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Veroy v. Layague [GR 95630, 18 June 1992]

En Banc, Paras (J): 12 concur

Facts: Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy are husband and wiferesiding in Davao City. When Veroy was promoted to theposition of Assistant Administrator of the Social SecuritySystem sometime in June 1988, he and his family transferredto Quezon City. The care and upkeep of their residence inDavao City was left to 2 houseboys, Jimmy Favia and EricBurgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of thepremises. The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna

Soquilon for the salary of the said houseboys and otherexpenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys hadthe keys to the interior of the house, only the key to thekitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, wasentrusted to Edna Soquilon to give her access in case of anemergency. On 12 April 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the

Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP raided Veroys house in DavaoCity on information that the said residence was being used asa safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yardwith the help of the caretakers but did not enter the housesince the owner was not present and they did not have asearch warrant. Permission was requested by phone to Ma.Luisa Veroy who consented on the condition that the searchbe conducted in the presence of Major Macasaet. Thefollowing day, Capt. Obrero and Maj. Macasaet met at theVeroys house to conduct the search pursuant to the authority

granted by Ma. Luisa. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal.handgun with a magazine containing 7 live bullets in a blackclutch bag inside an unlocked drawer in the childrens room. 3half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFPwere also found in the childrens room. A search of thechildrens recreation and study area revealed a big travellingbag containing assorted clothing, a small black bag containinga book entitled Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation,a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bagcontaining assorted medicines and religious pamphlets wasfound in the masters bedroom. Inventory and receipt of seized articles were made. The case was referred forpreliminary investigation to the Quezon City AssistantProsecutor , who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutorfor Davao City by the DOJ through Department Order 88 (16May 1990). In a resolution dated 6 August 1990, the Fiscal

recommended the filing of an Information against the Veroysfor violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms andAmmunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). Hence, on 8 August1990, an Information for the said offense was filed by theOffice of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the RTCDavao City). No bail was recommended by the prosecution.

The fiscals resolution was received by the Veroys on 13August 1990. The latter filed a motion for bail on the sameday which was denied for being premature, as they have notbeen arrested yet. The Veroys voluntarily surrendered to Gen.Pantaleon Dumlao, but who refused to receive them on theground that his office has not received copies of theirwarrants of arrest. In the meantime, on 15 August 1990, theVeroys were admitted to the St. Lukes Hospital for variousailments brought about or aggravated by the stress andanxiety caused by the filing of the criminal complaint. On 17

August 1990, Gen. Dumlao granted their request that they beallowed to be confined at the hospital and placed under guardthereat. Upon arraignment on 1 October 1990, the Veroyspleaded not guilty and filed a motion for hospital confinement,which was denied. The court ordered their commitment at theDavao City Rehabilitation Center pending trial on the merits.At the conclusion thereof, the court issued a second orderdenying their motion for reconsideration. The Veroys werereturned to the St. Lukes Hospital where their physicalcondition remained erratic. Gen. Dumlao informed the Veroysthat he had issued a directive for their transfer from the St.Lukes Hospital to Camp Crame on the basis of the 2 October1990 Order. They would proceed with their transfer pursuantto the order of the trial court, unless otherwise restrained bythe court. The Veroys filed the petition for certiorari,mandamus and prohibition.

Issue: Whether the permission granted by ma. Luisa Veroy forascertaining thereat the presence of alleged rebel soldiersinclude the authority to conduct a room to room search onceinside the house.

Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people tobe secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects againstunreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches andseizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not anabsolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are:(1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a movingvehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. LoHo Wing). The necessity of the permission obtained from Ma.Luisa underlines the recognition of Capt. Obrero of the need of a search warrant to enter the house. The permission grantedby was for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged rebel soldiers. The permission did not includeany authority to conduct a room to room search once insidethe house. The police officers had ample time to procure asearch warrant but did not. Warrantless searches weredeclared illegal because the officials conducting the searchhad every opportunity to secure a search warrant. The itemstaken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violativeof their constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible inevidence in the criminal actions instituted against them. Theoffense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitumbut it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarilyillegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but thesubjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seizedsimply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is stillnecessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and noexception being applicable, the articles seized wereconfiscated illegally and are therefore protected by theexclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidenceagainst the Veroys in the criminal action against them forillegal possession of firearms. Besides, assuming that therewas indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, whilethere is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledgethat the same existed. Without the knowledge orvoluntariness there is no crime.

Case Digest on Uy v. Bureau of Internal RevenueParticularity of Description

G.R. No. 129651 (October 20, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioners claim that the search warrant issued lacksparticularity. The items described in the warrant are asfollows: multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers, journals,columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records,provisional and official receipts, production record books,inventory lists, stock cards, unregistered delivery receipts,unregistered purchase and sales invoices; sales records, joborders, corporate financial records, bank statements,cancelled checks.

HELD: Most of the items listed lacked particularity. The judgecould have formed a more specific description of the

documents, since the former employee of the petitionersfurnished photocopies of the documents sought to be seized.With regard to the unregistered delivery receipts andunregistered purchase and sales invoices, they are specific.No more detailed description could have been given. Itemsnot particularly described may be cut off, without renderingthe entire warrant void.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMANDO DELROSARIO Y LOPEZ

G.R. No. 109633 July 20, 1994

Normando del Rosario was charged before Branch 17 of theRegional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region stationed inCavite City with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitionsin Criminal Case No. 236-91 and Illegal Sale of RegulatedDrugs in Criminal Case No. 237-91, under two informationsreading, respectively, as follows:

Criminal Case No . 236-91

That on or about September 4, 1991, in the City of


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Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-namedaccused, without legal authority, did, then and there,willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly havein his possession and control a homemade(paltik)caliber .22 revolver with three (3) liveammunition.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No . 237-91

That on or about September 4, 1991, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-namedaccused, without legal authority, did, then and there,willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly sell toa poseur buyer an aluminum foil containingMethamphetamine Hydrochloride also known as"Shabu", a regulated drug.

Contrary to law.

(pp. 20-21, Rollo .)

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty toboth charges, and after joint trial of the two cases, the court aquo rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of whichreads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court findsthe accused Normando del Rosario y Lopez guiltybeyond reasonable doubt in the above-entitled casesand he is hereby sentenced to undergoimprisonment: in Crim. Case No. 236-91 for Violationof P.D. 1866 of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4)months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal , asminimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal ,as maximum and in Crim. Case No. 237-91 for aviolation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act6425, as amended of life imprisonment and to pay afine of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonmentin case of insolvency and to pay the costs in bothcases.

The shabu, the One Hundred Peso bill and other

paraphernalia are hereby ordered confiscated infavor of the government.

(pp. 28-29, Rollo .)

From said decision, the instant appeal has been interposed.

The prosecution's version of the case, as set forth inappellee's brief, is as follows:

Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of thePhilippine National Police (PNP) of Cavite City,Regional Trial Court Judge Arturo de Guia issued inthe morning of September 4, 1991 a search warrant(Exh. T, p. 50, Rec. Crim. Case No. 237-91)authorizing the search and seizure of an"undetermined quantity of MethamphetamineHydrochloride commonly known as shabu and itsparaphernalias" in the premises of appellant's houselocated at 828 R. Basa St., San Roque, Cavite City.However, the search warrant was not implementedimmediately due to the lack of police personnel toform the raiding team (pp. 4, 7, tsn., Feb. 4, 1992).

At about 9 o'clock in the evening of that day, araiding team was finally organized. SPO3 Untiverosheaded the raiding team with PO3 Rogelio Francisco,SPO1 Eduardo Novero, SPO3 Reynaldo de la Cruz,PO1 Carlito Barbuco, PO3 Onrubio and SPO2 Villegasas members (pp. 5, 10, tsn., Feb. 4, 1992; p. 7, tsn.,Dec. 11, 1991).

In the final briefing of the raiding team at the policestation, it was agreed upon that PO1 Venerando Luna

will buy shabu from appellant and after his returnfrom appellant's house, the raiding team willimplement the search warrant (p. 10, tsn., Feb. 4,1992; pp. 17-18, tsn., Dec. 11, 1991). A markedmoney consisting of a P100 bill bearing serial no. PQ329406(Exh. P, p. 51, Rec.) was given by the Station

Commander to PO1 Luna and entered in the policelogbook (p. 12, Feb. 4, 1992). PO1 Luna with acompanion proceeded to appellant's house toimplement the search warrant. Barangay Capt.Maigue, Norma del Rosario and appellant witnessedthe search at appellant's house (p. 10, tsn., Dec. 11,1991). SPO3 de la Cruz and PO3 Francisco found ablack canister containing shabu, an aluminum foil, apaltik .22 caliber (Exh. O) atop the TV set, three usedammunitions in a cup and three wallets (Exhs. Q, R,S), one containing the marked money (Exh. P; pp. 11-12, tsn., Dec. 11, 1992). SPO1 Novero found inside ashow box aluminum foils, napkins and a burner (p. 9,tsn., March 11, 1992). SPO3 de la Cruz turned overthe wallet containing the marked money to PO3Onrubio (p. 8, 32, tsn., Jan. 7, 1992). The seizeditems were photographed thereat by Fred Agana andthen turned over to PO3 Onrubio (pp. 8, 32, tsn., Jan.7, 1992). SPO3 Untiveros issued receipts (Exhs. V, V-1, pp. 53-54, Rec.) for the seized items withBarangay Capt. Maigue and appellant's sister Normaas signing witnesses. He also made a return (Exh. U,p. 52, Rec.) of the seized items to the court (pp. 11-155, tsn., Feb. 18, 1992.).

At police station, the seized items were taped andinitialed by SPO3 de la Cruz (p. 33, tsn., Jan. 7, 1992).

The next day, SPO4 Pilapil, through PO1 Barbuco,forwarded to NBI Forensic Chemist Mary Ann Aranasfor laboratory analysis the aluminum foil (Exhs. A, J,pp. 37, 46, Rec.) containing suspected shabu boughtby PO1 Luna from appellant in thebuy-bust operation as well as the aluminum foils(Exhs. G, K, pp. 43, 47, Rec.) containing suspectedmarijuana which were confiscated by virtue of thesearch warrant.

The findings of NBI Forensic Chemist Aranasdisclosed that all the specimen submitted to her forlaboratory analysis by SPO1 Pilapil, thru PO1Barbuco, gave positive results for MethamphetamineHydrochloride (pp. 2-9, tsn., Dec. 3, 1991; Exh. B, C,H, I, pp. 38, 39, 44, 45, Rec.).

(pp. 102-105, Rollo .)

Carefully evaluating the evidence on record, we believe thatthe prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of accused-appellant. Much is to be desired in the manner the policeauthorities effected the arrest of accused-appellant and thesame observation may be made with regard to the way theprosecution conducted its case.

Foremost among the inadequacies of the prosecution is itsfailure to call to the witness stand PO1 Venerando Luna, thealleged poseur-buyer. There is, thus, a total absence of evidence to establish the purported sale of shabu by accused-appellant to Venerando Luna, the supposed poseur-buyer. Theomission to present the poseur-buyer casts serious doubtsthat an illegal sale of a dangerous drug actually took place.

The trial court gave much weight to the testimoniesof the police members of the buy-bust operation.However, the prosecution did not present as witnessthe supposed poseur-buyer. Such omission castsserious doubt on appellant's guilt because withoutthe testimony of the poseur-buyer, there is noconvincing evidence to show that appellant soldmarijuana. The testimonies of the rest of the buy-bust operation are hearsay in view of the fact thatthe poseur-buyer, was never presented at the trial.

There was even no testimony that when the accused-appellant handed the stuff to the poseur-buyer thatthe latter in turn handed the marked money. Thefailure of the prosecution to present the allegedbuyer of the marijuana was a fatal flaw in the caseagainst the accused.

(People vs. Fulgarillas, 212 SCRA 76, 80 [1992]) The testimony of prosecution witness PO3 Rogelio Franciscothat Veneracion Luna, the alleged Poseur-buyer, bought shabufrom accused-appellant was derived solely from what Lunasupposedly told him (pp. 19-20, tsn., December 11, 1991)and, therefore, is patently hearsay evidence, without any


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evidentiary weight whatsoever. Likewise, the statements of prosecution witnesses Policemen Reynaldo de la Cruz,Raymundo Untiveros, and Eduardo Novera, Jr. as to thealleged sale of shabu are hearsay, without weight, as all of them were not present during the alleged sale.

According to the version of the prosecution, during the allegedbuy-bust operation, accused-appellant handed over toVeneracion Luna, the alleged poseur-buyer, a quantity of shabu, and Luna in turn paid accused-appellant a markedP100 bill and then returned to the police station and informedthe raiding team that he had already bought the shabu fromaccused-appellant. Thereupon, the raiding team proceeded tothe house of accused-appellant to implement the searchwarrant. The version of the prosecution is highly incredible.

The record is devoid of any reason why the police officers didnot make any attempt to arrest accused-appellant at the timehe allegedly sold the shabu to Veneracion Luna who wasaccompanied by another police officer. That was theopportune moment to arrest accused-appellant. The versionfoisted by the prosecution upon this Court is contrary tohuman experience in the ordinary course of human conduct.

The usual procedure in a buy-bust operation is for the policeofficers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment hehands over the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That isthe very reason why such a police operation is called a "buy-bust" operation. The police poseur-buyer "buys" dangerousdrugs from the pusher and "busts" (arrests) him the momentthe pusher hands over the drug to the police officer.We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained ina small canister was actually seized or confiscated at theresidence of accused-appellant. In consequence, the mannerthe police officers conducted the subsequent and much-delayed search is highly irregular. Upon bargaining into theresidence of accused-appellant, the police officers found himlying down and they immediately arrested and detained himin the living room while they searched the other parts of thehouse. Although they fetched two persons to witness thesearch, the witnesses were called in only after the policemenhad already entered accused-appellant's residence (pp. 22-23,tsn, December 11, 1991), and, therefore, the policemen hadmore than ample time to plant the shabu. Corollary to theconstitutional precept that, in all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary isproved (Sec. 14(2), Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines) is the rule that in order to convict an accusedthe circumstances of the case must exclude all and each andevery hypothesis consistent with his innocence (People vs.

Tanchoco; 76 Phil. 463 [1946]; People vs. Constante, 12 SCRA653 [1964]; People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 [1986]). The factsof the case do not rule out the hypothesis that accused-appellant is innocent.

At any rate, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of possession of the shabu contained in a canister and allegedlyseized at his house, for the charge against him was for sellingshabu with the information alleging that the "accused, withoutlegal authority did . . . sell to a poseur buyer an aluminum foilcontaining Methamphetamine Hydrochloride . . ." Sale istotally different from possession. Article 1458 of the Civil Codedefines sale as a contract whereby "one of the contractingparties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and todeliver a determine thing, and the other to pay therefor aprice certain in money or its equivalent", while "possession isthe holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right" as definedby Article 523 of the Civil Code. Accused-appellant cannot beconvicted of a crime which is not charged in the informationfor to do so would deny him the due process of law (People vs.Despavellador, 1 SCRA 205 [1961]; People vs. Mori, 55 SCRA382 [1974]).

Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of illegalpossession of firearm and ammunition. The search warrantimplemented by the raiding party authorized only the searchand seizure of ". . . the described quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabuand its paraphernalia" (Exh. O, p. 50, original record). Thus,the raiding party was authorized to seize only shabu andparaphernalia for the use thereof and no other. A searchwarrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raidingparty to undertake a finishing expedition to seize andconfiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating toa crime. The Constitution itself (Section 2, Article III) and the

Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate thatthe search warrant must particularly describe the things to beseized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for thepolice officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned,much less described with particularity, in the search warrant.Neither may it be maintained that the gun was seized in thecourse of an arrest, for as earlier observed, accused-appellant's arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm,having been illegally seized, the same is not admissible inevidence (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967]). TheConstitution expressly ordains the exclusion in evidence of illegally seized articles.

Any evidence obtained in violation of this or thepreceding section shall be inadmissible for anypurpose in any proceeding.

(Section 3[2], Article III, Constitution of the Republicof the Philippines).

With the exclusion in evidence of the illegally seized firearm,there is, therefore, a total absence of evidence to support thecharge of illegal possession of firearm, against accused-appellant.

The same may be said of the charge of illegal possession of ammunition.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED

and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal CaseNo. 236-91 and Criminal Case No. 237-91.

The immediate release of accused-appellant is hereby orderedunless there exists a pending valid cause against him.

The shabu, the marked P100 bill, firearm, and ammunition arehereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 139131. September 27, 2002

JESUS R. GONZALES vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,

and PHILIPPINE CHILDRENS MEDICAL CENTER (PCMC)Petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution[1]dated January 14, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK-2819, which dismissed petitioners appeal viaa petition for review,[2] for his failure to comply with Section 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and its Resolution[3] datedFebruary 16, 1999, denying petitioners motion forreconsideration. Subject of said appeal before the CA wereResolutions Nos. 98-2359[4] and 98-3021[5] of the CivilService Commission, which upheld the dismissal of petitionerfrom respondent Philippine Childrens Medical Center (PCMC).

The facts of this case, as culled from records, are as follows:

Petitioner Jesus R. Gonzales was one of the two Utility WorkersII assigned at the Pharmacy Section of respondent PhilippineChildrens Medical Center (PCMC), a government-owned andcontrolled corporation created under P.D. No. 1631, asamended. At PCMC, petitioner served the patients and thepublic from 6:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M., seven days a week.

On March 2, 1998, petitioner started absenting himself without an approved leave (AWOL) and without explaining thereason for his absence to his superiors.

In view of the exigency of petitioners functions, Ms. JaraCorazon O. Ehera, Human Resources Management Officer III,wrote a letter-notice dated March 5, 1998 to petitionerdirecting him to report for work within three (3) days fromreceipt of said notice, otherwise, he would be dropped fromthe rolls.

During his absence, petitioner was seen on several occasionswithin the premises of PCMC, particularly in the Budget Office,Billing and Cashier, and Personnel Clinic. He allegedly visitedthe clinic without consulting any medical problem and whenDr. Galero once made a surprise visit, he was not found in hishouse.[6]


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On March 16, 1998, Dr. Corazon D. Rivera, officer-in-charge of the Pharmacy Section, reported petitioners irresponsibilityand lack of concern for his work to Dr. Lillian V. Lee, ExecutiveDirector of PCMC, recommending that petitioner be droppedfrom the rolls.

Despite the written letter-notice sent to him, petitioner failedto report for work thus constraining PCMC to drop him fromthe rolls, effective March 20, 1998.[7]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Civil ServiceCommission (CSC). In Resolution No. 98-2359 dated

September 8, 1998, the CSC upheld the action taken byPCMC, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Jesus R. Gonzales ishereby dismissed. Accordingly, the action of thePCMC Executive Director, dropping him from the rolls,is upheld.[8]

The decision, however, stated that considering that theseparation of petitioner was not disciplinary in character, hemay be re-employed in the same agency at the discretion of the appointing authority.[9]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration by the CSC of Resolution98-2359, but it was denied.

When he filed a petition for review in the CA, the petition wasdenied for failure to comply with Section 6 (c), Rule 43 of theRevised Rules of Court,[10] particularly for failure to attachcertified true copies of material portions of the records andsupporting papers.

The CA Resolution[11] dated January 14, 1999, concluded:

WHEREFORE, for being formally deficient, the instantpetition for review is hereby DISMISSED.

In a Motion for Reconsideration and Compliance,[12]petitioner attached the certified true copies of the requiredpapers. But the CA denied the motion in a Resolution[13]dated February 16, 1999.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues for resolution:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed

grave error in dismissing the appeal of hereinpetitioner based on pure technicality.

2. Whether or not there is factual and legal basis forrespondent PCMC to drop petitioner from the rolls forhis alleged absences without leave.[14]

On the first issue, petitioner argues that the dismissal of thepetition by CA on mere technicality is unwarranted andunjustified since pertinent jurisprudence abounds declaring inno uncertain terms that dismissals of appeals on purelytechnical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of theCourt is to encourage hearings of appeals based on merits.[15]

The same position is taken by the Office of the SolicitorGeneral in its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment[16] filedbefore this Court. But respondent PCMC asserts that thedismissal by the CA of the petition for review is in keepingwith Section 7[17] in relation to Section 6 of Rule 43 of theRevised Rules of Court.[18]

In Cadayona vs. Court of Appeals,[19] however, we alreadyheld that Section 6, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court isnot to be construed as imposing the requirement that allsupporting papers accompanying the petition should becertified true copies. We compared this provision with itscounterpart provision in Rule 42, on petitions for review fromthe RTC to the CA, and noted that under the latter, only the

judgments or final orders of the lower court need to becertified true copies or duplicate originals. In numerousresolutions issued by this Court we emphasized that in anappeal via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and in anoriginal civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation toRules 46 and 56, what is required to be a certified true copy isthe copy of the questioned judgment, final order or resolution.[20] We see no reason why a stricter requirement should bemade for petitions under Rule 43, which governs appeals fromthe Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to theCA. This could not have been intended by the framers of therules. A contrary ruling would be too harsh and would not

promote the underlying objective of securing a just, speedyand inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[21]

Further, we note that petitioner had attached certified truecopies of the documents supporting his Motion forReconsideration and Compliance.[22] As previously held,submission of a required document with the Motion forReconsideration constitutes substantial compliance withSection 3, Rule 46.[23]

On the second issue, petitioner argues that he was denied

due process[24] when he was dropped from the rolls. Heavers that he received PCMCs letter dated March 5, 1998 onlyon March 20, 1998 and thus, had until March 23, 1998 withinwhich to comply with the directive;[25] that in fact, he didreport for work on March 21, 1998, but was barred by securitypersonnel from entering the company because his name hadalready been dropped from the rolls effective March 20, 1998.He contends that his non-compliance with the return to workdirective does not constitute abandonment of work as noperson in his right mind would abandon his job to his owndetriment.[26]

For analogous reasons, the Office of the Solicitor Generalavers that petitioner was denied due process. The OSG statesthat he was summarily dismissed without affording him ahearing and the opportunity to introduce witnesses andrelevant evidence in his favor.[27] The OSG also opines thatthe penalty of dismissal was too severe.[28]

In its reply, respondent PCMC insists that the dismissal of petitioner is valid and legal, considering that petitionersactuations were clearly irresponsible. They showed lack of concern for his work and the smooth operation of PCMC.[29]

Further, PCMC contends that petitioner was given ampleopportunity to explain his side and to submit evidence and toexplain his absence.[30] PCMC points out that they sent aletter-notice dated March 5, 1998, to petitioner and he shouldhave taken it upon himself to report to work, even without anyprompting from PCMC, considering the significance of hiswork.[31] Besides, PCMC claims, petitioner showed the clearintent to sever his employer-employee relationship withPCMC. Finally, PCMC avers that factual findings of the CSC on

this matter are entitled to great weight and must be accordedrespect and finality.[32]

To avoid circuitous procedure, we shall now consider themerits of the case. This Court is not a trier of facts, and itsfunction is limited to reviewing errors of law that might havebeen committed by the lower court.[33] In this case, we findno exceptional circumstance and we find no cogent reason toset aside the factual findings of the CSC in sustaining theaction of respondent in the dropping of petitioner from therolls on the ground that he was found AWOL (absent withoutofficial leave).

The CSC noted that petitioner had admitted that effectiveMarch 2, 1998, he was absent without approved leave.[34]Petitioners unauthorized absences, as found by the CSC,constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of theservice, a ground for disciplinary action under E.O. No. 292 orthe Administrative Code of 1987.[35] For his services areessential to the efficient delivery of medical services and theexigencies of the service require his presence in the office.

We agree that there is legal basis for dropping petitioner fromthe rolls. It is also in accordance with law and rules, notablySection 35 Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing E.O.292 and Paragraph 2.1 (b) of CSC Memorandum Circular No.12, s. 1994 which provides as follows:

Sec. 35. Officers and employees who are absent forat least thirty (30) days without approved leave areconsidered on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) andshall be dropped from the service after due notice.However, when the exigencies of the servicerequire his immediate presence and hefails/refuses to return to the service, the headof office may drop him from the service evenprior to the expiration of the thirty (30) dayperiod abovestated. [36] (Emphasis ours.)

2.1 Absence without Approved Leave


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a. xxx

b. If the number of unauthorized absencesincurred is less than thirty (30) calendar days ,written return to work order shall be served on theofficial or employee at his last known address onrecord. Failure on his part to report for work within the period stated in the order shall be avalid ground to drop him from the rolls .[37](Emphasis ours.)

Petitioners assertion that he was denied due process isuntenable. The essence of due process is simply anopportunity to be heard or as applied to administrativeproceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side oropportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or rulingcomplained of.[38]

Records would show that respondent PCMC had written aletter to petitioner to report for work[39] and another letterinforming him that he was being dropped from the rolls, dueto his Absence Without Official Leave, with the enumeration of the reasons and basis thereof.[40] That petitioner onlyreceived the notice on March 20, 1998 is of no moment. Infact, two notices were given him: (a) the notice requiring himto report for work; and (b) the notice that he would bedropped because of his absences without official leave.Further, petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to reportfor duty after he received the return-to-work order, but he didnot report. Thus, the CSC found no error when respondentPCMC dropped petitioner from the rolls for his refusal tocomply with the return-to-work order within a prescribedperiod.[41]

Finally, it must be emphasized that under CSC Circular No. 12,series of 1994, the action dropping petitioner from the rolls isnon-disciplinary in nature and does not result in the forfeitureof his benefits nor his disqualification from re-employment inthe government. Likewise, dropping from the rolls of petitioner is without prejudice to his re-appointment at thediscretion of the appointing authority and subject to CivilService laws, rules and regulations.

WHEREFORE , the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 14, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK-2819 and itsResolution dated February 16, 1999 are SET ASIDE insofar asit denied petitioners appeal for his failure to comply withSection 6 (c), Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. ButResolutions Nos. 98-2359 and 98-3021 of the Civil ServiceCommission, dropping petitioner from the rolls of respondentPCMC, without prejudice to his re-employment in thegovernment service, are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 129651. October 20, 2000

FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION vs.BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HON. MERCEDESGOZO-DADOLE

Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for thesearch of the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation, andpray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof.

On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported tothe Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners UnifishPacking Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy wereengaged in activities constituting violations of the NationalInternal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to be a formeremployee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit[1] stating:

1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKINGCORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as UNIFISH), acanning factory located at Hernan Cortes Street, underthe active management of UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,]is selling by the thousands of [sic] cartons of cannedsardines without issuing receipt. This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the Internal Revenue Code.

2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through thefollowing scheme:

(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulkfrom the company;

(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout inthe distribution of the canned sardines processed byUNIFISH;

(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardinesthat he orders and buys from UNIFISH without anyreceipt of his purchases;

(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants,UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho delivers to the differentsupermarkets such as White Gold, Gaisano, etc.;

(5) Payments made by these tax evadingestablishments are made by checks drawn payableto cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These paymentsare also not receipted (sic);

(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantityof sardines he had withdrawn from the corporation;

3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISHthrough Uy Chin Hos direction is the sale of imported oillocally to different customers. This is a case of smugglingin the sense that UNIFISH, being an export company

registered with the Board of Investments, is enjoyingcertain exemptions in their importation of oil as one of the raw materials in its processing of canned tuna forexport. These tax exemptions are granted by thegovernment on the condition that the oil is to be usedonly in the processing of tuna for export and that it is notto be sold unprocessed as is to local customers.

4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH also enjoys tax exemptions in itspurchases of tin cans subject to the condition that theseare to be used as containers for its processed tuna forexport. These cans are never intended to be sold locallyto other food processing companies.

5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION was then run by thePREMIER INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION(hereinafter referred to as PREMIER) [,] whichcorporation was being controlled by the same majoritystockholders as those now running and controllingUNIFISH; [a]t that time, PREMIER was also committingthe same fraudulent acts as what is being perpetratedby UNIFISH at present.

6. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales, of both UNIFISH AND PREMIER, arefound in the office of the corporation at its factory site atH. Cortes Street, Mandaue City. The particular place orspot where these records [official receipts, salesinvoices, delivery receipts, sales records or sales books,stock cards, accounting records (such as ledgers,

journals, cash receipts books, and check disbursements

books)] are kept and may be found is best described inthe herein attached sketch of the arrangement of theoffices furniture and fixture of the corporation which ismade an integral part hereof and marked as Annex A,

7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath theveracity of the foregoing allegations and he is reservinghis right to claim for reward under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2338.

On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of theSpecial Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for searchwarrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.

The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.

After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge

Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the disputed search warrants. The first[2] is docketed as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79FOR: VIOLATION OF SECTION 253 ("Search Warrant A-1"), andconsists of two pages. A verbatim reproduction of SearchWarrant A-1 appears below:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES


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REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU

7th Judicial Region

Branch 28

Mandaue City

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79

FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY,

Unifish Packing Corporation

Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - /

(with sketch)

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

G R E E T I N G S:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned,

after examination underoath (sic), Nestor N. Labaria,Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR andwitness Rodrigo Abos that there is a (sic) probablecause to believe that the crime of violation of Section253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has beencommitted and there is good and sufficient reason tobelieve that Uy Chin Ho c/o Unifish PackingCorporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has inhis possession, care and control, the following:

1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, SalesBooks or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;

2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] StockCards;

3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

5. Sales Records, Job Order;

6. Corporate Financial Records; and

7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

You are hereby commanded to make an immediatesearch at any time of day or night of said premisesand its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize andtake possession of the articles above-mentioned andother properties relative to such violation and bringsaid properties to the undersigned to be dealt with asthe law directs.

WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.(sgd.)

MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE

Judge

The second warrant[3]is similarly docketed asSEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OFSEC. 253 ("Search Warrant A-2"). Search Warrant A-2, reproduced below, is almost identical in content toSearch Warrant A-1, save for the portions indicated inbold print. It consisted of only one page.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU

7th Judicial RegionBranch 28

Mandaue City

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79

FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253

UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and

Unifish Packing Corporation

Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - /

(with sketch)SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

G R E E T I N G S:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned,after examination underoath [sic], Nestor N. Labaria,Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR andwitness Rodrigo Abos that there is a [sic] probablecause to believe that the crime of violation of Section253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has beencommitted and there is good and sufficient reason tobelieve that Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy and UnifishPacking Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue

City has in his possession, care and control, thefollowing:

1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, SalesBooks or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;

2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] StockCards;

3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;

4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;




You are hereby commanded to make an immediatesearch at any time of day or night of said premisesand its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize andtake possession of the articles above-mentioned andother properties relative to such violation and bringsaid properties to the undersigned to be dealt with asthe law directs.

WITNESS MY HAND this 1 st day of October, 1993.

(sgd.)

MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE

Judge

Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant,[4] which wasdocketed as SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-80 FOR: VIOLATION OFSEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263 (hereinafter, "SearchWarrant B"). Except for the docket number and thedesignation of the crime in the body of the warrant (Section238 in relation to Sec. 263 - non-issuance of sales invoice anduse and possession of unregistered delivery receipts and/orsales invoices), Search Warrant B is a verbatim reproductionof Search Warrant A-2.

On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR,accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police, on2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish PackingCorporation. They seized, among other things, the recordsand documents of petitioner corporation. A return of saidsearch was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.

On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a casebefore the Department of Justice. The records, however, donot reveal the nature of this case.

On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash thesubject search warrants with Branch 28 of the Cebu RTC.


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The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash aswell as their subsequent motion for reconsideration,prompting petitioners to file a petition for certiorari with theCourt of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed their petition, holdingthat petitioners failed to comply with Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA),which states:

a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filedin seven (7) legible copies and a copy thereof shallbe served on each of the respondents, and must beaccompanied by a certified true copy of the decisionor order complained of and true copies of thepleadings and other pertinent documents andpapers. (As amended by S.Ct. Res., dated November24, 1992).

The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified truecopies of (1) the Motions to Quash, (2) the Motion forReconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo Abos.

The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy toquestion the resolution denying the motion to quash.

In this case now before us, the available remedies to thepetitioners, assuming that the Department of Justice willeventually file the case, are: a petition for reinvestigation; theright to post bail; a Motion to Quash the Information; and incase of denial, an appeal, after judgment on the merits, orafter the case shall have been tried. This brings us to the caseof Lai vs. Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the pronouncement,thus:

Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should notbe allowed where petitioner has other remediesavailable. -- Anent the remedy resorted to bypetitioners (referring to the petition for certiorari)from the Regional Trial Court of Negros Orientalpresided by Judge Diez, the same should not havebeen granted. Petitioners were not without plain,speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinarycourse of law against Judge Lomeda's order for theirarrest. These remedies are as enumerated byrespondent appellate court in its decision: "1. theycan post bail for their provisional release; 2. They can

ask the Provincial Fiscal for a reinvestigation of thecharge against them. If unsatisfied with the fiscal'sresolution they can ask for a review by the Ministerof Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180 as amended by P.D.911); 3. if their petition for review does not prosper,they can file amotion to quash the information in thetrial court. (Rule 117, Rules of Court). 4. If the motionis denied, theycan appeal the judgment of the courtafter the case shall have been tried on the merits.

x x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is notcertiorari, but to go to trial.-- Moreover, in the case of Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held that when amotion to quash a criminal case is denied, theremedy is notcertiorari but to go to trial withoutprejudice to reiterating the special defenses involvedin said Motion. In the event that an adverse decisionis rendered after trial on the merits, an appealtherefrom should be the next legal step.

xxx

In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that theCourt issued the Search Warrants without jurisdiction. On thecontrary, it had jurisdiction. The argument therefore that theCourt committed an error in not describing the persons orthings to be searched; that the Search Warrants did notdescribe with particularity the things to be seized/taken; theabsence of probable cause; and for having allegedly condonedthe discriminating manner in which the properties were taken,to us, are merely errors in the Court's finding, certainly notcorrectible by certiorari, but instead thru an appeal.[5]

In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction was committed by the RTC inthe issuance of the warrants.

As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile,petitioners filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true

copies of the pleadings and documents listed above alongwith their Petition, as well as in their Motion forReconsideration. An examination of the CA Rollo , however,reveals that petitioners first submitted the same in theirReply, after respondents, in their Comment, pointed outpetitioners failure to attach them to the Petition.

Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petitionon this ground although, to its credit, it did touch upon themerits of the case. First, it appears that the case could havebeen decided without these pleadings and documents.Second, even if the CA deemed them essential to theresolution of the case, it could have asked for the recordsfrom the RTC. Third, in a similar case,[6] we held that thesubmission of a document together with the motion forreconsideration constitutes substantial compliance withSection 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, requiring thesubmission of a certified true copy of material portions of therecord as are referred to [in the petition], and otherdocuments relevant or pertinent thereto along with thepetition. So should it be in this case, especially consideringthat it involves an alleged violation of a constitutionallyguaranteed right. The rules of procedure are not to be appliedin a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are usedonly to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigidenforcement of the rules is made, their aim could bedefeated.[7]

The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot availof certiorari to question the resolution denying their motionsto quash the subject search warrants. We note that the caseof Lai vs. Intermediate, cited by the appellate court asauthority for its ruling does not appear in 220 SCRA 149 .

The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court, as observedby petitioners,[8] appears to have been taken from the caseof Yap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court , 220 SCRA 245(1993). Yap , however, is inapplicable since that case involveda motion to quash a complaint for qualified theft, not amotion to quash a search warrant.

The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman ,[9] where weheld that the issuing judges disregard of the requirements forthe issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which may be remedied by certiorari :

Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule that certiorari is available where atribunal or officer exercising judicial functions has actedwithout or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with graveabuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain,speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein abovequoted, it is indisputable that Judge de Guzman gravelyabused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant.Indeed, he acted whimsically and capriciously when heignored the explicit mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of theRules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but uponprobable cause in connection with one specific offense to bedetermined by the municipal or city judge after examinationunder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the

witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing theplace to be searched and the persons or things to be seized;and that no search warrant shall issue for more than onespecific offense.

The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirementslaid down by the said rule renders the warrant in questionabsolutely null and void. It has been held that where the ordercomplained of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari andmandamus may properly be entertained despite the existenceof the remedy of appeal.

Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzmanwould neither be an adequate nor speedy remedy to relieveappellee of the injurious effects of the warrant. The seizure of her personal property had resulted in the total paralization of the articles and documents which had been improperlyseized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford anadequate and expeditious relief, certiorari can be allowed as amode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to aparty.

This Court had occasion to reiterate the abovepronouncement in Silva vs. Presiding Judge, RTC of Negros


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Oriental, Br. XXXIII ,[10] which also involved a special civilaction for certiorari :[11]

Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictlycomply with the constitutional requirement that he mustdetermine the existence of probable cause by examining theapplicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questionsand answers. His failure to comply with this requirementconstitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelovs. De Guzman , G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA657, the capricious disregard by the judge in not complyingwith the requirements before issuance of search warrantsconstitutes grave abuse of discretion.In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CAthat the issuing judge violated the pertinent provisions of theConstitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the disputedsearch warrants, which, if true, would have constituted graveabuse of discretion. Petitioners also alleged that the enforcersof the warrants seized almost all the records and documentsof the corporation thus resulting in the paralysis of itsbusiness. Appeal, therefore, would not be an adequateremedy that would afford petitioners expeditious relief.

We now proceed to the merits of the case.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers, and effects against unreasonable searches andseizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall beinviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shallissue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he mayproduce, and particularly describing the place to be searchedand the persons or things to be seized.

In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - Asearch warrant shall not issue but upon probablecause in connection with one specific offense to bedetermined personally by the judge after

examination under oath or affirmation of thecomplainant and the witnesses he may produce, andparticularly describing the place to be searched andthe things to be seized.

SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personallyexamine in the form of searching questions andanswers, in writing and under oath the complainantand any witnesses he may produce on factspersonally known to them and attach to the recordtheir sworn statements together with any affidavitssubmitted.

A search warrant must conform strictly to therequirements of the foregoing constitutional andstatutory provisions. These requirements, in outlineform, are:

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any otherperson;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judgemust examine, under oath or affirmation, thecomplainant and such witnesses as the latter mayproduce; and

(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe theplace to be searched and persons or things to beseized.[12]

The absence of any of these requisites will cause thedownright nullification of the search warrants.[13] Theproceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal,for there is not a description of process known to the law, theexecution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhapsthere is none which excites such intense feeling inconsequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The

warrants will always be construed strictly without, however,going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. Nopresumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of theprocess when an officer undertakes to justify under it.[14]

Petitioners contend that there are several defects in thesubject warrants that command their nullification. They pointout inconsistencies in the description of the place to besearched in Search Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies inthe names of the persons against whom Search Warrants A-1and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants (SearchWarrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for the same crime, for thesame place, at a single occasion is cited as anotherirregularity. Petitioners also dispute the existence of probablecause that would justify the issuance of the warrants. Finally,they claim that the things to be seized were not describedwith particularity. These defects, according to petitioners,render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence.[15]

Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched

Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy as HernanCortes St., Cebu City while the body of the same warrantstates the address as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City.Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B consistently statethe address of petitioner as Hernan Cortes St., MandaueCity.

The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant,that there be a particular description of the place to besearched and the persons of things to be seized.[16] The ruleis that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,ascertain and identify the place intended[17]and distinguish itfrom other places in the community.[18] Any designation ordescription known to the locality that points out the place tothe exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officersunerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.[19]

Thus, in Castro vs. Pabalan ,[20] where the search warrantmistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners thereinas Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio MariaCristina , this Court "admitted that the deficiency in the writ isnot of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation."

In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly namedHernan Cortes could be found in Cebu City. Nor was itestablished that the enforcing officers had any difficulty inlocating the premises of petitioner corporation. That SearchWarrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified the city wherethe premises to be searched is not a defect that would spellthe warrants invalidation in this case.

Inconsistencies in the description of the persons named in thetwo warrants

Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search Warrants A-1 and A-2. Search WarrantA-1 was issued solely against Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy.Search Warrant A-2, on the other hand, was directed againstUY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and Unifish PackingCorporation.

These discrepancies are hardly relevant.

In Miller v. Sigler ,[21] it was held that the Fourth Amendmentof the United States Constitution, from which Section 2, ArticleIII of our own Constitution is historically derived, does notrequire the warrant to name the person who occupies thedescribed premises. Where the search warrant is issued forthe search of specifically described premises only and not forthe search of a person, the failure to name the owner oroccupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrantdoes not invalidate the warrant; and where the name of theowner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectlyinserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if thelegal description of the premises to be searched is otherwisecorrect so that no discretion is left to the officer making thesearch as to the place to be searched.[22]

Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not forsearch of the persons owning or occupying the premises, butonly a search of the premises occupied by them, the searchcould not be declared unlawful or in violation of theconstitutional rights of the owner or occupants of thepremises, because of inconsistencies in stating their names.


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[23]

Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place

In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemedsuperseded by Search Warrant A-2.

Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actuallyissued by the trial court for the same crime (violation of SEC.253 of the National Internal Revenue Code). It appears,however, that Search Warrant A-2 was issued merely tocorrect the inconsistencies in the address in Search Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish Packing Corporation as a partyagainst whom the warrant was issued. Search Warrant A-2was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be moreprecise in the names of the persons against whom the warrantwas issued and in the description of the place to be searched.Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a singleoccasion two warrants authorizing the search of a single placefor a single offense. Inasmuch as the apparent intent inissuing Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search WarrantA-1, the latter should be deemed revoked by the former.

The alleged absence of probable cause

Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject search warrants.

Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstanceswhich would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man tobelieve that an offense has been committed and that theobjects sought in connection with the offense are in the placesought to be searched.[24]

In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution andthe Rules of Court require an examination of the witnessesunder oath. The examination must be probing and exhaustive,not merely routine or pro forma . The examining magistratemust not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but mustmake his own inquiry on the intent and justification of theapplication.[25] Asking of leading questions to the deponentin an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy therequirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.[26]

The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their

own personal knowledge. The oath required must refer to thetruth of the facts within the personal knowledge of thepetitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is toconvince the committing magistrate, not the individualmaking the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,of the existence of probable cause.[27] Search warrants arenot issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor onmere suspicion or belief.[28]

It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judgedeposed two witnesses, namely, Nestor Labaria of the BIR,and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old employee of Unifish. Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria andAbos are hearsay. We agree with this contention, but only asto the testimony of Labaria, who stated during theexamination:

Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias FrankUy?

A. No.

Q. Do you know his establishment known as UnifishPacking Corporation?

A. I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of ourinformer, Mr. Abos.

Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in thepremises of Unifish Packing Corporation?

A. Because of that information we received that theyare using only delivery receipts instead of the legalsales invoices. It is highly indicative of fraud.

Q. From where did you get that information?A. From our informer, the former employee of thatestablishment.[29]

The above portion of the transcript shows thatLabarias knowledge of the alleged illegal activities of petitioners was acquired not through his own

perception but was merely supplied by Abos. Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is basedon hearsay, standing alone, cannot justify theissuance of the search warrants.[30]

The application for the warrants, however, is notbased solely on Labarias deposition but is supportedby that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitionersalleged illegal practices was apparently obtainedduring his employment with Unifish. In his deposition,Abos detailed the schemes employed by Frank Uyand Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, anddescribed the place where the documents supposedlyevidencing these schemes were located:

Q Do you know Frank Uy?

A Yes.

Q Why do you know him?

A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980until August of 1993.

Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located?

A Hernan Cortes St.

Q What is it being engaged of?

A It is engaged in canning of fish.

Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effectthat it seems that in his business dealings that he isactually doing something that perpetrated taxevasion. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q How is it done?

A As an officer, he is an active member of thecorporation who is at the same time making hisauthority as appointing himself as the distributor of the company's products. He sells these products thrusupermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in fact, thewhole Philippines. He makes it appear that it is thecompany which is selling when actually it is him

selling the goods and he does not issue any invoices.Q Since he does not issue any invoices, how is itdone?

A Thru delivery receipts.

Q Is the delivery receipt official?

A No. It is unregistered.

Q For how long has this been going on?

A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we startedproducing the sardines.

Q When was the last time that you observed that thatis what he is doing?

A August, 1993, last month.Q How did you happen to know about this lastmonth?

A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets andthe payments of that supermarket did not go directlyto the company. It went to him and he is the one whopaid the company for the goods that he sold.

Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certainsupermarkets?

A White Gold and Gaisano.

Q How did you know this fact?

A As a manager of the company I have access to all

the records of that company for the last three years. Iwas the Operating Chief.

Q Until now?

A No. I was separated already.

Q When?


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such inquiries to be sufficiently probing.

Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the thingsseized

Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the thingsto be seized in the subject warrants and those in Stonehill vs.Diokno ,[32] Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz ,[33] and AsianSurety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera .[34]

In Stonehill , the effects to be searched and seized weredescribed as:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,credit journals, typewriters, and other documentsand/or papers showing all business transactionsincluding disbursement receipts, balance sheets andrelated profit and loss statements.

This Court found that the foregoing description failedto conform to the requirements set forth by theConstitution since:

x x x the warrants authorized the search for andseizure of records pertaining to all businesstransactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal . Thewarrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of thepetitioners and the aforementioned corporations,whatever their nature, thus openly contravening theexplicit command of our Bill of Rights - that thethings to be seized be particularly described - as wellas tending to defeat its major object: the eliminationof general warrants.

In Bache & Co. , this Court struck down a warrant containing asimilar description as those in Stonehill :

The documents, papers, and effects sought to beseized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 inthis manner:

Unregistered and private books of accounts(ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts anddisbursements books, customers' ledgers); receiptsfor payments received; certificates of stocks andsecurities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; businesscommunications; accounting and business records;checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits andwithdrawals; and records of foreign remittances,covering the years 1966 to 1970.

The description does not meet the requirement inArt. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrantshould particularly describe the things to be seized.

x x x

In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896,this Court had occasion to explain the purpose of therequirement that the warrant should particularly describe theplace to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:

x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General OrdersNo. 68 (sec. 97) specifically require that a searchwarrant should particularly describe the place to besearched and the things to be seized. The evidentpurpose and intent of this requirement is to limit thethings to be seized to those, and only those,particularly described in the search warrant - to leavethe officers of the law with no discretion regardingwhat articles they shall seize, to the end thatunreasonable searches and seizures may not bemade, - that abuses may not be committed. That isthe correct interpretation of this constitutionalprovision borne out by the American authorities.

The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively,be defeated under the search warrant issued in this case.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe thethings to be seized when the description therein is as specificas the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57Phil, 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the warrant officer may be guided

in making the search and seizure ( idem ., dissent of AbadSantos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to thosewhich bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrantis being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). Theherein search warrant does not conform to any of theforegoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have anydirect relation to an offense committed, the applicant mustnecessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, toprove the said offense; and the articles subject of search andseizure should come in handy merely to strengthen suchevidence. In this event, the description contained in theherein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, thedates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regardingthe receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities,contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages andcommunications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals,records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated inthe warrant.

In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera , thedescription of the things to be seized, i.e., Fire Registers,Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including subrogationreceipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Book of Accountsincluding cash receipts and disbursements and generalledger, etc. was held to be an omnibus description and,therefore, invalid:

x x x Because of this all embracing description which

includes all conceivable records of petitionercorporation, which if seized x x x, could paralyze itsbusiness, petitioner in several motions filed for earlyresolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of

TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed theirbusiness to the grave prejudice of not only thecompany, its workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bondsissued by it, including the government itself, and of the general public. And correlating the same to thecharges for which the warrant was issued, We havebefore Us the infamous general warrants of old.

In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described inthe following manner:

1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals,Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books orRecords; Provisional & Official Receipts;

2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;

3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;

4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;




We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail tomeet the test of particularity, especially since witness Aboshad furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought

to be seized. The issuing judge could have formed a morespecific description of these documents from said photocopiesinstead of merely employing a generic description thereof.

The use of a generic term or a general description in awarrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employthe specificity available will invalidate a general description ina warrant.[35] The use by the issuing judge of the termsmultiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers, journals,columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records,provisional & official receipts, production recordbooks/inventory lists, stock cards, sales records, job order,corporate financial records, and bank statements/cancelledchecks is therefore unacceptable considering thecircumstances of this case.

As regards the terms unregistered delivery receipts andunregistered purchase & sales invoices, however, we holdotherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that theserial markings of these documents need not be specified asit is not possible to do so precisely because they areunregistered.[36] Where, by the nature of the goods to beseized, their description must be rather general, it is notrequired that a technical description be given, as this would


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mean that no warrant could issue. Taking into considerationthe nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no othermore adequate and detailed description could have beengiven, particularly because it is difficult to give a particulardescription of the contents thereof.[37] Although it appearsthat photocopies of these unregistered documents wereamong those handed by Abos to the issuing judge, it would beimpractical to require the latter to specify each and everyreceipt and invoice, and the contents thereof, to the minutestdetail.

The general description of most of the documents listed in thewarrants does not render the entire warrant void. Insofar asthe warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistereddelivery receipts and unregistered purchase and salesinvoices, the warrants remain valid. The search warrant isseverable, and those items not particularly described may becut off without destroying the whole warrant. In United Statesv. Cook ,[38] the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit)made the following pronouncement:

x x x. The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court ,53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal.Rptr. 415 (1961).In Aday , a warrant was issued authorizing the seizureof two particularly described books and myriad othergenerally described items. On appeal, the CaliforniaSupreme Court held that only the books wereparticularly described in the warrant and lawfully

seized. The court acknowledged that the warrant wasflawed, but rather than suppress everything seized,the court chose to sever the defective portions of thewarrant and suppress only those items that were notparticularly described.

Although the warrant was defective x x x it does notfollow that it was invalid as a whole. Such aconclusion would mean that the seizure of certainarticles, even though proper if viewed separately,must be condemned merely because the warrant wasdefective with respect to other articles. The invalidportions of the warrant are severable from theauthorization relating to the named books x x x. Thesearch for and seizure of these books, if otherwisevalid, were not rendered illegal by the defectsconcerning other articles.

x x x

x x x We agree with the reasoning of the SupremeCourt of California and the majority of state courtsthat have considered this question and hold that inthe usual case the district judge should sever theinfirm portion of the search warrant as passesconstitutional muster. See United States v. Giresi , 488F.Supp. 445, 459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that were notdescribed with the requisite particularity in thewarrant should be suppressed, but suppression of allof the fruits of the search is hardly consistent withthe purposes underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the items improperly described prohibits theGovernment from profiting from its own wrong and

removes the court from considering illegally obtainedevidence. Moreover, suppression of only those itemsthat were not particularly described serves as aneffective deterrent to those in the Government whowould be tempted to secure a warrant without thenecessary description. As the leading commentatorhas observed, it would be harsh medicine indeed if awarrant which was issued on probable cause andwhich did particularly describe certain items were tobe invalidated in toto merely because the affiant andthe magistrate erred in seeking and permitting asearch for other items as well. 2 W. LaFave, Searchand Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment4.6(f) (1978).

Accordingly, the items not particularly described in thewarrants ought to be returned to petitioners.

Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listedin the warrants, were also taken by the enforcing officers:

1. One (1) composition notebook containing Chinesecharacters,

2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese characters,

3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,

4. Two (2) packs of chemicals,

5. One (1) bound gate pass,

6. Surety Agreement.[39]

In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging tothe Premier Industrial and Development Corporation (PIDC),which shares an office with petitioner Unifish.

The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentionedin the warrants, like those not particularly described, must beordered returned to petitioners. In order to comply with theconstitutional provisions regulating the issuance of searchwarrants, the property to be seized under a warrant must beparticularly described therein and no other property can betaken thereunder.[40] In Tambasen vs. People ,[41] it washeld:

Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described inthe search warrant, the police acted beyond theparameters of their authority under the searchwarrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitutionrequires that a search warrant should particularlydescribe the things to be seized. The evidentpurpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the

things to be seized to those, and only those,particularly described in the search warrant, to leavethe officers of the law with no discretion regardingwhat articles they should seize, to the end thatunreasonable searches and seizures may not bemade and that abuses may not be committed (Corrov. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co.[Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v.Villareal , 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The sameconstitutional provision is also aimed at preventingviolations of security in person and property andunlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, andgiving remedy against such usurpations whenattempted (People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992]citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).

Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the searchwarrant, had been illegally seized from petitioner. The factthat the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegalseizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in theperformance of official duty cannot by itself prevail againstthe constitutionally protected right of an individual (People v.Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176[1925]). Although public welfare is the foundation of thepower to search and seize, such power must be exercised andthe law enforced without transgressing the constitutionalrights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra , citingRodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As theCourt aptly puts it in Bagahilog v. Fernandez , 198 SCRA 614(1991), [z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble theuse of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors.

The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannotbe justified by the directive in the penultimate paragraphthereof to "seize and take possession of other propertiesrelative to such violation," which in no way can becharacterized as a particular description of the things to beseized.

As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, wecannot order their return in the present proceedings. Thelegality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whoserights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to anunlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot beavailed of by third parties.[42]

WHEREFORE , the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appealsdated 27 June 1996 and 14 May 1987, affirming the Order of

the Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995, are herebyAFFIRMED insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the seizure of theunregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase andsales invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the rest of thearticles subject of said warrants. The respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby ordered to return to petitioners all


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items seized from the subject premises and belonging topetitioners, except the unregistered delivery receipts andunregistered purchase and sales invoices.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133917 February 19, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NASARIO MOLINA yMANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y

MALAGURA @ "BOBOY" To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution inthe name of protecting the society from lawbreakers is tomake the government itself lawless and to subvert thosevalues upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend. 1

For automatic review is the Decision 2 of the Regional TrialCourt of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamatalias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias "Boboy,"guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, 3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), asamended by Republic Act No. 7659, 4 and sentencing them tosuffer the supreme penalty of death.

The information against accused-appellants reads: That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, inconspiracy with each other, did then and therewillfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in theirpossession 946.9 grants of dried marijuana which areprohibited.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellantspleaded not guilty to the accusation against them. 6 Trialensued, wherein the prosecution presented PoliceSuperintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr.,and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then amember of the Philippine National Police detailed at PrecinctNo. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regardingthe presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. 7

The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher inperson was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcyclepassed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver,accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to seehim before the arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused- appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1Paguidopon only after they were arrested. 8

At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusherwill be passing at NHA, Ma- a, Davao City any time thatmorning. 9 Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the sameday, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3,Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the teamof SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon(brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, toproceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where theywould wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. 10

At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while theteam were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a"trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At thatinstance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellantsas the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their, vehicleand overtook the "trisikad." 11 SPO1 Paguidopon was left in hishouse, thirty meters from where the accused-appellants wereaccosted. 12

The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that

point, accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black baghanded the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently,SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer andasked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag. 13 Molinareplied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." 14 SPO1Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed driedmarijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-appellants Mulaand Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. 15

On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the

marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible asevidence for having been obtained in violation of theirconstitutional right against unreasonable searches andseizures. 16 The demurrer was denied by the trial court. 17 Amotion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants,but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waivedpresentation of evidence and opted to file a jointmemorandum.

On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assaileddecision, 18 the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecutionalone without any evidence from both accused whowaived presentation of their own evidence throughtheir counsels, more than sufficient to prove the guilt

of both accused of the offense charged beyondreasonable doubt, pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA andGREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a SUPREMEPENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection underRepublic Act 8176, to be effected and implementedas therein provided for by law, in relation to Sec. 24of Rep. Act 7659.

The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered toimmediately elevate the entire records of this casewith the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila,for the automatic review of their case by theSupreme Court and its appropriate action as the casemay be.

SO ORDERED. 19

Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised penal Code and Rule122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevatedto this Court on automatic review. Accused-appellantscontend:

I.

THAT THE MARIJUANA IS IN ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCEFOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OFAPPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINSTUNREASONABLE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;

II.

THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THEGOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR

GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; ANDIII.

THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEENPROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THEIMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RANo. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF ANYAGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFEIMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH. 20

The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieuof Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants.

The fundamental law of the land mandates that sea

44825287 Constitutional Law 2 Cases Set 2

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