I .

SLAC-PUB-6440

February 18, 1994

T/Noyes

STAPP’S QUANTUM DUALISM: the

James/Heisenberg Model of Consciousness*

H. PIERRE NOYES

Stanford Linear Accelerator Center

Stanford University, Stanjord, California 9~309

Invited talk presented at the 10th Annual Meefing of ANPA West,-.Cordura Hall, Stanford, CA, February 19-21,1994

‘,

- - * Work supported by the Department of Energy, contract DE–AC03–76SFO05 15.--

I .

Abstract

Henry Stapp attempts to resolve the Cartesian dilemma by introducing what

I would characterize as an ontological dualism between mind and matter. His -

model for mind comes from William James’ description of conscious events and

for matter from Werner Heisenberg’s ontological model for quantum events (wave

function collapse). His demonstration of the isomorphism between the two types of

events is successful, but in my opinion fails to establish a monistic, scientific theory.

We trace Stapp’s failure to his adamant rejection of arbitrariness, or “randomness”.

He says

“... Some writers claim to be comfortable with the idea that there is in nature,

at its most basic level, an irreducible element oj chance. I, however, find unthink-

able the idea that between two possibilities there can be a choice having no basis

whatsoever... ”

This makes it impossible for him (or for Bohr and Pauli before him) to understand

the power of Darwin’s explanation of biology, let alone the triumphs of modern

“neo-Darwinism”. We note that the point at issue is a modern version of the

unresolved opposition between Leucippus and Democritus on one side and Epicurus-.

on the other. We contrast Stapp’s views with recent discussions of consciousness by

two e-minent biologists: Crick and Edelman. They locate the problem firmly in the

context of natural selection on the surface of the earth. Their approaches provide a

sound basis for further scientific work. We briefly examine the connection between

this scientific (rather than ontological) framework and our new fundamental theory

based on bit-strings and the combinatorial hierarchy.

-..--

2

1. INTRODUCTION

Cartesian dualism, at least in the specific form that human mind and matter

interact through the pineal gland, and that the rest of the material world is mind-

less, ”probably has no defenders left. Nevertheless, in practice, most scientists — -

even brain scientists — avoid the concept of “mind” altogether in their professional

work, yet use it freely and traditionally in their everyday lives. Logical coherence

is not a widespread human characteristic.

ANPA members cannot escape the issue because the first line in our statement

of purpose commits us to considering “... coherent models based on a minimal

number of assumptions... ” Hence Henry Stapp’s recently published collection of

papers representing his coherent thinking about the mind-matter issue demands

our serious attention.* His involvement with the problem has extended over several

‘decades and forms a very impressive body of work~’}

Like many contemporary thinkers, Stapp sees in quantum mechanics a new

way to resolve the mind-matter dichotomy. Unlike most of them he has as thor-

ough a technical grasp of the relativistic version of that theory as its unresolved

ambiguities allows. He is thoroughly conversant with the orthodox Copenhagen

interpretation and has succeeded in giving it canonical form thanks to several ex--.

changes of correspondence with Heisenberg!2] One of the important services this

book renders is to make this crucial paper easily available; it includes the complete

responses of Heisenberg to critical questions that distinguish his position from

Bohr’s. Stapp is also one of the acknowledged experts on the implications of Bell’s

Theorem, and draws on this expertise in his discussions.

It is important to emphasize that the Heisenberg theory of matter on which

Stapp relies for the “matter” in his dichotomic theory is not the “orthodox” Heisen-

berg of the Copenhagen interpretation, but the “ontological” Heisenberg who re-

* I had hoped Hank would be-.. await another occsion.

--

here for this meeting, but interactive discussion will have to

3

I .

jects the positivistic (Copenhagen) point of view, giving quantum events “reality”

in the philosophical sense.

As I read the book, Stapp gives primary status to the cognitive psychology of

William James, and hence to “mind” rather than matter. I have emphasized this -

assessment by referring to the “James/Heisenberg model” in my title for this paper

rather than following Stapp’s H/J order. In fact, some would claim that Stapp’s

model and Heisenberg’s ontology are both mentalist. Stapp doesn’t quite say “No

mind ~ NEVER MATTER”, but I fear he is perilously close to doing so. This

would be, of course, a monistic position, but many of us would refuse to call it a

scientific position. Stapp’s contention that his mathematical isomorphism between

mental and quantum events has empirical consequences for mind-brain research

has, to my knowledge, yet to be tested by workers in the field. Until it is read up

or out on the basis of laboratory evidence, the model will remain for me a dualism

rather than a resolution of the presenting dichotomy between mind and matter.

My bias has always been toward the position of the “Never matter ~ NO

MIND” protagonists. So, after explaining my objections to Stapp’s model in more

detail, I turn to research programs which are firmly grounded in evolutionary

biology. Here we find that the concepts of “awareness”, “primary consciousness”,

and “self-consciousness” only scratch the surface of what we need to describe what-.

is already known about what is loosely called “mind”. Indeed, some workers in the

field feel that terms which come from cognitive psychology get in the way of careful

scientific investigation unless or until they can be related to specific neurological

structures.

My concluding chapter outlines how this whole problem looks from the point of

view of the new fundamental theory of physics and cosmology based on bit-strings

and the combinatorial hierarchy which is part of the ANPA research program.

-..--

4

I .

2. SOME OBJECTIONABLE

PREMISES IN STAPP’S MODEL

Fortunately, Henry Stapp is very clear and explicit about his basic assumptions.

I presume that these have not changed since the paper ’31,reprinted as Chapter 4

in MMQM, was published in 1982. I expect that they were already a major part

of his thinking when he spoke about “Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics” at

Zurich in 1959 and at the University of Nevada in 1968. From a philosophical

perspective, some of his assumptions are very revealing. I do not mean to imply

that his thinking has not broadened and deepened since he first started thinking

about this subject. Stapp has been a major contributor to the discussions of non-

. . locality arising out of Bell’s Theorem, in a very positive sense. He has also, as

evidenced in this book, made serious efforts to keep abreast of developments in

-neuro-psychology and cognitive psychology.

If Stapp were following a more diffuse line of argument, a more general discus-

sion of his theory would be appropriate. But, from a false premise any conclusion

what soever can be drawn. (Computer scientists have a rather vulgar way of ststing

this. ) So I introduce my objections as they arise, rather than waiting to present a

coherent alternative viewpoint.

I quot; from and comment on MMQM, p. 91. et. seq.:

4:5 The Psychophysical Theory

(<. . . the physical world described by the laws of physics is a structure of ten-

dencies in the world of the mind. ...”

[Clearly, he accepts the presenting dualism between mind and matter as his

starting point. I read his first premise has giving ontological priority to mind

over physics. The questions I wish to keep in front of us are (a) whether he

ends with a vicious dualism in which the interaction between mind and matter

remains inexplicable or (b) establishes a monistic theory at the cost of making

-matter in some sense the product of mind or (c) provides the starting point for--

5

I .

a scientific research program which could eventually increase our understanding

of the interaction between minds (in my language, evolved, conscious, indirectly

interacting brains of terrestrial species, including us) and matter.]

4.5.1 Mind: The Creative Process

“Mind is identified with the process of creation. Everything that exists is

created by this process,.. .“

[This gives mind a prior status to “existence”. I find this as objectionable as

any other form of “creationism”. To my mind, all we need as a starting point for

science is Parker-Rhodes’ postulate: ’41

SOMETHING exists, but this statement conveys no information.]

4.5.2 Necessity and Chance

“ ‘Naught happens for nothing, but everything from a ground and of necessity’

(Leucippus; see, e.g., Russell [A History of Western Philosophy].)’> ...

Lb Some writers claim to be comfortable with the idea that there is in nature,. ..

at its most basic level, an irreducible element of chance. 1, however, find unthink-

able the idea that between two possibilities there can be a choice having no basis

whatsoever.. .“ [Italics supplied]

[This i;, ‘for me, the crucial issue, as I have already indicated by including the .’

quotation in my abstract. I find it bizarre to call the concept of chance “irrational”,

despite the fact that Bohr and Pauli, and following them Stapp and Laurikainen,

do SO. “Irrational”, after all, originally referred to the tradition that Pythagoras

discovered that the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with its sides. Aristotle

moved against this “irrational” theory by assuming that there is a “least step”.

Epicurus developed Aristotle’s idea by introducing a “least swerve” due to chance

into the atomic model (atoms and the void) of Leucippus and Democritus. They

were determinists, in contrast to Epicurus and his disciple Lucretius. The issue

remains unresolved to this day. (See comment after 4.5.3) To find one side of a

debate “unthinkable” is hardly a “rational” procedure in my view.]--

6

I .

4.5.3 Necessity and Pree Will

“Man’s free will is no illusion. It constitutes his essence. And it rests on the

law of necessity. Any play of chance would falsify the idea that I, from the ground

of my essential nature, make a true choice. ”

[Here Stapp makes “free will” a consequence of his law of necessity. But this

works only in a mentalist theory for which some of the characteristics of “mind” are

already assumed given. While I agree that free will is not necessarily an illusion,

I would place the concept in a biological context by noting the obvious selective

value in evolution for organisms that can consider many alternatives In my view the

limited free will of organisms, like their minds, are emergent developments on this

planet. Whether this biological development conceals an underlying determinism is

unresolvable at this stage in the evolution of rational thought; I think it likely that

this. situation will persist. In computer science a pseudo-random number generator

is only good up to the point when a sequence it generates is shown to have a non-

random component which has significant effects in the problem at hand. Natural

events can never be decisively tested in the same way. In contrast to Henry Stapp,

many quantum mechanicians take the success of quantum mechanics as evidence

for randomness at the elementary level. But this does not constitute the kind of

logical proof Stapp requires. I remind you that Epicurus introduced the chance-.

swerve into his atomism deliberately in order to make room for free will.]

4.5.4 Necessity and Predetermination

“The law of necessity entails that the process of creation is internally deter-

mined. But it is not externally predetermined.

<i. . . . . Both in principle and in practice the only way to determine precisely how

nature will unfold is to let it unfold.”

[1 agree with the last sentence, but not with the reasoning that leads to it.

-Seine of the conclusions that follow from false premises can be correct. This proves--

7

nothing. For what I consider to be a technical advance toward clarifying the vexed

issues here, I refer the interested reader to my recent paper on “Decoherence,

Determinism and Chaos” ~]]

4.5.5 Tendency, Propensity and Probability

[This section is mainly explanatory. In a finite and discrete theory which

defines probability via case counts, and probability amplitudes using the possibility

of negative case counts derived from conservation laws, the three terms discussed

in this section are absent or have different meaning.]

4.5.6 Emergent Qualities

“Each creative act brings into existence something fundamentally new: it cre-

ates a novel ‘emergent’ quality.”

‘[As discussed below, Darwinian evolution explains “emergence” given a ma-

terial framework of unknown origin. This explanatory theory gains more power

when based on the quantum mechanical properties of molecules and DNA, but

does not require this underpinning. There is a high degree of decoupling between

the physical basis for evolution and its actual “historical” course.]

4.5.7 Consciousness.

<L... : a record of its acts is stored in human memory; and it exercises a

partial functional control over both its own development and that of other human

biological processes. This sub-process is called human consciousness. It is part

of a larger process called consciousness, which includes the conscious processes

associated with other creatures.

“Consciousness is part of the full creative process.. .“

[For me, to abstract

experience of human and

While it is often hard to

-a-particular organism is--

“consciousness” as a universal singular noun from our

animal minds is an obvious mistake in a scientific theory.

agree on what we mean by the question whether or not

“conscious”, this to my mind is an indication that we

8

I .

need a diversity of terms to replace the grab-bag concept rather than an abstract

definition or (worse) postulate.]

4.5.7 Color

“Everything that exists was created by the world-process called mind. ...“

[To explain “qualia” metaphysically in this way, rather than seeing why color

sensitivity has the structure it does in some primates, differs significantly in other

primates, and is more widely different in other animals, is again a scientific mistake.

I agree that to go from what we know about the vision system from neurophysiology

to a consensus theory of “qualia” has yet to be accomplished. New ideas are

probably needed. But I gravely doubt that “the world-process called mind” will

find its place among them.

4.5.8 Spacetime

“Spacetime, like color, is an emergent quality that plays a prominent role

in human consciousness, and in a certain theoretical activity within consciousness

called physics. The success of physics indicates that the concept of spacetime bears

an important relationship to the structural properties of the creative process. ”

[While I agree that space-time is a concept that has emerged from the thinking

of physicists and physics itself is a concept that emerged from discussions between

Greek philosophers, this misses the point. Such tested structures are abandoned

at considerable risk, but this does not necessarily imply that they have a meaning

outside of human history and experience. It is one thing to recognize that science

contains many structures which are historically conditioned and quite another to

leap from that recognition either into the frying pan of calling them the product of

“mind” or the fire of assuming that they can be arbitrarily reconstructed without

using all our laboratory skills. We must be humble in the face of experience. We

sometimes forget that the dangers of hubris have increased rather than decreased

as our scientific “power” grows.]

-- The remaining sub-sections of section 4.5 of Chapter 4 go on into more detailed,--

9

.

technical discussions of Dynamics, Collapse of Wave Forms, Explanation of Bell’s

Nonlocality, Compatibility with Relativity, and other models of the mind-brain

problem. These will be of considerable technical interest to specialists in this

cross-disciplinary arena, as will practically all of the book. But I do not see that

they” lend support to the basic premises listed above.

3. BIOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED MODELS

3.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Stapp’s attempt to ground his theory of mind and matter on

plus cognitive psychology comes at a time when the basic validity

physical theory

physical theory

itself is being questioned in a new way. The “reductionist” assumption that we

have to get an accurate understanding of particle physics down to the level of

quantum gravity in order to understand consciousness, as contended by Penrose[6]

is being called into question at a much more prosaic level. For example, in a very

thoughtful and provocative article about priorities within physics by Schweber[’],

he contends that most of the problems of current scientific interest almost decouple

from basic physics, but require instead strong coupling with any number of other

scientific disciplines for their solution. One of his conclusions is that “We need

to reconceptualize the growth of scientific knowledge. The Kuhnian model will

no longer do. ” Although Schweber does not specifically mention the problem of

consciousness, it would, in my opinion, offer a good illustration of his thesis. In

particular, ignoring evolutionary biology in the discussion of the subject of this

paper amounts to a glaring error on Stapp’s part.

One of the problems in bringing physics and biology together in the study

of consciousness is the very different training practitioners of the two disciplines,

and perhaps even more basic the deep differences in personality types and skills

which the students tend to bring to these studies from the start. Physicists tend to

wdue generality, powerful theories, and mathematical or experimental precision —--

10

preferably both. Biologists tend to value the richness and diversity of their field,

and even to revel in the fact that practically every biological rule has exceptions.

They are so distrustful of theory that even after 40 years of molecular biology, there

is as yet no corpus of thinking that deserves the name of “theoretical biology”.

Of course, there is the grand explanatory principle due to Darwin that heritable

characteristics which convey differential probabilities for survival will, in time, lead

to both short-term stability and long term emergence of novelty in the presence of

a ‘(random” background. This is not “testable” in the sense that many physicists

take to be “paradigmatic” for science as a whole. Illustrations are subject to the

vagaries of the historical and paleontological record. In fact, until the “organ

of heredity” (the DNA double helix, with variations, of course) was discovered. .

the basic stability of the process was something of a mystery. Physicists often

are so put off by the “messiness” of the details that they fail to see how grand

and tough an explanatory fabric has been woven by evolutionary biologists and

paleontologists. On the other hand, geneticists can be too little aware of how long

and non-deterministic the route from genotype to phenotype, or even from health

to sickness in the adult organism, can be.

In spite of these difficulties, much progress has been made toward “understand-

ing consciousness”, though consensus on where the continuing research should be

directed, ~r what constitutes “understanding” could elude us for some time to

come: I try to give a little of the flavor

ular” books by two eminent biologists.

biologists.

3.2 CRICK: THE ASTONISHING

of the field by mentioning two recent “pop-

Not surprisingly, both started as molecular

HYPOTHESIS

Francis Crick’s recent book ‘8] starts with a very clear statement of his position:

“The Astonishing Hypothesis is that ‘You’, your joys and your sorrows, your

memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are

+n- fact no more than the behavior of a vast assemblage of nerve cells and their--

11

I .

associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll’s Alice might have phrased it: ‘You’re

nothing but a pack of neurons.’ This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most

people alive today that it can truly be called astonishing.” TAH, p.3.

Crick makes it clear that this is a hypothesis, and that his hope is to see what

type of continuing research might, eventually, lead to its acceptance. As Hopfield

remarks ‘9] “The book is a heroic attempt to wrest consciousness from the minds of

philosophers and place it in the hands of scientists.”

This forthright statement of the hypothesis will automatically be characterized

by many as “reductionist”. For Crick, this is not a valid objection:

“... What is ignored is that reductionism is not the rigid process of explaining

. . one fixed set of ideas in terms of another fixed set of ideas at a lower level, but

a dynamic interactive process that modifies the concepts at both levels as knowl-

-edge develops. After all, ‘reductionism’ is the main theoretical method that has

driven the development of physics, chemistry and molecular biology. It is largely

responsible for the spectacular developments of modern science. ...“ TAH, p.8.

Those of us who follow the type of recursive methodology discussed by Gefwert,

McGoveran and myself in Discrete and Combinatorial Physics[lo-13] should resonate

to this defense of standard scientific practice.

Whetfier this heroic effort succeeds or fails will depend more on how competent

and dedicated the scientists who rally to its clarion call prove to be than on the

book itself. The strategy which Crick and his close collaborator Christoff Koch are

vigorously pursuing is the detailed understanding of the visual system in humans

where possible, in other primates when necessary, and in other mammals when it

appears relevant. This is certainly one line of attack which deserves to be vigorously

pursued. Hopfield questions its wisdom as a strategy even when directed primarily,

as Crick and Koch do, at that aspect of consciousness which might be called visual

awareness. I tend to differ, particularly when there is speculative evidence in the

book that something that might be called an “awareness center” and another center

-that might even have something to do with ‘(free will” or at least choice may have--

12

I .

been located. There are even PET SCANS that purport to show specialized areas

in the human brain related to reading lists of verbs and nouns! ’14] I am a firm

believer in the old dictum that truth arises more readily from error than from

confusion.

3.3 EDELMAN: BRIGHT AIR, BRILLIANT FIRE

The second “popular” book I have decided to mention is by Gerald Edelman~15]

His work emphasizes the fact that in the development of the nervous system from

embryo to adult about 3070 of the nerve cells die. Thus there is a very rigorous

selective process going on which he calls “neural darwinism”, and has discussed

.. in three earlier books as well as numerous research papers. This work led him to

the conclusion that it is not so much individual neurons but fairly large groups

-of neurons” which are selected, and that the re-entrant back connections between

these groups play a critical role in the way the nervous system works.

His discussion of “consciousness” is broader and more theoretical than Crick’s,

and places more emphasis on evolutionary biology. He distinguishes three very

significant levels that have to be understood. The most primitive is “awareness”,

which can apply to individual sensory modalities. Where along the evolutionary

line this merges into “primary consciousness” in which the organism combines

variogs sensory modalities to form an internal (distributed) representation of the

external world on which it can act at both the “conscious” and the “unconscious”

level to produce appropriate behaviors is obviously not well defined. But many

higher organisms have “primary consciousness” in his sense.

“Self-consciousness” could be the exclusive prerogative of human beings, and in

his view requires an inter-communicating social system in order to develop. When

this arose in us is a vexed question, which Edelman does not enter into. Some

would claim that it is clearly present when burial of our dead is attested at least

70,000 years ago, while Julian Janes makes a case (not convincing

-self-consciousness arose as a reaction to the disasters attendant on--

to most) that

the explosion

13

I .

of Thera (1628 BCE). Others assume it occurs with the invention of language,

which could have happened at least 3 million years ago! That linguistic ability

is potentially present in Chimps (and for some, a fotiriori self-consciousness) is

controversial. But new evidence presented on NOVA this week, is beginning to

look” pretty convincing to me. I find it significant that progress has been made -

by a deliberate process of socializing very young Chimps in a rich environment

including a great deal of both verbal and nonverbal, unplanned interactions with

tender human beings. Returning to Edelman’s work, while he pays due attention

to neurophysiology, he also makes extensive use of computer modeling. His results

in modeling the primate visual system, achieved since the publication of his book

’161They explicitly show thatand called “Darwin IV” are particularly impressive.. .

“optical illusions” such as “entrainment” — bright dots moving past a fixed figure

in the visual field cause the figure to appear to move with them — occur in a system

consisting ofa television camera input coupled to a computer simulation of part of

the primate visual system. They also show that the re-entrant paths Edelman

builds into the model are required for it to perform properly. This work, to my

mind, clearly demonstrates the fact that neural groups and re-entrant pathways

organized in appropriate ways suggested by the actual neural architecture of the

primate visual system could take us a long way toward understanding one input

needed for -primary consciousness and awareness.

Edelman’s model is articulated using computers, and hence bit-strings (ordered

strings of the symbols O, 1) whose changes can be expressed in terms of XOR

(addition, modulo 2) and concatenation (adjoining one string to the end of another.

There is a widespread prejudice that such a “classical” system cannot be used to

model quantum mechanics, which we deny (see final chapter). We illustrate our

contention in terms of Edelman’s model for the neuron (Ref. 16, Figure 1). Each

neuron has a single output axon and many input dendrites with five different types

of synapses. The axon can carry an output pulse at most once in each cycle. The

time within each cycle is quantized into 256 steps, which are grouped into 32 phase

bins. The output axon emits a single pulse of uniform height in one of these 32--

14

I .

phase bins of uniform strength with a probability and phase determined by input

synapses of five different types. In addition to the spike from another axon, these

carry a gaussian voltage distribution. In three of the types the spike precedes the

voltage pulse, and in two overlaps with it. These inputs are summed at each of the

256 time steps within a cycle with specified weights, and the probability of the axon -

firing and its phase specified by thresholds. Thus the neuron in this model can

be thought of as a Feynman diagram for a multiparticle system, with a specified

transition matrix. The general analysis used in our bit-string physics applies, and

the system is “quantum mechanical” in a formal sense even though the components

are “classical”. It would be interesting to see if Edelman’s computer articulation

when replaced by a quantum mechanical wave function could be computed more

efficiently than by the direct simulation he employs, but this would be a lot of

work!

4. DISCUSSION

My own philosophical bias should be clear by now. I find what I call Stapp’s

“quantum dualism” just as objectionable as the “Cartesian dualism” which both

Stapp and I would like to see relegated to the dustbin of history. Like Darwin, I

believe that the rational principle of creation of novelty by selection of heritable

characteristics in the presence of an arbitrary background can be used to under-

stand biology. I find this dependence on “chance” at the basis of biology eminently

“thinkable” — in fact inevitable in the modern scientific environment — for those

who give due weight to the progress of both biological and historical knowledge.

As is clear from what Stapp himself says, Bohr never understood biology, and I

fear that — for all his erudition — Stapp’s rejection of “randomness” has had the

same result for him.

On the technical side, McGoveran, Manthey and 1[’7] have claimed that the

characteristic “quantum nonlocality” which most people find so weird not only

Aas a ready explanation in any finite and discrete theory of sufficient complexity,--

15

I .

but can remodeled with extant hardware. Stapp, Suppes, and Redhead—and

even more significantly for me, Tom Etter — do not believe we have proved our

case. Producing a working model is one of many items I hope to accomplish

soon. This would cut the ground out from under many of Stapp’s arguments, and

support my contention above that Edelman’s DARWIN IV need not be explicitly

quantum mechanical in order to provide insight into the primate visual system,

and eventually into visual awareness.

Lacking this demonstration, I would claim that my recent paper on decoher-

ence, determinism and chaos (Ref. 5) already shows that finite measurement ac-

curacy leads to non-commutativity in such a way that it both mimics quantum

mechanics and provides a well defined “correspondence limit” ’18] for relativistic. .

quantum mechanics in the classical relativistic field theory of electromagnetism

and gravitation — in so far as the fields act on or are radiated by a single particle

with a specified piecewise continuous trajectory.

More generally, Program Universe (Cf. Ref. 13), explicitly generates the stan-

dard model of quarks and leptons as the stable response to an arbitrary background,

and hence explains elementary particle physics and physical cosmology using the

same explanatory principle that Darwin used for biology. Whether this “grand

unified theory” of physics and biology holds up, or has to be discarded before the-.

“explanation” of consciousness is achieved, only the uncertain future can decide.

-..--

16

I .

REFERENCES

1. H. P. Stapp, Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics, Springer-Verlag, Berlin,

1993, hereinafter referred to as MMQM.

2. H. P. Stapp, Amer. J. Phys. 40,1098-1116(1972).

3. H. P. Stapp, Foundations of Physics, 12,363-399(1982)

4. A. F. Parker-Rhodes, The Inevitable Universe (unpublished); H. P.Noyes, “The

Inevitable Universe — Parker-Rhodes’ peculiar mixture of ontology and

physics”, SLAC-PUB-5161, December, 1989, and Proc. ANPA 11.

5. H. P.Noyes, “Decoherence, Determinism and Chaos”, SLAC-PUB-6397, Jan-

uary, 1994 and Proc. ANPA 15 (in press).

6. R. Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind, Oxford University Press, 1989.. .

7. S.S.Schweber, “Physics, Community and the Crisis in Physical Theory”,

Physics Today, November 1993, pp 34-40.

8. F. Crick, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: The Scientific Search jor

the soul, Charles Scribners Sons, New York, 1994; hereinafter referred to as

TAH.

9. J. J. Hopfield, Science 263,4 February 1994, p. 696.

10. C. Gefwert, D. McGoveran, and P.Noyes, “Prephysics” in Discrete and Combi-

natorial Physics; Proc. ANPA 9, H. P.Noyes, ed; published by ANPA WEST,

409 Leland Ave., Palo Alto, CA 94306, 1987, pp. 1-36.

11. D. McGoveran, and P.Noyes, “Foundations of a Discrete Physics”, Ibid, pp

37-104 and SLAC-PUB-4526 (June, 1989).

12. H. P. Noyes, “DISCRETE PHYSICS: Practice, Representation and Rules of

Correspondence, Ibid, pp 105-137.

13. H. P. Noyes and D. O. McGoveran, “An Essay on Discrete Foundations for

Physics”, Physics Essays, 2, 77-100 (1989).

14. J. Horgan, “Fractured Functions: Does the brain have supreme integrator”,

Scientific American, December 1993, pp 36-37.

15. G. M. Edelman, Bright Air, BrilJiant Fire, Basic Books, 1992.

16. G. Tononi, O. Sporns, and G. M. Edelman, “Reentry and the Problem ofIntegrating Multiple Cortical Areas: Simulation of Dynamic Integration in

the Visual System”, Cerebral Cortex, Vol 2, No. 4, July/August 1992, pp-.. 310-335. --

17

I .

17. D.O.McGoveran, H.P.Noyes and M.J.Manthey, “ON THE COMPUTERSIMULATION OF THE EPR BOHM EXPERIMENT”, presented at Conf.on Bell’s Theorem, Quantum Theory and Conceptions oj the Universe,

Fairfax, Va., Ott 21-22, 1988, and SLAC-PUB-4729, Dec 1988.

18. H. P. Noyes, “On the Correspondence Limit of Relativistic Quantum Mechan-

ics”, SLAC-PUB-601O, May, 1993( unpublished).

-..-.