SHIF (HEALING) Al-Nafs(Psychology) Book 4 · Avicenna, Shifa ’:Psychology, Book 4 2 when we...

Avicenna

SHIF (HEALING)

Al-Nafs(Psychology)

Book 41

Chapter One: In Which is Contained the Discourse

Concerning the Internal Senses Belonging to Animals

As for the common sense, it is in reality other than what the people teach

who suppose that the common sensibles belong to the common sense. Rather, the

common sense is the faculty to which all of the sensibles are conveyed. For if

there were not a single faculty which perceived the coloured thing and the

tangible thing, then we would not be able to distinguish between them, saying

that this is not that. Suppose that this power of discrimination belongs to the

intellect. Then it would be necessary that, without a doubt, the intellect would

have to find them together, in order for it to distinguish between them. And this

is because, insofar as they are sensible, and of the species of what is sensed, they

are not perceived by the intellect, as we will explain later. But we do [in fact]

discriminate between them; so it is necessary that there must be some collation

of them in the thing discriminating [between them], either in itself, or in

something else. But this is impossible in the case of the intellect, as you will

learn later. So it is necessary that this take place in another power. And if it were

not the case that they are collated in the imagination (al-khayl), of beasts who

have no intellect, but who incline through their appetite towards sweetness, for

example, that something whose form is of this sort is sweet, then it would not be

the case that whenever they saw such a thing, they would move to eat it. Just as,

if it were not the case that we had [such a power] in us, to [discern] that the

white is the singer, then when we heard his individual singing, we would not

confirm him [to be] the self-same individual, and vice versa. And if there were

not in the animal something which collates in it the forms of the sensibles, living

would be impossible for them; so too if smell did not signify taste for them, nor

sound signify taste for them, and if the form of wood were not remembered as

the form of pain, so that they shrink from it. So it is absolutely necessary for

these forms to have a single meeting place within [the animal.]

And the existence of this faculty has already been shown to us from

considerations of the things which show that it has an instrument other than the

external senses, from the fact that everything seems to us to be moving in a circle

1 Translation © Deborah L. Black; Toronto, 2009

Avicenna, Shifa ’:Psychology, Book 4

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when we imagine something moving a circle.2 For this is either an accident that

befalls the visible objects, or an accident which befalls the instruments by which

the vision is completed. And if it is not in the visible objects, it is without a

doubt in some other thing. So the dizziness only occurs with respect to a motion

of the vapor in the brain, and in the spirit which is in it. For it happens to this

spirit that it moves in a circle, so therefore the faculty established there is the

thing to which the thing which we determined earlier happens. And likewise

dizziness befalls the person who considers what is frequently turning, as we have

made clear. This is not because of something in a part of the eye, nor because of

the spirit diffused throughout it. For this reason we imagine the speed of a

moving point as a line or circle, according to what was said earlier.3

And because the representation (tamaththul) of false apparitions and the

hearing of false sounds may happen to those whose sense organs are defective,

or, for example, to someone whose eyes are closed, there is no cause for this

except for their representation in this principle [of sensation.]4 And the acts of

imagination (al-takhayyult) which occur in sleep either come to be on account

of the impression of the forms in the treasury that retains the forms (but if this

were the case, it would be necessary for everything which is stored in it to be

represented in the soul, rather than some things apart from others, so that this

one would be as if seen or heard in isolation); or /165 their representation comes

about in another faculty. And this is either an external sense, or an internal sense.

But external sense is not operative in sleep; and sometimes the person who

imagines colours has some injury to his eyes. So it remains that it is an internal

sense. But it is not possible for this to be anything other than the principle of the

external senses, this being the thing which the estimative faculty seizes

command of and conjures up when it conjures up what is in the treasury. And if

it were to occur during waking, then, if its establishment takes root in it, it would

be like direct observation (ka-al-mushhadah). This power is that which is called

the common sense, and it is the centre of the senses, from which they branch off,

and into which they are channeled. And it is in reality that which senses.

But the act of holding on (imsk) to what the common sense perceives

belongs to a power called imagination (khayl), which is also called the

formative [faculty] (muawwirah), and the imaginative faculty (mutakhayyilah).

And sometimes one distinguishes between imagination and the imaginative

faculty with respect to convention; and we are among those who make this

2 I.e. the experience of becoming dizzy upon watching something spin. 3 Probably a reference to the raindrop example in 1.5. 4 I.e. referring to the idea that the common sense is the principle of the proper senses.


3

distinction. And the common sense and the imagination are like a single power;

and it is as if they do not differ in subject (f al-maw), but rather, in form (f

al-rah): this is because what receives is not what retains. Thus the form of

what is sensed is preserved by the power called the formative faculty or

imagination. And it possesses no judgmental capacity at all,5 but rather, only

preservation (ifz ). As for the common sense and the external senses, they judge

in some respect, or with some judgment. For they say that this moving thing is

black, or that this red thing is sour. But this thing which preserves does not judge

of any of the existent things, unless perhaps of what is in itself, that there is in

fact in it a form of this kind.

Next, we know certainly that in our nature we compose some sensibles /166

with others, and separate some from others, not according to that form which we

have found in them externally, and not accompanied by assent (wa-l maa

tadq), to the existence of any of them, nor to their non-existence. So it is

necessary for there to be a faculty in us by which we do this, and this is the

faculty which is called cogitative (mufakkirah) when the intellect employs it, and

imaginative (mutakhayyilah) when the animal faculty uses it.

Next, we can make judgments concerning the sensibles by means of

intentions which we do not sense, or which are not in their natures sensibles at

all, or which are sensibles, but we do not sense them at the time of judgment. As

for those which are not sensible in their natures, they are, for example, enmity,

malice, and the aversion which the sheep apprehends in the form of the wolf, and

in general, the intention which averts it from the wolf; and the concord which it

perceives from its companion, and in general, the intention which makes it

friendly towards it. And the animal soul perceives these matters, although the

sense does not signify anything of them at all. Therefore, the power by which

they are apprehended is another power, and it is called estimation. As for those

which are sensibles, we see, for example, something yellow, and we judge that it

is honey and sweet. For the thing sensing (al-ss) does not convey this to it at

this time. And it is in the genus of what is sensible, even though the judgment

itself is not through anything sensible at all—even though its parts fall under the

genus of the things sensed, nonetheless, [the thing sensing] does not perceive

this in any way—for it is only a judgment by which one judges this, and

sometimes there may be error in it. And this too belongs to this faculty.

And in the human being estimation possesses special judgments from among

the totality [of judgments] which the soul predicates, according to which it

5 laysa ilay-hukm al-battata.


4

impedes the existence of things which cannot be imagined, and are not imprinted

in [the imagination], and it refuses assent (al-tadq) to them. /167 And without a

doubt this faculty exists in us, and is the directress and judge in the animal, with

a judgment that is not decisive (laysa falan), as is the intellectual judgment, but

which is an imaginative judgment (ukman takhayyulyah), joined to the

particular and to the sensible form. And from this judgment, most animal actions

emanate.

And it is customary to call the thing apprehended by the sense a form

(rah), and the thing apprehended by the estimation an intention (manan). And

each of these has a treasury, the treasury of what is apprehended by the sense

being the imagination (al-quwwah al-khaylyah), whose subject is the anterior

of the brain. And for this reason, whenever an injury occurs there, this type of

conception (hadh al-bb min al-taawwur) is corrupted, either by the imagining

of forms which do not exist, or because it is difficult to stabilize what exists in it.

And the treasury of what is perceived by the estimation is the power called

retentive (al-fi ah), and its seat is in the posterior of the brain. And for this

reason, whenever an injury occurs here, there is a corruption of what is proper to

the preservation of these intentions. And this power is also called memorative

(mutadhakkirah). For it is retentive on account of its conservation of what is in

it, and memorative due to the speed of its preparedness for discovering [what is

retained], and its conception, recalling it when it has been forgotten. And this

occurs when the estimation turns towards the imaginative faculty, and begins to

represent each of the existent forms in the imagination, in order for it to be as if

one were observing the things of which these are the forms. And when the forms

have appeared in it, along with the perception of the intention, after they forms

had disappeared, then the intention will also appear to it at the same time, just as

if it had appeared from outside, and the retentive faculty will establish it in itself,

just as it was established at that time, and thus it becomes a memory. And

sometimes the process (al-musr) is from the intention to the form. In this case,

the remembered object being sought (al-mutadhakkar al-) /168 is not

related to what is in the treasury of retention (al-ifz ), but rather, to what is in the

treasury of imagination (al-khayl). For its recurrence is either with respect to

the return to these intentions which are in the retentive faculty, so that the

intention requires the appearance of the form; in this case the relation to what is

in the imagination recurs a second time; or it is through a return to the sense. An

example of the former is that when you have forgotten the relation to a form, and

then become aware of this relation, you will consider the activity which was

intended by it; and when you know and discover the activity, and you know

which flavour, colour, and shape are proper to it, then the relation between them


5

is established. So you will be familiar with this, and it will produce a relation to

the form in the imagination (al-khayl), and you will reestablish the relation in

the memory. For the treasury of the activity is the retentive power, because is

from the intention. But if this too is doubtful for you, and it is not clear, then

sensation will provide you with the form of the thing, which has returned, being

established in the imagination, and the relation to it will return as well, being

established in that which retains.

And this faculty composes form with form, and form with intention, and

intention with intention. And it is as if it were the estimative faculty in subject,

not insofar as it judges, but rather, insofar as it acts to arrive at the judgment.

And its locus is the centre of the brain, so that it has a connection with the two

treasuries, that of intention, and that of form. And it seems that the estimative

power is itself cogitative, imaginative, and memorative, for it is itself the judge.

For through itself it is a judge, whereas its activities and its motions are

imaginative and memorative. For it is imaginative through what it effects in the

forms and intentions, and memorative through what its activity terminates in.

And it seems that reminiscence, which occurs voluntarily, is a notion belonging

to human beings alone.

And the treasury of forms is the formative faculty or imagination, whereas

the treasury of intentions is the retentive. And it is not impossible that the

estimative faculty is a judge per se, but through its movement imaginative and

memorative.

Chapter Two: On the Activities of the Formative and Cogitative Faculties

Among the Internal Senses

In which is contained the discourse concerning sleeping and waking,

and concerning true and false dreams,

and concerning one of the species of the characteristics of prophecy1

/A 169; L12; F119

Now let us take up the discourse concerning the formative faculty first. We

say that the formative faculty, namely, the imagination (al-khayl), is the last

faculty in which the form of the sensibles is established, and that the side of it

which is [turned] towards the sensibles is the common sense, and that the

common sense leads to the formative faculty by way of storing what the senses

have conveyed to it and deposited in it. And the formative faculty also stores

things which are not among the things that have been taken from sensation. For

the cogitative power may freely dispose of (tataarrafu) the forms which are in

the formative faculty, through synthesis and analysis, because they are its

subjects.

/A170 For when [the cogitative faculty] composes or divides one of the forms

among them, it is possible that it will preserve [that form] within it, because it is

not a treasury for this form insofar as this form is related to a thing, and comes

from inside or outside, but rather, it is only a treasure for it because it is this

form through this species of abstraction (al-tajrd). For if this form, to the extent

that it is within it from an act of composition of division, had returned from

outside, this power would take them as fixed, in the same way as it does when

they appear to this faculty because of something else. But if it had happened

because of some cause, either from the imagination (al-takhayyul) and cogitation

(al-fikr), or because of some heavenly configurations, that a form is represented

in the formative faculty, while the mind was inattentive,2 or resting from

considering it, it would be possible for this to be impressed upon the common

sense itself, according to is shape. So one hears and sees colours and sounds

which have no existence externally, nor are their causes external. And most often

these things happen when the intellectual faculty is at rest, or the estimative

faculty is negligent, and the rational soul is preoccupied from watching over the

imagination (al-khayl) and the estimation. For then the formative and

imaginative faculties have control over their proper actions, so that what they

furnish from among the forms is represented as something sensed.

1 Translation © Deborah L. Black; Toronto, 2009. 2 Literally, “absent.”

Avicenna, Shifa ’:Psychology, Book IV 2

And let us add to this a proof (baynan). For we say that it will be made

clear by us later that all of these powers belong to a single soul, and that they are

servants to the soul. So let us grant this as something posited, and let us know

that the soul's occupation with some of these [faculties] diverts it from helping

the other faculties in their activities, or from restraining them from their

deviation or from leading them to what is correct. For it is part of the soul's

nature, whenever it is preoccupied with internal matters, for it to be neglectful of

the establishment (an istithbt) of external matters, and so fails to verify the

sensible things which it ought to establish.

/A171 And whenever it is preoccupied with external things, it neglects the

employment of the internal powers. For when it is perfect in its attention to the

external sensibles, at some moment when it is directed towards this, its

imagination and its memory is weakened. And whenever it is intent upon the

activities of the desiderative faculty, the activities of the irascible faculty subside

from it; and whenever it is intent upon the activities of the irascible power, the

activities of the desiderative power subside from it. And in general, whenever it

is directed towards the perfection of the motive powers, the apprehending

powers are weakened, and vice versa. And whenever the soul is not preoccupied

with the activities of some faculties from the activities of other, but rather, is

tranquil, as if withdrawn, it happens to the strongest and most active of the

faculties to be supreme. And whenever it is preoccupied by some power and

common occurrence from correcting another faculty, it only retrains form that

faculties excessive movements with respect to the soul or to its estimative sense.

This power [of estimation] will have authority, and it will be effective in those of

its activities which are natural, “that the air is already empty of her.” And this is

what happens to the soul from not being occupied with the activity of one or

more powers, something which may occur because of injury or weakness

distracting it from perfection, as occurs in the case of sickness or fear; or

because of a certain relaxation, as in sleep; or because of being excessively

preoccupied with the effort to employ one faculty to what concerns it, and

distracted away from other things.

In this case, the imaginative faculty (al-mutakhayyilah) is a power which the

soul may divert from its proper action in two ways: (1) sometimes, as is the case

when the soul is occupied by the external sensibles, the formative power is

turned towards the external sensibles, and is moved by them through what

appears to it from them, so that the cogitative faculty does not submit to the

imaginative. So the /A172 imaginative faculty is preoccupied from its proper


activity, and the formative faculty too is preoccupied from isolation by the

imaginative, and that which these two require from the common sense is

established and fixed in the occupation of the external sense. This is one of the

two ways. (2) And sometimes, when the soul uses it in those of its action to

which it is joined from the discriminative (al-tamyz) faculty and cogitation (al-

fikrah), something which also happens in two ways: (2.1) one of them is that it

has mastery over the imaginative faculty, and makes it its servant, along with the

common sense, in composing forms with their specifying characteristics, and in

analyzing them, in a respect in which a correct end befalls the soul. And the

imagination does not, for this reason, take mastery over the free exercise of what

it possesses to exercise it through its own nature; rather, it is drawn forth in some

way when the rational faculty controls it. (2.2) The second way is that it diverts

it from the imaginings which do not correspond to external existents, and

restrains it from these things by nullifying them. Thus, the imagination is not

capable of representing and symbolizing them forcefully.

And if the imagination is preoccupied by both of these aspects together, its

activity will be weak. And if it ceases to be occupied by both these aspects, as

occurs in the state of sleep, or from one of them, as in the case of sicknesses

which weaken the body and distract the soul from the intellect and the

discriminative faculty, as also occurs when one is afraid, so that the soul is

weakened, and almost sanctions what does not exist; and in general, the soul is

turned away from the intellect, owing to its weakness and its fear, which comes

form corporeal things. And so, it is as if it abandons the intellect and its

governance. It is then possible for the imagination to be strong and to draw near

to the formative faculty and make use of it, and for their uniting to be strong. But

the formative faculty becomes more open in its activity, and so the form which is

in the formative faculty appears in the common sense.

/A173 And so it appears as if it were existent externally, because the

impression perceived from what comes from outside, and what comes form

inside, is that which is represented in it, and they are only distinguished by

relation. And when the thing sensed exists in reality as it is represented, then its

state which is represented is like the state of what has returned from outside.

And for this reason, what the madman, and the fearful man, and the weak man,

and the sleeping man, see as existent representations are like what is seen in the

state of health in reality. And likewise he will hear sounds. So when the

discriminative faculty or the intellect perceives any of these things, it wins the

imaginative faculty over to itself by admonishing it/alerting it, and so these

forms and images will disappear.


And it may happen that in some people the imaginative faculty is by nature

very strong and predominant, so much so that the senses have no authority over

it, and the formative faculty cannot resist it. Moreover, the soul is also strong,

and its inclination to the intellect and what is prior to the intellect does not

nullify its orientation to the senses. So these people possess in waking what other

people possess in sleeping, and have a disposition which we will discuss later.

And it is the same state of perception as that which someone sleeping has of

absent things, by verifying them through their disposition, or through the

resemblances which they possess. And frequently it happens to them, by means

of these things, that they are finally absent from the sensibles, and something

akin to fainting befalls them. But often this does not happen. And often they see

something in its actual state, and often its likeness (mithl-hu) is imagined for

them owing to the same thing that causes it someone who is asleep to imagine a

likeness of what he has seen—one of the things we will later establish. And often

a likeness (shibh) is represented for them, and they imagine that what they

apprehend is a speech (khib) from this likeness, by means of auditory

expressions which have been remembered and recited aloud. And this is

particular prophecy (al- al-khah) through the imaginative faculty.

And there is another type of prophecy whose nature we will explain [later].

/A174 And there is no one who does not have some share in the matter of

dreaming, and in the state of perceptions which occur in waking. For the notions

(al-khawur) which occur all at once in the soul, their cause is only connections

of which there is no awareness, nor is there any awareness of that which is

connected to them, neither before them or after them. For the soul is transferred

from them to some other thing, different from what is of their order. And this

may be of any genus, for it may be of the intelligible, or of rare things, and it

may be of poetry, or of something else according to one's disposition, custom,

and nature. And these notions are due to causes which for the most part arise

surreptitiously in the soul, and are like secret hints which are not fixed and

remembered, except that the soul hits upon them with a firm grasp, and often

what it does it to occupy the imagination with a variety unconnected to what is in

it.

And part of the nature of the imaginative faculty is to be continually

preoccupied with the two storehouses, that of the formative faculty and that of

the memorative faculty, and to be always mindful of the forms, beginning with

the sensed or remembered forms, and moving form them to a contrary or an

equivalent form, or to something which derives from that form as by way of


causality. For this is its nature. And as for the specification of the motion from

the thing to its contrary rather than to its equal, or to its equal rather than from its

contrary, there are particular causes for this which cannot be enumerated. And in

general, it is necessary that the root of the cause in this be that whenever the soul

unites together the consideration of the intentions and the forms, it moves from

the intentions to the forms which are most proximate to them, either absolutely,

or because of the recent occurrence of their perception (mushhadati-hi),

because of the /A 175 combination of the two in a sense power or in the

estimation. And likewise it can be moved from the forms to the intentions. And

the first cause which particularizes one form rather than another form, and one

intention rather than another, is something which appears to it from the sense

which is proper to it, or from the intellect, or from the estimation. For it is

particularized through [the thing itself] or though something celestial. For when

they are particularized by this thing [itself], its persistence and its transference

are particularized by the particularization of the two principles, and by the

dispositions which are combined in custom, and owing to the proximity in time

of some forms and intentions. And these states may also be due to celestial

states, and they may be due to things arising from intellect and sense, after the

first particularization which is attached to them.

And know that rational cogitation (al-fikr al-) is afflicted by this

power, and because of the nature of this power it is greatly preoccupied. For

whenever it uses [this power] concerning some form, for some use directed to

some end, it is quickly led to some other thing which is not related to [that end],

and from it to a third thing, so that it makes the soul forget the first thing from

which it began. Thus it is necessary for the soul to recollect, taking refuge in

analysis by conversion (al-l bi-al-aks), until it returns to the starting point.

And whenever it happens that the soul perceives something in a state of waking,

or that is it joined in some way to the heavens in a state of sleep, in the manner

that we shall later describe, then, if [this power] enables the soul, through its rest

or its subjugation, to establish [some form] firmly, and does not overcome it by

curtailing the time during which what appears to it from the imaginings is

established, /176 then this form will be established in the memory very strongly,

according to its own aspect and form (al wajhi-hi wa-rahti-hi).

But it is not necessary to recollect if it is awake, and if it is asleep it is not

necessary to and if it is inspired it is not necessary to interpret. For

interpretation and explanation are in this case analogous to recollection. For if

the soul does not seek to establish what it sees of these things in the faculty of

memory, according as it is necessary, but rather, the imaginative power opposes


to each singular among the things that it has seen in sleep a single image, or

opposes to a complex among the things that it has seen in sleep a single or a

composite image, and it does not cease to oppose what it sees here to an

imitation composed from forms and intentions, then the soul's seeking to fix in

itself what it sees is weaker than its seeking to fix, from the formative and

memorative faculties, what imagination presents. Thus what it sees from the

heavens is not fixed in the memory, whereas what is imitated by it is fixed.

And often it happens that what is seen from the heavens is something like the

head and the principle. But the imagination prevails over the soul with a control

which distracts it from completing what it sees, so it is transferred, one move

after another, without it imitating through these motions any of the things which

were seen from the heavens, and then it has already been cut off. And this is a

type of dream. The occasion3 for interpretation in it is only slight, and the rest

are confused dreams. And what is included amongst the genus of dreams over

which the imagination has dominion necessarily requires interpretation.

And sometimes a person sees the interpretation of his dream in the dream

itself, and this is in fact recollection. For just as the cogitative power may be

moved first from the root to the imitation (al-ikyah), because of the

correspondence between them, so too it is not unlikely that it may be moved

from the imitation to the root. So it happens often that this action of its own is

imagined again, and it seems as if /177 someone is addressing it through this.

And often it is not this way, but rather, it is as if the thing were being viewed

with a sound vision, without the soul being joined to the heavenly bodies, but

rather, there is an imitation of the imitation from the imagination, and so it

returns to the root. And this type of true dream may occur from the imagination

without the help of another power, even though it is the root in which this exists,

and to which it returns. And sometimes the imagination imitates the imitation

with another imitation, so the interpreter must interpret a second time. And these

things and states cannot be determined precisely.

And there are people who have the truest dreams. And this occurs when their

souls are habituated to the truth, and have subdued false imaginings. And most

of those to whom the interpretation of their dreams occurs in their dreams are

those whose attention is preoccupied with what they see. So whenever they are

asleep, their preoccupations with it and with its condition remains. So the

imaginative faculty begins to imitate it in the opposite way from the way it first

imitated it. And it is recounted that the king Heracles saw a dream which

3 Literally, “place.”


preoccupied his heart, and he could not find anyone among the interpreters who

could unravel it. But when he slept afterwards, the dream was interpreted for him

in his dream. For it comprised reports of matters which would occur in the world

and in particular his city and his kingdom. So when he recorded these

predictions, they emerged in the way in which they had been interpreted for him

in his sleep. And this has been experienced in other cases.

And those who see these things while awake include the person who sees

them on account of the nobility of his soul and its power. For his imaginative

faculty and memorative faculty are not distracted from their proper activities by

the sensibles. And they include the person who sees these things because of the

cessation of his distinctive faculty,4 because the soul which he has is freed from

making distinctions. And for this reason, if his imagination is strong, he will be

able to receive invisible5 things in the state of waking. For in order to receive the

emanation of what is invisible, the soul requires the internal senses in two

respects. One of them is in order to be able to conceive (taawwur) the particular

intention in them by means of a preserved conception. And the second is in order

that they might be an aid to it, by their being freely disposed of /178 in

accordance with its will, but not distracting it nor drawing it over to their side.

For it is necessary for there to be a relation amongst the absent/invisible thing,

the soul, and the internal imaginative faculty, and a relation between the soul and

the internal imaginative faculty. For if sensation is employing it, or the intellect

is employing it according to the intellectual manner which we have mentioned,

then the imagination will not be empty of other matters, the way a mirror must be

empty when it is turned away from one direction and faced towards another. For

many things whose nature is to be reflected in this mirror are, unexpectedly and

suddenly, because of some relation between the two, not reflected in it. And this

distraction is either from sensation, or from the intellect's seizing it. So when one

of them goes away, the relation required between the absent thing, the soul, and

the imaginative faculty, and between the soul and the imaginative faculty, is on

the verge of occurring. So some appearance appears in the imagination after the

manner of appearances.

And because the discourse concerning the imagination has transferred us to

the matter of dreams, there is no objection to our indicating briefly the principle

from which premonitions come in sleep, by means of things which we will later

posit. For these things will only be proven by us in the art which is First

4 , a synonym for the cogitative faculty, insofar as it analyzes or distinguishes images, as

well as synthesizing them. 5 Literally, “absent.”


Philosophy. Thus we say that all the intentions of the things existing in the

world, including what is past, present, and what is intended to be existent, exist

in the knowledge of the Creator, and of the angelic intelligences in respect, and

in the celestial angelic souls in another respect. (We shall explain these two

respects for you in another place, and the fact that human souls have a stronger

affinity to these angelic substances than they have to sensible bodies.) And there

is no concealment nor withholding [of knowledge] in this case;6 the concealment

is due only to the receptacles, either on account of their being submerged in

bodies, or on account of their being polluted by things which attract them to their

lower half. But whenever it happens to them that they are almost empty of these

activities, an insight into what is there befalls them. Thus the first thing which is

established is what is /179 related to this human being, either to himself or to his

land or his region. And for this reason most dreams which are related are specific

to the person who dreams them and to those who are close to him. And the

intelligibles will appear to the person whose zeal is for the intelligibles; whereas

the person whose zeal is for the things which are good for people, he will see

them and be rightly guided towards them; and so on, in an analogous fashion.

And not all dreams are true, or of such a nature that requires one to take heed

of them. For not all of the imitations of the imaginative faculty are simply of

what emanates upon the soul from the heavens. Rather, most of these things

which come from [the heavens] exist only when this power has ceased from

imitating the matters which are closest to it. And the matters which are closest to

it include natural and voluntary things. For the nature are those which come from

the mixture of the powers of the humours with the spirit7 that the formative and

imaginative faculties depend upon.8 For in the beginning it imitates and is

preoccupied with these things alone. And it may also imitate the afflictions

which occur in the body, and the accidents which are in it, such as happens

whenever the expulsive force of the semen moves ones to ejaculation. For in this

case the imagination imitates forms which it is the soul's nature to incline one

towards [desiring] intercourse with them. And foods are imitated by the person

who is hungry; whereas the person who needs to excrete waste, the place for so

doing is imitated by him; and by the person whose limbs happen to be hot or

cold because of some heat or cold, it is imitated that this limb of his is placed

near a fire or in cold water. And it is a wonderful thing that, just as a certain

6 I.e., on the part of the angelic substances with respect to us. These are technical Avicennian terms

used to describe a political or pedagogic technique of not fully disclosing known philosophical

doctrines, either for fear of their being misunderstood by those of a non-philosophical disposition,

or in order to goad novice philosophers to discover them for themselves. 7 R, which translates the Greek pneuma. 8 Literally, “ride” or “mount.”


imagining occurs from the natural motion of the ejaculation of sperm, so too

sometimes a certain imagining of desired forms occurs from some cause, and

thereupon nature is provoked to gather the semen and emit the spirit from the

sexual organ, so that sometimes it ejaculates semen. And this may occur both in

waking and in sleep, even if at the time there is not also /180 arousal and lust.

As for voluntary things, they occur when the soul is striving while it is

awake after something to whose contemplation and government it attends. So

when it is asleep, the imaginative faculty imitates this matter, and what is of the

same genus as it. These things come from the residue of the cogitation which

occurred while it was awake, and all of them constitute confused dreams. And

[dreams of this sort] may also occur from the impressions of the heavenly

bodies. For they may, with respect to their affinities and those of their souls,

cause forms to befall the imagination in proportion to its preparedness, forms

which do not come from the representation of anything invisible/hidden, and

which are not premonitions.

And as for those [dreams] which it is necessary to interpret and to explain,

these are those which are not related to anything from amongst the [foregoing]

group [of dreams]. For it is known that this occurs from an external cause and

that it has some significance. So for this reason, the poet's dream is not for the

most part sound, nor is that of the liar, the wicked person, the drunk, the sick

person, and the sad person, or of anyone over whom a bad disposition or

cogitation has control. And for this reason too, for the most part only that part of

a dream which occurs at the time of dawn is veridical, because all thoughts are

dormant at this time, and the movements of likenesses are still. And if, while

asleep, at times such as this, the imaginative faculty is not occupied with he body

nor cut off from the memorative and formative faculties, but rather, is in

command of them, then its service to the soul can scarcely improve. For it is

without a doubt necessary that the form of what returns to [the soul] from these

[faculties]9 be impressed on this [imaginative] power as a correct impression,

either in itself, or through an imitation of it. And it is necessary to know that the

people whose dreams are truest are those whose temperaments are most

balanced. For even if those whose temperament is dry retain well, they do not

receive will; whereas those whose temperament is moist, even if they receive

quickly, lose quickly, so that it will be as if they had not received anything at all;

for they do not remember well. And those who are /181 warm in temperament

have confused motions, and those who are cold are dull-witted. But the soundest

of the lot is the person who is habituated the most to the truth, for the habit of

9 The formative and memorative.


lying and of corrupt cogitation renders the imagination corrupt in its motions,

and disobedient to the direction of reason; or rather, its state is that of the

imagination of someone whose temperament has been corrupted to the point of

confusion.

And since these are things which are associated with sleeping and waking, it

is necessary for us here to indicate briefly the nature of sleeping and waking.

And we say that waking is a state in which the soul is using the senses or the

motive powers apart from the will, in which there is no necessity. And sleep is

the privation of this state. For the soul in sleep has turned away from the outside

to what is internal. And its turning away inevitably comes from one of these

directions: either owing to fatigue befalling it from this side,10

or on account of

some concern which befalls it from the other side,11

or owing to the disobedience

of its organs. And that which occurs because of fatigue is such that the thing

which is called “spirit” [=pneuma]—you will learn of this in its proper place—

has dissipated and weakened, and so is unable to extend itself [throughout the

body], and so turns inside, with the powers of the soul following it. And this

fatigue may occur because of bodily motions, but it may also occur because of

cogitations, and because of fear. For not only sleep, but even death, may occur

on account of fear. And sometimes cogitations may put one to sleep, not from

this side, but because of the heating of the brain, so that the humours are drawn

to it and the brain is filled, and put to sleep by the moistening. And that which is

owing to concerns which are within occurs when the nourishment and the

humours have united from within, and require that the pneuma proceed straight

to them with all of its natural heat, or order to accomplish complete digestion of

them, so that what is external is inactive. And that which occurs from the side of

the organs is when /182 the nerves are full and are obstructed by the vapours and

foods which penetrate it in order to be digested, or when the pneuma is too

oppressed to move, because of the weight of the moisture.

And waking is due to causes which are the opposite of these: among these

are causes which produce dryness, such as heat and dryness; also amongst them

is the cessation of digestion, for then the pneuma has returned to a state of

diffusion. And among them is a bad state which distracts the soul from what is

internal, and instead leads it out towards what is external, such as anger or fear

of something proximate, or suffering because of something painful. And these

things may enter into the matter with which we are concerned incidentally, even

though in fact sleeping and waking ought to be discussed along with the

10 The Latin translation understands this as meaning “from the outside.” 11 I.e. internally.


accidents that belong to sensation.

Chapter Three: On the Activities of the Memorative

and Estimative Faculties

And On the Fact that All the Activities of These Powers Occur

Through Corporeal Organs1

Just as we have examined what is said about the state of the imaginative and

formative faculties, it is necessary to speak about the state of the memorative

faculty and its relation to the cogitative, and about the state of estimation. So we

say that estimation is the greatest judge in the animal, for it judges the way to

provoke the what is imaginative (takhayyul) without this being verified. And

this is like what happens to the person who considers honey unclean because of

its resembling bile. For the estimative sense judges that it is of such a judgment,

and the soul follows this estimation, even if /183 the intellect falsifies it. And

animals and their like among humans (min al-ns) only follow in their actions

this judgment of estimation, which has no logical analysis (l tafl maniqyan),

but rather, is by way of a certain impulse (inbith) only. Nevertheless,

something may happen to the senses and faculties of a human being, because of

their proximity to reason, that may make his internal faculties almost become

rational, and different from those of beasts. For this reason, a human being can

attain things which other animals do not attain from the utility of composite

sounds, colours, smells, and tastes, and from hopes and desires, for the light of

reason is like something emanating and flowing into these powers. And this

imagination too which belongs to the human being becomes subject to reason,

after being subject to the estimation

in animals, so that he makes use of it in the sciences; and his memory also comes

to be useful in the sciences, as is the case with the experiences (ka-al-tajrib)

which he attains through memory, as well as the particular observations, and

other things like these.

So let us return to the account of the estimation. We say that one of the

things which the researcher must investigate and consider is how the estimation

which the intellect does not accompany at the time of its estimation (la

tawahhumi-hi) acquires the intention which is in the sensibles, while the sense

acquires its form without anything of its intention being sensed, and without

many of these intentions being useful or harmful in this circumstance (f tilka al-

l). And we say that the [ability to do] this belongs to the estimation from many

directions. Among them is the inspirations (al-ilhmt) that emanate upon

everything from divine mercy, such as the state of the infant at the instant it is

born of being attached to its mother's breast, and such as the state /184 of the

child when it is lifted up and made to stand but it almost falls, and hastens to

1 Translation © Deborah L. Black; Toronto, 2009.


hold on to something solid, on account of a natural instinct (li-gharzah) which

divine inspiration has planted in it. And if a person has a mote in his eye, all of a

sudden he closes his eyelid, before he understands what has happened to him,

and what he must do about it, as if this were innate (gharzah) to his soul, and

not his choice.

And in the same way natural instincts belong to animals, and the cause in

this case is the relations which exist between these souls and their principles,

which are eternal and not intermittent, and different from those relation which

only happen sometimes, and not others, such as the perfection of the intellect,

and the idea of correctness. For all of these things come from there. And by these

inspirations the estimation comes to know the intentions which are mixed with

the sensibles, concerning the harmful and the beneficial. So every sheep is wary

of the wolf, even if it has never seen one, and no danger has ever befallen it from

the wolf. And many animals fear the lion, and other birds fear predatory birds,

and weak birds avoid them without any [prior] experience.

And this is one division [of how estimations occur]. And another division is

because of something that is like experience. And this occurs whenever pain or

pleasure occurs to an animal, or some sensible utility or sensible danger reaches

it, conjoined to a sensible form, imprinting in the formative faculty the form of

the thing, and the form of what is conjoined to it, and imprinting in the memory

an intention of the relation between the two, and the judgment concerning [the

relation]. For the memory, by its own essence and nature, acquires these things;

so whenever these forms appear in the imagination from outside, then [these

same forms] will be moved within the formative faculty, and with them what is

conjoined to them of useful or harmful intentions, and in general the intention

which is in the memory, by way of /185 the transfer and inspection,2 which

belong to the nature of the imaginative faculty. So the estimation perceives the

totality of these things simultaneously, seeing the intention accompanied by this

form. And this takes place by a method which approximates experience. And for

this reason, dogs come to fear clods of earth and sticks, and other such things.

And other judgments may occur to the estimation by way of similitude (al-

tashbh),3 when a form belongs to some object, which is conjoined to an

estimative intention in some sensibles, but is not always conjoined to that

intention, and not in all of them. So [estimation] will consider this intention

along with this form, even though they may differ.

2 al al- al- wa-al-.. The latter term is used generally of entertaining images,

passing them through one's mind. 3 This term is used for metaphors in Arabic poetic theory.


Thus the estimation is a judge in the animal, and it requires the obedience of

these faculties which belong to the animal in its acts. And most often what it

requires is memory and sensation. As for the formative faculty, it requires it on

account of memory and recollection. While memory may be found in the rest of

the animals, recollection is the artificial skill (itiyl) for recalling what has been

forgotten, and so in my opinion it is only found in humans. And this is because

the inference (al-istidll) that something was, and then disappeared, only occurs

by means of the rational faculty. And if it does belong to a non-rational faculty,

then it might be the case that it belongs to the estimation, embellished by reason.

So the rest of the animals, if they do remember, only remember, and if they do

not recollect, then they do not desire to recollect, nor does this occur to their

minds, but rather, this desire and this search belongs only to humans.

And recollection is relative to some object which was in the soul in a past

time. And it resembles learning in one respect, and differs from it in another. As

for its resemblance to learning, this is because recollection is a transference from

things which are perceived /186 externally or internally to some other thing, and

in the same way learning is as well, for it too is a transference from what is

known to what is unknown in order to know the latter. But recollection is a

search to cause the like of what occurred in the past occur in the future, whereas

learning is only to cause some other thing to arise in the future. Moreover, in

recollection one does not reach an end in which are contained things which

require the occurrence of that end necessarily, but rather, only by way of signs

(almt). Whenever the most proximate of these [signs] to the end occurs, the

soul is transferred to the end which belongs to the like of this state; but if it were

a state other than this one, then even if a more proximate form or its intention

came to mind, it would not be necessary for it to be transferred. This would be as

if someone were to call to mind a specific book, and then recollect from it the

teacher under whom he read the book. For it would not be necessary for every

person to call this teacher to mind when calling to mind the form of the book and

its intention. But as for the path leading to knowledge (al-ilm), it involves a

necessary transference to it, and this path is the syllogism and the definition.

And there are some people for whom learning is easier than recollection,

because they are connatured (ma) to things whose transference is

necessary,; and there are some people who are the opposite, and some people

who have strong memories, but are weak at recollection. This is because they

have dry temperaments, and so they preserve what they do perceive, whereas

they do not have the liveliness of soul and the obedience of matter to the

activities of the imagination and its representations. And there are also people

who are the opposite. And the people who are quickest at recollecting are those


who are cleverest at interpreting signs (al-ishrt). For signs cause a transfer fro

the sensibles to the intentions of other things. So whoever is clever with signs is

quick at recollection. There are also people who are good at comprehending (al-

fahm) but are of weak memory. And it is almost the case that the nature of

comprehension is opposed to that of memory, for comprehension requires an

element () for the internal form which is very impressionable. /187 And

moisture alone is an aid to this. As for memory, it requires a matter in which

what is conceived and represented is difficult to delete. And this requires dry

matter. So for this reason, the combination of these two things is difficult. So

most of the people who can retain are those whose motions are not numerous,

and their concerns are not diverse. Whereas the person who has many concerns

and motions does not remember well, for memory, along with the appropriate

matter, requires that the soul be turned intently upon the form and the intention

to be established, without being distracted from them by any other concern. And

for this reason children, despite their moisture, retain well, because their souls

are not preoccupied with what the soul's of mature people are. So they are not

distracted from what they are directed towards by something else. And as for

youth, owing to their heat and the confusion of their motions, and despite the

dryness of their temperaments, they have memories that are not like those of

children and adolescents. And this also happens to the elderly, from their

predominating moisture, that they do not remember what they have perceived.

And there may occur, along with the recollection of sadness, anger, grief,

and other emotions, something which resembles the state that befalls us from

these emotions themselves. And this is because the causes of sorrow, anger, and

grief do not exist in what is past, except as the impression of these forms in the

internal senses. So whenever the form returns, it produces these emotions, or

what is proximate to them. And desires and hopes too produce these emotions,

although hope is different from desire, for hope imagines some matter, along

with a judgment or opinion that it will be existent for the most part, whereas

desire is the imagination of a thing, and concupiscence for it, and the judgment

concerning some pleasure which would exist if it were to be. And fear is

opposed to hope by way of contrariety, whereas desperation is the privation of

hope. And all of these are judgments belonging to the estimation.

[The chapter concludes with the proof that these powers all require a corporeal

organ. It is reproduced in the psychology of the Najh, chap. 8. English

translation in F. Rahman Avicenna’s Psychology, 41-45.]

Avicenna

SHIF (HEALING)

Al-Burhn (Demonstration)

Book IV, Chapter 10

The Concluding Discussion on Demonstration

Translation © Deborah L. Black; Toronto, 2009

We have shown previously that knowledge (al-ilm) of the principles of demonstration must

be more certain (kad) than knowledge of the conclusions of demonstration. But someone might

raise a doubt as to whether both of these is knowledge and belongs to a single power, or whether

one of the two is knowledge and the other is something else and belongs to some other power?

Then it is inevitable either that it was existent in us as soon as we were born, and that we have

known it since that time. But then how is there knowledge in us but we do not realize it until we

have reached maturity (att istakmaln)? For it is not possible that there should be

demonstrative knowledge in us which we do not know, so how can their be a knowledge that is

truer (a) than demonstration? And if we knew and then forgot, when did we know and at

what point in time did we forget? For it is not possible for us to know it while we are children and

to forget it after we have grown up, and then recollect it after another interval during maturity.

Therefore the truth is that we are lacking in the principles of demonstration at first, then we

acquire and attain them. But how do we attain the unknown without a demonstration? And if it is

through a demonstration, then we will require principles prior to the primary principles, and this

is impossible. So there is no way to dissolve this difficulty, unless there is in us a faculty whose

role is to know certain things without learning and through ancillary aids which assist it in a way

other than that of instruction. And these ancillaries are the external and internal sense faculties

existent in all or most animals.

For the external sense is existent in all animals; but the internal power which retains what the

sense conveys to the soul may not exist in all animals, or if it exists in all animals, it may not be

stable in some of them through its act, for example, their state in worms, flies, and moths which

fly from the light, then forget that it harms them and return to it. As for the perfect animals, in

them what is taken from the senses remains for a long time. And the animals take two things

through their perceptual faculties: one of them is the form of the sensible and its external

appearance (kilqah-hu), like the external appearance of the wolf which is harmful to it and the

external appearance of its human benefactor. And it only takes this form through the sense and

stores it in the imagination, which is in the anterior of the brain. And the second is the intention of

the sensible, for example /331 the incompatibility of the wolf and the agreeableness of the

benefactor. And the animal does not perceive this division by sensation, but rather, by a power

which discerns them, like the intellect does for us, which is called estimative. And it stores it in

another power, which is called memory, and it is in the posterior of the brain. And this internal

power is more powerful in humans, especially the power of memory, retention, and estimation.

And sensation and estimation establish what flows into the formative and retentive faculties

through repetition.

Then if the faculty which acquires the primary sciences in us peruses these internal

estimations and distinguishes the similar from the dissimilar, and extracts from each form what it

has accidentally, and abstracts what it has essentially, the first thing that will arise in it is the

conceptualization of the simples. Then it will compose the simples with one another with the aid

of the faculty called the cogitative, and it will divide some of them from others, so that there in it

composites of these intentions. So when it happens that among these is that whose nature is to be

known without instruction and without a middle, it knows and experiences it; for example, that

the whole is greater than the part. And in most of them it acquires the judgement of composition

and division from sensation by way of experience. And we have said what is the meaning of

experience.

Therefore the cause of our not knowing these principles is our forgetting that they too have a

principle, namely, conceptualization. For even if the first principle does not have a principle with

respect to assent, it does have a principle with respect to conceptualization. And as for their

principles with respect to conceptualization, they are acquired through sensation, imagination,

and estimation. And when they have been acquired, it is possible for the composition and division

of them to furnish the source of assent and to conceptualize [them] inasmuch as they are

composed and divided. And after this conceptualization we understand them (naqilu-h) through

themselves. And this conceptualization is one of their principles.

And just as memory (al-ifz) is fixed by repeated sensibles, so too experience is fixed—or

rather congealed—through repeated similar memories. So this is the way in which we hunt down

conceptualized universals and universals which are assented to without demonstration. So their

acquisition occurs in a different way from that of teaching and learning. And we were only

ignorant of them in the past because their simples did not appear to us nor come to our minds. But

when one of us acquires their simples from sensation and imagination in the aforementioned way

and their composition appears to him, this is the cause of our assents to them through themselves

when it is conjoined to the divine emanation from which the preparation is not detached.

/332 And as for the rest of the sciences, they are acquired either from experience or through a

medium if the composition of the simples itself is not sufficient for assent. For there are two

causes of ignorance which may have preceded what is acquired of the sciences. These are (1) the

absence of the appearance of the simples to the mind; and (2) the lack of the middle and the

experience. And one of these two causes [of ignorance also] precedes the self-evident primaries,

namely the first.

And the First Teacher compared the state of assembling (ijm) universal forms in the soul

with the state of assembling a battle line (al-al-arb). For whenever a rout occurs, one

person stands his ground (fa-thabata wid), then another one goes straight to him and stops next

to him, then a third person follows the two of them and joins the formation (al-amr). So one by

one they do this and return, and the line is arrayed a second time. So the line is arrayed bit by bit.

Likewise knowledge and the intelligible universal form is impressed in the soul bit by bit from

sensible unit (an d massah): whenever they are gathered up, the soul acquires the universal

forms from them and then emits them. And this is also because that which senses the particulars

in some respect may sense the universal, for what senses „Socrates‟ may also sense „human,‟ and

likewise whatever it conveys. For it conveys to the soul „Socrates‟ and „human,‟ except that it is a

vague human [n mun=homo vagus of the Physics] mixed with accidents, not pure

human. Then if the intellect peels and removes from it the accidents, there remains of it the

abstract human from which Socrates and Plato are not distinct. And if it were the case that

sensation did not perceive human being in some way, then estimation in us and in the animals

would not [be able to] distinguish between the individuals of one species and [those of] another

species, so long as there was no intellect. So neither does sense distinguish these, but rather,

estimation, even if the estimation only distinguishes one thing, and the intellect something else.

And whenever this power hunts down a universal intention, it joins it to another, and then

hunts down another universal intention through these two. And this natural process/source (al-

makhadh) of the soul‟s perception of primary things is like the artificial/technical process which

the First Teacher calls the hunting down of definitions—namely, composition. And this is one of

the signs of the nobility of composition. It is said, “Let us consider which of the powers of the

soul is this?” So we say: that the soul has a most learned power by which it acquires unknown

things through speculation (bi-al-nazar); and there occurs in us no other perceptual faculty among

the rational faculties than an intellectual faculty (quwwah qilah), an opinionative faculty

(quwwah z nnah), a cogitative faculty, and an estimative faculty. Then the opinionative, the

cogitative, and the estimative are not to be reckoned, for their judgement is not always true so as

to precede the capacity for knowledge. Nor is the capacity for knowledge suitable for this,

because just as the principle of demonstration is not acquired /333 through demonstration, so too

the principle of knowledge is not obtained through the capacity for knowledge. So no power

remains which is suitable for this except the intellet. For this faculty is the faculty of the naturally

disposed speculative intellect, which is the sound, innate (al-fiy) disposition.

And as for the principle for the reception of knowledge, it is the habitual intellect, which we

shall make known in the De anima. And this intellectual faculty only performs its primary

activity if the mixture of the brain is correct, for this makes the helping faculties—that is,

imagination, memory (al-dhikr), estimation, and cogitation—strong, and so perfects the

instruments of the intellect.

And know that speculation concerning the topics which are helpful in the art which of

dialectic (al-fann al-jadal) very useful in demonstration, since demonstrative topics follow

from them. And we will proceed from here to what is there, and when a demonstrative topic is

posited, we will indicate it.

Here ends the Demonstration of The Healing, being the fifth part. Praise be to God.

Avicenna

SELECTIONS ON ESTIMATION AND COGITATION


I. f al-nafs (Treatise on the Soul)

Chapter Five: On the Division of the Animal Powers and the Need

for Each of Them (L352.11-353.16/A158-60)

Since most of the arrival at knowledge of what is incompatible and what is appropriate only occurs

through experience, Divine Providence necessitated the positing of the common sense, that is, the

formative faculty in animals, in order to preserve by means of it the forms of the sensibles. And it posited

the retentive memorative faculty, in order to retain through it the intentions perceived from the sensibles;

and it posited the imaginative faculty in order to prepare by means of it what has been effaced from the

memory by a kind of motion; and it posited the estimative faculty in order to know by means of it the

verification of what the imagination has discovered; and its weakness is a type of opinionative

knowledge until one restores it in cogitation

[… Discussion of the motive faculties intervenes]

(353.3) As for the internal [senses], like the formative faculty, the imaginative, the estimative, and the

memorative, and the motive faculty, they are only moved in the presence of an determinate indication

from the estimative faculty, by enlisting the service of the imaginative faculty. And the motive faculty in

non-rational animals is the end, and this is because the motive faculty is not placed in it in order for the

causes of sensation and imagination to be suitable to it by means of it, but rather, the sensitive and

imaginative faculties are posited in it in order that the causes of motion should be made suitable for it by

means of them. As for the rational species, it is the converse, because the motive faculty is only place in

it in order for the things most suitable for the rational, intellective, perceptual soul to be prepared for it

by means of it, and not the converse. So the motive faculty in non-rational animals is like the prince

(amr) who is served, and the five senses are like the scattered spies, and the formative faculty is like the

master of the messenger of the prince to whom the spies return; and the imaginative faculty is like the

courier running between the messenger and the master of the messenger; and the estimative faculty is like

the vizier; and the memorative faculty is like the secret storehouse. And the sensitive and imaginative

faculties have not been placed in the heavenly bodies and plants: even each all of them have a soul and

have life. As for the heavenly bodies, it is on account of their loftiness; as for the plants, it is on account

of their inferiority.

Chapter Six: On the Division of the Internal Senses

and their Motive Powers (L358.17-361.3/A168-9)

The external senses have nothing in them which gathers together the perception of colour and of

smell and of softness; whereas we sometimes encounter a yellow body, and perceive that it is sweet,

pleasant /L359 smelling, liquid, honey, while we have not tasted it, nor smelled nor touched it. So it is

clear that there is a faculty in us in which the perceptions of these four senses is collected, and their

collection come to be under one form. And if it were not the case, then we would not know that the

sweet, for example, is different from black, since the distinction between two things occurs when we

know both of them together. And this faculty is called the common sense and the formative faculty. And

if it were derived from the external senses, their dominion would be confined to the waking state alone,

Avicenna: Selections on Estimation and Cogitation 2

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whereas observation confirms the opposite of this, for this faculty may perform its activity in the two

states of both sleeping and waking.

Then in the animal there is a power which combines what has been collected together in the common

sense in the way of forms, and distinguishes between them, and knows the differences amongst them,

without the forms leaving the common sense. And without a doubt this power is different from the

formative faculty, since the formative faculty has nothing in it but true forms bestowed by sensation.

Whereas it is possible that the thing in this faculty be the opposite of this, for it can conceptualize vainly

and falsely, so long as it does not accept is according to its form from sensation. And this power is called

the imaginative.

Then in the animal there is a power which judges of the thing, that it is such or not such, with a

decisive [judgement], and by; which the animal flees from what is dangerous, and tends towards what is

good. And it is clear that this power is different from the formative power, since the formative power

conceptualizes the sun in accordance with what it has received from the sense, after the measure of its

round, flat appearance. Whereas the nature of this faculty is the opposite of this. And likewise the

predatory animal encounters its prey from a distance, of the size of a small bird, but its form and its

extent are not represented for it, but rather, it seeks/intends it. And it is clear too that this faculty is

different from the imaginative; this is because the /A167 imaginative faculty performs its action without

any belief (d) from them that matters are in accordance with how they have been conceptualized.

And this faculty is called the estimative and the opinionative faculty (al-mutawahhimah wa-al-z nnah).

Then there is a faculty in the animal which retains intentions () which the senses have

received, for example, that the wolf /L360 is an enemy, and one’s offspring is an object of love and

friendship. For it is clear that this faculty is other than the formative, and this is because the formative

has no form in it except what has been bestowed upon it by the senses. Then the senses do not sense the

enmity of the wolf, nor the lovableness of the offspring, but rather, the form of the wolf and the features

(khilqah) of the offspring. As for loveableness and harmfulness, only estimation grants them, then it

stores them in this faculty. And it is clear that this faculty is other than the imaginative, and this is

because one does not imagine anything other than what estimation sanctions and assents to, and has

discovered from the senses. And this faculty is other than the estimative faculty, and this is because the

estimative faculty does not retain what some other faculty assents to, but rather, it assents to it through

itself. And as for this faculty, it does not assent to through itself, but rather it retains what another thing

has assented to. And this faculty is called the retentive and memorative. And if the estimative faculty

uses the imaginative faculty independently (bi--h), it is called by this name, that is, the

imaginative faculty; whereas if the rational faculty uses it, it is called the cogitative faculty.

And the heart is the source of all of these faculties according to the philosopher Aristotle. But their

dominion is in different faculties. As for the dominion of the external senses, it is in their known organs.

And as for the dominion of the formative faculty, it is in the front ventricle of the brain. And as for the

dominion of imaginative faculty, it is in the middle ventricle.

And as for the dominion of the memorative faculty, it is in the rear part of the brain. And as for the

dominion of the estimative faculty, it is in the rear ventricle of the brain. And as for the dominion of the

estimative power, it is in the whole of the brain, and especially in the sphere of the imaginative faculty in

it. And to the extent that these ventricles are affected by some injury, the activities of these faculties is

[also] affected. And if it were the case that they were subsistent in themselves and active in themselves,

they would not need anything in the way of organs in their proper activities. And for this reason we know


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that theses faculties are not self-subsistent, but rather, the immortal faculty is the /L361 rational soul, as

we shall explain next. But it may appropriate the core of these faculties for itself in a kind of

appropriation, and so make them exist through itself. And the proof of this shall be rendered shortly, if

God wills.

II. Genesis and Return (Al-Mabd wa-al-Mad)1

3.3 (pp. 93–4): And another faculty follows the imaginative faculty, which is called the cogitative faculty

if it is in people (al-), and the intellect uses it; whereas if it is in animals or in people, and the

estimation uses it, it is called the compositive imagination. And the difference between it and the

imagination is that there is nothing in the imagination except what it has taken from sensation, whereas

the compositive imagination may compose and divide and create (tuadithu) forms which have not being

sensed and are not sensed at all. For example, a flying human being, and an individual half human and

half tree.

III. On the States of the Soul (Awh al-Nafs)2

(p. 62): Then the power which is called imaginative in relation to the animal soul, and cogitative in

relation to the human soul. And it is the power which is seated in the middle ventricle of the brain, in the

vermiform [part], whose role is to compose some of the things in the imagination () with others,

and to separate some of them from others voluntarily (bi-asab al-).

IV. Sources of Wisdom (Uyn al-ikmah)3

Chap. 14 (pp. 38–9): And there is a power which acts on the images by composing and dividing, which

conjoins some of them with others and separates some of them from others. And likewise it conjoins

them with the intentions which are in the memory, and separates them. And if the intellect uses this

power, it is called the cogitative; whereas if the estimation uses it, it is called the imaginative. And its

organ is the vermiform part, which is in the middle of the brain.

V. Al-Shif(Healing)

2.2 (p. 67): As to perceiving that it perceives, this does not belong to the sense, for the perception here is

not a colour which is seen, nor a sound which is heard, but rather, this is only perceived through the

estimative faculty.

VI. Canon of Medicine4

Book 1, Section 1, Lesson 6, chap. 5:

On the perceptual psychological faculties

/96.7

And the psychological faculties comprises two types of faculties, that are like their genera: one of

them is perceptual faculties, and the other is motive faculties. And the perceptual faculty is like a genus

1 Ed. A. Nurani (Montreal: McGill University Press; Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1984. 2 Awl al-nafs (Les états de l’âme), ed. A. F. Al-Ahwani (Cairo, 1952). 3 Ed. A. R. Badawi, 2d ed. (Beirut: Dar al-Kalam, 1980). 4 n f al-ibb, . A. and E. Al-Qashsh (Beirut: Mu’assasah Izz al-Din, 1987).


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for two faculties: an external perceptual faculty, and an internal perceptual faculty. …

/96.13 And the internal perceptual faculty, that is, the animal faculty, is like the genus for five powers:

One of them is the faculty which is called the common sense and imagination (al-), which is a

single faculty according to the physicians, whereas according to the wise they are two faculties. … And

the common sense is that to which all of the sensibles are conveyed, and it is affected by their forms and

assembles them together; whereas the imagination is that which retains them after their assemblage, and

holds on to them after their absence from the sense. And the receptive faculty of the two is different from

the retentive. And the truth verified in this is also in accordance with the philosophers. And however it

may be, the seat and principle and activities of these two is the front ventricle of the brain.

And the second is the power which the physicians call cogitative, and those who know the truth

sometimes call it imaginative, and sometimes cogitative, for if the animal estimative faculty, which we

will discuss later, uses it or arouses it, it is through itself and on account of its own action called

imaginative. And if the rational faculty occupies itself with it and diverts it to what is useful for its ways,

it is called cogitative. And the difference between this faculty and the first faculty, however it may be, is

that the first is receptive or retentive of what has been conveyed to it of the sensible forms; whereas this

faculty has free disposal over what has been stored in the imagination (al-), in such a way that it

composes and divides. So it can re-present () a form in accordance with the way in which it has

been conveyed from the sense, as well as a form different from it, like a man who flew and a mountain of

emerald. And as for the imagination, nothing is present in it except on account of the reception from

sensation. And the seat of this faculty is the middle ventricle of the brain. And this faculty is a tool for a

faculty which is in reality the internal percipient in the animal, namely, estimation, which is the faculty

which judges in the animal that the wolf is an enemy, and the child is to be loved,, and the one offering

food is a friend, and so he does not flee from him in an irrational way. And enmity and friendship are

non-sensible, so the animal’s sense does not perceive them. Therefore another power alone judges them

and perceives them. And it is not by means of a rational perception, for it is without a doubt a perception

which is non-rational. And human beings also use this power in many of their judgements, and in them

they follow the course of the irrational animals. And this faculty is different from the imaginative (al-

), because the imaginative takes the sensibles as established, whereas this faculty judges of the

sensibles through non-sensible intentions. And it differs from the faculties which are called cogitative

and imaginative in that some judgement does not follow their activities, whereas /97 some judgement

does follow the activities of this faculty, or rather, they are certain judgements. And the activities of

those faculties are composed from sensibles, whereas the activity of this faculty is a judgement

concerning the sensibles from an intention external to the sensible. And just as it is the case that

sensation in the animal is a judge (kim) of the forms of the sensibles, so too the estimation is a judge

over them of the intentions of these forms which have been conveyed to the estimation, and which are not

conveyed to sensation. And some people, speaking loosely, call this power imagination (takhayyulan),

and they can have it this way, since there is no use fighting over names, but rather, it is necessary to

understand the meanings and distinctions. And the physician does not contradict this through his study of

this. This is because harm to the functions of this power follows upon harm to the actions of the other

powers prior to it, such as imagination, compositive imagination, and memory, which we shall speak of

afterwards. And the physician only speculates about the powers which, when harm accrues to them in

their actions, these are harmed. For harm accrues to the action of a power because of a harm which

attaches to an action prior to it. And this harm follows upon either the temperament of this organ or its

corruption, until someone cures it through a remedy or it is preserved from it. And it is not proper to him

to know the state of the faculty which only attaches to it without mediation. And the third thing with

which physicians are concerned—and it is fifth or fourth in reality—is the retentive or memorative


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faculty, which is the storehouse for what has been conveyed to the estimation from the intentions in the

sensibles which are other than the sensible forms. And its subject is the rear of the ventricles of the brain.

And there is a subject of philosophical consideration (naz ar ) as to whether the retentive or

memorative power which retrieves what is absent from the preservation of the storehouses of estimation

is one power or two powers. But his is not one of the things which is required of the physician, since the

organs which belong to these two things are organs occurring in the rear faculty of the brain, either from

the genus of mixture/temperament, or from the genus of composition. And as for the remaining faculty

from among the perceptual faculties of the soul, it is the rational human soul. And the reason why the

speculation of physicians omits the estimative faculty has been explained by us from its causes; so it

omits this faculty even more so, but rather, their speculation is confined to the actions of the three

faculties, and nothing else.

VII. t (Investigations)5

1. §305, 184.3–9:

He was asked: What is the demonstration that we are aware of ourselves with an intellectual

awareness, and not through a bodily organ or an estimative faculty (quwwah )? The

demonstration of this is that it is possible for us to abstract the universal meaning ourselves (min

-n), and to understand it. Moreover, if this were a bodily organ in which the true subsistence

( ) of our essences is, then it would be necessary that we would not be aware of ourselves

at all, except as blended [i.e. with the body]. And if it is not, then it is necessary for there to be something

else leading to our essences for this; and so our essences would be repeated in our essences. And as for

the animal’s perception of itself, if there is self-awareness here, and it is sound, then it is through

estimation—which it has in place of the rational perceptive faculty—blended [with the body], and

impossible to separate and abstract. But outside the animal soul (ghayr al-nafs al-),

estimation is not the primary faculty of awareness (al- al-l), because estimation cannot

imagine itself, nor establish itself, nor is it aware of itself.

2. §359, p. 199:

Cogitation requires conjunction with the principles in the procurement of definitions and their

conceptualization, and in the procurement of the middle [term]. As for [their] composition, this belongs

to [cogitation], which it sometimes does well, and sometimes poorly.

3. §367, 204.11–19:

An answer to objections to him concerning our self-awareness: Know that the soul of a human being

is aware of its own essence through its own essence, and that the soul of other animals is aware of its

essence through its estimative [faculty], in its estimative organ, just as it is aware of other things through

its sense faculty and its estimation in their organs. And the thing which perceives the intention which is

not sensed, insofar as it has a connection () to the sensible, is the estimative faculty in the

animals. And it is that by which the soul perceives its essence, not through its essence, nor in that organ

which is the heart, but rather, in the organ of estimation, through the estimative faculty, just as it

perceives, also through its organ, other intentions.

3. §421, 220–21:

He was asked, ―By what faculty am I aware that I see or that I hear?‖ The answer: ―By the animal

soul /221 or the rational soul, by way of the estimative faculty, whenever the sensible form passes

5 Ed. A. R. Badawi, in Ari inda al-arab (Cairo: Maktabah al-Nahdah al-Misriyah, 1947).


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quickly from the external sense to the common sense to the formative faculty to the estimation, one

concept after another being repeated.‖


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4. §468:

And if by the cogitative faculty one means [the faculty] which is seeking, it belongs to the rational

soul and it is of the species of the habitual intellect, especially when it adds a perfection by way of

surpassing the habit. And if one means by it the moving faculty which presents the forms, it is the

imaginative faculty insofar as it is moved with the desire of the rational faculty.

VIII. On the Human Faculties and their Perceptions

( - -n --h )6

pp. 43–44:

And a faculty called estimation, which is that which perceives from the sensibles what is not sensed,

like the faculty which is in the sheep which, when the form of the wolf is represented in the sense of the

sheep, represents its enmity and wickedness, since the sense does not perceive this. And a faculty called

the retentive, which is the storehouse of what the estimation has perceived, just as the formative faculty

is the storehouse of what sensation has perceived. And a faculty called cogitative, which is that which

has mastery over what has been deposited in the formative and retentive storehouses, and mixes some of

them with others and separates some of them from others. And it is called cogitative if the spirit and

intellect of the human being (r al-) uses it, but if estimation uses it, it is called imagination.

IX. Al-liq7

/68 But as for the fact that we know that the sensible has an external existence, it is due to the

intellect or to estimation. And the proof of this is that a form which the person who is mad, for instance,

sees in his common sense does not [in fact] arise in it, and it has no external existence, whereas he says

what these visions are which he sees. But since he does not have any understanding (aql) other than

these which knows that they have no external existence, he supposes (tawahhama) that they are in fact

seen. And likewise, someone sleeping sees in his sleep things in his common sense that have no reality,

and the cause of this is the occurrence of this form in his common sense; so he imagines of it (fa-

yatakhayyalu) that he sees it in reality; and this is owing to the absence of the intellect from reflecting

upon it 8and being acquainted with it. And likewise if our hands, for example, are affected by heat, and

sense it, they have nothing but the sensation of it. But as to knowing that this heat is without a doubt in a

warm body, this belongs only to the intellect. And likewise, if it carries something heavy, it only senses

heaviness, and if affected by heaviness, while the soul, or the estimative power, judges that this weight is

without a doubt in the body of the thing, for it is not affected by something like it (-hu), just as fire

is not affected by fire, for example, and likewise body is not affected by body, but rather, the thing is

only affected by its opposite, as cold is affected by heat. And if our hands sensed a nearby heat, for

example, by means of an increasing heat, it would sense and be affected by it, /69 but if the heat were

[the same as] its heat, then it would not sense it, because something does not arise in something twice.

But the heat arising in it is a likeness of the new heat. But if it increases [the heat], then the hand is

affected by it, for the thing arising in it is not like it.

6 In Tis’ Ras’il (Nine Treatises) (Constantinople: Matba’ah al-Jawa’ib, 1880). According to Michot, this text is probably an

excerpt from a longer text, possible the ps.-Frban Seals of Wisdom (Uyn al-ikmah). 7 Ed. A. R. Badawi (Cairo: Al-Hayah al-Misriyah al-Ammah li-al-Kitab, 1973). 8 Ed. S. Landauer, ―Die psychologie des Ibn Sina.‖ Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft 29 (1876):

339–72.

Avicenna, The Cure, The Soul V.6

1

AVICENNA

THE CURE: THE SOUL V.61

On Memory and the Intellect That which must be known about the state of the forms which are in the soul is what I have said. As for imaginations and what is connected to them, whenever the soul turns away from them, they are retained in the faculties to which preservation belongs and they are not perceived in reality, for otherwise [these faculties] would be simultaneously perceptive and a storehouse. Rather, they are [merely] storehouses, and whenever the perceptual, judgmental faculty returns to them—be it estimation, soul, or intellect—it finds [the forms] realized. And if it does not find them, then it will be necessary to recover them through sensation or recollection. If this were not the explanation, then when any soul is preoccupied and forgets a form, one would have to doubt whether this form is existent, or whether it is only potentially existent, and it would be unclear how it could recover it. For if it is not in the soul (inda al-nafs), then in what thing could it be, and to what thing could the soul conjoin in order to make this form return? /245 But the faculties of the animal soul are distinct [from one another], and a single instrument is made for each faculty, so that there is a storehouse made for the forms to which the estimative faculty is not paying attention, as well as a storehouse for the intentions to which the estimative faculty is paying no attention, since the estimative faculty is not a place which fixes these things, but is the judge. So let us say that the estimation may look upon the preserved forms and intentions in the domains of these two faculties, or it may turn away from them. So what must we now say about the human soul and the intelligibles that it acquires and then forgets for something else? Are they existent in it in complete actuality? For without a doubt it understands them in complete actuality. Or does it have a storehouse in which it preserves them, this storehouse being either in itself, or in its body, or in something corporeal which belongs to it? But we have said that its body or whatever is attached to its body is something which is not suitable for this, since it is not fitting that the intelligibles should have a place, nor is it fitting that the intelligible forms should have a position. But their conjunction the body would make them have position, and if they came to be in a body which possesses position, they would cease to be intelligible. Alternatively (aw) let us say that these intelligible forms are things subsistent in themselves, each form among them being a species of a thing which is subsistent in itself, which the intellect considers at one time and ignores at another. So whenever it considers them, they are represented in it, and whenever it turns away form them, they are not represented. Thus the soul is like a mirror, and they are like external things, for sometimes they appear in it and sometimes they do not appear, this being in proportion to the relations which there are between them and the soul. Or the agent principle emanates one form after another upon the soul in proportion to the seeking of the soul, such that whenever [the soul] turns away from it, /246 the emanation ceases. But if this is the case, why does it not need to learn form the start every time?

1 Translation © Deborah L. Black, 2009. From the Arabic text edited by Fazlur Rahman, De anima, Being the

Psychological Part of b al-(London, 1959); This follows shortly after excerpt #8, paragraph 5, in McGinnis and Reismann, eds. Classical Arabic Philosophy (Hackett, 2007), p. 204.


2

But we say that the truth is the latter disjunct. This is because it is impossible that this form should be existent in complete actuality in the soul but [the soul] not understand it in complete actuality, since “it understands it” means nothing other than that the form is existent in it. It is also impossible that the body should be its storehouse; and it is impossible for it to be its own storehouse, since its being a storehouse for [the form] is nothing but the intelligible form existing in it, and by means of this it understands [the form]. Likewise it is not memory and the formative imagination, because the perception of this form does not belong to them, but rather only its preservation. For the perception of it belongs only to another faculty, whereas the existence of the remembered and imagined forms in anything is not an act of perception, just as the existence of sensible forms is not in anything which is a sense. For this reason bodies—in which are the forms of the sensibles—are not capable of perception, but rather, perception must belong to that whose nature is to be imprinted by these forms in some way, through which [impression] it is a perceptive power. As for memory and the formative imagination, forms are only imprinted on them inasmuch as they are organic and have a body which preserves these forms close to the bearer of the perceptual power, namely, the estimative faculty, so that it can consider them whenever it wishes, just as sensible forms are preserved near to the sense so that the sense may consider them whenever it wishes. But while the memorative and formative faculties can support this interpretation, the soul cannot support it, for the existence of the intelligible forms in the soul is /247 its very act of perceiving them . Moreover, we shall show later, in metaphysics, that this form does not subsist independently. Thus it remains that the correct disjunct is the last one, and that learning is the search for the perfect disposition for conjunction with it [i.e., the Agent Intellect], until the understanding which is simple comes from it. Then the forms differentiated by means of cogitation emanate from it into the soul. Thus the disposition before learning is imperfect, whereas the disposition after learning is perfect. So if one has learned, then it is part of his nature whenever something which is conjoined to the intelligible being sought occurs to his mind and the soul turns in the direction of consideration—for the direction of consideration is the return to the principle which bestows [] to the intellect—then he will conjoin with [the Agent Intellect]. Then the power of the abstract intellect, upon which the emanations of distinction follow, will emanate from it. But if it turns away from it, [simple understanding] returns, and this forms becomes potential, although it is a proximate potency very close to actuality. Thus the first learning is like the treatment of the eye, for if the eye becomes healthy, then whenever it wishes it will gaze upon the thing from which it takes up some form; and whenever it turns away from this thing, this [form] becomes potential, but a potency which is very proximate to actuality. And so long as the common human soul is in the body, it is impossible for it to receive the Agent Intellect all at once. Rather, its condition is as we have said. Whenever it is said that so-and-so knows the intelligibles, this means is that whenever he wishes, he can make its form appear in its own mind. This [in turn] means that whenever he wishes, he has [the ability] to conjoin with the Agent Intellect through a conjunction by which the intelligible is conceptualized; it does not [mean] that this intelligible is present in his mind and always conceived by his intellect in actuality; nor [does it mean] that it is just as it was before learning and attaining this type of actual intellect. And this is the power which arises in the soul so that through it [the soul] understands whatever it wishes. /248 Thus it conjoins whenever it wishes to, and the intelligible form emanates. This form is in fact the acquired intellect, and this faculty is the actual intellect in us, inasmuch as it is up to us understand. As for this acquired intellect, it is the actual intellect inasmuch as


3

it is a perfection. As for the conceptualization of imagined things, this is the soul’s return to the storehouse of the sensibles, although the former looks upon what is above, whereas the latter looks upon what is below. But if it is freed from the body and from bodily accidents, then it will be able to conjoin to the Agent Intellect in a perfect conjunction, and then it will encounter intelligible beauty and eternal pleasure, as we will discuss in its [proper] place.

Avicenna

SELECTIONS ON COGITATION AND THE COGITATIVE FACULTY


1. Compendium on the Soul, ed. Landauer, chap. 6, p. 167–9?:

Then in the animal there is a power which combines what has been collected

together in the common sense in the way of forms, and distinguishes between

them, and knows the differences amongst them, without the forms leaving the

common sense. And without a doubt this power is different from the formative

faculty, since the formative faculty has nothing in it but true forms bestowed by

sensation. Whereas it is possible that the thing in this faculty be the opposite of

this, for it can conceptualize vainly and falsely, so long as it does not accept is

according to its form from sensation. And this power is called the imaginative….

And if the estimative faculty uses the imaginative faculty independently (bi-

-h), it is called by this name, that is, the imaginative faculty; whereas if

the rational faculty uses it, it is called the cogitative faculty.

2. Genesis and Return, 3.3, p. 93–4:

And another faculty follows the imaginative faculty, which is called the

cogitative faculty if it is in people (al-), and the intellect uses it; whereas if it

is in animals or in people, and the estimation uses it, it is called the compositive

imagination. And the difference between it and the imagination is that there is

nothing in the imagination except what it has taken from sensation, whereas the

compositive imagination may compose and divide and create (tuadithu) forms

which have not being sensed and are not sensed at all. For example, a flying

human being, and an individual half human and half tree.

3. On the States of the Soul, ed. Ahwani, p. 62:

Then the power which is called imaginative in relation to the animal soul,

and cogitative in relation to the human soul. And it is the power which is seated

in the middle ventricle of the brain, in the vermiform [part], whose role is to

compose some of the things in the imagination () with others, and to

separate some of them from others voluntarily (bi-asab al-).

4. Sources of Wisdom, chap. 14, pp. 38–9:

And there is a power which acts on the images by composing and dividing,

which conjoins some of them with others and separates some of them from

others. And likewise it conjoins them with the intentions which are in the

memory, and separates them. And if the intellect uses this power, it is called the

cogitative; whereas if the estimation uses it, it is called the imaginative. And its

organ is the vermiform part, which is in the middle of the brain.

5. Canon of Medicine, pp. 96–7:

Avicenna: Selections on Cogitation 2

And the second is the power which the physicians call cogitative, and those

who know the truth sometimes call it imaginative, and sometimes cogitative, for

if the animal estimative faculty, which we will discuss later, uses it or arouses it,

it is through itself and on account of its own action called imaginative. And if the

rational faculty occupies itself with it and diverts it to what is useful for its ways,

it is called cogitative. And the difference between this faculty and the first

faculty, however it may be, is that the first is receptive or retentive of what has

been conveyed to it of the sensible forms; whereas this faculty has free disposal

over what has been stored in the imagination (al-), in such a way that it

composes and divides. So it can re-present () a form in accordance

with the way in which it has been conveyed from the sense, as well as a form

different from it, like a man who flew and a mountain of emerald. And as for the

imagination, nothing is present in it except on account of the reception from

sensation. And the seat of this faculty is the middle ventricle of the brain. And

this faculty is a tool for a faculty which is in reality the internal percipient in the

animal, namely, estimation, which is the faculty which judges in the animal that

the wolf is an enemy, and the child is to be loved,, and the one offering food is a

friend, and so he does not flee from him in an irrational way. And enmity and

friendship are non-sensible, so the animal’s sense does not perceive them.

Therefore another power alone judges them and perceives them. And it is not by

means of a rational perception, for it is without a doubt a perception which is

non-rational. And human beings also use this power in many of their judgements,

and in them they follow the course of the irrational animals. And this faculty is

different from the imaginative (al-), because the imaginative takes the

sensibles as established, whereas this faculty judges of the sensibles through

non-sensible intentions. And it differs from the faculties which are called

cogitative and imaginative in that some judgement does not follow their

activities, whereas some judgement does follow the activities of this faculty, or

rather, they are certain judgements. And the activities of those faculties are

composed from sensibles, whereas the activity of this faculty is a judgement

concerning the sensibles from an intention external to the sensible. And just as it

is the case that sensation in the animal is a judge (kim) of the forms of the

sensibles, so too the estimation is a judge over them of the intentions of these

forms which have been conveyed to the estimation, and which are not conveyed

to sensation. And some people, speaking loosely, call this power imagination

(takhayyulan), and they can have it this way, since there is no use fighting over

names, but rather, it is necessary to understand the meanings and distinctions.

And the physician does not contradict this through his study of this. This is

because harm to the functions of this power follows upon harm to the actions of

the other powers prior to it, such as imagination, compositive imagination, and

memory, which we shall speak of afterwards. And the physician only speculates


about the powers which, when harm accrues to them in their actions, these are

harmed. For harm accrues to the action of a power because of a harm which

attaches to an action prior to it. And this harm follows upon either the

temperament of this organ or its corruption, until someone cures it through a

remedy or it is preserved from it. And it is not proper to him to know the state of

the faculty which only attaches to it without mediation.

6. Shif: De anima

6.1.1: De anima 1.5, p. 40: (trans. Marmura): The third is the human soul, being

a first entelechy of a natural body having organs by way of what is attributed to

it, [namely] that it performs [those] acts that come about by cogitative choice

(al-ikhtiyr al-fikry), deductive judgment, and by way of [its] apprehending

universal matters.

6.1.2: 1.5, p. 45: Then [we have] the faculty called imaginative in relation to the

animal soul, and cogitative in relation to the human soul. It is a faculty

organized in the middle ventricle of the brain at the vermiform [tissue] whose

function is to combine [things] in the imagination and to separate them from

each other as it wills [it].

6.2: 3.8, p. 153 (trans. Marmura—parenthetical ref. in discussion of double

vision): [The form] then connects with the spirit that carries the estimative

faculty through the mediation of the spirit that carries the imagining faculty that

in people is called the cogitative. The form which is in the imagination is then

imprinted in the spirit of the estimative faculty. The imagining faculty serves the

estimative, bringing to it what is in the imagination.

6.3: De anima 4.1, 165–66:

Next, we know certainly that in our nature we compose some sensibles with

others, and separate some from others, not according to that form which we have

found in them externally, and not accompanied by assent to the existence of any

of them nor to their non-existence. So it is necessary for there to be a faculty in

us by which we do this, and this is the faculty which is called cogitative

(mufakkirah) when the intellect employs it, and imaginative (mutakhayyilah)

when the animal faculty uses it.

6.4.1: De anima 4.2, pp. 169–170: ―On the Activities of the Formative and

Cogitative Faculties Among the Internal Senses.‖

And the formative faculty also stores things which are not among the things

that have been taken from sensation. For the cogitative power may freely dispose


of (tataarrafu) the forms which are in the formative faculty, through synthesis

and analysis, because they are its subjects.

For when [the cogitative faculty] composes or divides one of the forms

among them, it is possible that it will preserve [that form] within it, because it is

not a treasury for this form insofar as this form is related to a thing, and comes

from inside or outside, but rather, it is only a treasure for it because it is this

form through this species of abstraction (al-tajrd). For if this form, to the extent

that it is within it from an act of composition of division, had returned from

outside, this power would take them as fixed, in the same way as it does when

they appear to this faculty because of something else. But if it had happened

because of some cause, either from the imagination (al-takhayyul) and cogitation

(al-fikr), or because of some heavenly configurations, that a form is represented

in the formative faculty, while the mind was inattentive,1 or resting from

considering it, it would be possible for this to be impressed upon the common

sense itself, according to is shape. So one hears and sees colours and sounds

which have no existence externally, nor are their causes external. And most often

these things happen when the intellectual faculty is at rest, or the estimative

faculty is negligent, and the rational soul is preoccupied from watching over the

imagination (al-khayl) and the estimation. For then the formative and

imaginative faculties have control over their proper actions, so that what they

furnish from among the forms is represented as something sensed.

6.4.2, pp.171–72:

In this case, the imaginative faculty (al-mutakhayyilah) is a power which the

soul may divert from its proper action in two ways: (1) sometimes, as is the case

when the soul is occupied by the external sensibles, the formative power is

turned towards the external sensibles, and is moved by them through what

appears to it from them, so that the cogitative faculty does not submit to the

imaginative. So the imaginative faculty is preoccupied from its proper activity,

and the formative faculty too is preoccupied from isolation by the imaginative,

and that which these two require from the common sense is established and fixed

in the occupation of the external sense. This is one of the two ways. (2) And

sometimes, when the soul uses it in those of its action to which it is joined from

the discriminative (al-tamyz) faculty and cogitation (al-fikrah), something

which also happens in two ways: (2.1) one of them is that it has mastery over the

imaginative faculty, and makes it its servant, along with the common sense, in

composing forms with their specifying characteristics, and in analyzing them, in

a respect in which a correct end befalls the soul. And the imagination does not,

1 Literally, ―absent.‖


for this reason, take mastery over the free exercise of what it possesses to

exercise it through its own nature; rather, it is drawn forth in some way when the

rational faculty controls it. (2.2) The second way is that it diverts it from the

imaginings which do not correspond to external existents, and restrains it from

these things by nullifying them. Thus, the imagination is not capable of

representing and symbolizing them forcefully.

6.4.3, pp. 174–76:

And part of the nature of the imaginative faculty is to be continually

preoccupied with the two storehouses, that of the formative faculty and that of

the memorative faculty, and to be always mindful of the forms, beginning with

the sensed or remembered forms, and moving form them to a contrary or an

equivalent form, or to something which derives from that form as by way of

causality. For this is its nature. And as for the specification of the motion from

the thing to its contrary rather than to its equal, or to its equal rather than from its

contrary, there are particular causes for this which cannot be enumerated. And in

general, it is necessary that the root of the cause in this be that whenever the soul

unites together the consideration of the intentions and the forms, it moves from

the intentions to the forms which are most proximate to them, either absolutely,

or because of the recent occurrence of their perception (mushhadati-hi),

because of the combination of the two in a sense power or in the estimation. And

likewise it can be moved from the forms to the intentions. And the first cause

which particularizes one form rather than another form, and one intention rather

than another, is something which appears to it from the sense which is proper to

it, or from the intellect, or from the estimation. For it is particularized through

[the thing itself] or though something celestial. For when they are particularized

by this thing [itself], its persistence and its transference are particularized by the

particularization of the two principles, and by the dispositions which are

combined in custom, and owing to the proximity in time of some forms and

intentions. And these states may also be due to celestial states, and they may be

due to things arising from intellect and sense, after the first particularization

which is attached to them.

And know that rational cogitation (al-fikr al-) is afflicted by this power

[i.e., the compositive imagination], and because of the nature of this power it is

greatly preoccupied. For whenever it uses [this power] concerning some form,

for some use directed to some end, it is quickly led to some other thing which is

not related to [that end], and from it to a third thing, so that it makes the soul

forget the first thing from which it began. Thus it is necessary for the soul to

recollect, taking refuge in analysis by conversion (al-l bi-al-aks), until it

returns to the starting point. And whenever it happens that the soul perceives


something in a state of waking, or that is it joined in some way to the heavens in

a state of sleep, in the manner that we shall later describe, then, if [this power]

enables the soul, through its rest or its subjugation, to establish [some form]

firmly, and does not overcome it by curtailing the time during which what

appears to it from the imaginings is established, then this form will be

established in the memory very strongly, according to its own aspect and form

(al wajhi-hi wa-rahti-hi).

7. Ishrt, Forget 125:

A fourth faculty serves [estimation] in it, to which it belongs to compose and

divide what is close to it of the forms taken from sense and the intentions

perceived by the estimation; and it also composes forms with intentions and

separates them from them. And when the intellect uses it, it is called cogitative,

and when the estimation uses it, it is called imaginative.

8.1: Discussions, ed. Badawi, §359, p. 199:

Cogitation requires conjunction with the principles in the procurement of

definitions and their conceptualization, and in the procurement of the middle

[term]. As for [their] composition, this belongs to [cogitation], which it

sometimes does well, and sometimes poorly.

8.2, §468:

And if by the cogitative faculty one means [the faculty] which is seeking, it

belongs to the rational soul and it is of the species of the habitual intellect,

especially when it adds a perfection by way of surpassing the habit. And if one

means by it the moving faculty which presents the forms, it is the imaginative

faculty insofar as it is moved with the desire of the rational faculty.2

9.1 On the Human Faculties and their Perceptions, pp. 43–44:3

And a faculty called estimation, which is that which perceives from the

sensibles what is not sensed, like the faculty which is in the sheep which, when

the form of the wolf is represented in the sense of the sheep, represents its

enmity and wickedness, since the sense does not perceive this. And a faculty

called the retentive, which is the storehouse of what the estimation has

perceived, just as the formative faculty is the storehouse of what sensation has

perceived. And a faculty called cogitative, which is that which has mastery over

2 Alternatively: ―And if one means by it the faculty which presents the moving forms, it is the imaginative faculty insofar as it is moved with the desire of the rational faculty‖ (It is ambiguous whether al-mutaarrik modifies rah or riah). 3 In Tis Rasil, 42-48. According to Michot, this text is probably an excerpt from a longer text, possible the ps.-Frb Seals of Wisdom.


what has been deposited in the formative and retentive storehouses, and mixes

some of them with others and separates some of them from others. And it is

called cogitative if the spirit and intellect of the human being (r al-) uses

it, but if estimation uses it, it is called imagination.

9.2: Holy spirit (al-r al-quds) (44.23):

The side below does not distract it from the side above, and its internal

sensation is not immersed in external sensation, and its influence exceeds its

own body, without the heavenly bodies, and what is in them. And it receives

intelligibles from the angelic spirit without instruction /45 from human beings.

Common weak spirits, if they incline to the internal, they are absent from the

external, and if they incline towards the external, they are absent form the

internal. And if they rely externally upon [one] abode, they are absent from the

other. And if they incline internally to one power, they are absent from the other.

And for this reason the act of seeing overwhelms the act of hearing, and fear

preoccupies one from desire, and desire preoccupies one from anger, and

cogitation diverts one from recollection, and recollection diverts one from

cogitation. But one function does not distract the holy spirit from another

function.4

/46 And sometimes the imaginative power is transferred through its likening

motions (bi--h al-tashbhyah) from the thing seen in itself to things

which are related to it. And this requires interpretation, and the interpretation is

the intuition (ads) of the interpreter, who extracts the root in it from the

branches.

And it is not the role of the sensible insofar as it is sensible to be understood,

nor is it part of the role of the intelligible insofar as it is intelligible to sense. And

the senses will only be perfected through bodily organs, concerning what the

form of the sensible represents by a wonderful representation belonging to

foreign concomitants; whereas intellectual perception will not be perfected by

bodily organs. For what is conceived in them is particularized, whereas what is

common and general is not conceptualized in it in something divisible, but

rather, the human spirit, which receives intelligibles by means of intellects, is a

bodily substance which is divided nor localized, but rather, does not enter into

estimation, and is not perceived by sensation, because of the goodness of the

thing.

4 Note emendation from the text; this sentence belongs with this section; the new concerns the common sense, e.g., f al-iss al-mushtarak.

SHIF (HEALING) Al-Nafs(Psychology) Book 4 · Avicenna, Shifa ’:Psychology, Book 4 2 when we...

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