SSA Technical Report: Update on Status of Piracy & Armed Robbery

March 2016

1 | P a g e

Preamble

In June 2015, the SSA published a SSA Technical Report: Importance of Distinguishing Piracy

from Armed Robbery. The objective of the report was to highlight the importance of using

the correct terminology for incidents of attacks due to sovereign and legal implications

associated with each term. This was clearly illustrated on 29 February 2016 when the

Madras High Court Bench refused to suspend the five-year sentence imposed by a trial court

on a group of international armed-guards on board the U.S. anti-piracy vessel mv Seaman

Guard Ohio detained by Coast Guard on 12 October 2013 for entering Indian territorial

waters illegally with a huge cache of arms and ammunition. The decision of using armed

guards on board the mv Seaman Guard Ohio presents a dilemma for ships. Whilst

considered as accepted good practice on the high seas, the Gulf of Guinea and Gulf of Aden,

the reverse is true for the Asian region, in particular the wide expanse of Asean waters. The

lesson is that the terms piracy and armed robbery carry legal connotations of sovereignty.

The 1st Half 2015 (January to June): Rampant and Uncontrolled Attacks

During January-June 2015, a total of 106 incidents were reported in Asia, comprising 100

actual incidents and six attempted incidents. Of the 106 incidents, 11 were piracy incidents

which occurred in the South China Sea (SCS) and 95 were incidents of armed robbery against

ships. Amongst these, the number of Category 41 incidents was highest during January-June

2015. Of the 62 Category 4 incidents, 35 (56%) occurred onboard ships while underway in

the eastbound lane of the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) of Straits of Malacca and

Singapore (SOMS) and 12 (19%) onboard ships at ports and anchorages in Vietnam.

A key area of concern was incidents involving siphoning of ship fuel/oil from product/oil

tankers, most of them below 5000 GT. A total of eight incidents of siphoning were reported

during January-June 2015 compared to five incidents reported during the same period in

2014. This is tabulated below:

Period Piracy Armed

Robbery Attempted Major Events Theft/Siphoning Cases

1st

Qu

arte

r 2

015

(01

Jan

– 3

1 M

ar)

6 29 2

Phubai Pattra 1: Hijacking & Siphoning 20/02/2015 Off Pu Aur Malaysia Product tanker hijacked. 980MT Gasoline siphoned off and crew personal belongings taken.

David Tide II: Hijacking & Theft 22/03/2015 Off Pulau Tioman Malaysia OSV hijacked. 180MT Diesel oil siphoned off and crew personal belongings taken.

1 Category used by ReCAAP (Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia) to denote incidents which involved 1-3 men who were not reported to be armed and the perpetrators escaped empty-handed upon sighted by the crew immediately. Nothing was stolen and crew was not harmed.

2 | P a g e

2nd Half 2015 (July to December): Effective Enforcement by Littoral States

The collective efforts by enforcement agencies, relevant international organisations and the

shipping industry itself had produced results, as demonstrated from the arrest of the

perpetrators involved in the hijacking of chemical tanker, Sun Birdie on 29 January 2015 and

product tanker, Orkim Harmony on 11 June 2015. These outcomes were encouraging and

demonstrated the effectiveness of the cooperative mechanism in information sharing and

operational cooperation among ReCAAP Focal Points, regional maritime authorities from

Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia, INTERPOL and the ReCAAP ISC.

2 Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency

1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr 1st Qtr 2016

Piracy 6 6 1

Armed Robbery 29 39 35 16 5

Attempted 2 5 4 5 1

6 61 0 0

29

3935

16

5

25 4 5

105

1015202530354045

Nu

mb

er o

f In

cid

ents

Quarters 2015

Types of Incidents

Period Piracy Armed

Robbery Attempted Major Events Theft/Siphoning Cases

2n

d Q

uar

ter

20

15

(01

Ap

r –

30

Ju

n)

6 39 5

Dongfang Glory: Hijacking & Siphoning 01/04/2015 Off Pu Uwi Indonesia Product tanker hijacked. 4000MT Petrol plus 1000MT Diesel oil siphoned off.

Oriental Glory: Hijacking & Siphoning 15/05/2015 Off Labuan E Malaysia Product tanker hijacked. 2500MT ship fuel/oil siphoned off.

Orkim Victory: Hijacking & Siphoning 04/06/2015 Off Pu Aur Malaysia Product tanker hijacked. 770MT MDO siphoned off.

Orkim Harmony: Hijacking & Theft of Ship 11/06/2015 Off Pu Aur Malaysia Product tanker hijacked and renamed. 6,000MT ULG 95 (petrol) stolen. Ship commandeered by perpetrators and crew abandoned.

Pirates arrested through cooperation of MMEA2, Indonesia Navy, Australian patrol aircraft, Royal Thai Navy, ReCAAP Focal Point (Thailand and Vietnam) and Vietnamese Coast Guard.

3 | P a g e

Period Piracy Armed

Robbery Attempted Major Events Theft/Siphoning Cases

3rd

Qu

arte

r 2

01

5

(01

Ju

l – 3

0 S

ep)

1 35 4

Nil Hijacking or Siphoning cases

August 2015: Arrest of Gang The Jakarta Post also reported the recent arrest of the purported mastermind behind the Orkim Harmony hijacking incident. August & September 2015: Littoral states step-up anti-piracy efforts News sources reported that Indonesia and Malaysia were both stepping up their fight against piracy in the wake of growing security concerns in surrounding waters including the deployment of a helicopter-equipped special task force (STAR) team at Johor Bahru and proposal by Malaysia’s Defence Minister for joint patrols with Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore.

4th

Qu

arte

r 2

01

5

(01

Oct

– 3

1 D

ec)

Nil 16 5

Nil Hijacking or Siphoning cases

Efforts by Indonesia Besides the efforts in dealing with oil cargo thefts, the Indonesian authorities had also reportedly stepped up surveillance and presence in the Straits of Malacca & Singapore. The Jakarta Post dated 26 October 2015 reported that the Indonesian authorities had arrested two groups of perpetrators responsible for robberies on board ships. It was reported in a separate article (Ship Bunker dated 29 December 2015) that the Indonesian Navy would be launching a new campaign among the people living in villages believed to be hotbed for attacks; to create awareness about the crime so that they would not participate in such activities should they be approached to rob or hijack ships or steal items from ships. The campaign would involve local police and regional administrators.

Total 2015

13 119 16

4 | P a g e

Current Situation

These efforts and arrests have attributed to no reports of oil cargo thefts incidents in the last four months of 2015 (since the last incident involving Joaquim on 8 August 15). There has been no reports of actual incidents on board ships while underway in the Singapore Straits since November 2015. Both ReCAAP ISC and ICC IMB annual reports confirmed that there has been a significant drop in the number of piracy and armed robbery attacks in the region. The elink for the various ReCAAP reports are provided: http://www.recaap.org/AlertsReports/IncidentReports.aspx For proprietary purposes, the ICC IMB Annual Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery but is available from ICC IMB on request.

Cooperation between the Governments of the Littoral States

The 3 littoral states for SOMS (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore) have an agreement to

conduct coordinated patrols. The recent spate of armed robberies in SOMS have prompted

further regional cooperation between Malaysia and Indonesia, and the setting up of Rapid

Reaction teams to be based in Johor and Batam respectively.

Existing Bilateral/Multilateral Arrangements:

Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP),

Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrols (ISCP),

Malaysia-Indonesia Coordinated Patrols (MALINDO),

Eye-in-the-Sky (EiS), etc.

When alerted by ships of such incidents, the RSN IFC (Republic of Singapore Navy

Information Fusion Centre) will immediately broadcast an advisory to shipping in general

with instructions to also alert the Indonesian Navy Operation Centre on Channel 16. At the

same instance, the IFC will also relay this information immediately to their Indonesian

counterparts. This cooperation and action has successfully led to the arrest of 3

perpetrators recently.

Cooperation and Collaboration by the Private Sector within the Region

Piracy and Armed Robbery are standing agenda items discussed at the below regional ASF

(Asian Shipowners’ Forum) and FASA (Federation of Asean Shipowners’ Association)

meetings held as mentioned below:

28th Interim Meeting of the ASF Safe Navigation & Environment Committee, 23 March

2015, Singapore

40th FASA AGM & 47th FASA Executive Committee Meeting, 18-20 May 2015, Jeju,

Korea

5 | P a g e

24th ASF AGM, 18-20 May 2015, Jeju, Korea.

29th Interim Meeting of the ASF Safe Navigation & Environment Committee Meeting, 16

September 2015, Singapore

41st FASA AGM & 48th FASA Executive Committee Meeting, 22-24 November 2015,

Manila, Philippines

21st Interim Meeting of the ASF Seafarers Committee, 20-21 October 2015, Beijing

Interpol hosted a briefing on 6 August 2015. Concerned over recent developments, the

Malaysian government with assistance from Interpol set-up a forensic piracy training facility

in Mersing, Malaysia, to train their marine officers. The training will be made available to

other Asean countries.

To present a strong unified voice for a specific call for action, FASA (Federation of Asean

Shipowners’ Association) prompted its member countries to voice their concerns on Piracy

and Armed Robbery to their respective maritime administrations, and also at the ASEAN

Maritime Transport Working Group (AMTWG) Meeting to be held on 2-4 September 2015,

Phnom Penh, Cambodia. FASA wrote to Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, Chairman of Asean, to

appeal for action.

ICC IMB hosted an International Meeting on Global Piracy, Armed Robbery and Maritime

Security on 14-15 September 2015, Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia.

ReCAAP ISC hosted the Nautical Forum 7/16 Situation on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against

Ships in Asia for 2015 on 12 January 2016 which included a presentation by FAdm Maritime

Ibrahim Bin Mohamed, Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency on “MMEA : Enforcement

Efforts and Measures Taken on Armed Robbery and Piracy Issues”.

Publications for the Region to Combat Piracy

The following publications to guide and advise the shipping community on best practices

and updates on the piracy and armed robbery situations were also published:

Publication of the Tug Boats and Barges (TaB) Guide Against Piracy and Sea Robbery by

ReCAAP ISC, January 2013.

Quarterly and Annual reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery by ReCAAP ISC and ICC IMB

PRC. The ICC IMB PRC reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery are available only on

request

Publication of SSA Technical Report: Importance of Distinguishing Piracy From Armed

Robbery by SSA, June 2015.

6 | P a g e

Publication of the Guide for Tankers Operating in Asia Against Piracy and Armed

Robbery involving Oil Cargo Theft (Tanker Guide) by ReCAAP ISC, RSN IFC and RSIS,

November 2015

Publication of the “Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery Against

ships in Asia” (Asian Guide) by ReCAAP ISC, RSN IFC, RSIS, Intertanko, OCIMF, ASF, FASA

and SSA, 17 February 2016.

Legal Implications of Armed Guards Entering Territorial Waters

The on-going court case saga in India of the US registered mv Seaman Guard Ohio clearly

reinforces the point on the unauthorised carriage of weapons. Despite repeated

international appeals, including ministerial efforts at the government-to-government level,

the Madras High Court Bench has refused to suspend the 5-year sentence imposed by a trial

court on the armed guards for entering Indian territorial waters illegally with a huge cache

of arms and ammunition carried on board the vessel to combat piracy. The same principles

will apply to vessels entering the SOMS to the extent that large portions of the sea area in

South East Asia are sovereign waters protected by the adjacent littoral states, and in some

cases with significant overlaps. Further, the severity of the criminal penalties of bearing

arms without proper permits and authorisations vary between the littoral states. With the

recent subsidence of attacks against ships, it is important the industry is given the full

assurance that SE Asia waters and the South China Sea are safe and the debate of protection

by armed guards becomes purely academic.

Whilst all due care and diligence are deliberated, considered and included in the various

guides produced by ReCAAP ISC and associated partners, users must take care not to treat

such publications as the panacea for all situations. One cannot emphasise enough on the

importance of conducting risk assessment for each individual transit or passage. Conditions

will vary on a case-by-case basis, and should be left entirely to the discretion of the Master

and his team to determine the appropriate measures, including hardware hardening, setting

up a citadel, etc. based on the resources available, on the type of vessel, speed, freeboard,

visibility, weather conditions, traffic density, proximity of hazards, operating conditions of

navigational equipment, day or night passage, level of fatigue of crew etc. In addition, Rule 5

in Part B Steering and Sailing Rules of the International Regulations for the Prevention of

Collisions at Sea, specifically states in Lookout that “Every vessel shall at all times maintain a

proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the

prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of

the risk of collision.” It is good seamanship practice that vessels transiting pirate/armed

robbery infested waters should deploy additional manpower to perform and fulfill such

requirements. Heightened and acute vigilance is the key for a safe, uneventful and trouble-

free passage.

7 | P a g e

Recent Developments

There have been a number of recent developments connected with Piracy and Armed

Robbery as listed below:

1. Hacking by Pirates & Armed Robbers

In early March 2016, BIMCO and The Standard Club issued a warning regarding an

alleged security breach in the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Center, Gulf of

Guinea (MTISC-GoG), potentially resulting in the release of ships' data to pirates.

Although the breach was not officially confirmed, it was recommended that vessels

entering the area should “limit the provision of any information which would allow

vessels to be identified or tracked.” Global risk advisory firm PGI Intelligence has

recently alleged that corruption could be a possible contributing factor in recent

successful hijackings at long distances from shore (100 nautical miles plus), suggesting

that officials could be passing ship positions to pirates in the Gulf of Guinea. Similarly, a

report by US tech firm Verizon reported a case of a series of pirate attacks targeting

high-value containers, identified in advance by hackers. Cyber-criminals were able to

download bills of lading from the undisclosed company’s servers, identifying specific

containers through barcode information. The hack enabled pirates to board the vessels

and target these specific high-value containers, stealing their cargoes, rather than

“spending days holding boats and their crew hostage while they rummaged through the

cargo”. The pirates “……. board a vessel, locate by bar code specific sought-after crates

containing valuables, steal the contents of that crate—and that crate only—and then

depart the vessel without further incident,” the document indicated. Verizon’s Risk

team was able to identify the problem and shut down the compromised servers,

blocked the cyber-criminals’ IP address, reset all the compromised passwords and

rebuilt the affected servers. A more ominous and threatening note is the possibility of

terrorist using the guise of piracy and armed robbery to acquire resources to support

their cause. Although not evident as this stage, the attraction of using piracy and armed

robbery to fund terrorist activities presents a very real and present danger.

2. Fake Piracy Reporting & Risk Pay

A report in the Jakarta Post on 26 October 2015 highlighted a growing concern that

many reported cases of piracy or armed robbery may not be what they seem. Amongst

the reports compiled by the ReCAAP ISC for 2015, there are many in which intruders

came on board, were detected, and escaped empty-handed, with no property stolen

and no crew injured. Apparently, the Indonesia maritime enforcement agencies are

getting inundated with false alarms, and on sending in ships to respond, realized later

that there were no incidences at all. These reports could have been filed to fulfil other

ulterior motives related to insurance fraud or business. One such suspicion was the case

of seafarers lodging false reports to qualify for 'risk pay' bonuses. It seems that there

are some contracts in which such payments are only are triggered if the ship is subject

to an actual attack. Another was the practise among competitors to send in fake piracy

reports (not their ships, but their competitors’ vessels) to delay a competing rival

8 | P a g e

company’s ships as the vessels get hauled back to shore or the crew gets rounded up

for interviews/interrogations.

3. Investment in Assets

The Today on 10 March 2016 reported that the Malaysian Defence Ministry is spending

RM9 billion on six state-of-the art Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to beef up naval defence.

The ships are expected to be the largest combat vessels in the Malaysian armada and

will be equipped with capabilities to engage in anti-air, electronic, anti-submarine and

surface warfare. Capable of operating for 21 days without additional supplies, the LCSs

can also be used for search-and-rescue operation, and guarding high-value unit

convoys. The first of the combat vessels is slated for completion in 2019. Last month it

was reported that Putrajaya has ordered six advanced scout attack helicopters which is

believed to be the biggest arms contract between Malaysia and the US in more than 20

years. The new ships will be deployed to defend and monitor important areas in

Malaysian waters, particularly the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zones) and the sea line of

communication connecting the peninsula to Sabah and Sarawak.

Conclusion & Going Forward

At the international level, it has been reported that BIMCO is planning to invite key

international shipping and maritime organisations to a “roundtable Working group” tasked

to drawing up a global BMP guide on piracy. It is expected that this will be a collaborative

international effort to publish a comprehensive world guide to address the scourge of piracy

and armed robbery worldwide.

Upgrading IFC as the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre (MTISC) for the Asian

region. With the completion of the “Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery

Against ships in Asia” by ReCAAP ISC, RSN IFC, RSIS, Intertanko, OCIMF, ASF, FASA and SSA,

on 17 February 2016, it is anticipated that the guide for Asia will merge with the other

guides for Gulf of Guinea and Gulf of Aden, when ready, to form a complete international

world guide for all.

Whilst these efforts are progressing, in tandem with these initiatives, SSA, FASA and ASF are

collectively working towards better and clearer lines of communication for Asia. The current

reporting protocols for Piracy and Armed Robbery for the Asian region is somewhat

confusing and disjointed. The current IMO recommendations (MSC.1/Circ.1333) specifies

that a ship under attack immediately reports by radio/GMDSS to:

1. the RCC of the Coastal States and

2. PRC/IMB.

9 | P a g e

Unfortunately, this protocol does not reconcile with the recommendations in Q6112 &

Q6113 which encourages vessels entering the VRA (Voluntary Reporting Area) to notify the

IFC for tracking purposes. Sadly, the IFC which is tracking the vessel and has the best

knowledge is totally omitted in the IMO reporting protocol when a vessel is attacked. The

existing reporting protocols therefore differs substantially with those adopted in the Gulf of

Guinea and Gulf of Aden areas. The SSA advocates the establishment of a single reporting

point similar to the role undertaken by the internationally establised MTISC-GoG (Maritime

Trade Information Sharing Centre - Gulf of Guinea).

--------- End --------

10 | P a g e

FAQs

1. What is piracy? What is armed robbery?

Piracy mainly occurs in high seas whereas armed robbery takes place within territorial

jurisdiction.

The diagram below show the definition of Piracy, which is taken from Article 101 UNCLOS and

Armed Robbery, taken from IMO Resolution A. 1025 (26).

2. Is “fuel siphoning” considered piracy or armed robbery?

Fuel siphoning is the illegal transfer of fuel oil from one ship to another. From a legal

standpoint, whether it is a piracy or armed robbery depends on whether the theft takes place

on high seas or within territorial waters. In view of the increasing number of incidents with

respect to fuel siphoning, ReCAAP ISC has published special reports to address the concerns.

The link of the report can be found below.

http://www.recaap.org/AlertsReports/IncidentReports.aspx?EntryId=289

3. What is the modus operandi of pirates and armed robbers in S E Asia?

Essentially, there are two distinct types of attacks in S E Asia. In the majority of cases, the

perpetrators disguise as fishing boats and use stealth, poles, hooks and lines to board ships.

The aim is to board quietly and leave without being seen after stealing stores, engine spares

11 | P a g e

and/or personal possessions of seafarers. Unfortunately, the perpetrators sometimes turn

violent when confronted. These are opportunistic in nature and does not distinguish between

ship types or sizes, and occur when the bridge team is preoccupied with navigation in

congested waters or when the vessel is at anchor when vigilance is perceived to be slack. Most

attacks occur in the SOMS, the eastern approaches in the Singapore Strait and the South China

Sea. Perpetrators are known to have boarded very large container ships with very high

freeboard. The second type of attack is hijacking of ships for cargo theft, commonly referred

to as siphoning incidents, and is generally confined to small parcel tankers carrying gas oil or

gasoline oil products which can be easily sold on various black markets. Ships are intercepted

on passage, hijacked, communication disabled, and commandeered to another location to

rendezvous with another vessel to siphon-off the oil or modified/disguised for resale. The

manner these hijacks were so well coordinated and executed suggest that these attacks were

carried out by a team of professionals with syndicated and intelligence-led support.

4. Are there any reference material to guide ships and masters when navigating in SE Asia?

On 17 February 2016, ReCAAP ISC, RSN IFC, RSIS, Intertanko, OCIMF, ASF, FASA and SSA

published a guide “Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery Against ships in

Asia” (Asian Guide) for the maritime community in Asia. The publication was the culmination

of 4 months of intense consultation involving some of the major maritime organisations

representing the industry, including the oil majors, shipmanagement firms, dry bulk and

container shipping lines and coastal tanker operators. The regional guide is

comprehensive, all encompassing, useful and relevant to seafarers on all ship types trading in

Asia, assisting them to avoid piracy attacks, deter and delay attacks as well as provide

recommended measures should an attack occur. The guide is intended to complement a

world guide proposed by BIMCO and other major international organizations. The elink to the

Asian Guide is provided below:

http://www.recaap.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Command=Co

re_Download&EntryId=423&PortalId=0&TabId=78

5. How useful is the BMP4 as a guide for vessel transiting the SOMS?

The BMP4 was conceived by the international shipping community specifically to combat

piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea regions where enforcement

is lacking and there is rampant lawlessness. Some of these best practices are useful and can be

applied to the Asian region, however, care must be taken to ensure that safety and territorial

sovereignty are not compromised. Vessels are advised to conduct risk assessment exercises to

ensure that the ship and her personnel are aware of their vulnerabilities at the same time put

in place the correct amount of resources to ensure that the ship is adequately and

appropriately protected.

6. What preparations and precautions should vessels take when entering piracy and armed

robbery infested areas?

These topics are discussed in detail in the “Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed

Robbery Against ships in Asia”. Ships and Masters are advised to refer to the guide to obtain

12 | P a g e

a holistic risk assessment of each transit keeping in mind that the most appropriate action will

depend largely on the prevailing conditions in each particular situation.

7. What are the actions to take when attacked?

Ships under attack are advised to take immediate actions as recommended in Section 10:

Ships Under Attack of the “Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery Against

ships in Asia” (pg 28). Concurrent with such actions, ships and Master are advised to follow

the correct protocols as specified under the IMO circular MSC.1/Circ. 1334 on ‘Revised

Guidance to ship owner, ship operator, ship master and crew on preventing and suppressing

acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships’. The flow diagram for reporting incidents in

Asia is reproduced in Annex C (pg 42) of the Asian Guide.

8. Has the piracy or armed robbery situation in S E Asia worsen?

As of 1 May 2016, there has been no report of oil cargo thefts incidents since 8 Aug 2015

(8 months) after the last hijacking and siphoning incident involving mt Joaquim. Similarly,

there has been no reports of actual attacks on ships while underway in the Singapore Straits

since November 2015 (see chart on pg 2 showing significant drop in incidents for 2015 and 1st

Quarter 2016). Both ReCAAP ISC and ICC IMB PRC annual reports confirmed that there has

been a significant drop in the number of piracy and armed robbery attacks in the region. This

situation has improved as a result of concerted actions brought about from:

Cooperation between the Governments of the Littoral States, namely Indonesia, Malaysia

and Singapore, and extending to the ASEAN Maritime Transport Working Group.

Cooperation and collaboration by the private sector within the region, especially at the

various meeting and forums organised by ASF, FASA, ReCAAP ISC, ICC IMB PRC and RSN

IFC.

Publications for the region to combat piracy and armed robbery which included the SSA

Technical Report: Importance of Distinguishing Piracy From Armed Robbery, ReCAAP

ISC/RSN IFC/RSIS Guide for Tankers Operating in Asia Against Piracy and Armed Robbery

involving Oil Cargo Theft (Tanker Guide) and the latest “Regional Guide to Counter Piracy

and Armed Robbery Against ships in Asia” by ReCAAP ISC, RSN IFC, RSIS, Intertanko,

OCIMF, ASF, FASA and SSA.

9. Which areas in S E Asia are more prone to pirate or armed robbery attacks?

A detailed matrix of the locations and timings of the attacks for the four quarters in 2015 can

be found in Attachment 2 (pg 16). The aggregated data is presented in the Consolidated

Location & Timing Matrix shown on Page 13. There were 15 cases (10%) of actual/attempted

PIRACY attacks. The remaining 132 attacks (90%) were ARMED ROBBERY. Of these ARMED

ROBBERY cases, it is significant to note the location of many of these incursions:

13 | P a g e

75 cases (51%) were committed in the Singapore Strait, mostly in Indonesian territorial

waters whilst transiting Selat Durian in the vicinity of the eastbound TSS (Traffic

Separation Scheme) between Pulau Karimum Kechil and Phillip Channel.

45 cases (30%) were committed when the vessels were at in port waters either at

anchor or alongside a berth.

10. What time of the day do pirates/armed robbers tend to attack?

With reference to the same Consolidated Location & Timing Matrix, a detailed analysis of the

timings of the attacks revealed that 91attacks or 62% (comprising actual and attempted)

occurred between 0001 to 0600 hours whilst 21 attacks (14%) took place between 1800 to

2359 hours, and collectively revealed that 76% (112 cases) of all recorded attacks occurred

during hours of darkness from 1800 to 0600 hours.

Consolidated Location & Timing Matrix

11. Are there other threats in the region? Lately, of concern is a new threat in the southern Philippine waters of the Sulu Sea which is

unlike those encountered in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS). The actions by the

Abu Sayyaf, a terrorist group, of capturing and holding to ransom the crews of the tugs and

barges has added a new dimension to piracy and armed robbery in S E Asia. The recent

Type & Location

Timing

PIRACY ARMED ROBBERY

Total % Malacca Straits

Other than

Malacca Straits

Singapore Straits

In Port or Anchorage

Others

201

5

Act

ual

A

ttac

ks

0001 to 0600 1 3 57 15 6 82 56 %

0601 to 1200 3 14 1 18 12 %

1201 to 1800 1 1 6 8 5 %

1801 to 2359 3 5 3 5 3 19 13 %

Time Not Stated 1 3 4 3 %

Att

em

pte

d

Att

acks

0001 to 0600 8 1 9 6 %

0601 to 1200 2 1 1 4 3 %

1201 to 1800 1 1 1 %

1801 to 2359 1 1 2 1 %

2015 Total 4 11 75 45 12 147 100%

2015 by % 3% 7% 51% 31% 8% 100%

14 | P a g e

execution of a Canadian tourist by Islamist militants and the growing threats of such groups

using piracy and armed robbery attacks as their modus operandi have raised the danger of

attacks to crew and personnel to a completely new and unprecedented level. The foreign

ministers of Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia have agreed to conduct coordinated maritime

patrols - voyages by the different navies operating in their own territorial waters, set up a

hotline and share intelligence. The experience and cooperation of the littoral states in the

SOMS will be valuable lessons for the authorities in the Sulu Sea area.

For a detailed report, see latest ReCAAP “Special Report on Abducting of Crew from Tug

Boasts in Waters off East Sabah and South Philippines” (the elink is provided below):

http://www.recaap.org/Portals/0/docs/Reports/2016/Special%20Report%20on%20Abducting

%20of%20Crew%20from%20Tug%20Boats%20in%20Waters%20off%20East%20Sabah%20and

%20South%20Philippines.pdf

15 | P a g e

Attachment 1

Comparative Record of Incidents 2015: ReCAAP ISC and ICC/IMB PRC Number of Incidents: ReCAAP ISC Number of Incidents: ICC/IMB PRC

Piracy Armed Robbery Attempted Piracy Armed Robbery Attempted

1st Quarter 1st Quarter

SE Asia (MS)* - 1 - SE Asia (MS) 1 - -

SE Asia (Other)* 3 26 3 SE Asia (Other) 4 28 2

2nd Quarter 2nd Quarter

SE Asia (MS) - 2 1 SE Asia (MS) 1 1 -

SE Asia (Other) 7 42 2 SE Asia (Other) 5 39 5

3rd Quarter 3rd Quarter

SE Asia (MS) - 1 - SE Asia (MS) 2 - -

SE Asia (Other) - 41 5 SE Asia (Other) - 34 4

4th Quarter 4th Quarter

SE Asia (MS) - - - SE Asia (MS) - - -

SE Asia (Other) - 17 2 SE Asia (Other) - 16 5

Total 2015 10 130 13 Total 2015 13 118 16

Gross Total 153 Gross Total 147

Piracy Armed Robbery Attempted Piracy Armed Robbery Attempted

1st Quarter 1st Quarter

Far East - 7 - Far East - 8 -

2nd Quarter 2nd Quarter

Far East - 6 - Far East 2 3 1

3rd Quarter 3rd Quarter

Far East - 6 - Far East - 5 -

4th Quarter 4th Quarter

Far East - 10 - Far East 1 10 1

Total 2015 - 29 - Total 2015 3 26 2

Gross Total 29 Gross Total 31

* MS denotes Strait of Malacca; Other denotes Excluding Strait of Malacca. Extracted from ReCAAP ISC and ICC IMB PRC reports.

16 | P a g e

Attachment 2

Location & Timing Matrix Type &

Location

Timing

PIRACY ARMED ROBBERY

Total % Malacca Straits

Other than Malacca Straits

Singapore Straits

In Port or Anchorage

Others

Q1

Act

ual

Att

acks

0001 to 0600 1 14 1 16 11%

0601 to 1200 6 6 4%

1201 to 1800 1 1 2 4 3%

1801 to 2359 1 2 3 1 7 5%

Att

em

pte

d

Att

acks

0001 to 0600

0601 to 1200 2 2 1%

1201 to 1800

1801 to 2359

Q1 Total 1 6 15 12 1 35 24%

Q2

Act

ual

Att

acks

0001 to 0600 1 2 23 3 6 35 24%

0601 to 1200 1 1 2 1%

1201 to 1800 2 2 1%

1801 to 2359 3 1 1 2 7 5%

Att

em

pte

d

Att

acks

0001 to 0600 3 1 4 3%

0601 to 1200 1 1 1%

1201 to 1800

1801 to 2359

Q2 Total 1 5 28 8 9 51 35%

Q3

Act

ual

Att

acks

0001 to 0600 16 5 21 14%

0601 to 1200 2 5 7 5%

1201 to 1800

1801 to 2359 2 2 4 3%

Time Not Stated 1 3 4 3%

Att

em

pte

d

Att

acks

0001 to 0600 3 3 2%

0601 to 1200

1201 to 1800

1801 to 2359 1 1 1%

Q3 Total 2 25 13 40 27%

Q4

Act

ual

Att

acks

0001 to 0600 4 6 10 7%

0601 to 1200 2 1 3 2%

1201 to 1800 2 2 1%

1801 to 2359 1 1 1%

Att

em

pte

d

Att

acks

0001 to 0600 2 2 1%

0601 to 1200 1 1 1%

1201 to 1800 1 1 1%

1801 to 2359 1 1 1%

Q4 Total 7 12 2 21 14%

2015 Total 4 11 75 45 12 147 100%

2015 by % 3% 7% 51% 31% 8% 100%

Source: ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 2015 Annual Report