (for the linkages study)

INTERVIEW GUIDE AT COMMUNITY LEVELFor CSPCs and Extension Workers

NameofInterviewee: Position:

DateofInterview:

Brieflyexplainthepurposeandobjectivesofthisinterview,withintheframeworkoftheprojectaimed

atstrengtheningtheSCTSchemewithsupportfromSTOPAIDSNOW!Netherlands.

Section A: Programme Background19.WhenwastheSocialCashTransferSchemeintroducedinthecommunity?

20. Howhasthebeneficiarypopulationimproved/depreciatedovertime?

21.WhataretheobservablebenefitsoftheSchemesofar?(probeforasmanyaspossible)

•

•

•

•

•

22.MayyoukindlyoutlineobjectivesoftheSCTScheme?

23.Whatareotherobservableareasofimpactbeyondthestipulatedobjectives?

•

•

•

•

•

Section B: Programme Linkages24.Howdotheseobjectivescrosscutwithothersectorsatcommunitylevel?


appendix 4: Interview Guide For Government Official At District Level (Baseline)

1. WhendidtheCashTransferSchemebegininthedistrict?

2. Describethesocialcashtransferprocessfromtargetingtodelivery.

3. What’syourroletherein?

4. Whatarethegoals,objectivesandactivitiesoftheorganizationandwhatparticularactivities

istheorganizationdoingtoinfluencepolicies?

5. HowmanypolicyareasistheSWO/ASSEMBLYworkingin?

6. WhataretheScheme’ssourcesofresourcesandhowsustainablearethey?

7. Howlargeandqualifiedisthehumanresourcesofthesecretariatespeciallyforexpertise

intheimplementationoftheScheme?

8. HowdoestheSecretariatsolicitfinancialresourcesandhowsustainablearethesources?

9. DoestheSecretariatconductreviewsofitsactivitiesandhowoften?

10.Whenisthelasttimeyouconductedsuchareview?

11.Arethereotherorganizations,domesticandinternational,thattheorganizationpartnerswith


12.Istheresharingofinformationamonggovernmentdepartmentsintheimplementation

oftheSCTscheme?

13.Aretherelationalproblemsamongthevariousstakeholders?

14.HoweffectiveistheMinistryincoordinatingeffortsintheimplementationofthescheme?

15.HowdoesthesecretariataccessinformationfromtheMinistry?

16. TowhatextentarethepolicyproposalsmadebytheSecretariattakenonboardbytheMinistry?

17.Aretheirlaws,proceduresoranystricturestotheoperationofNon-StateActorsintheSCTScheme?

18.WhatarethechallengesandprospectsoftheSCTscheme?

19.Howmanyotherpolicyareasisyourdepartmentinvolvedin?

20.Hasthereeverbeenre-identificationofbeneficiaryhouseholdssinceinception?

21.ArethereconsultationsbeforeandduringthetargetingandimplementationoftheScheme?

Ifyes,whoareconsulted?Ifnotwhynot?

22.Whoarethemajorplayersatthevariousstagesoftheprocess?

23.Whatroledoeseachoftheplayersinquestion4play?

24. HowdoestheASSEMBLYidentifythestakeholdersintheprocess?

25.AretherelinkagesbetweentheSCTandotherpro-poorprogrammese.gPWPs,FISP,SFP,VS&L?

26. Howdoestheassemblycoordinatelinkageswiththeotherprogrammes?

27.TowhatextentareNon-StateActors(NSAs)involvedintheprocess?

25.WhatarethesectorswithwhichtheSCTSchemecrosscuts?(probeforasmanyaspossible

andlistthemdown;provideextrapaperifnecessary)

•

•

•

•

•

26.HowdoestheSCTpotentiallylinkwiththesectorsin6above(tallysectorbysector)

27.ArethereotherpotentialsectorswherebeneficiariesoftheSCTSchemecanbelinkedto?

(b) Yes (b)No

28.IfYeswhatarethey?(probeforasmanyaspossible)

•

•

•

•

•

29.HowdoestheSCTrelatetothesectorsin10above?(probesectorbysector)

Section C: Prospects for Linkages (foreachquestion,probesectorbysector)

30.WhatopportunitiesarecurrentlyavailabletolinkSCTbeneficiarieswithsectorsabove?

TowhatextenthastheAssemblyutilizedtheseopportunities?

31.Arethereanydeliberatemechanismstoexploitsuchopportunities?

32.Whatcanbedonetomaximizeutilityoftheopportunities?

Section D: Challenges for Linkages33. Whatcanbesingledoutaskeychallengesundermininglinkingbeneficiaries

oftheSCTtotheaforementionedsectors?

34. Whatcanyoupresentastherootcausesofsuchchallenges?

35.Howcanthesechallengesbedealtwithbydealingwiththerootcauses?

36.Whoissupposedtodowhat,tosolvethesebottlenecks?

Kindly ask for supporting documents/literature for cross referencing

Thank you very much for sparing your time to respond to this interview


15.Arethereotherorganizations,domesticandinternational,thattheorganizationpartners

withintheimplementationoftheScheme?

16.IstheresharingofinformationamongstakeholdersintheimplementationoftheSCTscheme?

17.Aretherelationalproblemsamongthevariousstakeholders?

18.HoweffectiveistheAssemblyincoordinatingeffortsintheimplementationofthescheme?

19.HowdoesyourorganisationaccessinformationfromtheAssembly?

20.TowhatextentarethepolicyproposalsmadebytheNGO/CSOtakenonboardbytheAssembly?

21.Aretheirlaws,proceduresoranystricturestotheoperationofNon-StateActorsintheSCTScheme?

22.WhatarethechallengesandprospectsoftheSCTscheme?

28.Atwhatstage(s)aretheNSAsinvolved?

29.Whatroledotheyplay?

30. HowdotheygettheinformationonnewdevelopmentsfromtheASSEMBLY?

31.WhatchallengesdoestheinvolvementoftheNSAspresenttoASSEMBLYintheprocess?

32.HowwouldyouratethesignificanceoftheNSAinvolvementinthescheme?

a)Insignificant b)Significant c)Verysignificant

33. HowwouldyouratethecontributionofCSOtothescheme?

a)Nocontribution b)negligible c)substantial

34.HowwouldyouratetherelationshipbetweentheASSEMBLYandtheCivilSocietyintheimplementa-

tionofthescheme?

35.Whatdoyouseeasthemajorweaknessesofthecivilsocietyinthescheme?

appendix 5: Interview Guide For CSO/NGO At District Level(Baseline)

1. Whatarethegoals,objectivesandactivitiesoftheorganizationandwhatparticular

activitiesistheorganizationdoingtoinfluencepolicies?

2. Howmanypolicyareasistheorganizationworkingin?

3. Whataretheorganization’ssourcesofresourcesandhowsustainablearethey?

4. Howlargeandqualifiedisthehumanresourcesoftheorganizationespeciallyforexpertise

inthepolicyareasoftheCSO’soperation?

5. Howdoestheorganizationsolicitfinancialresourcesandhowsustainablearethesources?

6. Doestheorganizationconductreviewsofitsactivitiesandhowoften?

7. Arethereotherorganizations,domesticandinternational,thattheorganizationpartners

withinitsoperations?

8. DoyouanythingabouttheSocialCashTransferScheme?

9. WhendidtheCashTransferSchemebegininthedistrict?

10.Describethesocialcashtransferprocessfromtargetingtodelivery.

11.What’syourroletherein?

12.WhataretheScheme’ssourcesofresourcesandhowsustainablearethey?

13.Howlargeandqualifiedisthehumanresourcesofthesecretariatespeciallyforexpertise


14.HowdoestheSecretariatsolicitfinancialresourcesandhowsustainablearethesources?


appendix 6: Guideline for Search Conference

Stages 1-3Step 7

Step 8

Step 9

Step 10

ACTIVITYGroupSession3

Presentationplenary

TaskgroupSessions

Finalplenary

PostConferenceprocess

DETAILS OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

• Constraintsandopportunities

• Possiblefutures

Reports,definestrategictasks/actions,selectkeytasks,formtaskgroups

(whatmustchange,howwhenandwhoshoulddowhat)

Taskgroupmeetings

Taskgroupreports,discussfuturecontacts,createnew

AdvisoryGroup

• Reportdistributed

Follow-upcontacts

AdvisoryGroupfacilitatesmeetingsofTaskGroups

Feedbackonproposedactions

Furthersearchconferences

Widennetwork

Continuingevaluationofoutcomes

THE SEARCH CONFERENCE PROCESS

Stages 1-3Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5

Step 6

ACTIVITYPre-Conferenceprocess

Introductoryplenary

Groupsession1

Plenarypresentation

Groupssession2

Presentationplenary

DETAILS• SetupAdvisoryGroupoflocal

representatives

• Agreeonprocessdesign,andparticipants

• SendoutinvitationstoparticipantsinChitipa

• Introductions,reviewofobjectives,outlineprocess,introducefirststage

• Presentproblemtreeanalysis

SCANNING THE ISSUE

• Pastandpresentsituation

• Currentproblemanalysis,problemtreeanalysis

• Outlineprobablefutures

• Reportsfromthegroups,discussdirections,introducesecondstage

DESIRED FUTURES

• Longrangevisions

• Alternative/Preferredfutures

• Groupreports,reviewprogress,introductiontothirdSession


appendix 7: THE FGD PROCESS

Stages 1-3Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5

Step 6

ACTIVITYPreparatoryStage

Introductoryplenary

Groupsession1

Plenarypresentation

Groupssession2

Presentationplenary

DETAILS• Setupgroupoflocal

representatives

• Agreeonprocessdesign,andparticipants

• Introductions,reviewofobjectives,outlineprocess,introducefirststage

• Presentproblemtreeanalysis

• Dividegroupintomen,women,andyouths

SCANNING THE ISSUE

• Pastandpresentsituation

• Currentproblemanalysis,problemtreeanalysis

• Outlineprobablefutures

• Reportsfromthegroups,discussdirections,introducesecondstage

DESIRED FUTURES

• Longrangevisions

• Alternative/Preferredfutures

• Groupreports,reviewprogress,introductiontothirdSession

Stages 1-3Step 7

Step 8

ACTIVITYGroupSession3

Presentationplenary

DETAILS OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

• Constraintsandopportunities

• Possiblefutures

Whatmustchange,howwhenandwhoshoulddowhat

Network of Organizations for Vulnerable and

Orphaned Children (NOVOC)

NOVOCsupportsOVCserviceproviders(CBO,FBO,

NGOs,andcommunities)toeffectivelyrespond

toOVCissuesthroughnetworkingandadvocacy,

technicalandorganizationalcapacitybuilding,

childprotectionandresourcemobilization.

InthisprojectNOVOCbroughtinitsexperiencein

advocacyworkforOVCissuestoleadinlobbying

andadvocacyforimprovednationallevelcommit-

mentandsupportfortheimplementationand

scaleupofthesocialprotectionpolicyandsocial

cashtransferinthecountry.

Youth Net and Counselling (YONECO)

YONECOisanongovernmentalorganization(NGO)

thatiscommittedto:Empoweringtheyouth,

womenandchildren;Combatingthespreadof

HIVinfection;MitigatingtheimpactofAIDS;

and,Promotinghumanrightsanddemocracyfor

socio-economicdevelopment.Inthisproject

YONECObroughtinitsdevelopmentexperienceat

communityleveltotakeleadinthedevelopment

ofaprojectmonitoringandevaluationtoolto

monitortheprogressoftheprojectanditsimpact

amongbeneficiariesinthecommunity.Thetool

hasbeendevelopedincollaborationwiththe

DepartmentofSocialWelfareandtheDistrict

M&EofficerinChitipadistrict.

appendix 8: Profile of Partners involved in this project


Institute for Policy Research and Social

Empowerment (IPRSE)

IPRSEisaMalawianregisteredThink-tankworking

towardsthepromotionofprogressivethinkingin

Malawi,throughwellresearchedandclearlyargued

policyanalysis,discussionpapers,reportsand

publications.TheInstitutewasregisteredin

May2005underthe1984MalawiRegistrationAct

no19,registrationnumber7880.IPRSEendeavors

toconductrigorousandimpartialresearchand

evaluationofpoliciesandprogramsaswellas

thepublicationanddisseminationofthefindings

throughwelldevelopedstrongnetworksingovern-

ment,donorcommunity,academia,corporate,

civilsocietyandthecommunityingeneral.Inthis

projectIPRSEbroughtinitsresearchexperienceto

leadinconductingabaselinesurveyandtheaction

researchfortheproject.

Centre for Youth and Children Affairs (CEYCA)

CEYCAaimsatpromotingtherightsandactive

participationofchildrenandyoungpeoplethrough

advocacy,facilitation,networking,research,

educationanddocumentation.Inthisproject

CEYCAwaspartofthecoordinationstructureto

supporttheimplementationofthisproject.

FurthermoreCEYCAbroughtinitsstrengthin

advocacyandchildrights.

STOP AIDS NOW! (Netherlands)

STOPAIDSNOW!raisesfundsforHIVandAIDS

projectsindevelopingcountries;

obtains(inter-)nationalpoliticalandpublicsupport

fortheeffortsagainstHIVandAIDS;innovates

orredefinesstrategiestoimprovetheresponseto

HIVandAIDS,andmeettheneedsofpeople

affected.Moreinformationcanbefoundon

www.stopaidsnow.org.

STOPAIDSNOW!supportedtheprojectinMalawi

inthelightofinnovatingstrategiesforOVCsupport.


Edition: STOP AIDS NOW!, March 2011

Text: KondwaniChikadza,

InstituteforPolicyResearch

&SocialEmpowerment(IPRSE)

Photography: AdriaanBacker

Design: PatrickvanZwieten

IPRSE

CentreHouseArcade,CityCentre

P/Bag236,Lilongwe

Malawi

Tel:+2651771168

E-mail:[email protected]

[email protected]

STOP AIDS NOW!

Keizersgracht392

1016GBAmsterdam

TheNetherlands

Tel:+31205287828

E-mail:[email protected]

STOP AIDS NOW! aimstoexpandandimprove

theDutchcontributiontotheglobalresponseto

HIVandAIDS.InSTOPAIDSNOW!fiveorganisations,

theAidsFonds,Hivos,ICCO,CordaidandOxfam

Novibhavejoinedforces.

STOP AIDS NOW! aimsto:

• Raisefundsinordertocontributetomore

HIVandAIDSprojectsindevelopingcountries

• Obtainpoliticalandpublicsupportforthe

effortsagainstHIVandAIDS,bothnationallyand

internationally

• Innovateorredefineexistingstrategiesand

establishnewformsofcooperationin

ordertoimprovetheresponsetoHIVandAIDS,

andmeettheneedsofpeopleaffected.

Pleasevisitourwebsiteforawiderangeof

downloadableresources:

www.stopaidsnow.org/downloads

Colofon


Strengthening the National Cash Transfer Programme in ...

Documents

Transcript of Strengthening the National Cash Transfer Programme in ...