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  • This issue in brief:

    Chinas Economic Policies during the Global Financial Crisis

    The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 caused mayhem in financial markets across the globe. In this

    article, Rachel Tan discusses in detail the steps which China took to navigate the crisis and the

    effectiveness of these measures.

    The Role of Russia in the Syrian Conflict

    The Syrian refugee crisis and Civil War are issues which have dominated headlines for much of the

    year. In this article, Valerie Hew discusses Russias possible motivations for intervention in Syria

    and the possible consequences of such actions.

    The Impending Fall of the Chinese Economy

    The economic progress of China since the era of Mao Zedong have been nothing short of

    extraordinary. However, are we witnessing the end of these glory days? Join Jin Zhiyan as he

    discusses the reasons behind a predicted decline in the Chinese economy and the potential impact

    this would have on the world at large.

    Proudly sponsored by

  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    By Rachel Tan Yi

    The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was the most severe crisis to rock the financial markets

    since the Great Depression of 1929. The most evident cause of this catastrophe was the decline

    in US housing prices, which led to widespread defaults in subprime mortgage lending. This

    eventually led to the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, a bank which was widely regarded as

    an institution that was too big to fail. Its collapse left global investors reeling and caused

    increased anxiety in the financial markets. As financial institutions became less willing to lend

    money, businesses cut down on spending and this resulted in a slowdown in the economy. The

    effects of the GFC were devastating to many economies.

    Before the start of the GFC, China had established robust economic and financial connections

    following years of significant economic reform. When the GFC hit, China realised that its

    heavy reliance on exports for growth, especially those from the United States and Europe, made

    it exposed to economic headwinds. Chinas leadership did not believe in the decoupling

    concept, which was the assertion that emerging economies in Asia could minimise their

    exposure to the effects of the GFC by increasing intra-regional trade.

    Figure 1: Exports of Goods and Services as a % of Chinas GDP

    In response to the GFC, the Chinese government implemented several policies designed to

    reduce the undesirable effects of a significant decrease in trade on Chinas economy (Figure

    1). Expansionary monetary policy was one of the key policies employed by the Chinese

    government. In September 2008, when the effects of the GFC became widespread, the

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  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    government took several actions in order to raise the availability of loanable funds. Firstly,

    lending quotas which had made it difficult for banks to meet loan demands from customers

    were eliminated. Secondly, to ensure that banks would have ample funds to cater to demand

    from consumers, the government lowered the required reserve ratio for banks. The interest rate

    which they could impose on loans was many times higher than the rate they could earn from

    interbank loans. The Chinese government also concurrently took steps to raise the demand for

    loanable funds. Firstly, they lowered benchmark interest rates, which influence the interest

    rates which banks impose on loans. Secondly, they dropped the rates for mortgage loans. These

    measures resulted in a rapid increase in bank loans, especially mortgage lending loans. Overall,

    outstanding bank loans in domestic currency increased by RMB9.59 trillion in 2009, up from

    an increase in RMB4.91 trillion in 2008.

    Expansionary fiscal policy was also implemented concurrently alongside monetary easing.

    Soon after expansionary monetary policies were implemented in 2008, the government

    announced that it would be launching a stimulus package worth US$586 billion (13.4% of

    GDP) over the following two years. The rise in bank lending obtained from monetary easing

    was meant to be a source of funding for the stimulus program. Other sources included central

    government spending and expenditure from local governments. Government spending was

    meant to serve as seed funding to draw additional investment, from local governments as

    well as private funding. A significant percentage of this stimulus was assigned to the

    development of physical infrastructure such as railways, roads and grids (Figure 2).

    Figure 2: Sector Breakdown of the Fiscal Stimulus Package

    The policies implemented by the Chinese government turned out to be tremendously effective.

    China became the first of the worlds major economies to bounce back from the global

    recession. Initially, the Chinas economic growth dropped to a low of 4.3 percent in the fourth

    quarter of 2008. However, as the stimulus package began to take effect, Chinas GDP growth

    increased to 9.5 percent in the first quarter of 2009 and 11.4 percent in the second quarter of

    the same year (Chart 3). It was estimated that the stimulus package actually boosted the

    increase in Chinas GDP by around 2 to 3 percent in 2009 and 2010.

  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    Chart 3: Real growth in Chinas GDP

    Although these policies played in a critical role in growing Chinas economy substantially

    during the GFC, they have not been exempt from criticism. Some have argued that the stimulus

    program allowed for an unsustainable rate of growth in 2009 and 2010. The substantial increase

    in loans was also believed to have several undesirable effects. The rise in loans increased the

    risk of higher inflation in China and may have contributed to the period of rising inflation at

    the tail-end of 2010 and 2011. During this period, inflation rates were greater than 5 per cent

    yearly. In addition, the higher availability of loans resulted in the formation of asset bubbles

    and a huge debt burden on the economy, which China is still grappling with presently.

    The policies which China implemented in order to deal with the GFC did enable China to

    ameliorate the adverse effects of the recession. However, the side effects of the stimulus and

    the governments intervention on Chinas economy cannot be disregarded. To deal with the

    current trend of slowing economic growth, China is currently considering rolling out a new

    fiscal stimulus package of at least RMB 1.2 trillion and rolling out infrastructural projects such

    as the building of railways. It would thus be prudent for the government to recognise the

    importance of careful implementation and calibration of its economic policies as these will not

    only affect its economic growth, but also those of its trading partners and the world economy

    at large.

  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    References:

    Grant, W., Wilson, W., & Wilson, Graham K. (2012). The Consequences of the Global Financial

    Crisis: The Rhetoric of Reform and Regulation, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

    The origins of the financial crisis: Crash Course. (2013, September 7). The Economist.

    Han, M. (2012). The People's Bank of China during the global financial crisis: Policy responses

    and beyond. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 10(4), 361-390.

    Lardy, N. (2012). Sustaining China's Economic Growth after the Global Financial Crisis,

    Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

    Supporting China's Infrastructure Stimulus Under the Infra Platform. (2010, June 1). Retrieved

    from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSDNET/Resources/5944695-

    1247775731647/INFRA_China_Newsletter.pdf

    China grapples with risk of economic hard landing: Analysts. (2015, September 13). The Straits

    Times. Retrieved from: http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-grapples-with-risk-of-

    economic-hard-landing-analysts

  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    By Valerie Hew Kai Shuen

    Post-World War I Syria

    After the end of World War I, the League of Nations was formed and the mandate system was

    created. In 1923, Syria became a Class A mandate placed under the rule of France. As a Class

    A mandate, Syria was almost ready for independence, but only under the condition that they

    received administrative guidance and help from France. During this period, the Sunni majority

    in Syria did not welcome French rule. To counter this, the French recruited the Alawites, which

    was a minority group, into the Syrian Army. This marked the start of the Assad familys rise

    to power.

    Syrian Civil War summarised

    In March 2011, a pro-democracy protest was organised following the arrest of teenagers who

    painted anti-establishment messages on their school walls. In retaliation, security forces opened

    fire on protestors and this resulted in even greater unrest in the nation, eventually escalating

    into a full-blown civil war. Since then, protestors have demanded that President Assad step

    down. In light of the situation in Syria, Russia decided to intervene in order to protect its

    national interests.

    Russias motivations for intervention

    Russia has tried to justify their intervention in Syria by claiming that these actions are in the

    interest of national safety. According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, if the Islamic

    extremists in Syria are not kept in check, they would eventually pose a threat to Russia. While

    the threat of Islamic extremist attacks are real, this factor does not seem as important as other

    factors which might explain Russias motivations for intervention. This can be seen from recent

    Russian airstrike targets.

    A non-ISIS area suggested to have been hit by Russian air strike

  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    Although Russia previously claimed that they were doing so to aid Syria in combating the ISIS,

    they have recently revealed that their air strikes have also hit anti-Assad militant groups. As

    such, Russia also shows a keen interest in protecting President Assads position in Syria and

    President Assad too was happy to have Russia working with them to combat terrorism.

    Therefore, this implies that Russias motive for intervention stretches beyond national safety

    concerns.

    Russias political interests seem to be a bigger factor to explain their intervention. Ever since

    rising to a superpower status during the Cold War, Russia has been keen on carving influence

    in the world. In order to be influential in the world, Russia would require strong allies in all

    continents and parts of the world. Syria, being one of their few allies left in the Middle East,

    would thus be of great importance to Russia. Syrias port of Tartous is Russias only base for

    its Black Sea Fleet. Moreover, Russia also operates several key air bases in Syria. As such, one

    can conclude that one of Russias motivations to be involved in Syrias conflict would be to

    protect their own security and defence forces.

    Map showing Russia, Syria and the Black Sea

    Others have also interpreted Russias involvement as an act out of fear. What President Putin

    is afraid of is the weakening of the rule of President Assad and Western involvement in Syria.

    To him, these factors could pose as a genuine threat to him as these forces might potentially

    put him out of power.

    Despite Russias numerous reasons to justify their actions, one definite consequences is that,

    by assisting President Assad, Russia has actually intensified the Syrian protestors

    dissatisfaction towards him. Thus, these undertakings by Russia may actually prove to

    eventually backfire on them.

    Russias motivations Economic Interests

    Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev mentioned that Russias involvement in Syria is not

    fuelled by economic gains, as the amount they spend in Syria way exceeds what actually gain

    from being in Syria. However, if we consider economic interests from a different angle, we

  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    might not come the same conclusion. In 2005, Russia signed six trade agreements with Syria

    in the energy and transportation sector. These agreements were important for Russia as it

    helped to expand in areas such as arms and oil. Their economic interests in Russia was

    demonstrated when Russia and China vetoed the decision to put in place a sanction on Syria.

    Thus, it could be possible explanation that Russia is actually getting involved in Syria to

    safeguard their investments. However, if we were to compare this to their political and national

    interests, this reason seems to hold less weight. At the end of the day, Syria is not one of

    Russias key trading partners and hence their economic interests in the nation may not be of

    particular significance.

    What lies ahead?

    It is clear that Russias involvement in Syria and their public backing of President Assad is

    directly going against American ideology. Moreover, Russias decision to launch air strikes in

    Syria has escalated these fears. Ultimately, with the civil war continuing, this only means more

    suffering for the Syrians. Russias intervention in Syria does not seem to bring the crisis closer

    to an end and might perhaps even aggravate the problem as their actions might fuel even greater

    anti-Assad sentiments. As for Russia, their intervention in Syria has gone against the will of

    many key Western nations, and the full effects of these actions remain to be seen.

  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    References:

    Syria: The story of the conflict. (2015, October 9). BBC News. Retrieved from:

    http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868

    Conflict enters more perilous phase after Russia attacks Syrian rebels. (2015, September 30). The

    Globe and Mail. Retrieved from: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/russian-attacks-

    bring-old-cold-war-rivals-into-close-proximity-in-syria/article26604468/

    Russia in Syria: Air strikes, Isis and Vladimir Putin's goals explained in 60 seconds. (2015,

    October 1). International Business Times. Retrieved from: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/russia-syria-

    air-strikes-isis-vladimir-putins-goals-explained-60-seconds-1522038

    Syria crisis: Where key countries stand. (2015, October 2). BBC News. Retrieved from:

    http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587

    Putin's Syria intervention isn't grand, brilliant strategy. It's an act of fear. (2015, September 30).

    Vox. Retrieved from: http://www.vox.com/2015/9/30/9419729/putin-syria-fear

    Assumption of Russia's Economic Interest in Syrian Mission 'Propaganda'. (2015, October 3).

    Sputnik International. Retrieved from:

    http://sputniknews.com/russia/20151003/1027962542/syria-russia-interest-propaganda.html

    An Alliance Built Around Trade (2015, March 16). NVC Review. Retrieved from:

    http://www.nvcreview.com/an-alliance-built-around-trade-what-drives-the-relationship-between-

    syria-and-the-russian-federation/

  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    By Jin Zhiyan

    Historical Background

    China opened its economy to the world in 1978, and has since enjoyed three decades of year-

    on-year GDP growth averaging 10%. What has been worrying these few years is the rapid fall

    of this indicator: 7.7% in 2013, 7.3% in 2014, and a projected 6.7- 6.8% by 2016, according to

    the OECD and IMF respectively. This article seeks to present some reasons for the predicted

    decline and will also proffer some insights into the potential impact of this slowdown on the

    global economy.

    The Cause

    The most commonly cited reason for the projected decline of the Chinese economy is that the

    current pattern of investment-driven growth is unsustainable. Since 2011, additional capital

    pumped into the economy has been the primary source of any increase in output. This is

    concurrent with the near-zero change in total factor productivity, which measures the change

    of output per unit of input. Indeed, the incremental capital output ratio, which measures the

    contribution of investments to growth, has risen and China has reaped high returns on

    investments (ROI) (Figure 1). However, it is clear that investment levels even then were

    already excessive and that over-investing in a large number of projects could lead to economic

    inefficiency. This is clearly evinced in Chinas notorious ghost towns where unsold

    residential properties are left barren and offer no ROI. As of October 2015, investment as a

    share of GDP is at 46%. To maintain the current level of GDP growth, investment as a

    contribution to GDP will have to increase to 60-70%. The cost of such measures could severely

    undermine overall economic stability because vast overcapacity results in investment

    inefficiency which would drag down the countrys long-term growth rate.

    Figure 1: Investment versus Real GDP growth in OECD and BRIC Countries

  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    Another reason for the projected decline of the Chinese economy is the massive debt overhang.

    Excessive investment has come hand-in-hand with a huge expansion of debt of questionable

    quality. While 97% of yuan-denominated bonds hold top-ratings of double- or triple-A

    domestically, many of them are rated as junk-grade bonds internationally. Total debt has

    climbed to over 250% of GDP, and although this allowed China to survive the global financial

    crisis, it also saddles the nation with a huge repayment burden which could hamper growth in

    the coming years. While much of this credit flowed to property developers, current unsold

    home inventory has climbed to a record high. This issue worsens as the property projects for

    which credit was loaned are unable to be sold off. Together, the repayment of debt and the

    repercussions of unsold home inventory will lead to a massive drag on the Chinese economy.

    Chinas previous growth has been powered by a large arsenal of able working-age citizens who

    have provided the requisite manpower for the nations manufacturing and service industries.

    Due to increased life-expectancy as well as the effects of the one-child policy, it has recently

    joined the ranks of ageing economies. While only 5% of the population was over 65 in 1983,

    this figure increased to 9% in 2013 and is likely to swell to around 25% by 2050. The

    corresponding fall in size of its total labour force erodes Chinas traditional competitiveness in

    labor-intensive industries especially when compared with other relatively young and rapidly

    developing countries in the region such as India. Simultaneously, the ageing workforce also

    means that China will not be able to take full advantage of the economic shift from primary to

    tertiary industries due to the relatively poorer acceptance and uptake of technology by workers

    of a more advanced age. This combination of factors implies that even as China is grappling

    with the problem of shrinking competitiveness in its traditional niches, it requires a transition

    to a younger workforce in order to stay competitive in the global economy.

    Figure 2: Percentage of labour force among those aged 15 and over

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    Percentage of labour force among those aged 15 and over

  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    Potential Impact on the World

    In the past decade, China has contributed to a third of the global economys expansion, a far

    larger proportion than that of any other individual nation. Hence, it is fair to conclude that the

    key to global growth rests definitively in Chinas hands. Should Chinese growth fall to negative

    or even near-zero rates, the world economy will certainly be severely affected. As the worlds

    second-largest economy, any change in Chinas growth rate will lead to a domino effect on

    countries all over the world. This is especially crucial as a number of other emerging economies

    such as Brazil and Russia are already locked in domestic recession. In addition, a fall in

    domestic GDP growth, will lead to both a fall in imports as well as a fall in exports, events

    which will lead to drastic consequences for the rest of the world.

    Another worrying issue which might develop would be the potentially massive decline of the

    commodities industry. China is the worlds largest consumer of many of the worlds most

    widely produced commodities, notably aluminum, iron ore, and copper. Even at current prices,

    commodity exporters such as Kazakhstan or Venezuela are already suffering. A drop in Chinas

    demand for commodities is likely to put further downward pressure on resource prices, many

    of which are already at multi-year lows. The role of China in shaping commodity prices can be

    seen in the consequences of the recent yuan devaluation, which caused aluminum and crude

    futures to dip by 1.8% and 1.6% respectively. A decline in the Chinese economy would lead

    to a far more severe and potentially catastrophic impact on the commodities industry.

    Conclusion

    As the second-largest economy in the world, China has a responsibility to not only its own

    citizens but the rest of the world to undertake responsible economic policies to ensure its

    continued growth. In recent months, the government has put in place changes such as partial

    privatization of state-owned enterprises in order to allow for greater market competitiveness.

    It has also introduced measures to boost demand in domestic markets, such as cutting the

    minimum down payment for first-time home-buyers in many cities and cutting taxes on the

    sale of small cars. With the governments aspiration to shift from its current investment-driven

    growth model to a consumption-driven one, it remains to be seen whether such a move will

    lead to more sustainable growth for the economy in the face of global headwinds.

  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    References:

    China Economic forecast summary (June 2015). OECD. Retrieved from: http://www.oecd.org/economy/china-economic-forecast-summary.htm

    Walker, A. (2015, September 27). Chinas economy is stumbling, but by how much? BBC News. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34340936

    Wolf, M. (2015, September 1). Column: China risks an economic discontinuity. Financial Times.

    Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cfe855be-5092-11e5-8642-

    453585f2cfcd.html#axzz3nOC07tLw

    Lee, Liu, Syed. (2012) IMF Working Paper: Is China Over-Investing and Does it Matter? Retrieved

    from: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12277.pdf

    Wolf, M. (2015, September 15). Column: A New Chinese export recession risk. Financial Times. Retrieved from: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/486bc716-5af0-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html#ft-

    article-comments

    The Economist Hong Kong. (2006, November 2). Dim Sums: The Widely Held Belief that China

    Over-invests is based on flawed figures. The Economist. Retrieved from:

    http://www.economist.com/node/8108538

    Law, F. (2015). Can All Chinese Debt Be Rated Top Quality? The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved

    from: http://www.wsj.com/articles/can-all-chinese-debt-be-rated-a-1437942674

    S.R. (2015, March 11). Why Chinas economy is slowing. The Economist. Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/economist-explains-8

    Huang, Yanzhong. (2013, November 10). Population Aging in China: A Mixed Blessing. The

    Diplomat. Retrieved from: http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/population-aging-in-china-a-mixed-

    blessing/

    Sharma, R. (2015, August 16). A Global Recession May Be Brewing in China. The Wall Street

    Journal. Retrieved from: http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-global-recession-may-be-brewing-in-china-

    1439764500

    Buttonwood. (2015, September 9) Forecasting a global recession. The Economist. Retrieved from:

    http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2015/09/economics

    Spence, P. (2015, September 2015). China leading world towards global economic recession, warns

    Citi. The Telegraph UK. Retrieved from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-

    business/11854084/China-leading-world-towards-global-economic-recession-warns-Citi.html

    Ro, S. (2015, August 11). China is the worlds largest consumer of most commodities. The Business Insider. Retrieved from: http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-share-of-global-commodity-

    consumption-2015-8?IR=T&

    Mukherji, B. (2015, August 11). With Yuan Devaluation, China Digs A Hole for Commodities. The

    Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from: http://www.wsj.com/articles/with-yuan-devaluation-china-digs-

    a-hole-for-commodities-1439292219

  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    Koh, GQ. (2015, May 27). China President stresses market forces in reforms: media. Reuters.

    Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/27/us-china-economy-reforms-

    idUSKBN0E71C320140527

    Reuters in Beijing. (2015, September 13). China unveils plan for partial privatisations as economy

    cools. The Guardian. Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/sep/13/china-

    partial-privatisations-economy-cools

    Shao, XY, Subler, J. (2015, September 30). China cuts downpayment requirement to boost property

    sector. Reuters. Retrieved from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/30/us-china-economy-

    property-idUSKCN0RU16420150930

    The Wall Street Journal. (2015, September 22). Full Transcript: Interview With Chinese President Xi

    Jinping. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from: http://www.wsj.com/articles/full-transcript-

    interview-with-chinese-president-xi-jinping-1442894700

  • Issue 57, SPEX SMU Economics Intelligence Club

    Tay Qi Hang (Director, SPEX)

    Undergraduate

    School of Economics

    Singapore Management University

    [email protected]

    Meghana Hari Prasad Sunku (Creative

    Director)

    Undergraduate

    School of Economics

    Singapore Management University

    [email protected]

    Rachel Tan Yi (Writer)

    Undergraduate

    School of Economics

    Singapore Management University

    [email protected]

    Jin Zhiyan (Writer)

    Undergraduate

    School of Business

    Singapore Management University

    [email protected]

    Valerie Hew Kai Shuen (Writer)

    Undergraduate

    School of Accountancy

    Singapore Management University

    [email protected]