Strategy - competition & cooperationChapter 592 CSUB SWOT Do a SWOT Analysis for CSUBDo a SWOT...

Strategy - competition & cooperation

Chapter 5 1

CSUB SWOTCSUB SWOT

• Do a SWOT Analysis for CSUBDo a SWOT Analysis for CSUB

• Combine 2 elements from your list above Combine 2 elements from your list above and devise 1 potential strategyand devise 1 potential strategy


Chapter 5 2

Ch 5 Ch 5 Strategy Formulation: Strategy Formulation: Situation Analysis and Situation Analysis and

Business StrategyBusiness Strategy


Chapter 5 3

SWOT AnalysisSWOT Analysis

Internal EnvironmentInternal Environment

• SStrengthstrengths• WWeaknesseseaknesses

External EnvironmentExternal Environment

• OOpportunitiespportunities• TThreatshreats

5.1 SWOT Analysis


Chapter 5 4

SO Strategies Generate strategies here that use strengths to take advantage of opportunities

ST Strategies Generate strategies here that use strengths to avoid threats

WO Strategies Generate strategies here that take advantage of opportunities by overcoming weaknesses

WT Strategies Generate strategies here that minimize weaknesses and avoid threats

INTERNAL FACTORS

(IFAS)EXTERNAL FACTORS (EFAS)

Strengths (S) List 5 – 10 internal strengths here

Weaknesses (W) List 5 – 10 internal weaknesses here

Opportunities (O) List 5 – 10 external opportunities here

Threats (T) List 5 – 10 external threats here

TOWS MatrixTOWS Matrix5.4 TOWS Matrix (Fig. 5.2)

Source: Adapted from Long-Range Planning, April 1982, H. Weihrich, “The TOWS Matrix—A Tool for Situational Analysis” p. 60. Copyright 1982, with kind permission from H. Weihrich and Elsevier Science Ltd. The Boulevard, Langford Lane, Kidlington OX5 1GB, UK.


Chapter 5 5

Domino’s Domino’s PizzaPizza

WeaknessesWeaknesses- Transient work force- Transient work force

StrengthsStrengths- Delivery system- Delivery system

ThreatsThreats- Energy blackouts- Energy blackouts

T & WT & W-Supermarket pizzaSupermarket pizza

T & ST & S- Mobile ovens- Mobile ovens

OpportunitiesOpportunities- Cell phonesCell phones

O & WO & W

- - free employee cell service free employee cell service (repay if leave before 1 (repay if leave before 1 year)year)

O & SO & SOne-button rapid One-button rapid response “Dom-Fob”response “Dom-Fob”

TOWS Matrix


Chapter 5 6

Business StrategyBusiness Strategy

• CompetitiveCompetitive

• CooperativeCooperative

5.6 Business Strategy Components

7Chapter 5Strategy - competition & cooperation

Porter’s Generic Competitive Porter’s Generic Competitive StrategiesStrategies

5.7 Porter’s Generic Competitive Strategies (Fig. 5.4)

Differentiation

Bro

ad T

arg

et

Nar

row

Tar

get

Competitive Advantage

Cost Leadership Differentiation

Cost Focus Focused Differentiation

Co

mp

etit

ive

Sco

pe

Lower Cost Name a firm for Name a firm for each quadrant.each quadrant.

Why are they Why are they operating in that operating in that quadrant?quadrant?


Chapter 5 8

Nobel Prize – Oct 05Nobel Prize – Oct 05• Two Game Theorists Win the Nobel Prize for Economics - Two Game Theorists Win the Nobel Prize for Economics - Thomas Thomas

Schelling's and Robert Aumann's work sheds light on conflict and Schelling's and Robert Aumann's work sheds light on conflict and cooperation. By Michael Muskal and Ken Ellingwood, Times Staff Writerscooperation. By Michael Muskal and Ken Ellingwood, Times Staff Writers

• An American and an American Israeli were awarded the Nobel Memorial An American and an American Israeli were awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences on Monday for fostering the understanding Prize in Economic Sciences on Monday for fostering the understanding of conflict and cooperation — in matters such as nuclear arms races, of conflict and cooperation — in matters such as nuclear arms races, trade battles or price wars.trade battles or price wars.

Thomas C. Schelling, 84, an emeritus professor at the University of Thomas C. Schelling, 84, an emeritus professor at the University of Maryland and Harvard University, and Robert J. Aumann, 75, an Maryland and Harvard University, and Robert J. Aumann, 75, an emeritus professor at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, used "game emeritus professor at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, used "game theory" as a way to explain social, political and business interactions.theory" as a way to explain social, political and business interactions.

Working separately, the pair have "enhanced our understanding of Working separately, the pair have "enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis," the Royal conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis," the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences said in its prize citation.Swedish Academy of Sciences said in its prize citation.


Chapter 5 9

Competition

-The act of endeavoring to gain, what another is endeavoring to gain at the same time

Rivalry, for a prize, or as where two or more persons are engaged in the same business and each seeking patronage


Chapter 5 10

BonnieBonnieRemain SilentRemain Silent

ConfessConfess

AlAl Remain SilentRemain Silent - 1 Year (Al)1 Year (Al)- 1 Year (Bon)1 Year (Bon)

- 10 Years (Al)10 Years (Al)- 0 Years (Bon)0 Years (Bon)

ConfessConfess - 0 Years (Al)0 Years (Al)- 10 Years (Bon)10 Years (Bon)

- 6 Years (Al)6 Years (Al)- 6 Years (Bon)6 Years (Bon)

Prisoner’s Dilemma


Chapter 5 11

ScarpiaScarpia

CooperateCooperate DefectDefect

ToscaTosca CooperateCooperate

- Tosca & Scarpia Tosca & Scarpia make lovemake love- Tosca’s lover is Tosca’s lover is sparedspared

- Tosca & Scarpia make Tosca & Scarpia make lovelove- Scarpia has Tosca’s Scarpia has Tosca’s lover killedlover killed

DefectDefect - Tosca lies & Tosca lies & murders Scarpia murders Scarpia - Tosca’s lover is Tosca’s lover is sparedspared

- Tosca lies & murders Tosca lies & murders ScarpiaScarpia- Scarpia has Tosca’s Scarpia has Tosca’s lover killedlover killed

Operatic Prisoner’s Dilemma


Chapter 5 12

Motor City LexusMotor City Lexus

Remain ClosedRemain Closed Open SundaysOpen Sundays

Barber Barber CadillacCadillac

Remain Remain

ClosedClosed

- $500k profit$500k profit

- $500k profit- $500k profit

- $300k profit$300k profit- $600k profit$600k profit

Open Open

SundaysSundays



Car Dealer Prisoner’s DilemmaShadow of the Future


Chapter 5 13

Shadow of the Future•Axelrod Experiments

–62 researchers submit for iterated PD game

–Cooperative Tit-for-tat wins

–Cooperate / Reinforce (+, -)


Chapter 5 14

Distributive vs. Integrative Distributive vs. Integrative BargainingBargaining

• Distributive bargaining Distributive bargaining fixed-sum pie fixed-sum pie

• Integrative Bargaining Integrative Bargaining Multiple issues w/trade Multiple issues w/trade offsoffs


Chapter 5 15

Distributive Negotiation Distributive Negotiation Bargaining ZoneBargaining Zone

Party A’s aspiration range

Party B’s aspiration range

Settlement range

Party A’s target point

Party B’s resistance

point

Party B’s target point

Party A’s resistance

point

Fixed Sum PieFixed Sum Pie


Chapter 5 16

Negotiation GuidelinesNegotiation Guidelines

• Prepare Prepare • Different perceptionsDifferent perceptions• Don’t make first offerDon’t make first offer• Take notesTake notes• Use creativityUse creativity• Power of silencePower of silence• Be kind and fairBe kind and fair• Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement

(BATNA)(BATNA)

17Chapter 5Strategy - competition & cooperation

Continuum of Strategic Continuum of Strategic AlliancesAlliances

5.15Continuum of Strategic Alliances (Figure 5.5)

Mutual Service Consortia

Joint Venture Licensing Arrangement

Weak and Distant

Value-Chain Partnership

Strong and Close

Source: Suggested by R. M. Kanter, “Collaborative Advantage: The Art of Alliances,” Harvard Business Review (July-August 1994), pp. 96–108.

Strategy - competition & cooperationChapter 592 CSUB SWOT Do a SWOT Analysis for CSUBDo a SWOT...

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