torts FINALS reviewer

TORTS and DAMAGESFINALS Reviewer

KEY LEARNING FOR TODAY: STRICT LIABILITY

A. Human Relations

Abuse of Rights (Article 19)

Velayo v. Shell100 Phil. 186 GOTEL

A creditor taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by the debtor if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent’s asset among them, and believing it most probable that they would not arrive at such understanding--- SCHEMED and transferred its credit to a sister company in the United States which, in turn, secured a writ of attachment in the court therein thereby gaining control over the subject plane. As consequence, the other creditors were deprived of his right to recover said plane. (ABUSE OF RIGHTS)

Globe Mackay v. Court of Appeals176 SCRA 778 KALAWG.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

Employee (Tobias) was held number one suspect for a number of fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions.

There were several tortuous acts done by the petitioners: Tobias was dismissed despite the fact that he was twice investigated and cleared by the police. He lost employment. The former employer prevented him from gaining employment to another company by informing the future employer that Tobias was dismissed from work due to dishonesty. Criminal charges were filed despite the negative results from the police investigations. Tobias was called a “crook” and a “swindler.” Also, Hendry gave scornful remark against Filipinos. All these are clear violation of Tobias’ personal dignity.

SUPREME COURT:

Globe Mackay and Hendry were contending that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss Tobias. Tobias contends that because of their abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, they must indemnify him for the damage that he suffered. The SC ruled in favor of Tobias.

PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS (Article 19)

The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed.

A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.

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When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.

Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. (Article 19 rule of conduct; Article 20 <damage arising from violation of law>and 21 <acts contra bonus mores> remedy)

RATIONALE FOR ART. 21: This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes"

NO PARTICULAR TEST; CASE TO CASE BASIS: In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test, which can be applied.

The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.

The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee.

The right to institute criminal prosecutions cannot be exercised maliciously and in bad faith.

RTC found that petitioners filed the cases maliciously because of all the tortuous acts done. Also, the criminal charges were filed pending the illegal dismissal case. The court observed the situation was of retaliation.

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable.

PERSONAL COMMENT: Art. 21 is the saving grace of Tobias in the present case because although respondents allege that they did not violate any law in their lawful exercise of dismissing an employee, any lawful conduct exercised contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy IS STILL ACTIONABLE UNDER SUCH ARTICLE. Indeed, the dismissal per se of any employee is not unlawful but the MANNER OF EFFECTING SUCH must be in WITHIN THE RULE OF CONDUCT SET BY ART. 19.

Albenson v. Court of Appeals

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217 SCRA 16 KHO

Mistakes in payment due to similar names: “Eugene Baltao”.

Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the Civil Code, petitioners didn’t have the intent to cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them.

There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22. Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on reasonable inquiries.

Elements of abuse of right under Article 19: (LES)

1. there is a legal right or duty2. exercised in bad faith3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores: (LCI)

1. there is an act which is legal2. but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy3. it is done with intent to injure

A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof.

In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate

Diaz v. Davao Light520 SCRA 481 LAINO

DLPC sent a Notice of Disconnection to Diaz and Co., Inc. informing it that, as of June 13, 1983, the hotel’s unpaid electric consumption bill amounted to P190,111.02. It also warned that if the amount was not paid, DLPC would be impelled to discontinue its service. Since Diaz and Co., Inc. ignored the letter, Meter No. 36510 was disconnected.

PARTIES SIGNED A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.

The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the petition since the issue became moot and academic because of the execution of the compromise agreement between the parties.

It further makes the admonition, however, that connections of electrical service and installations of electric meters should always be upon mutual contract of the parties, and that payments for electrical consumption should also be made promptly whenever due.

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In summary, plaintiff asks for damages for defendant’s alleged malicious prosecution of a criminal case of theft of electricity against him, for plaintiff’s filing of a charge of violation of P.D. 401 as amended after dismissal of the theft case, the filing of a damage suit against him before the RTC of Cebu City which was dismissed and the filing of another damage suit before the same Cebu RTC which is still pending.

whether or not the compromise agreement entered into between DLPC and Diaz barred the former from instituting further actions involving electric Meter No. 84736 or 86673509;

whether or not DLPC acted in bad faith in instituting the criminal cases against Diaz; and

whether or not Diaz is entitled to damages.

ON COMPROMISE AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.

Criminal liability is not affected by compromise for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion, though complete reparation should have been made of the damages suffered by the offended party.

A criminal case is committed against the People, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the offense.

Moreover, a compromise is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinction of criminal liability.

Malice or bad faith is at the core of Articles 19-21.

Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. An HONEST INTENTION to abstain from taking undue advantage of another; even though the forms and technicalities of the law together with the absence of all information or belief of facts would render the transaction unconscientious (University of the East vs. Jader).

Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, it is a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud.

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;

Damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; the recompense or compensation awarded for the injury.

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Malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by or against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.

Its elements are the following:

- the fact of prosecution and the further fact that the defendant (respondent) was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal;

- that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and

- that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is, by improper or sinister motive.

Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

The general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause.

Reason: It would be a very great discouragement to public justice if prosecutors, who had a tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictments miscarried.

Amonoy v. Gutierrez

Damnum absque injuria

A situation wherein the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty and does not amount to a legal injury or wrong BECAUSE THE ACT WAS SIMPLY A RESULT OF A VALID EXERCISE OF A LEGAL RIGHT.

Literal translation: DAMAGE WITHOUT INJURY

Consequences must be borne by the injured person alone

Under this principle, the legitimate exercise of a person's rights, even if it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. The law does not prescribe a remedy for the loss.

WHEN NOT APPLICABLE:

o When there is an abuse of a person's righto When the exercise of this right is suspended or extinguished

pursuant to a court order

PERSONAL COMMENT: Anything less or beyond the lawful exercise of a legal duty shall not receive the protection that this principle accords.

The demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In

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insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court's Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents’ house.

University of the East v. Jader325 SCRA 804

Petitioner was enrolled in the defendant’s College of Law. He failed to take the regular examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester as a fourth year student, and filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade, which was approved by the Dean. In the meantime, the faculty members and the Dean met to deliberate who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff’s name appeared on the tentative list, he also attended the investiture ceremonies to which he tendered blowout afterwards. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination and took review classes. However, he was not able to take the bar examination because his academic requirements is not complete. Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights, when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter’s negligence. He prayed for an award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

Whether or not an educational institution may be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case.

The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to where he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among those who will graduate. The school cannot be said to have acted in good faith.

Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.

Barons Marketing v. Court of Appeals286 SCRA 96

Barons admitted purchasing the wires and cables from private respondent but disputed the amount claimed by the latter. It interposed a counterclaim against private respondent, alleging that it suffered injury to its reputation due to Phelps Dodge's acts. Such acts were purportedly calculated to humiliate petitioner and constituted an abuse of rights.

Partial Prestations. — Since the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial performance, unless otherwise stipulated, the creditor who refuses to accept partial prestations does not incur in delay or mora accipiendi, except when there is abuse of right or if good faith requires acceptance.

THE MAIN INQUIRY BY PETITIONER: Why then did private respondent elect to file a suit for collection rather than accept petitioner's offer of settlement, supported by post-dated checks, by paying monthly installments of

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P500,000.00 plus 1% per month commencing on October 15, 1987 until full payment?

THE PETITIONER’S CONCLUSION: Phelps committed an abuse of creditor’s rights

Petitioner's theory is untenable.

Test of Abuse of Right. — Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not unlawful, are anti-social.

When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right.

Every abnormal exercise of a right, contrary to its socio-economic purpose, is an abuse that will give rise to liability. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.

The question, therefore, is whether private respondent intended to prejudice or injure petitioner when it rejected petitioner's offer and filed the action for collection. WAS PHELPS IN BAD FAITH?

It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. PETITIONER PRESENTED ONLY A SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH. THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF RIGHTS.

Acts contra bonus mores (Article 21) See AQUINO BOOK

Magbanua v. Junsay515 SCRA 419

To constitute malicious prosecution, however, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.

Carpio v. Valmonte438 SCRA 38

The case is about a wedding planner Valmonte being imputed to be the thief of the jewelries… Carpio accused her. She was singled out and searched. She was humiliated. Thus, she is entitled to moral damages.

Que v. Intermediate Appellate Court169 SCRA 137 BOLAURO

Antonio Nicolas issued five postdated checks to Magtanggol Que for his purchase of canvass strollers. However, claiming that the strollers were defective, he ordered his bank to “stop payment” of the said checks and Que was not able to encash them.

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Believing that Nicolas had intended to deceive him, Que filed a complaint for estafa against Nicolas before the City prosecutor of Caloocan. The charge was dismissed for lack of merit, the investigating fiscal holding that the controversy was an accounting matter that did not necessarily involve deceit on the part of Nicolas.

In Buchanan v. Esteban, this Court had already stressed that "one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause."

The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice.

Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.

The mere dismissal of the criminal complaint by the fiscal's office did not create a cause of action because the proceedings therein did not involve an exhaustive examination of the elements of malicious prosecution.

The right to litigate is an escape valve to relieve the pressures of personal disagreements that might otherwise explode in physical confrontation, It is necessary not only for upholding one's claims when they are unjustly denied but also for the maintenance of peace if not goodwill among incipient antagonists. Without the right to litigate, conflicting claims cannot be examined and resolved in accordance with one of the primary purposes of government, which is to provide for a just and orderly society.

The adverse result of an action does not per se make the wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously.

Illegal Acts (Article 20)

Garcia, Jr. vs. Salvador

On Oct 1, 1993, Respondent Ranida Salvador started working as a trainee in the Accounting Dep't of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc. (the Company). As a prerequiste for regular employment, she underwent a medical examination at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia who is a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test. The test result submitted to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the company physician.

The findings indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B. Thus, the Company terminated Ranida's employment for failing the physical examination.

Ranida's father suffered heart attack and was confined at the Hospital when he was informed by Ranida of the result.

Ranida underwent another 2 HBs Ag test to confirm such result and such 2 test resulted to a negative one. As she submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors and CDC to the Executive Officer of the Company who

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requested her to undergo another similar test before her re-employment would be considered. Thus, CDC conducted another HBs test on Ranida which indicated a negative result.

Thereafter, the Company rehired Ranida.

Ranida and Ramon then filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Garcia and a purportedly unknown pathologist of CDC, claiming that, by reason of the erroneous interpretation of the results of Ranida's examination, she lost her job and suffered mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business oppurtunities.

Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such person suffers injury.

For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if yes the he is guilty of negligence.

Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are:1) duty 2) breach 3) injury and 4) proximate causation

All the elements are present in the case at bar.

First: CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician, as required by law ( the LAW violated; this makes such case actionable under Article 20), but by Ma. Ruby Calderon, a licensed Medical technologist. Castro's infrequent vist to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administrative and control over the activities in the laboratory.

Second: Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of defendant-appelle Castro.

Last: the disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the authorization of defendant-appelle Castro.

Thus, Art 20 of NCC provides that:Art. 20 Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same."

Violation of human dignity (Article 26)

ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL, respondents 133 SCRA 179 November 14, 1984

This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful advertisement in the December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 issue of the Sunday Times

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where St. Louis Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy.

Whether or not the case filed against St. Louis Realty Corporation is covered by Article 26 of the new Civil Code.

Yes, this case is covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code. St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. Through that negligence, persons who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., petitioners, vs.ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, respondents.

"ALAM BA NINYO? Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."

Issue: WON the defendant's are negligent enough to be held liable for libel, and thus the petitioners may be awarded damages.

Ruling of SC: No. SC reversed the decision of the CA.

Reason: The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action.

The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement as one that "tends to so harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."

Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove as part of his prima facie case that the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff.

The rule in libel is that the action must be brought by the person against whom the defamatory charge has been made. The petitioners failed to show that the statements were specifically directed to them.

In fine, in order for one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it must appear that the plaintiff is the person with reference to

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whom the statement was made.

This principle is of vital importance in cases where a group or class is defamed since, usually, the larger the collective, the more difficult it is for an individual member to show that he was the person at whom the defamation was directed.

If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, they applied to any member of the group, and an individual member could maintain an action for defamation.

In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a large class or group of persons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a particular member of the class or group, no member has a right of action for libel or slander.

Where the defamatory matter had no special, personal application and was so general that no individual damages could be presumed, and where the class referred to was so numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out of the multiplicity of suits, no private action could be maintained. This rule has been applied to defamatory publications concerning groups or classes of persons.

Dissenting Opinion CARPIO, J ., dissenting:

Nature of Action: Not a Libel but a Tort Case (NOT UNDER ARTICLE 30 BUT UNDER ARTICLE 26)

Clearly, the instant case is not about libel which requires the identification of the plaintiff in the libelous statement.

If this were a libel case under Article 30 of the Civil Code, which authorizes a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a criminal offense, I would agree that the instant case could not prosper for want of identification of the private respondents as the libeled persons. But private respondents do not anchor their action on Article 30 of the Civil Code.

Private respondents insist that this case is principally about tortious conduct under Article 26 of the Civil Code.

Unlike the action in Article 30 of the Civil Code which must arise from a "criminal offense," the action under Article 26 "may not constitute a criminal offense." Article 26, adopted from American jurisprudence, covers several kinds of intentional torts.

Paragraph 4 of Article 26, which refers to acts humiliating another for his religious beliefs, is embraced in the tort known as intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress. This case must be decided on the issue of whether there was such tortious conduct, and not whether there was defamation that satisfied the elements of the crime of libel.

Article 26 specifically applies to intentional acts which fall short of being criminal offenses.

Article 24 itself expressly refers to tortious conduct which "may not constitute criminal offenses." The purpose is precisely to fill a gap or lacuna in the law where a person who suffers injury because of a wrongful act not constituting a crime is left without any redress.

Under Article 26, the person responsible for such act becomes liable for "damages, prevention and other relief." In short, to preserve peace and


harmony in the family and in the community, Article 26 seeks to eliminate cases of damnum absque injuria in human relations.

Consequently, the elements that qualify the same acts as criminal offenses do not apply in determining responsibility for tortious conduct under Article 26.

Where the tortious act humiliating another because of his religious beliefs is published in a newspaper, the elements of the crime of libel need not be satisfied before the aggrieved person can recover damages under Article 26.

In intentional tort under Article 26, the offensive statements may not even be published or broadcasted but merely hurled privately at the offended party.

E. Dereliction of duty (Article 27)

Amaro v. Samanguit5 SCRA 707

On October 5, 1958, Cornelio Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building. On the following day, he, together with his father Jose Amaro, went to the office of Ambrosio Sumanguit to seek assistance. But this police did not assist them. They alleged that they were harassed and terrorized. Thus, they gave up and renounced their right and interest in prosecuting the crime.

Although the complaint was vague, it can be lifted from the complaint that their claim for relief is not based on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on Sumanguit’s refusal to give them assitance, which was his duty to do as an officer of the law.

The refusal must be without just cause and so this case falls into what the law is prohibiting.

Under the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed upon the ground that the complaint is vague, ambiguous, or indefinite (see Rule 8, section 1), because the defendant, in such case, may ask for more particulars (Rule 16) or he may compel the plaintiff to disclose more relevant facts under the different methods of discovery provided by the Rules. (Rules 18, 20, 21, 22 and 23.)

Unfair competition (see Article 28)

o This provision is necessary in a system of FREE ENTERPRISE. Democracy becomes a veritable mockery if any person or group of persons by any unjust or highhanded method may deprive others a fair chance to engage in business or earn a living.

o Prohibited by the Constitution (Article XIV, Section 2) and the RPC (Article 186)

B . Special Liability in Particular Activities


Products Liability – the law which governs the liability of manufacturers and sellers for damages resulting from defective products based on FRAUD, WARRANTY, NEGLIGENCE, or STRICT LIABILITY. (Bases: NCC 2176, 33, 2187)

Consumer Act – RA 7394, secs. 92-107, (Ch. 1)- the law meant to protect the consumers by providing for certain safeguards when they purchase or use consumer products

Art. 92. Exemptions. - If the concerned department finds that for good or sufficient reasons, full compliance with the labeling requirements otherwise applicable under this Act is impracticable or is not necessary for the adequate protection of public health and safety, it shall promulgate regulations exempting such substances from these requirements to the extent it deems consistent with the objective of adequately safeguarding public health and safety, and any hazardous substance which does not bear a label in accordance with such regulations shall be deemed mislabeled hazardous substance. Art. 93. Grounds for Seizure and Condemnation of Mislabeled Hazardous Substances. –

(a) Any mislabeled hazardous substance when introduced into commerce or while held for sale shall be liable to be proceeded against and condemned upon order of the concerned department in accordance with existing procedure for seizure and condemnation of articles in commerce:

Provided, That this Article shall not apply to a hazardous substance intended for export to any foreign country if:

(1) it is in a package labeled in accordance with the specifications of the foreign purchaser; (2) it is labeled in accordance with the laws of the foreign country; (3) it is labeled on the outside of the shipping package to show that it is intended for export; and

(4) it is so exported,

(b) any hazardous substance condemned under this Article shall after entry of order of condemnation be disposed of by destruction or sale as the concerned department may direct, and the proceeds thereof, if sold, less the legal cost and charges, shall be paid into the treasury of the Philippines; but such hazardous substance shall not be sold under any order which is contrary to the provisions of this Act: Provided, That, after entry of the order and upon the payment of the costs of such proceedings and the execution of a good and sufficient bond conditioned that such hazardous substance shall not be sold or disposed of contrary to the provisions of this Act, the concerned department may direct that such hazardous substance be delivered to or retained by the owner thereof for destruction or for alteration to comply with the provisions of this Act under the supervision of an officer or employee duly designated by the concerned department.


The expenses for such supervision shall be paid by the person obtaining release of the hazardous substance under bond.

c) all expenses in connection with the destruction provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article and all expenses in connection with the storage and labor with respect to such hazardous substance shall be paid by the owner or consignee, and default in such payment shall constitute a lien against any importation by such owner or consignee. Art. 94. Labeling Requirements of Cigarettes. - All cigarettes for sale or distribution within the country shall be contained in a package which shall bear the following statement or its equivalent in Filipino: "Warning: Cigarette Smoking is Dangerous to Your Health". Such statement shall be located in conspicuous place on every cigarette package and shall appear in conspicuous and legible type in contrast by typography, layout or color with other printed matter on the package. Any advertisement of cigarette shall contain the name warning as indicated in the label. Art. 95. Penalties. - (a) Any person who shall violate the provisions of Title III, Chapter IV of this Act, or its implementing rules and regulations, except Articles 81 to 83 of the same Chapter, shall be subject to a fine of not less than Five hundred pesos (P500.00) but not more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than three (3) months but not more than two (2) years or both, at the discretion of the court:

Provided, That, if the consumer product is one which is not a food, cosmetic, drug, device or hazardous substance, the penalty shall be a fine of not less than Two hundred pesos (P200.00) but not more than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than one (1) month but not more than one (1) year or both, at the discretion of the court. (b) Any person who violates the provisions of Articles 81 to 83 for the first time shall be subject to a fine of not less than Two hundred pesos (P200.00) but not more than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) or by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month but not more than six (6) months or both, at the discretion of the court. A second conviction under this paragraph shall also carry with it the penalty of revocation of business permit and license. CHAPTER VLIABILITY FOR PRODUCT AND SERVICE Art. 96. Implementing Agency. - The Department of Trade and Industry shall enforce the provisions of this Chapter and its implementing rules and regulations. Art. 97. Liability for the Defective Products. - Any Filipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by:

defects resulting from design, manufacture, construction, assembly and erection, formulas and handling and making up,

presentation or packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient or inadequate information on the use and hazards thereof

A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited


to:

(a) presentation of product; (b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it; (c) the time it was put into circulation.

A product is not considered defective because another better quality product has been placed in the market. The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not be held liable when it evidences:

(a) that it did not place the product on the market; (b) that although it did place the product on the market such product has no defect; (c) that the consumer or a third party is solely at fault.

Art. 98. Liability of Tradesman or Seller. –

The tradesman/seller is likewise liable, pursuant to the preceding article when:

(a) it is not possible to identify the manufacturer, builder, producer or importer; (b) the product is supplied, without clear identification of the manufacturer, producer, builder or importer; (c) he does not adequately preserve perishable goods.

The party making payment to the damaged party may exercise the right to recover a part of the whole of the payment made against the other responsible parties, in accordance with their part or responsibility in the cause of the damage effected.

Art. 99. Liability for Defective Services. - The service supplier is liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects relating to:

the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient or inadequate information on the fruition

(completion; enjoyment) and hazards thereof. The service is defective when it does not provide the safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to:

(a) the manner in which it is provided; (b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it; (c) the time when it was provided.

A service is not considered defective because of the use or introduction of new techniques.

The supplier of the services shall not be held liable when it is proven:

(a) that there is no defect in the service rendered; (b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.


Art. 100. Liability for Product and Service Imperfection. - The suppliers of durable or nondurable consumer products are jointly liable for imperfections in quality that render the products unfit or inadequate for consumption for which they are designed or decrease their value, and for those resulting from inconsistency with the information provided on the container, packaging, labels or publicity messages/advertisement, with due regard to the variations resulting from their nature, the consumer being able to demand replacement to the imperfect parts. If the imperfection is not corrected within thirty (30) days , the consumer may alternatively demand at his option:

(a) the replacement of the product by another of the same kind, in a perfect state of use; (b) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with monetary updating, without prejudice to any losses and damages; (c) a proportionate price reduction.

The parties may agree to reduce or increase the term specified in the immediately preceding paragraph; but such shall not be less than seven (7) nor more than one hundred and eighty (180) days. The consumer may make immediate use of the alternatives under the second paragraph of this Article when by virtue of the extent of the imperfection, the replacement of the imperfect parts may jeopardize the product quality or characteristics, thus decreasing its value.

If the consumer opts for the alternative under sub-paragraph (a) of the second paragraph of this Article, and replacement of the product is not possible, it may be replaced by another of a different kind, mark or model: Provided, That any difference in price may result thereof shall be supplemented or reimbursed by the party which caused the damage, without prejudice to the provisions of the second, third and fourth paragraphs of this Article. Art. 101. Liability for Product Quantity Imperfection. –

Suppliers are jointly liable for imperfections in the quantity of the product when, in due regard for variations inherent thereto, their net content is less than that indicated on the container, packaging, labeling or advertisement, the consumer having powers to demand, alternatively, at his own option:

(a) the proportionate price; (b) the supplementing of weight or measure differential; (c) the replacement of the product by another of the same kind, mark or model, without said imperfections; (d) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with monetary updating without prejudice to losses and damages if any.

The provisions of the fifth paragraph of Article 99 shall apply to this Article. The immediate supplier shall be liable if the instrument used for weighing or measuring is not gauged in accordance with official standards.


Art. 102. Liability for Service Quality Imperfection. –

The service supplier is liable for any quality imperfections that render the services improper for consumption or decrease their value, and for those resulting from inconsistency with the information contained in the offer or advertisement, the consumer being entitled to demand alternatively at his option:

(a) the performance of the services, without any additional cost and when applicable; (b) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with monetary updating without prejudice to losses and damages, if any; (c) a proportionate price reduction.

Reperformance of services may be entrusted to duly qualified third parties, at the supplier's risk and cost. Improper services are those which prove to be inadequate for purposes reasonably expected of them and those that fail to meet the provisions of this Act regulating service rendering. Art. 103. Repair Service Obligation. - When services are provided for the repair of any product, the supplier shall be considered implicitly bound to use adequate, new, original replacement parts, or those that maintain the manufacturer's technical specifications unless, otherwise authorized, as regards to the latter by the consumer.

Art. 104. Ignorance of Quality Imperfection. - The supplier's ignorance of the quality imperfections due to inadequacy of the products and services does not exempt him from any liability. Art. 105. Legal Guarantee of Adequacy. - The legal guarantee of product or service adequacy does not require an express instrument or contractual exoneration of the supplier being forbidden. Art. 106. Prohibition in Contractual Stipulation. - The stipulation in a contract of a clause preventing, exonerating or reducing the obligation to indemnify for damages effected, as provided for in this and in the preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is more than one person responsible for the cause of the damage, they shall be jointly liable for the redress established in the pertinent provisions of this Act.

However, if the damage is caused by a component or part incorporated in the product or service, its manufacturer, builder or importer and the person who incorporated the component or part are jointly liable. Art. 107. Penalties. - Any person who shall violate any provision of this Chapter or its implementing rules and regulations with respect to any consumer product which is not food, cosmetic, or hazardous substance shall upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more than one (1) year or both upon the discretion of the court. In case of juridical persons, the penalty shall be imposed upon its


president, manager or head.

If the offender is an alien, he shall, after payment of fine and service of sentence, be deported without further deportation proceedings.

NOTE: As to product representation all EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION are considered actionable misrepresentation if they are established to be inaccurate.

Nuisance (Arts. 694-707, Civil Code)

Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.

Art. 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that property started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as the one who created it.

Art. 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to recover damages for its past existence.

Art. 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private.

Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:

(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or(2) A civil action; or(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

Art. 700. The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a public nuisance are availed of.

Art. 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance, such action shall be commenced by the city or municipal mayor.

Art. 702. The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance.

Art. 703. A private person may file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself.


Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:

(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance;(2) That such demand has been rejected;(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of the local police; and(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.

Art. 705. The remedies against a private nuisance are:(1) A civil action; or(2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

Art. 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed.

Art. 707. A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages:

(1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.

Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. v. Balandan, 91 Phil. 489 (1952)

Whether or not bodies of water may be considered ATTRACTIVE NUISANCES, thereby making the petitioner ice-plant operator liable.

NO. The principle reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children.

Now, is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little children in play? In other words is the body of water an attractive nuisance?

The great majority of American decisions say no.

The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.

Ayala v. Barreto, 33 Phil. 538 (1916)

This is a suit for a permanent injunction against the erection and


operation of a combined brewery and ice plant on Calle General Solano in the city of Manila, on the ground that it will be a nuisance. From a judgment denying the relief prayed for, the plaintiffs have appealed.

The Supreme Court held that the erection and operation of the brewery in the location at dispute will not create a nuisance.

• In this case, the Supreme Court cited the following cases:

Eller vs . Koehler (68 Ohio, 51) All that can be required of men who engage in lawful business is that they shall regard the fitness of locality.

In the residence sections of city, business of no kind is desirable or welcome.

One who becomes a resident of a trading or manufacturing neighborhood, or who remains should be held bound to submit to the ordinary annoyances, discomforts and injuries which are fairly incidental to the reasonable and general conduct of such business in his chosen neighborhood.

The true rule would be that any discomfort or injury beyond this would be actionable; anything up to that point would not be actionable.

Stevens vs . Rockport Granite Co. (216 Mass., 486) The law of nuisance affords no rigid rule to be applied in all instances.

It undertakes to require only that which is fair and reasonable under all circumstances.

One who settles in a district, which possesses natural resources of a special kind, cannot prohibit the development of those resources merely because it may interfere in some degree with personal satisfaction or aesthetic enjoyment.

The noisy or noisome factory cannot with immunity invade territory stamped by use for residence.

James, L. J., in Salvin vs . North Brancepeth Coal Co., (L. R. 9 Ch., 705, 709).

If some picturesque haven opens its arms to invite the commerce of the world, it is not for this court to forbid the embrace, although the fruit of it should be the sights, and sounds and smells of a common seaport and shipbuilding town, which would drive the Dryads and their masters from their ancient solitudes.

• Supreme Court’s conclusion on the case at hand:o That the neighborhood in question is of mixed character.o The locality has not sufficiently the impress of a residential district as to justify us in holding that the plant will be incongruous with its surroundings.o Made easier in view of the fact that another brewery is in fact closer to several of the plaintiffs than that of the


defendants will be. The fact that this latter brewery is not on the same street is immaterial. Distance is what counts in a matter of this kind. Noise, smells, and smoke are no respecters of streets.o Is there evidence of record that the proposed plant will be operated so carelessly as to materially increase the noise, smells, and smoke emanating therefrom? We think not.

• A long list of different testimonies were heard by the Supreme Court majority of which (in favor of the respondent) claim that due to the height of the proposed smokestacks, residents should not be materially disturbed. While those for the appellants claim that the operation of the said brewery will cause noise and odor.

• We think that the preponderating weight of the evidence is to the effect that the new brewery will be operated with a minimum of offense to nearby residents, and that in view of the semi-industrial character of the locality, what noise, etc., is produced, cannot be held to be unreasonable.

• It is possible that plaintiffs, or some of them, might prove damages by reason of property depreciation. But all events, this is not a proper case for the issuance of the extra-ordinary remedy of injunction.

Velasco v. Manila Electric Co., 40 SCRA 342 (1971)

NOISE: Whether or not the sound that emanates from the substation constitutes an actionable nuisance.

The noise that constantly emanate from the substation constitutes an actionable nuisance from which Velasco is entitled to relief by requiring Meralco to adopt the necessary measures to deaden the or reduce the sound at the plaintiff’s house, by replacing the interlink wire fence with a partition made of sound absorbent material, since relocation of the substation would be prejudicial to the customers who are being serviced from the substation.

General Rule: on habitual or customary inconveniences resulting from proximity of others is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary inconveniences that result from the proximity of others, and as long as the level is not surpassed, he may not complain against them.

Exception: But if the prejudice exceeds the inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the neighbor who causes such disturbance is held responsible for the resulting damage, being guilty of causing nuisance. When noise may constitute an actionable nuisance: Noise may constitute an actionable nuisance when it affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent.

Test to be applied: Whether rights of property, of health or comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to used which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within the reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of


property of another owner who thought creating noise is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it.

Factors to consider: The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of the complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable.

Iloilo Cold Storage Co. v. Municipal Council, 24 Phil. 471 (1913)

Iloilo Cold Storage Co. constructed an ice and cold storage plant in Iloilo City. Sometime after the plant was completed and in operation, nearby residents made complaints to the Municipal Council that the smoke from the plant was very injurious to their health and comfort.

WON a municipal corporation can declare the company’s plant a nuisance as operated and prescribe method of abating it (No)

Nuisance is anything that works hurt, inconvenience or damage (Blackstone)

Two classes are:a. Nuisance per se – nuisances under any and all circumstances.b. Nuisance per accidens – nuisance only because of the special circumstances and conditions surrounding it.

Municipal councils have under the code the power to declare and abate nuisances but they do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such a thing is not a nuisance per se.

Neither can they authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of a thing as a nuisance which in its nature situation or use is not such. These things must be determined in the ordinary courts of law.

However, a nuisance which affects the immediate safety of persons or properties or those presenting an emergency may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.

If the plant is in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the board. The company is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before a judicial tribunal.

Sitchon vs. Aquino

ART. 694. — “A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others;(2) Annoys or offends the senses;(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality;(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.


ART. 695. — “Nuisance is either public or private.

A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal.

A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.”

Houses constructed without governmental authority, on public streets and river beds, obstruct at all times the free use by the public of said places and, accordingly, constitute nuisance per se aside from public nuisances under Articles 794 and 695 of the Civil Code. AS SUCH, THEY MAY BE SUMMARILY REMOVED WITHOUT JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.

Whenever the owner or person responsible for any unauthorized obstruction shall, after official notice from the proper department, refuse or neglect to remove the same within a reasonable time, such obstruction shall be deemed a public nuisance, and the city engineer is authorized to remove the same at the owner’s expense.

The police power of the state justifies the abatement or destruction, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance; and the legislature may authorize the summary abatement of a nuisance without judicial process or proceeding.

It is not an objection to the validity of a police regulation that it does not provide for a hearing or for notice to the owner before his property is subjected to restraint or destruction. In the exercise of the police power the state may authorize its officers summarily to abate public nuisances without resort to legal proceedings and without notice or a hearing.

Ramcar, Inc. v. Millar6 SCRA 51 7 (1 962)

Petitioner Ramcar Inc., operates and maintains an auto repair and body building shop at No. 1241 (formerly No. 1377) General Luna Street, Ermita, Manila, while the seven private respondents reside near or around the shop. Respondents brought an action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to abate the said establishment as a nuisance. That Court, after trial, dismissed the complaint, and not satisfied with the decision, the plaintiffs (respondents now) appealed the case to the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner vehemently asserts that the award of damages has no sanction in law, and because its business was covered by a valid license, the decision tends to punish a citizen who acted with diligence and in accordance with law.

In disposing of this assigned error, it is enough to point out that the zoning ordinance prohibited the body building operations of petitioner. Contrary to petitioner's pretense that nowhere in the Civil Code is the award of damages arising from a nuisance authorized, said Code provides:

ART. 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of


any person injured to recover damages for its past existence.;

and, in the general provisions on Damages, the same Code states:

ART. 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this Code . . .

However, the business of the petitioner is not a nuisance per se. It is only on account of its location that it is a public nuisance. To abate it, it is not necessary, as the appealed decision decrees, to remove all building and structures built in the place where it is presently located as these, or parts thereof, may be utilized for pursuit that are not forbidden by law or ordinance.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified by permanently enjoining the petitioner only from operating its body building operations or activities in its present location, without requiring the demolition of the existing building in all other respects, the judgment below is affirmed.

City of Manila v. Garcia19 SCRA 41 3 (1 967)

Squatters in an area owned by the City of Manila

Sometime on November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered were given by mayor Fugoso written permits- each labeled " lease contract"- to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth.

It happened that Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous to the property came the need for the school's expansion.

Plaintiffs City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatter's houses on the City property, giving them 30 days to vacate.

ISSUE: Whether or not recovery of possession over the lands of the defendants will prosper

HELD: No. The city of Manila may eject the occupants of its land, who possess the same under permits revocable upon 30 days notice, especially where said occupants were originally squatters thereon.

The Mayor of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or for that matter, by executing leases.

Squatting is unlawful. No amount of acquiescence on the part of the city will elevate it into a lawful act. Such permits are void.

The houses and constructions of squatters constitute a public nuisance per se because they hinder and impair the use of the land for a badly needed school building.

As such, they could have been summarily abated without the need of judicial action.

Estate of Gregorio Francisco v. CA


199 SCRA 595 (1991)

Litigated herein is a quonset building situated in Port Area, Strong Boulevard, Isabela, Basilan, which was ordered demolished by respondent Municipal Mayor, Benjamin Valencia. Respondent municipal employees implemented the demolition, for which reason they are also impleaded.

Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the demolition of petitioner's quonset building. (NO)

Even granting that petitioner failed to apply for a Certificate of Non-conformance, the City Ordinance provision relied upon by the Mayor should not be interpreted as authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming building by the municipal government. For if it does, it must be struck down for being in contravention of the requirements of due process, as originally held by the respondent Court.

Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances" (Local Government Code, Sec. 141 [2] [t]).

Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]).

The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it cannot be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.

While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec. 149 [ee]), it cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.

Halili v. Lacson93 Phil. 772 (1956)

Municipal Corporations generally are empowered to abate public nuisances summarily without resort to legal proceedings, and to destroy the thing constituting the nuisance when its abatement cannot otherwise be effected.

This power may be, and generally is, conferred upon municipalities by the legislature, but it exists at common law without a special grant of authority. Thus, a municipality may summarily abate a nuisance consisting of an encroachment on a public street, and under some circumstances may remove or destroy buildings which are nuisances.

A chartered city may enact legislation, not in conflict with general laws,


authorizing the summary abatement of public nuisances, particularly where an emergency exists, and it may confer upon an administrative body the power to determine whether the property of a citizen constitutes a nuisance and if it does, to order its demolition. However, general statutory authority to define and abate nuisances does not authorize a municipality to declare that to be a nuisance which is not a nuisance in fact, and as a rule, under such authority it may abate as a nuisance that which is recognized as a nuisance per se or is branded as such by a valid statute or ordinance.

As to anything which is not a nuisance per se, it must proceed by an ordinance equally applicable to all similarly situated and in the absence of such ordinance, the municipality cannot declare a single thing or a particular piece of property to be a nuisance and to abate it.

Private structures in public places such as houses constructed without governmental authority on public streets, obstruct at all times the free use by the public of said streets and, accordingly, constitute nuisance per se, aside from public nuisances. Such being the case, the summary removal thereof without judicial process may be authorized by the statute or municipal ordinance despite the due process clause.

It appearing that the petitioners occupied the premises inside the Palomar Compound without the knowledge, authority or consent of the City of Manila, although later two of them succeeded in securing from the city mayor written permission to occupy the premises subject to the condition that they will remove the structure they had erected and vacate the premises within such time as may be specified in a notice to be issued by the city engineer; and considering that said structures constitute an obstruction to the use by the public of the park, plazas, streets, and sidewalks that are affected by them they constitute a public nuisance within the meaning of Articles 694 and 695 of the New Civil Code, which can be ordered demolished bu the City Authorities pursuant to Section 122 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila No. 1006.

Farrales v. City Mayor of Baguio44 SCRA 239 (1972)

Plaintiff was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods. The City ordered to demolish the temporary building where she had her stall, to construct a permanent building. Plaintiff was ordered to move her goods to another temporary place until the permanent building was completed. She did not like the location, so, she built a temporary shack at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market, without seeking prior permit or permission from any city official. When the police threatened to demolish this shack, which was built on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section building, Plaintiff filed for an injunction, which has been denied by the court. Police proceeded with the demolition.

It is true that under Article 702 of the Civil Code "the District Officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against public nuisance;" but in this case the failure to observe this provision is not in itself a ground for the award of damages in favor of the appellant and against the appellees.


According to Article 707 of the same Code, a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages in only two cases:

(1) if he causes unnecessary injury, or

(2) if an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.

Attractive Nuisance

Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. v. Balandan, 91 Phil. 489 (1952)

At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner's tanks are classified as attractive nuisance (NO)

Attractive Nuisance Doctrine

One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.

The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children.

Not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.

The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as follows:

Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger... (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance."

Petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial.


Easement against nuisanceArticle 682Every building or piece of land is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or possessor from committing nuisance through noise, jarring, offensive odor, smoke, heat, dust, water, glare, and other causes.

Article 683 Subject to zoning, health, police and other laws and regulations, factories and shops may be maintained provided the least possible annoyance is caused to the neighborhood.

Violation of Civil Liberties

Palma v. Graciano99 Phil. 72 (1956)

Cuenco, then Governor of Cebu filed of Criminal case “frauds against the public treasury,” which was dismissed and for malversation of public funds, in which he was acquitted against Ladislao Palma. Palma was acquitted in the first case while the other was dismissed.

AS TO LIABILITY OF DEFENDANTS: In this connection, it is well settled that when a public officer goes outside the scope of his duty, particularly when acting tortiously, he is not entitled to protection on account of his office, but is liable for his acts like any private individual

Zulueta v. Nicolas102 Phil. 944 (1958)

Amaro v. Sumanguit5 SCRA 707 (1962)

Appellants filed suit for damages in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the chief of police of the City of Silay. Although not specifically alleged in the complaint, it is admitted by both parties, as shown in their respective briefs, that the action is predicated on Articles 21 and/or 27 of the Civil Code.

WON chief of police be held liable for damages under art 27 of the CC

The facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code. That appellants were "harassed and terrorized" may be a conclusion of law and hence improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give them assistance, which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law.

Art. 27 NCC

Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Javellana vs. Tayo G.R. No. L-18919 December 29, 1962


That the petitioners made repeated demands for payment of their per diems by representing the payrolls to the respondent Mayor for the latter’s signature. The respondent however, refused to affix his signature to the payrolls thus presented, alleging that the proceedings were illegal due to his absence in the meeting. Despite the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, the respondent Mayor refused to sign the payrolls covering the per diems of the petitioners.

We find said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, considering that according to the trial court, he (Golez) was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his official duty, notwithstanding the action taken by the Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Board upholding the validity of the session in question.

Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of Appeals145 SCRA 100 (1986)

Issue: 1. WON Juan Ramon Guanzon was given due process when he was expelled by Ateneo, 2. WON the parents of Juan Ramon Guanzon is entitled to damages

Ruling: Supreme Court reversed the decision of CA and reinstated the first decision of CA. Juan Ramon Guanzon was given due process when he was expelled and his parents were not entitled to damages.

From the above proceedings that transpired it cannot be said that Juan Ramon Guanzon was denied due proems of law. On the contrary, we find that he was given the full opportunity to be heard to be fully informed of the charge against him and to be confronted of the witnesses face to face. And since he chose to remain silent and did not bother to inform his parents or guardian about the disciplinary action taken against him by the defendant university, neither he nor his parents should find reason to complain.

Moreover, notwithstanding the non-participation of the private respondents, the university, as stated earlier, undertook a fair and objective investigation of the slapping incident. Due process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence presented and the existence of evidence to support the decision (Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112).

2.There is no basis for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon was afforded due process of law. The penalty is based on reasonable rules and regulations applicable to all students guilty of the same offense. He never was out of school. Before the decision could be implemented, Juan Ramon asked for an honorable dismissal which was granted. He then enrolled at the De la Salle University of Bacolod City and later transferred to another Jesuit school Moreover, his full and complete tuition fees for the second semester were refunded through the representation of Mr. Romeo Guanzon, Juan Ramon's father.

There was no bad faith on the part of the university. In fact, the college authorities deferred any undue action until a definitive decision had been rendered. The whole procedure of the disciplinary process was set up to protect the privacy of the student involved. There is absolutely no indication ot malice,. fraud, and improper or willful motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila University in this case.

Aberca v. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1988)

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing


reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. (NO)

If such can be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superior as well?

No. Plaintiffs may proceed in filing their complaint as provided by Artcile 32 of the New Civil Code. The persons that can be held liable are those directly and indirectly involved and their superiors as well.

Ratio:

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard


or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Plaintiffs’ cause of action is not barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The suspension does not destroy their right and cause of actions for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

PRESCRIPTION: However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.

Question: May a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?

Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.

However, the decisive factor is the language of Art. 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

It should nonetheless be made clear that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

MHP Garments Inc. v. CA. 236 SCRA 227 (1993)

MHP Garments was granted by the Boy Scouts of the Phils. an exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official boy Scout uniforms, supplies, badges and insignias. It was also given authority to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies.


Accordingly, MHP tasked its employee, Larry de Guzman to undertake surveillance and report to the PC (Philippine Constabulary) of the activities of the respondents who were reported to selling Scout uniforms and paraphernalia without authority.

De Guzman and 3 constabulary men went to the stores of respondents and seized Scout uniforms without warrant, causing commotion and embarrassment to respondents. Subsequently, a criminal complaint for unfair competition was filed against respondents. Fiscal dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the seized articles.

Thereafter, the respondents filed a civil case against petitioners for sums of money and damages.

WON petitioners should be held liable (YES)

SC held that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of respondents’ goods:

1. progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores shows there was sufficient time to apply for a judicial warrant.

2.no probable cause for the seizure

Conjuangco Jr. v. Court of Appeals309 SCRA 602 (1999)

… And herein private respondents consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Government.

But before receipt of the summons on February 7, Presidential Commission on Good Government advi[s]ed defendants that "if poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings" to [herein petitioner].

The trial court ruled that Respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and its then chairman, Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings of petitioner, since no writ of sequestration therefor had been issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).

By not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family. 6 It thus ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioner's claimed winnings plus interests. It further ordered Carrascoso to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.1

COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING: in favor of the herein defendant (reversed).

1. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO); (YES)

2. Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his failure to file an appeal brief; (YES)

3. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and


reverse the judgment on a cause of action which was not appealed from by the respondents; and (NO)

4. Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and the law. (YES)

It is well-settled that only the errors assigned and properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily related thereto, may be considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case. 21 The appellate court has no power to resolve unassigned errors, except those that affect the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter and those that are plain or clerical errors.

Well-settled is the doctrine that no question, issue or argument will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court a quo.

We believe that there is sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent Court's conclusion that he did not act in bad faith. Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice.

The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. 32 Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code.

Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. 36 To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties.

Purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution.

MAIN DOCTRINE: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorney's fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Violation of Rights Committed by Public Officers

Rama v. Court of Appeals148 SCRA 498 (1987)

The present case is a consolidation of the three separate cases filed by the dismissed employees against the public officers of Cebu City.

To implement a city policy, the provincial board have to abolish around thirty positions, the salaries of which were paid from the JJ Road and Bridge Fund. Consequently around 200 employees of the province were eased out of their


respective jobs, and to implement the mechanization program in the maintenance of roads and bridges, the provincial government of Cebu purchased heavy equipment worth 4M pesos. However, contrary to its declared policy to economize, the provincial administration later on hired around 1000 new employees, renovated the office of the provincial engineer and provided the latter with a Mercedez-Benz car.

Whether or not the governor, vice- governor, and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan are personally liable for damages for adopting a resolution which abolished positions to the detriment of the occupants thereof.

Petitioners-public officers are personally liable for damages for adopting said resolution which abolished the positions to the detriment of the employees occupying thereof.

The petitioner-public officers are held personally liable because of their precipitate act dismissal of provincial employees through an ostensibly legal means. As found by the CA, the provincial employees concerned were eased out because of their party affiliation.

A public officer by virtue of his office alone is not immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith. A different rule would sanction the use of public office as a tool of oppression. Indeed municipal officers are liable for damages if they act maliciously or wantonly, and if the work which they perform is done rather to injure an individual than to discharge public duty, a public officer is civilly liable for failure to observe honesty and good faith in the performance of their duties as public officers or for willfully or negligently causing damage to another (Article 20) or for willfully causing loss or injury to another in the manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and/or public policy (Article 21).

Subsequent benevolent act of the governor (Rama, later he was elected governor) by reinstating most of the dismissed employees can not make up for the damages suffered by the employees.

Victory at the polls should not be taken as authority for the commission of illegal acts to remove government employees.

Provinces, Cities and Municipalities

City of Manila v. Teotico22 SCRA 267 (1968)

On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.

Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages.

WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave


making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.

Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."

Jimenez v. City of Manila150 SCRA 510 (1987)

Jimenez bought bagoong at the Santa Ana public market at the time that it was flooded with ankle-deep water. As he turned around to go home, he stepped on an uncovered opening w/c could not be seen because of dirty rainwater. A dirty and rusty 4-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, pierced his left leg to a depth of1½ inches. His left leg swelled and he developed fever. He was confined for 20 days, walked w/ crutches for 15 days and could not operate his school buses. He sued City of Manila and Asiatec Integrated Corp under whose administration the Sta. Ana had been placed by virtue of Management and Operating Contract.

ISSUE: WON City of Manila should be jointly and solidarily liable with Asiatec (YES)

It was also held that for liability under 2189 to attach, control and supervision by the province, city or municipality over the defective public building in question is enough. It is not necessary that such belongs to such province, city or municipality. (CONTROL AND SUPERVISION, NOT OWNERSHIP)

It is thus the duty of the City to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs. Ordinary precautions could have been taken during good weather to minimize danger to life and limb. The drainage hole could have been placed under the stalls rather than the passageways. The City should have seen to it that the openings were covered.

It was evident that the certain opening was already uncovered, and 5 months after this incident it was still uncovered. There were also findings that during floods, vendors would remove the iron grills to hasten the flow of water. Such acts were not prohibited nor penalized by the City. No warning sign of impending danger was evident.

Petitioner had the right to assume there were no openings in the middle of the passageways andif any, that they were adequately covered. Had it been covered, petitioner would not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City is the proximate cause of the injury suffered.

Asiatec and Cityy are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable.

Gilatco v. City of Dagupan171 SCRA 382 (1989)

Gilatco, (Court Interpreter) was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk at


Perez Blvd when she accidentally fell into a manhole causing her right leg to be fractured. Perez Blvd is a National Road under the control and supervision of City of Dagupan. Such manhole is partially covered by a flowerpot leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long and 1½ feet wide. She was hospitalized, operated on and confined. She had been deprived of income. She sued for damages.

ISSUE: WON control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists which makes City liable under Art 2189

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: Art 2189 says : Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries, suffered by, any person by reason of the defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works, under their control and supervision.

Thus, it is not even necessary that such defective road or street belongs to the City.

In the case at bar, the control and supervision of the national road exists and is provided for in the charter of Dagupan. It provided that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Such control and supervision is exercised through the City Engineer Tangco, who aside from his official capacity as City Engineer, was also Ex Officio Highway Engineer, Ex Officio City Engineer of Bureau of Public Works, and Building Official and received compensation for these functions. The function of supervision over streets, public buildings and public works, pertaining through the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these two officials are employees of the Nat’l Gov’t, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer. Hence the City is liable.

Owner of Motor VehicleChapman v. Underwood27 Phil. 375 (1914)

1. Whether or not the defendant-owner of an automobile driven by a competent driver, present or not would be held responsible.

2. Whether or not the defendant's competent driver is negligent

Issue #1: NO, The owner of an automobile present in the vehicle is not liable for the negligent acts of a competent driver unless such acts are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom and to fail to do so.

If a competent driver of an automobile in which the owner thereof is at the time present by a sudden act of negligence without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance violates the law, the owner of the automobile is not responsible. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that he, by acquiescence makes his driver's act his own.


Issue #2: YES, defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff, in coming out to board the car, was not obliged for his own protection to observe whether a car was coming upon him from his left hand,

According to the law which plaintiff knew provides that no automobile or other vehicle coming from upon from the left should pass upon the side of the car.

Therefore, such as in this case, the plaintiff needed only to watch for the cars coming form his right as they were only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the car.

Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai26 SCRA 410 (1968)Issue: WON Yu Khe Thai as owner of the Cadilla, is solidarily liable with the driver.

Held: Yu Khe Tahi free was from liability. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Tahi to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly.

The Test of Imputed Negligence under art. 2184 of CC is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective.

Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligences as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other person to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle.

Gelisan v. Alday154 SCRA 388 (1987)

On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, citing the case of Montoya vs. Ignacio, 3 found that Bienvenido Gelisan is likewise liable for being the registered owner of the truck; and that the lease contract, executed by and between Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu, is not binding upon Benito Alday (victim) for not having been previously approved by the Public Service Commission.

Accordingly, it sentenced Bienvenido Gelisan to pay, jointly and severally with Roberto Espiritu, Benito Alday the amount of P5,397.30, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint; and to pay the costs. Roberto Espiritu, in turn, was ordered to pay or refund Bienvenido Gelisan whatever amount the latter may have paid to Benito Alday by virtue of the judgment.

CA affirmed.

The Court has invariably held in several decisions that the registered owner


of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of the passengers therein.

The claim of the petitioner that he is not hable in view of the lease contract executed by and between him and Roberto Espiritu which exempts him from liability to third persons, cannot be sustained because it appears that the lease contract, adverted to, had not been approved by the Public Service Commission.

It is settled in our jurisprudence that if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding upon the public and third persons.

The law really requires the approval of the Public Service Commission in order that a franchise, or any privilege pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased without infringing the certificate issued to the grantee. The reason is obvious. Since a franchise is personal in nature any transfer or lease thereof should be notified to the Public Service Commission so that the latter mav take proper safeguards to protect the interest of the public.

In fact, the law requires that, before the approval is granted, there should be a public hearing, with notice to all interested parties, in order that the Commission may determine if there are good and reasonable grounds justifying the transfer or lease of the property covered by the franchise, or if the sale or lease is detrimental to public interest. Such being the reason and philosophy behind this requirement, it follows that if the property covered by the franchise is transferred, or leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding against the Public Service Commission and in contemplation of law the grantee continues to be responsible under the franchise in relation to the Commission and to the Public.

Since the lease of the jeepney in question was made without such approval the only conclusion that can be drawn is that Marcelino Ignacio still continues to be its operator in contemplation of law, and as such is responsible for the consequences incident to its operation, one of them being the collision under consideration.

Bienvenido Gelisan, the registered owner, is not however without recourse. He has a right to be indemnified by Roberto Espiritu for the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito Alday, since the lease contract in question, although not effective against the public for not having been approved by the Public Service Commission, is valid and binding between the contracting parties.

The Court has consistently considered the registered owner/operator of a public service vehicle to be jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the operation of said vehicles.

Tamayo vs. Aquino: As Tamayo is the registered owner of the truck, his responsibffity to the public or to any passenger riding in the vehicle or truck must be direct.


Proprietor of Building or Structure or Thing

Art. 1163. Every person obliged to give something is also obliged to take care of it with the proper diligence of a good father of a family, unless the law or the stipulation of the parties requires another standard of care.

Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)

Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:

(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;

(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;

(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;

(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)

Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)

Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground.

The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.

Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)

Head of Family

Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)

Dingcong v. Kanaan72 Phil. 15 (1941)


On the evening of 19 September 1933, Echevarria, before going to bed forgot the faucet open which resulted to the overflowing of water in a regular basin, as the pipe of the hotel at that time were under repair, the water overflowed all over the place down to the ground floor, wetting the articles and merchandises in the establishment, "American Bazaar," causing losses estimated to be around P1, 089.61.

As lessee and manager of the hotel, Jose Dingcong, has a complete possession and control of the second floor of the House is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or dropped from it (article 1910 of the Civil Code). Francisco Echevarria was a guest of the hotel, which directly by his negligence leaving the faucet open, allowed the water to overflow in the floor and leaking into the ground floor, soaked in water, the articles and goods of the plaintiffs. Jose Dingcong, on the other hand, without observing the due diligence expected of a prudent man to prevent such damage, knowing what the unrepaired water pipes could cause and expecting that Echavarria will use the faucet, must have, for the time being provided some container with gutter, and if only he put a basin below, avoided the water to spread along the ground. Affirming the decision appealed for, with costs to the appellant.

STRICT LIABILITY

Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

Vestil v. lAC179 SCRA 47 (1988)

Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she died because she was bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied this, claiming they had nothing to do with the dog. The Uys sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision of the court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are now before us. They ask us to set aside the judgment of the respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial court.

Afialda v. Hisole: A person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to anyone, including himself.

On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death.

Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death.


The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control.

And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an implied rejection of their original posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in their father's house that bit Theness.

According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.


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