STATUS OF ALGERIANS way, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines ...questions concerning the situation in the...

QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE) 57

QUESTIONS RELATING TOFUTURE OF NETHERLANDSNEW GUINEA (WEST IRIAN)A/4915. Letter of 7 October 1961 from Permanent

Representative of Netherlands circulating memo-randum of Netherlands delegation on future anddevelopment of Netherlands New Guinea.

A/4944. Note verbale of 27 October 1961 from Per-manent Mission of Indonesia circulating statementmade on 24 October 1961 by Foreign Minister ofIndonesia.

A/4954. Letter of 2 November 1961 from PermanentRepresentative of Netherlands transmitting memo-randum on status and future of Netherlands NewGuinea.

A/L.354 and Rev.1, Rev.1/Corr.1. Netherlands: draftresolution.

A/4959. Statement of financial implications of Nether-lands draft resolution, A/L.354.

A/L.367 and Add.1-4; A/L.367/Rev.1. Bolivia, Congo(Leopoldville), Guinea, India, Liberia, Mali,Nepal, Syria, United Arab Republic: draft reso-lution and revision. Revised text not adopted byAssembly having failed to obtain required two-thirds majority in roll-call vote on 27 November1961, plenary meeting 1066. The vote was 41 to40, with 21 abstentions as follows:In favour: Albania, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria,Burma, Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Ceylon,Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslo-vakia, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana,Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan,Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal,Pakistan, Poland, Romania; Saudi Arabia, SierraLeone, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, UkrainianSSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugo-slavia.Against: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Cameroun,Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China,Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica,Dahomey, Denmark, France, Gabon, Greece,Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, IvoryCoast, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritania,Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nor-way, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal,South Africa, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,United States.Abstaining: Afghanistan, Brazil, Canada, Do-minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland,

Guatemala, Haiti, Iran, Japan, Laos, Mexico,Nigeria, Panama, Somalia, Togo, Turkey, UpperVolta, Uruguay, Venezuela.Liberia did not participate in the voting.

A/L.371. Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad,Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, IvoryCoast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal,Togo, Upper Volta: amendment to 9-power draftresolution, A/L.367/Rev.1.

A/L.368. Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad,Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, IvoryCoast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal,Togo, Upper Volta: draft resolution. Text, asamended by vote on preamble, was not adoptedby Assembly, having failed to obtain required two-thirds majority vote on 27 November, meeting1066. The vote, by roll-call was 53 to 41, with9 abstentions, as follows:In favour: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia,Brazil, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Re-public, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo(Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark,

Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France,Gabon, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland,Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Luxembourg, Madagas-car, Mauritania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zea-land, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama,Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia,Spain, Sweden, Togo, United Kingdom, UnitedStates, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela.Against: Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma,Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Leo-poldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia,Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary,India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia,Libya, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan,Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone,Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian SSR,USSR, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugo-slavia.Abstaining: Austria, Ecuador, Guatemala, Iran,Japan, Laos, Portugal, South Africa, Turkey.

A/4983. Statement of financial implications of 13-power draft resolution, A/L.368.

STATUS OF ALGERIANSIMPRISONED IN FRANCE

(See p. 100 below, DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES.)

CHAPTER VII

QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLICOF THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

When the General Assembly considered thesituation in the Republic of the Congo (Leo-

poldville) during the second part of its fifteenthsession in March-April 1961, the situation was

58 POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS

complicated by the continuing constitutionalcrisis, marked by the existence of several rivalauthorities in the country.

The Chief of State, Joseph Kasa-Vubu, hadreplaced the "Council of Commissioners-Gen-eral" on 9 February 1961 by a "provisionalgovernment" headed by Joseph Ileo. The latter,however, had not been approved by Parliament,which had been adjourned by the Chief of Stateon 11 October 1960. The "government" set upin Stanleyville in December 1960, headed byAntoine Gizenga, Vice-Premier in the first Gov-ernment of the Congo (Leopoldville), con-tinued to exercise authority in Orientale andKivu provinces. The provincial government ofKatanga in Elisabethville, headed by MoiseTshombe, and the authorities in Bakwanga, inthe southern part of the Kasai province, con-tinued to claim independence. In this situation,the United Nations Operation in the Congo(ONUC) was endeavouring to prevent theleaders holding the reins of power from usingforce to subdue their opponents. At the sametime, ONUC intensified its efforts to inducethe leaders to solve their differences throughnegotiation and conciliation.

Concerned at the grave situation, particularlyafter the death of Patrice Lumumba, the firstPremier of the country, the Security Counciladopted a resolution on 21 February 19611 urg-ing the United Nations to take immediatelyall appropriate measures to prevent the oc-currence of civil war, including the use of forceif necessary in the last resort. It also urgedmeasures for the immediate evacuation of allBelgian and other foreign military and paramili-tary personnel and political advisers not underUnited Nations command and mercenaries, theconvening of Parliament, the re-organization ofCongolese armed units and an investigationinto the circumstances of the death of Mr.Lumumba and his colleagues.

After considering the report of the UnitedNations Conciliation Commission for the Congo,which had visited the. country in January-Feb-ruary 1961, and the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the SecurityCouncil resolution, the General Assemblyadopted three resolutions on 15 April 1961.

By the first resolution (1599(XV)),2 it: ex-pressed its conviction that the central factor

in the grave situation in the country was thecontinued presence of Belgian and other for-eign military and paramilitary personnel, politi-cal advisers and mercenaries in total disregardof repeated resolutions of the United Nations;called upon the Belgian Government to complyfully and promptly with the will of the Secu-rity Council and the General Assembly; anddecided that the above-mentioned foreign per-sonnel should be completely withdrawn andevacuated.

By the second resolution (1600(XV)),3 it:called upon the Congolese authorities to desistfrom attempting a military solution to theirproblems; urged the immediate release of allmembers of Parliament and provincial assem-blies and all other political leaders under deten-tion ; urged the convening of Parliament withoutdelay, with safe conduct and security extendedto its members by the United Nations, so thatit might take the necessary decisions concerningthe formation of a national Government andthe future constitutional structure of the Re-public; and appointed a commission of con-ciliation to assist the Congolese leaders toachieve reconciliation and end the politicalcrisis.

By the third resolution (1601(XV))4 it es-tablished a Commission of Investigation—con-sisting of four persons nominated by the Gov-ernments of Burma, Ethiopia, Mexico, andTogo—to investigate the circumstances of thedeath of Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues.(The members of the Commission were U AungKhine (Burma), Teschome Hailemariam(Ethiopia), Salvador Martínez de Alva (Mex-ico) and Ayite d'Almeida (Togo)).

The following account of subsequent develop-ments is based on information given in variousUnited Nations documents.

In a progress report on 17 May 1961, theSecretary-General recalled the measures takenby United Nations forces to avert the dangerof emerging civil war, and the apprehensionand evacuation of 37 mercenaries. He trans-mitted an agreement with President Kasa-Vubuunder which the President accepted the Security

1 For further details, see Y.U.N., 1960, pp. 104-5.2 Ibid., p. 106.3 Ibid., p. 107.4 Ibid., p. 107.


Operations in the Congo, was appointed Of-ficer-in-Charge of the United Nations Opera-tion in the Congo as of 25 May 1961.

Council resolution of 21 February and theUnited Nations undertook to provide assistancein its implementation, particularly with regardto the repatriation of foreign personnel and there-organization of the National Army. Theagreement, the Secretary-General reported, hadbeen initialled by United Nations representativeson 17 April 1961 and approved by the Sec-retary-General on 26 April 1961. A repre-sentative of the Secretary-General began discus-sions with President Kasa-Vubu on measuresto re-organize the National Army on a basiswhich would apply to the Republic as a whole.

The Secretary-General also reported on theprogress of discussions by his representative,Ambassador Sahbani of Tunisia, with the Gov-ernment of Belgium from 20 March 1961 onarrangements for the immediate withdrawal ofBelgian personnel covered by the Security Coun-cil resolution. The Belgian Government hadaccepted the resolution, but its views on im-plementation had been unsatisfactory. A slightchange in the position became apparent withthe change of government in April, but it re-mained far short of what was required by theSecurity Council resolution. The position, asstated in a letter of 6 May 1961 by the newBelgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was re-garded by the Secretary-General and the Ad-visory Committee on the Congo as not beingin accord with the letter or spirit of the reso-lution. Negotiations were subsequently resumed,and on 12 July 1961 the Secretary-Generalmet with the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, in Geneva. While some progresswas made in regard to the withdrawal of Bel-gian military personnel originally placed at thedisposal of the Congo and now active inKatanga, no agreement was reached in regardto mercenaries and "volunteers."

On 25 May 1961, the Secretary-General an-nounced a re-organization of the administrativearrangements for the Congo operation. TheSpecial Representative of the Secretary-Generalin the Congo, Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal, ofIndia, was relieved at his own request. He hadgone to United Nations Headquarters for con-sultations on 10 March; Mekki Abbas had beenActing Special Representative in Leopoldvilleuntil Mr. Dayal's resignation. Sture C. Linner,formerly Chief of United Nations Civilian

CONVENING OF PARLIAMENTAND ESTABLISHMENT OFA NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Representatives of the Secretary-General helddiscussions with the various authorities in theCongo on the question of convening Parliamentas urged by the Security Council and the Gen-eral Assembly, and every effort was made byONUC to facilitate a rapprochement betweenthe Congolese leaders. While divisive tendencieshad seemed to prevail at the Tananarive Con-fercence in March 1961, a conference at Coquil-hatville in April-May 1961 advocated a re-organization of the Congolese Government ona federal basis. Mr. Tshombe, who opposedthis development at Coquilhatville, was de-tained by the Leopoldville authorities.

On 12 May 1961, President Kasa-Vubu an-nounced that Parliament would be re-convenedat Leopoldville in the near future and requestedUnited Nations assistance and protection forthis purpose. Four days later, Mr. Gizengawrote to the Secretary-General that his "gov-ernment" had decided to convene an extraor-dinary session of Parliament under ONUC pro-tection at Kamina. This move was supportedin letters to the President of the Security Coun-cil by the representatives of Albania, Czecho-slovakia, Poland and the USSR.

Following strenuous efforts to bring abouta rapprochement between the principal factionsinvolved, representatives of the Secretary-Gen-eral succeeded in arranging a meeting of delega-tions from Leopoldville and Stanleyville on 13June 1961 at ONUC headquarters in Leopold-ville. The two delegations reached an agree-ment on 19 June that Parliament would meetat the University of Lovanium, Leopoldville,and that all the members of Parliament and itsadministrative personnel should be housed dur-ing the session in Lovanium itself and shouldhave no contacts with the outside world. Theyagreed to ask the United Nations to ensurethat the army and police at Leopoldville andadjoining zones did not carry arms during theperiod of the parliamentary session. The UnitedNations was also requested: to take various


other protective measures, including the provi-sion of free passage of members of Parliament;to invite all other political factions to subscribeto the agreement; and to continue to accordits good offices to the parties concerned in seek-ing a real and satisfactory solution to the Con-golese crisis. The Secretary-General acceptedall the responsibilities devolving upon theUnited Nations under this agreement.

The agreement was subsequently subscribedto by the authorities in South Kasai, but notby the authorities in Elisabethville, though therepresentatives of the Leopoldville authoritiesand Mr. Tshombe had signed a protocol on24 June 1961 for the convening of Parliamentand on several other matters relating to theeconomic and administrative re-integration ofKatanga into the Republic.

On 23 June 1961, Mr. Gizenga announcedthat eight Belgian soldiers who had been im-prisoned in Stanleyville since January 1961would be released.

On 5 July 1961, the President of the Re-public issued an Ordinance convening Par-liament. Under security and safe conduct ar-rangements devised by the United Nations inclose co-operation with the authorities fromLeopoldville and Stanleyville, members of Par-liament assembled at Lovanium from 16 July.The Senate began to hold its sessions on 22July and the House of Representatives on23 July. On 1 August, the President of theRepublic nominated Cyrille Adoula as forma-teur of Government.

On 2 August 1961, Mr. Adoula presentedhis Government to the two Houses of Parlia-ment and described it as a Government ofnational unity and political reconciliation. Hestated that his Government would: draw up anew constitution for the country; ensure theobservance of fundamental freedoms and humanrights and the maintenance of law and order;release all political prisoners and others im-prisoned without valid cause; re-organize andre-unite the armed forces; and annul the seces-sion of Katanga in the very near future. Heexpressed gratitude to the United Nations forits assistance and pledged that his Governmentwould honour its obligations as a Member ofthe United Nations and execute the resolutionsof the Security Council and the General As-

sembly so long as the sovereignty of the Congowas not affected. He added that his Govern-ment would strive for co-operation with theUnited Nations in the formulation as well asin the execution of projects and would useevery means to implement rapidly the agree-ment of 17 April. He also expressed the desireto conclude promptly an agreement on thestatus of the United Nations in the Congo,elaborating the details of the application of thebasic agreement of 27 July 1960 between theUnited Nations and the Congolese Governmenton the operation of the United Nations Force.

On the same day, both Houses of Parliamentunanimously adopted a resolution to the effectthat from the time the new Government ob-tained a vote of confidence in the Houses, noother Government might claim to act as theconstitutional Government, and that the newGovernment of national unity would be thelegal successor of the first Central Governmentof the Republic of the Congo. The two Housesthen approved a new Government, led by Mr.Adoula; the vote was unanimous, except forone abstention in the House of Representatives.

Following the swearing-in of the new Gov-ernment, Parliament decided to leave Lovaniumand continue its meetings in Leopoldville city.Before doing so, the House of Representativesunanimously adopted a resolution expressing itsgratitude to the United Nations for ensuringprotection of the members of Parliament andurging it to continue to provide security formembers who requested it or who were in anyway threatened.

In response to a letter of 10 August 1961from Prune Minister Adoula, the Secretary-General, on 13 August, expressed satisfactionat the establishment of a constitutional CentralGovernment, to which the Security Council andthe General Assembly had attached the greatestimportance. He confirmed that in response tothe decisions of Parliament, the United Na-tions would deal with Mr. Adoula's Governmentas being the Central Government and wouldrender all its aid and assistance exclusively tothat Government.

On 10 September 1961, at the unanimousrequest of the Council of Ministers, PrimeMinister Adoula extended an invitation to theSecretary-General to visit Leopoldville to dis-


cuss with them the framework within whichthe details of the aid and support by the UnitedNations could be worked out in relation tothe future programme of the Government. Headded that such a visit would provide the op-portunity for the Government to express itshigh appreciation for the untiring efforts of theUnited Nations in the course of its action inthe Congo. The Secretary-General immediatelyaccepted the invitation and arrived in Leopold-ville on 13 September 1961.

PROBLEM OF FOREIGN MILITARYPERSONNEL AND MERCENARIESIN KATANGA: DEVELOPMENTSFROM JULY TO NOVEMBER 1961

Meanwhile, negotiations of United Nationsrepresentatives with the Belgian Governmentand with the Katanga authorities for the evac-uation of foreign military and paramilitary per-sonnel and political advisers and mercenaries,as called for by the Security Council, were en-countering great difficulties.

The Katanga provincial authorities refusedto take effective action to remove the foreignelements without whom the secessionist move-ment might have collapsed. For its part, theBelgian Government said that it was preparedto help in the removal of its professional of-ficers and non-commissioned officers who hadbeen serving in the Congo and were now incommand of the gendarmerie, but it professedto be unable to do anything about the "volun-teers" and mercenaries. The latter were notthe traditional colonial administrative and mili-tary elements, but mostly non-Belgian adven-turers and soldiers of fortune, including out-lawed elements previously involved in extremistactivities in Algeria and elsewhere ; they fosteredextremist attitudes in Katanga, too.

The ONUC effort was also obstructed bycertain foreign financial interests, especially theUnion Minière du Haut-Katanga, which pro-vided economic and political sustenance for thesecessionist movement, including the high wagesof the mercenaries and the purchase of militaryequipment and warplanes.

In April 1961, 44 mercenaries who were mem-bers of the unit known as the compagnie inter-nationale were apprehended by the United Na-tions and evacuated from the Congo. By mid-

June, an estimated 60 more mercenaries hadwithdrawn from Katanga, and on 24 June thecompagnie was formally dissolved by the provin-cial government.

In June 1961, a United Nations military mis-sion reported that there were 510 foreign of-ficers and non-commissioned officers active inthe gendarmerie as against 142 Congolese cadres.Of the non-Congolese, 208 were the remainingBelgian professional military men; 302 weremercenaries.

Between June and August 1961, ONUC au-thorities evacuated several of Mr. Tshombe'sforeign military and political advisers. A jointcommission was established with the Katangeseauthorities to list such foreign personnel, boththose in official posts and those acting unof-ficially, who were to be repatriated.

On 24 August 1961, the President of the Re-public issued an Ordinance for the immediateexpulsion of all non-Congolese officers andmercenaries serving in the Katanga forces whohad not entered into a contractual engagementwith the Central Government. On the sameday, the Prime Minister, on behalf of his Gov-ernment, requested United Nations assistancein the execution of the Ordinance. This requestprovided the United Nations with the legal au-thority to take action within the Congo to im-plement the evacuation provision of the Secu-rity Council resolution.

As the Katangese authorities countered witha campaign of inflammatory statements andrumours against the United Nations whichcreated an atmosphere of tension, the UnitedNations was soon compelled to take securityprecautions in Elisabethville. On 28 August,it placed a surveillance on Radio Katanga, thegendarmerie headquarters and other key pointsand installations and proceeded to take meas-ures for apprehending foreign military personneland mercenaries.

Informed of the objectives of the UnitedNations action, Mr. Tshombe announced laterin the day that the services of foreign personnelin the Katanga armed forces were terminatedand that his government approved of theirevacuation. The Belgian Consul, in agreementwith his colleagues in the consular corps inElisabethville, offered to undertake the respon-sibility for ensuring the surrender and repatria-


tion of all such foreign military personnel. Rely-ing on this undertaking, the United Nationsthereupon refrained from continuing to searchfor and apprehend such personnel and sus-pended the security measures.

These arrangements, however, were notscrupulously observed. Only the Belgian Armyofficers placed by the Belgian Government atthe disposal of Katanga were dealt with underthis procedure, and even in the case of theseofficers, delays or administrative exemptionswere proposed. By 9 September 1961, 273 for-eign officers and mercenaries had been evac-uated, and 65 were awaiting repatriation, but atleast 104 failed to report.

Profiting from the relaxation of evacuationmeasures, foreign officers and mercenaries soonbegan to re-infiltrate into the gendarmerie.Together with some elements in the local non-African population, they began to exercise anadverse influence on the Katanga authorities.The actions of the Katanga Sûreté led by non-Congolese officers, the inflammatory broadcastsof Radio Katanga and the spreading rumourscaused panic among the Baluba populationwho began to throng into United Nationscamps seeking protection. By 9 September 1961,the number of these refugees had reached 35,000and created not only a very serious problem forthe United Nations but a situation likely tolead to tribal and civil war. Meanwhile, theKatanga authorities inspired demonstrationsagainst the United Nations, and reports werereceived of conspiracies directed against theUnited Nations Force.

In view of the deteriorating situation, theUnited Nations representative called on theconsuls in Elisabethville on 9 September 1961and asked them to ensure the immediate de-parture of their nationals among the non-Congolese officers and mercenaries, failingwhich the United Nations would have to re-sume action for implementing the SecurityCouncil resolution. On 11 September, thedeputy United Nations representative in Elisa-bethville was arrested on orders given by anon-Congolese officer of the Sûreté. In view ofthe long series of wrongful acts committed bythe non-Congolese officers of the Sûreté againstthe United Nations and of their actions againstthe Baluba population, ONUC representatives,

acting under the Security Council resolution of21 February 1961, requested the Katanga au-thorities to exacuate these officers within 48hours. Instead of acceding to this request, theKatanga authorities re-inforced their policeforce and began to maintain heavily armedpatrols and guard posts at all public buildingsand other installations. A meeting of UnitedNations representatives with Mr. Tshombe andmembers of his government on 12 September1961, in an attempt to obtain a lessening oftension and assurance on the prompt evacua-tion of foreign officers and mercenaries, provedfruitless.

On 13 September, the United Nations Forcetook security precautions similar to those ap-plied on 28 August in order to prevent threatsto the maintenance of law and order while itresumed its task of apprehending and evacuat-ing foreign military and paramilitary person-nel. During this operation, fire was opened onthe United Nations troops on several occasions,particularly from the building in which theBelgian "consulate" had its offices, and theONUC troops returned the fire. United Nationsunits guarding the radio station and the postoffice were repeatedly attacked. Non-Congoleseofficers and mercenaries were observed leadingthe attacks. A number of European residents,otherwise regularly employed, participated inthe attacks, and extensive sniping fire wasdirected against United Nations troops and posi-tions by non-African residents.

Despite persistent efforts by United Nationsrepresentatives to obtain a cessation of hostilities,the attacks continued and spread to Jadotville,Kamina and other areas. A number of foreignofficers who had gone into hiding after 28 Au-gust 1961 re-appeared. A jet fighter, pilotedby a non-Congolese, strafed and bombed UnitedNations troops and airports under United Na-tions control, making it impossible to providere-inforcements to the hard-pressed UnitedNations Forces, which had no war planes. Acompany of the United Nations Force, sent toJadotville at the urgent request of the consularcorps to protect the non-Congolese population,was attacked by a large gendarmerie forceunder non-Congolese leadership and subjectedto strafing and bombing by the jet fighter. Onthe other hand, there were no clashes whatever


between the United Nations troops and unitsof the Katanga gendarmerie, whose foreign of-ficers had been duly withdrawn.

After repeated efforts to contact Mr. Tshombeto end the fighting, the United Nations repre-sentative in Elisabethville received a messagefrom him, through the British Consul, at mid-night on 16 September, proposing a meeting inNorthern Rhodesia. Informed of this message,the Secretary-General, who was then in Leo-poldville, replied to Mr. Tshombe reaffirmingthe desire of the United Nations to ensure acessation of hostilities. He pointed out that thecease-fire would occur automatically on theUnited Nations side, as it was permitted to openfire only in self-defence. He asked that theKatanga authorities order an immediate andeffective cease-fire and offered to meet per-sonally with Mr. Tshombe at Ndola, NorthernRhodesia, to find peaceful methods of resolvingthe present conflict, thus opening the way to asolution of the Katanga problem within theframework of the Congo.

The Secretary-General and his party took offfor Ndola from Leopoldville on 17 September,but the flight ended tragically in the crash ofthe aircraft and the death of the Secretary-General and his party consisting of sevenUnited Nations staff members and two ONUCSwedish soldiers. Six Swedish crew membersalso lost their lives. (See also p. 161 below.)

The Secretary-General's mission was im-mediately taken up by Sture Linner and hiscolleagues. On 19 September, Mahmoud Khiari,Chief of the ONUC Civilian Operations, flewto Ndola, where, on the next day, he and Mr.Tshombe signed a provisional agreement for animmediate cease-fire. They agreed that thereshould be no movement of troops to re-inforcegarrisons or positions; also, the movement ofarms and ammunition and other military deviceswas prohibited. A joint commission of fourmembers was to be set up to fix the respectivepositions of the troops of both sides, to arrange

• the exchange of prisoners, to supervise the ap-plication of the agreement and to seek waysand means of placing the relations between theUnited Nations and the Katanga authorities ona basis of mutual understanding.

The United Nations representative madeclear the following points: that the agreement

was of a strictly military nature; that it appliedsolely to the United Nations Force in Katangaand the armed forces of Katanga, that it wouldnot apply outside Katanga ; that it had no politi-cal intention or aim; and that the conclusionof the agreement would in no way affect theresolutions of the Security Council and the Gen-eral Assembly. The agreement became final on24 September 1961 when approval of its termsby the United Nations Headquarters was com-municated to Mr. Tshombe.

The Katangese authorities failed to complyfully with the provisions of the agreement. Theybegan to make extreme demands and levelledunfounded accusations of breaches of the cease-fire by the United Nations. They frustrated thework of the joint commission by imposing con-ditions.

After further negotiations, the Katanga au-thorities and ONUC signed a protocol on 13October 1961 for the implementation of thecease-fire agreement of 20 September. Theprotocol provided for: the release of prisonerson 16 October; the creation of three sub-com-missions for the supervision of the applicationof the cease-fire agreement ; a return to positionsheld on 12 September; and the return of thepost office, radio station and several other posi-tions held by the United Nations in Elisabeth-ville in return for certain assurances by Katangaauthorities. The United Nations agreed that itwould consider that the cease-fire had beenviolated in the event that the Katangese gen-darmerie countered an attack from the outside.

The Prime Minister of the Central Govern-ment of the Congo expressed apprehensions asto the political implications of the protocol butwithdrew his objections when the approval con-templated by United Nations Headquarters wastransmitted to him.

The text of the approval, transmitted to Mr.Tshombe on 23 October 1961, stated that theconditions set forth as the basis for the approvalof the cease-fire agreement of 20 September1961 were equally applicable to the protocol.It stated, too, that approval of the protocol in-volved no derogation of the unity, territorialintegrity or independence of the Congo, ofthe sovereignty of the Republic of the Congoor of the authority of the Central Government.It also noted the agreement during the discus-


sions that full compliance with the require-ments of a paragraph in the Security Councilresolution of 21 February 1961 (paragraphA-2)5 concerning the withdrawal of foreignmilitary personnel and mercenaries was a con-dition essential to the effective application ofthe protocol.

(The Acting Secretary-General, in a letterdated 24 November 1961, stated that in theabsence of a Secretary-General, the approvalhad been decided on by senior Secretariat mem-bers who had responsible functions in the Congooperation, after consultation with the AdvisoryCommittee on the Congo. It had been essentialfor them to give approval for agreements onmilitary matters in order to save lives and tocarry out the specific objectives laid down bythe Security Council, and the action takencould properly be considered to have been apractical necessity. On 30 November 1961, therepresentative of the USSR, in a communica-tion to the Acting Secretary-General, stated thatthe cease-fire agreements were illegal as theywere in contradiction with the resolutions ofthe Security Council and had been concludedwithout the necessary authorization from theSecurity Council.)

Concurrently with the efforts for a cessationof hostilities, ONUC attempted to impress uponthe Katanga authorities the imperative need,in the interests of the people of the provinceand the Congo as a whole, to undertake seriouscontacts with the Central Government with aview to achieving a peaceful solution of theissues dividing them. It offered assurances guar-anteeing the safety of Mr. Tshombe and hisrepresentatives during any visit to Leopoldvillefor such discussions. Two emissaries of Mr.Tshombe went to the capital on 18 October1961 with Mr. Khiari and presented a memo-randum from Mr. Tshombe to the Prime Min-ister. They returned to Elisabethville on 23 Oc-tober with a message from the Central Govern-ment that it was prepared to examine anyproposals within the framework of the parlia-mentary institutions established by the Loi fon-damentale and in accordance with the principleof legality. The Central Government announcedits readiness to receive Mr. Tshombe and hiscolleagues in Leopoldville for such discussions.

Meanwhile, the Katanga authorities failed to

respect a number of provisions of the protocolof 13 October 1961. The prisoners—190 ONUCprisoners and 240 Katangese prisoners—wereexchanged, after some delays, on 25 October,and ONUC withdrew from several positionsas agreed in the protocol. But the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation re-ported on 2 November that the Katanga au-thorities had failed to fulfil several of theirobligations and had resumed a violent propa-ganda campaign against the United Nations.A large number of foreign personnel, chieflymercenaries, remained in Katanga. It had be-come more difficult than before to identify andapprehend the mercenaries, as they had begunto serve in civilian garb and take cover in vari-ous forms of civilian employ. (ONUC reportsindicated that 237 persons covered by the Secu-rity Council resolution, chiefly mercenaries, re-mained in Katanga in November 1961.) TheUnited Nations was obligated to continue tocare for some 35,000 refugees in Elisabethville,as they refused to return to their homes forfear of reprisals by the local police forces ormembers of Mr. Tshombe's Canokat Jeunesse.

In the latter part of October 1961, militaryengagements occurred on the border of Kasaiand Katanga provinces between Central Gov-ernment forces and the Katanga forces. Someprobing attacks by both sides were reported.The Central Government forces were reportedto have advanced some distance into Katangaand to have been forced by air and groundattacks to retreat. Prime Minister Adoula sentthe Chief of Staff of the National Army toKasai to halt the military operations in orderto establish a favourable climate for talks withthe Katanga authorities. Mr. Tshombe, how-ever, protested the alleged genocide by the Na-tional Army.

Towards the end of the month, small Katan-gese aircraft attacked troops, civilians and com-munications inside the Kasai border. As theseoperations over Kasai were a civil war actionand involved non-Congolese military personnelin violation of the Security Council resolutionof 21 February 1961, and, moreover, constituteda military movement in contravention of thecease-fire agreement of 20 September, United

5 See Y.U.N., 1960, p. 104.


and Mr. Tshombe and his aides, particularlythe Katanga Interior Minister, Mr. Munongo,should not escape the responsibility.

Nations representatives in Elisabethville en-joined the Katanga authorities on 31 Octoberto ground all military aircraft immediately. Theyindicated that unless this was done, the UnitedNations would be obliged to take counter-actionand bring down aircraft engaged in offensivemilitary operations in Kasai.

In order to prevent a recurrence of the situa-tion in September, when ONUC was unableto counter the attacks by a Katanga jet fighterplane piloted by a mercenary, the United Na-tions had secured military aircraft from certainMember States (Ethiopia, India and Sweden).

REPORT OF COMMISSION OFINVESTIGATION ON THE DEATHSOF MR. LUMUMBA AND HIS COLLEAGUES

On 11 November 1961, the report of theCommission of Investigation established by theGeneral Assembly in April by resolution 1601(XV) of 15 April 1961 to investigate the cir-cumstances of the deaths of Patrice Lumumba,Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito, was cir-culated to the Security Council and the Gen-eral Assembly.

The Commission's efforts to arrange a visitto the Congo did not materialize, owing chieflyto the objections of the Leopoldville authorities.

After the establishment of a constitutionalCentral Government in the Congo, its Ministerof Foreign Affairs informed the Commission on19 September 1961 that the Congolese Govern-ment had the right and duty to investigate theaffair and punish the perpetrators of the crime.The United Nations would be kept informedof the progress of the investigation.

The report of the Commission to the SecurityCouncil and General Assembly contained anaccount of the evidence it had gathered andcertain conclusions it had reached. The Com-mission concluded: (1) that the weight ofevidence was against the official version of theKatanga provincial government that Mr. Lu-mumba and his colleagues had been killed bycertain tribesmen on 12 February 1961; (2)that the evidence indicating that the prisonershad been killed on 17 January 1961 in a villanear Elisabethville, probably by certain mer-cenaries in the presence of Katanga provincialofficials, seemed to be substantially true; and(3) that President Kasa-Vubu and his aides

CONSIDERATION BY SECURITYCOUNCIL, 13-24 NOVEMBER

In a cable of 1 November 1961 to the Presi-dent of the General Assembly, the Emperor ofEthiopia expressed concern at the deteriorationof the situation in the Congo and suggestedthat the Security Council must take promptand decisive action.

On 3 November 1961, the representatives ofEthiopia, Nigeria and the Sudan requested thatthe Security Council be convened to considerthe situation caused by the lawless acts of mer-cenaries in the province of Katanga.

The Security Council met on 13 November1961 and decided to consider the situation inthe Congo, including the matter brought to itsattention by these three powers. The Councilconsidered the question at eight meetingsthrough 24 November, with the participation ofthe representatives of Belgium, Congo (Leo-poldville), Ethiopia, India and Sweden, whowere invited, at their request.

In addition to the three-power request andthe reports reviewed above, the Security Coun-cil received two documents and a report onthe situation in the Congo.

On 7 November, the Belgian mission trans-mitted a Belgian Government communiqué of30 October stating that passports of Belgiannationals who continued to serve in the Katangaarmies would be withdrawn and that passportswould henceforth be refused to applicants whowere not prepared to sign a declaration under-taking not to serve in foreign forces.

On 11 November, the Minister for ForeignAffairs of the Congo (Leopoldville) transmittedto the Acting Secretary-General a note he hadsent on 6 November to the Belgian representa-tive to the United Nations. In this note, herecalled that the Congolese Government hadasked for the closure of all Belgian consulatesin the Congo in 1960, when it had severeddiplomatic relations with Belgium, and that ithad repeatedly requested the closure of the "so-called Belgian consulate" which continued tofunction in Elisabethville. He asked in partic-ular that 12 Belgian military advisers who were


then in the "consulate" be immediately with-drawn in accordance with the resolutions of theSecurity Council and the General Assembly.(The Belgian Foreign Minister informed theSecurity Council on 15 November that theseofficers were being withdrawn at the requestof the United Nations.)

On 19 November 1961, the Officer-in-Chargeof the United Nations Operation in the Congosubmitted a report giving further informationon the hostilities on the Kasai-Katanga borderand an account of certain disturbances of publicorder which had taken place in Luluabourg.Stanleyville, Albertville and Kindu.

In Luluabourg, capital of the Kasai province,where National Army contingents had beenbrought in on the way to the Katanga border,a group of soldiers became disorderly on thenight of 1-2 November and raped eight women.ONUC, in co-operation with the local NationalArmy commander, took action to protect theforeign population, confine the troops to campand restore calm. United Nations officials madevigorous representations to the provincial au-thorities over the restrictions they had imposedon exit visas to persons of European origin.The restrictions were cancelled. Subsequently,on 5 November, when a unit of mutinous Con-golese troops arrived from the Katanga borderarea, United Nations troops disarmed the muti-neers on their arrival and transported them toLeopoldville at the request of the National Armycommander.

Disturbances also took place in Stanleyville,Orientale province. Vice-Premier Gizenga hadarrived there on 4 October on an eight-dayleave from the Council of Ministers, but failedto return to Leopoldville on the expiry of hisleave. The Orientale provincial president, J. F.Manzikala, was placed under house arrest on19 October after the provincial assembly adopteda vote of censure against him, and the UnitedNations Force granted him protection at hisrequest. Members of the Jeunesse du mouve-ment national congolais caused disturbances inthe city on 30 October 1961, and the UnitedStates Consul was assaulted at his hotel. Orderwas soon restored on the personal interventionof General Lundula. General Lundula went toLeopoldville on 11 November 1961 for con-ferences with members of the Central Govern-

ment and pledged allegiance to the Presidentof the Republic on 13 November.

In Albertville and nearby towns in northernKatanga, where the Baluba population was ingeneral opposed to Mr. Tshombe, problems ofmaintenance of public order were created bythe activities of disorderly groups describingthemselves as "jeunesse." On 10 November 1961,ONUC granted protection for the evacuationof the families of the staff of certain Albertvilleenterprises and helped control the situation inthe city. Disturbances occurred again on 13November when a National Army contingentfrom Stanleyville reached Albertville. TheUnited Nations representative persuaded itsofficers to keep the troops out of the centre ofthe city, but on the next day, armed soldiersappeared in town and began to loot propertyand threaten and arrest civilians. ONUC offi-cials organized additional evacuations of foreignnationals, afforded protection to those remain-ing in the city and took measures to restoreorder. The Commander of the National Armycontingent promised to maintain order, punishthe culprits and return stolen property. Securityconditions improved rapidly thereafter.

A grave incident occurred on 11 Novemberat Kindu, Kivu province, a staging area forNational Army troops sent from Stanleyville tonorthern Katanga. After the arrival of twoUnited Nations aircraft with armoured cars forthe United Nations contingent, Congolese troopsattacked and looted the United Nations messand beat and imprisoned 13 Italian crew mem-bers. When their demand for the surrenderof the armoured cars was refused, they sur-rounded the airport where the camp of theONUC battalion was situated.

United Nations officials contacted the Congo-lese commander, Colonel Pakassa, but heclaimed that he had little control over his troopsand sent telegrams to General Lundula andMr. Gizenga asking them to come to Kindu.

A senior staff officer of General Lundulaarrived on 13 November, but Colonel Pakassarefused to acknowledge his authority. GeneralLundula and the Minister of Interior arrivedon the next day and issued orders to ColonelPakassa to pacify his troops, return the Italiancrewmen and United Nations property, with-draw the troops near the airport and send the


culprits to Stanleyville for punishment. TheUnited Nations property was returned, and theCongolese troops withdrew from the airport on15 November, but Colonel Pakassa stated thathe had no information on the Italian crewmembers who were said to have escaped. Laterin the day, however, United Nations representa-tives secured information that the 13 Italiancrew members had been brutally murdered byCongolese soldiers on the day of their capture.The Officer-in-Charge of ONUC in Leopold-ville dispatched a letter to the Central Govern-ment demanding the immediate arrest of Colo-nel Pakassa and the punishment of those guiltyof the crime. He also proposed the establishmentof a joint investigating committee. This wasagreed to by the Prime Minister. The commit-tee's investigation did not result in the appre-hension and punishment of the actual culprits.Colonel Pakassa was apprehended and, afterbeing questioned by the committee, was handedover to the Central Government at its requestfor possible prosecution.

Initiating the discussion in the Security Coun-cil on 13 November 1961, the representative ofEthiopia stated that a grave situation had beencaused by the continued foreign intervention inKatanga and the military build-up in the prov-ince. Since it seemed that the Katanga authori-ties would not evict foreign military personneland mercenaries as required by the Council'sresolution of 21 February 1961, he suggestedthat the Council should adopt clear directivesauthorizing the Acting Secretary-General toevict them by force. He also called for measuresby the Council to stop interference in Katangathrough territories on the borders of the prov-ince. He said that the United Nations Commandshould help the efforts of the constitutionalCentral Government, which had been set upin August, to restore law and order in thecountry and remove the threat of foreign in-tervention against its territorial integrity.

The Foreign Minister of the Congo (Leopold-ville) stated that all efforts by the Central Gov-ernment towards a peaceful solution of theKatanga problem, within the framework of theLoi fondamentale, had failed because of theintransigence and duplicity of Mr. Tshombe,who had been supported by foreign mercenaries.Since the Congolese National Army alone did

not have the necessary means to dispose of theKatangan secession, he argued that the UnitedNations had the duty to expel the mercenariesor deliver them to Congolese justice. (On 13November 1961, the Congolese Governmentcommunicated to the United Nations the textof an Ordinance providing for the punishmentof non-Congolese officers and mercenaries serv-ing in the Katangese forces who had not en-tered into contract with the Central Govern-ment. It requested the United Nations hence-forth to place all mercenaries at the disposal ofthe Central Government.) The Foreign Min-ister also requested United Nations assistancein the re-organization and strengthening of theNational Army so that his Government couldensure the maintenance of law and order in thecountry and avoid dependence on other States.He said that such assistance by the UnitedNations would not involve intervention in Con-golese domestic affairs, as it would be givenat the request of the legal Government and asits purpose would be to prevent foreign inter-vention rather than involvement in any internalconflict.

The Foreign Minister of Belgium stated thathis Government, since taking office in April1961, had attempted to co-operate effectivelywith the United Nations in the implementationof its decisions even when it did not agree withthe decisions. He claimed that it had compliedwith the United Nations decisions concerningthe evacuation of political advisers and militaryand paramilitary personnel. It had refrainedfrom providing any military assistance to theKatanga authorities, had taken measures to pre-vent recruitment of Belgian mercenaries forKatanga and had co-operated with the UnitedNations in the withdrawal of a large numberof mercenaries. He claimed that his Govern-ment could not be held responsible for theBelgian mercenaries who might be in Katangain defiance of the law, without its knowledgeand against its instructions. He complained thatthe United Nations had made unfounded accus-ations against Belgium, especially in connexionwith the events of 28 August and 13 September,and asked for an impartial international investi-gation. He stated that his Government recog-nized the Central Government of the Congo asthe legitimate Government in all the country


and was opposed to the secession of Katanga.It had provided substantial technical assistanceto the Congo, despite the absence of diplomaticrelations, and only wished to continue such as-sistance without interfering in the country's poli-tical life.

Finally, the Belgian Foreign Minister ex-pressed apprehension over proposals to author-ize the use of force by the United Nations. Hesaid that, although the position taken by Mr.Tshombe in recent correspondence with theCentral Government was not acceptable, con-ciliation did not seem impossible. He thoughtthat the United Nations should first exhaust allpossibilities for conciliation.

On 14 November 1961, Ceylon, Liberia andthe United Arab Republic submitted a draftresolution by which the Security Council would :reaffirm earlier resolutions; deprecate secession-ist activities carried out in Katanga—with theaid of external resources and foreign merce-naries—and armed action against the UnitedNations forces; authorize the Secretary-Generalto take vigorous action, including the use ofrequisite measures of force, for the apprehen-sion, detention or deportation of all foreignmercenaries and other "hostile elements" as laiddown in the resolution of 21 February 1961;request the Secretary-General to take all neces-sary measures to prevent the entry of such ele-ments or of war material; demand that allsecessionist activities in Kantaga should ceaseforthwith; and declare full and firm support forthe Central Government of the Congo.

The sponsors argued that the United Nationsshould declare its support to the constitutionalCentral Government established in August andshould give a clear mandate to the ActingSecretary-General to deal with the problem offoreign intervention in Katanga. They expressedconfidence that he would use his mandate wiselyand judiciously and stated that their proposalwould not close channels for conciliation.

During the discussion, all Council membersexpressed opposition to secessionist activities inKantanga and to foreign interference in theCongo. Several representatives, however, voicedreservations about certain provisions of thisdraft resolution.

The representative of France said that theproblem of re-integration of Katanga in the

Congo and the problem of relations betweenthe various parts of the country should be solvedthrough negotiations and persuasion, to whichhis Government would give full support, andnot by force.

The United States representative stated thatthe three-power draft resolution had construc-tive elements but focused predominantly onone aspect of the problem. He felt that theCouncil should take effective action not onlyin connexion with the secessionist actions inKatanga, but also with regard to what he de-scribed as the defiance of the Central Govern-ment by the authorities in the Orientale prov-ince. He suggested that the United Nationsshould provide assistance to the Congolese Gov-ernment to strengthen and re-train its armedforces and acquire a small, effective air force.

The USSR representative said that Katangawas the centre of foreign intervention in theinternal affairs of the Congo and that suchinterference was the basis of the whole Congo-lese crisis. He supported the three-power draftresolution since, despite its weaknesses, it didfocus attention on this main problem.

The United Kingdom representative deniedthat the authorities in Rhodesia had intervenedor facilitated foreign intervention in the Congo.He suggested that the draft resolution shouldnot be confined to the problem of Katanga andthat it should place greater emphasis on paci-fication and conciliation as the main role ofthe United Nations in the Congo.

The representative of China suggested meas-ures to promote negotiation and conciliationand emphasized that the United Nations shouldnot interfere in conflicts of a domestic nature.

The representative of Turkey, while support-ing most of the draft resolution, expressed reser-vations on the wording of two paragraphs. Therepresentatives of Chile and Ecuador stated thatthey would support measures in line with theCharter to end foreign intervention in theCongo and to preserve its territorial integrity.

The representative of Sweden stated that theproblem of foreign personnel and mercenariesin the Congo could only be settled by vigorousefforts by the Government concerned. He feltthat the United Nations role should be limitedto the maintenance of order and to preventingconflict. It should not be extended to include


participation in a civil war. The representativeof India emphasized the need for clear direc-tives by the Security Council so that the UnitedNations Force could function effectively andcomplete its mission as soon as possible.

On 20 November, Ceylon, Liberia and theUnited Arab Republic submitted a revision oftheir draft resolution. By the new text, theCouncil would, among other things, declare thatall secessionist activities were contrary to theLoi fondamentale and Council resolutions, whilespecifically demanding that such activities thentaking place in Kantanga should cease forth-with. They stated that though the Council hadno official information concerning secessionistactivities outside Katanga, they were willingto declare opposition to such activities anywherein the Congo.

On the same day, the United States sub-mitted several amendments to the joint draftresolution; these were revised on 21 Novemberand again on 24 November.

During the discussion which followed, theUSSR representative indicated that he wouldnot object to certain of the amendments butwould oppose several others. Among the UnitedStates amendments which he was willing tosupport were the proposed revisions to the pre-amble, whereby the Council would: deplore allarmed action in opposition to the authority ofthe Congolese Government, specifically actionthen being carried on in Katanga; note withdeep regret the recent and past actions ofviolence against United Nations personnel; andrecognize that the Congolese Government wasexclusively responsible for the conduct ofCongo's external affairs. He also did not objectto a revision of the paragraph which wouldauthorize the Secretary-General to take actionto apprehend, detain or deport persons coveredby the Security Council resolution of 21 Febru-ary. (The three-power draft resolution referredto "foreign mercenaries and hostile elements."Several members feared that the last phrasewas liable to misinterpretation and might causeneedless alarm and uncertainty. The UnitedStates amendment used the terminology of theCouncil's resolution of 21 February 1961,namely, "foreign military and para-military per-sonnel and political advisers not under theUnited Nations Command, and mercenaries".)

The USSR representative opposed the otherUnited States amendments. One of these wouldhave the Council authorize the Secretary-Gen-eral, in consultation with the Congolese Gov-ernment, to remove weapons of war which hadillegally entered Katanga "or any other regionof the Congo," or to prevent their use againstthe United Nations or the Republic of theCongo or the civilian population. AnotherUnited States amendment would have theCouncil ask the Secretary-General to assist theCongolese Government to re-organize and re-train its armed forces. A third amendmentwould have the Council ask the Secretary-Gen-eral to take steps he considered necessary, in-cluding negotiation and conciliation, to achievethe immediate political unity and territorial in-tegrity of the Congo.

With regard to the first of these amendments,the USSR representative proposed deletion ofthe reference to other regions of the Congo onthe grounds that it would distract attentionfrom the central problem of colonial interven-tion in Katanga and that war material had notillegally entered regions other than Katanga.Opposing the provision of assistance to Congo-lese armed forces, he stated that it was anenormous task which did not fall within thefunctions of the United Nations at the presenttime. He added that the Acting Secretary-Gen-eral had authority under the Council's resolu-tion of 21 February 1961 to extend appropriateassistance and that a special decision on thatmatter in the present resolution would only dis-tract attention from the main problem. Further,the third amendment seemed to imply negotia-tions with the secessionists in Katanga, which,in his delegation's view, were inappropriate andharmful. He added that political unity hadbeen achieved in the Congo through the con-vening of Parliament and that territorial in-tegrity would be attained only when the so-called independent state of Katanga wasliquidated.

The United States representative and severalother members argued that the amendmentswere essential to meet the needs of the situa-tion and were consistent with the intent of thethree-power draft resolution. They stated thatrecent events described in the report of 19November 1961 by the Officer-in-Charge of the


United Nations Operation had shown thethreats to the maintenance of law and orderarising from a lack of discipline in certain Con-golese armed units, and they suggested thaturgent action was required to rebuild the armedforces, in accordance with the earlier decisionsof the Council, so that they might be able toperform their functions. They stressed the im-portance of making every effort to solve theCongolese problems by negotiation, conciliationand other peaceful means to the greatest ex-tent possible.

The Foreign Minister of the Congo (Leopold-ville) expressed the view that there was nocontradiction between the draft resolution andthe United States amendments and the Sovietsub-amendment. He asked for assistance to hisGovernment in order to build an effective armyand stated that little progress had been madein this respect since the agreement of April be-tween the United Nations and the President ofthe Congo. He supported the amendment onremoving or preventing the use of illegally im-ported arms. He said that though there existedno secession other than that in Katanga, hisGovernment would not object to the declara-tion condemning all secession. As to the ques-tion of negotiations and conciliation towardsa peaceful solution of the Katanga problem, headded that the repeated efforts of his Govern-ment had been frustrated by the attitude ofMr. Tshombe and the interference of foreigninterests.

The United Kingdom representative said thathe would support the draft resolution with theUnited States amendments but expressed mis-givings about the provisions concerning the useof force. He also stated that United Nationsofficials should not interpret the provisions andact in such a way as to endanger the uneasypeace in Katanga, especially in view of theexistence of a cease-fire agreement with theKatanga authorities. The representative ofFrance stated that though his delegation de-plored secessionist and mercenary activities inKatanga, it would abstain on the vote, as itfelt that the United Nations should not becomea party to any internal conflict and that use offorce could bring results contrary to those soughtby the Council.

Before the vote on the amendments and the

draft resolution on 24 November 1961, the rep-resentative of the United States withdrew theamendment concerning negotiation and concili-ation. He stated that the Secretary-General hadthe requisite authority under earlier resolutionsand that an adverse vote on the amendmentmight be construed as a restriction of suchauthority.

The Council then adopted the United Statesamendments to which the USSR did not ob-ject. The amendment to authorize the Secretary-General to remove or prevent use of weaponsof war which had entered illegally into Katangaand other regions was rejected, having receivedonly six votes. (The representative of the USSRvoted against it after his sub-amendment to de-lete a reference to other regions was rejected.France, the United Arab Republic and theUnited Kingdom abstained, and Ceylon did notvote). The other United States amendmentsfailed of adoption because of the adverse voteof the USSR. The three-power draft resolution,as amended, was then adopted by 9 votes, withFrance and the United Kingdom abstaining.(For full text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCESbelow.)

The representative of the United Statesstated, in connexion with this resolution, that itcould in no way be regarded as implying adiminution of the authority previously grantedto the Secretary-General and expressed confi-dence that the Acting Secretary-General wouldcontinue to carry out all the resolutions to thefull effect. The USSR representative expressedthe hope that the Acting Secretary-Generalwould scrupulously implement the provisions ofthe resolution without covering them in anyspecial or political interpretation. The UnitedKingdom representative stated that he had ab-stained because of the rejection of some of theUnited States amendments. The Foreign Min-ister of the Congo (Leopoldville) thanked theSecurity Council for its decision and pledgedfull co-operation to the Acting Secretary-General.

The Acting Secretary-General told the Secur-ity Council that he intended to discharge theresponsibilities entrusted to him, in connexionwith the question of the activities of the mer-cenaries in Katanga, with determination andvigour and to employ as much as possible of the


total resources available to the United Nationsoperation toward that end. He pointed out,however, that the recent events in the Congoshowed that the Central Government was atthat stage unable to assume an increased re-sponsibility in the sphere of law and order. Asthe need for continuing United Nations as-sistance in that field was still critical in manyparts of the Congo, it might be necessary fromtime to time to establish temporary prioritiesin the continuing efforts to achieve the variousobjectives of the United Nations. He noted thatall of the United Nations responsibilities flowingfrom past resolutions continued with new em-phasis, as they had been reaffirmed in thepresent resolution. They included the responsi-bility with regard to the training and re-organ-ization of the Congolese armed forces under theterms of the previous Security Council resolu-tions. He appealed to United Nations MemberStates for more troops at the present criticalstage and expressed the view that a gradualreduction in the size of the Force might be pos-sible after the current phase of disorder andsecessionist threat was over. He assured theCouncil that the United Nations would redoubleits efforts to achieve peaceful reconciliation ofthe differences which endangered the unity ofthe country.

Finally, with regard to the murder of 13Italian members of the United Nations Forceon 11 November, which had been condemnedby members of the Security Council, he statedthat ONUC was taking all possible measuresto see that all who were guilty of the crimewould be severely punished. He pointed out,however, that this tragedy was but one of along series of such experiences suffered withpatience and fortitude by the United Nationspersonnel at the hands of undisciplined troopsin the Congo.

DEVELOPMENTS FROM24 NOVEMBER TO21 DECEMBER 1961

On 27 November 1961, the Acting Secretary-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairsof the Republic of the Congo signed an agree-ment on the legal status, facilities, privilegesand immunities of the United Nations Organ-ization in the Congo. It laid down the details

of the application of the basic agreement signedon 27 July 1960 and was to be deemed to havetaken effect from the date of the arrival of thefirst elements of the United Nations. The agree-ment made it clear that the responsibilities ofthe United Nations Force for the maintenanceof public order, peace and security would bedischarged in accordance with its interpretationof the mission assigned to it by the SecurityCouncil. It would not apply to domestic laws,regulations and procedures, which would re-main fully within the responsibility of the Con-golese authorities. The United Nations wouldnot have recourse to the use of force except asa last resort and subject to the restrictions im-posed by its mandate and the resolutions of theSecurity Council and the General Assembly.Both parties undertook to co-ordinate their ac-tions in the maintenance of public order andto adopt the principle of mutual consultation.

Meanwhile, the Katanga authorities launcheda propaganda campaign of increasing violenceagainst the United Nations in violation of theprovisions of the protocol of 13 October 1961.The campaign became highly inflammatoryafter the adoption of the Security Council reso-lution of 24 November. Mr. Tshombe and hiscolleagues alleged that the United Nations haddecided to launch a war on Katanga and calledon the Katangese to prepare to fight against theUnited Nations. The rousing of public feelingagainst the United Nations and the incitementto violence against the United Nations person-nel, despite the protests of the United Nationsrepresentatives, soon led to grave incidents.

On the night of 28 November 1961, twosenior officials of the Secretariat, George IvanSmith and Brian Urquhart, were dragged by"para-commandos" and gendarmes from a pri-vate residence in Elisabethville and severelybeaten. Mr. Smith was rescued by the UnitedStates Consul, but Mr. Urquhart was held forseveral hours under threat of death and was re-leased only after demands to the provincial min-isters. An officer of the United Nations Force,Major Ajeet Singh, who had been looking forMr. Urquhart, was soon found to be missing,and the mutilated body of his driver was dis-covered by United Nations patrols.

On instructions from the Acting Secretary-General, United Nations representatives warned


Mr. Tshombe to cease the inflammatory propa-ganda against the Organization and to co-oper-ate with it for a peaceful solution of the prob-lems in conformity with the resolutions of theSecurity Council and the General Assembly.They demanded the punishment of those guiltyof acts of violence and written apologies onbehalf of the provincial government.

The first reaction of the Katanga authoritiesseemed to have been one of alarm. On 1December, Mr. Tshombe sent a letter to UnitedNations representatives expressing regret overthe attacks on Mr. Smith and Mr. Urquhart,announcing that those guilty had been punishedand affirming his intention to avoid incidentsand attempt to resolve problems by peacefulmeans. He stated that an investigation had beenundertaken into the incident concerning MajorSingh and his driver.

It soon appeared, however, that the Katangaauthorities were unable to control their forces,especially the "para-commandos." Incidents in-creased after the departure of Mr. Tshombe on1 December for Brazzaville and Paris.

On 2 December 1961, United Nations troopsat the Elisabethville airport disarmed somedrunken Katangan gendarmes when they mo-lested several Congolese women. Other gen-darmes and police opened fire on the UnitedNations troops and were also disarmed anddetained. United Nations representatives con-tacted the Katanga authorities in order to de-liver the prisoners to them, but, in the mean-time, the Katanga gendarmerie began to patrolthe town and set up roadblocks to impede vitalUnited Nations communications. United Na-tions personnel were molested at the roadblocks,and several were detained by the "para-com-mandos." The gendarmerie units were with-drawn on the night of 2-3 December at thedemand of the United Nations, and the latterdelivered the prisoners to the Katanga authori-ties. The next morning, however, the gendarm-erie returned to the town and resumed man-ning the roadblocks. Several incidents occurred,and by the morning of 4 December, one memberof the United Nations Force was killed, twowere wounded and a number missing. Laterthat day a roadblock, manned by a strong force,was set up on the road from the airport to thecity, thus cutting communications between the

ONUC headquarters and the airport and sever-ing the only exit available to ONUC troops inthe city. Though the Katanga authorities under-took, at the demand of United Nations repre-sentatives, to remove the roadblock, it soon be-came apparent that they were only engaged ina delaying manoeuvre and that the gendarmeriewas planning to encircle the airport and attackand destroy the United Nations Force. On 5December, United Nations troops cleared theroadblock by force; one Indian officer of theUnited Nations Force was killed and four menwounded in the action, while the Katangaforces lost at least 38 gendarmes and "para-commandos" and two non-Congolese merce-naries.

After this defensive action by the UnitedNations to regain freedom of movement, theKatanga forces engaged in a series of aggressiveactions, attacking or sniping at United Nationspositions. A Katanga airplane dropped threebombs at the airfield. On the morning of 6December, the Katanga Minister of Interiormade an inflammatory broadcast accusing theUnited Nations of declaring war on Katangaand calling upon the people to fight against theUnited Nations Force. In order to prevent thearrival of further crowds of disorderly Katan-gese gendarmes in Elisabethville and to preventfurther attacks by Katanga planes, the UnitedNations planes attacked the airports at Jadot-ville and Kolwezi and certain other points.United Nations troops cleared a number ofroadblocks in Elisabethville. They also under-took to disarm the Katanga gendarmerie atManono where they had been strengthened inviolation of the cease-fire and caused tension.

The Katanga forces, aided by non-Congolesecivilians and mercenaries, intensified sniping at-tacks against United Nations positions and ham-pered the freedom of movement of United Na-tions troops. They followed a consistent patternof sniping and shelling from civilian homes andfrom the immediate vicinity of hospitals, schoolsand similar institutions. ONUC headquarterswas under constant mortar attack. Violating thelaws of war, the gendarmes attacked the Balubarefugee camp and inflicted a number ofcasualties.

In addition, they regularly abused the RedCross symbol, employing vehicles painted with


red crosses to transport gendarmes and to snipeat United Nations personnel. Mr. Olivet, thechief delegate of the International Red Crossat Elisabethville, vainly attempted to preventthis, requesting Radio Katanga to broadcasthourly messages for that purpose. On the after-noon of 13 December 1961, Mr. Olivet and twoother Red Cross representatives were reportedmissing. On 23 December, their bodies werefound beside a burnt-out ambulance near theold airfield. In February 1962, a commission ofinvestigation was appointed by the Acting Secre-tary-General of the United Nations and theInternational Committee of the Red Cross. Thetask of the commission was to carry out animpartial and independent inquiry into the cir-cumstances of the tragic death of the Red Crossrepresentatives on 13 December at Elisabeth-ville. (On 8 June 1962, after making a full andthorough investigation, the commission submit-ted its report to the International Committeeof the Red Cross and the United Nations.)

The United Nations Force in Elisabethvillewas in a particularly unfavourable positionwhen hostilities were launched against it by theKatangese gendarmes, because about one-halfof its units were carrying out a periodic peace-ful rotation. While re-inforcements were rushedto the scene, in part with the assistance of airtransport provided by the United States, theONUC troops refrained from major defensiveaction. They were, however, obliged to clearseveral roadblocks and positions from which theKatangese gendarmes fired on United Nationspositions. In its anxiety to avoid endangeringcivilian lives and property, the United NationsForce was at serious disadvantage, as the Ka-tanga forces consistently used the presence ofcivilians and civilian installations to shield theiractivities. The mercenary-led gendarmes alsoendeavoured, without success, to draw theONUC troops into house-to-house fighting intown; this would have caused heavy civiliancasualties.

On 10 December 1961, the Acting Secretary-General issued a statement saying that militaryaction had been forced on the United Nationsby a series of deliberate attacks against UnitedNations personnel and positions and by theimpeding of the freedom of movement in Elisa-bethville. Only when negotiations had proved

fruitless, because of repeated instances of badfaith by the Katanga political leaders and theirfailure to implement agreed measures, did theUnited Nations undertake military action withthe greatest reluctance. Its purpose was toregain and assure freedom of movement, restorelaw and order, and defend United Nations per-sonnel and positions. The Acting Secretary-Gen-eral added that the military action would bepursued only up to such time as these objectiveswere achieved by military or other means andsatisfactory guarantees were obtained for thefuture. The United Nations would also need tobe satisfied that it would be able to pursue theimplementation of the Security Council andGeneral Assembly resolutions without hindrance.He stated that he would welcome any initiativewhich would enable the achievement of theaims as peacefully and as speedily as possible.

The re-inforcement of the United Nationstroops in Elisabethville was completed on 14December and, as the Katangese attacks con-tinued, ONUC undertook a more active role insecuring freedom of movement. Between 15 and17 December, ONUC forces captured severalimportant positions around the perimeter ofElisabethville, including the main gendarmeriecamp. ONUC struck from the air at certain in-stallations of the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga which, despite repeated warnings, wereused for sniping at United Nations troops. On18 December, United Nations troops began topatrol the streets of Elisabethville to re-establishlaw and order.

During all the fighting, the United Nationsgave all possible assistance to civilians andshowed great restraint despite sniping fromcivilian houses. The Katangese forces, on theother hand, inflicted damage on civilian areas,often by missing their targets during attacks onUnited Nations positions. Many press dis-patches, however, misrepresented the facts onthe operation and exaggerated the loss of lifeand property suffered by the civilians.

In cables on 8 and 9 December 1961, theForeign Minister of Belgium informed the Act-ing Secretary-General that the military opera-tions in Katanga and the death of several Bel-gian civilians killed by United Nations troopshad aroused profound emotion in Belgium. Heurged that the United Nations troops should


scrupulously respect the obligations of theGeneva Convention regarding the safeguardingof the lives and property of the civilian popula-tion. He denied allegations against the UnionMinière and asked for the protection of its tele-communications installations, which were ofgreat importance to the population. He ques-tioned the legal basis of the action taken by theUnited Nations and expressed the view that theoperations seemed to be out of proportion withthe mandate given to the Secretary-General. Inreplies of 8 and 15 December, the Acting Secre-tary-General reviewed the course of eventswhich led to the hostilities, explained the UnitedNations objectives and denied allegations againstthe United Nations troops. He stated that theUnion Minière had assisted the Katanga author-ities against the United Nations by supplyingarms and equipment, providing working papersfor mercenaries and in other ways. He offeredto provide protection to the company if it ceasedto carry out its hostile activities against theONUC.

In cables on 15 December 1961, the Presidentof the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville)called for an immediate cease-fire in Katangaand requested that the Security Council con-vene immediately to reconsider the action takenby the United Nations. The representative ofCongo (Brazzaville) stated, in a note to theActing Secretary-General, that his Governmentconsidered that the continuation of militaryoperations would exceed the limits set by theobligations of the United Nations Force andwould imply a deliberate intention to intervenein the settlement of Congo's internal politicalproblem. The Acting Secretary-General repliedon 15 December that he would fully support thedesirability of a cease-fire on the basis outlinedin his statement of 10 December. On 16 De-cember, the President of the Congo (Brazza-ville) informed the Acting Secretary-Generalthat his Government had regretfully decided toforbid aircraft engaged in transport on behalfof ONUC to land in or fly over its territory.The Acting Secretary-General replied on thesame day that this action would constitute agrave hindrance to the fulfilment of United Na-tions purposes and would violate the obligationsof the Republic under the Charter and the Se-curity Council resolutions. (The Security Coun-cil did not accede to the request for a meeting

to consider the messages from the Republic ofthe Congo (Brazzaville).)

The Acting Secretary-General informed theAdvisory Committee on the Congo on 16 De-cember 1961 that he had also received appealsfor a cease-fire from the representatives of theUnited Kingdom, Belgium and Greece and fromthe President of Madagascar. He stated that hewas always ready to consider reasonable pro-posals for a cease-fire provided that the UnitedNations objectives were safeguarded.

Meanwhile, on 15 December, the President ofthe United States consulted the Acting Secre-tary-General in connexion with a cable he hadreceived from Mr. Tshombe indicating that hedesired to negotiate with Prime Minister Adoulaon various aspects of the Congo problem.

The Acting Secretary-General stated that theUnited Nations would do all in its power tofacilitate such a meeting at a place acceptableto the Prime Minister and would give assur-ances in regard to the personal security of Mr.Tshombe. After agreement with Prime MinisterAdoula, he designated representatives to assistin the negotiations and announced that, thoughthere would be no cease-fire agreement, theUnited Nations troops in Katanga would holdtheir fire for the duration of the talks unlessfired upon.

Fighting soon subsided in Elisabethville, ex-cept in the Union Minière area where theKatanga forces and non-Congolese civilians andmercenaries subjected the United Nations troopsto heavy mortar fire causing many casualties.The United Nations Force occupied the UnionMinière factory on 19 December 1961 andcaptured a large quantity of arms. They re-pulsed an attack by a gendarmerie platoon onthe next day.

A meeting between Prime Minister Adoulaand Mr. Tshombe was arranged on 19 Decem-ber 1961, with the assistance of the United Na-tions and the United States, at Kitona, a formerBelgian military base under ONUC control. Itended on 21 December when Mr. Tshombe, aspresident of the provincial government of Ka-tanga, made a declaration accepting the appli-cation of the Loi fondamentale of the Congo;recognizing the indissoluble unity of the Re-public and the authority of the Central Govern-ment over all parts of the Republic; recognizingPresident Kasa-Vubu as Head of State; agreeing


set up a commission to study the implicationsof the Kitona declaration.

On 5 January 1962, Mr. Tshombe ap-proached ONUC with a request for the serv-ices of a neutral juridical expert to assist theprovincial assembly and its commission. He con-firmed this request in a letter of 15 January,making it clear that the expert would not beasked to express any opinion on matters of sub-stance, but would only examine the form andpresentation of the conclusions drawn from theassembly's discussions. The United Nations con-sulted Prime Minister Adoula, who stated thathe had no objection to the provision of a legalexpert for the limited purpose indicated. TheActing Secretary-General then assigned theLegal Counsel of the United Nations, Constan-tin Stavropoulos, to the task.

Meanwhile, tension in Elisabethville dimin-ished after the conclusion of the Kitona talks,and military activities directly involving theKatangese gendarmerie and ONUC forcesceased almost completely. ONUC took immedi-ate measures to help restore normal civilian life.Joint patrols were organized by ONUC and theElisabethville police to maintain public order,particularly to halt looting of a large numberof houses which had been deserted. ONUC as-sisted the Elisabethville police to bring about theevacuation of houses which had been illegallyoccupied by members of various tribes (espe-cially Baluba) who had fled from their owncommunes in fear of attacks by the gendarmerieand by foreign elements. These measures helpedgreatly to restore law and order in Elisabethville.

The problem of mercenaries continued, how-ever, as the hard core of this group remained atlarge, having succeeded in evading apprehensionby ONUC forces. Recruitment of mercenariesin certain foreign countries did not cease afterthe Kitona declaration.

United Nations representatives continued topress the Katanga authorities in the strongestterms for the urgent and complete eliminationof all remaining mercenaries from Katanga.Little progress was made in that respect, thoughMr. Tshombe reiterated his Government's in-tention to liquidate the problem and providedinformation on the dismissal or expulsion ofsome mercenaries.

In order to reduce the influx of mercenariesand the illicit arms traffic into Katanga, the

to the participation of Katanga's representativesin the Governmental Commission to be con-vened at Leopoldville on 3 January 1962 tostudy the draft Constitution; pledging to takeall necessary steps to enable Parliament mem-bers from Katanga to discharge their nationalmandate from 27 December 1961 ; agreeing toplace the Katanga gendarmerie under theauthority of the President of the Republic; andpledging to ensure respect for the resolutions ofthe General Assembly and the Security Counciland to facilitate their implementation. Thoughthe declaration contained no reservation on hispart, Mr. Tshombe added in a letter to theUnited Nations representative, Ralph J. Bunche,that he had not been able to consult the com-petent authorities in Katanga so as to be author-ized to speak on their behalf and that he pro-posed to do that on his return and inform theCentral Government of the steps to be takenwith a view to the application of the declaration.

DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN21 DECEMBER 1961AND 30 JANUARY 1962

In accordance with the Kitona declaration,Mr. Tshombe announced his readiness to sendKatanga parliamentarians to Leopoldville toparticipate in the session of the Parliament. Healso dispatched three Katanga officials to Leo-poldville to participate in discussions for themodification of the constitutional structure ofthe country. ONUC provided transport to theparliamentarians and officials and gave assur-ances guaranteeing their safety during their stayin Leopoldville and return to Elisabethville.

With respect to the other provisions of theKitona declaration, Mr. Tshombe took the posi-tion that they should be discussed by the pro-vincial assembly. He summoned the assembly tomeet in Elisabethville on 3 January 1962 andasked the United Nations for assistance in trans-porting the deputies. President Kasa-Vubu, onthe other hand, promulgated an Ordinance toconvoke the provincial assembly to meet inextraordinary session at Kamina, but Mr.Tshombe replied to him through ONUC chan-nels contending that convocation by the Presi-dent was irregular and contrary to the Loifondamentale. The provincial assembly met inElisabethville on 3 January and on the nextday, when a quorum was obtained, decided to


Acting Secretary-General addressed communica-tions to the Permanent Representatives of theUnited Kingdom and of Portugal on 29 and 30December 1961, respectively, soliciting their co-operation and proposing that United Nationsobservers be stationed at a few selected airportsand roads through which transit from Rhodesiaand Angola into Katanga takes place. NeitherGovernment accepted the Secretary-General'sproposal, though for different reasons.

The Government of the Federation of Rho-desia and Nyasaland suggested, through theUnited Kingdom Government, that the ActingSecretary-General visit the Federation to discussall aspects of traffic across the border and thatthe present Red Cross inspection procedures forrail traffic from Ndola to Katanga be extendedto air and road communications between North-ern Rhodesia and Katanga. The Acting Secre-tary-General replied, after consulting the Advi-sory Committee on the Congo, that he was un-able to accept the invitation but would considersending a high official of the United Nations torepresent him in discussions on this subject.

In view of the continued presence of merce-naries in Katanga, United Nations representa-tives, acting on instructions from the ActingSecretary-General, warned the Katanga authori-ties on 24 and 25 January 1962 that unlessurgent steps were taken to eliminate the merce-naries, not only in Elisabethville but also inother towns, ONUC would not hesitate to takeall necessary measures to do so.

In a letter on 27 January 1962, Mr. Tshombestated that his government was determined toexpel the mercenaries who were still in Katangawithin a month. It was also prepared to give theUnited Nations a list of all mercenaries whohad been in Katanga, He proposed that a jointcommission of civilian representatives of theUnited Nations and the Katanga governmentbe set up to seek out any mercenaries who triedto escape the consequences of the measurestaken. He stated that the proposed joint com-mission would have free access to all places inKatanga.

The Officer-in-Charge of the United NationsOperation in the Congo replied on 30 Januaryagreeing to the idea of one or more joint com-missions on the understanding that the UnitedNations representation in the commissionsshould not be limited to civilians and stating

that the elimination of the mercenaries shouldbe undertaken immediately and should not besubject to the time-limit of one month.

On 30 January, Mr. Tshombe delivered tothe United Nations representative a list of for-eign officers who had been serving in the Ka-tanga gendarmerie up to 28 August 1961 when,according to him, the services of foreign officerswere terminated.

Meanwhile, on 1 January 1962, mutinoussoldiers of the Congolese National Army com-mitted acts of brutality in Kongolo, north Ka-tanga. They killed twenty-two Catholic mission-aries, most of them Belgians, as well as manyCongolese, and sacked the town. Soon afternews of the disturbances was received, anONUC officer flew to Kongolo to help evacuatenon-Congolese priests and nuns from the area.The evacuation was completed successfully, andno casualties were reported after 1 January.The Central Government undertook an investi-gation into the events.

In reply to communications from the repre-sentative of Belgium about this incident, the Act-ing Secretary-General stated that the UnitedNations had been prevented from stationingtroops in the Kongolo area owing to the deter-mined opposition of the Katanga gendarmerie.The gendarmerie, then 1,800 strong, withdrewon 30 December 1961, leaving the town to themercy of a small and disorderly detachmentof the Congolese National Army. As neitherONUC nor the Central Government had beeninformed of this move, the United Nations wasunable to ensure the protection of persons bydirect ONUC action. The Acting Secretary-General pointed out, further, that the activitiesof the mercenaries and the attacks by theKatanga gendarmerie in Elisabethville hadstrained the available resources of the UnitedNations Force and had sharply circumscribedits ability to assist in the maintenance of lawand order.

Meanwhile, at the request of the CentralGovernment, the United Nations Force tooksteps to assist in the maintenance of law andorder in Stanleyville, Orientale province, whenit was disturbed by certain developments re-lating to Antoine Gizenga. Mr. Gizenga, whohad been appointed Vice-Premier of the CentralGovernment in August 1961, had returned toStanleyville in October on a leave of absence


of eight days. Despite numerous reminders fromthe Prime Minister, he refused to return to Leo-poldville. He created a new political party andmade speeches violently attacking the CentralGovernment; these led to increasing tension inStanleyville and the Orientale province. Tensionincreased after 13 November 1961 when GeneralLundula, commander of the Congolese NationalArmy in Orientale province, swore allegianceto the President of the Republic.

On 8 January 1962, the House of Representa-tives decided to request the Government to or-der Mr. Gizenga to return to Leopoldville with-in 48 hours in order to answer charges of seces-sionism and of maintaining a private militia.Mr. Gizenga did not, however, return to thecapital within the time-limit. On the night of12 January, the provincial gendarmerie, whichfollowed orders from Mr. Gizenga, took uppositions around his residence and in CampKetele, the gendarmerie camp, where theyarrested their own officers. Fighting broke outat Camp Ketele on 13 January between thegendarmerie and the army, and 14 persons werekilled.

The next morning, most of the gendarmes sur-rendered to General Lundula. During the fight-ing, ONUC troops had been on guard through-out the city to protect the civilian population,but they did not have to intervene. After thegendarmes had surrendered, ONUC assistedtroops of the Armée nationale congolaise (ANC)in disarming them at the request of the CentralGovernment; this mission was performed with-out a shot being fired.

On 14 January, Mr. Gizenga sent a messageto the Prime Minister, through ONUC, that hewould return to Leopoldville on 20 January.On 15 January, the House of Representativesadopted a motion of censure calling for the re-moval of Mr. Gizenga from his post as Vice-Premier, and the motion was confirmed on thesame day by an Ordinance by the President.The Government also ordered a judicial investi-gation to determine Mr. Gizenga's responsibili-ties in the Stanleyville incident of 13 January1961. On 17 January 1961, Mr. Gizenga ad-dressed a message to the Acting Secretary-Gen-eral seeking assurance of his safety and claimingthat the decision of the House of Representa-tives could have no validity until he had beengiven a hearing. The Acting Secretary-General,

in a message to Prime Minister Adoula on 17January, stated that while he would scrupulouslyavoid any intervention in the internal affairs ofthe Congo, he would express the hope that Mr.Gizenga's rights under the law would be fullyrespected. He added that the United NationsForce would respond to Mr. Adoula's requestsfor any assistance which might be necessarytoward ensuring Mr. Gizenga's safety.

On 19 January 1961, Prime Minister Adoulaendorsed a request by the President of theOrientale provincial government and GeneralLundula for ONUC assistance to transport Mr.Gizenga to Leopoldville. On 20 January, Mr.Adoula assured the Acting Secretary-Generalthat the Government would take all necessarysteps to enable Mr. Gizenga to avail himself ofall the legal processes open to him under thelaws in force.

Mr. Gizenga arrived in the capital on 20January on a United Nations aircraft. ONUCafforded him protection, with the approval ofMr. Adoula, until 22 January, when he wastransferred at his own request to his former offi-cial residence. Mr. Gizenga thanked the UnitedNations and declared that he no longer wishedONUC protection. The offer of ONUC protec-tion, however, remained open to him.

The Central Government then assumed theresponsibility for Mr. Gizenga's protection andtransferred him on 23 January to a residenceat Camp Rhodeby. The Présidence du Conseilissued a communiqué on 26 January that Mr.Gizenga was not under house arrest but that theGovernment had had to take certain securitymeasures to ensure his safety. (In February, Mr.Gizenga was moved to an island at the mouthof the Congo River.)

MEETING OF SECURITYCOUNCIL, 30 JANUARY 1962

Meanwhile, by a letter of 25 January 1962,the USSR representative requested an urgentmeeting of the Security Council to consider theimplementation of the Council resolution of 24November 1961. He stated that the matter re-quired consideration, since the resolution hadstill not been implemented because of the oppo-sition of certain colonial powers. He added thatthe United Nations had completely halted mili-tary operations, though the provisions of theresolution had not been complied with.


In a cable on 28 January, the Prime Ministerof the Congo expressed regret that the USSRhad made the request for a Security Councilmeeting without prior consultation with theCongolese Government. He opposed any meet-ing at the present time as likely to create con-fusion when the situation in the Congo wasshowing marked improvement on the basis ofthe country's territorial integrity. On the nextday, the Chairman of the Conference of theHeads of African and Malagasy States and Gov-ernments, which was then in session at Lagos,Nigeria, sent a cable to the President of theSecurity Council that the Conference had learntabout the USSR request with considerableanxiety. In view of the encouraging develop-ments towards a solution of the Congo problem,the Conference considered it unwise to disturbthe present efforts of the Congolese CentralGovernment by any uncalled-for intervention.

When the Security Council met on 30 Janu-ary 1962 at the USSR's request, the UnitedStates representative moved the adjournment ofthe meeting on the ground that the Councilshould be guided by the views of the CongoleseGovernment and that the Acting Secretary-Gen-eral and the United Nations Command shouldbe left alone to continue their vigorous effortsto carry out their mandates. After some pro-cedural discussion, the United States motionwas approved by 7 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions.

DEVELOPMENTS FROM30 JANUARY TO23 FEBRUARY 1962

On 2 February 1962, in response to continuedpressure by United Nations representatives formeasures to ensure the expulsion of the merce-naries, Mr. Tshombe stated that he would ac-cept two joint commissions, composed of civilianand military representatives, to expedite theimplementation of United Nations resolutions.He explained that he had not meant to makethe operation conditional on any time-limit. Thetwo commissions were formed on 7 and 8 Febru-ary and left on their first visits, one to Jadotvilleand the other to Kipushi, on 9 February.

During joint meetings of the two commissionson 8 February and on subsequent dates, theUnited Nations representatives asked for listsand various particulars concerning the merce-naries and for lists of foreign personnel in the

Sûreté and the Katanga police. They also askedfor a list of areas where the Katanga forceswere stationed and their strength. The Katan-gese members, on 12 and 16 February 1962, de-livered a list of 89 "other volunteers" (in addi-tion to those on the list transmitted on 30 Janu-ary 1962) who were said to have left on 8February. Apart from the locations of unitswhere most of these mercenaries had served,they provided no further information.

In discussions with Mr. Tshombe, the UnitedNations representatives also emphasized theurgent need for the presence of United Nationstroops at Jadotville, Kolwezi and other loca-tions. Mr. Tshombe stated on 7 February 1962that such an arrangement, under the circum-stances, would call for psychological preparationof the population. He suggested that the re-sumption of the operations of the Union Minièreplant at Lubumbashi and the return of theKatanga gendarmerie to Camp Massart wouldbe helpful. The Officer-in-Charge of the UnitedNations Operation in the Congo agreed to thesemeasures on condition that ONUC would main-tain measures to ensure the necessary supervisionof the activities of the Lubumbashi factory andthat the return of the gendarmerie to CampMassart would be synchronized with the entryof ONUC forces into Jadotville and Kolwezi.

The Commission of the Katanga provincialassembly continued discussions on the imple-mentation of the Kitona declaration of 21 De-cember.

The United Nations legal expert, Mr. Stavro-poulos, attended seven meetings of the commis-sion from 3 February 1962. The commission hadadopted a report on 7 January providing forcompliance with the Loi fondamentale and theauthority of the Central Government only aftera number of stated conditions had been met.After discussion with the legal expert, whostated that his terms of reference did not permitassistance in the preparation of such a docu-ment, the commission decided to prepare a re-port adopting the Kitona declaration withoutreservations and adding observations relating tothe implementation of its terms. A new reportwas then prepared with the assistance of thelegal expert and approved on 13 February. Itwas, however, amended by the commission onthe next day: among the changes was the refer-ence to the Kitona declaration as the "draft"


declaration. On 15 February the provincial as-sembly adopted the commission's draft resolu-tion with further amendments.

Under this resolution, the Katanga assemblyaccepted the "draft declaration of Kitona" asa "potential basis of discussion with a view tothe settlement of the Congolese conflict." Itauthorized the Katanga government to estab-lish contact with the Central Government witha view to arriving at a solution by negotiationand peaceful means in the spirit of the "draft"declaration. It proceeded to recommend thatin a spirit of conciliation, the Central Govern-ment must: forego taking punitive measuresagainst any civil or military officers who mighthave executed the orders of the Katanga gov-ernment since 30 June 1960; avoid sending toKatanga civil or military officers who might behostile to the Katanga authorities; refrain fromsending to Katanga armed forces liable tospread disorder or panic among the population ;refrain from showing any form of partiality inthe internal dissensions of Katanga and fromopposing the restoration of the Katanga govern-ment's authority over the whole of the province;take the necessary measures to balance thebudget of the country; and prohibit all mone-tary, fiscal or administrative measures liable toprejudice the economic and financial situationof Katanga or the smooth running of publicservices. The assembly also recommended thatthe work of preparing the new constitution

should be speedily concluded. Finally, it re-served the right to ratify the agreements whichmight be concluded between "the authorities inLeopoldville and those of Katanga."

On 16 February 1962, Prime Minister Adoulaexpressed disappointment at a statement madeby Mr. Tshombe in the Katanga provincial as-sembly and at the resolution adopted, but sentan invitation to Mr. Tshombe for a meeting inLeopoldville to discuss the procedure for carry-ing out the Kitona declaration. On the sameday, Mr. Tshombe suggested a personal meet-ing with Mr. Adoula to discuss a solution ofthe problems in the spirit of the Kitona decla-ration. On 19 February, Mr. Adoula sent threemessages to Mr. Tshombe asking for informa-tion on appointments of officers in the Katangagendarmerie, inviting Katanga gendarmeriecommanders to a meeting to discuss the re-organization of the National Army and sug-gesting a session of the provincial assembly, at-tended by all elected representatives underUnited Nations security arrangements, to helpsettle the internal problem of Katanga.

In response to requests by Mr. Tshombe,ONUC offered him and his party guaranteesfor their security during their visit to Leopold-ville. The guarantees were to cover the wholeperiod of the visit and were to include com-plete freedom to decide the time of the returnto Elisabethville. Mr. Tshombe arrived in Leo-poldville on 15 March 1962.

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 973-979, 982, 989.

S/4790/Add.1. Report to Secretary-General from hisActing Special Representative in Congo concerninginterrogation of 30 mercenaries apprehended atKabalo on 7 April 1961. Note from Secretary-General.

S/4803. Letter of 15 May 1961 from Representativeof USSR.

S/4805. Letter of 15 May 1961 from President of Secur-ity Council to Permanent Representative of USSR.

S/4807 and Add.1. Second report by Secretary-Gen-eral dated 17 and 18 May 1961, on certain stepstaken in regard to implementation of Security Coun-cil resolution of 21 February 1961.

S/4809. Letter of 23 May 1961 from Permanent Rep-resentative of USSR.

S/4810. Letter of 23 May 1961 from President ofSecurity Council to Permanent Representative ofUSSR.

S/4811. Letter of 16 May 1961 from A. Gizenga.

S/4812. Letter of 24 May 1961 from Permanent Rep-resentative of Poland.

S/4815. Letter of 29 May 1961 from Acting Perma-nent Representative of Czechoslovakia.

S/4817. Letter of 30 May 1961 from Chargé d'Affairesa.i. of Albania.

S/4836. Letter of 12 June 1961 to President of Se-curity Council from Acting Chairman of Commis-sion of Investigation established under terms ofGeneral Assembly resolution 1601 (XV).

S/4841 and Add.1-3. Report of 20 June 1961 bySecretary-General on implementation of paragraphB-1 of Security Council resolution of 21 February1961; Statement by Mr. Gizenga on 23 June 1961;Protocol of 24 June 1961 signed by Mr. Tshombeand representatives of Leopoldville authorities; Or-der No. 41 of 5 July 1961 by President of Congoconvening Legislative Chambers.

S/4842. Letter of 21 June 1961 from Permanent Rep-resentative of Cuba to Secretary-General and replyof 22 June.


S/4863. Message of 19 July 1961 from President ofMali to Secretary-General, and reply of 20 July.

S/4865. Letter to 9 July 1961 from A. Gizenga toSecretary-General.

S/4876. Telegram of 21 July 1961 from President ofTunisia.

S/4908 and Corr.1. Letter of 31 July 1961 from Act-ing Permanent Representative of USSR.

S/4909. Letter of 1 August 1961 from President ofSecurity Council to Secretary-General transmittingUSSR letter (S/4908.)

S/4910. Letter of 1 August 1961 from President ofSecurity Council to Acting Permanent Representa-tive of USSR.

S/4911 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2. Messages of 25 Julyand 1 August 1961 from A. Gizenga to Secretary-General; Letter of 2 August 1961 addressed to Mr.Gizenga by Officer-in-Charge of United NationsOperation in Congo.

S/4913. Report of 2 August 1961 by Secretary-Generalconcerning meeting of Parliament of Republic ofCongo and establishment on 2 August 1961 of anew Government of Republic.

S/4917. Report of 4 August 1961 by Officer-in-Chargeof United Nations Operation in Congo on actiontaken by United Nations to assist in implementationof 19 June agreement between Leopoldville andStanleyville authorities.

S/4923. Exchange of letters of 10 to 13 August 1961between Prime Minister of Congo and Secretary-General.

S/4937. Exchange of letters of 10 September 1961between Prime Minister of Congo and Secretary-General.

S/4939. Note verbale of 13 September 1961 fromPermanent Representative of Belgium transmittinga press communiqué issued by Belgian Government.

S/4940 and Add.1-12, and Add.12/Corr.1. Report of14 September 1961 by Officer-in-Charge of UnitedNations Operation in Congo relating to implemen-tation of paragraph A-2 of Security Council resolu-tion of 21 February 1961, and addenda coveringperiod 14 September-2 November 1961, includingspecial report on tragic flight of Secretary-General(S/4940/Add.5 and 9) ; Report on implementationof cease-fire agreement between United Nationstroops and those of Katanga authorities (S/4940/Add. 10 and 11) ; Report on action taken in imple-mentation of protocol of agreement between Ka-tanga authorities and ONUC subsequent to cease-fire and on other matters (S/4940/Add.12).

S/4962. Letter of 16 October 1961 from PermanentRepresentative of USSR.

S/4964. Note verbale of 17 October 1961 from Min-ister of Foreign Affairs of Congo (Leopoldville).

S/4973. Letter of 3 November 1961 from representa-tives of Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan.

S/4975. Note verbale of 7 November 1961 from Per-manent Representative of Belgium, transmittingcommuniqué of Belgian Government.

S/4976. Report of Commission of Investigation estab-lished under terms of General Assembly resolution1601 (XV).

S/4977-S/4980, S/4982, S/4983, S/4986. Letters andtelegram dated 10 to 14 November 1961 concerningrequests of representatives of Ethiopia, Belgium,India, Congo (Leopoldville) and Sweden to par-ticipate in discussion in Security Council.

S/4981. Letter of 11 November 1961 from Ministerfor Foreign Affairs of Congo (Leopoldville).

S/4987. Letter of 16 November 1961 from PermanentRepresentative of Israel.

S/4988. Communications of 14 November 1961 fromMr. Tshombe addressed to Secretary-General andto certain delegations.

S/4940/Add.13. Report of Officer-in-Charge of UnitedNations Operation in Congo relating to implementa-tion of paragraph A-2 of Security Council resolu-tion of 21 February 1961; Report dated 16 No-vember 1961 on action by troops of Government ofRepublic of Congo in Kasai-Katanga border areaand on hostilities involving gendarmerie units inprovince of Katanga.

S/4985 and Rev.1. Ceylon, Liberia, United Arab Re-public: draft resolution and revision.

S/4989 and Corr.2 and Rev.1 and 2. United States:amendments and revised amendments to 3-powerrevised draft resolution, S/4985/Rev.1.

S/4991. USSR: sub-amendments to United Statesamendments, S/4989.

S/5002. Resolution, as proposed by three powers,S/4985/Rev.1 and as amended, adopted by Councilon 24 November 1961, meeting 982, by 9 votes to 0,with 2 abstentions, as follows:In favour: Ceylon, Chile, China, Ecuador, Liberia,Turkey, USSR, United Arab Republic, UnitedStates.Against: None.Abstaining: France, United Kingdom.

"The Security Council,"Recalling its resolutions S/4387, S/4405, S/4426

and S/4741,"Recalling further General Assembly resolutions

1474(ES-IV), 1592(XV), 1599(XV), 1600(XV) and1601 (XV),

"Reaffirming the policies and purposes of the UnitedNations with respect to the Congo (Leopoldville) asset out in the aforesaid resolutions, namely:

"(a) To maintain the territorial integrity and thepolitical independence of the Republic of the Congo;

"(b) To assist the Central Government of theCongo in the restoration and maintenance of law andorder;

"(c) To prevent the occurrence of civil war in theCongo ;

"(d) To secure the immediate withdrawal andevacuation from the Congo of all foreign military,para-military and advisory personnel not under theUnited Nations Command, and all mercenaries ; and

"(e) To render technical assistance,"Welcoming the restoration of the national Parlia-

ment of the Congo in accordance with the Loi fonda-mentale and the consequent formation of a CentralGovernment on 2 August 1961,

"Deploring all armed action in opposition to the


authority of the Government of the Republic of theCongo, specifically secessionist activities and armedaction now being carried on by the Provincial Ad-ministration of Katanga with the aid of external re-sources and foreign mercenaries, and completely re-jecting the claim that Katanga is a 'sovereign inde-pendent nation,'

"Noting with deep regret the recent and past actionsof violence against United Nations personnel,

"Recognizing the Government of the Republic ofthe Congo as exclusively responsible for the conductof the external affairs of the Congo,

"Bearing in mind the imperative necessity of speedyand effective action to implement fully the policies andpurposes of the United Nations in the Congo to endthe unfortunate plight of the Congolese people, neces-sary both in the interests of world peace and inter-national co-operation, and stability and progress ofAfrica as a whole,

"1, Strongly deprecates the secessionist activitiesillegally carried out by the provincial administrationof Katanga, with the aid of external resources andmanned by foreign mercenaries;

"2. Further deprecates the armed action againstUnited Nations forces and personnel in the pursuit ofsuch activities;

"3. Insists that such activities shall cease forth-with, and calls upon all concerned to desist therefrom;

"4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigor-ous action, including the use of requisite measure offorce, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension,detention pending legal action and/or deportation ofall foreign military and para-military personnel andpolitical advisers not under the United Nations Com-mand, and mercenaries as laid down in paragraph A-2of the Security Council resolution of 21 February1961;

"5. Further requests the Secretary-General to takeall necessary measures to prevent the entry or returnof such elements under whatever guise and also ofarms, equipment or other material in support of suchactivities ;

"6. Requests all States to refrain from the supplyof arms, equipment or other material which could beused for warlike purposes, and to take the necessarymeasures to prevent their nationals from doing thesame, and also to deny transportation and transitfacilities for such supplies across their territories, ex-cept in accordance with the decisions, policies andpurposes of the United Nations;

"7. Calls upon all Member States to refrain frompromoting, condoning, or giving support by acts ofomission or commission, directly or indirectly, to ac-tivities against the United Nations often resulting inarmed hostilities against the United Nations forces andpersonnel ;

"8. Declares that all secessionist activities againstthe Republic of the Congo are contrary to the Loifondamentale and Security Council decisions and spe-cifically demands that such activities which are nowtaking place in Katanga shall cease forthwith;

"9. Declares full and firm support for the CentralGovernment of the Congo, and the determination to

assist that Government in accordance with the deci-sions of the United Nations to maintain law and orderand national integrity, to provide technical assistanceand to implement those decisions;

"10. Urges all Member States to lend their sup-port, according to their national procedures, to theCentral Government of the Republic of the Congo,in conformity with the Charter and the decisions ofthe United Nations;

"11. Requests all Member States to refrain fromany action which may directly or indirectly impedethe policies and purposes of the United Nations inthe Congo and is contrary to its decisions and thegeneral purpose of the Charter."

S/5003. Letter of 23 November 1961 from Presidentof Security Council to Acting Secretary-General andreply of 24 November 1961.

S/5004. Agreement of 27 November 1961 betweenUnited Nations and Republic of Congo relating tolegal status, facilities, privileges and immunities ofUnited Nations Organization in Congo.

S/4940/Add.14, 15 and Corr.1, 16-19. Reports of29 November-22 December 1961 by Officer-in-Charge of United Nations Operation in Congo,relating to implementation of paragraph A-2 of Se-curity Council resolution of 21 February 1961 in-cluding Report relating to incident of 28 November1961 in Elisabethville (S/4940/Add.15 and Corr.1)and Reports concerning situation in Elisabethville(S/4940/Add.16-19).

S/5009. Letter of 30 November 1961 from representa-tive of USSR.

S/5010 and Corr.1. Note verbale of 1 December 1961from Permanent Delegation of Congo (Leopold-ville).

S/5025. Note verbale of 11 December 1961 from Per-manent Representative of Belgium communicatingtext of three cables from Minister for Foreign Af-fairs of Belgium to Acting Secretary-General, andreplies of 8 and 15 December 1961.

S/5026, S/5027. Telegram and letter of 15 December1961 from President of Congo (Brazzaville), andletter of same date from Permanent Representativeof Congo (Brazzaville).

S/5035. Exchange of communications dated 15-18 De-cember 1961 between President and PermanentRepresentative of Congo (Brazzaville) and ActingSecretary-General.

S/5038. Report of 21 December 1961 by Secretary-General concerning negotiations at Kitona betweenPrime Minister Cyrille Adoula and Mr. Tshombe.

S/5053 and Add.1-5, 5/Corr.1, 6, 6/Corr.1, 7, 8. Re-port of 9 January 1962 by Officer-in-Charge ofUnited Nations Operation in Congo on develop-ments relating to application of Security Councilresolutions of 21 February and 24 November 1961,and addenda covering period through 19 Febru-ary 1962.

S/5064. Letter of 25 January 1962 from PermanentRepresentative of USSR.

S/5065 and Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1. Note verbaleof 17 January 1962 from Permanent Representative


of Belgium to Acting Secretary-General, and repliesof 27 and 29 January 1962.

S/5066. Cable of 28 January 1962 from Prime Min-ister of Congo (Leopoldville).

S/5069. Telegram of 29 January 1962 from Chairmanof Conference of Heads of African and MalagasyStates and Governments.

S/5070, S/5072. Notes verbales of 30 January 1962from Permanent Delegation of Congo (Leopold-ville).

S/5078. Note verbale of 3 February 1962 from Perma-nent Representative of Belgium to Acting Secretary-General and reply of 16 February 1962.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY——16TH SESSION

A/4786(S/4841) and Add.1-3. Report of Secretary-

General on implementation of paragraph B-1 ofSecurity Council resolution of 21 February 1961.

A/4830(S/4913). Report by Secretary-General con-cerning meeting of Parliament of Republic of Congoand establishment on 2 August 1961 of new Gov-ernment of Republic.

A/4951. Cable of 1 November 1961 from Emperor ofEthiopia to President of General Assembly.

A/4964 (S/4976). Report of Commission of Investiga-tion established under terms of General Assemblyresolution 1601(XV).

A/4974, A/4976. Letters of 16 and 20 November1961 from Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

A/4986(S/5004). Agreement between United Nationsand Republic of Congo relating to legal status,facilities, privileges and immunities of United Na-tions Organization in Congo.

UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO(As of 21 February 1962)

ArgentinaAustriaBrazilCanadaCeylonDenmarkEthiopiaFederation of MalayaGhanaIndiaIrelandItalyLiberiaNetherlandsNigeria

InfantryForces

2,9981,505

6484,701

695

235

1,696

Supporting Forces(including staff, airand administrative

personnel)164855

318138953

92

1,07134

132367

NorwayPakistanSierra LeoneSwedenTunisia

Total

InfantryForces

111672546

13,807

Supporting Forces(including staff, airand administrative

personnel)132671

2042

2,865

Infantry and/or supporting units contributedto the United Nations Force in the Congowere withdrawn at varying stages by variouscountries, during the period May 1961—Feb-ruary 1962 as follows: by Morocco in May1961 and by Greece in November 1961.

UNITED NATIONS CIVILIAN OPERATIONSIN THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)

During 1961, the United Nations CivilianOperations Scheme—set up in 19606—continuedto aid the Republic of the Congo (Leopold-ville) in many fields of activities.

MAIN SPHERES OF ACTIVITY

As in 1960, the long-range aim of the schemecontinued to be the training of the largest pos-sible number of Congolese nationals in variousprofessional fields in order to enable themfully to assume the responsibilities imposed uponthem by their country's independent status. Theneed to alleviate critical hardships or to preventserious damage made it necessary, however, toconcentrate an important part of the available

resources on the carrying out of emergencyprogrammes of famine relief, assistance to re-fugees and displaced persons, assistance to theunemployed through public works, and assist-ance to flooded areas. Many critical situationsoccurred during the year and were met throughthe good will and donations of Governments,international institutions and charitable organi-zations, co-ordinated locally by the UnitedNations.

In the field of public administration, the de-parture of several thousand Belgian technicians

6 For information about activities in 1960, seeY.U.N., 1960, p. 108.


left a gap that could be only partially filled.The national civil service of the Congo wasleft with a shortage of qualified employees inpractically every field of activity. In 1961, theCivilian Operations Scheme was still heavilycommitted to some of the operations it had tostart in 1960 as a result of this serious shortageof manpower.

In order to maintain a minimum of essen-tial services, it was necessary to make extensiveuse of United Nations experts in such fields aspublic health, civil aviation, telecommunicationsand meteorology. These experts often had toassume responsibilities in the national civilservice until such time as the training effortsof the United Nations produced enough Congo-lese to replace them. Many special trainingprojects were undertaken in 1961 by the Congo-lese authorities with United Nations assistance.They covered a wide range of activities, asindicated below.

The Civilian Operations Scheme was alsoused to help the Republic of the Congo financeits essential imports. Owing to the difficult po-litical and economic situation, foreign exchangereserves had been dwindling rapidly. Exportproceeds dropped to a fraction of the levelprevailing before the country attained inde-pendence. The foreign exchange proceeds be-came insufficient to cover the minimum im-port requirements. Accordingly, on 12 June1961, an agreement was signed between theSecretary-General of the United Nations andthe President of the Congo providing forUnited Nations financial assistance. A sum of$10 million was made available by the UnitedStates through the United Nations to the Re-public's Monetary Council for financing a pro-gramme of essential imports. This assistancewas intended to benefit the population of thecountry as a whole.

FINANCING OF SCHEMEContributions to the United Nations Fund

for the Congo (set up to finance the CivilianOperations Scheme from voluntary contribu-tions) rose from $10 million at the end of 1960to $33 million at the end of 1961. United Na-tions Member States continued to respond tothe appeal for contributions to the Fund whichwas made by the General Assembly in Sep-tember 1960 when it approved the Fund's es-

tablishment. This Fund did not include thenumerous contributions from Governments andcharitable organizations for relief or refugeerelief activities.

A sum of $22,950,000 from the Fund wasspent for the import support programme estab-lished under the Agreement of 12 June 1961between the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations and the President of the Republic ofthe Congo. Another $7 million was used tofinance the technical assistance programmesdescribed below.

The following table gives a breakdown ofexpenditures from the Congo Fund, by fieldof activity, from the time the Scheme wentinto operation until the end of 1961 :

AgricultureCommunicationsEducationFinance

Import Support ProgrammeAdvisory Services

Foreign TradeHealthJudicatureLabourPublic AdministrationNatural ResourcesPublic WorksSocial Activities

Total

(In U.S. Dollars)208,537

1,681,008897,246

22,950,000371,54821,213

3,784,550119,57088,466

495,982600

59,820851,200

31,529,740

OPERATIONS

Details of some of the more important as-sistance projects undertaken by the CivilianOperations Scheme are given below.

FISCAL MATTERS

Besides providing a channel for external as-sistance to the import support programme, theCivilian Operations Scheme helped in the or-ganization of the Monetary Council, establishedby a decree in June 1961 to assume the manage-ment of all activities previously conducted bythe Central Bank of the Belgian Congo andRuanda-Urundi. United Nations experts gaveadvice on the country's foreign exchange posi-tion, and they helped to organize, under theMonetary Council's guidance, the ExchangeControl Office and the Import-Export Licens-ing Office.

In addition to providing training in customs


and taxation matters, United Nations expertstried to improve the collection of public reve-nues (customs duties and internal taxes).

AGRICULTURE

In 1961, 60 Congolese students completedtheir courses at the Farm Mechanics TrainingCentre. The aim of the Centre was to provideshort, intensive training courses to turn outmechanics capable of operating and maintain-ing the agricultural machinery lying idle atthe country's agricultural settlements. Thirty-six courses were in progress at the end of 1961.Another training scheme—an accelerated coursefor agricultural assistants—was completed inDecember, training 24 students, all governmentemployees.

Eighteen experts from the Food and Agricul-ture Organization (FAO) helped the CentralGovernment's Department of Agriculture indrawing up plans and projects to facilitatethe recovery of the Congo's agriculture.

COMMUNICATIONS

The lack of Congolese technicians made itnecessary for the United Nations to continueto operate communications, meteorological,postal, transport and other services in 1961.This was achieved with the help of expertsprovided by the International Civil AviationOrganization (ICAO), the World Meteorologi-cal Organization (WMO) and the Interna-tion Telecommunication Union (ITU).

The United Nations continued its work oftraining Congolese to take up full operationalresponsibility in future years. By the end of1961, there were 34 students who had com-pleted preliminary training in the aforemen-tioned fields, and 99 were taking advancedcourses. The courses were given at the ICAOSchool for Air Traffic Controllers and Aero-nautical Radio Operators.

A telecommunications school and a school ofmeteorology were also run by the CongoleseGovernment with United Nations assistance.

Aid was also given in radio broadcasting, forrepairing radio installations and for advisingon programmes and the broadcasting system asa whole.

EDUCATION

The contribution of the United Nations

Scheme to the restoration and expansion of theeducational system of the Congo representeda most important undertaking. Of the manyeducational problems in the Congo, the over-riding one was the lack of trained teachers. Inthis connexion, the United Nations Operationin the Congo (ONUC) arranged for the recruit-ment of a number of teachers who arrived earlyin 1961. Political disturbances and the break-down of law and order in certain parts of thecountry made it impossible, however, to providethe required educational assistance on an evenbasis throughout all the provinces of the Congo,as many teachers were not willing to work inareas that did not enjoy the protection of theUnited Nations Force.

In spite of these difficulties, experts providedby the United Nations Educational, Scientificand Cultural Organization (UNESCO) at-tempted to draw up an emergency assistanceprogramme and initiated a study on the futureprospects of education in the Congo. On thebasis of these studies, it appeared that im-mediate action should be concentrated on twomain problems: (a) increased recruitment offoreign school teachers and (b) increased train-ing of Congolese teachers at both the primaryand the secondary levels.

The need for the training of teachers, par-ticularly of secondary school teachers, and forthe training of management and inspectionpersonnel led to the undertaking of two train-ing projects. One, the National PedagogicalInstitute, began courses in December 1961.Twenty-six students were enrolled for thepreparatory-year classes and for the first yearof regular study. The Congolese Government,bilateral programmes and the United Nationswere associated with this project. It was hopedthat, within five years, the school would turnout 200 fully qualified students annually.

These projects were only a part of a muchlarger plan of action that was extended alsoto some research institutions, such as the In-stitute for Scientific Research in Central Africa.Manuals and other teaching materials neededby Congolese schools were obtained abroadthrough the UNESCO coupon scheme.

HEALTH

The immediate task of the Civilian Opera-tions Scheme continued to be the recruiting of

QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE) 85doctors in order to replace some of the medicalpersonnel who had left their posts as a resultof the political disturbances. As in the case ofthe teachers, however, fear, on the one hand,and, on the other hand, the limitations imposedby the fact that doctors had to be French-speaking, directly affected the development andscope of the programme. Nevertheless, by themiddle of 1961, 100 doctors were already work-ing in the Congo. At the end of the year, thenumber of doctors in the Congo had reached150, coming from more than 20 countries.

An emergency programme was also organizedat an early stage to increase quickly the tech-nical skills of those Congolese who already hadsome elements of medical knowledge. In addi-tion to the provision of fellowships for studyabroad (115 medical assistants had beenawarded study opportunities abroad since thefellowship programme began), a course forpublic health personnel and for laboratory tech-nicians was started in the Congo. Apart fromformal training programmes, each doctor ortechnician assigned under the Civilian Opera-tions Scheme was required to train the Congo-lese personnel working with them.

Though it was not intended that it shouldbe the responsibility of the Civilian OperationsScheme to provide medical supplies and drugsto the Congo, it was necessary on several oc-casions for the Scheme to help out in face ofcritical shortages of indispensable pharmaceuti-cal or medical products. Certain provinces hadto be supplied for several months, and this wasachieved with the aid of the International Com-mittee of the Red Cross, the League of RedCross Societies and the United Nations Chil-dren's Fund (UNICEF).

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Many of the difficulties confronting the Con-golese authorities in 1961 were due in part tothe lack of adequate administrative machinery.After the attainment of independence and thewithdrawal of Belgian officials, the Congoleseauthorities had no alternative but to promoteto administrative and managerial functionsjunior clerks who had had no chance previouslyfor proper training or preparation for assumingthe responsibilities attached to their new jobs.

The aim of the aid in public administrationwas to lay some of the groundwork for building

up, in subsequent years, a Congolese civil serv-ice suited to the country's needs.

The most urgent task of the United Nationsexperts was to assist in establishing a depart-ment responsible for the civil service. Theydrew up organizational charts in order to definethe functions and jurisdiction of different de-partments, and they helped in the drafting ofstatutes for the civil service in order to simplifyor supplement the pre-independence regulationsthat had been drawn up mostly for expatriatecivil servants.

Besides providing these urgent advisory serv-ices, the Civilian Operations Scheme gave tech-nical and financial aid to the newly createdNational School of Law and Administrationthat was set up with ONUC's assistance totrain judges, legal advisers and higher publicservants. By the end of 1961, 293 Congolesewere taking courses at the School. Of these,100 were to take posts in the Central Govern-ment and the provinces during the course of1962.

In addition, 40 magistrates' assistants com-pleted their training in 1961.

EMERGENCY PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME

The emergency public works programme wasintended to give an immediate boost to therehabilitation of the Congo's economy and toprovide jobs to the many Congolese who hadto face unemployment as a result of the de-teriorating economic situation.

The public works programme concentratedon repairing bridges and roads and on the main-tenance and construction of roads. It becameincreasingly evident during 1961 that the in-ternal transportation problem was one of themain reasons for lagging agricultural produc-tion and for recurrent famine situations in theprovinces.

Public works experts assisted in drafting thebudget for public works, in checking plans forroads and bridges with the provincial ministries,in supervising the works technically and inverifying bills presented by contractors for workdone. In view of the shortage of trained Congo-lese supervisors and overseers, the public worksteam urged the Congolese authorities to estab-lish a technical college for which the CivilianOperations Scheme would provide the teachingstaff.


In the latter part of 1961 there was wide-spread and serious flooding in the central CongoRiver basin. In co-operation with the provincialgovernments, internationally-recruited engineerstook the measures needed to re-establish basicpublic services which had been disrupted by theextensive flooding.

REFUGEE AND FAMINE RELIEF

AND OTHER ACTIVITIES

At the end of 1960, shortages of food inSouth Kasai developed into a famine situation,which continued through a large part of 1961.An emergency relief programme, organized bythe United Nations, was able to draw uponand co-ordinate the contributions of many Gov-ernments and international and national or-ganizations in all parts of the world. After sixmonths of emergency assistance and medicalcare, it was possible to report that the faminehad been overcome and the death rate reducedto normal. Several thousand persons had diedof famine before the United Nations effortbegan. The number of those saved was estimatedat about a million.

Other recurrent famine conditions appearedamong the refugee settlements in Katanga, inKivu and in Leopoldville. Donations for reliefpurposes were co-ordinated through the United

Nations. A small staff was put together atONUC headquarters headed by a Relief Co-ordinator. UNICEF, the Food and AgricultureOrganization (FAO) and the Red Cross helpedin the establishment of emergency food distri-bution programmes. A staff of Congolese clerks,mechanics, loaders and drivers helped to ensureefficient results.

Among the many other training and opera-tional activities during 1961, there may also bementioned the advisory services given in thefield of labour and social affairs. The socialand labour system existing before independencecould not be maintained as such and had tobe re-organized. Of particular importance toUnited Nations activities in the social field wasthe contribution of UNICEF, which providedfinancial support during the first year of CivilianOperations in the amount of $948,000. UNICEFcontributed largely to the medical assistance ofthe refugees. UNICEF experts were also in-strumental in setting up a milk-distribution net-work (to reach needy children all over theCongo) and training programmes for teams ofCongolese nurses' aides and rural leaders.

Technical advice, inspection tours and de-tailed reports were also offered in the fields ofnatural resources and mining and industry.


Progress Report No. 10 on United Nations CivilianOperations in the Congo: first year of operations,July 1960-June 1961.

Progress Report No. 11 on United Nations CivilianOperations in the Congo (for July-August 1961).

Progress Report No. 12 on United Nations Civilian

Operations in the Congo (for September-October1961).

Progress Report No. 13 on United Nations CivilianOperations in the Congo (for November-December1961).

FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONIN THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)

On 30 October 1961, the General Assemblyadopted, by 69 votes to 10, with 18 abstentions,a resolution (1633(XVI)) authorizing the Sec-retariat to continue until 31 December 1961to incur commitments for the United NationsOperation in the Congo (Leopoldville) at alevel not to exceed $10 million per month.

This action was required since the appropria-tion for 1961 in terms of a resolution (1619(XV)) adopted by the Assembly on 21 April19617 related only to the period from 1 Januaryto 31 October 1961. The Assembly's decision

of 30 October 1961 was taken on the basisof a text approved by its Fifth Committee on24 October by a roll-call vote of 55 to 9, with15 abstentions, on a proposal by Canada, Ceylon,Ethiopia, the Federation of Malaya, Ghana,Ireland, Liberia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden andTunisia.

It arose out of consideration of a report bythe Secretary-General indicating: (a) that ex-penditure for the United Nations Operation in

7 See Y.U.N., 1960, pp. 127-28.

QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE) 87the Congo (ONUC) was estimated at a totalof $100 million for the 10-month period, Jan-uary to October 1961; and (b) that it wasanticipated that, in existing circumstances, themonthly requirements would remain at approxi-mately $10 million.

A later report, consideration of which ledto another Assembly resolution on 20 December1961, indicated that, in view of the prevailingcircumstances, the Secretary-General was notin a position to submit detailed cost estimatesfor ONUC during 1962 or to predict when thetasks given him by the Security Council and bythe General Assembly would have been success-fully accomplished. He added, however, that inthe light of the most recent developments, therewas not, in his opinion, any sound basis foranticipating that the expenses of ONUC duringthe next few months would be appreciably lessthan the current level of expenditures, estimatedat $10 million per month. He accordingly soughtauthority for continuing to incur expendituresfor ONUC at that level for such period and inaccordance with such financing arrangementsas the General Assembly might deem appro-priate.

The Assembly's Advisory Committee on Ad-ministrative and Budgetary Questions concurredwith this proposal.

On 15 December 1961, the Fifth Committeeadopted a draft resolution on the matter, bya roll-call vote of 57 to 11, with 12 abstentions,which was approved five days later at a plenarymeeting of the Assembly, by a roll-call vote of67 to 13, with 15 abstentions, as resolution1732(XVI).

By this resolution, the Assembly decided: toappropriate an amount of $80 million for theoperations of the United Nations in the Congofor the period from 1 November 1961 to 30June 1962; to continue the ad hoc account forthe expenses of these operations; and to au-thorize the Secretary-General to spend during1962 an average monthly rate of not more than$10 million for the continuing cost of theseoperations.

The amount of $80 million was to be appor-tioned among all United Nations MemberStates in accordance with the scale of assess-ments for contributions to the regular UnitedNations budget for 1962 (see p. 572 below),subject to reductions as set out below, pending

the establishment of a different scale of assess-ment to defray the Organization's expenses re-sulting from the United Nations operations inthe Congo. The assessments were to be reducedas follows: (a) by 80 per cent in the case ofthe assessment of Member States whose contri-butions to the regular budget ranged from 0.04per cent to 0.25 per cent, inclusive; (b) by 80per cent, in the case of assessment of MemberStates receiving assistance during 1961 underthe Expanded Programme of Technical Assist-ance, whose contributions to the regular budgetranged from 0.26 per cent to 1.25 per cent, in-clusive; (c) by 50 per cent, in the case of theassessment of Member States receiving assist-ance during 1961 under the Expanded Pro-gramme of Technical Assistance, whose con-tributions to the regular budget were 1.26 percent and above.

The Assembly also: urged the permanentmembers of the Security Council to make size-able additional contributions; appealed to allMember States in a position to do so to makevoluntary contributions to help defray the costsof United Nations operations in the Congo ; andcalled on the Government of Belgium, "a Statedirectly concerned with the situation" in theCongo, to make a substantial contribution. TheAssembly decided to apply such additional con-tributions to offset the deficit resulting from theimplementation of the provisions for reductionsas set out above. (For full text of resolution,See DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

The text to this effect arose out of discussionof a proposal introduced in the Fifth Com-mittee by Denmark, Nigeria, Pakistan and Tu-nisia, as later revised by them in accepting aseries of amendments submitted by Argentina,Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hon-duras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

The main effect of these amendments wasto make the following points in the preambleof the draft resolution: (a) that the extra-ordinary expenses for the United NationsOperation in the Congo were essentially dif-ferent in nature from the expenses of the Or-ganization under the regular United Nationsbudget and, therefore, that a procedure dif-ferent from that applied in the case of theregular budget was required for meeting these

POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS

extraordinary expenses; ( b ) that the permanentmembers of the Security Council had a specialresponsibility for the maintenance of interna-tional peace and security and therefore forcontributing to the financing of peace andsecurity operations.

The operative part of the text accordinglyreferred to the establishment, at a later stage,of a different scale of assessments to defray theextraordinary expenses of the United Nationsresulting from the operations in the Congo and,in addition, urged the permanent members ofthe Security Council to make sizeable additional

contributions. (See text of resolution 1732(XVI), quoted in DOCUMENTARY REFERENCESbelow.)

Matters relating to the financing of theUnited Nations Operation in the Congo werealso raised in connexion with discussions at theAssembly's sixteenth session on the budget es-timates for 1962, and in particular on thequestions of the financial position and prospectsof the United Nations (see p. 565 below) andthe administrative and budgetary procedures ofthe United Nations (see p. 569 below).


GENERAL ASSEMBLY——16TH SESSION

Fifth Committee, meetings 862, 863, 899, 900, 902-905.

Plenary Meetings 1044, 1086.

A/4931. Report of Secretary-General.A/C.5/L.677 and Add.l. Canada, Ceylon, Ethiopia,

Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Ireland, Liberia,Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, Tunisia: draft resolu-tion adopted by Fifth Committee on 24 October1961, by roll-call vote of 55 to 9, with 15 absten-tions, as follows:In favour: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil,Burma, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Re-public, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador,El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Fin-land, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, India,Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Le-banon, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, NewZealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru,Philippines, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Thailand,Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, UnitedStates, Uruguay, Venezuela.Against: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR,Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania,Ukrainian SSR, USSR.Abstaining: Afghanistan, Belgium, Cambodia,France, Guinea, Iraq, Mali, Niger, Portugal, SaudiArabia, South Africa, Sudan, United Arab Re-public, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

A/4943. Interim Report of Fifth Committee.RESOLUTION 1633(xvi), as submitted by Fifth Com-

mittee, A/4943, adopted by Assembly on 30 Oc-tober 1961, meeting 1044, by 69 votes to 10, with18 abstentions.

"The General Assembly,"Pending action to be taken at the present session

regarding the financing of the United Nations opera-tions in the Congo and without prejudice to suchaction,

"Authorizes the Secretariat to continue until 31December 1961 to incur commitments for the United

Nations operations in the Congo at a level not toexceed $10 million per month."

A/C.5/904, A/5019. Reports of Secretary-Generaland of Advisory Committee on Administrative andBudgetary Questions.

A/C.5/L.706 and Add.l. Burma, Denmark, Ethiopia,Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia: draft resolution.

A/C.5/L.706/Rev.l. Burma, Congo (Leopoldville),Denmark, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia:revised draft resolution, as revised by sponsors'acceptance of 18-power amendments, A/C.5/L.712,adopted by Fifth Committee on 15 December 1961,meeting 905, by roll-call vote of 57 to 11, with12 abstentions, as follows:In favour: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil,Burma, Cameroun, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Co-lombia, Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus,Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federa-tion of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel,Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mali,Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zea-land, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Para-guay, Peru, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Thailand,Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, UnitedStates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.Against: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, ByelorussianSSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland,Romania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR.Abstaining: Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, France,Iraq, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Sudan,United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen.

A/C.5/L.712. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Co-lombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guate-mala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pa-nama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela:amendments to draft resolution, A/C.5/L.706.

A/5066. Report of Fifth Committee.RESOLUTION 1732(XVI), as submitted by Fifth Com-

mittee, A/5066, adopted by Assembly on 20 De-cember 1961, meeting 1086, by roll-call vote of67 to 13, with 15 abstentions, as follows:In favour: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia,

88

OTHER QUESTIONS RELATING TO AFRICA 89

Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia,Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus,Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethio-pia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece,Guatemala, Guinea, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran,Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Laos,Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mali, Mex-ico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,Paraguay, Peru, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia,Spain, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia,Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, UpperVolta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.Against: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, ByelorussianSSR, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Madagascar,Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR.Abstaining: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cameroun,Central African Republic, China, Cuba, DominicanRepublic, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Philippines,Union of South Africa, Sudan, United Arab Re-public, Yemen.

"The General Assembly,"Recalling the Security Council resolutions of 14

July 1960, 22 July 1960, 9 August 1960, 21 February1961 and 24 November 1961, and General Assemblyresolutions 1474(ES-IV) of 20 September 1960, 1599(XV), 1600(XV) and 1601(XV) of 15 April 1961,1619(XV) of 21 April 1961 and 1633(XVI) of 30October 1961,

"Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the estimated cost of United Nationsoperations in the Congo in 1962 and the report ofthe Advisory Committee on Administrative andBudgetary Questions thereon,

"Bearing in mind that the extraordinary expensesfor the United Nations operations in the Congo areessentially different in nature from the expenses ofthe Organization under the regular budget and that,therefore, a procedure different from that appliedin the case of the regular budget is required formeeting these extraordinary expenses,

"Bearing in mind that the permanent members ofthe Security Council have a special responsibility forthe maintenance of international peace and securityand, therefore, for contributing to the financing ofpeace and security operations,

"1. Decides to continue the ad hoc account forthe expenses of the United Nations operations in theCongo ;

"2. Authorizes the Secretary-General to expend,during 1962, at an average monthly rate not toexceed $10 million for the continuing cost of theUnited Nations operations in the Congo;

"3. Decides to appropriate an amount of $80million for the operations of the United Nations inthe Congo for the period 1 November 1961 to 30June 1962;

"4. Decides to apportion as expenses of the Or-ganization the amount of $80 million among theMember States in accordance with the scale of as-sessment for the regular budget, subject to the provi-sions of paragraph 5 below, pending the establish-ment of a different scale of assessment to defray theextraordinary expenses of the Organization resultingfrom these operations;

"5. Decides to reduce:"(a) By 80 per cent the assessment of Member

States whose contributions to the regular budget rangefrom 0.04 per cent to 0.25 per cent inclusive;

"(b) By 80 per cent the assessment of MemberStates receiving assistance during 1961 under theExpanded Programme of Technical Assistance, whosecontributions to the regular budget range from 0.26per cent to 1.25 per cent inclusive;

"(c) By 50 per cent the assessment of MemberStates receiving assistance during 1961 under theExpanded Programme of Technical Assistance, whosecontributions to the regular budget are 1.26 per centand above;

"6. Urges the permanent members of the SecurityCouncil to make sizable additional contributions;

"7. Appeals to all Member States which are in aposition to assist to make voluntary contributions tohelp defray the costs of the United Nations opera-tions in the Congo;

"8. Calls upon the Government of Belgium, aState directly concerned with the situation in theRepublic of the Congo (Leopoldville), to make asubstantial contribution;

"9. Decides to apply the additional contributionsof Member States under paragraphs 6, 7 and 8above to offset the deficit resulting from the im-plementation of the provisions of paragraph 5."

CHAPTER VIII

OTHER QUESTIONS RELATING TO AFRICA

THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA

CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCILOn 26 May 1961, a request was made by 42

United Nations Members—later joined by twoother Members—for a Security Council meet-

ing to be called, as a matter of urgency, to con-sider the situation in Angola. They charged thatthe massacres in Angola were continuing andhuman rights were being continually suppressed,

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