Securities Fraud Class Action “When talk is not cheap …” Last updated 25 Jan 12.
Transcript of Securities Fraud Class Action “When talk is not cheap …” Last updated 25 Jan 12.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson (US 1988)
1. F: What are the facts in the case? • What allegations did the plaintiffs make?• What kind of suit is this? What do the plaintiffs seek?• Who are the defendants?
2. I: What is the issue that the Court addresses? • What are the arguments of the defendants?• What are the responses by the plaintiffs?
3. R: What is the definition of materiality adopted by the Court? The Court’s ruling?
• What alternatives did the Court have in choosing a definition?• What is an "agreement in principle" definition? a "price and structure"
definition?• What is a "probability-magnitude" test? Is this how financial markets
judge information's materiality?
4. A: Why does the Court adopt a case-by-case definition of materiality? • Why does the Court reject the bright-line tests urged by the
defendants?• What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Court's approach?• After this case, when should corporate executives disclose merger
negotiations?
5. C: What do you conclude about the case:• After this case, can corporate executives strategically misinform
securities markets about merger plans?• Can a corporation engage in material silence?
Basic Inc. v. Levinson (US 1988)
Issue 1: Were statements about merger negotiations "material"?
ND Ohio: NO - Merger negotiations were not certain to become "agreement in principle" Summary judgment for defendants (no trial)
6th Cir: YES - statements were misleading and material, since denials were untrue Reverse and remand (send case back for further proceedings)
Sup Ct: PERHAPS - materiality depends on facts of case, fact-finder must assess "probablity + magnitude" Reverse and remand (send case to 6th Circuit for further proceedings consistent with opinion / 6th Circuit will likely remand case to trial court)
Basic Inc. v. Levinson (US 1988)
Issue 2: Can plaintiffs' reliance be presumed when misstatements are disseminated in public trading market?
ND Ohio: YES - presumption of reliance when fraud on trading market Certify class action (common issues predominate over individual issues)
6th Cir: YES - YES - fraud-on-market theory OK Affirm
Sup Ct: YES - Presumption of reliance OK, based on fraud on market theoryAffirm fraud-on-market theory OK (in dicta, court explains how presumption might be rebutted)
“King of Pain”
“Loathed because he's so mean, feared because he's so powerful, Bill Lerach is the lawyer everyone in Silicon Valley hates.”
Fortune Magazine, Sep. 2000
“"In 10 or 15 years you will be holding another hearing about a debacle in the securities market that will make you remember the S&L mess with fondness."
Bill Lerach, congressional testimony (1995)
Curriculum Vitae• 1946: born in working-class
Pittsburgh• 1970: U Pittsburgh law grad• 1976: joins Milberg Weiss (San
Diego)• 2004: moves to Lerach
Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins (San Diego)
• 2005: $7.2 billion recovery in Enron litigation ($45 over career)
• 2007: pleads guilty to obstruction of justice (later Milberg Weiss)
• 2009: disbarred by California State Bar
• 2010: released from prison / “Circle of Greed” published
Stanford Class Action Clearinghouse
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Federal Securities Fraud Class Action Litigation
(lawsuits filed)
Securities Fraud Action
When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores (US 1975)
William Rehnquist
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Section 10 -- Manipulative and Deceptive Devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange--
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered … any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule 10b-5
• Plaintiff• Defendant• Elements
– Material – Misrepresentation– Scienter (intentional)– Reliance– Causation– Damages
• Transactional nexus• Jurisdictional nexus
Compare to other private actions
Exchange Act Securities Act
Rule 10b-5
§ 18(a) § 9(c) §11 §12(a)(1)§12(a)
(2)
Fraud icw purchase or sale of security
Materially false statement in SEC filing
Specified manipu-lative practice(pools, etc)
False statement in registration statement
Offer or sale of unregistered, non-exempt securities
Offer or sale by means of materially false prospectus
• Investigate corporate disclosures …
• … identify corporate “fiction” …
• … followed by “surprise” …
• … resulting in price drop …
• … identify “scienter” …
• … file complaint …(e.g. Bay Networks, Inc)
• … which must tell “fraud story” …
• … to avoid “motion to dismiss”
Who pays?
Average settlement: $80 MMAverage attorney fees: 20%
2006 data2004 data2003 data
Atty feesoverview
Settlement
Buying shareholders(plaintiffs)
Selling shareholders(windfall winners!)
Holding shareholders(losers!)
CorporationPayment
Corporate execs(D&O insurance)
Insiders(insider trading gains)
Class Counsel – Business Model• Get started
– identify material corporate misrepresentations– find appropriate shareholders to act as class
representatives– file a complaint in a court of class counsel’s choosing
• Take care of legalities– defend the complaint against motion to dismiss (on legal
grounds)– urge the judge to grant class action status to the
litigation – send notice to class members, giving them an option to
withdraw from the lawsuit– undertake discovery of information from the company
and other sources• Close the deal
– enter into settlement negotiations with company officials
– champion any settlement before the judge– administer settlement funds – appeal any adverse decisions by the trial court judge