SOCIAL SECURITY

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SOCIAL SECURITY Chapter 11

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SOCIAL SECURITY. Chapter 11. Social Security Expenditures (1939-2011). Source: Social Security Trustees [2012]. Why Have Social Security?. Consumption Smoothing and the Annuity Market How Social Security works Annuity Consumption smoothing Adverse Selection and the Annuity Market - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of SOCIAL SECURITY

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SOCIAL SECURITY Chapter 11

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Social Security Expenditures(1939-2011)

Source: Social Security Trustees [2012].

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Why Have Social Security?

• Consumption Smoothing and the Annuity Market– How Social Security works– Annuity– Consumption smoothing

• Adverse Selection and the Annuity Market– Asymmetric information– Adverse selection

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Other Justifications

• Lack of foresight and paternalism• Moral hazard• Economize on decision-making and

administrative costs• Income Redistribution• Improve the Economic Status of the Aged

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Fully Funded Plan

Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4

contribute benefits

contribute benefits

contribute benefits

The GreatestGeneration

The Baby BoomGeneration

Generation X

Work Retire Dead

Unborn

Work

Work

Retire

StillDead

DeadChildhood

Childhood Retire

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Each generation’s benefits based on deposits it made

during working life plus accumulated

interest

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Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4

The GreatestGeneration

The Baby BoomGeneration

Generation X

Work Retire Dead

Unborn

Work

Work

Retire

StillDead

DeadChildhood

Childhood Retire

contribute

benefits

contribute

benefits

contribute

benefits

benefits

Pay As You Go (or Unfunded) System

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Each generation’s

benefits come from tax

payments made by current

workers

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Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4

The GreatestGeneration

The Baby BoomGeneration

Generation X

Work Retire Dead

Unborn

Work

Work

Retire

StillDead

DeadChildhood

Childhood Retire

contribute

benefits

contribute

benefits

contribute

benefits

benefits

Today’s Partially Funded System

Baby Boomers and Gen X are also

contributing to their own retirement

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Explicit Transfers

• Benefits for dependents and survivors (1939)• Supplemental Security Income

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Benefits

• How to calculate benefits– AIME (Average Indexed Monthly Earnings) –

average monthly earnings in 35 highest paid years• Wages indexed for inflation• Ceiling on AIME – up to tax ceiling

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Benefit Structure

If AIME < $711 PIA = .90*AIMEIf $711< AIME <$4288 PIA = .90*$711 + .32*(AIME - $711)If AIME > $4288 PIA = .90*$711 + .32*($4288-$711) + .15*(AIME - $4288)

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Adjustments• Family Status

– +50% for spouse or dependent child– If covered worker dies spouse receives 100% of worker’s benefit

or spouse’s own benefit (whichever is higher)– Divorced spouse married at least 10 years gets spouse benefit if

not remarried while covered worker alive• Earnings test and taxing benefits

– Benefits reduced $1 for every $2 earned above $14,160– Individuals losing benefits may have later benefits increased– Up to 85% of benefits taxed for recipients with income above a

base amount ($25,000 for single and $32,000 for married taxpayers)

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Financing• FICA (Federal Insurance Contribution Act)• 2008 Social Security Tax rates

– Employee– 6.2% (OASI - 5.6%, DI - .6%) of first $102,000 of earnings on both

employee and employer– Self-employed

• 12.4%• 2008 Medicare Tax rates

– 1.45% on both employer and employee with no earnings ceiling• Why not fund Social Security through general tax revenues?

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Distributional Issues

• Actuarially fair return• Intergenerational redistribution

– Total benefits = Nb * B

– Total taxes = t * Nw * w

– If total benefits = total taxes:Nb * B = t * Nw * w orB = t * (Nw/Nb) * w

• Ida Mae Fuller

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Ida Mae Fuller

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Social Security Wealth:

Representative Individuals

-1000

-800

-600

-400

-200

0

200

400

Tho

usan

ds o

f 20

06 D

olla

rs

Year Cohort Turns 65

Single Male

Low

Average

High

Max

Single Female

-1000

-800

-600

-400

-200

0

200

400

Year Cohort Turns 65

Low

Average

High

Max

One-earner Couple

-1000

-800

-600

-400

-200

0

200

400

Year Cohort Turns 65

Tho

usan

ds o

f 200

6 D

olla

rs

Low

Average

High

Max

Two-earner Couple

-800

-600

-400

-200

0

200

400

Year Cohort Turns 65T

hous

ands

of 2

006

Dol

lars

Low

Average

High

Max

Source: Updated tables, furnished by C. Eugene Steuerle and Adam Carasso, 2006.

See C. Eugene Stueuerle and Jon M. Bakija [1994] for original tables and methodology.

All values expressed in 2006 dollars.

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Other Distributional Issues

• Redistribution within a generation– Differences by earnings– Differences by lifespan– Differences by living arrangements– Differences by number of earners in the family

• Normative evaluation

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The Social Security Trust Fund

• Social Security and National Saving• Budget Treatment of Social Security

– Off budget– Unified budget

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Social Security and Savings Behavior

• Life-cycle theory of savings• Wealth Substitution Effect• Retirement Effect• Bequest Effect

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Budget Constraint for Present and Future Consumption

Present consumption (c0)

Futu

re c

onsu

mpti

on (c

1)

N

MI0

I1

D

I0 - S

I1 + (1+r) S

S

(1+r)S

I1 - (1+r) BF

B

(1+r)B

At endowment point (A)

consumer neither saves nor borrows

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A

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Utility-maximizing Choice of Present and Future Consumption

Present consumption (c0)

Futu

re c

onsu

mpti

on (c

1)

N

MI0

I1

E1c1*

A

c0*

Saving

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Crowding out of private saving due to Social Security

Present consumption (c0)

Futu

re c

onsu

mpti

on (c

1)

N

M

I0

I1

E1c1*

A

c0*

R

T

I0T

(1+r)T

Saving before Social Security

Saving after Social

Security

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Empirical Evidence: Does Social Security Reduce Saving?

• Time-series evidence– Martin Feldstein (1974, 1996) v. Leimer and

Lesnoy (1982)

• Cross-section evidence• Evidence from other countries

– Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) and Italy

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Other ways Social Security Affects Saving

• Retirement effect• Bequest effect• Empirical evidence

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Distribution of Wealth

• Bequeathable vs. Annuitized Wealth• Effect of Social Security on Bequeathable

Wealth• Effect on Wealth Mobility

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Retirement Decisions

• Social Security wealth and the retirement decision

• Empirical evidence– Diamond and Gruber [1999]– Gruber and Wise [2004]

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Long-Term Stresses on Social Security

Source: Social Security Trustees [2012]

Projected revenues and projected costs of Social Security as share of Gross Domestic Product

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Long-Term Stresses on Social Security

Since: B = t * (Nw/Nb) * w

Rearrange: t = (Nw/Nb) * (B/w)

Dependency RatioReplacement Ratio

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Social Security Reform

• Time horizon for solvency– Sustainable solvency

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Maintain the Current System

• Raise the payroll tax• Raise the Maximum Taxable Earnings Level• Raise the Retirement Age• Reducing the Cost-of-Living Adjustment• Change the Benefit Formula• Comparing the Options

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Privatize the System

• Personal Accounts• Pros and cons of personal accounts

– Effect on Solvency– Effect on Saving

• Carve-out accounts• Add-on accounts

– Risk– Administration– Distribution

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