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Conflict, Security and Development Group

CSDG Occasional Papers #2

Linkages between Environmental

Stress and Conflict

Environmental Resources Management


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Linkages between EnvironmentalStress and Conflict

This report has been prepared byEnvironmental Resources Management

This report, published in March 2002, is a product of a project funded by the

UK Department for International Development (DFID), and based on research

work completed by August 2000. The views contained in this paper are those

of the authors and not the UK Government or CSDG.

The report can be found on the CSDG website

http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk

Conflict, Security & Development Group (CSDG) Environmental Resources Management

International Policy Institute 8 Cavendish Square

Kings College, London London

Strand, WC2R 2LS W1M 0ER

Telephone 020 7848 2338 Telephone 020 7465 7200

Facsimile 020 7848 2748 Facsimile 020 7465 7272


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

1. This desk study has reviewed the linkages between environmental stress and

conflict. The study has been requested by DFIDs Environmental Policy (EPD) and

Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Departments (CHAD). It examines the

relationship between environmental stress and conflict and offers recommendations

on what the UK government can do to minimise the contribution of environmental

stress to the incidence of conflict in developing countries and thereby improve the

achievement of the International Development Targets.

2. The report is composed of two parts. We first examine the contribution of

environmental stress to conflict in the developing world and look at key trends that

will determine whether this link is likely to become stronger in the medium-term (up

to 2015) and long-term (post 2015). We also review how practitioners are takingaccount of environmental stress when dealing with conflict to learn from their

experience. Second, we offer suggestions on how DFID (and other UK government

departments) can improve the way it works in areas experiencing conflict associated

with environmental stress at present or potentially in the future. In short, the study

attempts to address the following questions:

What role does environmental stress play in contributing to conflict?

How can we better understand the occurrence of environmental stress?

Where is environmental stress likely to occur in the medium (up to 2015) and

long-term (post 2015) and how will it impact on the poor and efforts to reduce

poverty? What are donors, governments and the private sector doing to take account of the

environment when dealing with conflict?

What should DFID do to improve the way it deals with conflict situations in order

to strengthen its efforts to achieve the IDTs especially poverty reduction?

WHATROLE DOESENVIRONMENTAL STRESSPLAY INCONTRIBUTING TOCONFLICT?

3. Focus on the link between environmental stress and conflict over the past two

decades or more has generated a large body of research. The overall message is that

environmental stress is a significant factor in either contributing to or aggravatingconflict in many parts of the developing world affecting millions of the poorest

population.

4. Two sets of thinking currently dominate and are influencing policy makers. First,

researchers have collected and examined a wide range of case studies. Two examples

are: i) the Toronto/AAAS Project on Environment and Acute Conflict which has

compiled and analysed a large collection of case studies focusing on how

environmental stress has been a cause of conflict, and ii) ENCOP the Environment

and Conflicts Project, based in Switzerland, which has also examined case studies but

with more focus on interaction of environmental stress with other factors.

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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5. Examples include:

Bangladesh-India (1980s): Flood, cyclones and droughts in Bangladesh,

together with land scarcity and inequitable land distribution, led to the migration

and illegal settlement of over 10 million Bengalis in India, contributing to theproceeding civil strife between the Indian states of Tripura and Assam.

Haiti (1980s): impoverishment of rural farmers due to, inter alia, lack of

productive land, deforestation and population pressures, contributed to their

migration to city slums. This was seen as a catalyst for the ensuing class

mobilisation and civil strife, which included the overthrow of president Jean-

Bertrand Aristide in 1986.

Gaza: acute water shortages, inequitable access to water supplies, water pollution

and population pressures are factors seen as ultimately contributing to the

ongoing violence of Palestinians against Israel and the level of dissatisfaction and

grievance within the Palestinian population.

Rwanda (1994): Water and land scarcity, declining soil fertility and deforestation

were viewed as factors aggravating the internal conflict which led to the 1994politically motivated genocide in the country. The legitimacy of the Habyarimana

regime declined as it was no longer able to provide for the basic needs of the

population.

6. The main conclusions are that:

environmental stress alone rarely leads to conflict. It usually contributes

indirectly to conditions political, social or economic in society which result in,

or exacerbate conflict.

where violence that is linked to environmental stress results, it will usually be

sub-national and not interstate. however, case studies have not helped predict how environmental stress

contributes to conflict in combination with other relevant factors.

7. Thus, there is a second body of work, in which researchers have examined the way

in which environmental stress inter-relates with other drivers of conflict or other

factors that influence whether conflict arises. For example, the US sponsored State

Failure Task Force has revealed that environmental stress is an important contributor

to other variables more directly linked to conflict e.g. infant mortality. The Task Force

concluded that the same level of environmental stress in different countries could lead

to a number of outcomes, dependent on the capabilities of the country to cope with the

environmental stress (e.g. government policies, diversification of national economy,

community conflict management skills).

8. A threshold of violence needs to be crossed for tensions between groups to

escalate into violent conflict. This threshold occurs as a result of the interplay

between environmental stress drivers and its impacts with past and existing

conditions in affected societies. The implications of this complex relationship are that

governments, assisted by development agencies, should:

manage environmental stress and reduce its negative impacts;

analyse the relationship between environmental stress and economic, political and

social factors/conditions which, if pushed to crises, could lead to conflict.


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An example is land tenure systems in South Asia leading to marginalisation of

poor farmers, land degradation and ultimately mass migration of poor farmers into

areas with different ethnic populations. The resulting impacts could be economic,

political and social crisis and could lead to conflict, as evidenced in Bangladesh

and India; take account of the capabilities of a country to cope with environmental stress and

in particular, the capabilities of government, business and communities at both

central and local level. These can all affect the ultimate impact of environmental

stress; and

be alert to factors that trigger the violence threshold to be crossed.

HOW CAN WE BETTER UNDERSTAND THE OCCURRENCE OFENVIRONMENTALSTRESS?

9. Environmental stress can be caused by political, economic and social pressures as

well as environmental change itself. Activities which affect levels of environmental

stress have been termed environmental stress drivers. These drivers include factorssuch as increased international consumption and trade (putting pressure on cash

crops and deforestation), population growth (increasing demand for basic

environmental goods such as land, food and water), economic policies which under-

value natural resources and accelerate their exploitation, or natural events, such as

rising sea level, extreme weather events or earthquakes.

10. These drivers are stronger in some regions than others and countries with weak

capacities to cope with rising environmental stress may become conflict hotspots.

Analysis of conflict (at least at the strategic level), can be improved by understanding

and monitoring these drivers, how they vary between regions and over time and the

capacity of the countries to deal with them.

WHATWILL BE THE SCALE OFIMPACTS OFENVIRONMENTAL STRESS IN THEMEDIUM ANDLONG-TERM AND WHICHAREAS MAY BEMOSTAFFECTED?

11. Our current understanding of environmental trends are that, in the poorest

regions of the developing world, pressure on the natural resource base is getting

worse over the medium term. Additional problems, such as the expected impacts of

climate change, are becoming a significant threat in the medium and long term, and

will affect the poor most severely. Furthermore, the capacity of governments to cope

with these changes, especially in the poorest regions, are under severe strain and likely

to remain so in the medium term. While there may be countries where improvements

are evident, the overall conclusion is that environmental stress will become a moresignificant factor in conflict.

12. Water scarcity models, for example, indicate the scale and severity of

environmental problems many countries will soon be facing and it is easy to see how

the medium term trends will seriously impact achievement of International

Development Targets (IDTs). Longer term, the number of people living in absolute

water scarcity by 2025 is estimated to be between 1.8 and 4 billion. The spread of

countries affected will expand from the Middle East and North Africa today, to

include West and South Africa, South and Southeast Asia. Similarly, sea level rise of


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nearly 1 metre by 2070 is expected to inundate several low lying islands in the

Pacific, Indian Ocean and the Caribbean and seriously threaten large areas of

Bangladesh, Indonesia and Egypt. These countries, many of which are very poor,

may be more vulnerable not only to environmental stress but also conflict.

Furthermore, studies and models show that the countries facing the greatestenvironmental stress are also countries with weak capacities to cope.

13. The majority of work undertaken to date, does not, however, predict where

resource scarcities will lead to conflict. Current research programmes, such as the

US CIAs DCI Environment Center (DEC), are now developing indicators for both

environmental stresses (e.g. land degradation and deforestation) and

government/economic capacity to cope with these. It is this combination that will be

most useful for future efforts to assess areas of likely environmental stress related

conflict.

WHAT AREDONORS, GOVERNMENTS ANDPRIVATE SECTOR DOING TO TAKEACCOUNT OFENVIRONMENT WHEN DEALING WITHCONFLICT?

14. The main actors who have recently taken initiatives in addressing the link between

environmental stress and conflict are the private sector, governments and

development agencies. There are some preliminary lessons relevant to DFID.

Private sector:

15. Private sector projects, exploiting non-renewable natural resources, have often

affected local populations, their resources and their livelihoods. This has sometimes

resulted in new or exacerbated conflict. As a result, operators often carry out risk

analysis before significant investments are made. Operators have also developedbest practice social responsibility measures, such as reinvestment of royalties

locally, to reduce conflict with local communities.

16. The work of the Business Partners for Development has focused on the value of

building partnerships between private sector projects and both local government and

local communities and of more focused capacity building in alternative conflict

management/resolution skills. Improved dialogue between parties, enhanced by the

capacity to negotiate and build consensus, increases the likelihood that tensions are

identified and resolved before they escalate into violence.

Government:

17. The UK Ministry of Defence recognises the importance of examiningenvironmental stresses, alongside the more traditional political, economic and

technological indicators. Their Strategic Assessment Method (SAM) incorporates

environmental and demographic analysis as part of an overall security assessment.

However, this tool is not in widespread use by the policy makers and contingency

planners in the department.

Development agencies:

18. Many development agencies are increasing their focus on conflict and on steps to

understand its causes and contribute towards its prevention. The linkage between

environment and conflict is being seen as increasingly significant within the


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development community. The US Agency for International Development (USAID)

has developed internal procedures where programme design needs to take account of

both environmental and conflict issues. USAID has adopted procedures whereby a

conflict lens is used in the preparation of all projects designated as hotspots. This

includes an explicit analysis of the relationship between environment and conflict forany project being designed in one of these countries. Based on this framework, USAID

is now considering this guidance for projects in all countries of operation. Other

agencies, such as the World Bank, are taking initiatives to build the linkage between

environmental stress and national/local capacity into their understanding of conflict

and its impact on poverty.

19. Donors or governments are also acting successfully as third party facilitators in

regions of tension over shared resources. They assist in negotiating agreements and

setting up legal and institutional frameworks for affected countries to negotiate

within. This proved successful in the 1970s to avert heightened conflict between India

and Pakistan over water use from the Indus River basin and has also recently been

developed for the countries of the Nile Basin.

20. We suggest that DFID build on these private and donor sector experiences. The

lessons learned should be shared between other departments of DFID, other

government ministries and between international donors and private sector groups.

HOW SHOULDDFID RESPOND TO THE LINKAGES BETWEENENVIRONMENTAND CONFLICT?

21. We urge DFID to note that the ability of the poorest countries to meet the IDTs, in

particular the poverty reduction target, may be impaired by the increased

contribution of environmental stress to conflict and its impact on the most vulnerablesections of the population. Our recommendations to DFID are:

Policy

22. At the policy level, DFID should recognise the significance of environmental

stress and conflict as a new issue that the development community at large is

tackling. Given its relevance to IDTs and reducing poverty, DFID should look at

various options to ensure it is incorporated into various current initiatives:

The White Paper on Globalisation;

Strategies for achieving IDTs and the regional implications of implementing these

strategies; UK government cross-cutting reviews on conflict prevention Global and for

the Africa region;

DFIDs Africa Regional Policy;

DFIDs role in influencing International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other

key development organisations, such as the EC.

Regional Strategy

23. Future environmental stress is likely to affect some regions more than others.

Therefore, it is critical that the issue is tackled at a regional level as many countries


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could face similar stresses and difficulties in coping.

24. DFIDs regional departments, for example for north, western and southern Africa,

should examine the key environmental stresses, such as food and water scarcity, in

developing strategies to analyse and manage conflict. This may include identifyingregional watershed management or wetlands management initiatives. Two actions for

regional strategy formulation within DFID are therefore suggested:

use approaches (e.g. Strategic Conflict Analysis, indicators, models) or at least

information being produced by actors (such as the MOD or DEC), which could

be useful in determining which regions may be particularly vulnerable to conflict,

how many people may be affected and the potential impact on poverty reduction

targets; and

undertake one or two case studies in a particular region (e.g. Africa, Southeast

Asia or the Pacific), focusing on the interplay between environmental stresses

and the capacities of countries to cope in order to try to understand how theconflict threshold is crossed. In Africa, case studies in Southern Africa and/or

the Great Lakes would be useful as there are extreme environmental stresses

evident and severe capacity problems the studies could build on DFID work on

water scarcity in the region.

Country Strategies and programming

25. Country Strategy Papers should take into account the drivers and linkages

between environment and conflict, especially where environmental stress is identified

as being significant. This should take account of both current and future trends in

environmental stress. In cases where CHAD have prepared country case studies,these could be used in developing country strategies.

26. Resulting programming should identify ways of managing and reducing these

stresses and drivers. Programmes could for example include actions to develop

national capacity to identify and address environmental stress, and projects which

reduce the impact of the stress such as water redistribution systems or income

diversification. Developing national environmental management capacity is greatly

needed in areas where environmental stress is severe and overall governmental

capacity is weak such programmes can not only help to reduce poverty but would

also serve to manage tensions between natural resource user groups, rural and urban

populations.

Procedures and Guidance

27. Conflict assessment procedures, such as SAM, benefit from the inclusion of

environmental stress variables. Environmental guidance for such procedures should

be further developed and applied, to maximise their value in identifying the key

stresses and drivers for particular regions/countries.

28. Two options to integrate the environment into CHADs Conflict Assessment

method are considered appropriate, namely:


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providing specific environmental input into the pilot CA studies currently being

prepared.

incorporation of environmental issues into the CA guidance, where screening

results have suggested that environmental stress is an important issue within the

region/country.

29. There is also a case for ensuring that procedures for application of the sustainable

livelihoods approach encourage analysis of implications for conflict and its impact on

the poor.

UK Government Co-ordination

30. Effective government action to reduce the impacts of conflict, now and in the

future, requires a co-ordinated approach by all government departments. A key

opportunity is to build on the "cross-cutting reviews" on conflict prevention in

particular, to agree coordinated actions to be funded through the pooled budget inresponse to regional issues. This provides the opportunity to align policies and

shared analysis capabilities across the government taking account of the role of

environmental stress in conflict.

31. At a more general level, awareness of the issues, linkages and importance of

environmental stress and conflict must be increased within the government

departments. This could be achieved through organisation of a seminar on conflict

and the environment to discuss the different approaches and goals of respective

government departments. Awareness raising efforts should also include

dissemination of lessons learned from existing conflict management initiatives such

as BPD and Nile Basin Initiative.

32. Government-wide goals can be achieved if departments co-ordinate their efforts

and share their experiences in developing environment and conflict assessment

methods and tools. This requires a consensus approach between DFID, the MOD and

the FCO on their comparative strengths and roles in promoting the linkages between

environmental stress and conflict. It also requires co-ordination and sharing of

lessons between the different teams developing SAM and CA methodologies to see

how the environment can best be considered within them, and how the results can best

inform decisions in DFID, the MOD and the FCO.

33. In the longer-term, DFID could consider the adoption of USAIDs procedures on

conflict assessment. DFID should also enter dialogue with USAIDs EnvironmentalCentre in Washington DC about how environment and conflict has been integrated

into programme development.


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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAAS American Academy of Arts and SciencesBPA BP-Amoco

BPD Business Partners for Development

CA Conflict Assessment

CHAD Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department (DFID)

CIA US Central Intelligence Agency

CIDA Canadian International Development Agency

CPR Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Network

DAC Development Assistance Committee (OECD)

DEC DCI Environment Center (US CIA, Director of Central Intelligence)

DETR UK Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions

DFID UK Department for International DevelopmentENCOP Environment and Conflicts Project (Center for Security Studies and

Conflict Research, Switzerland)

EPA US Environmental Protection Agency

EPD Environmental Policy Department (DFID)

EU European Union

FAO UN Food and Agriculture Organisation

FCO UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office

GECHS Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project

GMES Global Monitoring for Environment and Security

GSG Global Scenario Group (Stockholm Environment Institute)

IDTs International Development TargetsISPRA International Space Research Agency

IWMI International Water Management Institute

MOD UK Ministry of Defence

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NBI Nile Basin Initiative

NRM Natural Resources Management

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OTI Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)

PCIA Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (European Commission)

PRIO International Peace Research Institute

SAM Strategic Assessment Method (UK Ministry of Defence)

SCA Strategic Conflict Assessment

SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

SFTF State Failure Task Force (US Government)

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

USAID US Agency for International Development

WBGU German Government Advisory Council on Global Change

WWC Woodrow Wilson Center


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CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 STUDYBRIEF 11.2 REASONS FOR THE STUDY 11.3 AIMS OF THE STUDY 11.4 DEFINITIONS 21.5 STRUCTURE OF THEPAPER 3

2 REVIEW OF LINKAGES BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS ANDCONFLICT 5

2.1 INTRODUCTION 5

2.2 OVERVIEW 52.3 FIRSTWAVE 52.4 SECOND WAVE 62.5 THIRD WAVE 92.6 OVERALLFINDINGS 12

3 WHY ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS OCCURS AND WHEN IT MAYLEAD TO CONFLICT 15

3.1 INTRODUCTION 153.2 FACTORSINFLUENCINGENVIRONMENTAL STRESS 15

3.3 WHENENVIRONMENTAL STRESSMAYLEAD TO CONFLICT 173.4 CONCLUSIONS 20

4 FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS 21

4.1 INTRODUCTION 214.2 CHANGES TO GLOBALENVIRONMENTAL STRESSDRIVERS 214.3 FINDINGS ONFUTURELEVELS OFENVIRONMENTAL STRESS 234.4 ASSOCIATEDFACTORS 294.5 CONCLUSIONS 30

5 PRACTICE BY ACTORS 32

5.1 INTRODUCTION 325.2 PASTEXPERIENCE 325.3 KEYACTIVITIES/APPROACHES 335.4 OTHER UK GOVERNMENTINITIATIVES 355.5 LESSONSLEARNED 37


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6 HOW UK GOVERNMENT CAN CONSIDER ENVIRONMENTALSTRESS WITHIN CONFLICT ANALYSIS 39

6.1 MAINFINDINGS 39

6.2 OVERALL

RELEVANCE TO

DFID 396.3 POLICYLEVEL 406.4 REGIONAL STRATEGY 416.5 COUNTRYPROGRAMMING 436.6 PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE 456.7 UK GOVERNMENT CO-ORDINATION 47

ANNEXES

A TABLE OFCASE STUDIES A1-3

B PRACTICE BYACTORS B1-14

B1.1 Introduction B2B1.2 Tools for Environmental Trends Assessment B2B1.3 Conflict Assessment Tools B5B1.4 Conflict Prevention Management B7B1.5 Programmes/Initiatives for Conflict Prevention B10Appendix 1 MODs Strategic Assessment Method B12

C LIST OFUK INITIATIVES C1-2

D BIBLIOGRAPHY D1-4


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to make recommendations on how to integrate environmental factors into

CHADs current efforts to develop strategic conflict assessment; and

to offer recommendations on the choice of field studies that could shed

more light upon the linkages between environmental stress and conflict andthe effectiveness of different approaches to resolving these conflicts.

The recommendations at this stage are broad and preliminary. This is because

the linkage between environment and conflict is complex and environmental

trends analysis is difficult. The recommendations should be seen as the first

steps to increase focus on this important linkage and set the direction for

further work.

1.4 DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this study we have used the following definitions forenvironmental stress and conflict.

1.4.1 Environmental Stress

In this study environmental stress is defined as follows:

decreased quality and quantity of renewable resources through human

activities causing degradation or natural phenomena such as climate

change or extreme weather events (supply-induced scarcity);

increased population growth or per capita consumption increasing thedemand for basic environmental services and competition over resources

(demand induced scarcity); and

increasing inequality in access to resources leading to unequal

disbursement of economic benefits from resource exploitation.

These factors can act singly or in combination to create a general condition of

stress.

Resources can be roughly divided into two groups: non-renewables and

renewables. The latter category includes renewable goods such as fisheries

and timber, and renewable services such as regional hydrological cycles andbenign climates2.

The definition of environmental stress includes all scales from household

stress to impacts from global trends e.g. from climate change, changes in

weather patterns and extreme events.

2 Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases, International Security, Summer

1994.

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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1.4.2 Conflict

The term conflict is used in a broad sense that is to say any fundamental

disagreement which prevents co-operation and collaboration and causes

tension and dispute. Thus, it could encompass both low-level (community)based tensions and also more widespread, open conflict.

It is, for the purpose of this report, restricted to the perceived and/or real

threat of violence as opposed to social tensions or low level disputes.

Conflict may be latent or open. It also includes fragile peace that may exist

after a period of intense open conflict. Conflict can occur at local, national or

regional levels.

1.5 STRUCTURE OFPAPER

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:

section 2 overview of literature on the nature and significance of linkages

between environmental stress and conflict;

section 3 analysis of the nature of environmental stress and conflict

linkages, examining why environmental stress occurs and under what

circumstances it may lead to conflict;

section 4 examines how environmental stresses may change in the

medium (to 2015) to long term (post 2015) and how this may affect conflict;

section 5 reviews practice, by donor community and private sector to

avoid and manage environmentally related conflict; and finally

section 6 uses the results of the preceding sections to draw conclusions on

the types of tools and initiatives which UK Government departments,

could implement in order to fully take account of the contribution of the

environment to conflict management and resolution.

Annexes at the end of this report provide additional examples of linkages,

responses and lessons learned.


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2 REVIEW OF LINKAGES BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS ANDCONFLICT

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This section briefly describes the growing body of research, mainly from the

US, Canada and Switzerland, which explores the various ways in which

environmental stress may play a role in the generation of conflict.

2.2 OVERVIEW

Since the mid 1980s, a large volume of research on this subject has been

published. The themes have been evolving and enlarging, and there are

currently various schools of thought on the nature and role of environmentalstress in causing conflict. They can best be described in three waves.

Thefirst wave was an initial attempt to broaden the focus of security to

consider non-mainstream issues such as human rights and environment.

The second wave tried to prove direct causal links in case studies, arguing

that there are cases where environmental stress can be seen to have caused

conflict. It explored the nature of the linkage. The research has been

mainly based on empirical evidence gained through a select number of

case studies. However, conclusions drawn from these cases have been

challenged.

Critics observed that the logic of the case studies was positivist: their

findings only examined cases of violent conflict, and then investigated the

environmental factors involved. It was proposed that it would be more

useful to accept there is a link and to understand why and when it is

important, particularly in relation to key contextual factors economic,

political and social.

The third wave of researchers learning from the limitations of the second

wave are trying to be more objective. They seek to determine the relative

importance of environment, vis-a-vis other factors, in promoting or

averting conflict. This approach views environment as playing a role but inrelation to (and through) a series of other factors (social, economic and

political), which will have different degrees of importance, depending on

the local and national dynamics.

2.3 FIRSTWAVE

In the 1970s and 1980s various institutions and writers began addressing

security issues beyond strict military concerns that affect the state. The UN

Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues was first to popularise the


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distinction between collective security and common security: the former

implies the more traditional interstate military security issues, while the latter

reflects the growing array of non-military threats, including economic

pressures, resource scarcity, population growth and environmental

degradation. The World Commission on Environment and Development, inOur Common Future, went a step further. It called for recognition that security

was partly a function of environmental sustainability3.

Academics such as Lester Brown, Redefining Security, 1977, Jessica Mathews,

Redefining Security, 1989 and Gwyn Prins, Politics and the Environment, 1990,

also wrote seminal pieces that began to reconceptualise the links between

security and environment. This redefinition of security also led to a more

focused hypothesis of relationships between environmental stress and conflict

(a sub-set of security). The Commission highlighted the causal role

environmental stress can play in contributing to conflict.

First wave thinking about environment and security had difficulty co-existingwith the Cold War world. It concluded in the late 1980s (around the end of

the Cold War). At this time there was also a growing demand for

empirical studies to demonstrate the links4.

2.4 SECOND WAVE

2.4.1 Research Programmes

Research programmes in the early 1990s (e.g. Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994 &Libiszewski, 1992), started investigating the role of environmental change and

resource depletion as potential causes of conflict. This led to a few major

programmes to conduct case studies exploring the direct relationship of

environmental stress leading to conflict. The main research programmes

were:

the Peace and Conflicts Studies Programme, the University of Toronto led

by Homer-Dixon;

the Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) in Zurich and Bern led by

Libiszewski and Baechler).

However, in building empirical evidence to demonstrate the presence of

linkages this set of research did not attempt to quantify the strength of the

linkages.

The two most notable research programmes for promoting linkages are the

University of Toronto/American Association for the Advancement of Science

3 Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS), IHDP Report No.11, 1999.



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and the Centre for Security Studies and Conflict Research/Swiss Peace

Foundation (ENCOP)5. Case studies produced by these programmes are

presented inAnnex A. These provide examples of conflicts which claim to

have contributing environmental factors. They should not be viewed as proof

of direct linkages. The challenges to the second wave case study researchfindings are summarised at the end of this sub-section.

The University of Toronto/AAAS Project on Environment and Acute Conflict

The argument highlights three types of environmentally induced conflicts:

interstate conflict originating in part from resource scarcity;

sub-national or intra-state conflict originating from environmental scarcity

driving population movements (environmental refugees); and

subnational conflict originating from environmental stress exacerbating

economic deprivation and disrupting social institutions.

Case studies, of differing quality, were published on Chiapas, Mexico;

Pakistan; Gaza; Rwanda and South Africa; El Salvador-Honduras; Haiti; Peru;

Philippines. Further national case studies on Environmental Scarcities, State

Capacity and Civil Violence were carried out for China, India and Indonesia.

The case studies do not quantify the role environmental stress played in the

conflicts. However, they provide a good illustrative base and broad

conclusions for further empirical work on the occurrence of linkages.

The sources of environmental stress can act singly or in combination to create

a general condition of scarcity. The three conditions of environmental scarcitywhich Homer-Dixon mentions are:

decreased quality and quantity of renewable resources (supply-induced scarcity):

increased population growth or per capita consumption increasing the demand for

basic environmental services and competition over resources (demand induced

scarcity); and

increasing inequality in access to resources (structural scarcity) leading to

unequal disbursement of economic benefits from resource exploitation.

The interaction of these conditions produces two common phenomena that

Homer-Dixon calls resource capture and ecological marginalisation.

Resource capture occurs where, due to increased environmental scarcity,

powerful groups within a society shift resource distribution in their

favour (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Examples include changes in land

legislation, imposing protected areas or constructing dams. These can lead

to further impoverishment of poorer groups disadvantaged from the

changes (e.g. dams in Euphrates-Tigris basin).

5 The summary is based on a review by the Canadian Global Environmental Change and Human Security Programme

(GECHS).


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Ecological marginalisation occurs when scarcity causes migrations to

ecologically fragile areas such as steep upland slopes or rainforests. Here a

combined lack of knowledge and capital to manage the local resources can

lead to chronic poverty and, depending on the contextual conditions, to

conflict (e.g. Chiapas, Mexico or Haiti).

Homer-Dixon concluded that any or all of these conditions in turn can

produce social effects that are linked to violent conflict. His findings also

conclude that degradation and depletion of natural resources will have a

more significant effect on conflict (through socio-economic change) than will

global environmental problems such as climate change.

The Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP)

Overall, ENCOP agree with many of the findings by the Toronto Project.

However, ENCOP investigates the nature of the links in a more integratedmanner with other factors. Two important broad findings are:

environmental stress interplays with economic, political and social factors

to cause conflict; and

the importance of the states capacity to deal with environmental problems

and thus influence their impact which, if inadequately addressed, can cause

conflict.

ENCOP therefore situates environmental conflict within social, economic and

political causes of conflict. Their case studies and research findings pay

particular attention to the institutional structures that often make thedifference between the existence or absence of conflict in the presence of

environmental transformation or discrimination6.

ENCOP also stresses the need to distinguish between the different

contributing roles environmental stress can play in conflict.

ENCOP suggested eight types of environmental stress which could lead to

some form of conflict. These generalisations were drawn from the conflicts

studied.

Baechler (a principal ENCOP researcher) produced a typology of 40 examples

of environmental conflicts. The table classifies each environmentally inducedconflict according to the eight types of environmental stress and by the

intensity of conflict.

Related Research

Subsequent work by Baechler and Spillman (1996) demonstrated that

environmental degradation may play a number of different roles in

6 Baechler 1998, quoted in Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS), IHDP Report No.11, 1999.


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contributing to conflict7. Other researchers (e.g. Westing, Gleick, Kavanagh)

have focused on particular resources e.g. Peter Gleicks work on water

resources and conflict8.

Arthur Westings research identifies the exploitation of non-renewableresources as the key source of environmentally induced inter-state conflicts.

This is because resources such as oil can be easily converted into wealth and

energy (itself a precious resource).

He identified twelve conflicts in the 20th century involving resources,

beginning with WWI and ending with the Falklands war. Access to oil and

minerals was at issue in ten of the conflicts. The only two conflicts concerning

renewable resources were over cropland in Honduras and cod fisheries near

Iceland (1972-3)9.

2.4.2 Challenges to Second Wave Conclusions

However, some scholars began to criticise these perspectives on environment

and conflict as being too deterministic (e.g. Deudney, Levy, Gleditsch, WWC).

Despite the number of case studies undertaken, the evidence for a direct

causal link remains speculative10. The criticism was that all the studies

focused on cases where there was both environmental stress and conflict.

Other cases where there was environmental stress but no conflict or conflict

but no environmental stress were not produced, thus there was no objective

conclusions as to the significance of environmental stress in conflict

generation.

So whilst there is increasing acceptance that environmental stress is at least acontributor to conflict, there remained debate about the level of significance

and the complexity of the nature of the linkages.

2.5 THIRD WAVE

The current studies within this third wave try to assess the level of

contribution of environmental factors vis-a-vis other security factors

(economic, political and social) in explaining the underlying causes (and their

relative importance) of conflict. Researchers hope that findings on how often

environmental stress can lead to conflict will inform formulation of policy to

avoid violent outcomes11.

7 Baechler and Spillman Eds 1996, Environmental Degradation as a Cause of War, vols 2-3, quoted in Global Environmental

Change and Human Security (GECHS), IHDP Report No.11, 1999.

8 Water and Conflict, Fresh Water Resources and International Secutiry, International Security Summer 1993.

9 Arthur Westing Appendix 2. Wars and Skirmishes Involving Natural Resources: A Selection from the Twentieth

Century in Arthur Westing eds Global Resources and International Conflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and Action, 1986,

quoted in Homer-Dixon article.


11 Time for a Third Wave of Environment and Security Scholarship? Marc Levy


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Research programmes include the Woodrow Wilson Centre and its

Environmental Change and Security Project (Dabelko), further work by

Toronto and ENCOP as well as the involvement of the US and Canadian

governments and the International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).

PRIO have used quantitative methods to look for correlation betweendifferent types of environmental degradation and conflict12.

In general, they are trying to identify conditions under which environmental

stress generates violent conflict and when it does not (through comparing

societies facing similar environmental problems but exhibiting different levels

of conflict). The third wave recognises that the link to conflict depends upon

how environmental factors interact with existing economic, political and

social factors. It is the impact of the interplay between these factors which can

cause conflict, not environmental change per se. This is explored in more

depth in Section 3.

2.5.1 Role of Environmental Stress

One key piece of research was undertaken by the State Failure Task Force

(SFTF). This came out of interest in environment and conflict from the highest

levels in the US government. Their first report, commissioned by the CIA, in

1995, represents an empirically driven effort (based on historical data of all

conflicts between 1955 and 1994) to identify factors associated with state

failure. It examines a broad range of indicators influencing state stability and

applies statistical methods to develop a model.

The State Failure Task Force, after assembling more than 2 million pieces of

data and examining more than 600 potential independent (or explanatory)variables, identified 75 high-priority variables deemed to be, 1) most likely to

correlate with state failure and 2) based on reasonably complete and reliable

data sources13.


10

12 N Gleditsch, Environmental Conflict and the Democractic Peace, in Gleditsch (ed): Conflict and the Environment,

1997.

13 The study assumes that state failure is correlated with conflict although there will be conflict without state-failure. This models

results therefore are assumed to be relevant to understanding causes of conflict although there may be differences in levels of

importance of the explanatory factors as sub-national levels.

SFTFsMost Important Explanatory Variables

demographic and societal measures, such as infant mortality, school enrolment and

population change;

economic measures, such as GDP per capita, change in inflation, and trade openness;

environmental measures, such as access to safe water, drought and intensity of use of

cropland; and

political and leadership measures, such as democracy level, traits of ruling elites, and

presence of ethnic discrimination and separatist activity.


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Combinations of variables were examined together to try to produce the most

accurate analysis or model. The single-best model relied on three variables:

openness to international trade; infant mortality; and level of democracy. The

study found that a combination of these variables could correctly discriminate

between failure and non-failure cases some two years in advance for abouttwo-thirds of the cases.

The report specifically notes that some variables that might have been

expected to be significant indicators of state failure do not appear in the

model. The main example they use is environment. The report notes that

although direct measures of environmental conditions are lacking in the three

variable model, it is likely that environmental effects are captured by other

variables (such as infant mortality), which are highly correlated with

environmental factors. These interactions are discussed in Sections 3 and 4.

2.5.2 Capacity to Deal with Environmental Stress

Many researchers in explaining the links between environmental stress and

the occurrence of conflict have identified the importance of the national

capacity of developing countries to respond to the changes and reduce the

impacts which may lead to conflict. The conclusions from two sets of

research on this component are summarised below.

ENCOP concluded that environmentally-caused conflicts escalate across

the violence threshold only under certain conditions and that the ability

of structures and actors to deal with environmental stress can determine

the type of conflict that is triggered.

The second State Failure Report14 concluded that the impact of

environmental degradation on the quality of life (found to be a driver of

state failure) is mediated by a nations vulnerability (dependent on

economic, social and political conditions) to environmental shocks and its

governmental and societal capacity to deal with them.

An example of the importance of national capacity comes from the 1991-92

growing season impacted by El Nino-driven droughts. There was rainfall

forecast for both Brazil and Zimbabwe, with roughly equivalent lead times

given to decision makers and a comparable projected and actual change

rainfall. The vulnerability (the potential drop in agricultural productiondivided by loss in rainfall) was also about the same. However, the actual loss

of output was very small in Brazil but quite high in Zimbabwe, where 80% of

the maize crop was lost. This is because officials in Brazil acted on the

14 State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings, July 1998


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knowledge early, implementing effective strategies, whereas in Zimbabwe the

information was never used, and no responsive strategies were developed15.

2.6 OVERALL

FINDINGS

The state of thinking on environmental stress and conflict currently appears

to be in its third wave. The main findings from the three waves suggest the

following about the nature and significance of environment.

2.6.1 Significance

There is evidence of many situations around the world where the exploitation

and management of natural resources has fuelled and exacerbated such sub-

national conflict situations. The main conclusions are:

environmental stress rarely leads directly to conflict; where violence results it will usually be sub-national (not inter-state),

persistent and diffuse;

environmental stress should be acknowledged to have different roles in

contributing to the violence threshold being crossed. It can act as a

trigger(one of a set of causal factors in starting conflict) or a catalyst (fuels

or exacerbates existing conflict). It can also act as a medium through which

political failures affect certain parts of a population e.g. issues of land

tenure, pollution or lack of infrastructure (e.g. potable water); and

the variation in importance of environmental stress is country specific.

2.6.2 Nature of Linkage

The main issues presented are that environmental stress impacts economic

and social conditions. It is often the poor who feel the impact in large

numbers causing the extreme conditions that in turn can lead to conflict.

The occurrence of conflict depends not only on the level of environmental

stress but the capability of the country to deal with the environmental stress

and its specific impacts.

Indirect Linkage

The increase in environmental stress can have specific economic, social and

political impacts. It is these resulting changes to the economic, social andpolitical dynamic of a country or sub-region which can lay the foundations for

conflict.

One of the strongest indirect linkages leading to conflict appears to be where

the reduction of natural resources impacts on the rural poor, reducing their

income earning opportunities and increasing levels of poverty. These

15 State Failure report quoting from Glantz, Betsill and CrandallFood Security in Southern Africa: Assessing the Use and

Value of ENSO Information., 1997.


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linkages are shown in the Case Studies inAnnex A. However, there is no clear

correlation between poverty (or economic inequality) and conflict.

Capacity of Countries to Deal with Environmental Stress

Environmental change is often not sufficient to cause some unique form of

environmental conflict. The overall impact of environmental stress depends

greatly on several other key factors which affect the capacity of a country to

cope with the environmental stress.

These other factors with which environment interacts vary in nature and

influence between and within countries. The result is that there are many

cases where the same levels of environmental stress in different countries will

lead to different outcomes some violent and some passive.


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3 WHY ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS OCCURS AND WHEN IT MAYLEAD TO CONFLICT

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The linkages presented in Section 2 can be further broken down to better

understand where there are opportunities for development assistance to

better analyse and deal with conflict. This section attempts to explain why

environmental stress occurs and under what circumstances it may lead to

conflict. In particular it discusses:

activities which can increase environmental stress; and

factors which influence whether or not the impacts of environmental stress

lead to violent conflict or peaceful outcomes.

3.2 FACTORSINFLUENCINGENVIRONMENTAL STRESS

3.2.1 Causes of Environmental Stress

There are many types of activities in society as well as environmental factors

which can increase or decrease the levels of environmental stress. These

activities are influenced by a number of factors, economic, social, political and

environmental and many of these can be seen to be occurring world-wide.

There has been a large body of work undertaken in this area by donors,particularly the World Bank.

These trends are stronger in some regions than others and countries which

are most vulnerable may become conflict hotspots as their environmental

stress increases. It is therefore useful to understand these drivers and how

they will vary between regions and over time.

We term these global trends Environmental Stress Drivers and they can be

economic, social, political and environmental.

3.2.2 Environmental Stress Drivers

Types of activities which can affect levels of environmental stress vary from

land ownership and fragmentation, leading to increased intensity of farming

and reduced soil quality, to increases in extreme natural events such as

droughts which also reduce crop production and the quality of water with

potential health side-effects.

Furthermore, many of these trends are worsening which suggest an increase

in environmental stress in the future. The results of studies modelling future

trends and how they can be used to predict conflict are presented in Section 4.


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These drivers can act at global, regional and national levels. The main drivers

include:

Population growth: putting increased pressure on natural resources

including land and water and generating pressures between different users(e.g. subsistence farmers and industry) at local, national and international

levels.

Increasing consumption levels: related to population and economic growth,

increasing demands on, and potential conflicts over, resources such as raw

materials, energy, water and land for construction and agricultural

productivity. Increasing consumption in conjunction with increased

population pressure will also lead to competing demands over these

resources.

Globalisation and trade: DFID has produced a White Paper on

globalisation and development, within which DFID acknowledges thatglobalisation means that causes and effects of violent conflicts are inter-

connected across the globe. Globalisation is multi-faceted and has many

manifestations and consequences. A main trend is the redefining of

political authority with the increasing role of the private sector and

the growing voice of local communities.

Private sector investment: in natural resources often has a key role to play in

environmental stress. Activities such as mining, logging, industrial scale

farming and power generation etc. have frequently resulted in

marginalisation of local populations, often cutting them off from their

traditional sustainable subsistence practices and pushing them into moremarginal land areas or removing their traditional source of income.

Economic Policy: economic policy has a significant influence on the

management of natural resources and the distribution of economic benefits

from them. One example of economic policy leading to increases in

environmental stress is timber pricing policies (royalties, concessions, rents

etc) which have generally underpriced the resource and encouraged rent-

seeking behaviour. Insufficient enforcement allowing illegal logging also

leads to higher rates of deforestation e.g. in Myanmar.

Governance and related policies: power structures within local and national

government can contribute to environmental stress through for exampleeconomic incentives for natural resource exploitation which fail to

recognise the environmental and social cost of exploitation and also in

instances of land ownership, where for example rich landlords push

poorer subsistence farmers onto more marginal pockets of land which are

then often farmed unsustainably.

Environmental change: droughts and extreme weather events can increase

existing environmental stresses on water availability and quality, food

security, and land degradation. In addition, climate change induced sea


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level rise, desertification and associated problems for low lying areas and

dry land agricultural livelihoods are expected to experience further stress

in the future. This is examined in further detail in Section 4. In addition,

anthropological pressures of excessive water abstraction and construction

in some areas (e.g. Jakarta and Venice) are exacerbating natural geologicaltrends of subsidence once again resulting in loss of land and increased

pressures on populations and resources.

These and other examples of the links between environmental drivers, stress

and conflict, are illustrated in the selection of case studies presented in

Annex A.

Long-term conflict prevention approaches should consider how to reduce

these drivers of environmental stress.

3.2.3 Identifying areas with environmental drivers and stress

A key to managing the potential for conflict is the ability to identify regions,

areas and situations which may contribute as environmental drivers or

stresses to conflict. Initial research has resulted in two key tools which are

described in more detail inAnnex B, Section B1.2, namely:

models to estimate changes in environmental stress (e.g. water, land

experiencing degradation, sea level inundation etc.); and

indicators to assist analysts in forecasting the potential incidence of conflict

and to determine the potential for existing conflicts to escalate.

There have been various attempts to develop indicators of environmentalstress and environmental change (e.g. with respect to water-induced

conflict 16) but less on the more economic, social and political drivers.

Development assistance could be aided by a system to monitor environmental

stress drivers and their resulting activities.

3.3 WHENENVIRONMENTAL STRESSMAYLEAD TO CONFLICT

3.3.1 Associated Factors

There are conditions and factors present in societies, at both government and

community level, which influence their ability to cope with the specificimpacts of environmental stress. It is the result of how the specific impacts of

environmental stress interplay with past and existing conditions in affected

societies that determine whether tensions between groups escalate into

violent conflict or maintains peaceful outcomes. These conditions and factors

are termedAssociated Factors in this review.

16 Pacific Institute's Global Environment Program's Water Scarcity Indicators.


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One example is if a farming community has its income drastically reduced

because of land degradation. The income issue is worsened if there are no

alternative (off-farm) income earning opportunities. If the community can

turn to an economically-viable alternative, an example of which may be

servicing the tourism industry, then the overall economic effect of theenvironmental stress may be mitigated.

Associated factors consist of economic, social and political (governance)

factors. One can view two types of associated factors:

factors which influence the attitude of affected groups towards the negative

consequences of environmental stress; and

factors which influence the ability of affected groups to deal with the

negative consequences of environmental stress.

The sum of these interacting factors represents the national capacity to addressenvironmental stress. In general, the fact that the affected groups are often

the poor, who have limited resources to cope with the effects, is likely to

stretch capacity more acutely.

3.3.2 Attitude Influencing Reaction

There are conditions existing in society based on past events which will

influence how affected communities immediately react to the environmentally

induced negative economic and social impacts. These events can be either

historic or recent, i.e. before or during the increase in environmental stress.

For example, historically, relations between the ethnic groups which nowcomprise Pakistan and India have been tense and international concern over

the potential for violent conflict was heightened in the 1970s when disputes

arose between these newly independent countries over use of the waters from

the Indus river basin. Conversely, the activities of large multi-national

corporations exploiting natural resources in developing nations without local

support and trust, has been found to fuel hostilities (e.g. in Nigeria against

Shell).

These factors can influence the attitude of affected communities to be more

aggressive or more understanding to the impacts.

It is also important to consider the perception of the actors involved. Thelatter can be positively influenced by inclusive participation in decision-

making over the future development of the resource base, or activities which

promote alternative income or opportunities.

3.3.3 Structural Conditions Influencing Response

Current structural conditions will affect the ability of communities and

governments to respond to and deal with the changes affecting them. Two


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main associated factors are the level of resource dependency and the ability of

government to mitigate environmental stress.

Resource Dependency

The capacity to deal with environmental stress depends on the opportunity

for resource development and sustainable management (e.g. development of

irrigation systems or cropping patterns which minimise water wastage),

economic diversification (e.g. non-agricultural employment in rural areas) and

social welfare support. Studies by Collier et al. indicate that a country more

than 25% dependent on primary commodity exports is four times more likely

to engage in a conflict than one that is not17.

The GECHS programme identifies small islands as particularly vulnerable to

environmental stress due to their high economic dependence on natural

resources. Relatively small resource bases, small populations, limited

institutional capacities and fragile economies leave the pacific islands exposedto the vagaries of international geopolitical and economic forces.

Governance

Legal and civil institutions are also key factors in the potential escalation of

environmental conflicts for the following reasons.

The less stable and developed regulatory mechanisms are in a given

society, the more susceptible the society will be to violence (e.g. civil war in

Rwanda resulting in part from an unstable political regime).

If instruments for managing resources and regulating conflicts becomeineffective over time, actors may come to view violence as a rational means

of pursuing their own interests (e.g. forced land redistribution in

Zimbabwe).

Weak states are not committed or able to assume political responsibility for

an ecological crisis such as droughts in sub-Saharan Africa or floods in

Bangladesh. They need to develop early warning response systems.

However, governments often tend to rely on foreign assistance.

In addition, the propensity for tensions and pressures to escalate into violent

conflict is largely dependent on the ability of the affected peoples to organise

and mobilise themselves.

3.3.4 Threshold of Conflict

Non-violent conflict is often present between natural resource user groups.

Often negative environmental impacts will develop into conflict but this

17 Paul Collier, 2000. Doing Well out of War in Berdal and Malone edsGreed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil War

quoted in Natural Resources and Civil War: Shrinking Pie or Honey Pot?, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, March

2000.


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does not necessarily mean violent conflict. There is thus an apparent threshold

of violence which has to be crossed before violent conflict to actually occurs.

Whilst there are certain combinations of associated factors and environmental

stress impacts which will trigger the crossing of the conflict threshold, it is only

when the aggregate impact is sufficient for conflict to cross a threshold ofviolence that it turns into violent conflict. It is therefore critical to understand

the combination of factors which escalate conflict to violent conflict.

It is extremely difficult to assess exactly when the conflict threshold may be

crossed. Not only do all the factors need to be identified and assessed but the

outcome of their interactions need to be modelled. Further research is needed

regarding the critical triggers of conflict so that policy makers can assess the

likelihood of conflict occurring and focus attention on ascertaining where and

when environmental stress may actually lead to conflict in time to do

something about it.

3.4 CONCLUSIONS

Improved understanding of the relationship between environmental

stress and conflict can aid in identifying areas for better analysis of

conflict and development programming. The main issues useful for future

guidance and policy intervention are:

recognising and analysing environmental stress drivers to reduce levels of

environmental stress;

managing environmental stress once it has been identified;

improving associated factors, such as levels of poverty, so thatenvironmental stress less frequently leads to conflict; and

considering the thresholds for conflict.

The conflict threshold will only be crossed under certain combinations of

environmental stress and associated factors. Therefore the existence and

impact of associated factors in situations where environmental stress is

occurring should be considered for both assessing conflict potential and

developing policy to prevent conflict.

The ability to target assistance to countries in most need will depend on

monitoring of environmental stress drivers as well as in-country knowledge

of associated factors. Sets of indicators have been developed and modelsdeveloped to identify potential hotspots. These are presented in Section 4.


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concluded that largely as a result of population growth, the number of people

living in areas where water resources will be under severe stress will

increase from 2.1 billion in 1995 to 4 billion in 202519.

Climate Change

Various scenarios of climate change have predicted increases in annual

average global surface temperature of between 1-3.5C by 2100 with sea level

rises of between 15-95 cm, changes in precipitation patterns, subsequent

changes in cropping patterns and an increase in extreme weather conditions

such as droughts, cyclones, hurricanes and floods.

Rising sea levels could for example threaten the lives of millions, with

Bangladesh estimated to lose 17% of its land area (affecting around 13 million

people and 16% of its national rice production), Egypt 12-15 per cent of its

agricultural land affecting 6 million people, and numerous small island states

in the Indian and Pacific Oceans being threatened by complete inundation(e.g. Maldives, Marshall islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Samoa, Tonga, Cook

Islands and Bahamas). Huge populations who stand to loose their homes and

livelihoods could potentially produce many millions of environmental

refugees. In Indonesia alone, 3.3 million people living in low lying areas will

possibly face this prospect by 2070.20

Figure 4.1 overleaf identifies some of the areas which may be affected by the

effects of global warming.

Energy Consumption

The developing nations share of commercial energy consumption is expected

to grow to nearly 40% by 2010 due to rapid industrial expansion and

infrastructure improvement; high population growth and urbanisation; and

rising incomes. This will put pressure on increased exploitation of fossil fuels

and construction of dams. Turkey is a good example of a country with

ambitious hydro-electric plans which may cause conflict with both minority

Kurdish populations and international conflict with neighbouring countries of

Syria and Iraq.

19 Joseph Alcamo, Thomas Henrichs & Thomas Rsch (2000), World Water in 2025, Kassel World Water Series, Report No. 2

20 Nick Middleton (2000) The Heat is On In The Geographical Magazine, January 2000.


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Figure 4.1 The potential effects of Climate Change on regions around the world (to 2070)

Source: Nick Middleton, 2000, Geographical Magazine.

4.3 FINDINGS ONFUTURELEVELS OFENVIRONMENTAL STRESS

Many of the current environmental stress research programmes have focused

on the issue of water scarcity and stress. Predicting future water scarcity and

stress has been a key area of research for a number of international

institutions.

4.3.1 Water Scarcity

The studies vary in their methodologies and in their predictions (mainly in

terms of the scale of water scarcity which is foreseen). The main predictions

are summarised below.

International Water Management Institute (IWMI): Global Water Scarcity Study

The IWMI have used scenario analysis to develop indicators of water scarcity

for individual countries, from 1990 to 2025. Because of their enormous

populations and water use, combined with extreme variations between wet

and dry regions within the countries, India and China are considered

separately. The 116 remaining countries are classified into 5 groups according

to these criteria, and the results can be summarised as follows:

For many countries in West Asia and North Africa water scarcity will be a

major constraint on food production, human health, and environmental


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quality. Many will have to divert water from irrigation to supply their

domestic and industrial needs and will need to import more food.

Countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, must access more than twice the

amount of water they currently use to meet reasonable futurerequirements. They have an increase in projected 2025 water withdrawals

of 100% or more.

India and China are considered separately since they contain 41% of the

study population and national statistics underestimate the degree of water

scarcity and can thus be misleading. The capacity of India and China to

efficiently manage water resources, especially on a regional basis, is likely

to be one of the key determinants of future global food security.

Centre for Environmental Systems Research, University of Kassel, Germany

The Centre for Environmental Systems Research at the University of Kasselhas used global modelling and scenario analysis to examine how growth in

population and economy, and climate change will affect the distribution of

water in the future; and how these changes will worsen or improve existing

water scarcities. Their predictions, under a Business-as-Usual (BAU)

scenario, are:

the current severe water situation could continue at least through 2025;

the areas affected by severe water stress will expand from 36.4 million

km2 to 38.6 million km2;

the number of people living in these areas is predicted to grow from 2.1

billion to 4 billion people, with the increase especially significant inSouthern Africa, Western Africa and South Asia areas with high levels of

poverty;

many of the worlds internationally shared river basins will be in the high

or very high stress categories in 2025. 33% of the total area of international

river basins will be in either of these categories;

technology will greatly improve the efficiency of water use, but not enough

to avoid water scarcity in many river basins. Basic structural changes (such

as a shift from thermal to non-thermal power plants) will therefore be

needed to avoid water scarcity.

Figure 4.2 Shows the predicted percentage change in population living in

areas of severe water stress between 1995 and 2025 under the business asusual scenario (not taking climate change into account). It can be seen that

Southeast Asia and Southern Africa will experience the greatest potential

change in population affected, amounting to 1.4 billion people in Southeast

Asia and 73 million people in Southern Africa in 2025. The majority of the

increase in numbers affected will be experiencing high poverty levels.


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Figure 4.2 % Change in population living in areas with severe water stress between

1995-2025.

Source: Alcamo, Henrichs, Rsch, 2000.

Under the alternative scenarios used by the Centre, total water withdrawals

continue to grow substantially in many parts of Africa, Latin America and

Asia because of increasing population, economic growth and the materialaspirations which come with this. However this does not lead to a large

increase in the areas under severe water stress in Africa and Latin America

since this growth is mainly in water-rich areas. The problem therefore

becomes the need to rapidly expand the water infrastructure to accommodate

increasing water demands and expand water distribution systems to fulfil the

needs of growing populations and industry. Failure to do so could be a cause

of stress. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Centre recommends that

the capacity of municipal water withdrawals (and perhaps waste water

treatment) will need to be expanded by more than 5% per year.

Stockholm Environment Institute: Global Scenario Group

The Global Scenario Group (GSG) established by the Stockholm Environment

Institute is undertaking research on global water futures, primarily through

scenario analysis. The GSG has developed a base case or BAU scenario where

current policies on water resources management and development are

continued in essence unchanged. In this they predict that a global water crisis

may occur, but even if it does not, water is not used sustainably and regional

crises do occur. In the medium term, the regional crises will become more

pronounced and depending on specific triggers e.g. a widespread, major multi-

year drought, a breakdown in the global food trading system, a major global

water crisis could develop.


25

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World Regions

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15

20

25

30

35

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South

A

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C.I.S.

A

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Middle

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EastAfrica

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estern

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Global Environment Programme, Pacific Institute for Studies in Development,

Environment and Security

The Director of the Programme, Peter Gleick, has compiled many sets of data

on existing and predicted water availability. Of particular interest in thiscontext is data showing the number of countries which are and will suffer

water scarcity based on quantity available per capita. This includes 17

countries in Africa and 12 in the Middle East by 2025.

Countries suffering water scarcity are those with less than 1000 cubic meters

per person per year which is argued to be the minimum water requirement

for an efficient, moderately industrialised nation. Table 4.1 summarises the

countries which Gleick has identified as being below this threshold either

now or in 2025. Most of the countries expected to fall below the threshold by

2015 have very low income levels.

Table 4.1 Countries Facing Water Scarcity in 1990 and in 2025 (m3/person/year)


26

Country Per Capita Water Availability Projected Per Capita Water

1990 Availability 2025

AfricaExisting water scarcity

AlgeriaBurundiCape VerdeDijboutiKenyaLibyaRwanda

TunisiaNew areas in 2025ComorosEgyptEthiopiaLesothoMoroccoNigeriaSomaliaSouth AfricaTanzania

North and Central AmericaBarbadosHaiti

South AmericaPeru

750660500750590160880

530

204010702360222012002660151014202780

1701690

1790

38028022027019060350

330

7906209809306801000610790900

170960

980


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UK Centre for Hydrology and Ecology

Hydrologists and geologists at the UK Institute of Hydrology (now called the

UK Centre for Hydrology and Ecology) and the British Geological Survey

have undertaken work for DFID to model water scarcity for Eastern and

Southern Africa, using a grid-based approach. Water demands, surface flows

and groundwater availability are estimated, and various water availability

indices were derived, comparing the resources with the projected demand.

This approach was then applied to the regions of Eastern and Southern

Africa.

The results from their modelling show that water scarcity is likely to increase

in many countries in Eastern and Southern Africa, with particular problems inthe countries around Lake Victoria and in the southernmost parts of the pilot

region. Figure 4.3 presents the findings of the work.


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Country Per Capita Water Availability Projected Per Capita Water

1990 Availability 2025

Asia/Middle EastExisting water scarcity

IsraelJordanKuwaitQatarSaudi ArabiaSingaporeUnited Arab EmiratesYemen

New areas in 2025CyprusIranLebanonOman

470260>1050160220190240

1290208016001330

31080


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Figure 4.3 Areas affected by water scarcity in 2030 (Data from Fischer and Heilig, 1997)

4.3.2 Food Scarcity

Food security is critical for the maintenance of peace both within nations and

internationally. However, countries in the past have faced food scarcity and

studies show this trend will get worse in the medium term. The World

Resources Institute (WRI) predict that some 680 million people will have

insufficient food in 2010. Sub-Saharan Africa will be particularly hard-hit

where one third of the population will lack adequate food.

The FAO has developed an early warning system for alerting the UN to food

emergencies around the world. They have identified countries which are

about to face food security problems. Table 4.2 shows 16 countries in Africa

which may become potential hotspots because of lack of food. The table

shows that environment is both a driver of stress and a consequence of

conflict. However, even where food scarcity is caused by civil strife, it is itself

an environmental stress which will fuel the existing conflict.

Table 4.2 Countries Facing Exceptional Food Emergencies

Country/Region Reason for Emergency

AFRICAAngola Civil strife, Population displacementBurundi Civil strife and insecurityCongo, Dem. Rep. Civil strife, IDPs and refugeesCongo, Rep of Past civil strifeEritrea IDPs, returnees and droughtEthiopia Drought, IDPsKenya DroughtLiberia Past civil strife, shortage of inputsMadagascar Drought/cyclones


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62%* of world population

Over 2000 m p year1000 2000 m p year

Under 1000 m p year

3

3

3 -1

-1

-1

1

1

1


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Country/Region Reason for Emergency

Mozambique FloodsRwanda Insecurity in partsSierra Leone Civil strife, population displacementSomalia Drought, civil strifeSudan Civil strife in the southTanzania Food deficits in several regions

Uganda Civil strife in parts, droughtASIAAfghanistan Civil strife, droughtArmenia Vulnerable groups and refugeesAzerbaijan Vulnerable groups and refugeesEast Timor Civil strifeGeorgia Vulnerable groups and refugeesIraq Economic embargo, droughtJordan DroughtKorea DPR Economic problemsMongolia Heavy snowfallSyria DroughtTajikistan Drought, reduced harvest

LATIN AMERICACuba DroughtEl Salvador Adverse weather (Hurricane Mitch)Guatemala Adverse weather (Hurricane Mitch)

Haiti Structural economic problemsHonduras Adverse weather (Hurricane Mitch)Nicaragua Adverse weather (Hurricane Mitch)Venezuela Adverse weather (flooding/mudslides)

Source: FAO webpage (http://www.fao.org/giews/english/eaf/eaf9708/af970801.htm)

4.3.3 Limitations of Trends Assessment

Since the making of assumptions is inherent to most predictive "tools", there

will always be limitations to the accuracy of their results. Furthermore, any

regional or local predictions must be evaluated in the light of national and

local information, particularly on a countrys capacity to addressenvironmental stress.

4.4 ASSOCIATEDFACTORS

The level of impact on conflict from this increased environmental stress will

depend on national capacities to address the stress as discussed in Section 3.

While it is hard to identify standard indicators of national capacity (or indeed

consistent measurement) in this context, we believe it is reasonable to assert

that in some parts of the developing world, for example in much of Africa

and parts of SE Asia, the trends are worrying. Political stability,

administrative capacity, monitoring and response to social, health andpoverty related conditions, are all under strain in many, though of course not

all, countries. Where these factors are on a downward trend, the implications

of environmental stress are of far greater concern. Indeed reduction in

capacity often appears where environmental stress looks likely to increase the

most where large numbers of the poor are increasingly vulnerable to

environmental stress and over-stretched government systems have limited

ability to respond.


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4.5 CONCLUSIONS

4.5.1 Results

The studies presented above, suggest that environmental stresses in manyparts of the world will increase over in the medium and long term. Under a

BAU scenario21, all the studies conclude that regional water crises over the

period up to 2075, are a li

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