Sivaramakrishnan electoral systems paper politics democracy and governance conf iit madras 2014 feb...

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ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THE COMPOSITION OF ELECTED ASSEMBLIES IN VARIOUS DEMOCRACIES Arvind Sivaramakrishnan Senior Deputy Editor, The Hindu and Adjunct Faculty, Asian College of Journalism, Madras Presented at Politics, Democracy and Governance National Seminar Organized by Association for Democratic Reforms Prime Point Foundation ezines PreSense New Gen Thamizhan with IIT Madras 15 February 2014 Copyleft: freely quotable, copiable, and reproducible with attribution to the author and the event

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Prime Point Foundation and IIT Madras organised a seminar on politics, democracy and governance on 15th feb 2014. Mr Arvind Sivaramakrishnan, Sr. Deputy Editor of The Hindu made a presentation on electoral systems in various countries.

Transcript of Sivaramakrishnan electoral systems paper politics democracy and governance conf iit madras 2014 feb...

Page 1: Sivaramakrishnan electoral systems paper politics democracy and governance conf iit madras 2014 feb 15

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

AND THE

COMPOSITION OF ELECTED ASSEMBLIES

IN

VARIOUS DEMOCRACIES

Arvind Sivaramakrishnan

Senior Deputy Editor, The Hindu

and

Adjunct Faculty, Asian College of Journalism, Madras

Presented at

Politics, Democracy and Governance

National Seminar

Organized by

Association for Democratic Reforms Prime Point Foundation

ezines PreSense New Gen Thamizhan

with

IIT Madras

15 February 2014

Copyleft: freely quotable, copiable, and reproducible with attribution to

the author and the event

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There is no doubt whatever about the legitimacy of all elected assemblies in India, at all levels from panchayats to the Rajya Sabha. That legitimacy is ensured by the Constitution and sustained by at least two things:

The electorate’s commitment to the ballot box.

The quality of the Central Election Commission, which conducts and oversees elections.

However – the electoral system used at all levels (except that of the Rajya Sabha) is such that questions arise:

About the composition of the elected assemblies.

About whether or not that has become such a problem that it calls into question the representative character of the elected assemblies, and therefore undermines their substantive legitimacy.

This also raises wider questions about the relation between voters and their elected representatives.

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Except for the respective elections of the President and the Rajya Sabha

India uses

The Simple Majority or First Past the Post electoral system.

Single constituencies.

One representative from each constituency; whichever candidate gets most votes in a constituency is elected to the assembly.

The party which wins the most constituencies forms or tries to form a government.

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INDIAN GENERAL ELECTION 2009 543 seats in the Lok Sabha 272 needed for a majority

2009

Congress BJP Left Front

Seats

262 159 79

Seat Share

48% 29% 15%

Vote Share

37.22% 24.63% 21.15%

Under- or over-representation in number of

seats

+60

+25

-36

(Adapted from Wikipedia)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Congress BJP Left Front

Seats

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0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

Congress BJP Left Front

Seat Share

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

35.00%

40.00%

Congress BJP Left Front

Vote Share

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-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Congress BJP Left Front

Under- or over-representation innumber of seats

0

50

100

150

200

250

Congress BJP Left Front

Hypotheticalseats under PR

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THE LANDSLIDE THAT WASN’T

THE 2012 UTTAR PRADESH STATE ELECTION

Party

Seats won

Seat

share %

Seats

contested out of 403

SP

226

56%

401

BSP

80

20%

403

BJP

47

12%

398

INC

28

7%

355

RLD

9

2%

46

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0

50

100

150

200

250

SP

BSP

BJP

INC

RLD

(Adapted from Ramani 2012)

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PERCENTAGE VOTE SHARES U.P. 2012

Party

Overall vote

share %

SP

29.3

BSP

25.9

INC

15

BJP

11.7

RLD

2.3

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0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Overall vote share %

SP

BSP

BJP

INC

RLD

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IF U.P. HAD USED A PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEM

SEATS ACCORDING TO SHARE OF VOTE WOULD HAVE LOOKED LIKE THIS

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

SP

BSP

BJP

INC

RLD

Party

Seats under hypothetical

PR

SP

117

BSP

104

BJP

60

INC

47

RLD

9

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AN INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLE

THE U.K. GENERAL ELECTION 2010

650 seats 326 needed to win

ACTUAL RESULTS

Conservative

Labour

Liberal

Democrats

Actual results under SM or

FPTP

307

258

57

(Adapted from the BBC)

SEATS ACCORDING TO SHARE OF VOTES

Conservative

Labour

LibDem

Seats under

hypothetical PR

235

189

150

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Conclusion 1: In the Simple Majority system:

No direct relation between votes cast and seats won. OR Support among voters does not translate directly into seats won in the elected assembly.

Major parties tend to be overrepresented and significant third and even fourth parties tend to be severely underrepresented.

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THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN PARTY SUPPORT

INDIA 2004 and 2009

Party

Congress

BJP

Third Front

Change in support from the previous election (2004) = Swing

Up 3.96%

44 more seats

Up from 218 to

262

Approx 20% gain

Down 4.88%

22 fewer seats

Down from 181

to 159

Approx 11% loss

Down 1.06%

20 more seats

Up from 59 to 79

Approx 33% gain

(Adapted from Wikipedia)

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Conclusion 2: In the Simple Majority system:

Small swings in voter support can produce very large changes in the number of seats won or lost.

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POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 1. The composition of the elected assembly does not

represent the range or spread of political support for different parties among the voters.

2. Parties tend to target their campaigns at so-called

swing voters. Swing voters are often the most self-interested, and

post-election policies may have to be tailored to their wishes irrespective of wider consequences.

3. Only one candidate per party – voters who like the

party but not the candidate get no other choice. 4. Tactical voting – voters often vote not for a

candidate or party but to keep another candidate out.

(Adapted from Beetham 2007 and the Electoral Reform Society 2008)

5. In India, targeted campaigns are often aimed at

particular castes or communities:

causes divisive (and sometimes worse) campaigns and policies.

6. Local leaders are often expected to deliver blocks

of votes.

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Advantages of the Simple Majority System

Simple.

The voter can express a view on which party should form the next government.

Usually results in a two-party system.

One constituency, one representative – a direct link between the representative and the constituency.

The candidate with the greatest support wins the constituency.

If electoral processes in a democracy are functioning, why change them?

(Adapted from the Electoral Reform Society 2008)

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Disadvantages of the Simple Majority system

A candidate can win a seat on a very small percentage of the vote.

In India, 30% of the turnout vote is usually enough to win a seat. On a 60% turnout, this means 18% of the total electorate in a constituency. In 2005, only 2 British MPs gained over 40% of the votes in their respective constituencies. One candidate won with the votes of 18.36% of the electorate in their constituency.

Wasted votes. Votes for any losing candidates count for nothing, even if the winner wins by only 1 vote. Supporters of losing candidates end up unrepresented. Also wasted are the votes forming the winner’s majority, minus one. In the UK in 2005, this meant 70% of the turnout, or 19 million wasted votes on a turnout of 61.4%

Parties tend to choose ‘safe’ candidates.

In India, the selection of candidates often depends on the religious, caste, or ethnic composition of constituency populations.

One representative per constituency – the representative becomes the sole gatekeeper.

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AN ALTERNATIVE

A FULLY PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM

THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE OR STV SYSTEM

Multi-member constituencies based on population in each constituency. No need to redraw constituency boundaries – eliminates gerrymandering. Population changes can be accommodated by increases or decreases in the number of seats for any given constituency, e.g. South-East England used to have 11 Members of the European Parliament and now has 10. The ballot paper shows a list of candidates; any party can field more than one candidate. Voters rank the candidates in order of preference, eg 1, 2, 3, etc. Every candidate who gets a minimum quota of votes is elected. The most common formula for the quota is the Droop formula:

Q = Total valid ballot papers received + 1 Number of seats +1

Q is the minimum quota a candidate must achieve in order to be elected.

Every candidate who reaches the quota figure on first preferences is elected. If not enough candidates reach the quota to fill the available seats, the count continues with second preferences. If a candidate gets more votes than the quota on first preferences, then their second preference votes are distributed appropriately to the other candidates, in a sort of ‘top-up’ procedure; an arithmetical weighting can be given to these distributed votes. Counting stops when all the seats are filled.

(Wikipedia 2008)

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Typically, constituencies can have 4 or 5 representatives. For large constituencies, there can be more.

E.g. My European Parliament constituency, South-East England, has 10 Members of the European Parliament from a range of parties.

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Advantages of Proportional Systems

Voters have more choice than they do in any other electoral system.

The elected assembly gives a much more accurate representation of the range of support among voters.

Far fewer votes are 'wasted' (i.e. cast for losing candidates or unnecessarily cast for the winner).

Most voters can identity a representative whom they personally helped to elect. This can enhance the voters’ and the representatives’ sense of the link between them.

Parties have an incentive to present a wide field of candidates in order to maximize the number of second and third preferences – makes negative or hate-campaigning an election risk.

Removes the need for reserved constituencies – that system already has many inconsistencies (Jensenius 2011: 17-18).

This helps women and minority candidates, who are often overlooked in favour of a 'safer' candidate.

After the election, voters have a choice of representatives whom they can approach over constituency issues.

Voters in a constituency can compare their elected representatives over the quality of response provided.

No safe seats.

o Parties must campaign everywhere, not just in marginal seats.

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o Representatives cannot be complacent after they are elected.

The most disliked candidate cannot win, as they are unlikely to obtain second-, third-, and lower-preference votes.

No need for tactical voting to keep a candidate or party out.

A more sophisticated link between a constituency and its representatives.

(Adapted from the Electoral Reform Society 2008)

A possible advantage of STV for India:

Successful candidates will generally not know whose votes have got them in

because they may have needed second- and third- preference votes in order to reach the quota. Could reduce vote-bank campaigning.

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Disadvantages of Proportional Systems

Some MPs dislike STV because it makes them pay too much attention to their constituencies.

In the Irish Republic, politicians have twice tried to scrap STV for this very reason, but both times they were defeated in the referendum on scrapping it.

Some people find voting with anything other than a solitary 'X' too complicated - can lead to an increased number of spoilt or voided ballot papers.

The evidence is that voters learn the new system very quickly. E.g. Scottish local elections 2012.

Risk of ‘donkey voting’, where after the first one or two choices, voters rank the rest of the field arbitrarily.

Not much evidence of this in existing STV systems. Scottish local elections in 2012: In constituencies with 11 or more candidates, 65.3% of voters used at least three preferences (Curtice 2012).

In large multi-member constituencies, ballot papers can be big and confusing.

(Electoral Reform Society 2008)

STV usually gives significant third parties considerable weight. So the two largest parties have fewer opportunities to agree the political agenda with one another. A possible advantage for the Indian context:

STV would enable the election of assemblies which represent many more sections of society than they seem to do at present.

Could widen the social range of electoral participation.

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In India, proportional electoral systems were discussed only briefly during the struggle for Independence, e.g. by the Motilal Nehru Committee in 1928:

We feel strongly attracted to this method [a PR electoral system] and

are of the opinion that it offers the only rational and just way of meeting

the fears and claims of various communities. There is a place in it for

every minority and an automatic adjustment takes place of rival

interests. We have no doubt that proportional representation will in the

future be the solution of our problems.

(cited in Jensenius 2011: 18)

I suggest that a proportional electoral system could at least be the solution of some of the electoral problems we face, not only here but in any country that uses the Simple Majority system for major elections.

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Bibliography

B.B.C. Election 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/election2010/results/ [Accessed 13 Oct 2013] Beetham, D. 2007. How Should We Vote? Democratic Audit. http://www.democraticaudit.com/issues/electreformbrit.php [Accessed 2 April 2008] Curtice, J. 2012. 2012 Scottish Local Government Elections. Electoral Reform Society. http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/images/dynamicImages/file512f4e5ae047f.pdf [Accessed 20 October 2012] Electoral Commission. 2007. Scottish Elections 2007: The independent review of the Scottish parliamentary and local elections. www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/Scottish-Election-Report-A-Final-For-Web_27622-20316__E__N__S__W__.pdf [Accessed 24 April 2008] Electoral Reform Society. Voting Systems. First Past the Post. http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/votingsystems/systems2.htm#First [Accessed 3 April 2008] Electoral Reform Society. Voting Systems. Why STV? http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/article.php?id=103 [Accessed 3 April 2008]

Jensenius, F.R. 2011. Mired in Reservations: The Path-Dependent History of Political Quotas in India. Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Keele University. 2008. British Government and Politics on the Internet. School of Politics, International Relations and Philosophy, Keele University. http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/por/ukbase.htm#elections [Accessed 3 April 2008] Keele University. 2005. Results and Analysis: General Election 2005. http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/ge05/wvote.htm [Accessed 2 April 2008] Ramani, S. 2012. A Flawed Democracy – the Case for Proportional Representation in India. http://kafila.org/2012/03/15/a-flawed-democracy-the-case-for-proportional-representation-in-india-srinivasan-ramani/ [Accessed 9 February 2014] Scottishelections.org.uk. N.d. Scottish Local Elections 2012. http://www.scottishelections.org.uk/scotland/l12/ [Accessed 20 October 2012] Wikipedia. Local Government in Scotland. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_government_in_Scotland#Election_results.2C_2007 [Accessed 3 April 2008]

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