G.R. No. L-15445             April 29, 1961

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MERCEDES CANO. FLORANTE C. TIMBOL,administrator-appellee, vs.JOSE CANO, oppositor-appellant.

Jose P. Fausto for administrator-appellee.Filemon Cajator for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Hon. Arsenio Santos, presiding, dated August 25, 1958, approving petitions of the administrator Florante C. Timbol dated January 6 and 8, 1958. The order appealed from authorizes the administrator to increase the area of a subdivision to be formed out of the lands under administration from 30 hectares to 41.9233 hectares and approves the plan of such increased area.

The intestate Mercedes Cano died in August, 1945, leaving as her only heir her son Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. On September 27, 1946, Jose Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator. On April 13, 1951 Jose Cano, filed a petition, thru his counsel Atty. Filemon Cajator, also an uncle of the minor Florante C. Timbol, proposing that the agricultural lands of the intestate be leased to the administrator Jose Cano for an annual rental of P4,000, this rental to be used for the maintenance of the minor and the payment of land taxes and dues to the government. Judge Edilberto Barot, then presiding the court, approved the motion in an order dated April 27, 1951, which reads:

WHEREFORE, the motion of the administrator and his lawyer dated April 13,1951, is hereby granted under the conditions therein set forth and the further condition that all previous obligations of the administration including the previous deficits are assumed by said administrator, and that the arrangement will continue only as long as, in the judgment of contageous to the heir, the Court, the same continues to be advantageous to the heir, Florante C. Timbol. (p. 27, Rec. on Appeal)

On January 14, 1956 the court, upon motion of the administrator and the conformity of the minor heir and his uncles, approved the reduction of the annual rental of the agricultural lands of the intestate leased to the administrator from P4,000 to P2,400 and the conversion of 30 hectares of the agricultural lands into a subdivision.

On April 2, 1957, upon motion of the administrator, a project of partition was approved, designating Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all the properties of the intestate.

On June 6, 1957 Florante C. Timbol was appointed administrator in place of Jose Cano and on January 6, 1958 he presented a motion, which he modified ina subsequent one of January 8, 1958, alleging among other things (a) that the area destined for the projected subdivision be increased from 30 hectares to 41.9233 hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved. The motions were approved but the approval was immediately thereafter set aside to give opportunity to the former administrator and lessee Jose Cano to formulate his objections to the motions. Cano's objections are (1) that the enlargement of the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and would deprive his tenants of their landholdings, and (b) that he is in possession under express authority of the court, under a valid contract, and may not be deprived of his leasehold summarily upon a simple petition.

The court granted the motions of the administrator, overruling the objections of Jose Cano, in the order now subject of appeal, which reads:

The said contract of lease is on all forms illegal. Under article 1646 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, — a new provision, — "the persons disqualified to buy referred to in articles 1490 and 1491, are also disqualified to become lessee of the things mentioned therein," and under article 1491 (3) o the same Code, executors and administrators cannot acquire by purchase the property of the estate under administration.

If, as already stated, Florante C. Timbol was only pointed administrator on June 6, 1957 and the said contract of lease having been executed on July 9, 1956, the same fall within the prohibition provided by law. However, Jose C. Cano avers that this Court, in the instant proceedings, cannot pass upon the legality of the aforesaid lease contract, but in its general jurisdiction. There is no need for the court to declare such contract illegal and, therefore, null and void as the law so expressly provides.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations the court hereby grants Florante C. Timbol's petitions date January 6 and 8, 1958, approving the amended plan for sub division, attached thereto, and overrules Jose C. Cano's motion for reconsideration dated May 9, same year. (pp. 151-152 Record on Appeal) The above is the subject of the present appeal.

The above is the subject of the present appeal.

In the first assignment of error appellant claims that the consideration of the motions of the administrator July 6 and 8, 1958, without due notice to him, who is lessee is a violation of the Rules of Court. This objection lost its force when the court, motu proprio set aside it first order of approval and furnished copy of the motion to appellant and gave him all the opportunity to present his objections thereto.

In the second and third assignments of error appellant argues that the court below, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his rights under the lease, because these rights may be annulled or modified only by a court of general jurisdiction. The above arguments are without merit. In probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent (Rule 80, See. 5); grants letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or to any qualified applicant (Id., Sec. 6); supervises and controls all acts of administration; hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased (Rule 87, See. 13); orders payment of lawful debts (Rule 89, Sec. 14); authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90, Sec. 2); directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Rule 91, See. 1). It has been held that the court acts as a trustee, and as such trustee, should jealously guard the estate and see that it is wisely and economically administered, not dissipated. (Tambunting vs. San Jose, G.R. No. L-8152.) .

Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural lands of the intestate and which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with the court's approval. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The matter of giving the property to a lessee is an act of administration, also subject to the approval of the court. Of course, if the court abuses its discretion in the approval of the contracts or acts of the administrator, its orders may be subject to appeal and may be reversed on appeal; but not because the court may make an error may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to control acts of administration of the administrator.

In the fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the effect of the reduction of the area under lease would be to deprive the tenants of appellant of their landholdings. In the first place, the tenants

know ought to know that the lands leased are lands under administration, subject to be sold, divided or finally delivered to the heir, according to the progress of the administration of the lands of the intestate. The order appealed from does not have the effect of immediately depriving them of their landholdings; the order does not state so, it only states that the lands leased shall be reduced and subdivided. If they refuse to leave their landholdings, the administrator will certainly proceed as the law provides. But in the meanwhile, the lessee cannot allege the rights of his tenants as an excuse for refusing the reduction ordered by the court.

In the fifth assignment of error, appellant claims that his rights as lessee would be prejudiced because the land leased would be reduced without a corresponding reduction in the rentals. This would be a matter to be litigate between the administrator and himself before the probate court. But the fact of the prejudice alone cannot bar reduction of the land leased, because such reduction is necessary to raise funds with which to pay and liquidate the debts of the estate under administration.

The sixth assignment of error merits no attention on our part; it is appellant himself who, as administrator since 1945, has delayed the settlement of the estate.

In the seventh assignment of error, appellant argues that since the project of partition had already been approved and had become final, the lower court has lost jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator or to authorize the enlargement of the land to be converted into a subdivision. This assignment of error needs but a passing mention. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In the case at bar, the debts had not yet been paid, and the estate had not yet been delivered to the heirs as such heir.

We have taken pains to answer all the arguments adduced by the appellant on this appeal. But all said arguments are squarely laid to naught by the declaration of the court that the lease of the agricultural lands of the estate to the appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease was granted, is null and void not only because it is immoral but also because the lease by the administrator to himself is prohibited by law.(See Arts. 1646 and 1491, Civil Code of the Philippines). And in view of the declaration of the court below that the lease is null and void, which declaration we hereby affirm, it would seem proper for the administrator under the direction of the court, to take steps to get back the lands leased from the appellant herein, or so much thereof as is needed in the course of administration.

The court order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-65656 February 28, 1985

AMORANTE PLAN, petitioner, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FEDERICO BAUTISTA, respondents.

Agrava, Lucero & Gineta Law Office for petitioner.

Jose O. Lara for private respondent.

 

AQUINO, J.:

The issue in this case is whether Federico Bautista could nullify in a separate action, instead of in the intestate proceeding for his deceased father's estate, the sale of two conjugal lots, with the theater thereon, made by his mother Florencia Topacio as administratrix to Amorante Plan with the authorization and approval of the probate court. Federico, who claims a 1/8 interest in the property, alleged that he was not notified of the sale. His mother had a 5/8 interest in the property. The Appellate Court allowed Federico to redeem the said lots although he never prayed for such redemption.

In the intestate proceeding for the settlement of Regino Bautista's estate, his widow filed a motion dated December 9, 1964 for authority to sell to Plan the two lots and theater for not less than P140,000. The purpose was to pay the debts amounting to P117,220. The motion was set for hearing on December 18, 1964. It was indicated in the motion that the children were notified through one child named Milagros Bautista (18-20, Record on Appeal).

On December 22, 1964 Judge Jose B. Jimenez granted the authority to sell to Plan the entire estate of the deceased for not less than P140, 000 so as to pay the obligations of the estate "land it appearing that all the heirs have conformed thereto" (20-21, Record on Appeal).

On that day, Florencia Topacio and Plan executed a deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage obligations for the two lots with an area of 664 square meters together with the theater (with a total assessed value of P52,720) and the apparatus used therein.

It was recited in the deed of sale that Regino's estate owed Plan P25,700 and a mortgage debt of P44,292.07 to the Philippine National Bank which Plan assumed. The amount actually received by the administratrix as vendor was P70,00793. Milagros Bautista-Alcantara, the heir through whom the other six children were allegedly notified, was an instrumental witness in the sale.

A motion to approve the sale was filed on January 5, 1965. Judge Jimenez signed the original deed under the word "Approved" to indicate that the sale was okayed by the probate court. It should be noted that in 1963 the widow and four of her seven children as owners of 7/8 interest in the said property had, in consideration of P9,600, agreed to sell that same property to Plan for the same amount of P140,000 (12-17, Record on Appeal).

Sixteen days after the sale, or on January 7, 1965, Federico Bautista filed an "Opposition to Agreement to Sell Absolute Sale, Project of Partition and Request for Inventory and Accounting of Estate and for Furnishing of Orders, Notices and Pleadings". The clerk of court set the said opposition for hearing on January 26, 1965. On that date Judge Jimenez gave Federico's counsel ten days within which to interpose any opposition to the project of partition filed by the administratrix on October 16, 1964 which had not been acted upon by the court and of which the decedent's six children were notified through Milagros Bautista.

Federico's counsel did not file any objection to the project of partition. The reason is not hard to surmise. The estate sought to be partitioned had already been sold to Plan.

Then, Federico filed on March 2, 1965, or 56 days after the approval of the sale, a "petition for relief from order". Judge Jimenez had informed him on January 26, 1965 that his "opposition" was filed out of time. He alleged in his opposition that counsel for the administratrix misrepresented to the court that all the heirs had approved of the sale and that there was fraud in not giving notice to the heirs of the proposed sale.

He contended that because there was no compliance with section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court the sale was void. He prayed that the order authorizing the sale be set aside "and the case tried upon its merits" (pp. 174-5, Record).

No action was taken by the probate court up this time on the petition for relief. The widow or administratrix did not render an accounting of the sum of P70,007.93 which she received from Plan. Only Federico among her seven children questioned the sale. She died on September 18, 1969 or more than four years and eight months after the sale. More than a year after her death or on August 6, 1971, she was succeeded by Milagros Bautista-Alcantara as administratrix, the same heir who took part in consummating the sale to Plan. The other six children, including Federico, signified their conformity to her appointment as administratrix.

As there was no movement in the case for an unreasonable length of time, Judge Catolico in his order of March 22, 1973 ordered it archived until an interested party moves for the termination thereof (p. 185, Record).

In a motion and supplementary motion dated August 27 and September 3, 1973 Milagros asked that her bond be reduced to P500. Through her counsel, she alleged that the two lots and theater were sold by her mother with the approval of the court and the proceeds of the sale were used to pay the claims of the creditors. Federico and the other five children signified their conformity to Milagros' motions. A copy was sent to the seventh child Luz in Lipa City. Judge Catolico reduced the bond to P2,000. In a prior order, Judge Catolico called Milagros' attention to her failure to present an accounting.

Instead of asking the court to act on his petition for relief from the orders authorizing and approving the sale, Federico Bautista on July 13, 1965 filed a separate action against Plan, Civil Case No. N-806, to nullify the sale. He did not implead his mother, brothers and sisters.

Judge Catolico in his order of February 4, 1971 dismissed the action without prejudice. He ruled that the nullity of sale as to Federico's 1/16 share should be resolved in the intestate proceeding (41, Record on Appeal).

On June 13, 1974, after his mother's death, Federico sued Plan again for the nullification of the sale, Civil Case No. N-2145. Judge Vallejos in his order of October 7, 1974 reiterated the ruling of Judge Catolico. He dismissed Federico's complaint and also the intervention of the administratrix, Milagros Bautista-Alcantara, without prejudice to pursuing any available remedy in the intestate proceeding and not in a separate action (42, Record on Appeal).

Less than a year later, on April 1, 1975, Federico for the third time filed a separate action against Plan, Civil Case No. 2282, to annul the sale. After trial, Judge Fule dismissed the case on the same ground, namely, that his remedy is in the intestate proceeding. He should not be allowed to seek relief outside the intestate court (145-147, Record on Appeal).

Federico appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its decision dated September 13, 1983, through Justice Pascual, reversed Judge Fule's decision. It declared void the agreement to sell and the sale, ordered Plan to reconvey to Federico the disputed property for P140,000 and to pay him P3,000 a month from December 22, 1964 up to the time the possession of the property is turned over to Federico, with legal interest from that date until fully paid, plus P50,000 as attorney's fees. The reconveyance was based on article 1088 of the Civil Code.

We hold that the Appellate Court erred in ordering Plan to reconvey the disputed property to Federico Bautista upon payment of P140,000 and to pay him P3,000 a month as income from December 22, 1964.

Said judgment is bereft of factual and legal basis. Federico did not pray for reconveyance in his complaint. He was not the owner of the property in 1964. He prayed for receivership, for nullification of the agreement to sell and the sale itself and for the refund by Plan of all the income which he received from the property from the time he possessed it in the concept of owner (10, Record on Appeal).

Article 1088 of the Civil Code does not justify legal redemption in this case because it refers to sale of hereditary rights, and not to specific properties, for the payment of the debts of the decedent's estate as to which there is no legal redemption.

"In the administration and liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, sales ordered by the probate court for payment of debts are final and not subject to legal redemption. Unlike in ordinary execution sales, there is no legal provision allowing redemption in the sale of property for payment of debts of a deceased person" (Abarro vs. De Guia, 72 Phil. 245). Such sale is not the one contemplated in article 1067, now article 1088 of the Civil Code (Vda. de Mendoza, 69 Phil. 155).

In Jimenez vs. Jimenez, 67 Phil. 263, the deceased Josefa Jimenez left an estate consisting of Lot No. 1090 with a house of mixed materials with a total assessed value of P490. Geronimo Jimenez had a claim against her estate in the sum of P359 for expenses of her last illness and funeral.

The Cavite Court of First Instance ordered the sale of the said lot and house to pay the claim of Geronimo. At the auction sale, Geronimo was the only bidder. The property was adjudicated to him for P432. He was placed by the sheriff in possession of said property. One Gregoria Jimenez, an heir of the deceased Josefa Jimenez, filed a motion praying that she be allowed to redeem the property from Geronimo. The Cavite court denied the motion.

It was held that Gregoria could not be allowed to redeem the property because properties of a decedent, which are sold at public auction for the payment of his debts, are not subject to redemption.

In the instant case, we agree with Judges Fule, Catolico and Vallejos that Federico's remedy is in the intestate proceeding where his petition for relief has been pending for nearly twenty years. He should amend it by impleading the present administratrix and Plan himself and serving copies of the petition upon them. Plan, as the purchaser of the disputed property, is a forced intervenor in the intestate proceeding. He should answer the amended petition for the annulment of the sale. The probate court has jurisdiction over him.

Federico should also ask for an accounting of the P70,007.93 received by his mother. His brothers and sisters should also be served with copies of the amended petition. The case of Tagle and Ignacio, Jr. vs. Manalo, 105 Phil. 1123, cited by Federico Bautista in his brief, is not in point because the testamentary proceeding in that case was already closed and the purchaser did not want to be pulled into the probate proceeding. Here, the purchaser had no objection to litigating the validity of the sale in the intestate proceeding.

The probate court, having authorized and approved the sale, should resolve the issue as to its validity.

More important is that if all the interested parties are heard, an amicable settlement may be reached.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Appellate Court is reversed and set aside. The trial court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

 

 

Separate Opinions

 

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I vote to set aside the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court and sustain that of the trial court. However, I cannot go along with the suggestions in the main opinion that Federico Bautista should: (a) question the sale made by his mother of the properties to Amorante Plan in the intestate proceedings; and (b) ask for an accounting of the money received by his mother.

Notwithstanding his persistence it seems to me that Federico is better advised to let things as they are out of respect for his mother. It is painful to see children litigating over their inheritance especially when a surviving parent is involved. As to the accounting, the only person who could really make it is Federico's mother but she is gone. And Federico practically assented to an "accounting" when he gave his conformity to Milagros' motions which stated that the proceeds of the sale were used to pay the claim of creditors. That was how the money spent and nothing more can be done.

 

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I vote to set aside the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court and sustain that of the trial court. However, I cannot go along with the suggestions in the main opinion that Federico Bautista should: (a) question the sale made by his mother of the properties to Amorante Plan in the intestate proceedings; and (b) ask for an accounting of the money received by his mother.

G.R. No. L-31979 August 6, 1980

FILOMENA G. PIZARRO, MISAEL G. PIZARRO, AURELIO PIZARRO, JR., LUZMINDA G. PIZARRO, DELIA-THELMA G. PIZARRO, ROGELIO G. PIZARRO, VIRGILIO G. PIZARRO, ROSALINDA G. PIZARRO, JOSE ELVIN G. PIZARRO and MARIA EVELYN G. PIZARRO, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH III OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, HONORABLE VICENTE P.

BULLECER, JUDGE OF BRANCH IV OF THE COURT OF INSTANCE OF DAVAO, ALFONSO L. ANGLIONGTO JR., FELICITAS YAP ANGLIONGTO, GAUDENCIO A. CORIAS, REGALADO C. SALAVADOR, ALICIA P. LADISLA and LYDIA P. GUDANI, respondents.

 

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

A review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 42507-R, entitled Filomena Pizarro, et al. vs. Hon. Manases G. Reyes, et al., dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus with Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction which sought to nullify the Order of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch III, dated April 10, 1968, dismissing Civil Case No. 5762.

The controversy stemmed from the following facts:

Petitioner Filomena G. Pizarro, is the surviving spouse of the late Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., while the other petitioners, Misael, Aurelio, Jr., Luzminda, Delia-Thelma, Rogelio, Virgilio, Rosalinda, Jose Elvin and Maria Evelyn, all surnamed Pizarro, as well as respondents Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, are their children. Upon the death of Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., Special Proceedings No. 1421 entitled "In the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Aurelio Pizarro, Sr.," was instituted by petitioners through Atty. Regalado C. Salvador on September 21, 1965 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, presided by Judge Vicente P. Bullecer. Listed among the properties of the estate were parcels of land situated in Agdao, J. Palma Gill, and Claro M. Recto Streets, Davao City. On December 23, 1965, the Court, upon agreement of the parties, appointed Gaudencio A. Corias, Clerk of Court of said Court, as Administrator of the estate.

On January 11, 1967, the Administrator, through Atty. Regalado C. Salvador, filed a Motion for Authority to Sell the properties located at Agdao and Jose Palma Gil Streets, Davao City, to settle the debts of the estate initially estimated at P257,361.23, including inheritance and estate taxes. The heirs, Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, opposed the Motion stating that the claims against the estate had not yet been properly determined and that the sale of the Agdao lot with an area of 13,014 sq. ms. would be more than sufficient to cover the supposed obligations of the estate, which they claimed were exaggerated.

The Court, in its Order dated February 7, 1967, authorized the sale "in the interest of the parties" and since majority of the heirs were in favor of the sale "to avoid unnecessary additional burden of about P2,000.00 every month. 1 On February 8, 1967, the Administrator moved for the approval of the conditional sale of the Agdao property to Alfonso L. Angliongto for a total consideration of P146,820.00 payable in six installments including the down payment. 2 The document of sale stipulated that the vendor was to cause the ejectment of all occupants in the property on or before July 31, 1967, otherwise, the vendee was to have the right to rescind the sale and demand reimbursement of the price already paid. The heirs filed a Motion, also dated February 8, 1967, to set aside or hold in abeyance the Order authorizing the sale on the ground that they were negotiating for the sale of said lot to Mr. Benjamin Gonzales, whose theatre was being constructed on a 1,187 square meter portion thereof. 3

The Court, in its Order dated February 9, 1967, denied the "Motion to Set Aside" stating that the grounds relied upon by the heirs were "nothing but speculations and had no legal basis." 4 The heirs moved for reconsideration alleging that they were being deprived of the right to a more beneficial sale. 5 On February 11, 1967, a hearing was held on the Motion for approval of the sale of the Agdao lot to Alfonso Angliongto. 6 The heirs maintained their objection on the grounds that 1) the sale would be improvident and greatly prejudicial; 2) there has been no determination of the debts or obligations of the estate as yet; and 3) the terms of the sale were very prejudicial to them. The Court denied reconsideration

on February 20, 1967, 7 and approved the sale on the same date stating that "the sale sought to be approved was more beneficial."

On February 22, 1967, the Administrator presented another Motion for Authority to Sell the Claro M. Recto lot stating that the proceeds from the sale of the Agdao lot were not sufficient to settle the obligations of the estate and that the sale of the property on J. Palma Gil Street was unanimously opposed by the heirs. Authority was granted by the Court o March 6, 1967. 8

Prior to this, the heirs, in a Motion dated February 27, 1967 prayed that Administrator Gaudencio A. Corias be asked to resign or be removed for having abused his powers and duties is such and that, Letters of Administration be granted instead to Filomena Pizarro. 9 They also terminated the services of Atty. Regalado C. Salvador, who had acted likewise as counsel for the Administrator.

On March 11, 1967, the Administrator moved that he be allowed to resign.

On June 22, 1967, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, filed a "Motion for Cancellation or Rescission of Conditional Contract of Sale" of the Agdao lot in favor of Alfonso L. Angliongto reiterating that it was unnecessary and prejudicial to their interests, that the sale of the lot in Claro M. Recto Street for P370.000.00 was more than sufficient to settle the obligations of the estate, that it was impossible to eject all nineteen tenants, not later than July 31, 1967, and that the vendee had failed to pay the last four installments due despite repeated demands. 10 Angliongto's counsel countered that the condition of the sale requiring the prior ejectment of squatters had not been complied with so that the vendee would hold in abeyance payment of the balance of the purchase price until all the squatters were ejected. 11 The Court denied rescission of the sale in its Order, dated July 3, 1967, stating that the relief prayed for is not within its power to grant, and that the heirs "should file the necessary action before a competent Court not before this Court, and much less by mere motion." 12 The heirs moved to reconsider the said Order. In the meantime, Judge Bullecer was transferred to the Court of First Instance at Mati, Davao Oriental.

On July 6, 1967, the Administrator presented a "Motion to Approve Final Sale" of the Agdao lot to spouses Angliongtos stating that the latter had paid the full balance of P58,728.00. On the same date, the Court approved the same. 13 It appears that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19342 was issued in favor of Alfonso Angliongto on July 10, 1967. 14

On July 13, 1967, Gaudencio Corias ceased to be Administrator. 15

Without waiting for the resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying rescission of the sale, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, filed on October 5, 1967, a verified Complaint for "Cancellation of Authority to Sell and Rescission and Annulment of Deed of Sale and Damages with Preliminary Injunction" (Civil Case No. 5762, hereinafter called the Rescission Case) in the Court of First Instance of Davao (raffled to Branch III), against the Angliongto spouses, Administrator Gaudencio A. Corias, Judge Vicente P. Bullecer, Atty. Regalado C. Salvador, Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, 16 the latter two having refused to join as plaintiffs. Petitioners contended inter alia that despite all their efforts to block the sale "the Administrator taking advantage of the name and influence of the presiding Judge" succeeded in inducing Angliongto to purchase the lot at a price allegedly much higher than the reported P12.00 per square meter; that the sale contained an impossible condition which was the ejectment of the tenants before a certain date; that there was connivance between the Administrator and the vendee with the knowledge of the Judge and Atty. Regalado Salvador; and that they had suffered actual and moral damages by reason of the sale. They also prayed that since the vendees had entered the lot and destroyed improvements thereon, that they be enjoined from doing so. Attached to the Complaint was a letter 17 addressed to the surviving spouse, Filomena G. Pizarro, from Atty. Raul Tolentino to the effect that the sum of P58,728.00 issued by Alfonso

Angliongto in favor of the estate and which was deposited by virtue of a Court Order had been dishonored by the Bank because of a stop-payment order of Angliongto.

All the defendants except Judge Bullecer and Atty. Corias who filed a Motion to Dismiss, presented their respective Answers. Eventually, however, they all adopted the same Motion predicated mainly on plaintiffs' lack of legal capacity to sue and lack of cause of action. 18 In addition, the Angliongtos pleaded res judicata, the sale having been approved by the Court as far back as February 20, 1967 and the final deed on July 6, 1967, and the corresponding title issued in the name of Alfonso Angliongto on July 10, 1967. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition 19 as well as a supplemental Opposition. 20

On October 17, 1967, Judge Alfredo I. Gonzales, as Executive Judge, issued an Order enjoining the Angliongtos, their agents, laborers, representatives, from further cutting and destroying coconuts, other fruits and improvements on the property pending the final termination of the action or until a contrary order is issued by the Court, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P25,000.00. 21

On April 10, 1968, the trial Court (respondent Judge Manases G. Reyes presiding) dismissed the Rescission Case (Civil Case No. 5762) on the ground that it could not review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of the Court besides the fact that a Motion for Reconsideration was still pending resolution before the Probate Court. 22Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal Order was denied on October 10, 1968.

While the Rescission Case was pending, the Angliongtos filed Civil Case No. 5849 for Damages (the Angliongtos Case) against the heirs.

On November 25, 1968, petitioners elevated their cause to the Court of Appeals on "Certiorari and mandamus with Prohibition and Injunction," charging that respondent Judge Manases G. Reyes gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the Rescission Case and prayed that he be required to take cognizance thereof and that the Angliongtos be enjoined from exercising rights of ownership over the property.

On February 11, 1970, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition opining that the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, did not abuse its discretion in approving the sale in the Intestate Case (Sp. Proc. No. 1421), and even granting that it did, the proper remedy was appeal not Certiorari; that the Court of First Instance, Branch III, neither abused its discretion in dismissing the Rescission Case (Civil Case No. 5762) as that case sought to review the actuations of a coordinate Branch which is beyond its judicial competence; and that since said dismissal was final, the proper remedy was appeal. It also observed that copies of the Orders sought to be reviewed were not certified true copies and, therefore, violative of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The present Petition before us seeks a reversal of the aforestated findings of the Appellate Court anchored on the principal contentions that the sale of the Agdao property should be rescinded for failure of the vendees to pay the purchase price, and that actually no review of the actuations of a co-equal Branch of the Court is being sought. We gave due course to the Petition on June 8, 1970.

In a Manifestation filed by petitioners on March 29, 1976, 23 they disclosed that the Angliongtos had mortgaged the Agdao property to the Development Bank of the Philippines in Davao City, in violation of the injunctive Order of the lower Court, and after redeeming the same caused the property to be subdivided into three lots and titled in their names. Subsequently, they allegedly sold the biggest portion containing 11,500 sq. ms. to Yu Cho Khai and Cristina Sy Yu for P250,000.00 on October 25, 1975. Title to said portion has been allegedly transferred in favor of said vendees.

The primary point, tendered for resolution is the correctness of the ruling of the Court of Appeals upholding the opinion of the trial Court that the latter was devoid of authority to review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of the Court. Secondarily, the propriety of the extra-ordinary remedy of certiorari despite the existence of the remedy of appeal is also in issue.

Certiorari should lie.

While an Order of dismissal is, indeed, final and appealable as it puts an end to litigation and leaves nothing more to be done on the merits in the lower Court, 24 so that certiorari is ordinarily unavailable, that general rule allows of exceptions, namely, when appeal is inadequate and ineffectual or when the broader interest of justice so requires. 25 In this case, appeal would not have afforded the heirs an effective and speedy recourse. It would have entailed a protracted litigation and in the interim, the heirs stood to suffer as a consequence of the approval of the sale. The prompt stoppage of that sale was vital to them. Thusly, appeal not being speedy enough to bring about the desired objective and to be of any utility to the heirs, their availment of certiorari must be held to have been proper.

We come now to the question of correctness of the Order of dismissal of the trial Court which the Appellate Tribunal had upheld. As a strict legal proposition, no actuation of the Probate Court had to be reviewed. There is no judicial interference to speak of by one Court in the actuations of another co-equal Court. The Order authorizing the sale was issued on February 20, 1967, and on July 6, 1967, the Court gave its stamp of approval to the final sale. Title was issued in favor of the vendees on July 10, 1967. To all intents and purposes, therefore, that sale had been consummated; the Order approving the sale, final.

But, what petitioners sought to achieve in filing the Rescission Case was to rescind the sale mainly for failure of the vendees to pay the full consideration thereof, 26 which is a valid ground for rescission. That cause of action was within the judicial competence and authority of the trial Court (Branch III) as a Court of First Instance with exclusive original jurisdiction over civil cases the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It was beyond the jurisdictional bounds of the Probate Court (Branch IV) whose main province was the settlement of the estate. As a matter of fact, the Rescission Case was instituted after the Probate Court itself had stated that petitioners' cause of action was not within its authority to resolve but should be filed with the competent Court. The cause of action in one is different from that obtaining in the other. It behooved the trial Court, therefore, to have taken cognizance of and to have heard the Rescission Case on the merits and it was reversible error for the Court of Appeals to have upheld its dismissal.

G.R. No. L-50553 February 19, 1991

NAZARIO VITA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.SOLEDAD MONTANANO, ESTANISLAO JOVELLANO and ESTEBANA JOVELLANO, defendants-appellants.

JOSE, ELENA AND ALODIA, ALL SURNAMED MONTANO, intervenors-appellants.

 

MEDIALDEA, J.:p

In a resolution dated March 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals certified this case to Us because it involves pure questions of law (pp. 70-80, Rollo).

The pertinent facts are as follows:

A complaint was filed before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna by plaintiff-appellant Nazario Vita, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of deceased Edilberto Vita, seeking to recover from defendants-appellants Soledad Montanano, Estanislao Jovellano and Estebana Jovellano the possession of three (3) parcels of land located in Barrio Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna and their annual yield since January, 1962 in the amount of P1,100.00 a year. Plaintiff-appellant claims that during the lifetime of Edilberto Vita, he was the owner and possessor of these three (3) parcels of land covered by: Tax Declaration No. 1252 (73, old) with an area of 3,640 square meters, Tax Declaration No. 1231 (72, old) with an area of 1,000 square meters, and Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) with an area of 640 square meters; and he was enjoying the fruits therefrom. When he died on January 23, 1962, defendants-appellants, through stealth and strategy, took possession of the above-stated parcels of land and gathered the fruits therefrom. Notwithstanding demands from plaintiff-appellant, defendants-appellants refused to surrender the possession of these parcels of land. Plaintiff-appellant further claims reimbursement in the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P1,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages.

In their answer dated December 1, 1964, defendants-appellants deny that the three (3) parcels of land belong to the estate of Edilberto Vita. Instead, they claim that the two parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252 and Tax Declaration No. 1231 belong to Soledad Montanano as these were conveyed to her by Isidra Montanano (her aunt and wife of Edilberto Vita) and Edilberto Vita in a document signed and executed by them on November 22, 1938 and ratified by one Mr. Matienzo, a Notary Public from Nagcarlan, Laguna. However, all copies of said document were lost during the last war. The parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 is owned in common by Soledad Montanano, her brother Jose and sisters Elena and Alodia. It originally belonged to Francisca Asilo, deceased sister of their grandmother, Micaela Asilo. Its ownership was transferred to them under the arrangement sanctioned by Edilberto Vita himself wherein all the proceeds from the yearly harvests therefrom shall be spent for the yearly masses to be held for the souls of Francisca Asilo and Isidra Montanano. This being the case, plaintiff-appellant is now estopped from instituting this action. Defendants-appellants claim also that Edilberto Vita could not have inherited these parcels of land from Isidra Montanano as the latter's estate has never been the subject of a judicial or extra-judicial proceeding. The erroneous inclusion of these parcels of land in the inventory of the estate of Edilberto Vita in Special Proceedings No. SC-136 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna does not make them actually a part of his estate. There is no fixed income from these parcels of land because since 1962, plaintiff-appellant, with unknown persons, has been gathering whatever crops that may be taken therefrom. And, by reason of the malicious filing of this complaint, they seek reimbursement of the amount of P1,000.00 representing attorney's fees and other litigation expenses.

Replying to defendants-appellants' answer, plaintiff-appellant claims that Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita never executed any document on November 22, 1938 and if they had, it was thereafter repudiated, canceled and destroyed, for which reason, the three (3) parcels of land remained in the possession of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita; that upon the death on September 25, 1957 of Isidra Montanano, who left neither descendants nor ascendants, her surviving spouse Edilberto Vita succeeded her and took immediate possession of her estate; and that from the time defendants-appellants took possession of these parcels of land, they have continuously gathered the fruits therefrom.

In a petition dated August 20, 1966, Jose, Elena and Alodia Montanano sought leave of court to intervene in this case. In the order of the trial court dated April 12, 1967, the amended answer dated September 10, 1966, which intervenors-appellants filed jointly with Soledad Montanano, was admitted as their answer-in-intervention. Incorporated therein is a counterclaim that Soledad, Jose, Elena and Alodia Montanano are the co-owners of (pp. 43-44, Record on Appeal):

(a) A parcel of coconut land situated in Bo. Bangbang, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 2,450 square meters, more or less, covered by Tax Declaration No. 8953;

(b) A parcel of coconut and secano land situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna with an area of 15,096 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 10228;

(c) A parcel of coconut land, with its improvements, situated in Bo. Yucos, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 2,500 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 7999;

(d) A parcel of coconut land, with its improvements, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 12,865 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1233 (sic) (third parcel of land in the complaint); and

(e) A parcel of residential land, with its improvements, situated in Gen. Luna, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 167.50 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 102;

that Jose Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Bangbang, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 10,000 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 6493; and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Banago, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 9,604 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8304;

that Soledad Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 4,165 square meters more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 123 (sic) (the second parcel of land in the complaint); and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 10,434 square meters, more or less; and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252 (the first parcel of land in the complaint);

that Alodia Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, Ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land and irrigated riceland, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 24,153 square meters, more or less and covered by Tax Declaration No. 10268; and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 1,619 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8510;

that Elena Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, Ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 6,242 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8511; and

(b) A portion of a parcel of riceland situated at C. Lirio St., Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 9,691 square meters, more or less and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1184.

They alleged therein that they acquired ownership of the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint, which are in the possession of Soledad Montanano, and the other parcels of land mentioned in their counterclaim, which are in the possession of plaintiff-appellant, by virtue of a donation mortis causaexecuted by Isidra Montanano on November 22, 1938 or by a donation executed by her on December 20, 1940 which was confirmed by Edilberto Vita. They pray that these parcels of land be adjudicated to them in the manner set forth in their counterclaim; that plaintiff-appellant be ordered to account for the harvests from these parcels of land from the time he took possession; and that they be awarded damages corresponding to their litigation expenses.

In his reply dated July 4, 1967, plaintiff-appellant denied all the allegations contained in the answer-in-intervention and reiterated that there was no such donation executed by Isidra Montanano. If such donation were really executed, she was forced to do so at a time when she was not mentally in a position to execute and sign freely said document.

On September 15, 1973, the trial court rendered judgment adverse to all parties, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 52, Record on Appeal):

Considering that the plaintiff has not shown by preponderating evidence that the three (3) parcels of land covered in the complaint belong to the estate of Edilberto Vita and it appearing likewise that the defendants and intervenors have not shown that the parcels of land covered in the counterclaim were validly donated to them and that they have legally accepted the donation made by Isidra Montanano, the complaint filed by the plaintiff and the counterclaim filed by the intervenors are hereby DISMISSED. This is without prejudice to the filing of a separate proceedings (sic) in Court for the proper disposition of the estate of the deceased Isidra Montanano, including that of her share in the fruits of the properties donated to her during her marriage with Edilberto Vita which is considered part of their conjugal properties. No assessment is hereby made with respect to the damages sustained by the parties as they offset each other, if any.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

All parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The case is now before Us raising mainly the following legal issues:

1) whether or not the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint are included in the estate of Edilberto Vita (as regards the appeal of plaintiff-appellant); and

2) whether or not acceptance is necessary in a donation mortis causa; and whether the donation dated December 20, 1940 is mortis causa or inter vivos (with respect to the appeal of defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants).

Plaintiff-appellant avers that the trial court failed to consider that Edilberto Vita's right to the conjugal half in the first two parcels as surviving spouse had ceased to be inchoate upon the death of Isidra in 1957, and that such right had been vested upon him by operation of law. With respect to the conjugal half pertaining to Isidra in said two parcels, and the entirety of the third parcel as her paraphernal property, they were likewise vested upon him by operation of law, subject only to the right of her nephew and nieces, pursuant to Articles 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code.

In other words, plaintiff-appellant is again claiming that the parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252 (73, old) and Tax Declaration No. 1231 (72, old) are conjugal properties of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita whereas the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) is the paraphernal property of Isidra Montanano. We are in conformity with the finding of the trial court that the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint were paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano, being supported by documentary and testimonial evidence (p. 48, Record on Appeal):

. . . plaintiff claims that in accordance with the inventory prepared by Edilberto Vita of his properties before his death (Exhs. "O", "O-1", "O-1-A", "O-1-B", and "O-1-C"), the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 4 (old) was a paraphernal property of his wife Isidra Montanano while the parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 72 (old) and 73 were conjugal properties of the spouses Edilberto Vita and Isidra Montanano as they were donated to the latter by Francisca Asilo during their marriage. It is the contention of the plaintiff that upon the death of Isidra Montanano, her husband Edilberto Vita acquired ownership of these properties.

This contention of the plaintiff in effect corroborates the claim of the defendants and intervenors that an the three (3) parcels of land, subject-matter of the complaint, including all the parcels of land being claimed by them in the intervenor's counterclaim, were all paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano. The two (2) parcels of land supposedly received as donation by Isidra Montanano during her marriage with Edilberto Vita should be classified as her paraphernal properties, it being acquired by her through lucrative title (Art. 148, Civil Code). On the other hand, plaintiffs testimony that the third parcel of land covered in the complaint was inherited by Edilberto Vita from Isidra Montanano is an admission that the said property was the paraphernal property of the latter.

The defendants and intervenors claim that the above-stated three (3) parcels of land and the properties covered in their counterclaim were donated to them by Isidra Montanano by virtue of two (2) deeds of donation she executed on November 22, 1938 and December 20, 1940. They presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove that Isidra Montanano acquired all these parcels of land, either by inheritance or donation, from her father Domingo Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her uncle Juan Asilo. Aside from this, the tax declarations covering the properties involved in the complaint and counterclaim are mostly in the name of Isidra Montanano, except one each in the name of her father Domingo Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her nephew Jose Samonte. The court is convinced, therefore, that all the properties involved in t litigation were the paraphernal properties of the deceased Isidra Montanano.

Whatever merit there may be in plaintiff-appellant's claim that upon the death of Isidra Montanano, the ownership of these parcels of land (except with respect to the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) which was validly donated to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants by Isidra Montanano, as We shall discuss later) are vested upon Edilberto Vita by operation of law, subject only to the right of her nephew and nieces, liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita must be undertaken prior to the adjudication of properties to the heirs (Vicente J. Francisco,The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1970 Edition, p. 619). In this connection, contrary to the trial court's ruling, it is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the proper disposition of the estate of Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. In the present case, therefore, the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita should be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the latter.

Defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants allege the following: 1) that a donation mortis causa (as in the case of the November 22, 1938 donation), being in the nature of a legacy, need not be accepted; their acceptance of that donation is superfluous and 2) that the December 20, 1940 donation is a donation inter vivosbecause: a) there is no stipulation or provision therein that the donation is essentially revocable; b) there was an acceptance of the donation; c) the donation was not simply made in consideration of the death of the donor but of her affection for the donees.

It is explicit in Article 725 * of the Civil Code that acceptance is necessary in a donation. This applies to all kinds of donation because the law does not make any distinction. The rationale behind the requirement of acceptance is that nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his will (Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume II, 1972 Edition, p. 521). We uphold the trial court that (p. 50, Record on Appeal):

. . . notwithstanding the fact that from the secondary evidence presented, the said deed of donation mortis causa of November 22, 1938 seems to have been legally and validly executed, it cannot be given force and effect as the acceptance thereof by the donees is void and illegal in as much (sic) as they were made at the time of the execution of the document, not after the death of the donor Isidra Montanano. A donation mortis causa takes effect only after the death of the donor, consequently it is only after the latter's death that its acceptance maybe made.

xxx xxx xxx

However, We adopt a view contrary to that of the trial court regarding the second allegation of defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants. According to the trial court (p. 50, Record on Appeal):

The defendants and intervenors further claim that all the properties covered by that counterclaim were donated to them by Isidra Montanano pursuant to a second deed of donation executed by the latter on December 20, 1940 (Exh. "3"). A careful study of the said document, however, shows that it is another deed of donation mortis causa, considering the following provisions appearing therein with respect to its effectivity:

Na bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa ng pag-aaring dito'y itinungod sa kani-kanila, matangi ang ganang napaukol sa kay Dr. Vicente C.

Chipongian at kay Maria Osuna, na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayo'y iginagawad sa kanila ng walang pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon bilang tunay na may-ari, gayon man, ay kami pa ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa pag-mamayari, pakikinabang at pamomosision sa kani-kaniyang pag-aaring ditoy ipinagkakaloob, sa buong panahon na ang bawat isa sa amin mag-asawa'y nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian kami ng hiram na buhay, ay saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamo nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at pakikinabang sa mga pag-aaring iyan na dito'y inihayag nila ang pagtangap.

From this provision of the document, it clearly appears that the donors shall continue to be the owner and possessors of the properties involved in the donation and shall continue to enjoy the fruits of said properties while they are still living and it is only upon their death that ownership will transfer to the donees. It was the evident intent of the donors in this case to give the donation after their death. In the meantime, they retain full or naked ownership and control of the properties while they are still living and title will pass to the donees only after their death. This is donation mortis causa (Heirs of Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-6600, July 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3568; Howard v. Padilla, G.R. L-7064, 7098, April 22, 1955).

The quoted provision in the second deed of donation should be understood in its entirety. Thus, based on the first part of the paragraph which states " '[n]a bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa . . . na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayo'y iginagawad sa kanila ng walang pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon bilang tunay na may-ari . . . " (Emphasis supplied), supra, it was obviously the intention of Isidra Montanano to grant a donation inter vivos to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants. Although the rest of the paragraph states "'gayon man, ay kami pa ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa pag-mamayari, pakikinabang at pamomosision, –– na kani-kaniyang pag-aaring dito'y ipinagkakaloob, sa buong panahon na ang bawat isa sa amin mag-asawa'y nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian kami ng hiram na buhay, ay saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamo nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at pakikinabang sa mga pag-aaring iyan . . . supra," We have adjudged in the case of Heirs of Juan Bonsato, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 481, 488:

It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective." . . . However, said expression must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would become vested in the donees.

It was also Our observation therein that (ibid, at p. 487):

. . . The donor only reserved for Himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce . . . a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations . . .

Furthermore, mention must be made of the fact that the consideration of the second deed of donation is love and services rendered by defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants to Isidra Montanano, as revealed by the third and fourth paragraphs therein (Exhibit "3," for the defendants):

Na sapagkat ang banal kong nais ay kung bawian man ako ng aking hiram na buhay ay matumbasan man lamang sa pamamag-itan ng isinasagawa kong pagkakaloob sa hinaharap na kasulatan yuong manga pagdamay, pagmamahal at paghahasikaso na tinanggap ko at tunay na ipinakita sa akin ng mga ditoy itinangi ko, ––

Kaya't dahil diya'y buong puso kong ibinibigay, isinusulit at ganap na IPINAGKAKALOOB, ang mga natitira ko pang mga pag-aari, na wala pang kinatutunguran o napagbibigyan, sa kaparaanang dito'y itinatagubilen ko, sa manga taong gaya nitong mga sumusunod:

xxx xxx xxx

As We have ruled in Concepcion, et al. v. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823, 830:

. . . even if he (donor) says it (the donation) is to take effect after his death, when from the body of the instrument or donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the death of the donor but rather services rendered to him by the donee or his affection for the latter, then the donation should be considered as inter vivos, . . . and the condition that the donation is to take effect only after the death of the donor should be interpreted as meaning that the possession and enjoyment of the its of the property donated should take place only after donor's death.

Along the same line of ratiocination is Our holding in Balaqui, et al. v. Dongso, et al., 53 Phil. 673, 677:

. . . that as the donor guaranteed the right which she conferred on the donee by virtue of the deed of gift, wherein, in recompense of the latter's good services to the former, she donates to her the two parcels of land with their improvements, said gift is inter vivos and irrevocable, and not mortis causa,notwithstanding the fact that the donor stated in said deed that she did not transfer the ownership of the two parcels of land donated, save upon her death, for such a statement can mean nothing else than that she only reserved to herself the possession and usufruct of said property, and because the donor could not very well guarantee the aforesaid right after her death.

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal of plaintiff-appellant is hereby DENIED whereas the appeal of defendants-appellants is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna dated September 15, 1973 is MODIFIED as follows: 1) the dismissal of the complaint of plaintiff-appellant is AFFIRMED; 2) the dismissal of the counterclaim of defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants is SET ASIDE; and 3) plaintiff-appellant is ordered: a) to deliver the possession of the properties donated to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants by virtue of the deed of donation dated December 20, 1940, and b) to render an accounting of the products harvested therefrom from January 23, 1962 up to the present.

G.R. No. L-21309      December 29, 1967

BERNARDO PICARDAL and SEBASTIAN PICARDAL, petitioners, vs.CENON LLADAS, respondent.

Concordio C. Diel and C. Noel for petitioners.F. T. Tamargo for respondent.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, dated December 20, 1962, in CAR Case No. 67, Lanao del Norte — 1960.

Sometime in 1950, petitioner Bernardo Picardal entrusted to respondent Cenon Lladas a piece of land with an area of about seven hectares, planted to some 812 fruit-bearing coconut trees, located at Samburan, Linamon, Lanao del Norte. This land formed part of the properties belonging to the conjugal partnership between petitioner Bernardo Picardal and his wife, Aurea Burgos, who died in 1941, and was under judicial administration in Special Proceedings No. IL-227 of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte. As of the date of the decision of the lower court, appealed from, this property was not yet partitioned among the heirs. When Bernardo Picardal entrusted the land to Cenon Lladas they had a verbal agreement that they would divide the coconut produce from the land on the basis of 1/3-2/3 in favor of the landowner and that Cenon Lladas, as tenant, would keep the coconut plantation clean. Cenon Lladas entered the landholding, harvested the nuts, processed the same into copra, and divided the harvest, after selling it, on the basis agreed upon.

On November 19, 1959, Demetrio P. Sira, Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, wrote a letter to respondent Cenon Lladas informing the latter of his appointment as special administrator of the estate of the late Aurea Burgos, and advised said respondent take good care of the coconut plantation, with a warning that should he fail to do so within 30 days from receipt of the letter, he would be forced to take the corresponding action under the tenancy law.

In February, 1960, respondent Lladas harvested coconuts and processed them into copra. This was sold by petitioner Bernardo Picardal to the Lian Hong Company in Iligan City on March 1, 1960. The manager of said firm wrote on March 2, 1960 to petitioner Bernardo Picardal informing the latter that the copra processed by respondent Cenon Lladas had been mixed with fresh coconut meat, because of which 16% of the weight would be deducted for moisture content, and at the same time requested Picardal to advise Lladas to stop the undesirable practice.

On March 3, 1960, herein respondent Lladas filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations a petition against Bernardo Picardal, Cesar Montoya and Demetrio Sira, alleging in substance that he had been a tenant since 1948 on the said coconut landholding owned by Bernardo Picardal, and planted to about 800 fruit-bearing coconut trees, the produce of which was shared between them on a 1/3-2/3 basis; that on February 5, 1960, Bernardo Picardal, thru Cesar Montoya and Demetrio P. Sira, served on him (Lladas) a notice to vacate one-half of said landholding in order that it might be given to another tenant; that because of said act, he suffered damages in having been compelled to bring said action.

On March 14, 1960, Bernardo Picardal, Cesar Montoya and Demetrio Sira filed their answer alleging, among others, that the landholding in question was a part of the property of the late Aurea Burgos, wife of Bernardo Picardal, and was the subject of administration proceedings, the administrator being the special administrator; that they had no information about the notice of ejectment; and as special defenses, they alleged never having notified Cenon Lladas to vacate the premises, and that the landholding in question was under custodia legis.

In May, 1960, Cenon Lladas again harvested coconuts and processed them into copra. The copra was sold by Bernardo Picardal to Lian Hong Company of Iligan City at P34.50 per 100 kilos in the early part of June, 1960. From the proceeds of the sale, Bernardo Picardo delivered to Lladas the sum of P645.00 representing the latter's share.

Herein respondent Lladas never made further harvests after May, 1960 although he still had his house on the land and continued to raise short term crops therein.

On October 12, 1960, Cenon Lladas filed an amended petition eliminating Cesar Montoya as one of the respondents and substituting Sebastian Picardal in his place, and alleging that he (Lladas) had been ejected from the landholding in September, 1960 by Sebastian Picardal, with the knowledge and consent of Bernardo Picardal. Cenon Lladas further claimed that he had planted on the land 2,000 banana hills and 24 fruit trees, the produce of which he shared on a 50-50 basis with Bernardo Picardal, and that as a result of the ejectment, he suffered damages in not receiving his share of the produce.

Bernardo Picardal, Sebastian Picardal and Demetrio Sira filed their answer on October 25, 1960 denying the ejectment and averring that Cenon Lladas had abandoned for quite a long time the landholding in question, for which cause Sebastian Picardal had to post in the premises a notice against trespassing.

Cenon Lladas filed a second amended petition dated July 24, 1961, the amendment consisting principally in the substitution of Demetrio P. Sira, the former special administrator, by Rosalia P. Penpeña the newly appointed administratrix of the Picardal estate.

After trial, the Court of Agrarian Relations rendered a decision, dated December 20, 1962, ordering (1) Bernardo Picardal as landholder and Rosalia P. Penpeña as administrarix to reinstate Cenon Lladas to the landholding; (2) ordering Bernardo Picardal and Sebastian Picardal to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of four thousand five hundred fifteen (P4,515.00) pesos to Cenon Lladas, with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the amended petition on October 12, 1960, until fully paid; and (3) ordering said Bernardo Picardal and Sebastian Picardal to pay, jointly and severally, to Cenon Lladas the further sum of six hundred forty-five (P645.00) pesos every four months from January, 1963 during such period that said Cenon Lladas has not been actually reinstated to said landholding, and to pay the costs.

The motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied, appeal was made to this Court by now petitioners Bernardo Picardal and Sebastian Picardal.

Herein petitioners have asserted in their petition the following grounds for review:

1. That the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR Case No. 67 was not in accordance with law;

2. That the proceeds of the estate is in the hands of the administratrix and not with herein petitioners, hence, the damages assessed by the lower court should be levied against the intestate estate; and

3. That the ejectment of Cenon Lladas was not supported by substantial evidence.

This appeal has no merit.

Petitioners claim that the lower court erred in finding that herein respondent had been ejected, said finding not being supported by evidence. In support thereof, they quoted the testimony of Sebastian Picardal,1 who testified that respondent Cenon Lladas voluntarily abandoned the landholding in June, 1960, without having been advised to leave either by the special administrator, Demetrio Sira, or by his father, Bernardo Picardal; that Lladas left the land because he had already a piece of land in Bualan, Tubud, Lanao del Norte, and also because he was ashamed to the special administrator who had forbidden him from harvesting coconuts twice in three months.

This Court has consistently held that the findings of facts of the Court of Agrarian Relations will not be disturbed on appeal where there is substantial evidence to support them,2 and all that this Court is called upon to do insofar as the evidence is concerned, is to find out if the conclusion of the lower court is supported by substantial evidence.3 Substantial evidence in support of the findings of the Court of Agrarian Relations does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, as petitioners herein have done in quoting the contrary evidence consisting of the testimony of Sebastian Picardal, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criterion for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.4

Even a cursory reading of the decision appealed from would reveal that the lower court arrived at its finding, that herein respondent Lladas had been ejected, after weighing the evidence of both parties and it gave its reasons for its conclusion together with the supporting facts. itc-alf The relevant portion of the decision reads thus:

Weighing the evidence of both parties, we find it easier to believe that respondent Bernardo Picardal and his son Sebastian had a more compelling motive in ousting the petitioner from the coconut plantation than had the latter in abandoning the same. As far back as March, 1960 when the copra harvest of February, 1960 was sold, respondent Bernardo Picardal had reason to be irked by the petitioner's act of mixing fresh coconut meat with his dried copra, thereby devaluating its quality. That the petitioner had been verbally told by the two Picardals, father and son, to stop making copra after the May, 1960 harvest, is corroborated by the circumstance that Sebastian Picardal, upon instructions by his father, put up a sign board inside the petitioner's coconut holding with a notice that "it is prohibited to whoever he is to take or to do anything with the coconuts, especially the squatters." A fair interpretation of the contents of the notice would show that it was intended for everyone, and that was what the petitioner understood by it, else he would not have put up his own sign board stating: "Do it because the law is yours. lawphil.net I have no fault."

On the other hand, there is no cogent reason for the petitioner to want to vacate his coconut holding The evidence shows that he is still raising short term corps and bananas inside said coconut holding. Unless he was out of his mind — and there is no evidence that he was or is — he would not voluntarily quit his coconut holding where he used to get an income of more than P600.00 every four months or over P1,860.00 a year and, at the same time, spend his efforts on his banana and corn holdings in the same land from which his income was negligible. It is true that the petitioner had applied for a homestead in Bualan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte. However, according to the evidence presented by the respondents themselves, the petitioner had transferred his rights over said homestead to one Mangolima Cuidato. (See Exh. "2" for respondents.) Furthermore, it should be noted that the instant case was instituted by the petitioner when he was only being threatened with ejectment but was not yet actually ejected from his coconut holding, and that he forthwith amended his complaint when

his ouster materialized. All these facts and circumstances negate respondents' claim that the petitioner had abandoned his coconut holding.

It cannot be said, therefore, that the finding of the Court of Agrarian Relations that respondent Cenon Lladas was ejected was not supported by substantial evidence.

In support of the other grounds for review of the decision of the lower court, herein petitioners aver that when the alleged ejectment of Cenon Lladas took place sometime in September, 1960 (as stated in the lower court's decision), the entire conjugal estate of herein petitioner Bernardo Picardal and his deceased wife, which includes the landholding in question, was under the administration of the special administrator, Demetrio P. Sira. Petitioners claim that, not being the administrators but only overseers of the special administrator, they could not have ejected herein respondent, much less should they be held exclusively liable for the damages since they were only two of the heirs to the estate and they turned the proceeds of the landholding in question to the estate. They claim that the estate should be the one liable for the damages.

In answer thereto, respondent Cenon Lladas argues that the administration of the estate of the late Aurea Burgos covered only one-half of the estate, that is, the portion belonging to the deceased, and did not cover the one-half interest of respondent Bernardo Picardal, who retained control and management of his undivided share, and was, therefore, still the landholder, and that since it was Bernardo Picardal, with the help of his son, Sebastian, who ejected the tenant, Cenon Lladas, they alone should be responsible for the damages.

Petitioners are correct in saying that the entire conjugal partnership property of the marriage between petitioner Bernardo and the late Aurea Burgos is under administration.5 It follows that the estate was really the landlord of the landholding subject of the instant action.6 This fact does not justify, however, petitioners' claim that the estate should be the one liable for the illegal dispossession of the tenant perpetrated by herein petitioners, as found by the lower court. itc-alf Republic Act No. 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act, does not hold the landlord liable for damage in case of dispossession of the tenant under any and all circumstances. The landlord is liable when he is responsible for the unlawful ejectment; otherwise, he is not. Thus, according to Section 27 (1) of Republic Act No. 1199, it is the landlord who illegally dispossesses the tenant who is liable for damages. Section 49 of the same Act renders the third party himself who unlawfully dispossesses a tenant, liable for damages. Hence it is only when the dispossession is imputable to the landlord should the latter be liable for damages.

Bernardo Picardal and Sebastian Picardal were the ones who ejected Cenon Lladas, according to the finding of the lower court. lawphil.net They, therefore, Should be the ones to suffer the consequences of their unlawful act.

Petitioners' responsibility for the damages cannot be shifted to the intestate estate for various reasons, namely: .

First, petitioners' act of dispossessing the tenant was not the act of the estate, for they did not represent the estate. Its representative was the special administrator and it was not the special administrator who perpetrated the ejectment. Even if it be assumed, gratia argumenti, that the special administrator acquiesced to the ejectment, the estate would still not be liable, because if Section 5, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court makes the administrator himself liable for any waste committed in the estate through his negligence, with more reason would he be personally responsible, and not the estate, for the consequences of his unlawful act.

Second, the fact that the proceeds of the landholding in question, as claimed by petitioners, were turned over to the estate, would neither render the estate liable, because the intestate estate did not really benefit from the dispossession. Whether it was Cenon Lladas or petitioner Sebastian Picardal who was the tenant, the estate would have received the 2/3 share of the proceeds. The estate not having benefitted from the dispossession, besides not having been guilty of the unlawful act, it cannot be ordered to pay the damages awarded by the lower court.

Third, the intestate estate before partition is owned in common by all the heirs (Article 1078, Civil Code). A coownership should not suffer the consequences of the unlawful act of any of the coowners (Article 501, Civil Code). Hence the estate should not suffer from the consequences of the dispossession perpetrated by only two of the many heirs of the estate.

Fourth, Article 18 of the Civil Code, the application of which to the instant case is authorized both by Section 55 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and Article 20 of the Civil Code, provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same." Hence, herein petitioners themselves, and not the intestate estate, should indemnify the respondent for the damages suffered by the latter on account of the unlawful dispossession.

We find that the lower court has not committed any of the errors assigned by herein petitioners.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-62431-33 August 31, 1984

PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) and HONOR MOSLARES, respondents.

Azucena E. Lozada for petitioner.

Estrella Funelas Iral & Associates and Tomas Trinidad for respondents.

 

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on June 30, 1982 in CA-G.R. Nos. 12599-R, 12600-R, and 12601-R entitled "Honor P. Moslares, petitioner v. Honorable Reynaldo P. Honrado, et al., respondents, was filed as part of the effort to expedite the final settlement of the estate of the deceased NICOLAI DREPIN.

The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) making permanent the temporary restraining order issued:

(b) declaring null and void the impugned orders of April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980, September 30, 1980, and October 20, 1980, for having been issued in grave abuse

of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction, with the September and October orders having the additional defect of due process violation;

(c) declaring null and void the Deed of Undertaking and Deed of Sale in favor of respondent Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc., for being mere consequences of null orders;

(d) ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel the transfer certificates of title issued to Pio Barreto Realty Development, (TCT Nos. N-50539, N-50540, N-50541) and to transfer the same to the Estate of Nicolai Drepin with the annotation that this transfer to the estate is subject to the final decision in Civil Case No. 41287 of the CFI of Pasig, Metro Manila; and

(e) denying the prayer for the exclusion of the three titled lots involved from Special Proceedings Nos. 7257, 7261, and 7269 of the CFI of Makati Branch Civil Case No. 41287 abovementioned.

The proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Drepin were initiated shortly after his death on July 29, 1972 with the filing of a petition for probate of his holographic will on August 23, 1972.

In this holographic will the late Drepin listed twenty-two (22) persons as his alleged creditors, and within the six (6) months after publication within which to file claims against the estate, twelve (12) persons filed their respective claims. The total amount of obligations that may be chargeable against the Drepin Estate is P1,299,652.66.

The only asset of the testate estate of Drepin consists of three (3) parcels of titled land with an area of approximately eighty (80) hectares, and another parcel with an area of eighty-one (81) hectares still pending registration. The estate is saddled with claims of creditors named in the Drepin will and creditors who have filed their claims within the reglementary period. The only way to pay their claims is to sell the Drepin lots, so that from the proceeds of the sale, the debts of the estate could be paid, and any remaining balance distributed to the Drepin heirs.

Since the filing of the petition for probate of the Drepin will, on August 23, 1972, nine (9) offers had been made for the purchase of the Drepin lands, among them, that of GM Management Phils., dated August 15, 1978, through its President Honor P. Moslares. Basis for Moslares' letter proposal is a deed of sale with mortgage executed by the decedent in his favor on October 9, 1970. It appears that on said date, the deceased sold 80.3980 hectares of land absolutely and perpetually to Honor P. Moslares for the sum of P2,600,000.00 with a downpayment of P300,000.00. To secure the payment of the remaining P2,300,000.00, the latter mortgaged the land to the former. The parties further agreed not to register the sale yet until P1,300,000.00 shall have been paid to Drepin and P1,000.000.00 paid to Drepin's creditors.

Subsequently, on June 25, 1971, Drepin and Moslares entered into a "Joint Venture Agreement". Said agreement listed Drepin as the registered "owner" of the lots and denominated Moslares as "developer" tasked with converting the lands into a residential subdivision. The agreement specified:

(h) That the Developer agrees to reserve the right of the registered Owner of the land to ask for immediate CASH payment against an "Absolute Deed of Sale " on the said above mentioned properties, subject of this "Joint Venture Agreement" on the amount of not less than TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P2,300,000.00) PESOS, after the big loan is granted to the Developer in or about

thirty (30) days to forty-five (45) days from the signing of this Joint Venture Agreement and the "Special Power of Attorney",

(i) However, if the Owner of the property Mr. Nicolai Drepin not choose to be paid on this said above mentioned property in CASH of TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P2,300,000.00) PESOS, this "joint venture agreement is still in full force and effect, OTHERWISE if full payment of TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P2,300,000.00) PESOS receipt is acknowledged by the said Mr. Nicolai Drepin, the "Joint Venture Agreement" is automatically cancelled and declared no force and effect.

Before the agreement could be implemented, Nicolai Drepin died.

Upon learning of the existence of Special Proceedings No. 7257, 7261 and 7269 herein respondent Moslares, on August 15, 1978, informed the Judicial Administrator Atty. Tomas Trinidad that he is already the owner of the properties made subject matter of the Special Proceedings and proposed that he be permitted to pay the balance on the sale with mortgage in accordance with the terms of his written proposal. The probate court, on August 17, 1978 issued an order approving respondent Moslares' proposal and authorizing administrator Trinidad to enter into the appropriate agreement. This was reiterated by the court in its order dated January 9, 1979, with the condition that GM Management Phils. had only up to February 28, 1979 to comply with its letter-offer dated August 15, 1978 and "failure on their part to comply with the same within the period specified, the contract with the decedent shall be deemed resolved and ineffective." Counsel for heir claimant Cornelia Tejano was Revise given up to said date to make and submit a more beneficial offer. Neither GM Management nor counsel for Tejano was able to perform as required.

Requests for revision of payment and extension of period within which to pay the balance of P1,600,000.00 were made by Moslares. Further, he filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion proposing transfer of the certificate of titles over the land subject of the proceedings so as to enable him to generate funds to liquidate the payable balance. The same were left unacted upon by the probate court.

Meanwhile, on September 25,1979, A Deed of Undertaking was entered into by respondent Moslares and the Administrator to implement the Contract of Sale with Mortgage. Such deed provided for the mode of payment which Moslares was to follow as well as the clearing and transfer of the certificates of title in the name of Moslares. The latter proviso was to enable Moslares to secure the loan needed to pay for the balance of the purchase price. Postdated checks were issued by Moslares to cover the amount embraced in said undertaking. Approval of the agreement with Moslares was strongly urged by the Administrator. No action was taken by the court thereon. At the hearing of October 19, 1979, Moslares tendered P1,600,000.00 to the Judicial Administrator. This was opposed by counsel for heir Tejano, Atty. Ramon Encarnacion, on the ground that respondent Moslares had only until February 28, 1979 within which to pay the same. Attorney Encarnacion thereupon brought to the attention of the court an offer to buy the properties for P3,000,000.00 by herein petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. Because of the differing contentions and the new offer, the probate court ordered the parties to submit memoranda and set a conference on November 28, 1979 to discuss the new offer.

On November 12, 1979, respondent Moslares submitted his memorandum containing three points to wit:

l. Actually, Honor P. Moslares is already owner of the Property, subject matter of this proceedings, and as such, could no longer be the subject matter of this testate proceedings. The payment made by Honor P. Moslares to the Judicial Administrator through this Honorable Court on 19 October, 1979, is in compliance with the Contract entered into between him and the late Nicolai Drepin, in 1970;

2. The Order of this Honorable Court dated 9 January, 1979, particularly with reference to the period, mentioned in No. 1, page 2 of the Order of this Honorable Court giving Honor P. Moslares up to 28 February, 1979, within which to comply with his letter-offer to the Court dated 15 August, 1978, is not yet final, said period having been extended;

3. The Order of this Honorable Court dated 9 January, 1979, particularly No. 2, Page 2 thereof, barred Counsel for Cornelia B. Tejano from making any further offer, his right to do so having expired on 28 February, 1979.

Thereupon, the probate court judge directed Moslares through the administrator Atty. Trinidad, to furnish copies of — (1) Deed of Absolute Sale; (2) Special Power of Attorney; and (3) Joint Venture Agreement. The same were promptly submitted.

On February 28, 1979, March 6, 1980 and April 15, 1980, letters to Judicial Administrator Trinidad were sent by respondent Moslares seeking further extension of time within which to pay the balance of his obligation to the estate, and for favorable recommendations to the probate court in his reports saying: "Help me now, this is ours. We can make money of all this sacrifice we had on the pass (sic)."

On April 15, 1980, the probate court reiterated its order dated August 17, 1978 authorizing the Administrator to finalize the sale with GM Management Phils. and giving respondent Moslares ten (10) days from date to deposit the necessary amount to cover the value of the checks as each fallsdue. Failure to do so would result in the automatic rescission of the authority to sell to GM Management Phils. and the Administrator would be permitted to accept other offers in the best interest of the Estate. This order was the probate court's prompt action on a "Report with Motion for Cancellation of Order Approving Sale to GM Management, Phils. Honor P. Moslares, if it fails to make good the April 15, 1980 check "As Token Payment in Good Faith", filed by administrator Trinidad on the same day, April 15, 1980.

GM Management sought reconsideration and amendment of the Order of April 15, 1980 to conform to the provisions of the Deed of Undertaking.

On May 23, 1980, administrator Trinidad filed a "Report with Motion to Authorize Administrator to Screen Offers to Purchase Estate and Others.

On May 31, 1980, respondent Moslares filed another manifestation praying that his pending motions be acted upon and that the motion of administrator Trinidad be denied for lack of merit.

On June 30, 1980, administrator Trinidad made the following "Observation and Report on the Motion of Buyer GM Management Phils. for reconsideration" —

2. Two checks, one for P50,000.00 and one for P250,000.00 were deposited on April 28, 1980 after the Order of the Probate Court. BOTH BOUNCED. DAIF (Drawn against insufficient funds).

3. Another check for P300,000.00 is now held by the Administrator, postdated for today, June 30, 1980 and Administrator just received, June 29, 1980 a telegram asking to withhold deposit until after 30 days from amendatory order of the Probate Court.

xxx xxx xxx

6. The motion of Administrator is reiterated.

On July 2, 1980, the probate court issued the following order:

Finding the Motion of the Administrator well-taken and in the best interests of the Estate, the administrator is authorized to enter into agreement with any other interested parties on a first paid first served basis without prejudice to G.M. Management Philippines to continue with its offer and make good the same in as an ordinary buyer on the same first paid first served basis.

Respondent Moslares filed a motion for reconsideration of said July 2, 1980 order on the ground that:

1. The Honorable Probate Court has no jurisdiction over the three (3) parcels of land, consisting of 80.3980 hectares subject matter of the Deed of Sale which the late Nicolai Drepin, conveyed to Movant Honor P. Moslares. The only right which pertains to the ESTATE, is the right to demand from Honor P. Moslares, the balance of the Deed of Sale, which has been fixed by this Honorable Court at ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND (P1,600,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency;

2. As of November, 1979, the law that governs between the ESTATE and MOVANT, Honor P. Moslares, is the DEED OF UNDERTAKING executed by the Administrator in favor of Movant Honor P. Moslares, pursuant to the authority given by the Honorable Probate Court to the Administrator contained in the Order dated August 15, 1978, reiterated in the Order dated January 9, 1979, and in the Order dated 15 April 1980; and

3. The Honorable Probate Court has no jurisdiction to decree rescission of the Contract into (sic) between the decedent and Movant Honor P. Moslares on the 9th day of October, 1970.

This motion for reconsideration was opposed by administrator Trinidad as well as the Tejano heirs through counsel, arguing that the probate court has jurisdiction to issue the questioned orders because petitioner submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction and his checks bounced also that the Deed of Undertaking was validly cancelled as a result of the valid rescission of Trinidad's authority to sell to petitioner.

On September 30, 1980, the probate court issued an order denying respondent Moslares' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. And on October 10, 1980 administrator Trinidad executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. transferring the titles to the properties in question in the name of the latter. The same was duly registered. On October 20, 1980, the probate court approved the report of administrator Trinidad dated October 16, 1980, with xerox copies of the Deed of Sale in favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. of the estate of Nicolai Drepin pursuant to respondent court's order authorizing the sale, and of the approved Deed of Undertaking with the vendee.

An urgent Motion and Manifestation was filed by respondent Moslares on April 8, 1981 praying that his motion for reconsideration of the orders be already resolved, followed by an Omnibus Motion on April 27, 1981 to resolve all pending motions and praying that the Deed of Sale and Deed of Undertaking in favor of Pio Barretto be cancelled. The same remained unacted upon.

On May 18, 1981, respondent filed Civil Case No. 41287 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, Metro Manila to determine title and ownership over the Drepin lands.

On June 23, 1981, a petition for certiorari was filed by respondent Moslares before the Court of Appeals which issued a temporary restraining order. Judgment was rendered by respondent court in favor of respondent Moslares, the dispositive portion of which has been quoted.

Barretto filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on November 12, 1982. Hence, this petition.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals laid down the two principal issues involved in the case, as follows: (1) whether or not the respondent judge (Judge R. Honrado) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to exclude the parcels of land involved from the testate proceedings of the Drepin estate; and (2) whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the impugned orders dated April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980, September 30, 1980, and October 20, 1980.

We are in full accord with the respondent court's resolution of the first issue, and we quote:

For continually presuming that the three titled lots were part of the Drepin estate and for refusing to provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion, did the respondent court act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion?

We hold that even with such presumption and refusal, the respondent court still acted within its jurisdiction and not with grave abuse of discretion. After all, the jurisprudence and rule are both to the effect that the probate court "may" provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion, not "should". The obvious reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result to inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. Hence, even if respondent court presumed an the way that the properties sold by Drepin to petitioner were part of Drepin's estate, that would not prevent nor defeat petitioner's remedy in a separate suit.

And We hold that Civil Case No. 41287 is just such a suit instituted to settle the question of ownership over the lots covered originally by TCTs Nos. 259060, 259061 and 259062, despite the claim for damages, because of the composite effect of the prayer in the complaint thereof ...

xxx xxx xxx

In effect, We are saying that the question of whether the properties sold by Drepin to Petitioner should be excluded from the probate proceedings below, can not be determined with finality by Us in this case, because in this petition We are merely reviewing the acts of the respondent CFI as a probate court. Any ruling by the probate court to include those properties "is only provisional in character and is without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action on the issue of title or

ownership" (Sebial v. Sebial, L-23419, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 385). Consequently, in reviewing the exercise of such limited probate jurisdiction, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion of the properties involved, as prayed for; to do so would expand the probate court's jurisdiction beyond the perimeters set by law and jurisprudence. It is fitting and proper that this issue be ventilated and finally resolved in the already instituted Civil Case No. 41287, even as We hold that respondent court's act of not excluding the lots involved did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. In view of this limitation, We need not resolve the issue of whether there was novation of the Deed of Sale with Mortgage, or not.

This same elemental principle, we found occasion to reiterate in the cases of Junquera v. Borromeo (19 SCRA 656); Borromeo v. Canonoy (19 SCRA 667); Recto v. dela Rosa (75 SCRA 226); Lachenal v. Salas (71 SCRA 202); Bolisay v. Alcid (85 SCRA 213); Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals (91 SCRA 540).

However, from here, the road forks as we disagree with the respondent court's findings on the second issue.

In his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, respondent Moslares assails the issuance of the four impugned orders by the probate court on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to rescind the Deed of Sale with the Mortgage entered into by the deceased during his lifetime, due to the limited jurisdiction of the probate court merely to settle and liquidate the estates of a decedent and not to pass upon questions of title to property.

On the other hand, the petitioner argues that in voiding and nullifying the four orders of the probate court, the Court of Appeals, in effect, would have the former court recognize the alleged ownership of Mr. Moslares over the three titled Drepin lots involved in this case contrary to its pronouncement in settling the first issue.

It is to be noted that the last agreement entered into by the deceased prior to his death, that is, the Joint Venture Agreement listing Drepin as owner of the properties in question, and the surrender to administrator Trinidad of the certificates of title, had led the probate court to enter or include said properties in its inventory of the deceased's estate. Thus, provisionally, ownership thereof was recognized as vested in the estate. Subsequently, in the course of the probate proceedings, the sale of the properties was found to be necessary to settle the deceased's obligations. It was then that herein private respondent Moslares submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court in an "Offer to Buy" said properties, based on his previous agreement with the deceased during the latter's lifetime.

It is noteworthy that contrary to Moslares' assertion of ownership, he had offered to buy the Drepin lands from the probate court. Surely, this is not conduct ordinarily expected of one who is the owner of the property. Further, the fact that subsequent to the Deed of Sale, the deceased as buyer and as absolute owner entered into an agreement with the respondent merely as developer of the lands in question evidences a change of cause or object as well as a change of relation between the parties. Moslares' own acts negate his claims in this petition that he had acquired ownership of the properties. Thus, the transparency of respondent's argument becomes readily apparent.

Having submitted his letter-proposal to the court, the same was approved, allowing Moslares to pay the balance of the purchase price agreed upon by respondent and the decedent in the amount of One Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,600,000.00) specifying the time and manner of payment thereof. Thus, he was given preference and priority over other persons or groups offering to buy the estate. Having failed to comply with the conditions of payment of the contract, the same was

rescinded by the probate court. Now, respondent questions this rescission which he maintains to be beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

Estoppel works to preclude respondent from questioning the jurisdiction of the court. By offering to buy the properties in question, respondent has clearly recognized the jurisdiction of the probate court to which he had effectively submitted himself. It is well settled that a party is estopped from disputing the jurisdiction of the court after invoking it himself (Tible v. Aquino, 65 SCRA 207). After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 278; Capilitan v. dela Cruz, 55 SCRA 706; Summit Guaranty and Insurance Co., Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 110 SCRA 241; Tajonera v. Lamoroza, 110 SCRA 438). A party will not be allowed to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions. Doctrine of estoppel bars a party from trifling with the courts (Depositario v. Hervias, 121 SCRA 756).

The merits of the case likewise lead to similar conclusions.

It cannot but be conceded that the limited jurisdiction of a probate court prohibits it from determining rights to property left by a decedent which depends on the contract (Goodin v. Casselman 200 N.W. 94, 51 N.D. 543). However, actions of the probate court, in the case at bar, do not refer to the adjudication of rights under the contract entered into by the deceased during his lifetime. It is to be noted that the dealings of the respondent with the court arose out of the latter's bid to sell property under its authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber property of the estate to pay or settle against the estate (Rule 89, Revised Rules of Court). Thus, respondent bound himself under an agreement with the court separate and distinct from that which he had with the decedent. In rescinding such contract, the court merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an agreement which had ceased to be a working proposition. Surely, this is well within the power of the probate court. Though of limited and special jurisdiction, it cannot be denied, however, that when the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdicton to make it effective (Zuniga v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 740).

We cannot allow an absurd situation to arise where the Drepin estate will never be settled and liquidated because even if Moslares cannot pay the agreed purchase price of the Drepin lands, still the probate court can no longer sell the lands to other prospective buyers. Under the theory of respondent, it is insisted that the probate court has no authority to cancel his unfulfilled offer to buy, notwithstanding the fact that he failed miserably to comply with the terms of his own offer to buy. It is to be remembered that Moslares had already been granted undue leniency by the probate court to meet his obligations to pay. But, the saga of Moslares' bouncing checks remains. Three reports of Administrator Trinidad had been submitted as annexes to the petition for certiorari. The report, dated June 30, 1980 showed that two of Moslares' checks were dishonored, having been drawn against insufficient funds. The August 18, 1980 report stated that: "All the checks submitted to the probate court for payment bounced." And in the report dated April 15, 1981, it was further averred by the administrator that "... believing that the bouncing checks were not intended to defraud the Estate," "he refrained from prosecuting Honor P. Moslares criminally under the law on dishonored checks."

It is also to be emphasized that it was not respondent's contract of sale with decedent that had been invalidated but rather the administrator's authority to sell to respondent. Although the court recognized the Deed of Sale with Mortgage, still the same was not being enforced as such but was used only as basis for the terms and conditions of respondent's agreement with the court. To enforce the same is truly beyond the scope of the probate court's jurisdiction. The court's actions constitute a refusal to pass upon the validity of the contract to sell.

Further, the probate court has ample discretion in determining whether conditions of a particular sale would be beneficial to the estate and this is generally respected by the appellate courts (Court of First Instance v. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 114, Fernandez, et al., v. Montejo, 109 Phil. 701). To attack the nullity of the order of the probate court to sell property of the deceased, it must be shown that the contract of sale is null and void (Rafols v. Barba, 119 SCRA 147). The infirmity of the subject deed of sale is premised on the alleged nullity of the order of the court authorizing the sale. The validity of said order may not be attacked in a collateral proceeding, the supposed ground for declaring it void for lack of jurisdiction not being apparent on the face thereof (Rafols v. Barba, supra). Nevertheless, respondent could have prevented the sale of the Drepin lands. Section 3, Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 3. Persons interested may prevent such sale, etc., by giving bond. — No such authority to sell mortgage, or otherwise encumber real or personal estate shall be granted if any person interested in the estate gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies within such tune as the court directs; and such bond shall be for the security of the creditors, as well as of the executor or administrator, and may be prosecuted for the benefit of either.

provides respondent with the legal means by which he could have forestalled the sale of the Drepin lands to the petitioner. (Court of First Instance v. Court of Appeals, supra) If third persons oppose an application for leave to sell the property of the decedent, claiming title to the property, the title claim, cannot be adjudicated by the probate court, but it can hold approval of the sale in abeyance until the question of ownership shall have been decided in a proper action (Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501). But this, he failed to do. Ergo, we find no reason to disturb the questioned orders of the probate court.

Moreover, the respondent is not without remedy if truly his claim of ownership is proper and meritorious. Since the probate court has no jurisdiction over the question of title and ownership of the properties, the respondents may bring a separate action if they wish to question the petitioner's titles and ownership (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540). Though an order of the probate court approving the sale of the decedent's property is final, the respondent may file a complaint in the proper court for the rescission of the sale. (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 72). Likewise, the initial question of respondent regarding the propriety of including the properties in question in the inventory of the probate court as he claims ownership thereof may therein be finally and conclusively settled (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, supra; Lachenal v. Salas, 71 SCRA 202). The respondent has ample protection of his rights for the province of the probate court remains merely the settlement of the estate and may not be extended beyond (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, supra).