Social Network as a Subjective Construct Artricle 1969 Social Networki

7/25/2019 Social Network as a Subjective Construct Artricle 1969 Social Networki

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Social Network

as

a Subjective

Construct: A New Application for

an

Old Idea

R O B E R T

A.

S T E B B I N S / MemorialUniversityofNewfoundland

Bott a dCfini le rCseau social com me Ctant un ensemble

de

relations sociales qui ne

posshdent pas de frontikres communes.

Par

ailleurs personne ne sest prCoccup6

explorer les rCpercussions quengendrent cette connexion entre ces deux con-

cepts.

En

se basant

sur

la dC6nition WebCrienne dune relation sociale

ou

nterper-

sonnelle ( R),

il

devient 6vident quessentiellement cest une orientation mutuelle

entre deux individus; cest une perception subjective ou une prhdisposition.

Les

conskquences logiques de cette observation par rapport au rCseau social sont

exam inks. On arrive la conclusion que les rCseaux sont aussi des modeles sub-

jectifs et , par voie de consCquence, ils possiident le pouvoir de guider la conduite

dans une situation sociale.

Bott has defined social network

as

a set

of

social relationships for which there is

no common boundary. Yet, no one has ever bothered to explore the implications

of this connection between these two concepts. By examining Webers definition

of

social or interpersonal relationship

(

IR)

,

t becomes evident that

it is

basically

a mutual orientation between two persons; it is a subjective construct or pre-

disposition. The logical consequences of this observation for the social network

are considered, and it is concluded that networks are also subjective constructs

and therefore have the potential to guide behaviour in the social situation.

T h e ever-growing body of literature incorporating the notion of social net-

work in to its analysis

is

strong evidence

for

th e fertility

of

an idea formally

introduced into social science by J. A. Barnes 1954). T he numerous studies

which have ap peared since tha t time have related social network t o a n ex-

tensive a rray of subjects. A m ajority of the se have em ployed

this

dea as an

explanatory factor, explaining or helping

to

explain such diverse phenomena

as

social

change, efficiency

of

communities as melting pots, links between

the various groups in a society,

social

class, maintenance

of

rur al ties, a nd

nature of contacts outside the family (Epstein, 1961; Gutkind, 1965;

P.

Mayer, 1962; Mitchell, 1966; Srinivas and Beteille, 1964; Bott, 1957;

Nelson, 1966; Young and Wilmott, 1957; Barnes, 1954).

A

somewhat

smaller proportion of studies or summaries has treated social networks as

objects of explanation while investigating influences of rural to urban migra-

tion

on

networks, formation

of

interpersonal relationships as they atrect

networks, types of networks, gossip and networks, and how networks

originate (Frankenberg, 1965; Katz, 1966; Adams, 1967; Bott, 1957;

Barnes, 1954;Hannerz, 1968).

would like

to

express my gratitude to D.

Ralph

Matthews and Robert Paine for

their

valuable

comments on a

draft of this

paper.

Rev.

canad.

k Anth./Canad.

Rev.

Soc Anth. 6 1)1969


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For the purposes of this introductory discussion we can accept Botts

definition of social network as a set of social relationships for which there is

no common boundary Bott, 1957: 59). In the strict sense of the word a net-

work is not a structure, since it has no shared boundaries boundaries recog-

nized by everyone in the social network) and no commonly recognized

hierarchy or central co-ordinating agency. Nevertheless, there are intercon-

nections between others in the network in that some of its members are

directly in touch with each other while others are not. Thus, it is also a charac-

teristic of networks that their mesh may be closely-knit many members

having direct contact) or loosely-knit few members having direct contact)

Barnes, 1954; Bott, 1957:59). Many of the studies mentioned above pro-

vide evidence for Botts definition of social networks as comprised of social

relationships.

A certain amount of confusion has sprung

up

among those who have

endeavoured to consider the idea of network on a theoretical plane. This

confusion is almost entirely centred in the question

of

whether a network

should be approached from the point

of

view of a particular person ego-

centred perspective) or from a more totalistic stance in which the component

relationships are seen as a

sum

total of every persons network holistic per-

spective). The ego-centred perspective is like the standpoint used in kinship

analysis, whereas the holistic perspective focuses less on any particular point

in the network than on the total structure of relationships.

What has happened, as Adrian Mayer 1966) recently observed, is that

Bott used network in an ego-centred sense, a usage which Barnes originally

reserved for the term set which he never developed to any definitive degree.

Most subsequent writers have continued to follow Bott, and we shall do the

same here. This definition has become established in the parlance of anthro-

pologists and sociologists.

Outside of these few attempts at conceptual clarification, there has been

a regrettable paucity

of

theoretical discussion about the concept of social

network. In order to strengthen the explanatory power

of

this idea, we shall

examine its logical connection with the concept of interpersonal or social

relationship

( IR)

and the implications which this link has for the network as

an explanation. The set of statements belowwill serve as a sort of itinerary for

the theoretical excursion which follows:

1

Interpersonal relationships as mutual orientations between persons are

basically psychological predispositions to respond which guide behaviour in

the social situation.

2. Interpersonal relationships are the component parts of social networks.

3. If

one or more of a persons

IRs

influence his actions as they are being

carried out with reference to still another IR, then we can say that part or all

of that persons social network directly guides his situated behaviour.

4. Therefore, we can say that a social network is also a psychological pre-

disposition to respond.

1 For

a critique of the term social network and the closely related notion of field

also used

by

Barnes), which is som ewhat contradictory to Mayer, see Jay 1964).


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5

The observation that the network is a predisposition which can directly

explain behaviour, although perhaps not wholly new, has received little or no

systematic empirical or theoretical attention in the past.

I N T E R P E R S O N A L R E L A T I O N S H I P S

Max

Weber

I

1947: 118)

can be given credit for setting the basic theoretical

foundation of the contemporary approach to social or interpersonal relation-

ships: The term social relationship will be used to denote the behaviour of

a plurality of actors in so far as, in its meaningful content, the action of each

takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms. The social

relationship thus consists entirely and exclusively in the existence of a prob-

ability that there will be, in some meaningfully understandable sense, a course

of social a c t i ~n .~t is clear from this quote and Webers subsequent discus-

sion that mutual orientation is the essence of IR. In order to have a more

concise definition at hand, which emphasizes this subjective quality, we shall

redefine the interpersonal relationship as egos sustained orientation toward a

particular alter which is perceived by ego to be reciprocated by that alter.3

Certain basic characteristics of IRS must first be discussed as a prerequisite

to our later consideration of IRS as predispositions. Accordingly, we shall

briefly review the intimate nature of IRS, their changeability, some of the rea-

sons for their continuation, the relationship of sentiments to IRS, and the pri-

vate culture of IRS.

Interpersonal relationships are born in the prolonged interaction of two

people, and it is not unusual to find that more than one has sprung up be-

tween them Znaniecki,

1965:89) .4

Related to this observation is the fact

that there is i l strain toward totality whereby as time goes on, the flow of

external events calls forth more and more of the total set of identities of the

individuals involved McCall and Simmons, 1966: 186) .

Each

of

the parties in an IR recognizes the other as a distinct individual

about whom he has some degree of prior knowledge McCall and Simmons,

1966:169) . This knowledge

is

not only historical knowledge about ones

partner but intimate knowledge as well, a facet of

IRS

which probably charac-

terizes all but themarginal cases Simmel,

1950: 12 127).j

It is probably acknowledged by most participants in IRS that they are by no

2 Cooley 1922: 114-120) also approached

IRS

from

a

subjective point of view by treat-

ing them as clusters of sentiments attached t o a symbol or image of another person.

3

Because IRS develop through sustained contact, it is probably safe to say that, in fact,

they are reciprocated. There appears to be little likelihood that a normal person

would see an IR between himself and another individual while the latter did not see

one between them. Of course, the intensity

of

the sentiments involved may vary, as

we shall see shortly. Evidence that

IRS,

in fact, are reciprocated can be found in New-

comb 1961 ). Schutz 1964: 11 1 ) presents what is basically a n operational definition

of

an interpersonal relationship: each

of

them [the partners

in

the

IR]

has the chance

to reestablish the we-relation,

if

interrupted, and to continue it as if no ntermittance

had occurred.

4 A common example of two IRS between the same parties

is

that of the father-son and

employer-employee relationships.

5

Schutz 1964: 1 1 3 ) has also defined intimacy in an operational manner: the degree

of reliable knowledge we have of another person.

3


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means totally static conditions even though some exhibit a greater constancy

than others. Strauss notes that involvements are evolvements

-

n the course

of

which parties and their relationships become transformed (Strauss,

1959:37 ) . Thus, there are unevenly spaced high points in the career of any

IR after which one is a difEerent person to the other and the other is difEerent

to oneself. Such experiences along with less dramatic ones may actually effect

the development

of

additional

IRS

as

when the

boss

invites his subordinate

to accompany him on a fishing

trip

thereby initiating a sequence of interaction

which may lead to a friendship relationship.

It is also important for our purposes to recognize that while IRS quite fre-

quently terminate, there are forces which may prevent this from happening.

Reward dependability is a characteristic feature

of

many IRS and a major

reason for their existence and continuation.6 Ascription, both desired and

undesired, is a second compelling reason for maintaining a certain relation-

ship,

as

well as for initiating it. Men may also be more or less forced to re-

main in an

IR

for reasons other than ascription. Commitment,

as

this pro-

cess is sometimes referred to, is manifested

by

means

of a

variety

of

arrange-

ments, such as the existence of pension funds and seniority rights which make

it costly for a person to quit his

job

simply because he does not get along with

his boss (Becker, 1960) . Of course, the person may also become positively

attached or involved

in

an IR. Furthermore, ones investment in terms

of

time and other resources may operate to sustain a relationship. The effective-

ness of these forces apparently depends somewhat upon the IR under con-

sideration; for instance, kin relationships, at least for some segments of the

population, are harder to break than others (Bott,

1957:93;

McCall and

Simmons,

966: 179 ).

Sentiments and InterpersonalRelationships

Essential to any discussion of

IRS

is the idea of sentiment, or the basic unit

of

organization of affect

(Pear,

1964

:

634-635 )

8 A

sentiment is the generalized

feeling which one person has for the other in an IR, and it is to be identified

through a pattern of response, rather than through any particular act (Shi-

butani, 1961:333). Thus, a man in love with a woman expresses different

emotions according to the situation

in

which he finds himself; he expresses joy

in her presence, sorrow in her prolonged absence, fear when her life is in

danger, and so forth.Sentiment organizes the appropriate emotions in the

ongoing situation and it must be stressed that neither this underlying senti-

ment nor its emotional manifestations need always

be

positive in a relation-

ship. One can have a negative IR with a neighbour or work superior, for in-

stance, based upon the sentimentof hate, and it seems that this is especially

likely to happen where he is committed to that

IR.

Although there is con-

siderable empirical and theoretical work on specific negative relationships,

6 Most of these forces

are

presented by McC all and Simmons 1966: 179).

7 For

a further discussion

of

the distinction between attachment and commitment, see

Stebbins (1969) .

8

ome

of the basic works on sentiment are those of Shand (1 920 ), McD ougall(1908),

4 and Shibutani (1961).


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general discussions of the nature of

IRS

tend to overlook this characteristic by

by limiting their focus to relationships built on positive bonds 0nly.O

Of course, the intensity of the sentiment in an IR varies from situation to

situation for each person, as well as varying over the career of the relation-

ship. Variation in the intensity of sentiments alerts us to the fact that senti-

ment

is

only part, albeit a very important part, of the meaning which an

enduring

IR

may have for a person.

An

IR

may also have rational, evaluative,

and traditional meanings for those involved in them, and these forms of mean-

ing may also vary from situation to situation and over the career

of

the rela-

tionship. If there were not several kinds of meaning contained in an IR, many

relationships would probably disintegrate or come dangerously close to dis-

integration with each dip of the intensity of the supporting sentiment. We are

assuming,

of

course, that no one will maintain an IR which does not hold some

meaning for him.

The Private Cu lture

Because

IRS are

basically subjective constructs, it should be apparent that they

develop from virtual social identities or the categories to which the parties

of the relationship judge the other to belong (GofFman,

1963:2).1

These

are to be distinguished from actual social identities or those categories to

which one can

be

proved, by objective analysis, to belong and those attributes

which one can be proved to possess.

In the broad senseof the term, identities have roles attached to them; roles

shall be defined here as sets of expectations of behaviour. This set of expecta-

tions can always be subdivided into a publicly-recognized component and a

private component, the latter having been generated exclusively

in

the inter-

action of the two participants. The public expectations are generally acknowl-

edged by members of the community to apply to those persons claiming to

have or imputed to possess certain attributes and to those claiming

to

be or

said to be members of certain categories. While there are always some com-

munity-wide or public expectations associated with them, for certain kinds

of IRS e.g., enemy, friend, and lover) the private aspect, nevertheless, is said

tobeby farthelargest Nadel, 1957:42).

This private aspect of role is part of the larger private culture associated

with the IR, which may include a rudimentary common language, common

goals, memories of common experiences, and so forth. The recognition of a

private culture associated with an

IR

contributes to the perception

of

the rela-

tionship as being unique among other relationships.

Znterpersonul Rela tionships asPredispositions

By treating interpersonal relationships as predispositions, we give them a

more explicit psychological foundation, a foundation implied in the words

reciprocal or mutual orientation found within the definitions presented

9 See, for example, S i m e l ( l 9 5 0 : 118-142) and McCall and Simmons (1966, chap. 7).

10Identity

is

preferred over closely related ideas like status, position, and rank

because

of its

apparently broader

scope.

For example, one can have the identity of

neighbour, but we would not ordinarily call

this

a position or a status.


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earlier. Furthermore, as we shall see later, the proposition that

IRS

are predis-

positional is an essential part of the causal nexus linking this concept and that

of social network to situated behaviour. Social relationships have traditionally

been seen in this latter role of guiding behaviour, a view which can be traced

back to Webers statement on this subject. However, their conceptualization

as predispositions and, hence, as subjective constructs has never been clearly

formulated.

The usage of the term predisposition follows that of Campbell

( 1963 97-112). He limits his statement to acquired states, stressing the im-

portance of the fact that predispositions or as he calls them, acquired

behavioural dispositions) are enduring and that they remain dormant until

activated by situational stimuli. When activated, these products of past

experience impinge upon our awareness, equip us with a specific view of the

world, and guide behaviour in the immediate present. Values, attitudes, bits

of knowledge, memory, habits, and meanings all have predispositionalqualii-

ties about them.

The use of the term orientation in definitions of the

IR

is itself a clue to

the latters status as a predisposition. Websters Third International Diction-

ary defines an orientation in one sense

of

the word as the choice or adjust-

ment of associations, connections, or dispositions. It is of interest that

Campbell includes adju~tment,~orientation, and disposition in his

extensive list of acquired behavioural dispositions. In harmony with the defi-

nition of orientation as an adjustment of predispositions, there are several

subsidiary presdispositions to be found in any IR. Knowledge about the other

person, whether intimate or simply historical, may be considered as one such

predisposition. The same is also true of the knowledge ego holds about alters

expectations of him and other aspects of the private culture. Commitment or

attachment to a particular IR is a predisposition and soare the sentiments and

other meanings which are part of any relationship.

Interpersonal relationships are also special views of the world; views which

develop from their component subsidiary predispositions. It is perhaps this

facet of IRS which explains best Nadels observation 1957:9) that there is

a consistency about the many diverse acts which take place within them.

Within wide limits we may still say of persons in a given relationship that

they act towards each other always in the same manner.

To

the people in them IRS when activated have a very poignant reality which

is

manifested in at least three ways. First of all, the continuous interaction be-

tween the two parties works to emphasize the existence of the relationship.

Secondly, the high points in the career of the I R also make the participants

conscious of it. Finally, the basic sentiment and its various emotional expres-

sions make the person aware of the relationship.

T H E S O C I A L N E T W O R K

As we have already observed, Botts definition

of

social network 1957:59)

indicates the importance of interpersonal relationships as the basic elements


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of

this construction. She viewed a social network as a set of social relation-

ships for which there is no common boundary. How ever, we have also noted

tha t the traditional approach to IRS is essentially predispositional w hich means

that upon activation these mental states help guide behaviour in the immediate

setting.

Now.,

since most peo ple have several relationships a t any o ne period

in their lives, there is a strong possibility th at on e o r more of them will be

activated during interaction with members of the community. Where the

ongoing interchange is with one of egos relationship partners and his be-

haviour is at least partially guided by his reflection about o ne o r more other

I R S

activated because they a re relevant to th e business at hand, we ca n say that

all or a portion

of

his social network is influencing his actions. Because

clusters

of

IRS, and pe rhaps not infrequently even the total set

of

IRS, can in-

fluence a persons action

in

the situation, we are forced to conclude that the

social netwo rk also has subjective or predispositional qualities.l

Awareness

of

the ocial Network

Like an IR, a social network as an activated predisposition m ust also be sub-

jectively real to th e individual whose n etwork it is; that is, we a re aware of

activated predispositions. T he re is a considerable am ount

of

theoretical dis-

course and empirical evidence in various social science fields which support

this assertion. W e shall briefly review some of them here.

One of the ways subjective awareness is manifested is through the direct

an d indirect effects which

IRS

in a network have upon each other. Direct con-

tact between others in the various IRS is especially likely where the social net-

work is closely-knit. Un der these circumstances what transpires between two

people in one relationship may affect another relationship through trans-

actions in the social network of the second person. In this way a cha in reac-

tion can be set up, becoming, for examp le, a form

of

social control (Epstein,

1961; Hannerz, 19 68 ). This direct influence is also seen where a third party,

an

IR

signific:ant in the network of both ind ividuals, intercedes o r threatens

to intercede in the affairs of their I R . ~Fo r instance, Kemper ( 19 68 ) found

that wives arid parents influence egos response to alter in

IRS

established in

a w ork organization.

Another possibility of direct influence is seen in Newcombs

A-B-x

theory

of the symm etry of o rientation (1961 , chap . 2). W here A is th e central actor in

an IR, B is his partner, and x is another person (for our purposes one with

whom both have I R S ) , the following postulate may be advanced: The

stronger the forces toward AS co-orientation in respect to

B

and

x, a )

the

greater

AS

strain toward sym metry with B in respect to

x ;

and 6 ) he greater

the likelihood of increased symmetry as a consequence of one or more

1 1 Statements

by

B l u e r

1956),

Cicourel

1964: 119),

and Fenton

1968)

all support

the belief that if structural variables can be said to influence ongoing behaviour, then

they are mediated by the personal interpretation of the actor; and if personal inter-

pretation has

not

been demonstrated, then any putative causal link between structure

and behaviour may actually be

no

more than a chance correlation.

12

Nadel 1957:86-87) refers to this situation as the triadization of roles. See also

Blau

l964:31-32).

7


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comm unicative acts.13 The influencing force here is the desire on the part

of

the centra l actor to maintain some sort of cognitive equilibrium with respect to

the elements of his social network through comm unication about this matter

to his pa rtner,

B.

The intensity of co-orientation determines which xs will

require symm etry. T he possibilities of disequilibrium, and hence awareness

of the network, are considerab le when we remember that

A

may see himself

in

a positive o r negative relationsh ip to

B

as well as to

x.

The various IRS also may have indirect effects through the person whose

network it is. M uch, if not all, of this can be fitted into one of the various bal-

ance theories, which are in many ways like Newcombs

A-B-x

model but do

not involve communication with the actors partner. In general, a state of

balance exists for the actor when the elements in the social network have non-

contrad ictory relationships for himThe basic proposition in balance theory

is that where there is imbalance a person strives to restore the state of balance.

U d i i e the A-B-x model the elements themselves are not, as a rule, in contact.

Thus

when in one mans social network his clergyman demands attitudes of

racial equality whereas close friends in his neighbourhood demand attitudes

of discrimination, a state of imbalance prevails. Balance theory hypothesizes

that the individual

in

question will strive for balance, which may

be

achieved

in various ways. Unfortunate ly, it is beyond the

scope

of this paper to examine

these at the present time; our objective is simply to point out that the social

network is very much a reality to the individual because of the pressures

which originate within it.

In addition to the pervasive influence of the component IRS on each other,

the problems

of

trying to intermesh the daily and weekly routines associated

with each relationship create an awareness of the over-all network. One

comes to realize which IRS mean the most to him as he distributes his time to

each. As McCall and Simmons (1966:246) put it, it is a concern

of

agenda-

construction, and ones agenda is not altogether a personal matter but must

be

interactively

determined.

Because of he problem s of agenda-construction connected with m aintain-

ing several IRS, the addition o r loss of an

IR

also calls for a certain am oun t of

planning,

an

activity which in itself makes one conscious of his network.

Moreover, gaining new IRS or losing old ones may upset network balance or

symmetry.

It

may be hypothesized that these problems are especially acu te in

what

Bott

(1957:95) has called the transitional network: where one is

changing

from

tightly-knit to a loosely-knit network, or vice versa. Finally,

Morenos discussion (1960:W) about death in the social atom (see footnote

15) can be interpreted as illustrating these points: If we happen to survive

the ones we love or hate, we die a bit with

them

as we feel the shadow of death

marching from one person in our social atom to another.

13

The term a-orientationor simultaneous orientation is equivalent

to

attitude in

the more inclusive sense of refemng to both cathectic and cognitive tendencies.

Symmetry refers to the similarities

of

AS and BS orientations to x.

14For a further discussion and bibliography of some of the various balance models, see

8

Brown

(1965,chap.

1 1 ) .


9/14

size is also an important factor for agenda-construction; only so many IRS

can

be

properly maintained in any given

period

of time. Thus, we can say that

size makes the network subjectively real by curtailing the addition of new rela-

tionshipsand by pushing the claims on ones time resources to the limit. After

assessing a variety of IRS, Jennings 1950:309) iscovered that the typical

maximum number was twelve. Nelson 1966) has provided some evidence

from his study of families that tightly-knit networks

are

more demanding

of

time than the loosely-knit ones. Another important observation on the factor

of size is supplied by Goodenough (

1965:7)

o the effect that the number of

IRS depends upon how many are available, and this may vary from one culture

to another. Finally, we may note that even if further expansion is possible

from the point of view of the agenda, the psychological necessities

of

main-

taining balance and symmetry set or strongly favour network growth in par-

ticular directions, directions which are compatible with the existing IRS. It

would seem, in light of this last statement, that people also become at least

partially committed to networks,as well as to certain

IRS.

Social N etwor ks as Predispositions

If social networks are to be accepted as predispositions, then we must be able

to demonstrate this characteristic of them in a way independentof the disposi-

tional nature of their component

IRS.

ust because each individual IR in the

network is a tendency to respond is not reason enough to assert that the net-

work as a whole or any subpart of it also has this quality when activated.

What features of a social network and its various segments give it the alleged

predispositional character?

We can answer this question

by

pointing out that, like an IR, a social net-

work is an orientation or an adjustment of subsidiary dispositions. The knowl-

edge which a person has about the direct influence which IRS in his network

have upon each other may be taken as one of these dispositions. Imbalance

stemming from the presence of contradictory elements is definitely a state

of

mind which also predisposes a person to respond. Conflict of the daily and

weekly routines associated with each

IR

not only creates awareness of the

over-all social network but activates an adjustment disposition which is mani-

fested in agenda construction. The same sort of conflict emerges when one

attempts to increase the sizeof his set of IRS. Adjustment, in this case, may be

simply to refuse to interact with the person in question, thereby preventing

the development of a relationship.

Botts earlier definition of social network while noting the role of IRS does

not adequately convey this subjective characteristic which we have been dis-

cussing.

It

has been pointed out that she generally takes an ego-centred

approach. A social network from our perspective is not ego-centred, in that

the individual is merely the point from which analysis may begin, but person-

centred: it is seen from the subjective standpoint of the individual whose net-

work it is. Thus, we can now redefine social network as the orientation which

develops from considering all or a portion of ones interpersonal relationships.

9


10/14

Formulated in

this

way this notion differs from several related ones which

have appeared in the sociological and social psychological literature.ls

S O C IA L N E T W O R K I N E X P L A N A T I O N S

O F

B E H A V I O U R

The principal use to which networks have been put in the past is that of help

ing

to account for the pattern of distributionof values, attitudes, or some sort

of information. The kind of content conveyed may be gossip, rural values in

the city, news about kin, or any number of other interests which can be spread

by human contact. Recognizing and treating the social network as a predis-

position does not in any way supplant this approach, but rather the predis-

positional point of view complements the communicationsnetwork stance by

opening up a new avenue of application: the direct explanation of behaviour

in the social situation. Just how new this use of social network actually

is

could be a matter of conjecture. Observations like the following from Eliza-

beth Botts study 1957:94)have, no doubt, appeared from time to time in

the network literature: But although external people may help the elemen-

tary family, close-knit networks may also interfere with conjugal solidarity.

A wifes loyalty to her mother may interfere with her relationship with her

husband. Similarly her relationship with her husband may interfere with her

relationship with her mother.

A

mans loyalty to his friends may interfere

with his obligations to his wife and vice versa.

The point which should

be

stressed is that there has been no explicit for-

mulation of a predispositional or subjective approach to networks. And, such

an approach has utility as an explanation for certain kinds of human action

as it is played out in social settings.

We can begin by asking when is this predispositional point of view of social

networks and IRS called for in explanations? Or, perhaps, why is it needed at

all? Is not the ordinary objective stance adequate? In answering these ques-

tions we may note that first of all, the predispositional point of view is re-

quired when the object of explanation is human social action of some kind:

e.g., migration to an urban centre

or

the channels of gossip, to name two

15

The formulation which comes closest to being synonymous with

our

version of social

network is Morenos social atom

196052-54).

However, the following two fea-

tures of social atoms disqualify them as social networks from

our

point of view. 1)

Moreno states that actors can be related to others even when those others do not

know it. However, the best evidence to date suggests that

IRS,

as we have been dis-

cussing them in this paper, are reciprocated (Newcomb, 1961). ( 2 ) Moreno includes

wished-for relationships in his social atom, while the idea of social network as de-

veloped in this paper is comprised only of ongoing

IRS.

Other similar formulations

like Mertons status-set and role-set

1 957:368-384) or

Znanieckis social circle

1965:203-209) focus on one role or identity of the individual actor, while a social

network encompasses all of the actors identities and roles as long as there are estab-

lished IRS involved. Finally Kempers reference-set 1966) should be mentioned

since it includes the total aggregation of others from whom one derives central no-

tions about oneself. Certainly any social network would include many of these, but

it would, at the same time, exclude certain reference others with whom there areno

IRS established (e.g., the prominent baseball star for the ten-year-old boy) and it

would include certain non-reference others (e.g., the hated superior or the hostile

10 neighbour).


11/14

recent foci

of

network studies. M ore specifically, and this is the second point,

it is needed when structural or cultural explanations or both fail

to

d o their

job adequately

-

when there

is

variation in social action w hich these frame-

works cannot: account for. When this happen s we may be sure that perso nal

interpretation has entered the picture. This personal interpretation has been

referred

to

as the definition

of

the situation (see Stebbins, 19 67 b ); th e com-

bination

of

internalized (and therefore previously interpreted) elements of

culture an d social structure, of personality, a nd of the situation w hich when

reflected

upon

and defined in the ongoing setting can lead to behaviour that

is to some degree different from what is categorically expected. The

signifi-

cance

of

th e process of interpretation for th e social sciences has been clearly

stated

by

Herbert Blumer in his critique of variable analysis: In my judg-

ment, the crucial limit to the successful application of variable analysis to

hum an group life is set

by

th e process of interpretation o r definition that goes

on

in human groups. This process, which

I

believe to

be

the core

of

human

action, gives a character to hum an g roup life that seems at variance with the

logical premnses of variable analysis. ... Any scheme designed to analyze

human

group

life in its general character has to fit this process

of

interpreta-

tion

(1956:686) .

The definition of the situation is basically an interrelation and interpreta-

tion of other predispositions which have been activated by certain situational

factors. It

is

our contention that among the persons predispositions will be

found specific

IRS

and all or a portion of his social network, where activated.

Thu s, the strength

of

this predispositional view lies in the fact that it enables

us to study peoples social networks at the situational level where it is hypo-

thesized that on some occasions these networks modify culturally expected

behaviour.

Research utilizing these concepts in this way should n ot b e diflticult. Inter-

personal reIationships c an be inferred in a variety of ways; such as, by length

of time in which ego has known alter, by a mou nt of contact between the pair,

by

ability

to

predict the others behaviour, as well as

by

the chances of re-

establishing the relationship as suggested by Schutz and cited earlier in this

article. W hether o r not any particular IR was influencing behaviour in a given

situation could easily be discovered by in-depth interviewing with regard t o

alters salience at that time. Social networks could

be

determined by getting

the respon den t to report all interperson al relationships of sufficient length,

intimacy, an d frequency of conta ct in various spheres of life: occupational,

familial, recreational, neighbourly, religious, political, educational, commer-

cial, and governmental. The activation of ones social network in any specific

situation coulld be uncovered by a question like were there certain things you

wouldnt do with or say to certain other persons present because you were

afraid it would get back to a mutual acquaintance? Information about the

respondents awareness of th e incompatibility of expectations stemm ing from

various IRS as they affect his behaviour indicates influence of the network as

does aw areness of a conflict of routine. 11


12/14

S U M M A R Y A N D C O N C L U S I O N S

Ou r m ain purpose has been to examine the logical connection between the

concept of interpersonal or social relationsh ip ( IR) and that of social net-

work, and to determ ine the implications of this link for network as an expla-

nation. On the basis of the observation that since Webers time IRS have been

regarded

as

reciprocated orientations between two people, we presented a

definition which more adequately conveyed this subjective or predispositional

nature of the relationship. It follows that because of their status as predisposi-

tions IRS influence actual behaviour in the social situation. Botts definition

of social network as a set of relationships was assessed from this point

of

view. If one or more of a persons

IRS

influence his actions as they are being

cam ed out with reference to one or more other IRS, then it is possible to con-

clude that part o r all of that

persons

social network directly guides his situ-

ated behaviour. Therefore, we can say that a social network is also a psycho-

logical predisposition. This observation that the network is fundamentally

a

subjective construct which can be used as a direct explanation of behaviour,

although perhaps not wholly new, has received little or no systematic em-

pirical or theoretical attention in the past. Yet, such an application of network

could be very fruitful in helping to account for why men d e situations as

they do and hence, why they act as they do. Moreover, as Boissevain

1968:546-9)

has pointed out, non-group phenomena like networks help to

free social anthropology from the grip of functionalism, thus opening new

vistas for research and explanation.

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