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Transcript of Steve Schondelmeyer Fri 830 Onsite
Changes to AMP & Best Price:
Impact on 340B Pricing
February 1, 2008Long Beach, California
4th Annual 340B CoalitionWinter Conference
University of Minnesota
Stephen W. Schondelmeyer, Pharm.D., Ph.D.Director, PRIME Institute
Overview
• Medicaid & AMP
• Deficit Reduction Act: AMP & the Final Rule
• Deficit Reduction Act: The Preliminary Injunction
• Impact of DRA & Preliminary Injunction on 340B
What will be discussed?
Medicaid & OBRA ’90:
Creation of AMP[Average Manufacturer Price]
Medicaid Payment Policy Changes
Medicaid & AMP
OBRA ’90 Required Manufacturers to
Pay Rebates to Medicaid
Minimum rebate
Best Price rebate Inflation adjustment rebate
Veterans Health Care Act of 1992 Set Federal Ceiling Price for Big 4 Established 340B Pricing
Based on AMP (Minimum and Best Price)
Federal Ceiling Price Negotiated Price
Medicaid Rx Expenditures & Rebates: 1990 to 2002 (Current Dollars)
$0
$5,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$15,000,000,000
$20,000,000,000
$25,000,000,000
$30,000,000,000
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Expenditures
Total RxTotal RxExpendituresExpenditures
SOURCE: Compiled by the PRIME Institute, University of Minnesota from data found in Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance Programs, National Pharmaceutical Council, 1976 to 2002.
Total RxTotal RxExpendituresExpenditures- Rebates- Rebates
RebatesRebates
$6.2 bil.$0.9 bil.$7.1 bil.
$29.3 bil.
$5.9 bil.
$23.4 bil.
Drug Rebates as a % of Total Drug Expenditures
20.2%
23.3% 23.8%
12.6%
2.0%
18.8%17.9%
19.4%
22.3%
0.0%
2.7%
17.1%
24.9%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
% of Drug Product Cost (AMP)
% of Total Drug Expenditures
% of MedicaidDrug Expenditures
Source: Compiled by the PRIME Institute, University of Minnesota from data found in Pharmaceutical Benefits Under Medical Assistance Programs, National Pharmaceutical Council, 1975 to 1998 and in HCFA Form 64.
Estimated Prices of Selected Public Purchasers(2001)
44.8%47.9%49.0%
51.7%
60.5%
67.9%
80.0%
100.0%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
AWP AMP Medicaid(Min.)
Medicaid(Net)
FSS 340B FCP VAContract
% of AWP
SOURCE: Estimated by PRIME Institute, University of Minnesota and reported in Pharmaceutical Discounts Under Federal Law: State Program Opportunities, Public Health Institute, May 2001.
AMP
Medicaid & theDeficit Reduction Act
of 2005
AMP now has 2 roles in Medicaid:
Dual Role for AMP
Basis for Manufacturer Rebates to Medicaid
Minimum rebate of 15.1% of AMP
Best price rebate Inflation adjustment payment State supplemental rebates
Basis for Setting FULs for Generics New FULs to begin mid-2007 Lowest AMP of all generic equivalents x 250% Updated monthly & posted on web site Applies to any drug with 2 or more equivalents
Provider/Pharmacy
Medicaid Prescription Payment Gap
Patient
Wholesaler
ManufacturerAMP
AAC
StateMedicaidProgram
Does AMP = Pharmacy AAC ?
Payment Gap(Wholesaler Operation & Margin & other costs)
No !
Rebates
AMP as a % Independent Invoice Acquisition Cost
(CBO, January 2007)
62.0%
88.0%
95.0%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Single Source Multi-Source Brands Multi-Source Generics
% of Acquisition Cost
SOURCE: Independent invoice acquisition cost based on IMS invoice data from CBO January 2007.
AMP Range
2% to 10%
Below
Actual Cost
AMP Range
2% to 27%
Below
Actual CostAMP Range
8% to 61%
Below
Actual Cost
FULs set as 250% above the lowest AMP are:
GAO Study of AMP (December 22, 2006)
Below Average Retail Acquisition Cost
65% Below for Highest Spend Generics
15% Below for Most Prescribed Generics 28% Below for Most Prescribed & High Use Drugs
59 of 77 Generics Studied AMP-based FULs was below average retail
pharmacy acquisition cost
AMP Final Rule
The CMS Final Rule:
The Final Rule for AMP
Proposed Rule published (Dec. 2006)
Final Rule published (July 2007)
AMP Regulation Takes Effect (Oct 2007)
Lawsuit Filed by NACDS / NCPA (Nov 2007)
CMS to Report AMP to States & Website
(Jan 2008)
AMP as defined in the CMS Final Rule
Winners & Losers with AMP
The Final Rule AMP benefits:
Manufacturers with less rebate liability
340B with lower AMP from broad definition of retail
The Final Rule hurts: Medicaid program with less rebates
Traditional retail pharmacy with AMP-based FULs
(payment below acquisition cost in many cases)
340B rebates lower due to exclusion of
wholesaler prompt pay discounts
Proposed Rule Expected Impact Includes:
CMS Proposed Rule on AMP(December 22, 2006)
Savings from Use of AMP to Set FULs
$800 million in savings in 2007
$8.04 billion in savings over 5 years 90% of savings would come from pharmacy
Pharmacies Will Feel the Impact 18,000 pharmacies will be significantly impacted 350 pharmacies in Minnesota will have
significant impact High Medicaid pharmacies will be affected most Rural & Low-income area pharmacies will be hit
The Lawsuit & Preliminary Injunction
Preliminary Injunction Alleges CMS Final Rule:
The Lawsuit Alleges:
Violates Admin. Procedure Act
Definition of Retail Class of Trade Violates Statute
Definition of Wholesaler Violates Statute
Prices in Each State, Not “United States” to
be Considered
FUL Used for Non-equivalent Multiple Source Drugs
Overly broad & self-styled CMS definitions:
The CMS Final Rule:
Firms not licensed as wholesalers are wholesalers
Firms not licensed as pharmacies are pharmacies
Physicians, clinics, hospital outpatient, & home
infusion are called “retail pharmacies”
Manufacturers are wholesalers & retail pharmacies
Consumers are wholesalers & retail pharmacies
Exhibit 3C. Pharmaceutical Market Structure: Distinct Market Segments & Classes of Trade
ChainPharmacy
Mass Merchant
Pharmacy
Food & DrugPharmacy
IndependentPharmacy
Mail OrderPharmacy
Health PlanPharmacy
Clinic &Drs’ Office
Long TermCare
PharmacyHospital
GovernmentFacilities &
Other
Chain Warehouse
RegionalWholesalers National Wholesalers
Drug Manufacturers & Marketers
Retail PharmacyMail
Pharmacy
Outpatient Providers
Wholesalers
Institutional Providers
Manufacturers,
Marketers, &Distributors
Exhibit 3D. Pharmaceutical Market Structure: Wholesalers
ChainPharmacy
Mass Merchant
Pharmacy
Food & DrugPharmacy
IndependentPharmacy
Mail OrderPharmacy
Health PlanPharmacy
Clinic &Drs’ Office
Long TermCare
PharmacyHospital
GovernmentFacilities &
Other
Chain Warehouse
RegionalWholesalers National Wholesalers
Drug Manufacturers & Marketers
HospitalOutpatient
ManufacturerDirect Sales,
Pt. Assistance,Coupons, &Vouchers
Non-ProfitEntities
Wholesalers
Exhibit 3E. CMS Final Rule: Wholesalers
ChainPharmacy
Mass Merchant
Pharmacy
Food & DrugPharmacy
IndependentPharmacy
Mail OrderPharmacy
Health PlanPharmacy
Clinic &Drs’ Office
Long TermCare
PharmacyHospital
GovernmentFacilities &
Other
Chain Warehouse
RegionalWholesalers National Wholesalers
Drug Manufacturers & Marketers
HospitalOutpatient
ManufacturerDirect Sales,
Pt. Assistance,Coupons, &Vouchers
Non-ProfitEntities
Wholesalers
Wholesalers
WholesalersWholesalers
Wholesalers
Exhibit 3F. Pharmaceutical Market Structure: Retail Pharmacy Class of Trade
ChainPharmacy
Mass Merchant
Pharmacy
Food & DrugPharmacy
IndependentPharmacy
Mail OrderPharmacy
Health PlanPharmacy
Clinic &Drs’ Office
Long TermCare
PharmacyHospital
GovernmentFacilities &
Other
Chain Warehouse
RegionalWholesalers National Wholesalers
Drug Manufacturers & Marketers
HospitalOutpatient
ManufacturerDirect Sales,
Pt. Assistance,Coupons, &Vouchers
Non-ProfitEntities
Retail Pharmacy Class of Trade
Exhibit 3G. CMS Final Rule: Retail Pharmacy Class of Trade
ChainPharmacy
Mass Merchant
Pharmacy
Food & DrugPharmacy
IndependentPharmacy
Mail OrderPharmacy
Health PlanPharmacy
Clinic &Drs’ Office
Long TermCare
PharmacyHospital
GovernmentFacilities &
Other
Chain Warehouse
RegionalWholesalers National Wholesalers
Drug Manufacturers & Marketers
HospitalOutpatient
ManufacturerDirect Sales,
Pt. Assistance,Coupons, &Vouchers
Non-ProfitEntities
Retail Pharmacy Class of Trade Retail Pharmacy by
Final Rule Definition
Preliminary Injunction Order by Judge R. C. Lamberth
“Unless enjoined plaintiffs are likely to suffer
irreparable harm for which no adequate remedy
exists in law”
“Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits”
CMS is enjoined from:
Preliminary Injunction Order by Judge R. C. Lamberth
“does not provide the ambiguity for the
wholesale re-writing of the words by the
Agency”
“statute is clear enough”
“any and all action to implement the AMP rule
to the extent such action affects Medicaid
reimbursement rates for retail pharmacies”
“Posting AMP on a public website or . . . to states”
wholesale
What Can We Expect? What Can We Expect?
What Can We Expect?
May have settlement of legislative intervention
Without above the lawsuit will proceed to trial
CMS may implement other aspects of DRA & AMP
Manufacturers will continue to report AMP
AMP may be implemented for 340B pricing purposes
In the Next Year:
PRIME Institute
P R I M E
PRIME Institute
P R I M E
harmaceutical esearch n anagement & conomics
harmaceutical esearch n anagement & conomics
University of MinnesotaUniversity of Minnesota