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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Chavez vs. JBC, G.R. No. 202242,April 16, 2013

JBC Composition

The Senate and the House of Representatives are entitled to only one (1) representative in the Judicial and Bar Council, not one (1) each. in opting to use the singular letter “ ” to describe “representative of Congress the Filipino people through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.

DE CASTRO VS. JBC, G.R. NO. 191002 MARCH 17, 2010

Ban on Midnight Appointments

- Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

ANG ATONG PAGLAUM VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 203766, APRIL 2, 2013.

Party-list System

three groups that may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. On the part of national parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations which intend to participate in the party-list race, the new guidelines state that these parties “do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any ‘marginalized or underrepresented sector.'” As for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race by registering under the party-list system and no longer field congressional candidates. These parties, if they field congressional candidates, however, are not barred from participating in the party-list elections; what they need to do is register their sectoral wing or party under the party-list system. This sectoral wing shall be considered an “independent sectoral party” linked to a political party through a coalition.

REGINA ONGSIAKO VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 207264, OCTOBER 22, 2013

HRET Jurisdiction

. . . the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, of which Reyes was not. Citing the case of Vinzons Chato vs. Comelec and a few more, the Court stated that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives, the Comelec’s jurisdiction over the election contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s jurisdiction begins.

TAGOLINO VS. HRET, G.R. NO. 202202, MARCH 19, 2013

Valid Substitution

- valid Certificate of Candidacy is a condition sine qua non for a valid candidate substitution. Since Richard’s COC was not valid for material representation as to his residence, then there was no valid substitution. In short, since Richard is not considered a “candidate” or there was no candidate to speak of, there would be no candidate to be substituted. Unlike disqualification under Section 68 where he can be substituted because the candidate therein has all the qualifications but disqualified because of prohibited acts like election offences or because he is a permanent resident of a foreign country, a candidate disqualified under Section 78 could not be validly substituted.

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DENR, GR. NO. 175368,APRIL 11, 2013

Control of Small Scale Mining by the State

– Issue: WON the Environment Secretary has the authority to cancel small-scale mining permits issued by a local government. Ruling: The SC finds that the grounds raised by petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of RA 7076 failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said provision of law. The DENR Secretary's cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the provincial Governor, was part of his "judicial review" under Republic Act 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

"The DENR Secretary's power to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.

BELGICA VS. OCHOA G.R. NOS. 208566, 208493 AND 209251, 2013

Legislative Department – Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power

- Is the congressional pork barrel system constitutional. Ruling: No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers; b, Non-delegability of legislative power; Principle of Checks and Balances.

How about the presidential pork barrel?

Held: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President ” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not laydown a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the

Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives thePresident wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect,allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. Hence, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds

intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of “priority infrastructure development projects”, it has transgressed the principle of non-delegability

ARAULLO VS. AQUINO G.R. NO. 209287, JULY 1, 2014

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM (DAP)

Issues:

I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

CONT. HELD:

I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.

CONT.

Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

On the issue of what are “savings”

These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

CONT.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 190582, APRIL 7,2010

Non-establishment clause of the Constitution/Freedom of association

– Ruling Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose

IMBONG V OCHOA, ET AL. (G.R. NOS. 204819, 204934, 204957, 205003, 205138, 204988, 205043, 205478, 205491, 205720,

206355, 207111, 207172, 207563) Issues: Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the:1. Right to life

2. Right to health

3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6. Due process clause

7. Equal protection clause

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

CONT.

In ruling against the petitioners, Justice Mendoza wrote: “In general, the Court does not find the RH law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies. The RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.”

Right to Access to Public Information and Public Accountability of Judiciary

RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS,LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATASHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THESUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEESOF THE JUDICIARY, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012RE: REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVEJOURNALISM [PCIJ] FOR THE 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS,LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATASHEETS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES, A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA, June 13, 2012 -

CONT.

In order to give meaning to the constitutional right of the people to have access to information on matters of public concern as well as accountability of public officers (AFTER THE IMPEACHMENT AND CONVICTION OF FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO CORONA BASED ON HIS SALN), the Court laid down the guidelines to be observed for requests made. Thus:

1. All requests for copies of statements of assets and liabilities of any Justice or Judge shall be filed with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court or with the Court Administrator, as the case may be (Section 8 [A][2], R.A. 6713), and shall state the purpose of the request.

2. The independence of the Judiciary is constitutionally as important as the right to information which is subject to the limitations provided by law. Under specific circumstances, the need for fair and just adjudication of litigations may require a court to be wary of deceptive requests for information which shall otherwise be freely available. Where the request is directly or indirectly traced to a litigant, lawyer, or interested party in a case pending before the court, or where the court is reasonably certain that a disputed matter will come before it under circumstances from which it may, also reasonably, be assumed that the request is not made in good faith and for a legitimate purpose, but to fish for information and, with the implicit threat of its disclosure, to influence a decision or to warn the court of the unpleasant consequences of an adverse judgment, the request may be denied.

CONT.

3. Where a decision has just been rendered by a court against the person making the request and the request for information appears to be a “fishing expedition” intended to harass or get back at the Judge, the request may be denied. 4. In the few areas where there is extortion by rebel elements or where the nature of their work exposes Judges to assaults against their personal safety, the request shall not only be denied but should be immediately reported to the military. 5. The reason for the denial shall be given in all cases.

DISINI, JR. V. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. NO. 203335

Cybercrime law (On-line libel)

- In upholding the constitutionality of the libel provision of the Cybercrime Law, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, it added, on-libel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel.

But for the High Court on-libel is made applicable only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. However it struck down as a nullity Section 5 which penalizes the act of aiding or abetting the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act. In effect the ruling does not consider “Liking” “Sharing” or “Commenting” as tantamount to aiding or abetting the crime of libel.

CONT. Constitutional law; Unsolicited commercial communications, also known as “spam” is entitled

to protection under freedom of expression. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

Criminal law; Cyberlibel under Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law is constitutional. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel. But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the Penal Code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.

CONT.

Criminal law; Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.