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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Committee Study ofthe Central Intelligence Agency's Detention andInterrogation Program

Additiomal Views

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SENATOR

ROCKEFELLER

VIEWS

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Senator John D. Rockefeller IV - Additional Views

The Senate Intelligence Committee's entire Study on the CIA's Detention and InterrogationProgram is themost in-depth and substantive oversight initiative that theCommittee has everundertaken, and itpresents extremely valuable insights into crucial oversight questions andproblems that need to be addressed at the CIA.

Moreover, this Study exemplifies why this Committee was created in the first place - followingthe findings of the Church Committee nearly 40years ago - and I commend Chairman Feinstein .forshepherding this landmark initiative to this point.

Itis my hope and expectation that beyond the initial release ofthe Executive Summary andFindings and Conclusions, the entire 6,800 page Study will eventually be made public with theappropriate redactions. Those public findings will becritical tofully learning the necessarylessons from this dark episode inour nation's history, and toensuring that this never happensagain.

It has been a long, hard fight to get to this point. Especially in the early years of the CIA'sDetention and Interrogation Program, it was a struggle for the Committee toget the most basicinformation - or anyinformation at all- about theprogram.

The Committee's Study ofthe Detention and Interrogation Program isnot just the story ofthe^brutal and ill-conceived program itself. This Study is alsothestory of the breakdown in oursystem of governance that allowed the country to deviate, in such a significant way, from ourcore principles.

Oneof the profound ways thatbreakdown happened was through the active subversion ofmeaningful congressional oversight - a theme mirrored in the Bush Administration's warrantlesswiretapping program during the same period.

As a matter of my own history with this issue, I first learnedabout some aspects of the CIA'sDetention and Interrogation Program in 2003, when I became Vice Chair of the Committee. Atthat point, and for years after, the CIA refused to provide me with additional information Irequested about the program or share information regarding the program with the fullCommittee. The briefings I received provided little or no insight into theCIA's program.Questions or follow up requests were rejected, and at times I was notallowed to consult with mycounsel or other members from my staff.

It wasclear that the briefings were notmeant to answer my questions, butwere intended only toprovide cover for the Administration and the CIA. It was infuriating to realize that I was part of abox checking exercise the Bush Administration planned touse - and later did use - sothey coulddisingenuouslyclaim that they had "fiillybriefed Congress."

In the years that followed, I fought - and lost - many battles to obtain credible information abouttheDetention andInterrogation Program. As Vice Chair I tried to launch a comprehensive

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investigation into the program, but that effort was blocked. Later, in 2005, when I fought foraccess to over100 specific documents cited in the Inspector General report, theCIA refused tocooperate.

The first time the full Senate InteUigence Committee was given any information about the CIA'sDetention and Interrogation Program was September 2006. This was years after the program'sinception, and the same day President Bush informed the public ofthe program's existence.

The following year, when I became Chairman, the new Vice Chairman, Kit Bond, agreed withme topush for significant additional access to the program - including Senators' access to ourstaffs counsel on these matters. We finally prevailed and got this access, which enabled us tohavemuchneeded hearings on theprogram, and we did. As Chairman, I made sure wescrutinized it from every angle. However, the challenge of getting accurate information from theCIA persisted.

In the same time period, I also sent two Committee staffers tobegin reviewing cables at the CIAregarding the agency's interrogations ofAbu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri. I firmly believed we hadto review those cables, which are now the only source of important historical information on thistopic because the CIAdestroyed its videotapes of theinterrogation sessions. The CIA did thisagainst the explicit direction of the White House and the Director of National Intelligence.

The investigation I began in 2007 grew under Chairman Feinstein's dedication and tremendousleadership into a full study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The more theCommittee dug, the more it found, and the results we uncovered areboth shocking and deeplytroubling.

First, the Detention and Interrogation Program was conceived bypeople who were ignorant ofthe topic and made it up on the fly based on the untested theories of contractors who had nevermet a terrorist or conducted a real-world interrogationof any type.

Second, it was executed by personnel with insufficient linguistic and interrogation training, andlittle if any real-world experience.

Third, it was managed incompetently by senior officials who paid little or no attention to crucialdetails, and it was rife with troubling personal and financial conflictsof interestamong the smallgroup of CIA officials and contractors who promoted and defended it.

Fourth, it was physically severe, far more so than any of us outside the CIA ever knew.

Finally, its results were unclear at best, but it was presented to theWhite House, theDepartmentof Justice, the Congress, andthemedia as a silver bullet thatwas indispensable to "saving lives."In fact, it did not provide theintelligence it was supposed to provide, or thatCIAofficials arguedit provided. To be perfectly clear, these harsh techniques were notapproved by anyone - ever-for the low-bar standard of learning "useful information" from detainees. These techniques wereapproved because Bush Administration lawyers and officials were told, and believed, that these

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coercive interrogations were absolutely necessary to elicit intelligence that was unavailable byany other collection method and would save American lives. That was simply not the case.

Nevertheless, for all of the misinformation, incompetence^ and brutality in the CIA's program,the Committee sStudy is not, and must not be, simply abackward looking condemnation of pastmistakes. The Study presents atremendous opportunity to develop forward looking lessons thatmust be central to all future intelligence activities.

The CIA developed the Detention and Interrogation Program in atime of great fear, anxiety andunprecedented crisis; but itis at these times of crisis when we need sound judgment, excellence,and professionalism from the CIA the most. When mistakes are made, they call for self-reflection and scrutiny. For that process to begin, we first have to make sure there is an accuratepublic record of what happened. The public release of the Executive Sunmiary and Findings andConclusions is a tremendous and consequential step toward that goal.

For some Iexpect there will be anatural temptation to reject, cast doubt on, or rationalize partsof the Study that are disturbing or embarrassing. Indeed the CIA program's dramatic divergencefrom the standards that we hold ourselves to is hard to reconcile. However, we must fight thatshortsighted temptation to wish away the gravity ofwhat this Study has found.

How we deal with this opportunity to leam, and improve, will reflect on the maturity of ourdeniocracy. As a country, we are strong enough to bear the weight ofour mistakes, and as aninstitution, so is the CIA. We must confront this dark period in our recent history with honestyand critical introspection. We must draw lessons, and we must apply those lessons as we moveforward. Although itmay be uncomfortable at times, ultimately we will grow stronger, and wewillensure that this never happens again.

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SENATOR

WYDEN

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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

Having served in Congress for nearly thirty-five years, and having served on theIntelligence Committee for over thirteen, Ican easily say that this report is among the mostdetailed and comprehensive that Ihave ever seen. In addition, the investigation that produced ithas been one of the most thorough and diligent that Congress has conducted during my tenure. Iam proud to have been able to support it, and I would like to thank the extremely dedicated andtalented staff who worked incredibly hard to produce it in the face ofsignificant obstacles. Also,I commend Chairman Feinstein, and her predecessor Senator Rockefeller, for their leadership onthe issue of interrogations.

However, I would be remiss ifI let this opportunity go by without adding some briefadditional thoughts that go beyond the scope of this report and touch on broader issues of secrecyMd transparency. In my view certain aspects ofthe disturbing history surrounding coerciveinterrogations highlight broader problems faced by those who lead intelligence agencies, andthose who oversee them.

In particular, I have long been concerned about the problems posed by governmentofficials' reliance onwhat is effectively secret law. As I have said before, when laws aresecretly interpreted behind closed doors by a small number ofgovernment officials, withoutpublic scrutiny or debate, itdramatically increases the likelihood ofgovernment agencies takingactions that the American public would not support.

Most Americans expect their govemment to gather information about genuine threats tonational security andpublic safety, and they recognize that this information cansometimes begathered more effectively when somedetails about how it is collected remain secret. ButAmericans alsoexpect govemment agencies to operate at all times within theboundaries ofpublicly understood law. Americans inthe 21" century don't expect their military andintelligence agencies to publish every single detail oftheir operations any more than theyexpectedGeorge Washington to publish his strategy for the Battleof Yorktown. But Americansabsolutely expect that the law itself will not be secret - and as voters they have a need and a rightto understand what government officials think the law actually means, so that they can decidewhether particular lawsneed to bechanged andratify or reject decisions that their electedofficials make on their behalf. .

It is clear that a central problem with the CIA's secret detention and interrogationprogram was thatit relied on secret interpretations of thelaw that went well beyond both thelaw's plain meaning and the public's understanding ofwhat the law permitted. And this problemwas unfortunately notconfined to the CL\. During thesame time period, the NSA relied onsecret legal interpretations from the Department ofJustice (and, later, the Foreign InteUigenceSurveillance Court) as the basis for a massive expansion of its domestic surveillance activities.Both history and common sense made it clear that these secret interpretations of the law wouldnot stay secretforever, and thepredictable result was a robust public backlash andan erosion ofconfidence in US intelligence agencies and in govemment more generally.

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Another serious problem that can be seen in both the CIA interrogation case and the NSAsurveillance case is the way that reliance on asecret body of law helped spawn aculture ofmisinformation, in which senior government officials repeatedly made inaccurate and misleadingstatements to the public and the press regarding intelligence agencies' authorities and activities.In addition to misleading the public about how the law was being interpreted, these statementsoften inaccurately characterized the effectiveness of these controversial programs - much ofwhat CIA officials said about the effectiveness of coercive interrogations was simply untrue.

Beyond the problem of secret law, it is also clear that excessive secrecy within thegovernment contributed to atroubling lack ofoversight. This lack ofoversight meant that baddecisions were not corrected, and shocking mistakes were often allowed to proliferate and berepeated. While some individual members of Congress and the executive branch pushed hard formore oversight ofCIA interrogation activities, the argument that information about theseprograms needed to be kept tightly guarded even within the government was allowed to prevail.

This is an argument that has been frequently been made when oversight bodies inCongress and the executive branch have attempted to leam more about potentially controversialsecret programs. Intelligence officials will naturally tend to argue that it is necessary to limitaccess to information about sensitive intelligence collection methods to keep those methods frombeing publicly disclosed. Ifthis imperative isnot balanced against the need for informed andvigilant oversight of intelligence activities, then effective oversight can be stymied by excessivesecrecy, leaving these agencies much more likely to make serious errors and repeat them.

In the case ofthe CIA interrogation program, of course, the fact that this impulse towardsecrecy was allowed to outweigh the need for robust, well-informed oversight is particularlyegregious because CIA officials were at times providing information to the press (includinginformation that was often inaccurate and misleading) at the same time that congressionalrequests for information were being stonewalled. Itis an unfortunate fact that intelligenceagencies legitimate mandate for secrecy has often been used to hide programs and activitiesfrom people who might criticize them.

Fortunately, the solution to these problems is straightforward, even ifit isn't easy.Members ofCongress and the executive branch must continually push for the information thatthey need to do their jobs, and intelligence officials must avoid taking actions that obstruct thisimportant oversight. And everyone involved must remember that there is ultimately nosubstitute for oversight from the public itself, which iswhy all government agencies - evenintelligence agencies - should constantly be pressed tomake as much information available tothe public as possible. Finally, everyone who values the legitimacy ofour democraticinstitutions must remember that the government's understanding oflaws, treaties and theConstitution shouldn't just bepublic when government officials find it convenient. Thisinformation should bepublic all the time, and every American should beable to find outwhattheir government thinks the law means.

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The vast majority of the men and women who work at America's intelligence agenciesare overwhelniingly dedicated professionals who make enormous sacrifices to help keep ourcountry safe and free, and they should be able to do their jobs secure in the knowledge that theyhave the confidence of the American people. By remembering these principles and working hardto adhere to them, Ibelieve that those of us who are lucky enough to serve in government canensure the protection of both American security and American values, and give these men andwomenthe confidence that they deserve.

Ron Wyden

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SENATOR

UDALL

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SEN. UDALL ADDITIONAL VIEWS TO THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARYOF THE COMMITTEE STUDY ON THE

CIA'S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAMJune 9,2014

This summary of the Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is over five years in themaking and highlights the key facts and findings in the much more comprehensive, nearly 6700-pagereport that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted to initiate in 2009. This Study has beennghtly called one of the most significant examples of oversight in the history of the U.S. Senate. It isbased on adocumentary review of more than 6million pages of CIA and other records, and raises criticalquestions about intelUgence operations and oversight, many of which remain highly relevant today.

The Committee's Study details the numerous flaws in the CIA's Detention and InterrogationProgram. Among them: It was allowed to be shaped and conducted by individuals who didn't understandwhat they were doing and who had afinancial stake in representing the program as effective. It was runby personnel with insufficient training. It was managed incompetently by senior CIA personnel. The"enhanced interrogation techniques" were far more brutal than anyone understood. Perhaps mostimportantly, these techniques did not work. Nonetheless, the program was sold to the White House, theDepartment of Justice, the Congress, and the media as anecessary program that provided uniqueinformation that "saved lives."

The significance of the Committee Study lies in the words written in its pages. But the history of theStudy itselfis alsoan important story that needs to be told.

Chairman Feinstein, who has shouldered the greatest responsibility and deserves the greatest credit forseeing this project to completion, and former Chairman Rockefeller, who served as the Committee'sranking member and then Chairman during the time when the CIA was conducting its program, are bestable to speak to the earliest days ofthe Study and the events that led the Committee to undertake thisenoiTOOus task. And after five years of courageous leadership in pushing this Study forward, navigatingpartisan rancor and CIA obstacles. Chairman Feinstein can certainly speak most authoritatively to all thetwist and turns on the road to theStudy's release.

But as a newer member of the Committee, I also have a perspective toshare. And I believe that thehistory ofthe CIA's program isn't complete without a full telUng ofthe events that came after theprogram ended, to include this Committee's efforts - and mine - to complete and declassify the Study oftheCIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,

As anew member on the Committee in 2011,1 was briefed on the origins and status of the Study andbegan reading early drafts and discussing the way forward with Committee colleagues. Ihad alwaysbelieved that the CIA's program - with its "enhanced interrogation techniques," renditions, and blacksites - was astain on our country's recent past. But Iwas deeply disturbed to learn specifics about theflaws in the program, the misrepresentations, the brutahty. During this time, I also learned about thededicated Committee staff who were working every day and late into the nights at the CIA-leased off-sitefacility, where they sifted through millions of CIA records, and in our Committee spaces in the Senate,where they continued to write the thousands of pages that would become the first comprehensive reviewof the CIA's program.

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By late 2012, the Study was largely complete. In December 2012,1 supported the Chairman and otherCommittee colleagues in voting to approve the Study, which we then provided to the White House andExecutive Branch agencies for "review and comment." The CIA took over six months to produce itscomments on the Study, during which time I and other Committee members repeatedly requested thatCIA personnel meet with Conmuttee staff to discuss the report. The CIA declined all requests to meetwith its oversight committee on this matter.

In January 2013, President Obama nominated John Brennan to serve as the next CIA director. I hopedthat as acareer CIA officer, Brennan would understand the opportunity before him to lead the Agency incorrecting the false record that the Committee's Study uncovered and instituting the necessary reforms torestore the CIA's reputation for integrity and analytical rigor. During his nomination hearing, I stressed toMr. Brennan that this Study isn't just about the past. Acknowledging the flaws of this program isessential for the CIA's long-term institutional integrity - as well as for the legitimacy of ongoing sensitiveprograms. The findings ofthis Study directly relate to how other CIA programs are managed today. TheCIA cannot be its best unless it faces the serious and grievous mistakes ofthis program - to include thefalse representations made to policymakers and others - to ensure these mistakes never happen again.

I also expressed my belief to Mr. Brennan that the government has an obligation to the American peopleto face its mistakes transparently, help the public understand the natiire of those mistakes, and correctthem. I asked him whether he believes the CIA has a responsibility to correct any inaccurate informationthat was provided to the previous White House, the Department ofJustice, Congress, and the publicregarding the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Mr. Brennan said yes.

Mr. Brennan has yet to make any corrections to the public record. Instead, the CIA engaged in efforts toobstruct and undermine the Committee's oversight efforts. In spring 2013, as the CIA prepared itscomments on theStudy, we heard through the public statements of unnamed current intelligence officialsand named former officials - those who have aclear stake in preserving the myth of the program's value- that the CIA was highly critical of the Committee's report, believing it tobe"political" and "biased."

In May 2013, still awaiting the CIA's promised response to the Committee Study, I wrote toPresidentObama, underlining the importance of correcting the publicrecord if it was determined that inaccurateinformation had been conveyed to the American people by the U.S. government and urging a swiftresponse from the CIAto the Committee Study. I received noreply.

On June 27, 2013, the CIA finally submitted its 122-page formal response to the Committee, though itwas notthecorrection of therecord that many ofushoped it would be. Instead, a CIA spokesman saidthat although the Agency "agrees with a number ofthe study's findings," the Study contained "significanterrors." AWhite House spokeswoman noted "factual questions" about the Study. But the CIA onlyidentified one factual error in its response - and it was one that had no impact on the report and wasquickly corrected. Moreworrisome, theCIAcontinued to cling to false narratives about theeffectivenessofthe program in its written response - only admitting tothe factual errors inits own response inmeetings with Committee staff. The Committee requested that the CIA resubmit a written responsereflecting corrections to theerrors that the CIA acknowledged in meetings, but the CIA submitted norevised response. As such, the last document the CIA submitted to the Committee on this programcontinues to be riddled with factual errors and misstatements.

In July 2013, as a member ofthe Senate Armed Services Committee, I attended the nomination hearing ofStephen Preston - then CIA General Counsel - tobeGeneral Counsel at the Department ofDefense. His

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answers to questions regarding his role in and support ofthe CIA's June 27, 2013, response concerned meenough that I asked him to answer additional questions for the hearing record. His answers to myadditional questions contrasted with statements provided by the CIA in its response to the CommitteeStudy, admitting that the CIA's efforts "fell well short" ofcurrent standards for providing information toits oversight committees, as is required by law; that CIA briefings to the Committee included "inaccurateinformation"; that the CIA's efforts had again fallen "well short ofour current practices when itcomes toproviding information relevant to [the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel]'s legal analysis";and that by reviewing the CIA's records, it would be possible to determine whether information providedafter the use of brutal interrogation techniques had akeady been obtained from other sources, somethingthe CIA continuedto officially claimwas "unknowable."

But Stephen Preston wasn't the only CIA official todisagree with the standard CIA narrative on itsdetention and interrogation program. As Idiscovered in late 2013, an internal CIA review of the programinitiated under former Director Panetta corroborates some of the significant findings of the Study andacknowledps significant errors made during the course of the CIA's program - but this internal reviewconflicts with theCIA's own official response provided to theCommittee, which denies or minimizesthose same errors.

As Chairman Feinstein soeloquently outlined inher floor speech onMarch 11, 2014, drafts of the so-called Panetta review had been provided to Committee staff years before - apparently unknowingly ormistakenly by the CIA. When the disparity between its conclusions and the CIA's June 27, 2013,response to the Committee became clear. Committee staff grew concerned that the CIA was knowinglyproviding inaccurate information to the Committee in the present day - which would bea serious offenseand adeeply troubling matter for this Committee, the Congress, the White House, and our country. Topreserve evidence ofthis potential offense. Committee staff securely transported a printed portion ofthedraftPanetta review from the CIA-leased facility to the Conmiittee's secure offices in the Senate.

At the December 2013 nomination hearing ofCaroline Krass - who was slated toreplace Preston as theCIA's top lawyer -1 asked Ms. Krass toensure that a final copy of this review would be made availabletothe Committee, since it raised fundamental questions about why a review the CIA conducted internallyyears ago - and never provided to the Committee - is so different from the CIA's formal written responseand from the many public statements of unnamed and former CIA officials. Chairman Feinstein hadmade the same request inan earlier letter. Although the Committee had a draft of the review already in itspossession, I believed then - as I donow - that it was important to make public the existence of thisinternal document and its conclusions and to obtain a final version.

In early January 2014,1 wrote a letter to President Obama reiterating myrequest that the final draft of thePanetta review be provided to the Committee. The CIA needed to reconcile the fact that it agreed with theCommittee behind closed doors with itscontinued CIA criticisms of the Study in public. But instead ofcontiing clean, the Agency chose to double down on its denials.

In early March 2014,1 wrote another letter toPresident Obama, restating my interest in the final Panettareview. Inthat letter, I also alluded to "unprecedented action" that the CIA had recently taken against theCommittee, calling it "incredibly troubling for the Committee's oversight responsibilities and for ourdemocracy." As news reports made clear on March 4, 2014, and Chairman Feinstein explained further inher March 11, 2014, speech, that action was the CIA's unauthorized search ofthe Committee's computersat the off-site facility - a search conducted out ofconcern that Committee staff ah-eady had access to thePanetta review, a document they were fiilly cleared tosee. More troubling, despite admitting to the

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Committee that the CIA conducted the search, Director Brennan publicly refeiTed to "spurious allegationsabout CIA actions that are wholly unsupported by the facts."

The CIA never asked the Committee whether or how it had access to the review conducted under DirectorPanetta. Instead, without notifying the Committee, the CIA searched the Committee computers that theagency had agreed were off limits, and in the process, the CIA may have violated multiple provisions ofthe Constitution (including both the Speech and Debate Clause and the Fourth Amendment) as well asfederal criminal statutes and Executive Order 12333. Director Brennan declined to respond to furtherquesUons about the CIA's actions to the Committee, and instead, the CIA's acting general counsel - whowas involved in the 2005 decision to destroy the CIA's interrogation videotapes - filed acrimes reportwith the Department of Justice about the Committee stafTsactions to preserve the Panetta reviewdocuments. The CIA's Inspector General also referred the CIA search to the Department of Justice, andthe Senate Sergeant at Arms continues to conduct aforensic review of the Committee's computers.

The matter ofthe Panetta Review remains unresolved, but serves to emphasize the fact that the CIA isunwilling or unable to submit itself to honest and transparent oversight by the Congress. The agency notonly hasn't learned from its mistakes ofthe past, but continues to perpetuate them.

Meanwhile, even as the threat ofcriminal prosecution and inquiry persisted. Committee staff continued towork at the direction ofthe Members in preparing the Conmiittee Study for declassification andrelease. After months spent incorporating comments from the CIA's June 27, 2013, response - to ensurethat the CIA's views on the Study's findings were represented - Committee staff completed arevisedConmiittee Study that grew from 6,300 pages to nearly 6,700 pages. On April 3, 2014, in abipanisan 11- 3vote, the Committee moved to submit for declassification the nearly 500-page Executive Summaryand 20 findings and conclusions of the Committee Study on the CIA's Detention and InterrogationProgram.

This was a proud day for the Committee - for the Chairman who led this vital effort, for other memberswho worked alongside her, and for Committee staff, who put their lives on hold for years whilecompleting this seminal work. This was also aproud day for the American people - who deserve tounderstand this dark chapter inour history and why it is still relevant today.

The American people also deserve to read as much ofthis history as possible. That is why the Chairmanand I and many ofourcolleagues called repeatedly for the fullest possible declassification of theExecutive Summary and the Study's findings and conclusions, with only redactions as necessary for realnational security concerns, not to avoid embarrassment. The American people deserve a proper andaccurate accounting ofthe history, management, operation, and effectiveness ofthis program - and theyhave the right toknow what the government has done on their behalf. It ismy hope that we can soonrelease not just the Executive Summary, but the entire 6,700 pages ofthe Committee's Study, for theAmerican people.

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SENATOR

HEINRICH

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Additional Views of Senator Martin Heinrich

In January 2009, President Obama signed Executive Order 13491, limitinginterrogations by any American personnel to the guidelines in the Army FieldManual, and reinforcing the commitment that prisoners inU.S. custody are entitledto rights under the Geneva Conventions. This officially ended a dark period inAmerican history that, in reality, had already effectively collapsed under theweight ofpoor policy decisions, ineffectiveness, bad management, and publicdisclosures.

I came to this Committee believing that the press accounts andbooks I read hadadequately prepared me for what took place in this program. I was wrong.

Compounding this is the fact that my ignorance was not unique; the CIAdeliberately kept the vast majority ofthe Senate and House IntelligenceConmiittees in the dark until the day the president revealed the detention andinterrogation program to the world in 2006 - four years after it began.

Even then, misrepresentations to the Committee about the effectiveness of theCIA's detention and interrogation program continued, in large part because theCIA had never performed any comprehensive review of the effectiveness of theprogram or the actions of its officers. Myths of the "effectiveness" of torture havebeen repeated in the press, perpetrating the fable that this was a necessary programthat "saved lives." My hope is this meticulously detailed, near 7,000-pageCommittee study finally puts those lies to rest.

Those who were responsible for the CIA's detention and interrogation programwill continue to exploit public ignorance of what tookplacein the program toargue that the study is one-sided or biased, or that it lacks importantdetails orcontext. In the course of their efforts, they will misrepresent what is or is not in thestudy, while selectively picking through the executive summary in an effort tosupport their arguments.

However, the full study contains far more information and detail than could everbe captured in an executive summary. That is why I firmly believe the release ofthe executive sununary should not be the last step in thisprocess, but the first. It ismy hope that someday soon there will be a public releaseof the full Committeestudy. If this deplorable chapter is to truly be closed and relegated to history, thefull study should be declassified and released. The president has thatauthority,and I hope he will exercise it.

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This study represents years ofhard work by Members and staff who faced anumber ofobstacles in completing the work: the CIA taking years to dumpmillions of unsorted documents in amassive database while resisting requests foradditional information; the executive branch withholding thousands of pages ofdocuments from the Committee; and current and former officials anonymouslymisrepresenting the contents and the findings of the study in the press. The listcould go on. The fact that this study was finished is a testament to the dedicationofChairmen Rockefeller and Feinstein in deciding that oversight is worth it,regardless of how long it takes.

This is an objective and fact-based study. It is a fair study. And itis the onlycomprehensive study conducted of this program and the CIA's treatment of itsdetainees in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

The reality is that the president's signature on Executive Order 13491 is only validuntil the next national crisis emerges and moves awell-meaning, but misguidedpresident to rescind the order. It is worth remembering that years before thisdetention andinterrogation program even began, the CIA had sworn off the harshinterrogations ofits past; but in the wake ofthe terrorist attacks against the UnitedStates, it repeated those mistakes by once again engaging in brutal interrogationsAat undermined our nation's credibility on the issue ofhuman rights, producedinformation of uneven - and often questionable - value, and wasted millions oftaxpayer dollars.

This study should serve as a warning to those who would make similarchoices inthe future: torture doesn't work. It is therefore my hope that Members ofCongresswill read this study and join me in the conclusion that we must never let thishappen again. We need to shut the door on abusive interrogations completelythrough legislative action that leaves no loopholes, and no room for interpretation.

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SENATOR

KING

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Additional Views ofSenator King

(U) Ijoined the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in January 2013, approximatelyfour years after President Obama issued an Executive Order to end the detention andinterrogation program of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Assuch, I was not involved inthe inception and initial stages ofthe committee's review ofthe program. After carefiilly readingthis study's lengthy executive summary, the CIA's response, and other relevant documents, it isclear to methat some detainees were subjected to techniques that constituted torture. Suchbrutality is unacceptable, and themisconduct on thepartof some of theindividuals involved inthe use ofenhanced interrogation techniques, which isdocumented in the study, is inexplicable.Based upon this review, it appears tome that the enhanced interrogation techniques were noteffective in producing the type ofunique and reliable information claimed bytheagency'sleadership, andshould never again be employed by ourgovernment.

(U) In thecourse of conducting vigorous oversight with respect to this program, it is alsoimportant to bear in mind several points. First, in the wake of the September 2001 attacks, ourgovernment was inundated with endless leads to track down. There was genuine fear anduncertainty about follow-on strikes, whichmay explain, but not excuse, the actions that are thesubject of this study. Second, we live in a dangerous world with all-to-real enemies and I believefirmly that intelligence is our nation's first line of defense against terrorism. As such, the CIAand other intelligence agencies are vital to keeping us safeand the disturbing nature of thestudy's findings shouldnotbe used to undermine our overall intelligence enterprise. Lastly, itshould be understood that those responsible for the mismanagement and misconduct associatedwith the detention and interrogation program are not representative of the manydedicatedprofessionals serving our nation, often in anonymity, at theCIA. Having met with many CIAofficers, I have great respect for theirintellect, dedication, courage, and sacrifice.

(U) Despite the unquestionable professionalism of the vast majorityof CIA personnel,the study demonstrates that the detention and interrogation program was mismanaged, that somewithin the leadership of the CIA actively impeded congressional oversight, and that agencyofficials misrepresented the program's effectiveness.

•(SjrThestudy finds that CIA headquarters failed to keep accurate records on those itdetained and placed individuals with limitedexperience in senior detention and interrogationroles. Even after a detainee died of hypothermia at a detention facility in November 2002, manyof these practices continued without adequate oversight. In its response to the study, the CIAstates that delegating managementof this particular facility to a junior officer "was not a prudentmanagerial decision given the risks inherent in the program."' It is difficult to imagine a greaterunderstatement of what occurred. More accurately, in the words of one of the CIA's seniorinterrogators, the program was "a train wreak [sic] waiting to happen."^

' Central Intelligence Agency's Response to the SSCI's Study ofthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,June 27, 2013, Response to Conclusion 15, p. 42.^SSCI Study ofthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, April 3, 2014, Executive Summary, p. 68.

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(U) Of the many examples of impeding congressional oversight documented in the study,none is more striking than the decision by CIA leaders to destroy videotapes ofCIAinterrogations out ofa concern that Congress might discover evidence ofmisconduct andbrutality. There is no excuse for this decision and those involved should no longer be associatedwith the CIA or the United States government.

^Most significantly, the study finds that the CIA's justification for the use ofenhancedinterrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness. In its officialresponse to the study, the CIA contradicts many ofits previous claims ofunqualifiedeffectiveness by arguing that it is now "unknowable" whether the same information could havebeen acquired without the use ofenhanced interrogation techniques and further contends that itspast assertions were "sincerely believed but inherently speculative."^ Yet in the long andunfortunate history ofthis program, no one in the CIA's leadership expressed such an equivocalview of the techniques' effectiveness. What was once certain is now "unknowable;" thismigration ofrationales underlines for me the magnitude ofthe prior misrepresentations.

^ I have to assume that in many cases the representations ofeffectiveness were believedby the individuals who made them. However, the CIA also admits in its response that it neverattempted todevelop a "more sustained, systematic, and independent means by which toevaluatethe effectiveness of the approaches used with detainees."^ It states further that its reviews of theprogram's effectiveness were "heavily reliant on the views ofthe practitioners" - including thecontract psychologists who designed and executed the techniques.

(U) If such a sustained, systematic, and independent evaluation was impractical, as theCIA now claims, then it follows that the CIA's assertions about the effectiveness of suchtechniques were largelyguesswork. In theend, policymakers based theirdecisions about aprogram so at variance with our past practices and values on anecdotal information, rather thanona verifiable process. This, inmy opinion, is among the seminal failings of the program andthe CIA's leadership during this period.

(U) Finally, I am deeply disturbed bythe implications of thestudy for the committee'sability to discharge its oversight responsibility. The core of the oversight function rests in largepart upon the interaction of ourcommittee with representatives of thevarious intelligenceagencies, most particularly theCIA. Because it appears from thestudy that thecommittee wascontinuously misled as to virtually allaspects of this program, it naturally raises the extremelytroubling question as to whether wecantrust therepresentations of theagency in connectionwith difficult or sensitive issues in the future. If ourprincipal oversight approach is based onfirank and open communication with the CIA's leadership, and we cannot fully rely upon theanswers we receive, then the entire oversight function is compromised.

3 Central Intelligence Agency's Response tothe SSCI's Study ofthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,June 27, 2013, Response to Conclusion 9, p. 23.^Central Intelligence Agency's Response to the SSCI's Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,June 27, 2013,Response to Conclusion 10,p. 24.^Central Intelligence Agency's Response to the SSCI's Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,June 27, 2013, Responseto Conclusion 10,p. 25.

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(U) As acommittee, we should discuss this matter to determine if additional steps may benecessary to ensure that we are getting accurate information. I,believe that our solemnresponsibility to provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities oftheUnited States requires serious consideration ofthis problem.

(U) I agree with my colleagues in the minority who note that the Department ofJustice'sdecision to begin acriminal investigation in 20G9 prevented the committee from conductingmost interviews and required the study to rely mainly on documents provided by the CIA. I amalso disappointed that the study could not utilize the expertise of the minority through ajointreview, as has been the committee's practice. While I believe the study isaccurate, this is afundamental lesson that will inform my approach to the committee's work in the years ahead.

(U) In conclusion, upon joiningthecommittee in 2G13 I endeavored to undertake athorough review of thestudy, the CIA's response, and other relevant documentation. I alsodiscussed this matter with Democrats and Republicans on the committee, the staffmembersinvolved in writing the study and the minority staff, the CIA personnel who drafted the agency'sresponse, a former senior military interrogator, current CIA officers bravely serving our nation inharm s way, a former top FBI official, and numerous Maine people —including human rightsexperts and leaders of the religious community.

(U) Based upon this review, I voted to approve declassification ofthe study because Ibelieve our nation's reputation as a beacon ofopenness, democratic values, human rights, andadherence to the rule of law is atstake. Our credibility —and ultimately our influence —in theworld is dependent upon this reputation, and it is ourobligation to admit when we fail to meetAmerica's high standards. I beUeve we can protect intelligence sources and methods and stilldeclassify a significant portion ofthe study to accomplish this goal.

(U) As then Secretary ofState Colin Powell said in 2004, following the scandals at AbuGhraib prison,

"Watch America. Watch how we deal with this. Watch how America will do theright thing. Watch what a nation of values and character, a nation that believes injustice, does to right this kind of wrong. Watch how a nation such as ours will nottolerate such actions."^

(U) In thelastanalysis, America's real power is based upon ourvalues and how we putthose values into practice. As with any individual - orgreat nation - we will occasionallystumble, but when we do, we acknowledge ourfailings - as wehave in thiscase- and move on,true to ourselves and to the better angels of our nature.

ANGUS S. KING

^Powell, Colin. "Commencement Address." Wake Forest University. 17 May 2004.

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Additional Views of Senator Collins

(U) The use oftorture is deplorable and is completely contrary to our values asAmericans. For as long as Ihave served in the Senate, I have cast votes in opposition to tortureand inhuman treatment of detainees. I cosponsored and voted in favor of Senator JohnMcCain'sDetainee Treatment Act of2005, which banned "cruel, inhuman, and degrading" treatment ofany prisoner in the custody ofany U.S. government agency, and I supported the MilitaryCommissions Act of2006, which bolstered the Detainee Treatment Act's prohibition on abusiveinterrogations.

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Review ofthe CentralIntelligence Agency's (CIA's) Detention and Interrogation Program devotes much ofits reportto supporting its judgment that enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) were ineffective inacquiring intelligence. While I agree with the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) currentposition that it is"unknowable" whether or not its "enhanced interrogation techniques" elicitedsignificant intelligence thatwould nototherwise have been obtained, the fact remains that tortureis wrong. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, orDegrading TreatmentorPunishment, which the United States ratified in 1994, is clear: "No exceptional circumstanceswhatsoever, whether a state ofwar or a threat ofw^, internal political instability orany otherpublicemergency, may be invoked asa justification of torture."

(U) The method by which the SSCI report was produced was unfortunate, to say theleast, and will cause many to question its findings. In my years ofservice on the traditionallybipartisan Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC), the Senate'schief oversight committee, the congressional reports I have coauthored have almost always beenthe result ofcollaborative, bipartisan investigations. Indeed, even a subject ascontroversial asthe treatment ofdetainees can lead tothe production ofa strong bipartisan report, asdemonstrated by the Senate Armed Services Committee's Inquiry into the Treatment ofDetainees in U.S. Custody drafted byChairman CarlLevin and Ranking Member John McCainandapproved by voice vote in November 2008. When I joined the Senate Select Committee onIntelligence in January 2013,1 was disappointed to leam that the Committee's investigation intothe CIA's Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation (RDI) program had not beenconducted in asimilarly bipartisan manner.

(U) Sincejoining theCommittee, I have sought to compensate for this missedopportunity and have encouraged greater dialogue among the CIA and the majority and minorityConunittee staff members, and extensive conversations have indeed occurred. Following thedelivery of the CIA's feedback to the Committee's report in June 2013,1 asked that we hold ahearing prior to a vote to declassify this report that would have included CIA witnesses. Such ahearing would have permitted a robust and much-needed debate about the claims made in thereport compared to the rebuttals in the Agency's formal response. Unfortunately, this hearingdid not occur.

(U) In theabsence ofa formal Committee hearing, I was briefed directiy byveteran,career CIA analysts who provided feedback on the report's factual accuracy and analytic quality.Two Senators from both sides of the aisle joined me in this worthwhile briefing.

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(U) Ialso sought to improve the report by recommending revisions and greater precisionin the Review sFindings &Conclusions, and Iappreciate Chairman Feinstein incorporatingsome of my edits.

(U) In addition to the partisan nature of the staff investigation, the report has significantintrinsic limitations because itdid not involve direct interviews ofCIA officials, contractpersonnel, or otherExecutive branch personnel. John Rizzo, oneof thechiefarchitects of theprogram, has stated publicly that he would have been happy to beinterviewed, and he said anumber ofhis colleagues would have as well. The absence ofinterviews significantly eroded thebipartisan cooperation that existed when the SSCI Review began and calls into question some ofthe report's analysis.

(U) The lack ofinterviews violated the Committee's bipartisan Terms ofReference thatwere approved by an overwhelming 14-1 vote in March2009. The Terms of Reference describethe purpose, scope, and methodology ofthe Review, and they include the following statement:*The Committee will use the tools ofoversight necessary to complete a thorough reviewincluding, but not limited to, document reviews and requests, interviews, testimony at closed andopen hearings, asappropriate, and preparation offindings and recommendations." Yet, therewere no interviews, no hearings, and no recommendations. By comparison, the SASC's 2008Inquiry into the Treatment ofDetainees in U.S. Custody included 70interviews, writtenresponses from more than 200 individuals in response to written questions, two hearings, and atleast two subpoenas.

(U) Documents never tell the full story and lack context. As the former Chairman orRanking Member of the Senate's chief investigative committee for ten years, I found thatinterviews were always key sources ofinformation for every investigation our HomelandSecurity Committee conducted. In the 2012 HSGAC investigation into the attacks inBenghazi,forexample, we discovered one ofour most alarming findings in a discussion with theCommander of U.S. Africa Command, General Carter Ham. We learned that he was unaware ofthe presence ofCIA officers inBenghazi, despite the fact that his Command had responsibility toprepare for the evacuation of U.S. government personnel.

(U) The bipartisan Terms ofReference also called for the production ofpolicyrecommendations, but not one is included in the Review's Findings & Conclusions or itsExecutive Summary. Ironically, it was the CIA, rather than the Committee, that first developedrecommendations to address the mismanagement, misconduct, andflawed performance thatcharacterized too much of theCIA's Detention & Interrogation program. I have identifiedseveral recommendations that should beimplemented as soon as possible.

(U) Despite these significant flaws, the report's findings lead meto conclude thatsomedetainees were subject to techniques that constituted torture. This inhumane and brutal treatmentnever should have occurred.

r/NF) The Review also raises serious concerns about the CIA'smanagement of this program. I particularlyagree with its conclusions that the CIA was notprepared to conduct the RDI program, that the CIA failed toconduct a comprehensive evaluation

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of the effectiveness of the use of EFTs, that theCIArarely held officers accountable formisconduct and mismanagement related to the RDI program, and that the CIA allowed a conflictof interest to existamong contractors responsible for too much of the RDI program. Is there anyfunction thatcould be more inherently governmental than the questioning of high-level al Qaedadetainees in CIAcustody? Yet, the CIA relied heavily oncontractors for its RDI program andeven had contractors evaluate the program.

(U) The Review's most significant findingdeals with the ineffectiveness of EITs incollecting valuable intelligence. As a Senator who strongly opposes torture, I would havewelcomed a well-documented finding that reached this judgment. Unfortunately, the evidencecited does not sustain theReview's categorical judgment that EITs were ineffective at acquiringvaluable intelligence.

(U) For example, the Review concedes that some detainees were subject to EITs so soonaftertheircapture that it is impossible to determine whether the information they provided couldhave beenobtained through non-coercive debriefing methods. Here the report gets it right: thereis no way to know whatinformation these particular detainees would haveprovided without theuse of EITs because the detainees werenot afforded that opportunity for very long. Yet, thereport drawsa different and much more definitive conclusion; EITs werecategoricallyineffective at acquiring valuable intelligence.

It is also striking to me that two highly experienced pubhcservants who are both widely respected for their integrity and impartiality, examinedthe programat two different times, independently of each other, and they both rendered the same verdictregarding the Leon Panetta, and in 2005, awell-regardedm^^^^^l^^^iP^^^^^l^^^^mboth wesimply can never know for sure if the information obtainedfrom detainees who were subjectedto EITs would have been obtained through other non-coercive means.

A letter from then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta toSenator John McCain sums up his conclusion on the effectiveness of EITs with respect to theOsama bin Laden raid: "Some of the detainees who provided useful information about thefacilitator/courier's role had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. Whether thosetechniques were the 'only timely and effective way' to obtain such information is a matter ofdebate anc^^j^yj^stablished definitively." According tothe Review's own ExecutiveSummary^^^^^Hsaid the following about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques: "here enters the epistemological problem. We can never know whetheror not this intelligence could have been extracted though altemative procedures."

(U) It bears repeating that torture need not be ineffective to be wrong. The United Statescorrectly answered the question of whether torture should be prohibited when our nation ratifiedthe Convention against Torture in 1994. The prohibition against torture in both U.S. law andinternational law is not based on an evaluation of its efficacy at eliciting inforination. Rather, theprohibition was put in place because torture is immoral and contrary to our values.

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(U) There are three findings about the RDI program that warrant attention because theyprovide important perspective and context about the CIA program.

(U) First, even as the mistreatment ofdetainees was occurring, senior CIA officialsrepeatedly sought legal approval from the Department ofJustice (DOJ) inaneffort tomake sureeach the EITs employed by CIA officers did not constitute torture. For example, the CIAsuspended the program and/or sought legal approval prior to conducting EITs on Abu Zabaydahand several times afterwards: in 2004 after anew attorney in DOJ's Office ofLegal Counsel(OLC), Jack Goldsmith, said the Department had never formally opined on whether EITs metconstitutional standards, in 2005 when another attorney in OLC assessed OLC had not providedasubstantive ruling on whether certain EITs violated portions of the Convention AgainstTorture, after passage of the Detainee Treatment Act of2005, and after the Supreme Court'sdecision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and the passage ofthe Military Commissions Act of2006.

(U) Second, the problems ofthe detention program were frequently whole-of-govemment failures, not justCIA's alone. Legal opinions issued by OLC are almost neverwithdrawn, especially by the same Administration that issued them. Yet, that is exactly whathappened in this case. Why was the original legal analysis by the Department ofJustice soinadequate regarding such animportant issue? CJA should not have made definitive claimsabout the effectiveness ofEITs, but independent ofthe material facts represented by CIA, thewithdrawal of the original August 1, 2002, OLC classified legal analysis demonstrated that itwastooflawed andlacked thelegal rigor necessary to serve as the basis fora controversial andquestionable program.

Third, the Review's Findings & Conclusions understate thedegree to which the U.S. Government failed to focus on anend game for CIA detainees in theprogram by not moving them to mihtary installations, even as the CLA repeatedly sought to movethe detainees out ofits custody in 2005 after many had ceased producing valuable intelligence.

(U) In theabsence of recommendations in theSSCI's report, I believe four actionsshould be taken to prevent the terrible mistakes in the CIA's RDI program from ever happeningagain.

(1) Outlaw waterboarding ofdetainees once andfor all. President Obama implementedthis policy when he took office by signing Executive Order 13491, which requires allgovernment agencies, not just the Department of Defense, to adhere to thetechniquesin the Army Field Manual 2-22.3. Codifying thisprohibition would make thisrestriction even more explicit than the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. I voted infavor of the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act inFebruary 2008, whichwould have restricted the interrogation techniques employed byCIA personnel toonly those covered in the Army Field Manual. Unfortunately, this legislation wasvetoed on March 8, 2008.

(2) Reduce the number ofprograms now shared exclusively with the Gang ofEight,which consists ofthe Chairman and Vice Chairman of the intelligence committeesandthe leadership ofboth chambers ofCongress, somore member ofthe oversight

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committees have access to significant information. Congress was informed about theRDI program to the bare minimum required by the National Security Act and nofurther. Most members of the intelligence committees, not to mention the rest ofCongress, officially learned about the program on the same day President Bushannounced it tothe world in September 2006. In this case, adherence to the letterofthe law rather than the spirit of the law resulted in insufficient oversight. As formerCIA attorney John Rizzo has said:

The decision in 2002 to limit congressional knowledge of the EITs to theGang of8and to stick to that position for four long years—as the prevailingpolitical winds were increasingly howling in theother direction—was foolish

^ and feckless. ..For our part, we inthe CIA leadership should have insisted atthe outset that all members ofthe intelligence committees be apprised ofallthe gory details all along the way, on the record, inclosed congressionalproceedings.

(3) Strengthen the review process at the Department ofJustice (DOJ) Office ofLegalCounsel (OLC)for legal opinions concerning sensitive intelligence activities. TheIntelligence Community (IC) requires and deserves to have confidence that OLC canproduce valid, durable legal analysis upon which it can rely. At the same time, the ICneeds to inform OLC if material facts related tosensitive programs that havepreviously been reviewed havechanged.

(4) Improve CIA controls in the management ofcovert action. Theunauthorized useofEITs beyond those approved by DOJ OLC, along with the many shortcomings inCIA's management ofthe RDI program, require CIA toimplement greater and moredetailed controls regarding sensitive programs.

(U) My vote to declassify this report does not signal myendorsement of all of itsconclusions or its methodology. I do believe, however, that the Executive Summary, and.Additional and Minority Views, and the CIA's rebuttal should be made public with appropriateredactions so the American public can reach their own conclusions about the conduct of thisprogram. In myjudgment, the"enhanced interrogation techniques" led, in someinstances, toinhumane and brutal treatment ofcertain individuals held by the United States government.

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