SECURINGINDIATHEMODIWAY

Pathankot,SurgicalStrikesandMore

SECURINGINDIATHEMODIWAY

Pathankot,SurgicalStrikesandMore

NITINA.GOKHALE

©NitinA.Gokhale,2017

Firstpublished,2017

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproducedortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronicormechanical,includingphotocopying,recording,oranyinformationstorageorretrievalsystem,withoutpriorpermissioninwritingfromthecopyrightholder.

NoresponsibilityforlosscausedtoanyindividualororganizationactingonorrefrainingfromactionasaresultofthematerialinthispublicationcanbeacceptedbyBloomsburyIndiaortheauthor/editor.

BLOOMSBURYPUBLISHINGINDIAPVT.LTD.NewDelhiLondonOxfordNewYorkSydneyISBN:978-93-86643-88-9

10987654321

PublishedbyBloomsburyPublishingIndiaPvt.Ltd.DDAComplexLSC,BuildingNo.4,2ndFloorPocket6&7,SectorCVasantKunj,NewDelhi110070

Thecontentofthisbookisthesoleexpressionandopinionofitsauthors,andnotofthepublishers.Thepublishersinnomannerisliableforanyopinionorviewsexpressedbytheauthor.Whilebesteffortshavebeenmadeinpreparingthisbook,thepublishersmakesnorepresentationsorwarrantiesofanykindandassumesnoliabilitiesofanykindwithrespecttotheaccuracyorcompletenessofthecontentandspecificallydisclaimsanyimpliedwarrantiesofmerchantabilityorfitnessofuseofaparticularpurpose.

Thepublisherbelievesthatthecontentsofthisbookdonotviolateanyexistingcopyright/intellectualpropertyofothersinanymannerwhatsoever.However,incaseanysourcehasnotbeendulyattributed,the

propertyofothersinanymannerwhatsoever.However,incaseanysourcehasnotbeendulyattributed,thepublishermaybenotifiedinwritingfornecessaryaction.

CONTENTS

Foreword

Prefce

CHAPTER1RemovingtheCobwebs

CHAPTER2TestingTimes,Post-Uri

CHAPTER3TheSurgicalStrikesinPoK

CHAPTER4Pathankot:AvertingaCatastrophe

CHAPTER5StrikingHardinMyanmar

CHAPTER6InternalSecurity:ChallengesRemain

CHAPTER7StandingUptoChina

CHAPTER8Re-engagingwiththeMiddleEast

CHAPTER9Defence:GoodStart,MuchtoDo

CHAPTER10HarnessingSpace

CHAPTER11SecuringtheCyberDomain

Notes

AppendixI:NIAChargesheet

AppendixII:IndianNavy:CapabilityBuilding,OverseasDeploymentsandFuturePlans

T

CHAPTER1

REMOVINGTHECOBWEBS

Wemustplanforthefuture;everythingcannotbeseenfromapoliticalpointofview.

–NarendraModi

hursday,29September2016,waslikeanyotherweekdayinthecountry’scapital, New Delhi. The scorching summer had given way to cooler

mornings, although the political heat was rising on the Narendra Modigovernment.Inthepreviousweek,19soldiershaddiedinUri.Thegovernmentwasonthebackfoot,withcriticsquestioningitspolicyagainstPakistan.Asenseofdespondencyhungoverthecountry.

At sunrise that day, Modi’s National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval,drivinginhisowncar,arrivedattheresidenceofthePrimeMinisterat7RaceCourseRoad(nowLokKalyanMarg)bearingimportantnews.

NeitherthePrimeMinisternortheNationalSecurityAdviserhadsleptmuchthrough thenight.Bothof themwereawareofaSpecialForcesoperation thathad been launched across the Line of Control (LoC) by the Indian army thepreviousevening.

Now,afterasuspense-filled12hours,Dovalcamebearingthegoodnews.India’s Special Forces had hit several terrorist camps and returned safely,

delivering a tight, hard slap to the PakistanArmy and its proxies in PakistanOccupiedKashmir(PoK).Atleast70–75occupantsinmultiplecamps—bothto

thesouthandnorthofthePirPanjalranges—hadbeenkilled.Amongthedeadwas amix ofPakistani regulars and terroristswaiting to cross over into J&K.PostashortconversationwiththePrimeMinister,DovalrushedhomeandthenquicklyreturnedtotheSouthBlockonRaisinaHills.

ThehighestseatofpowerinIndiawasastirearlierthanusualthatmorning.Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and Army Chief Gen Dalbir Singh hadalready arrived. Doval informed them of his conversation with the PrimeMinister and the directions that he had issued as a follow-up to India’sunprecedentedaction.

ModitooreachedhisofficeinSouthBlockby0800hours.FinanceMinisterArun Jaitley and Home Minister Rajnath Singh—both members of India’shighest national security decision-making body, the Cabinet Committee onSecurityorCCS—alsomadetheirwaytoSouthBlock.ExternalAffairsMinisterSushmaSwarajwasunabletoattendsinceshewasunwell.Atthathour,itwasstilltooearlyforthepryingeyesofthemediatonoticetheunusualgatheringoftopministersandothersecurityhonchos.

ThecrucialCCSmeetingthatdecidedtogopublicwithsurgicalstrikes

By 0900 hours, India’s Cabinet Committee on Security had begun itsunscheduledmeeting.InattendancewereArmyChiefGenDalbirSinghandhisDirectorGeneral,MilitaryOperations (DGMO), LtGeneralRanbir Singh, theForeign, Home and Defence secretaries, besides the chiefs of the intelligenceagencies.

Rightatthebeginning,GenDalbirbriefedtheCCSaboutthecounterterroriststrike carried out by the Indian Army across the LoC inside PoK and itssuccessfuloutcome.

Once the briefing had been concluded, the Prime Minister announced hisdecision to go public with the raid across the border. Modi told his seniorcolleagues: ‘We must now let the world know what our brave soldiers haveachieved to sendanunambiguousmessage to the terrorists and theirmentors.’Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar was asked to prepare a press release. It wasdecidedthattheDGMO,LtGenRanbirSinghwouldreadoutthesuccinctpressnote in the presence of Vikas Swarup, then the Ministry of External Affairs(MEA)SpokespersonandJointSecretary,ExternalPublicityDivision.

Withinanhour,thepressnotewasreadied.Atprecisely1130hours,LtGenRanbirSingh, a strapping Infantryofficer,

announced to theworld that India had carried out ‘counterterrorist strikes’ onterroristcampslocatedinsidePoKandinflictedheavydamagetobothmenandmaterial. ‘Based on very specific and credible information... the Indian armyconducted surgical strikes last night...during these counterterrorist operations,significantcasualtieshavebeencausedtotheterroristsandthosewhoaretryingto support them,’ the DGMO said, reading from a prepared text, with VikasSwarupsittingbesidehim.

ThenDGMO,LtGenRanbirSingh(left)announcingIndia’ssurgicalstrikesinPoK

Theratheranodynestatementdidnotdojusticetowhattheraidhadachieved.For one, never before in India’s troubled history with Pakistan had the

government taken responsibility at the highest level of an unprecedented stepsuchascross-borderstrikes.Bytakingtheonusofthedecisiononhimself—andannouncing it too—PrimeMinister Modi once again demonstrated why he iscapableofthinkingbeyondthenorm,andsurprisingrivalsandsupportersalike.

Foranother,thetrans-LoCstrikescarriedoutonmultiplelocationsbroketheshacklesthattheIndianArmyhadbeenforcedtoimposeuponitselfbecauseoftimid political leadership in the past. Now, by exercising the option that hadalways existed, but had never been authorised at the highest level for fear ofescalation,ithadmanagedtocreateanuncertaintyinthemindsofthePakistanArmythathadbecomeusedtopredictableresponsesattheborder.

By personally authorising a surgical strike, and then announcing it to theworld,PrimeMinisterModiwas truly livingup tohisgrowingreputationasa‘risk taker’. Surgical strikes inside PoK were indeed a massive political anddiplomaticgamble.

A number of things could have gone wrong. The advancing parties could

havebeenattacked,orambushed,leavingIndiansoldiersinjuredorkilledinthearea occupied byPakistan. If the information regarding the targeted areas androuteshadbeenfoundtobeinaccurate,themissioncouldhavefailedtoachieveits objectives. Most importantly, the success of the operation depended uponpreciseintelligenceabouttheterroristcamps,theirpresenceinthosecamps,andsaferoutes toaccess themwhichwouldbefreefromlandmines.Theprecisionandaccuracyofintelligencethereforeplayedavitalrole.

It is imperativetonotethat if thetrans-LoCraidshadfailed, theIndianPMwould have lost face, aswell as huge political capital.A setback in the raidswould have further constricted India’s room to manoeuvre its policy againstPakistan, and politically,Modi would have been hobbled in domestic affairs.However,hewentforthejugular,preciselybecausenooneexpectedhimto.Ofcourse, the PrimeMinister could take the risk because he had built a nationalsecurityteamledbyDovalthathadtherequisiteoperationalexperience,andtheabilitytobemeticulousinpreparationofaplanandexecution,basedonprecisereal-time intelligence. The troops toowere highlymotivated andwell trained.Overandaboveeverythingelse,Modihadconfidenceintheabilityoftheforcestocarryoutthemission.

The PrimeMinister’s critics have variously described this and some of hisother unconventional decisions since coming to power as rash, thoughtless,gimmicky,andevendangerous.

Modihasneverthelesschartedhisowncourse.Thesurgicalstrikeswasjustonesuchexample.Inthepast40months,Modi

hasshowntheabilitytostayaheadofthecurveandcatchalmosteveryoneoffguardonmanyoccasions.

Infact,ModibeganhistenurewithahighlyunusualmoveonthedayofhisassumingofficeasIndia’sfifteenthPrimeMinister.

Onthehotdustyeveningof26May2014,whenModitookoathofofficeinthe forecourtof the imposingRashtrapatiBhawan, the colonial erapalace thathasbeenhome tosuccessive IndianPresidents,over4,000guests—politicians,Bollywoodcelebrities,topbureaucrats,someofIndia’srichestindustrialistsandcommon citizens—witnessed the ceremony. The focus was however on the

heads of states from seven nations in the neighbourhood who had especiallyflowninatthepersonalinvitationofthenewleaderofIndia,yettobeswornin.

The Prime Ministers of Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, and Mauritius, and thePresidentsofAfghanistan,SriLanka,andMaldives,wereathandtowitnessthetectonicshiftinIndia’spoliticallandscapethatday(seePlate1).

That they came at less than 24 hours’ notice was the first glimpse of the‘shock and awe’ technique that PrimeMinisterModi would come to employduringhisthreeyearsplusinofficesofar.MandarinsoftheMEAnormallyfindeven a few months too short a notice to arrange visits of the Heads ofGovernment.They are perhaps stillwondering howTeamModi organised thewhole event, within twenty-four hours, and executed it with clock-workprecision.NotonlydidModicatchtheusuallystaidMEAoffguardbydirectlyreachingouttotheheadsofstatesinIndia’simmediateneighbourhood,hebrokealongstandingtabooofnotinvitingrepresentativesoftheTibetangovernment-inexileand thatofTaiwan toofficial functions, lestBeijing feltoffended.ThePrime Minister of the Tibetan Government-in-exile and Taiwan’s traderepresentative inNewDelhiwere among the select invitees to the oath-takingceremonythatsummerevening,settingthetoneforamorerobustforeignpolicythat has been practiced by Delhi in the past three years. A new regime hadindeedmadeafreshbeginningonRaisinaHillthatsummer.

The very fact that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, India’simplacable adversary, flew into New Delhi at Modi’s invitation—he wasofficiallystillnotPrimeMinister—spokehighlyoftheexpectationsthatIndia’snewleaderhadgenerated.Theenthusiasmwouldnotbemisplaced.

Modi had swept to power riding an unprecedented wave of popularity,winning,for thefirst timein threedecades,aclearmajority inParliament,andleaving behind the legacy of shaky, compromised coalition governments thatIndiahadbeensubjectedtosincethemid-1990s.

Hewasnotabouttobeconstrainedbythe‘hesitationofhistory’.Norwashewilling to be weighed down by the precedence or lack of it. In hismind, nodecisionwasimpossiblejustbecausesomethinghadnotbeendonebefore.

Asthewell-knownstrategicaffairscolumnistandauthorCRajaMohanhas

noted: ‘The massive electoral majority that Modi won in the 2014 generalelections suggested that an era was coming to an end in India’s domesticpolitics...an empowered government under a strong political leadership withprovenexperienceinadministration,whichdidnotcarrytheideologicalburdensofthepastandwasunabashedaboutIndia’sgreatpoweraspirations,seemedallset to unveil a new age in the nation’s evolution since themiddle of the 20thcentury...’1

Indeedthatwasthecaseasisevidentfromthebold,unconventionalandswiftmovesindiplomacy,security,andadministration,whichhasmarkedthePrimeMinister’s tenure so far, often leaving his opponents stunned and supportersasking formore.Onecommon threadacross the spectrum inhis approachhasbeentherealisationthatithastobe‘IndiaFirst’.EverydecisionthatistakenandimplementedisaimedatmakingIndiasafe,stable,andprosperous.

Modi’sboldmovetoinviteheadsofstatesintheneighbourhoodforhisownswearinginwasnotaone-off‘outofthebox’decision.ThePrimeMinisterhasrepeatedlydemonstratedhisabilitytobreakoutofthestatusquoistmind-set.

GivingaleguptoBIMSTEC

Take the example of inviting leaders of the BIMSTEC countries to hold aparallelsummitwithBRICSinGoain2016.

BIMSTECor theBay ofBengal Initiative forMulti-sectoralTechnical andEconomicCooperationisagroupingofnationsthatholdsimmensesignificanceintheSouthandSouth-eastAsianregion.Itsmembersare:Bangladesh,Bhutan,Myanmar,SriLanka,Thailand,Nepal,andIndia.

HenotonlycalledtheBIMSTECleadersforaSummitinGoa,butalsogaveitasubstanceandnewdirectionbyorganisingasuccessfulmeetingofNationalSecurity Advisers or equivalent rank officials of the BIMSTEC countries inDelhi.ThismeetingwasconductedundertheChairmanshipofDovalwithinsixmonthsofthemainBIMSTECmeetinginGoa.

Theconference,afirstofitskind,provedtobehighlysuccessfulandisnowlikelytobeinstitutionalisedasaregularforum.Asaninnovator,Modicouldseethelongtermimportanceofmulti-facetedcooperationwithBIMSTECcountries,notonlyonaneconomicfront,butalsointhedomainofsecurity.

TherewasareasonwhyIndiaadoptedthisapproach.ExceptThailandandMyanmar,allothermembersofBIMSTECarealsopart

ofSAARCortheSouthAsianAssociationforRegionalCooperationthatcountsPakistan among its members. In 2016, India wanted to limit its diplomaticengagements with Pakistan because of its continued support for cross-borderterrorism.NewDelhihadinfactledtheboycottoftheSAARCsummitthatwassupposedtohavebeenheldinPakistanthatyear.MostothercountriessupportedIndia’sstand.

However, Indiawantedtokeepitsengagementwithotherneighboursonanevenkeel.So, inonestroke, thePrimeMinister facilitated interactionbetweenBRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa, besides India) andBIMSTECmembers,andsimultaneouslyisolatedPakistan.

WhileIndia’scloserrelationshipwiththeUShasbeenacontinuousprocesssincethebeginningofthe21stcentury,ModitookittoahigherlevelbystrikingapersonalrapportwithPresidentBarackObamabetween2014and2016.AfterthesurpriseelectionofDonaldTrumpasBarackObama’ssuccessor,therewereworriesinNewDelhithatthegrowthtrajectoryoftheIndo-USrelationshipwill

becutshortgiventhetemperamentalnatureoftheTrumpadministration.Alltheapprehensions however vanished once Modi and Trump had a one-on-onemeetinginWashingtoninJune2017.Thetwoestablishedaworkingrelationshipandchartedoutapracticalroadmap.

ThattheTrumpadministrationregardsIndiaasanimportantplayerinSouthAsiawasevidentwhenPresidentTrumpunveiledhisnewAfghanistanpolicyinAugust. Hewanted India to domore in assisting the war-torn nation even asTrump recognised—and articulated clearly—a stand that India has beenadvocatingvis-à-visPakistaninthecontextofAfghanistan.WashingtonclearlyrecognisedthattheproblemofterrorisminAfghanistanemanatedfromPakistanand that Islamabad must demonstrate its commitment to act against terroristgroupswhichgetsanctuariesandsupportinPakistan.

‘We welcome President Trump’s determination to enhance efforts toovercome the challenges facing Afghanistan and confronting issues of safehavens and other forms of cross-border support enjoyed by terrorists. Indiashares these concerns and objectives. We are committed to supporting theGovernment and the people of Afghanistan in their efforts to bring peace,security, stability, and prosperity in their country.We have been steadfast inextendingreconstructionanddevelopmentassistancetoAfghanistaninkeepingwith our traditional friendshipwith its people.Wewill continue these efforts,and in partnershipwith other countries,’MEAnotedwithin hours ofTrump’spublicstatement.

What is not known is that hours before Trump announced the policy, hisNationalsecurityAdviser,HRMcMaster,wasonalongishtelephonecallwithhis IndiancounterpartAjitDoval.Many inputs thatDovalhadonhowtheUScoulddealwiththePakistan-Afghanistanconundrum,founditswayinthefinalannouncementbyTrump,topdiplomaticsourcessaid.Clearly,patientbackroomwork and theDoval-McMaster personal chemistry has allowed India an upperhandinAfghanistan.

Modi’snationalsecurityteamhasalsonotneglectedoldfriendshipsthatNewDelhi has had over decades even as it set out to capture new ground. So thePrimeMinistermadespecialeffortstoreachouttoRussianPresidentVladimir

PutinsinceanimpressionhadgainedgroundthatIndiawasabandoningMoscowinfavourofWashington.ModiandDovalmadespecialeffortstonotletRussiafeel neglected. India continues to source over 60 per cent of India’s militaryhardwarefromRussia.India’sdecisiontobuyS-400missilesfromRussiaforitsvital air defence needs is one example of the continuing robust New Delhi-Moscowrelationship.

Several other instances come tomind. Stepping up the outreach toMiddleEastcountriesacrosstheboard(fromSaudiArabiatoIranandfromtheUAEtoIsrael)hasbeenadeliberate,well-thoughtoutplanforinstance.Or,considerthedecision to delegitimise 85 per cent of India’s currency in one fell swoop.Demonetisation, as the decision came to be known more popularly, not onlycaughtpeoplebysurprise,butalsomostofhisownpartyandcabinetcolleagues.Thejuryisstilloutonwhetheritwasagooddecision.

ThenthereisthedecisiontomoveawayfromthestereotypeofaddressingtheannualconferenceofDirectorGeneralsofPoliceinthecapital.Traditionally,thetwo-day conference has always been held in Delhi and had a set agenda foryears.Usually,thePrimeMinisterspokeattheinauguralfunction,followedbytheinteractionwiththeHomeMinister.

PolicechiefswiththePrimeMinisterandtheHomeMinister

PMModiandhiscolleaguestakingastrollinRannofKutch

Modi however, decided to take the unusual step of holding this annualmeetingawayfromDelhi.

Hence in 2014, Guwahati, Assam’s capital and the biggest city in India’snorth-east,waschosenasthevenue.Thepolicechiefs—ofallthestates,andtheCentral Armed Police Forces—travelled to Guwahati that year. In 2015, theconferencevenueshiftedwest, to theRannofKutch,and then in2016, itwasheld inHyderabad.But thechange invenuewasonlyoneoutofmanyfactorsthatweredifferent.

Therehasbeenaparadigmshift in theway inwhich thepolicechiefsnowcome for theannualgatheringas thePrimeMinistergiveshis full attention tosuggestions and presentations by the DGs, in tackling increasingly complexchallengesfacedbylawenforcers.

For three years running,Modi has spent two to three full days listening topresentations by the heads of police forces from across the country, trying tounderstand their challenges, demands, and shortcomings. The retreat,participants reveal, is business-like and starts with a common yoga and PTsession early in the morning, followed by day-long deliberations on differenttopics,andfinallyendingwithdinner.

Inbetweentheformaldeliberations,ModimakesitapointtomeettheDGsingroups.So,asapolicechiefreveals,duringbreakfast,hemayaskDGsofstatesthatarefacingtheproblemofLeftWingExtremismtojoinhistable;atlunchhemay meet the heads of police forces from all the eight north-eastern states;whereas dinner could be with a group drawn from states facing the threat ofradicalisation.‘Thisformat,ofdiscussioninasmallergroupovermeals,allowsustospeakalittlemorefreely.ThePMisalsomorefocused,’revealsaservingDG.

However, the discussion on the dining table just doesn’t remain there. Asanotherpolicechiefsays,‘Afterdiscussionovermeals,wehavetofollowuponthe pointswe hadmade on the dining table by sending official inputs to bothMinistry of Home Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office. Often, withinmonths,weareaskedforafollowupreport.’

Clearly, apart from the obvious teambuilding it fosters, these retreats have

allowed the PrimeMinister to understand the internal security situation in thecountryfirsthand.PrakashMishra,whoretiredasDG,CRPFin2015,saysthePrime Minister’s attention to detail and ability to be a good listener isremarkable. ‘He engages on a broad spectrumof issues ranging frompolicingphilosophy for a new India to the intricate workings of the police force. Hisemphasis on technology, modernisation, morale of the forces, and so on, canpossibly be considered the first attempt at the highest level to bring about aparadigmshiftinpoliceworking,’headds.

GivinganexampleofhowModi’smindworks,apolicechiefrecounted:‘Inoneoftheconversations,heaskedsomeofuswhyisitthatseniorpoliceofficersnolongerseemtohaveanycommunicationwithcitizensandthenheansweredthequeryhimself.Perhapsmanyseniorpoliceofficershave forgotten to inter-mingle with common people. Perhaps they should make it a point to walkthroughcrowdedstreets,inthemarketsinpeakhours,toestablisharapportwithpeople. Perhaps they should leave behind their official vehicles and let only aminimum staff accompany them during these interactions, letting people feelless intimidated andmoreopen about theproblems facedby them,’ thePrimeMinistergentlysuggested.

There isnomatrix tomeasure ifhissuggestionshavebeenfollowed inanyway, but clearly, Modi has the ability to think of even seemingly mundanemethodstoimprovetheefficiencyandacceptanceofthemuch-malignedpoliceforce. A police chief recalls the PrimeMinister’s suggestion to take steps tohonour hundreds of policemenmartyred on duty.During one of themeetings,Modi’ssuggestionwastoputupasimplephotographofsuchfigureswithabriefdescriptionofhis/herdeedsinalltheschoolsinthevillage/townthepolicemanorwomanbelongedto,whichcouldgoalongwayininspiringchildrentotakeupthepoliceman’sprofession.Theseinitiativesapart,Modiwillhoweverhavetocrack thewhipon implementing longpendingpolice reforms in thecomingyears.

TRANSFORMATION

Ithasbeenaremarkabletransformationforsomeonewhowasessentiallyalocalleader,efficientlyrunningastateandnotwastinghistimeonwhatwasnothisdomainthen.PerhapsbecauseModididnottakeofficewithanypre-conceivedideasaboutnationalsecurityandforeignpolicy,hehasbeenabletochartanewcourse.

Asalong-timegovernmentwatcherremarked,‘Startingwithacleanslatehasallowedhimtoescapetheusualtimiditythathascometosymbolisesomeofourdecision-makingatthehighestlevel.’

His approach to global affairs is based on interlinking foreign policy withstronginternalgrowth.HeenvisionsasecureIndiathatisconfidentofitsplacein the world and capable of dealing with its peers and competitors from apositionofconfidenceandstrength.

HishandlingofChina—extendingahandof friendship firstbut thenactingtough when Beijing started playing truant on various issues—and taking aplunge in signing the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement(LEMOA)withtheUnitedStates,istestimonytoModi’sconfidenceindealingwithtrickyforeignpolicyissues.

Modi also looks at the vast IndianDiaspora as a national asset andmakeseveryefforttoengagewiththemduringhisforeignvisits.MostofthemfeelthatModi’s statesman-like image of a strong and decisive leader has changedpeople’sperceptionofIndia.PeopleofIndianorigintodayarelookeduponwithgreaterrespectanddeferenceincountriesoftheirdomicile.AsveterandiplomatGParathasarthysays,‘PrimeMinisterModihascourtedtheIndiancommunityabroadmoreaggressivelythananyoneelseinmymemory.AndisalsothefirstpersontohavethegutstodoitinArabcountriesliketheUAEandSaudiArabia.TheIndiancommunityabroadswearsbyhim.HehasbeenabletomobilisetheIndiancommunity in amannernoother leaderhasdone.’2Sowhat advantagedoes that give India, I asked Partha (as he is fondly known by friends andadmirersalike). ‘Ah, theadvantage! In theUS forexamplewecannowmoveIndians to organise bi-partisan support.And because the Indian community ispolitically organised on both sides, there is a big advantage. Similarly, in theUK. Given the money and influence the Indian community has in many

countries,Modiisusingtheirreachstrategically.’OneofthefirstexamplesofthedeftuseoftheDiaspora’sinfluencewasthe

presenceofthreedozenmembersoftheUSCongressincludingSenateForeignRelationsCommitteeChairDemocraticSenatorBobMenendezand the IndianAmericanRepublicanGovernor of SouthCarolinaNikkiHaley, on stagewithModi’sgrandMadisonSquareGardenevent inNewYork inSeptember2014.Cleo Paskal, Associate Fellow at Chatam House, the Royal Institute ofInternationalAffairs,London,inachapterinhisrecentbookonModi’sforeignpolicywrites,‘ThiswasModi’sfirstvisittotheUSasPrimeMinisterandmediainimical to the changes in India were looking for reasons to call the visit afailure...The US politicians were there because Indian-Americans are covetedsupporters.Theyarenotpermanently tied to anypartyandarewell above theUSaverageinwealthandeducation.Theyarepotentiallyinfluentialvotersanddonors’3(seePlate2).

VijayChauthiawale, in-charge ofBJP’s department of foreign affairs since2015 and the man entrusted with organising the Prime Minister’s publicinteractions abroadwherever possible, reveals the thought behind the exercisethatallowsModitoleveragethestrengthoftheIndiancommunityabroad.

ThePrimeMinisteramidstecstaticsupportersinMSG

‘Theideatoorganiseacivicreceptionbeganin2014justbeforeModimadehis first visit asPrimeMinister to theUS.Wedon’t have any set structure invarious countries, but there are influential individuals, and of course,organisationslikeOverseasFriendsofBJPwhohelpinmanagingtheseevents.Forexample,thereisDrBharatBaraiinChicago—apopular,influentialdoctorwith ties across the political spectrum in the US—who took the initiative insettinguptheMadisonSquareGardeneventinSeptember2014.Therewasnoset template availablewhenwe began. But nowwe have a precedent, havingorganisedpublicmeetingsforthePMevenatplaceslikeSingaporeandDubai,’Chauthaiwalerevealed.4

Initially, thereusedtobealotofchaos, lotofjostlingforcredit, infighting,but the now the system has settled down. So Chauthaiwale, a PhD inmicrobiology and a former vice-president at Torrent Pharmaceuticals, travelsweeksinadvancetoacountrywherethePrimeMinisterisscheduledtovisitand

setsuphispublicoutreachtotheDiaspora.‘The first thing I tell everyone that this is not about theBJPor theOFBJP

(OverseasFriendsofBJP),butabouttheentirecommunity.IgivethatmessageloudandclearintheveryfirstmeetingwiththeDiasporaoutfits.Theorganisingcommittees,whichwe set up, consist of representatives fromall communities,linguisticandprofessionalgroupsoftheDiaspora,’Chauthaiwaletoldme.

Theaim,closeaidesofthePMsay,istomakeIndiaacceptableeverywhere.That iswhy the PrimeMinister has chosen to tour smaller countries like Fiji,Sychelles,Mauritius,andMongolia,countriesasdiverseastheycanget.

Chauthaiwale points out, ‘By interacting with Indians abroad and solvingtheir issues, the PM sends amessage that he cares for them and is concernedabout theirwellbeing.Take forexample, the issueof land fora temple in theUAE.Itwasalongstandingdesireofthecommunitythere.ThePMpersonallyintervenedandandhadthelandallottedtothem.Thesearesmallissues,emotiveissues, but they add substantially to the comfort of the community.Moreover,thePrimeMinister’svisitsandhisaddressestotheDiasporahaveincreasedtheirstatureintheirowncountry.’

ThelargerstrategicaimofcourseistoprojectIndiaastherisingpowerwithaboomingeconomy,democraticethos,andvibrantculture.Itiswiththissingularfocus that Modi tours the world. Between 15 June 2014—when he visitedBhutan for his first official trip as PrimeMinister—andMay 2017,Modi hadundertaken visits to 49 countries. By contrast, the PM’s predecessor, DrManmohan Singh, in his first three years in office had toured 27 countries,according to records availableon theMEAwebsite.As formerdiplomatAmitDasguptawroterecently:‘Ifweassumethattheessenceofforeignpolicyliesinfurthering a nation’s vital interests through policies that are principled,pragmatic, strategic and outcome-driven, the approach is as important as theobjective.Themeans, inotherwords, reflecthow the endwouldbeperceivedandare,thus,equallyimportant.

‘Toachievehisstrategicvision,Modioptedforhisowndistinctiveapproach:first, he chose toplacegreater emphasisonpersonal equations and second,heoptedtobedisruptiveandunpredictableand,ifrequired,unhesitatinglyforceful.

Bothdepartdramaticallyfromtheapproachadoptedbyhispredecessors.‘The results, so far, have been encouraging. India’s sagging international

imageduringtheUPA2tenurehas,undoubtedly,seenadramaticrevival.ThePrime Minister’s personal outreach and strategically designed approach inestablishing personal equations with world leaders has been reciprocatedsubstantially.Both,withUSPresidentBarackObama andmore recently,withPresident Trump, this was visibly apparent, as was his disruptive initiative inreachingouttoIsrael.Thesewereparadigmshiftsinapproach.’5

ButwhatofModi’ssecuritypolicies?Whatishisapproach?At one level, because of his record as a no-nonsense administrator and his

nationalisticviews,itwasagiventhatModiwouldadoptamorerobustsecuritypolicywithrespecttobothPakistanandChina.Breakingyearsofstatusquoandhesitationhavenotbeeneasy.Inevitably,therehavebeensetbacks—inKashmirand the Maoist-dominated areas—but in each case, the national securityapparatusunderModi’spremiershiphasbouncedbackandreconfigureditself.

AmbassadorSatishChandra, seasoneddiplomat and formerdeputynationalsecurity adviser, sums it up succinctly: ‘Modi is not looking at the past as ainhibitingfactor.ThePrimeMinisterwilldowhathe thinks is right.He isnotinhibited by lack of precedence. Every PrimeMinister gets bogged down bycountervailingforceswithinthewellestablishedsystem.ButModihasbeenabletobreakoutoftheironcladframeworkbecauseheisacompleteoutsider.HeisnotpartoftheDelhiDurbarandcanthereforethinkoutoftheboxonmostvitalissueslikeforeignpolicyandnationalsecurity.’6

Theresultsmaynotbeimmediatelyapparent,butmanyfarreachingchanges,ushered in over the past three years, will strengthen national security, as thesubsequentchapterswillargue.

However, according to NSA Doval, it is difficult to comprehend Modi’ssecuritypolicieswithoutunderstandinghisvision for thenation.Groomedandnurtured ideologically inastrongnationalistmode,hehasbothacivilisationalawarenessandalong-termstrategicvisionofIndia’ssecurity.Hebelievesthatastrongeconomy, transformedhumancapitalof India, technologicalexcellence,andpowerfulnationalconsciousnessof theIndianpeopleare theguarantorsof

Indiansecurity.Hisemphasisonhumanresourcedevelopment,indigenisationofdefence production, and emphasis on technology in defence, are all aimed atmaking India strong and secure. A careful analysis of all his speeches andutterances make it clear that he considers the will of the nation as the mainingredient of its Comprehensive National Power (CNP). He wants the Indianpeopletobeproudoftheirpast,resoluteintheirpresent,andimbuedwithhighhopes for the future. Most Indians credit him for raising the nationalconsciousnesstoamuchhigherlevel.

PMModiandNSAAjitDoval:Effectivecombination

With those objectives in mind, the Prime Minister wanted to build aneffectiveandefficientteamaroundhim.Theteammembersalsoneededtosharehisvisionand jointly resolve to secure India, and tomake it powerful,potent,andprosperous.Moditherefore,neededtohaveateamleaderwithexperience,knowledge,integrity,andhighcredibilityinthesecuritydomain.

HefoundthatmaninAjitDoval,theoldsecurityczar,alegendinthehighlycompetitive and covert world of intelligence, but more importantly someone,wholikeModi,wasuninhibitedbypersonalbiasesanddidnotharbouraprivateagenda,exceptmakingIndiastrongandsecure.Dovalhadservedforlongyearsin the Intelligence Bureau and dealt with crucial matters of national securitybeforeretiringin2005asDirectoroftheIB.

IndeedDoval’sappointmentasNationalSecurityAdviser(NSA)wasoneofthefirstofficialdecisionsthatModitookafterassumingofficeon26May2014.

ModiandDovalhadanoddingacquaintancewhenDovalwasinservice,buttheycametoknoweachotherbetterafter2005whentheNSAretiredasheadofthe Intelligence Bureau. By that time, Modi was a wellestablished andundisputed leader inGujarat.Gradually,Doval,who founded theVivekanandaInternationalFoundation(VIF),athink-tankonstrategicaffairsafterretirement,developed a great deal of admiration and saw in Modi a leader who couldtransform India. His critics allege that Doval used VIF for promoting BJP’selectoral prospects by lending legitimacy and garnering support for the RSSversion of Indian nationalism. No one was however, able to substantiate thecharge.ModiropedhimintoestablishtheRakshaShaktiUniversityinGujarat.Aoneofitskindtraininginstitution,theRakshaShaktiUniversityhasavisionto‘impartcustomisededucationtotheyouthofthecountryinallvitalaspectsofinternalsecuritytoensurethatspecialisedandtrainedpersonnelareavailableforemployment in various security agencies like police forces, defence, privatesecurity. It now attracts many talented young men and women interested in‘understandingtheworldofsecurity.’7

AfterDoval tookoverasIndia’sfifthNationalSecurityAdviser,heandthePrimeMinistersetaboutremovingthecobwebsinthemindsofsecuritysectorpractitionersandthelethargythathadcreptintothesystem.

In Doval, the PrimeMinister had the advantage of a personwho not onlyknew the inner workings of the security apparatus in the country, but alsosomeonewhocommandedgreatrespectamongstpeersandjuniors.TheNSA’soperational exploits arewell-known and his high decorations include theKirtiChakra,oneof thehighestmilitarygallantryawards. Indeed,hisachievementsduringactiveyears in serviceaccordshimanunparalleled standingamong theyoungergenerationofofficers.

Over thepast threeyears, theModi-Doval combinehasput together a coreteamof security professionals across the board and created a seamless systemwhere bickering and infighting of yore has been eliminated. Speaking to thisauthorover three longishsessions—Dovalrarelycomesonrecord,bothdue to

the sensitivity of his job and also because of years of being in the habit ofoperatingintheshadows-theNSAremarked,‘ForPrimeMinisterModi,theonlycriterion is national interest when it comes to formulating national securitypolicies, or taking difficult decisions. He is completely oblivious to politicalconsequenceswhen it comes to taking the rightdecisionsonnational security.ThisattributegivesthePMrareclarityofthought.Heisneverindoubtoveradecisiononceitistaken.Moststrikingly,heisaninnovativegenius.Ihaveyettocomeacrossaninstancewhenhedoesnotaddanewdimension,orofferaninnovativesuggestiontoanyissuebroughtbeforehim.’

Doval reveals that Modi’s National Security approach is ‘without fetters’.‘TheadvantageofsuchadoctrineisthathehasnootherfocusexcepthisdeeplyembeddedpatriotismandtheawarenessthatforIndiatobecomeagreatpower,asecureenvironment—bothinternalandexternal—isanabsolutemust,’theNSAremarked.More importantly, Doval says the PrimeMinister looks at nationalsecurityfromalong-termperspectiveand‘doesnotgetrattledwithepisodicupsanddowns’,referringtooccasionalsetbacksinthefightagainsttheMaoistsandin J&K.His larger strategic objective is tomake India secure and stable, saidDoval.

Asaresultofthisclarity,asDovalobserves,inthelastthreeyears,Indiahasmanaged to enhance its intelligence capabilities, strengthen its bordermanagement, and silently but resolutely enhance defence preparedness. ‘Thereareveryfewpeopletalkingaboutanyintelligencefailurethesedays,’hepointsout.‘Therehasbeenenhancementinourrealtimeresponsecapability,speedandsurprise in our operations, and a shift from improved coordination to inter-agency synergy,’ he adds. According to the NSA, the Prime Minister’sunderstanding of cyber security, maritime security, space research, and othersuchcomplexmatters‘continuestosurpriseusall’.

Doval,whoperhapsmeetsthePrimeMinistermorethananyoneelse,reveals,‘His comprehension and attention span is unbelievably high. His approach isessentially of a problem solver; he comes out with solutions that will oftensurpriseyou.’TheNSAalsorevealsthattheModiapproachtonationalsecurityis also highly ‘value based’.He stronglybelieves that as a responsible nation,

withahighpotentialandpromisingfuture,weshouldnotdoorsupportanythingthat is not in consonance with India’s core values, or that might beinternationallyunacceptable.Thenation’scommitmenttodemocracyandruleoflaw must always be upheld. He wants ‘India’s security apparatus to beprofessional,seamlesslycoordinated,well-equipped,andinnovative.’Dovaltoobelieves in capability building, anticipating threats and leading from the front.As he observed, ‘in security, it does matter what happens to you, but whatmattersmoreishowyourespond.’There’snodoubtthathavingspentlongyearsof his life conducting operations on ground, Doval has developed a uniquetactical and strategic sense. Elaborating further, he toldme, ‘Strategywithouttacticsisnoisebeforethedefeat,andtacticswithoutstrategyistheshortestroutetocommittingsuicide.Bothareequallyimportantandintertwined.Forexample,neutralising a terrorist commander is tactical, but degrading the capacity of aterroristoutfitisstrategic.’

Healsodoesnotagreethataterrorist,eveninasuicidemode,canstrikeanytime.‘Ibelieveterroristincidentstakeplacewhenthreecurvesmeet:thecurveof intention, the curve of capability, and the curve of opportunity.We changetheir intentions and capabilities through strategic and tactical means, whiledenialofopportunityismainlytactical,degradingthecapacityofaterrorgroupby proactive or preventive means is strategic. An effective counterterroristpolicyshouldthereforeaimtoensurethatthetriangleisneverformedandif itdoes,theareaisminimised,’hestated.

TheNSAappearstobesatisfiedwiththeincreaseinintelligencecapabilities,butfeelsthatthereisstillalongwaytogo.Hesaid‘thereisnothingsogoodthatcannotbeimproved.’HewashappythatwhetheritwasUri,Pathankot,Nagrota,or other terrorist strikes, ‘we had good real time intelligence’. ‘Yes, we havefallenshortinsomeaspects,butsetbacksinthisfightareinevitable.Thetrickisto minimise the losses and keep the pressure on to degrade the enemy,’ heremarked.Hepointstothefactthatimprovedintelligencegatheringcapabilitieshasmeant Indiahasbeen freeofany terroristattack inareasoutsideJ&KandsomedistrictsofPunjabborderingPakistan.‘Whilewearenotcomplacentaboutthis, it must be pointed out that our agencies have managed to pre-empt and

neutralisemanyterroristmodulesbothwithinandoutsidethecountry,’theNSArevealswithoutgoingintofurtherdetails.

Headmits that suchanapproachcertainlynecessitatesplannedand focusedattention from the government, with an emphasis on capacity building ratherthan merely episodic response. These forms of conventional threats can beaddressed through the strengthening of state police forces and it intelligenceunits.‘Wearestrivingtobolsterthecapacitiesofthestatesthroughintelligencesupport, strategic guidelines, coordinationmechanism, training, equipment andfinancialhelp.Thestatesontheirpartneedtostreamlinepoliceadministration,fill the existing vacant posts, implement police reforms as mandated by theSupremeCourt,andensurepoliticalinterferenceinlawenforcementabates,’theNSAconcluded.

SowhathasModi’sfocusedapproachachievedsofar?Subsequentpageswillgiveaglimpseintothehighsandlows,thesuccesses

and failures,andnew initiativesandabandonmentofoldways in the realmofnationalsecurity.

One of the prominent examples of bold decision making by the ModigovernmentcameinSeptember2016,whenPakistan-backedterroristsattackedanarmycampatUriinJ&KnecessitatingahardresponsefromtheIndianstate.The fitting riposte came in the form of surgical strikes in Pakistan occupiedKashmir(PoK).

F

CHAPTER2

TESTINGTIMES,POST-URI

Iassurethenationthatthosebehindthisdespicableattackwillnotgounpunished.

–PrimeMinisterNarendraModion18September2016

orColHandColK(nameswithheld),themomentofreckoningarrivedontheafternoonof18September2016.

Throughout thatmorning, theCommandingOfficers (COs) of two separatePara (Special Forces) battalions were like most of their colleagues posted inKashmirValley, following the increasingly grim news coming out ofUri, thegarrisontownnotveryfarfromSrinagar.

Well-trained andwell-informed terrorists of theLashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) hadinfiltratedacrosstheLineofControl(LoC)andattackedanadministrativecampinthe12BrigadeHQlocatedinUriwithdeadlyeffect.

DefenceMinisterManoharParrikarwithGenDalbirSinghandtopcommandersinSrinagar,September2016

Atleast19soldiersof6Biharbattalion,campingintents—daysbeforetheywere to take their assigned positions along the LoC—were killed in the earlymorningattack.Majorityofthesoldiersdiedintheirsleep,restingastheywereinhighlyinflammabletents.

Althoughallthefourterroristswereneutralisedeventually,theyhadsetoffachainofeventsthatwouldculminateonthemorningof29September.

ButIamgettingaheadofthestory.Asthedeathtollkeptrisingbythehour—three,four,10,17andendingon19

—thetwoSFCOsknewtheyweregoingtohaveabusytimeahead.InUdhampur,NorthernArmyCommanderLtGenDSHoodawasdistressed.

He had been the GOC-in-C for over two years and witnessed his share ofsuccesses and setbacks as the head of India’s most active Army command.Nevertheless,thiswaspossiblytheworstmomentofhislonganddistinguishedcareer, spent fighting insurgencies and terrorism in the north-east as well asJammu & Kashmir. ‘It was terrible. Very difficult to justify what happened.Thereweredefinitelylapsesonourpart,’Hoodasaysinretrospect.

ButanArmyCommanderdoesn’thave the luxuryofwallowing inhisownstateofmind.Hehastosetanexamplebyleadingfromthefront.

Ashe accompaniedArmyChiefGenDalbirSingh toUri,Hoodaknew thetimehadcometoimplementaplan,theseedsofwhichhadvaguelytakenshapeinhismindsomefifteenmonthsago.EvenGenDalbir,awareofhowthePrimeMinister’smindworked,wasthinkingofsomethingdifferent.

GenDalbir,whohadservedallhislifeincombatzones—fromNorth-easttoKashmirandinSriLanka—wasapragmaticleader.Heplannedwell,refusedtorush into a decision even when pressure was put on him to take immediateretaliatory action, and had interacted with Prime Minister Modi long enoughsinceMay2014torealisethatModiwouldnotlettheUriattackgounpunished.So, themoment he returned toDelhi,GenDalbir told hisDGMO to draw upplans to launch crossborder strikes since he had sensed that the currentgovernmentwillseekpunitiveactionagainstPakistanfortherecentattacks.

SoldiersGeneral:ArmychiefGenDalbirSinghin2016

Gen Dalbir was drawing on his experience during the crossborder raid inMyanmarmorethanayearpreviouslywhenthePMhadquietlyauthorisedthestrikeagainstnorth-eastmilitantsholedupinthejunglesofManipur-Myanmar

border after killing 18 Indian soldiers. Gen Dalbir had a hunch then that thePrimeMinistermay demand aMyanmar-like action if push came to shove inJ&K.

Cuttomid-Junein2015.InJune2015,itwasunderhiswatchasArmyChiefthatthesoldiersofaPara

SFunit of the IndianArmy, based in the north-east, had carried out a preciseattackonanNSCN(K)camplocatedinsideMyanmarandeliminatedatleast60insurgentsintheprocess.

WhilethecrossborderraidinsideMyanmarwasmakingwavesanddividingopinion (see separate chapter), discussions in TV studios in India centredaround the possibility of similar raids against Paksitan. Minister of State ofInformation&Broadcasting, RajyavardhanRathore told TV anchors1 that theoptionofcrossborderraidsagainstPakistanareapossibility.HealsotoldIndianExpress in June2015: ‘This is amessage forall countries, includingPakistan,andgroupsharbouring terror intent towards India.A terrorist is a terrorist andhasnootheridentity.Wewillstrikewhenwewantto.’2

Pakistan was quick to react to Rathore’s remark. ‘Pakistan is not likeMyanmar,’ Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan said. ‘Those having ill designsagainst Pakistan should listen carefully that our security forces are capable ofmatching response to any adventurism… Indian leaders should stopdaydreaming.’ Pakistan Army spokesman also issued a warning. A militaryconference inRawalpindi, chaired byArmy chiefRaheel Sharif, took ‘seriousnotice of recent Indian hostile rhetoric coupled with their covert and overtactionstodestabilisePakistan,andreiteratedtheirresolvesuchdesigns…NoneshoulddaretocastanevileyeonPakistan,’militaryspokesmanMajorGeneralASBajwatweeted.3

Amidst all this public exchange, IndianArmyHQ andNorthernCommandtoo were planning well ahead. Gen Dalbir said: ‘I recall telling my NorthernArmyCommandertostartthinkingonthelinesoftheMyanmarstrike.’

ThesuccessofMyanmaroperationshadplantedtheseedofthoughtaboutasurgical strike in Pakistan in everyone’s mind. Once during his visit to theNorthernCommand,thenDefenceMinisterManoharParrikartoohadexhorted

topcommanderstobepreparedforeveryeventuality.‘AlthoughIdidn’tspellitoutexplicitly,IknewsomedayagraveprovocationbyPakistanmayrequireaMyanmar-likeoperation.SoItoldtheArmyChiefandhisseniorcommanderstolookateverypossibleresponse,’Parrikarrecalls.

Onhispart,LtGenHoodacalled the twoCOs(ColHandColK)and toldthemthattheyneededtostartlookingattargetsacrosstheLoC,althoughfranklyat thatpoint in time (June2015)neitherGenDalbir,norLtGenHoodaor thepoliticalleadershipwouldhavethoughtofsuchaneventualityarising.Tillthen,thethinkingatthehighestlevelsofIndia’spoliticalandmilitaryleadershipwasanymajortrans-LoCstrikewouldbedeemedescalatory.

Remember, in Kargil, the Vajpayee government had imposed the strictrestrictionofNOTcrossingtheLoCinspiteofagraveprovocation.

‘I thought to myself, if tomorrow someone asks us to go, how can I, asNorthern Army Commander say we are not prepared?’ Hooda remembersthinking.

Gen Dalbir says: ‘From my experience in planning and executing theMyanmarraids,Iwantedmycommanderstomakesurethatanycrossborderraidshouldbe carriedoutwithminimumcasualties.My instructionswere, notonesinglesoldier shouldbe leftbehind inenemy territoryeven ifwesufferedanysetback.’

Hence, in the immediateaftermathof theMyanmaroperation, the twoCOswere told to seriously plan to hit targets inside PoK. Other senior officers inNorthernCommand’splanningstaffalsohelddiscussionsacoupleoftimeswiththe MO (Military Operations Directorate at the Army HQ). They identifiedtargets, looking for more intelligence inputs on them, and consolidating athought process in the presence of the Army Chief and the Northern ArmyCommander.

‘Basically, we had started planning for a crossborder operation, somethingthathadnotbeencontemplatedearlier...withoutthisplanning,bothatArmyHQlevelandinNorthernCommandandachangeinthoughtprocess,itwouldhavebeenimpossibletodowhatourboyseventuallydid.Itisnotsomethingyoudobasedonovernightplanning,’GenDalbirsaid.

Butwere not crossborder raids carried out earlier too, I askedGenDalbir.‘Yes, theywere,’heagreed‘butmostactions taken inouryoungerdayswere,whatwecall,BAT(BorderActionTeam)raidsonspecificpost(s)asretributionfor something that the Pakistan Army troops would have carried out on ourposition(s),’ he said. ‘What we were now planning for wasmuch larger withgreaterramifications,’heexplained.

After theMyanmarOperation,GenDalbirhad alreadypassedorders togetbetter equipment for the Special Forces... ‘Immediately after Manipur, I hadinitiated a case for procurement of special equipment and weapons. Then wedecidedtoequipatleasttwobattalionsofSFintheEastandtheNorth(EasternandNorthernCommand)onafast-trackbasis.’

Thispreparationandprimingupof theSpecialForceswasnecessary, sincethetwobattalions,involvedinaday-to-dayengagementinJammuandKashmirfor years, had somehow taken the focus away from their primary task ofoperating behind enemy lines and undertaking special operations in enemyterritory.

Sointhewinterof2015,thetwoSFbattalionsweretoldtoconcentratefullyon training for their conventional role (of infiltrating behind enemy lines andcarryingoutstrategicstrikes).

Although the COs were initially inclined to do both—carry out Counter-insurgency, Counter-terrorists (CI-CT) operations even while stepping up thebattalions’trainingforconventionaloperations—Hoodaorderedthemtojustdothe latter in peak winter. Both Gen Dalbir and the then Northern ArmyCommander remember receiving flak from some Special Forces veterans fortheirmove.Butneitherofthemwerebudging.

For twomonths in thewinter of 2015, the two battalions trained aswholeunitsafteryearsofoperatinginsmall,agileteamsagainstterroristsinJ&K.Thistraining was to prove crucial in sharpening the set of skills needed for raidsacrosstheLoC.

Inaway,itwaslikerevisitingtheirbasictenetsfortheSpecialForcesmen.And they loved it.Althoughnoonecouldhaveanticipated that theywouldbecalled in to strikeacross theLoC, thevery thoughtofcrossinga line thatwas

seenastaboomotivatedthetroopsfurther.Indeedforovertwodecadesnooneat thehighestpolitical levelhadeverexpressedwillingness tosanction,orhaddemandedsuchanactioninsidePoKforthefearofescalation.

‘Thetwototwo-and-a-halfmonthsthattheseboysspenttogetherhelpedthemhone theirskills insurveying targets,mountsurveillance,practising infiltrationandexfiltration,whichinthefinalanalysishelpedthemachievewhatwasaskedof them,’ a senior officer in MO Directorate, privy to the development nowagrees,lookingbackatthatdecision.Asaresultofthereorientation,bythetimethesummerof2016arrived,thetwobattalionshadaddedanextraedgetotheirrepertoryofformidableskills.

However,noone—noteventhemost imaginativescriptwriter inBollywood—couldhaveanticipatedtheeventsastheyunfoldedinSeptember2016.

URIATTACKANDAFTER

Sunday, 18 September 2016 dawned with the worst news possible for theIndianArmyandthenation.

AgroupoffourheavilyarmedsuicideattackershadtrekkedacrosstheHajiPir pass, infiltrated into the Uri sector and launched an assault on theadministrative base of the 12 Brigade HQ located on the edge of the UriGarrison.Itwas0530hours.

By0900hours, the terroristswereeliminatedby theArmy’squick reactionteam.

Butnotbefore theyhadkilled19Indiansoldiers. Itwas thebiggesthit thattheArmyhadtakeninanyterrorattackin15years.Thelastsuchbigloss,oldtimers remember, was during an attack on theKaluchakArmy camp in 2002when22soldierswerekilledinasimilarsuicideattack.

TheArmywasshaken.Andangry.For too long, theArmyhadbeen takingcasualtiesinitsowncampswithouthittingbackinthesamefashion.

Across the board, the langar gup (mess gossip)was full of frustration andrage. I rememberspeaking to somemiddle levelofficersposted in J&Kin theimmediateaftermathoftheUriincident.Theangerwaspalpable.‘Ifthisisnot

the last straw,what is,’manyof themwonderedaloudwhen thepossibilityoftheIndianarmy’sretaliationwasdiscussed.

NSA Doval too remembers PrimeMinister Modi telling him: ‘This attackshouldnotgowithoutaresponse.’GenDalbiradds:‘DuringoneofthemeetingsintheimmediateaftermathofUri,thePrimeMinistersaidtheretaliationshouldbeimmediatetosendanunambiguousmessage.’

Parrikar,Doval andGenDalbir howeverknew theyhad toplan for severalcontingencies before attempting a Myanmar-style crossborder raid. For one,unlike on theMyanmar border, the Pakistani forces strung all along the LoCwereonhighest alert in thewakeof theUri attack.The terroristswould havealsobeentoldtolielowandshiftedtocampslocatedfartherawayfromtheLoCsothathittingthosetargetswouldhavebecomeharder.

Moreover,nomatterhowremote thepossibility, Indiahad towargame thelikelyescalationbyPakistanifretributionwasordered.

DefenceMinisterParrikar, reviewing thepreparednessof the forces, recallshow he had held a number of meetings within a week of the Uri attack andordered fast track purchases of critical ammunition, spare parts and crucialequipment. ‘It became apparent from the briefings I received from the ArmyChiefthatwehadtobepreparedforapossibilityofashort,swiftskirmish,ifnotaconflict,onceithadbeendecidedtoorderaretaliatorystrike,’Parrikarsays.

Many deficiencies—which were in the process of being overcome in thenormalcoursebutwouldhavetakenatleastanotheryear—hadtobemadeupindoublequicktime.

‘Intheweekafter theUriattack,Irememberchairingsome18-20meetingstakingstockoftheurgentneeds,’Parrikarsaid.‘Whenourgovernmentcametopower inMay 2014, wewere shocked to find severe shortages that the threeforces were facing. Certain types of ammunition were down to two days ofsupplyasagainsttherequirementofatleast20days,’Parrikarsaid.Hewasonlyconfirming what many defence analysts had noted. Lethargy and indecisionunderUPA’sDefenceMinisterAKAntonyhadbroughtthesituationtoasorrypass.

InfactGenVKSingh,whowasArmyChiefbetween2010and2012before

becomingaBJPMPandnowaMinisterofStateinMinistryofExternalAffairs,had noted in a letter to then PrimeMinisterManmohan Singh in 2012: ‘Thearmy’sentiretankfleetis‘devoidofcriticalammunitiontodefeatenemytanks.’The thenArmyChiefalsospokeaboutairdefencebeing97percentobsolete.Headdedthattheinfantryiscrippledwith‘deficienciesofcrewservedweapon’and lacksnight fightingcapabilities, eliteSpecialForces arewoefully shortofessentialweaponsandtherearelarge-scalevoidsincriticalsurveillanceaswellasnightfightingcapabilities.

In the letter scooped by Saikat Datta in the DNA newspaper, Gen Singhpointedoutthatthepresent‘hollowness’inthesystemisamanifestationoftheproceduresandprocessing timeforprocurementsaswellas legal impedimentsbyvendors.‘Thegeneral’spleaisadirect indictmentofthecomplexandslowdefenceprocurementprocedures,’Dattawrote.4

GenDalbir,whobecame theArmyChief in July2014 realisedafter takingstockwithhisPrincipalStaffOfficers(PSOs)thatthesituationhadnotimprovedmucheventwoyearsafterwhatGenVKSinghhadwritteninhisletter.SohepushedMoDforquickerprocurementofkeyammunition.

Againstthisbackdrop,Parrikarhadalreadyinitiatedseveralcontractstomakeupforyearsofneglect.Butnow,inthewakeoftheUriattack,whenplanswerebeingfinalisedto launchpunitivestrikesagainstPakistan,hehadtohastentheprocess.

Multipleconversationswith those involved in theprocess reveals that Indiaprocuredequipment,platforms,sparesandammunitionworthanythingbetweenRs20,000to25,000croresintheimmediateaftermathoftheUriattack.Parrikarrecallshehadtocutthroughredtaperuthlesslyinordertogetthedeliveriesontime. At the same time, he temporarily enhanced the financial powers of theVice Chiefs (effectively the No. 2) of the Army, Navy, and Air Forcesubstantially.Theyweretoldtostockupforashortandintensewarevenastheongoingplan tobuild reserves for a longer conflict continuedapace.Thiswasfor thefirst timeinrecentyears that theViceChiefshadbeengivenenhancedfinancialpowers.

InJuly2017,theinitialorderswereformalised.5

MediareportsinJanuary2017,monthsaftertheUriattack,spokeofongoingpurchasestomakeupforglaringdeficienciestoo.MyfriendSudhiRanjanSen,writing forHuffPost India in January 2017 reported that Indiawas continuingwith ‘fast-track’ military purchases from Russia and Israel. ‘In a move withtremendous strategic import, India has been on a secretive weapons shoppingspree on an emergency footing, buying up anti-tank missiles, tank engines,rocketlaunchersandvariouskindsofammunition,fromIsraelandRussia.Thepurchasesamounttomorethan$3billion,personsclosetothedevelopmentsaid,askingnottobenamed.Deliverieshavebegunevenasnewordersarestillbeingplaced.FromRussia,Indiahasboughtafewthousandanti-tankguidedmissiles,severalT-90tankenginesandcriticaltankcomponents.TheRussia-madeT-90is the IndianArmy’smainstaybattle tank.TheRussia list also includesmulti-barrelrocketlaunchersthatoperatewiththeartilleryagainstadvancingcolumnsandsoftskinnedtargets,andlargequantityofvariouskindsofammunition,’Senreported.6

Onground however, neitherColH norColKwere aware of or concernedabout thehigh level confabulations.Theywere focusedon the task theyknewtheyhadtodo.Thiswasachancetheyknewtheywouldnevergetagain.Thiswas the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity Special Forces wait for. ‘The day Urihappened,wehad, inourmind,decidedwheretohit,howtohit theothersidesince we had already planned for this eventuality in the previous six-eightmonths,’ Col H said. ‘We knew this incident called for a punitive response.There was no way this government would allow the Uri incident to gounpunished,’ColKadded.‘Ourboyswereangry,notsad.Theykeptsaying‘ekbada sabak sikhana padega Pakistan ko’ (we have to teach Pakistan a biglesson).Weknew,thestrikewillhavetobebigenoughtoinflictmajordamage.Atokenraidwouldnothavebeensufficient,’boththeCOsrecalledduringourconversation.Andsureenough,thecallcamefromUdhampurbytheeveningof19September.TheArmyCommanderwanted themat theNorthernCommandHQforthwith.

Thecountdowntothesurgicalstrikeshadbegun!On20and21September,severalbriefingsanddiscussionstookplaceinthe

CommandHQ’s operations room.The focuswas on specifics: targets, timing,methods.OnlyLtGenHooda, theMGGS, theBGSand the twoCommandingOfficerswereprivytothediscussions.

As the twoCOsand theNorthernCommandMGGSandBGSgotdown tofinalisingtheminutestofdetails,LtGenHoodaflewtoDelhiat least thriceinthatweekbetween theUriattackand thesurgical strikes, to sitdownwith theDGMOandselectofficersoftheMilitaryOperations(MO)Directoratetofine-tunetheplans.

THEPRESSUREBUILDSUP

The week of the Uri attack was also a testing time for the PrimeMinister’sleadership. Modi, adept at judging the public mood, was aware that peopleexpected him to ‘walk the talk’ in acting tough against India’s implacableenemy.

Publicopinioninthecountrywasinflamed.Peoplewerecallingforanall-outwar against Pakistan. Even saner voices were advocating at least somedemonstrableretribution.Modiwasawareofthepublicsentimentandtheangerthatwasbuildingupinpopularperception.Hevowedimmediateretribution.‘Iassure the nation that those behind this despicable attack will not gounpunished,’hetweetedonthedayoftheUriattack.Notmanypeopletookthestatementatfacevalue.Afterall,politiciansandprimeministersinthepasthadpledged stern action against terrorists and their handlersmany times, but hadultimatelyrefrainedfromgivingthatfinalgoaheadrequiredtoretaliate,urgingrestraintinstead.

Almost everyone thought it to be the standard condemnation—kadi ninda(severe condemnation)—as some commentators have often categorisedpoliticians’routinestatementsaftereachterroristattack.However, thePMwasclear in his mind that he cannot afford to be taken for granted like hispredecessor,DrManmohanSingh,whooftenditheredandfailedtolaunchanypunitiveactionagainstPakistanevenaftertheoutrageousattackonMumbaiinNovember2008thatkilledmorethan170peopleandmadeamockeryofIndia’s

securityapparatus.ModihadhimselfstronglycriticisedDrSingh’sinactionthen.Now,theball

wasinPrimeMinisterModi’scourt.TheOppositionwasupinarms.Afteradayortwoofshowingsolidaritywith

the government and sympathy for those martyred, it was now mocking thegovernment’sinabilitytopunishPakistan.

India’ssecuritybrains-trust:OnthedayoftheUriattack

The Congress targeted Modi, holding him ‘singularly responsible for thecomplete disarray’ in the government’s policy vis-a-vis Pakistan. Congress’chiefspokesmanRandeepSinghSurjewalahadallegedthattheUriattack,whichwasplannedand executedbyPakistan,was the result of the ‘failure’ofModigovernment’spolitical leadership.Hehadalsoallegedthat the tragedywastheresultofamassiveintelligenceandoperationalfailureinsidethegovernment.

Newspaperswerecritical too.TheTimesof India dugupold statementsbythePrimeMinisterwhenhewastheChiefMinisterofGujaratandtheUPAwasin power. It recalled a statement made by Narendra Modi at Rewari on 15September 2013: ‘The problem lies in Delhi, not at the borders... Only acompetent,patrioticandpeopleorientedgovernmentat thecentrecansolve theproblem.’

About amonth before hemade this statement,Modi had tweeted: ‘India is

goingthroughatroubledsituation.Chinaintrudesourborders,Pakistankillsoursoldierstimeandagain.ButCentredoesn’tact.’

Strategic affairs analystswere alsounsparing.CUdayBhaskarwrote: ‘TheIndianresponsetotheUriattackhasfollowedafamiliarpatternofangeragainsttheadversary,thestate-sponsoredterrorist—andthe‘deepstate’representedbythe Pakistan military. Home Minister Rajnath Singh has castigated Pakistan,called it a ‘terrorist state’ and imprudently cancelled his visit to the US andRussia.PMModihasassuredthenationthattheperpetratorsofthis‘despicableattack’willbepunished.Thedominantquestionthathasbeendeliberateduponwithangerandanguishacrosstheaudio-visualmediumandinsocialmediaoverthelast24hoursis:‘When?’7

DovalandParrikar:StrategisingafterUriattack

Amidstallthecriticism,thePrimeMinistercontinuedtobeunruffled.Recall his aides: ‘The PM went through with his daily routine and pre-

scheduledappointmentsandprogrammeswithoutanychange,butmadesurehehadallpossibleoptionspresentedtohimbeforegivingthefinalgoahead(forapunitivestrikeagainstPakistan).’

All options, economic, political, and diplomatic were considered. They

rangedfromdowngradingdiplomaticties,revisitingtheprovisionsoftheIndusWaterTreaty,mobilisinginternationalopinionbyfurnishingproofofPakistan’scomplicityinterroristattacks,andofcoursepunishPakistanmilitarily.

Buthewasnotabouttoberushedintoanyhastydecision.ThePrimeMinisterhowevermadeuphismindby23September, fivedays

after the Uri attack. Later that evening, he and Doval, escorted by a MajorGeneral from the MO Directorate, walked the length of the South BlockCorridor from thePMO to theArmyHQOps roomaround2100hours,muchlong after the corridors had been emptied and offices had closed. Alreadypresent in the roomwere DefenceMinister Parrikar, Army Chief Gen DalbirSingh,DGMO, LtGenRanbir Singh, and a couple ofMODirectorate seniorfunctionaries.

ThePMsatthroughthebriefingsilently,listeningwithraptattention.Hewaspresentedvariousoptions,showntargetsthatwereplannedtobehitinsidePoK,andbriefedonthepossibleretaliation/reactionbyPakistan.

Once the initialbriefingwasover,Modihadacoupleofquestionsonotherpossible options like a precise air strike on terrorist camps, remembers aparticipant. Eventually, the Prime Minister agreed that a Special Forces raidacross the frontier was the best possible course of action at that point, theparticipantadded.

The PM’s situational awareness and sharp memory was also were also inevidence that night. When the subject of international reaction came up, heremindedeveryonethatExternalAffairsMinisterSushmaSwarajwastodeliverher speech at theUNGeneralAssembly in the next oneweek or so.ThePMthereforeorderedthattheoperationbetimedafterherspeech.However,beyondgiving general directions about the need to be careful,Modi did not get intospecifics.

‘Helefttheplanningandexecutiontousprofessionals,’Dovaltoldme.So the professionals got down to business. Parrikar,GenDalbir andDoval

analysedthesituationandsentoutinstructionstotheNorthernCommandforan‘in-principle’ go ahead for a trans-LoC strike. ‘We told Udhampur (NorthernCommandHQ)tolookformajorterroristcamps.Theideawastodestroysome

ofthatinfrastructureacrosstheLoCinPoK,’GenDalbirremembers.All decisions were however taken after long deliberations and thorough

discussions. ‘Allofusknewthat thePakistaniforceswouldbeat theirhighestalertaftertheUriattack,sowedidnotwanttodoanythingrash,’thethenArmyChiefsaid.

India’sexternalintelligenceagency,theRA&W,andtheIntelligenceBureauasked its operatives to assess the possible impact of a retaliatory strike insidePoK. ‘We needed to be ready for any possible backlash,’ a top intelligenceoperativerecalls.

GenDalbir,cautiousbutpragmatic,alsosoughtpermissionfromParrikartoredeploysomekeyformationsjustincasePakistandecidedtouptheanteaftertheretaliation.‘AsArmyChief,theonuswasonmetomakesurewedidnotfallshortoffirepower,’GenDalbirrecalls thinkingthroughout theweekfollowingtheUriattack,planningfarbeyondtheretaliatorystrikes.‘Ihadalreadymovedsomeadditional forces to theKashmirValley to reinforce theexistingsecuritygrid following large scale unrest, after we had eliminated Burhan Wani (theKashmirilocalcommander),’GenDalbirrevealed.‘NowIhadtomakesurethatotherareastoowerereadyforanypossiblebacklash,’hetoldme.

So formations responsible forborders inPunjabandRajasthanwereputonalert.Areviewofshortagesatthelocallevelwascarriedoutandorderspassedtoreplenishinventory.

Meanwhileasdebates—mostlyacrimoniousandbitter—continuedtorageontelevision channels and in public discourse, the Indian security establishmentwasquietlypreparingforacounterstrikeonascalethatwasalwayspossibleintheory,buthadneverbeenimplementedinpracticeforfearofescalation.

As one week passed after the Uri attack, the debates tapered off; peopleseemedresignedtolivewiththebitterfactthatthesituationinJ&KandontheLoC would continue to be volatile with the Indian army unable to take anydeterrentsteps.

Little did anyone know that Indiawas about to unleash unprecedented andaudaciouscrossborderstrikes.

O

CHAPTER3

THESURGICALSTRIKESINPoK

nce the political call was taken, the wheels began to move faster. InUdhampur,theOpsroomwasbuzzingwithactivity.Nowwasthetimeto

bringthetwoCorpsCommandersof15and16Corpsintheloop.Accordingly,LtGensSatishDuaandRRNimborhkar,headingtheSrinagar-

based Chinar and Nagrota-basedWhite Knight Corps respectively, were alsobroughtonboard.

ColHandColKmeanwhilewereback to their respectivebases.Theyhadmuch todo.Bothhad finalised the targets, but themenhad tobe selected fordifferent tasks, although in their mind they had already earmarked some keypersonnelthepreviouswinterwhentheentireunitsweretrainingtogether.

AsColHremembers,‘Mostofourreorientationtookplaceinthemind;wewerecrossingathresholdthathadbeenembeddedinthemind:thusfarandnofurther.Nowwewerebeingaskedtodoa jobthathadnotbeenundertakenindecades.’AddsColK:‘Ourboysalwayshadtheskills,buttheyhadappliedtheskills to a different set of circumstances, not the task we were about toundertake.However,duetoourpracticeandreorientation,theywereatthepeakoftheirskills.’Theywere,likemanyIndianArmyOfficersbeforethempostedalong the LoC, aware of one-off, shallow raids launched by different infantryunits intoPoK.Butallof themwere individualpunitiveactionsandnot large-

scaleplannedoperationsliketheonethatwasbeingcontemplatednow.Thetaskswerediverse.Teamshad tobeformedaccordingly.Over thepast

quarter century, the IndianArmy had created a strong network of intelligenceoperativesinthevalleyandwithinvarioustanzeemsbasedinPakistan-OccupiedKashmir(PoK).PosttheUriattackandaroundthetimewhenthesurgicalstrikewasbeing finalised,NorthernCommand tapped a couple of sources inHizbulMujahideen,locatedinthegeneralareaofAnantnag,toobtainmoreinformationaboutthelayoutofPakistanicamps,andthepossibleroutesthatcouldbetakenbothtoenterandexitPoK.Theseinputswerecrucialtoplanstrategyandformteamsfordifferent tasks likemountingsecretsurveillance, raid thecamps,andforguidingthetroopsbacksafely.TheyalsohadtodolastminuterecheckingoftargetstomakesurethattheterroristswerestillholedupthereandlaunchpadswerenotemptiedoutaftertheUriattack.

So what were the thoughts that were going through their minds as theypreparedtolaunchthestrikes,IaskedthetwoCommandingOfficers.

Looking back, with a quiet sense of pride in their eyes, both the officersrecalledtheirstateofmind:‘Weknewwehadtohittheadversarysohardthathewouldbehumiliated.Therewasnotimeforhalf-measures,noplacefortokengestures,’recountedColK.Hiscolleagueadded:‘Thisiswhatwetrainfor:Thatonechancetodeliverablowsolethalthattheenemywillconstantlythinkaboutitwhenplanninganymisadventure.’

Interestingly,boththeCorpsCommanderswereclearthattheoperationshadtobecalibratedsothatthebacklashdoesn’tgooutofhand.‘Wehadtohitthem,humiliatethem,butonlytoanextentthattheykeptlookingovertheirshoulders,keptsweating,thinkingwhatnext,andnotplanforaconventionalescalationtoanall-outwar,’bothLtGenDuaandNimborkarrecallhavingdiscussedduringtheplanningstage.

Accordingly,theCOsweretoldthattheintentofthecross-borderstrikeswastwo-fold:inducingfearandextractingrevenge.Simultaneously,totaldestructionof terrorist infrastructure directly oppositeUriwas planned so that thosewhohadlaunchedtheattackon18Septemberwouldgettherightmessage.‘Theideawastoletthemknowthatweknowwhereyouarebasedandwhereyoulaunch

yourattacksfromandmoreimportantly,weknowwheretohityou.Themessagehad togoup toMuzzafarabad (thecapitalofPoK),’ColHsaid,reflectingupontheweekintherunuptotheactualoperation.

The two Colonels were however critical of the media frenzy and pressurebuiltbyhyperbolicdiscussionsonnewschannels thatnotonlyputpressureonthegovernment, but also alerted the adversary.Theyknew that the essenceofspecialoperationslayinsurprise,butnooneinthemediaseemedtounderstand.‘There was endless rhetoric on TV Channels with some of our own armyveteranstheorisingaboutwhatcanbedone,whatispossible,givingideastotheadversary.We in Special Forces abhor such public discussion,’ the duo said.‘Weprefertobeformless,anunknownentitythatcreatesdoubtinthemindsoftheadversary,’saidColK.AsSandeepUnnithanwroteaboutthesurgicalstrikesin India Today, the Para-SF (short for Parachute Regiment-Special Forces)operatives knowhow tomake themselves almost invisible in the area of theiroperations,‘Theyblendedintotheruggedtopographybecausetheyhadreducedtheir four S-es: shape, shine, silhouette, and smell. Their combat fatiguesblended into the forest, and their faces were streaked with camouflage paint.Their skin was covered in a thin film of mud to suppress body odour. Theirweaponshadbeenblackened.Theyhadlaininambushforover48hours.1

Bothwentaboutpreparingmeticulously,butatonepointa flickerofdoubtcrossedColH’smindashis teamkeptgettingfeedbackof thesituationonthechosentargets.‘Wecouldseetheywerevisiblybeefinguptheirsecurity.This,foramoment,mademethink:is thisgoingtoaffectmyextricationplan?Willmyboysgetintoarunningfight?Lateron,however,Ifeltthatmorethemerrier(thenumberofpeopleinthecamps).Wecaninflictmoredamage,’ColHsaid,revealingconflictingthoughtsinhismindintherun-uptothestrike.

Week-longsurveillancethroughHUMINTandsatellitepicturesrevealedthatthe nature of deployment in the camps close to the LoC was being changed.Normally,Pakistaniforces,especiallyinPoKandaroundterroristcamps,loungearoundinPathanisuitsandcasualattireinborderareas,butaboutaweekafterthe Uri attack, spotters revealed a change in demeanour. More people werewearinguniformsnow.Thereweresignsthatseniorofficerswereabouttovisit

thesecamps—arareoccurrence.BackintheSFunits,from20Septemberonwards,preparationswereinfull

swing.Inthatentireweekintherunuptotheactualstrike,HizbulMujahideenoperatives and other sources were providing the teams with important bits ofintelligenceaboutthetargets.ImagesfromISROsatellitesandpicturestakenbyUnmannedAerialVehicleswerebeingused tocorroborate the inputsprovidedby the human intelligence sources. The plan was finally taking shape. By 25September,theteamswereconfidentofgoinginatanytimethattheleadershipdecided.Coincidentally, the previous evening, the PrimeMinister had alreadygiven the go-ahead, but the actual time and date were left to the people onground.‘TheNorthernArmyCommandertolduson26ththatyouareonashortnotice,’ColKrecalls.

For72hours—26to28September—thetwoteamskeptreviewingtheplans,goingovertheroutes,theterrain,andthereturnpath,intheirmind’seye.Theywerelikemusicians,rehearsingnotesintheirheadsbeforeamajorperformance.Exceptthiswasnotastageshow.Andtherewasgoingtobenoaudience.

TheHM sources and SF surveillance teams, keeping awatch on the likelytargets meanwhile reportedmajor changes in some of the camps and in theirvicinity(seePlates4and5).

TheHMoperatives through theirownknowledgeof theareaandalso fromtheirinteractionwithsomePakistanisoldiersreportedbackthattheycouldseealotofmovement in thecamps.They saidold sentrieswerechangedand somespecialisedteamsappearedtohavearrivedtobeefupsecurity.Inshort,thelevelofalertnesshadgoneup.SaysColK, ‘They(thePakistanis)obviouslyhadaninklingthatsomethingmayhappen,butgiventhelargefrontageoftheLoC,theywere not sure where (the attack could take place).’ Adds Col H: ‘It was aguessinggame.Ourscoutsreportedarrivalofreinforcements.Behaviouronthetargetshadchanged.Itwasnotbusinessasusualforthem(theadversary)either.Nowitwasamatterofwhenandwhere.’

Thewaitwasnowgettingshorter.Itwasfinallyoveron28September.Thatafternoon,LtGenHoodasignalledthelaunchofOperationXwhenhe

calledbothColHandColK.Separately,hewishedthemasimple‘goodluck’

andtoldthemtogoaheadandcompletetheassignedtask.Teamssurgedforwardbylateevening,poisedontheedgeoftheLoC,ready

tocrossoverlaterthatnight.Back inDelhi,GenDalbir briefedNSADoval about themission plan and

workedoutamechanismtoupdatehimasandwhenhereceivedinputsfromtheground.

‘The die was cast now. The onus was on the Army that I was leading todeliver. But I was confident of our success,’ Gen Dalbir recalls. Parrikar,meanwhile,was separately briefed about the roll-out of the action plan by theArmyChief.

OPERATIONX

28-29September2016,J&KFromhereonward,teamsledbyColKandColHwereontheirown.Allofitdepended on their skills, daring, ingenuity, and above all, determination tosucceedinwhethertheywouldaccomplishthetaskassignedtothem.

Therewasnolookingbacknow.Theoperation,calledOperationXinconversationbutnotofficiallynamedas

such,wasbeingmonitoredatArmyHQinDelhi,attheNorthernCommandHQin Udhampur, and at Nagrota and Srinagar, the HQs of 16 and 15 Corpsrespectively.

As PrimeTime television debates across different news channelswere justaboutwindingdown,ColK’steamsweremakingtheirwaytotheLoC.ColK,assignedtotargetcampssouthofthePirPanjalrange,ledhisteamsacrosstheLoC around midnight. In four hours, they were in close proximity of theobjectives. Having bypassed some of the outposts close to the LoC on thePakistaniside,theteamswerenowtrulybehindenemylines.

The camps—launch pads-cum-waiting areas for terrorists, colocated withPakistani Army’s forward establishments—that Col K’s teams had chosen totargetwereintheKannaareaoppositetheNangiTekriandBalnuibattalionsofthe IndianArmy.Oneof thecamps inPoK,calledRoshnicrossingpoint,was

locatedmuchdeeperthanothersbutColKwantedtohitwhereithurt,soeventhoughtherewasagreaterriskofretaliation,theSFteamseventuallytargetedit.

TheLoCbetweenIndiaandPakistan:CirclesdenotecampsinsidePoKthatwerehitinthesurgicalstrikes

Some300kmaway,northofPirPanjal,ColHandhisteamhadalsocrossedtheLoC.TheirtargetswereinthegeneralareaofKelandLippa(seePlate3).

Themostcriticalperiodoftheoperationhadnowcommenced.‘Wehadobserved the target closely andhadmapped the behaviour pattern

there.Thebest timetostrikeinthejudgementofourreconnaissanceteamwasarounddawnorjustanhourbeforethatwhentheguardwasatitslowest.ButtheArmyCommanderwanted us towait, since the plan by the other team in thenorthwastohitthetargetatfirstlight,’ColKrevealed.

The difference of time over target between the two teams had an inherent

risk.WhatifPakistaniformationssouthofPirPanjal—oncetheyweretargeted—alertedothersallalongtheLoC?WhatifthecampsthatColHwastotargetwas then fortified?What if the second team got ambushed even before theycouldstrike?

AllthesethoughtscrossedLtGenHooda’smind,buteventually,heaccededto Col K’s request. Col H was accordingly warned about the timing and thepossiblefalloutofthatdecision.

Asthe teamsmovedinfor thekill,closemonitoringradar images indicatedminimalactivityinthecampswithlaxsecurity.

Col K’s teams spread out and got closer to the camp, they opened firesimultaneously,tookoutthesentriesfirstandthenrainedaccuratefirefromtheirCal Gustaf rocket launchers, M-4 Carbines, under barrel grenade launchersclippedonriflesandgrenadelaunchersthatspewedhalfadozengrenadesatonego. As the Special Forces Team unleashed its firepower on unsuspectingoccupants of the Pakistani army-protected terrorist camp, all hell broke loose.TheSpecialForces troops, raring toget intoaction for a long time,used theirprecisionweaponssystemsandtheirhand-to-handcombatskillswhensomeoftheoccupantstriedtoresisttheraid.Thentheyproceededtocompletelydestroythecampandeliminatealmostalloccupants.

They of course had no intention to wait and do the headcount. Havingaccomplishedtheir task, theyquicklystartedmakingtheirwayback.The teamnow decided to take a circuitous route to avoid any remote possibility ofinterdiction by the Pakistani forces. Thus, instead of taking the shorter, easierroute,theteamswentdeeperintoPoKandguidedbyadvancedGPSsystem,aswellascontinuousfeedfromaUAV,madetheirwaybacktotheLoC,avoidingpossiblePakistanideployments.

Meanwhile,ColH’stimeovertargetwasstilltwohoursaway.Anxiety began to gnaw Lt Gen Hooda and his Corps Commander in the

KashmirValley,LtGenSatishDua.ColH’s teamwaspoisedforastrike,butwasnotwillingtoberushedintoituntiltherewassufficientlightforthemtoseethetargetclearly.

‘Evenbefore theoperationstartedIhadkepta two-lineresignation letter in

mypocket, lestanythingwentwrong.Thebuckneededtostopwithmejustincase something went wrong,’ Lt Gen Hooda told me looking back at thoseanxioushours.

Thus,theseniorsattheCommandandCorpsHeadquartershadnochoicebuttowaitanxiously.

As the clock ticked away,ColK’s teammeanwhilewas safely back insideIndianterritory,inthe16Corpsareaofjurisdiction.

LtGenNimbhorkarwaspleased, but he toowasnowwaiting tohear fromacrossthePirPanjal.

At dawn, Col H’s men, primed and eager to pounce on the largeadministrative base and several launch pads deep inside PoK that they had intheirsightsonforpastweek,stealthilymovedforward.Astheynearedthecamp,itwasclearfromthecasualmovementofthesentriesthatnoonehadexpectedany attack at this time of the day. A few souls were up and about, perhapsansweringnature’scallearly.

Wastingnotimeandshowingnomercy,ColHandhismenopenedfirewiththeir lethal weapons, aiming at living quarters and what looked like anammunitiondepot.Astheoccupants,mostlyPakistanisoldiersandmanymeninPathan suits (mostly terrorists) tried to escape the firing, a lot of fell to thebullets. Barracks caught fire, there were at least three loud explosions as theSpecial Forces vented all their pent-up frustration on the hapless and utterlysurprisedPakistanis,eliminatingthetokenresistanceputupbysomeoccupants.

The raid over, Col K and team were now hurrying back. In such cases,extricationfrombehindenemylinesismoredifficultthantheattackitself.Theyhadtocoveratleastfourtofivekilometresoveramountainousterraininbroaddaylight. Will the Pakistanis bring the Air Force into play? Will helicopterschase them? The decision makers in Udhampur and Srinagar were thinkingalongtheselinesastheykeptaclosewatch.

As the strike teams made their way back, one of the boys stepped on alandmine closer to the Indian side. His injurywas not life threatening. In themeantime, twounmannedaerialvehicles(UAV),keepingaclosewatchon theprogress of Col H’s team, recorded huge explosions at the camp site. A

particularly longish sequence showed many people running helter-skelter andfallingtotheground.

Barring one minor injury, Operation X had gone off with clockworkprecision.Completesurprisewasachieved,resultinginthehigherfataltiesinthecamps-cum-launch pads of the Pakistanis. It also validated many conceptualplansmadeovertheyearsfortrans-LoCoperations.

Sowhatwasthedeathcount?IaskedthetwoCOs.Bothwere candid, admitting they didn’t stop to count the dead. ‘Thatwas

neither our remit nor the objective of the strike.We had been given a job todestroyselectedtargetstosendamessage.Inlightofwhichweperformedtothebestofourabilities.Wecan’tgiveyouexactfigures.Noonecan,butwhatwesawwithoureyesinthosemoments,tellsusthatwewouldhaveaccountedforatleast70–75fellowscombined,’bothColKandHtellme.Laterthatday,radiochatter from across the LoC reportedly confirmed at least 80 fatalities in thecampsthatwerehitbyIndianSpecialForces.

Lookingback,ColHremarksthatthePakistanisweretoodazedtoreact.Oneortwofellowswhohadtheweaponswithinreachtriedtoretaliatebuttonorealeffect. While the Indian government decided to make only one statementofficially (by the thenDGMO,LtGenRanbir Singh), the Pakistanis chose tokeepabsolutelyquiet.

Mediareportsonbothsidesof thebordernaturallyvaried in theirstyleandcontent. One report in the Indian Express, quoting residents in PoK said:‘EyewitnesseslivingacrosstheLineofControl(LoC)haveprovidedtheIndianExpresswithgraphicaccountsoflastweek’sIndianArmySpecialForcesstrikeson jihadists’ staging posts, describing how bodies of those killed in clashesbefore dawn on 29 Septemberwere loaded onto trucks for secret burials. Theeyewitnesses also described brief but intense fire engagements that destroyedmakeshiftbuildingshousing jihadistsbefore they left for the last stageof theirjourneysacrosstheLoC.’2

TheDawn newspaper, perhaps Pakistan’smost authentic news source,wassceptical.Inanewsreportheadlined‘Wasitreallyasurgicalstrike?’thepaperquoted Lt Gen Bajwa, man in-charge of of ISPR (Inter-Services Public

Relations),‘Howisitpossiblethatthetargetofa‘surgicalstrike’hasnoideaittook place?’ he said. ‘Thiswas simply an episode of cross-LoC fire that they[India]havebeendoing.Smallarmsandmortarswereusedinthefire,similartowhathasbeenusedbefore...Wegaveabefittingresponse.’3InIndiatoo,therewerescepticalvoicesmainlybecausethegovernmentchosenottoreleaseeithervideo footage (taken by the raiding teams or by the hovering UAVs) orphotographs. The PrimeMinister and his top security advisers decided to beambiguousandsecretiveaboutthestrikes.EventhosewithwhomIspoketo,inordertopiecetogetherthisaccount,werecautiousinnotgivingoutdetailsthatwould jeopardise future operations of a similar kind.Denials by the PakistaniArmynotwithstanding,ineffect,theintendedhumiliationwasstrong.

For the first time, all bodies were taken away from the site to unknowndestinations.Normally,ifsoldiersorterroristsarekilledinanyIndianfiring,thevictimsareburiedrightnexttothecamporinthenearestvillage.

Afterthesurgicalstrikehowever,bodieswerepiledupintrucksbysoldiers—andnotbyvillagersasisnormallythecase—andtransportedout.Theintentwasclear: if thevillagerscame toknowof thebig losses sufferedby thePakistaniArmyandthetanzeems,theimageofinvincibilitythathadbeencarefullybuiltoverdecadeswouldbeshattered.Overthenextfewdays,Pakistaniswerebusyliving indenial.Theirpatrollingbecamedefensiveand firingonlyspeculative.MoredetachmentsstartedcomingintoreinforceformationsneartheLoC.

Clearly, the tacticaloperationhadachieved thestrategic impact. Indeed, theeffectofthecross-borderstrikeswentbeyondthesecuritydomain.

In fact, the global financial world, focused on India as an attractiveinvestment destination was quite concerned over the possible fallout of thesurgicalstrikeson the financialmarketsandIndia’seconomy.WithinhoursoftheIndianDGMOgoingpublicabouttheIndianoperations,Iwaspartofmanytelevision discussions. In the middle of juggling appearances on the paneldiscussions, I remember receiving an unexpected call fromNeelkanthMishra,IndiaEquityStrategistofCreditSuisse,atopglobalinvestmentfirm.

Wedidn’tknoweachotherfrombeforebutMishrawasonthelinetoaskifIcouldjoinaconferencecallwithafewinvestorsbasedintheUSandEuropeto

givemyassessmentonthelikelyconsequencesofIndia’ssurgicalstrikes.Ihadnever done this before but was reasonably confident about giving accurateassessment of the likely fallout.Within anhour, Iwason the conference call,alongwithnotedstrategicaffairsanalystBharatKarnad.Thenearly70-minlongconversation focusedon thepossibilityof an all-outwar and the likelihoodofIndiahavingtoincreaseitsdefencespending.

Mishrawasgoodenoughtosendmeagistof therecordedconversationwehadthatday—29September2016.Here’sthesummaryofwhatwesaidthen:

Afurtherescalationisunlikely(i)Indiacallsitan‘anti-terror’operation,andonlyattackedlaunch-pads,notanymilitarycamp;and(ii)Indianactionfitstheprincipleof‘proportionateresponse.’Thismaybeastabilisingeventandnotade-stabilisingonebecause:(i)Itsetsaprecedentandanaction-reactionsequencethatcandiscouragefutureprovocations;(ii)ItcalledPakistan’s‘nuclearbluff’(itneverexisted);(iii)andnopublicpressure/criticismofIndiabyanyofthebigpowers.HeightenedpreparednessontheLoC/borderdoesn’trequireadditionaltroopmobilisationorsignificantspendingfornowandshouldstaywithinthebudget.4

Almostayearlater,bothKarnadandIhavenotbeenprovedwrong,despitethefactthatwewerespeakingwithlimitedknowledgeofthecross-LoCraids.

LESSONSLEARNED

Threecrucialpointsstandoutfromtheentireepisode.One,thefactthatthesimultaneusstrikeswereconductedforthefirsttimeon

suchamassivescaleacrossalargefrontageofnearly250kmoftheLoC—fromKelsectorofPakistanoppositeKupwaratoBhimberSectoroppositeNaushera—wasindeedaremarkableachievement.

Two,theplanningandexecutionwasdoneincompletesecrecy,andnoone,leastofallthePakistaniArmy,couldanticipatesuchanoperation.

Finally, the confidence shown by the decision-makers in the ability of the

IndianArmyleadershipanditsSpecialForcesisnoteworthy.Oncethepoliticalcallwastaken,itwaslefttotheArmyChieftodecideonthetimeandplaceofthestrike.GenDalbir in turn letNorthernCommandhandle theplanningevenwhile keeping a close watch on the larger picture. Before giving the final goahead,PrimeMinisterModiandhisteamhadfactoredinthepossibilityofanyescalationbasedonbriefingsbythemilitary.

ThefalloutofthedecisiontostrikeacrosstheLoCandownitatthehighestlevelhashadmanyconsequencesbothinmilitaryandinstrategicterms.

Tobeginwith, the government’s proactive strategic initiative has given themilitaryasignalthatitneednotperpetuallybeboundbyadefensiveorreactiveapproachindealingwiththeproxywarwagedbyPakistaninJ&K.

By introducing an element of uncertainty in its response on the LoC andbeyond, the military has now compelled the Pakistani establishment to dwelluponthenatureoftheescalatorydynamicthatmayinformitschoices.Whenthesurgical strikeswere carried out in September 2016, India had factored in thepossibilityofPakistanwideningtheconflict.Thatitdidnotdoso—foravarietyofreasons,fromthethenimpendingchangeofguardatthetopinthePakistaniArmytothelackofpreparednessofitsmilitary—isnotadefinitiveconclusionthatPakistanwillnot try toretaliate in thefuture toasimilaractionacross theLoC.

On the other hand, theModi government’s proactive stand on themilitaryfront—bothagainstPakistanandChina—meansthatPakistanwillhavetothinktwice before climbing the escalatory ladder. If, for instance, GHQ was toescalate the violence beyond the current levelafter a similar surgical strike inPoK,itrunstheriskoffreeingtheIndiandecisionmakersfromtheirperceivedhesitation to launch the cold start campaign that seeks to launch swiftconventional military attacks into the Punjabi heartland of Pakistan. If thathappens,willPakistanbereadytofacetheconsequences?Canitaffordawiderconflict?That’saquestionthatneedsadetailedanalysiselsewhere.

Oneaspecthoweverisundeniableintheaftermathofthesuccessfulsurgicalstrikes:Indiahasopenedupthespacebetweenadefensiveresponsetotheproxywarandanall-outconventionalresponsebelowthenuclearthresholdintheform

ofthesurgicalstrikes.Interestingly, despitemost Pakistaniwriters and commentators going along

with the Pakistani Army’s denials, a senior Pakistani political analyst blamedRawalpindi for continued hostility towards India.Within days of the surgicalstrikes, noted Pakistani political analyst Munir Saami confirmed that IndiacarriedoutsurgicalstrikesinPoK.InaninterviewtoaCanadiannewschannel,SaamisaidthatdenialbyIslamabadismeaninglessinthiscontext.

Saami said, ‘If they (Pakistani establishment) admit to the surgical strikescarriedoutbyIndia,itwouldbedifficultforthemtoexplainthesituationtothepeopleofPakistan.’

‘Howwill theytell thepeoplethatIndianarmycrossedtheLoC?It’s likeabonestuckintheirthroat.Theywanttotakeitout,butit’sdifficultforthemtodosoandthat’swhytheyaresayingthatthesurgicalstrikesdidnottakeplace,’Saamitoldthenewschannel.AccordingtoSaami,India’spatiencehadwornoutonaccountof thecontinuedterrorattackslaunchedfromacross theborder.Hesaid, ‘What happened (the surgical strikes) this time was due to the fact thatIndiasufferedinMumbai,PathankotandUri.’

‘Westartedthisstory(ofcross-borderterrorism)andnowwewanttheworldto support us. Unfortunately, the world is not supporting Pakistan,’ Saamicandidlysaid.5

Thesurgicalstrikesalsoseemedtohavegarneredcautioussupportfromtheinternationalcommunity.TheUSgovernment,whilestressing theneedforde-escalation of hostilities between India and Pakistan, reiterated its support forIndia’s fight in combating terrorism. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson,GengShuang, on the other hand said ‘as shared neighbour and friend to bothIndia and Pakistan, we are concerned about continuous confrontation andtensionsbetweenIndiaandPakistan.’

RussiatoosupportedIndia,statingthatitstoodfor‘decisivestruggleagainstterrorism in all its manifestations.’ In an interview given to an Indian newsnetwork, the thenRussianAmbassador to India,LateAlexanderKadakin, saidthat ‘the greatest human rights violations take place when terrorists attackmilitary installations and attack peaceful civilians in India. We welcome the

surgicalstrike.Everycountryhastherighttodefenditself.’Aspokespersonforthe British Foreign Office said, ‘we are monitoring the situation closelyfollowing reports of strikes carried out by the Indian Army over the LoC inKashmir.Wecallonbothsidestoexerciserestraintandtoopendialogue.’

Other neighbours in South Asia also backed India. The Bangladesh PrimeMinister’s adviser, Iqbal Chowdhury was forthright: ‘India has got the legal,internationally accepted right to make a response to any attack on hersovereigntyandhersoil.’

Within the Indian military too, there is an acceptance that the Modigovernment iswilling to employ forcewhen necessary.Both the cross-borderstrikes (Myanmar andPoK)havedemonstrated thewillingnessof thepoliticalexecutive leadership to unshackle themilitarywhen necessary. The proactive,specific and focused intelligence-drivenoperationsagainst terrorists in J&K in2017arepartofthefreshapproachtotacklethePakistan-backedproxywar.Itmustbenotedthatover140terroristshavebeeneliminatedbetweenJanuaryandAugust2017.

ItishowevernotnecessarythatIndiawillexercisetheoptionofanothersetofsurgicalstrikesincaseofanotheroutrageousterroristattack.Therecouldbeothermethodstouseasaretaliatorytool.Aproactiveandboldleadershipthusenables the military to think of different options rather than those which arepredictable.

Clearly, themilitary leadership haswar-gamed possible scenarios to give arealistic assessment to the NSA, and the Prime Minister, who should feelconfidentthattheIndianmilitaryhasthelogistics,requiredlethalfirepower,andrequisiteskillstomeetanychallenge.

Thewillpowerof thenationwasofcoursedemonstratedearlier thatyear inPathankottoo.

A

CHAPTER4

PATHANKOT:AVERTINGACATASTROPHE

1500hours,1January2016,SubrotoPark,NewDelhiirMarshal Shirish B Deo had just finished a late but relaxed lunch atTrishulHouse, the official bungalowhewas staying at inNewDelhi’s

SubrotoParkatthattime.AsChiefoftheWesternAirCommand,hewasresponsibleforairoperations

acrossavastarea,stretchingfromtheformidableheightsofLadakhinthenorth-westtothedesertsofRajasthantothesouthwestofDelhi.Deohadspentover35yearsasanacefighterpilot,survivedtwoejections,andwasatthepinnacleofhisdistinguishedcareer.

LittledidtheWesternAirCommandChiefknowthathewasabouttoembarkon a journey thatwould pose a challengewhich he could not have dreamt offacingasanairforceofficer.

1515hours,1January2016,SubrotoPark

ThesecurephoneinTrishulHouserangpersistently.As Deo answered the call, he heard the familiar voice of his Air Chief

MarshalArupRahaontheotherend.‘Shirish, there’saproblem.IamcomingfromameetingwiththeNSA.AdefiniteintelsuggestsPathankotisabouttobe

attacked. Issue immediate instructions to be on the highest alert and increasepatrolling.TheArmyandPunjabPolicearealsobeinginformedofthespecificinformation,’theAirChiefsaid.

Themeeting thatAirChiefMarshalRahawasspeakingabouthadbegunat1340hours in the office of theNationalSecurityAdviserAjitDoval.Doval’sofficehadmadehurriedcallstotheArmyChiefGenDalbirSingh,ACMRaha,RajinderKhanna, head of India’s External IntelligenceAgency, Research andAnalysesWing(R&AW),andDirectorofIntelligenceBureau(DIB)DineshwarSharmatoassembleforthemeeting.

Afterhour-longdeliberations,adetailedplanofactionwasapprovedbytheNSAandallconcernedwereaskedtomovewithoutanylossoftime.Thestrikehefelt‘couldnowtakeplaceatanymoment’.Weshouldreachthetargetareabefore they do, theNSA told the assembled officers. ‘Onewho outsmarts theterroristinspeed,surpriseandskillwillcarrytheday,’Dovalrememberstellinghistopsecuritymanagers.

Forthepreviousthreeweeks,India’sIntelligenceagencies—theIntelligenceBureau, the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), and theResearch andAnalysisWing (R&AW)—had tapped into terrorist chatter fromacross the border, tracked suspicious movements of terrorists, and receivedvaluable Humint (Human intelligence) from Pakistan, to arrive at a definiteconclusionthatagroupofterroristshadbeenassignedtoattackamajorIndianmilitaryinstallationinPunjab,orintheJammuregion.

Information about recovery of Punjab Police officer Salwinder Singh’scommandeered vehicle at Tajpur, about 4 km from Pathankot air base theprevious day, also flowed in to Delhi. The SP had meanwhile informed thePunjabPolicethattherewerefourarmedoccupantsinthevehiclewhenhewasletoff(seebox).

AstheworldwokeuptoaNewYear,afreshchallengewasbeingmountedontheborder.

The leadwas consolidated further by 12noon as Indian intelligence agentsintercepted three calls to Pakistan in quick succession from the vicinity ofTajpur-Pathankot (see Appendix I). Itwas now clear that a group of terrorists

were on the loose in the area even though the target their handlers had giventhemwasnotclear.Urgentpreventiveactionwasclearlyneeded.

Asaseniorintelligenceofficerrecalls,‘Pathankotwasnotatipoff.ItwasanassessmentthathadbeenarrivedatafterIndianagencieshadanalysedaseriesofintelligenceinputs.IndiahadzeroedinonaterroristhandlerbasedinSialkot.Infact,on31stDecember,ourNSAactuallyconveyedthisdefiniteinformationtoPakistan’s NSA (Lt Gen Nasser Khan Janjua). We had lot of specificinformation that was passed on to the Pakistani NSA.We even sent him thefellow’s telephone number and coordinates based in Sialkot and asked him totake immediate action.Gen Janjuaassuredushewould take immediate actionandnotallowtheattacktogothrough.Butnothinghappened’(seePlate6and7).

Doval,withalifetimeofexperiencespentintheshadowyandsecretiveworldofintelligence,instantlyrecognisedthattheyhadaseriousproblemathand.TheareaaroundPathankot-Mamunhadseveralhighvaluemilitaryinstallations,butnonemore tempting than thePathankot air base. ‘Wemaybe on a very shortfuseandunlesswerespondfasterthantheterrorists,wemightbeinforaseriousdisaster’,he told theArmyand theAirChief, theDIBandSecretarywhohadassembledinhisofficeon1January.

Juicytarget:ThePathankotAirbase

‘In theory, a frontline strategic air base like Pathankot has always been

vulnerabletoterroristattacks,butnowthepossibilitywasreal,’theNSAadded.Any damage to the fighter aircraft and other high value assets based in

Pathankotwouldhavebeenamajorsetbackfor theIndianestablishmentandamassivepublicityfortheterrorists.Noone,noteventheNSAhoweverknewforcertainwhetheronlyPathankotwasthetarget.Heandhisadvisersassumedthatanyofthemilitaryestablishmentscouldcomeunderattack.

Embarkingonacrucialmission:MembersofNSG's51SAGonboardtheIL-76

‘Iknewtherewasnotimetolose.Theprioritywastopreventtheattack,’theNSArecalledinourrecentconversation.

Withoutamoment’shesitation,hedecidedtotaketheleadandgetcracking,since there was no time to go through bureaucratic rituals. The defence andsecuritytopbrass—allofthemprobablyskippedtheirlunch—assembledintheNSA’schamberintheSouthBlock.

‘We discussed and decided only the actions that were to be taken. EightcolumnsoftheArmyweremovedfirstbyWesternCommand.ParaCommandosfromNahanwereaskedtoreachPathankotforthwith,’GenDalbirSinghrecalls.By1630hourstheWesternAirCommandchieftoowasonhiswaytoPathankotwithGaruds(IAF’sowncommandos)followedbytheNationalSecurityGuards(NSG).

ThedecisiontosendtheNSGwasinfactamasterstroke.Duringthemeetinginhisoffice,Dovalhadsoughtsuggestionsonhowbest

totackle thesituation.AirChiefArupRahaandArmyChiefDalbirSinghhad

both agreed that besides mobilising Army columns and Garuds, it would beprudenttosendtheNSGjustincaseterroriststriedtogetintoanybuilt-upareaor livingquarters inanyof themilitaryestablishments.Withover10,000non-combatants—families and civilian employees—living on the air base, thepossibilityofahostagesituationcouldnotberuledouteither.

Forsuchasituation,theNSGwouldbebestsuited,Dovalreasoned.Soas themeetingbrokeup,Doval told theNSGtoget itscrack51Special

ActionGroup(SAG)commandosreadyforimmediatedeployment.

1545hours,1January2016,WACHQ,SubrotoPark,NewDelhiMeanwhile,backattheWesternAirCommand,Deo’smindwasalreadyracingaheadofhisthoughts.Whatiftheterroristswerealreadyinsidethebase?Havingservedthereasayoungofficer,DeoknewthatthebasewasoneofthebiggestinAsiawithits2000acreareaand25kmperimeterwall.Guardingeveryinchoftheareahadalwaysbeenatoughtask;searchingforsomeonedeterminedtohidewasgoing tobe tougher.Especially, considering that thecompoundhadmanywoodedandgrassypatches.

AsC-in-C,hewasalsoawareoftheimportantpartplayedbythePathankotbaseinguardingIndia’sairspaceclosetothePakistanborder.SquadronsbasedherehadplayedacrucialroleintheIAF’sspectacularshowduringthe1965and1971wars.Asthefrontlineairbase,itwashometoimportantfightersquadrons,missile, and radar assets. Damage to any of these strategic assets would bedisastrous,heconjectured,asheplannedhisdeparture.

Assoonas thecallwith theChiefended,DeosummonedhisStaffOfficer,SquadronLeaderYashuBhardwajandgavehimmultipleinstructions:‘GettheEmbraerready;tellopsroomIamheadedtoPathankot;getmeAOCPathankot(AirComJSDhamoon)ontheline;getSASOtomeetmeatPalam...’

Inlessthan30minutes,Deo’sEmbraer(the14-seatertransportaircraftusedby senior officers of the three forces and important ministers) was ready fortake-off fromPalam.TheWesternAirCommandChiefhaddecided to rush toPathankot,oneoftheIAF’smostimportantfrontlineairbases.

Bhardwajremembersrushingbackhome—astone’sthrowawayfromTrishul

House—stuffing a couple of sets of uniforms and getting into the light greenoverallsallairwarriorshavetowearwhenflyingintheserviceaircraft.Luckily,Delhi’s Palam airport was just a 10-minute drive away from theWesternAirCommandHQ.

As theCommander-in-Chief’s car reached thePalamTechnical area, actingSASO(SeniorAirStaffOfficer)AirViceMarshalDSRawatwalkeduptoDeo.Rawat,thenAirDefenceCommanderintheCommandwasstandinginforAirMarshal B Sureshwhowas on leave.At thatmoment, hewas effectively thenumber2inthecommand.DeoandRawatconferredfor twotothreeminutes.Meanwhile, Deo got through to Dhamoon. ‘I told him to not to take anychances,’Deoremembersvividly.‘Searcheveryareaandmakesureeveryoneisonhistoes,’theAirMarshaltoldthestationcommanderatPathankot.

1630hours,1January,PalamAirport

TheAirOfficerCommanding-in-Chief,WesternAirCommand,alongwithhisSOwasairborneenroutetoPathankot.

ForSqnLeaderBhardwaj,thiswasatotallynewexperience.‘IhavetravelledwithDeoSironanumberofsuddentrips,butthiswassomethingelse.Assoonaswewereairborne,IlearntSirhadaskedforastopoveratAdampur(anotherIAFbase inPunjab).We landed there in 15-20minutes. SixGaruds, in battlegearclamberedonboardandwewereoffagain,’Bhardwajrecalls.

InfactforBhardwajtoo,itwasthefirstglimpseofaGarudinfullbattlegear.‘Ayoung, fitSikhairman in theGaruduniformwas in fact sittingon theseatnext tome,’Bhardwaj remembers. The young SikhwasGursewak Singh, themanwhomadethefirstcontactwith the terroristsbeforebeingfatallyhit laterthatnight.

‘Ithoughtit’sbettertotakeasmallteamofGarudstoPathankot,justincase,’Deo remembers. At that point they were available at Adampur, hence thestopover.

1740hours,1January2016PathankotAirbase

AirCommodoreDhamoon,AirOfficerCommanding of the base received hisboss, Air Marshal Deo and acknowledged the arrival of the Garuds. As DeodonnedabulletproofjacketandpickedupanAK-47,heandDhamoongotintotheAOC’scaranddroveawayforaninspectionofthebaseandtotakestockofitsperipheralsecurity(seePlate8).

Asalreadymentioned, spreadover2000acreswithseveralpatchesof thickshrubs and trees, Pathankot is not an easy area to secure. More importantly,besides fighter planes, it is also the base for India’s attack helicopters.Furthermore,thatweek,Pathankotwasalsohostingagroupofforeignmilitaryofficersundergoing trainingon thebase.Byall accounts,Pathankotwasquitevulnerabletoaterroristattack.

As Dhamoon drove his boss around, Deo was informed that the IAF hadrequisitionedtroopsfromnearbycantonments,buttheywereyettoarrivesincethearmywasalsosecuringitsownbases.

DeoandDhamoonreachedthetechnicalorthecorearea(wheretheaircraftareparked).TheC-in-Crealisedheneededmorebootsonthegroundtoguardtheammunitiondepotandthehugeresidentialarea.AnotherrequestwassenttotheArmytorush troops toguardvaluableassets.Simultaneously,asystematicsearchwaslaunchedbytheAirForcepersonnelacrossthemammothbase.

Byevening,WesternCommand,on instructionsofArmyChiefGenDalbirSingh,haddeployedArmycolumnsaroundPathankotandover20oddmilitaryinstallations in thearea,assisting the localpolice inpatrollingandestablishingnakas/barriersandbeefingupgeneralareasecurity.TheArmyChiefhadtoldLtGenKJSingh, then theWesternArmyCommander,of themeetingwithNSAand the intelligence thatwas shared. ‘I remember tellingKJ since the intel isgeneric, let us secure all bases. They could come for any one of ourcantonments.Makesureeachoneofthemiswell-secured.’

Evenbefore theArmyChief had called theWesternArmyCommander,LtGenKJ remembers getting the first tip off about a bunch of terrorists on theloosearound1630hourson1JanuaryfromtheDGofPunjabPolice.TheDGPhad come to the conclusion that the terrorists who had let off Senior SPSalwinderSinghandhis friend thepreviousnightevenas theycommandeered

his vehicle,were lurking around in the vicinity ofMamum-Pathankot.The tipoffwas followed by a short conversationwithArmyChiefGenDalbir Singhwho called after the meeting in the NSA’s office to tell his Western ArmyCommanderaboutthedecisionsattheconferenceinDelhi.

‘TheDGPwantedtheArmytomountasearchfortheterroristsimmediately,’LtGenKJ toldme, recalling thatNewYear’s day. ‘Myquestion to himwas,wheredowesearch?Armycanbedeployedinaspecificareabutwecan’tbesearchingallovertheplacelikethepolice,IremembertellingtheDGP,’LtGenKJrevealed.

TheDG promised to come backwithmore details, but theWesternArmyCommanderwasnotabout to takechancesgiven thatoneof the largestArmycantonments—Mamun—wasintheareathatwasthoughttobeontheterrorists’radar. ‘A quick vulnerability analysis in my mind told me that many of mysmallerunitsinthevicinitywouldbeeasypicking.SoIquicklyorderedInfantryQRTs(QuickReactionTeams)toguardthevunerableestablishmentswhichhadlittleornoperimeterprotection.’Next,theWesternArmyCommandermovedateamofSpecialForcessoldiersfromSambatoMamumandreplacedtheSambateamwithaback-upcontingentfromNahantoSamba.

Soldiersat theMamum-basedDivisionwerealsokeptonhighalert incasetheywereneededatmultiplelocations.‘Atthatstage,nooneknewthelocationof thegroupof terrorists.All thatweknew(becauseof the intercept)was thatthe armed terrorists hadgot into somebase.’LtGenKJ says, lookingbackatthateventfulevening.

AcoordinationmechanismwithPunjabPolicewasestablished immediatelyasthesearchfortheterroristgroupwasfurtherintensified.

Thepolicehadbeeninfactonthelookoutforagroupofterroristssince31December after Gurdaspur SP Salwinder Singh had claimed that his car waswaylaid by four gun-toting terrorists (see NIA chargesheet Appendix I).However,thepolicesearchwasnotthoroughenoughassubsequenteventsweretoprove.

1700hours,1January2016,7RaceCourseRoad

InNewDelhimeanwhile,evenasDeowasonhiswaytoPathankot,NSADovaldrovetothePrimeMinister’sresidencetobriefhimontheemergingthreat.

‘I told the PMwhat had transpired so far and themeasures that had beentaken. I also remember tellinghim thatour assessmentmaybe completelyoffthe mark, but we were not going to take any chances,’ Doval tells me whilerememberingtheincidentsofthatcrucialday.IaskedtheNSAwhatthePrimeMinister’sreactionwas.WashedisappointedthatsoonafterhisattempttoreachouttoPakistan(thePMhadmadeanunscheduledstopoveratLahorejustaweekprior,tomeethiscounterpartNawazSharif),thePakistanishadchosentolaunchanother terrorist attack? ‘Well, he was quite cool and composed. He knew aserious problemwas at hand and his resolve to meet the threat squarely wasquitevisible.Hegavespecificdirectionsandwantedustoensurethatourvitalair assets andpersonnelwereprotected.ThePrimeMinister alsowantedus toredoubleoureffortstolocateandneutralisetheterrorists.Thoughhewantedustocleartheareaoftheterroristsattheearliest,thePrimeMinisterdidnotbetrayanyanxiety. I thought itwashis implicit faithandconfidence in theabilityofourforces.IdonotrememberhimmentioninganythingabouthisLahorevisit.Hewasfocussedonnothingbuttheproblemathand,’theNSAtoldme

But why wasn’t the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)—the highestdecision-makingbodyonsecuritymattersinthecountry—convened,IaskedtheNSA.

TheNSA’sanswerrevealshispracticalside.‘AssumingthatCCSwascalled,whatwouldhavebeen thequestion in frontof theCCS todecide?Whether totake immediate countermeasures andneutralise theattack?Could ithave saidanythingelseexcepttoissueinstructionstocounterthethreatandneutraliseit?Theprocesswouldhaveonlydelayedthewholeprocessbyseveralhoursandifterroristshadfiredonebullet,itwouldhavebeenimpossibletolandanaircraft(atPathankot).TheNSG,Garuds,andarmycommandoswouldhavepotentiallyreachedtherehoursaftertheterroristshadtakenposition.Sothewholecriticismismisdirected.Therewasnooptionbuttotakethedecisionrightthenandthere.Inanemergency,on-the-spotdecisionsneedtobetaken.Thecountryhastrainedandpositionedustotaketheresponsibility.Ifwedonottakethatresponsibility

when the country’s vital security interests are endangered, what is thejustificationforustobethere,’hewondered.

Doval,wholedthenegotiatingteamintheinfamousKandaharhijackepisodein December 1999, had clearly learnt his lessons. That time the CrisisManagementCommitteeandtheCCStookaninordinatelylongtimetoarriveatadecision.By the time itwasconvened, theplanehadalready takenoff fromAmritsar when it could easily have been neutralised in Amritsar. Delay anddithering in decision-making at the highest level in Delhi and the bumblingsecurityestablishmentonthegroundhadforcedIndiatoreleaseMasoodAzharandothers inexchangeforpassengerson the IndianAirlinesplane.Dovalstillsimmers with anger on the shameful handling of the hijack crisis becauseaffected families, instead of showing patience and faith in their securityagencies, virtually forced the Government to wilt under the pressure of thepublicmood.Many people in official positions insisted on following protocolwhen the needwas to take urgent action. Doval wasmortified towitness thereleaseofMasood,thedreadedterrorist.ThesameMasoodwouldthengoontoform the Jaish-e-Mohammad, whose operatives were now about to launch anattackonamilitaryinstallationinPathankot.

Clearly,Dovalwasnotabout to repeat themistakesof1999,conventionbedamned.

2100hours,1January2016,Pathankot

Backat thebase,AirMarshalDeo,having finished the tour and inspected themeasures taken by the AOC, came to the officers’ mess to stay put. He hadordered that Mi-35 helicopters and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPA) belaunchedintheeveningtoenhancesurveillanceanddetectioninthedark.AC-130flightwasduetoarrivelaterthatnighttofurtherincreasesurveillanceacrossthe vast air base. TheRPAs andC-130were both equippedwith night visioncapability.

Deo also knew that an NSG team was on its way to Pathankot on thededicatedIL-76planethatisalwaysonstandbyatPalamforthem.TheNSG’s

counterterrorism task force I (CTTF-I) or 51 Special Action Group (SAG)contingentconsistedof140speciallyselectedandtrainedsoldiersondeputationfromtheArmy.

TheNSGsquadwascapableoftacklingbothterrorandhijacksituations.Theoperationalcommanderofthe51SAGwasBrigGautamGanguly.OriginallyaGrenadier Regiment soldier, Ganguly had come on deputation to the NSG tohead the 51SAG that looks after counterterror operations.MajGenDushyantSingh, the IG (Operations), who had relinquished command of an InfantrydivisioninJammu(andhencewasintricatelyfamiliarwiththegeneralareaandtopographyoftheareaaroundPathankot),alsoaccompaniedtheNSGsquadtoPathankot.

TheNSG’sCTTFILandsatPathankot

ThedecisiontosendtheNSGtoPathankotwastosavetheday.By the time theNSG teamalightedwith all their special equipment, itwas

past2200hourson1January2016.TheyweresupposedtohavedrivenoutofthePathankotbaseandstayedatan

accommodation arranged for them at the nearby Mamun Army cantonment.

‘Somehow,tomeitdidn’tseemrighttoleavePathankotsinceIknewthebasehad valuable air assets and did not have enough protection,’ Brig Gangulyrecallsthinkingthatnight.

Onthatpurehunch—callitgutfeeling,describeitasinstincthonedbyyearsof experience—the NSG squad stayed back on the base and was assigned tosecurethetechnicalareawheretheaircraftsareparked.

Thatonehunchwastoprovedecisiveinthenextfewhours.TheGarudswerealsoprimedandready!

As thenightprogressed,everyone, from thesentriesonduty to theGaruds,andfromarmysoldierstotheNSGmen,wereonhighalert.

TheunstatedstrategywastoletterroristsshowtheirhandIFtheywereinsidethebase.

0330hours,2January2016,PathankotAirBase

Thesilenceofthenightwassuddenlyshatteredbyaburstoffire,mostprobablyfromanAKrifle. In theVIPsuitof theOfficers’Mess,SqnLeaderBhardwajwaswokenupbyaknockonhisdoor.AWingCommanderwasstandingatthedoor.‘TheAOChassentmetoalertyouandtheC-in-C.Suspiciousmovementhasbeenspottedinsidethebase.Thereisalreadysomefiringtakingplace.Iamhere to provide protection to the VIP suite,’ Wing Commander Sarin toldBhardwaj.SarinfurtheraddedthatoneGarudhadbeenkilledasweretwoDSCguards.

Oneterroristwasalsosupposedtohavebeeneliminatedinthefirstcontact.However, details were still hazy. Even as they were conversing, AirMarshalDeocalledBhardwajon thephone. ‘Where areyou,DeoSir askedme. I toldhim Iwas in the room.He said stay put, don’t go out.We are under attack.’Evenastheywerespeaking,DeocametoBhardwaj’sroom.

‘Take thisweapon,’ theAOC-in-Chandedapistol tohisSO.SoBhardwajtookholdofthepistolwhileDeohimselfwascarryinganAK-47andhadputonabulletproofjacket.Theyquicklyswitchedoffthelightsandwaitedinthedark.TheDSC guard outsidewas also told to be on alert.WingCommander Sarin

meanwhilewent to the terrace to takeguardevenasDeoandBhardwajkeptawatch from their positions. ‘The only thought inmymind at that timewas tomakesuremybosswassafe,’Bhardwaj,whowaswithoutabulletproofjacket,remembers distinctly. ‘If he remained safe, everything else could be handled,’theSOthoughttohimselfashepeeredoutintothedark,tryingtomakesenseofwhatwashappeningoutthere.

Deohimselfwasallchargedup.‘Ifitcomestothecrunch,Iwillsurelytakedowna couple of them,’ he remembers thinking as he clutched theAK in hishand.ThenighthoweverpassedwithoutanyincidentintheVIPsuite.

Later,atfirstlight,Deowasbriefedaboutthefirstcontactwiththeterroristsandwhathadtranspired.

Evidently,imagesreceivedfromtheRPAhadindicatedsuspiciousmovementatabout0215hours(seephoto).The locationof the terroristswasclose to thewesternboundarywallnearthesmallarmsrange.TheGarudswererushedtheretocheckonthesuspiciousmovement.AstheGarudsstartedsanitisingthearea,slowly and methodically, first blocking the route to the family quarters, theycame under sudden and heavy fire near the MES yard. Grenades were alsohurledbytheterrorists.TheGarudsfiredback.

Theclinchingevidence;imagecapturedbyIAF'sassetshowingterroristslocation

Thefirstcontactwithterroristshadbeenmade.Intheensuingfirefight,aheavybursthadhitCorporalGursewakSingh,the

GarudwhohadsatnexttoBhardwajontheplane.Ashefell,threeterroristsrantowardstheDSClivingbillet.

As the Garuds chased the terrorists, they entered the DSC living quarters,firingindiscriminately.FiveDSCmen—allunarmed—diedinthefiring.Butoneofthem,SepoyJagdishChandjumpedonaterrorist,wrestledwithhimandshothimdeadwithhisowngun.

His action was reminiscent of a similar brave act by Constable TukaramOmbale in the Mumbai attack of November 2008. Ignoring personal safety,OmbalehadwrestleddownAjmalAmirKasab.WithoutKasabgetting caughtalive,itwouldhavebeendifficulttoprovethatthe26/11attackswasaPakistaniconspiracy. However, likeOmbale, Jagdish Chandwas shot down by anotherterrorist.

Allthishappenedinamatterofminutes.Thethreeremainingterroristsranawaytowardstheopengroundfulloftall,

thickelephantgrassnotveryfarfromtheDSCbillet.AstheGaruds,NSGmenand DSC personnel got down to evacuating the injured, Ganguly startedredeployingtheavailablemanpower.

Five unarmedDSCmen andCorporalGursewakhad laid down their lives.Oneterroristwaskilled.

Threewerestillatlarge.Therewasnotimetomournthedead.Thethreattotheairbase,thefamilies,andtheairassetswasreal.

Pathankotwasinlockdownasthesunroseon2ndJanuary.

0700hours2January2016,PathankotAirBase

Deo decided to drive to the Air Traffic Control tower. Air CommodoreDhamoonandMajGenDushyantSinghtoohadreachedtheATC,nowserving

astheunofficialwarroom.Astheytookstockofthesituation,itwascleartheterroristswerewellarmed

anddeterminedtocausemaximumdamage.The priority therefore was to neutralise them without taking any more

casualtiesorallowinganyharmtocriticalairassets.Deodecidedtomakesurethetarmacandthetechnicalareawascompletely

sealedalthoughflyingoperationswereallowedtocontinue.On the groundmeanwhile, theNSG, theArmy troops andGaruds resumed

their slow, deliberate search in the grassy area.Mi-35 attack helicopterswereonceagainpressedintoservice.Thehelicoptersmadesome12lowpasses,butthethickgrassmadeitimpossibletotakeaccurateaimattheterrorists.

By 0900 hours it was clear that the three terrorists were holed up in thewoodedareaandfiringintermittentlywhenevertheythoughtthesecurityforcesweregettingclose.

Inthemeantime,themediahadgatheredinstrengthjustoutsidethebase,TVstudioswere trying togiveaballbyballcommentaryexcept that theydidnotknowwhatwasactuallyhappeninginside!

By noon, as the cordon started tightening, andmore exchange of fire tookplace, terrorists were slowly running out of ammunition. By afternoon, NSGsharpshootershadpickedoneoftheterroristsinthecrosshairsofhissniperrifle.Oneofthethreeterroristsfell,hitbyapreciseshot.Theremainingtwoterroristsheldon,butbyevening,theNSGcommandoshadneutralisedbothofthem.

Bodiesofthreeneutralisedterrorists

Back in theATC tower, Sqn Leader Bhardwajwas fieldingmultiple calls,answering a bank of phones and mobiles. Calls were coming from Raksha

Mantri Parrikar, theWestern Air Command control room, and the Air Chief.‘Afterthefirsthour,Ibecamethedefactotelephoneoperator,takingnumerouscallsandpassinginformationbothways,’Bhardwajremembers.

By evening, Brig Ganguly and rest of the ground forces had given the allclear signal, having eliminated the remaining three terrorists hiding in the tallgrass.

The terroristshadbeenconfined to a250mby250marea after the initialcontactandwerepreventedfrominflictinganyfurtherdamagetothecriticalairassetsorfromtakinganyhostages.

Asnightfellon2January,aquietsenseofaccomplishmentwaspalpable.FromtheDefenceMinistertotheHomeMinisterandfromtheNSGChiefto

the Chief of Air Staff, everyone shared a word of congratulations on thesuccessfulcompletionoftheoperations.

Unlike in other such similar attacks on airfields and air bases in the recentpast, itwas ensured that no harm had come to the aircraft or the ammunitiondump.Civilians toohadbeenfullyprotected.Theterroristswere infactboxedintoasmallareaandnotallowedtorunamokastheyhaddoneinsimilarattacksinPakistan,AfghanistanandSriLanka.

Althoughsixliveshadbeenlost,thecombinedeffortofalltheforcesandthetimely intelligence thatwas generated had ensured a successful termination ofoperations.

Orsoeveryonethought.

0800hours,3January2016,PathankotAirBase

Thedayafter.Thetaskofsanitising theareaandthesearchforanyexplosives leftbehind

bytheterroristsremained.Thebombdisposalsquad—anintegralpartofthe51SAG—was led by Lt Col EKNiranjan, a Sapper officer. As he and his menstartedcombingthegrassypatchoflandwherethethreeterroristsweregunneddown the previous evening, Deo and his staff arrived at the scene and aftercommending the excellent work done by the troops the previous day, he

proceededtowardstheadministrativeofficesofthebase.Withinminutes,thecalmofthemorningwasshattered.LtColNiranjanand

hismenpulledouttwoofthethreebodiesfromthethickgrassandlaidthemoutin an open space. The body of the third terrorist was proving difficult to beretrieved; it was repeatedly getting stuck in a ditch. So Niranjan and anothersoldierwentclosertopullitout.Oncetheysucceededingettingthebodytotheopen space, both were standing over it when Niranjan decided to check theterrorist’spockets.Assoonasheopenedhischestpocket,ahugeblastblewupNiranjanandinjuredhisbuddy.TheterroristhadkeptahandgrenadeprimedbytakingoutitssafetypininthetoppocketwhichhadthenexplodedthemomentNiranjanhadtouchedhistoppocket.

Retrievingthebodiesofkilledterrorists

LtColEKNiranjan(right)momentsbeforehisunfortunatedeath

TheNSGsquadwasdevastated.Niranjanwas rushed to thehospitalon thebase, but he succumbed to his injuries. This was a crushing blow. But evenbeforetheNSGsquadcouldmournNiranjan’sdeath,suddengunshotsrangoutfromthetwo-storiedairman’sbilletlocatedrightbehindtheopenareawheretheterrorists’bodieswerelaidout.

Thiswasashock.Nooneknewwherethefirewascomingfromandwhowasfiring.Everyonehadthoughtalltheterroristshadbeenneutralised.

Latersomesuspicionarrosewhether therecouldstillbemore terrorists left.All precautions were taken and necessary search operations were carried out.They,however,turnedouttobeafalsealarm.

Theairmen’sbillet,laterburntdown

Thefiringonceagainputalltheforcesbackintoaction.The51SAGmenaswellastheArmytroopsguardingtheassetswerebackin

alertmode.Theairmen’sbillethadbeenemptiedthepreviouseveningandthesoundof

firingstumpedeveryone.Weretheremoreterroristshiding?TheNSGmen began their search once again. The peripherywas sanitised

onceagain.Camerasthatcouldseebeyondthewall—availablewiththeNSG—weredeployedtodetectwho,ifany,washidinginsidethebuilding.Thecamerashowever failed to establish conclusively if any onewas indeed holed up. TheNSG,with its experience of the 2008Mumbai attack,wanted tomove slowlyanddeliberately.

It therefore took the entire day, probing every room with speculative fire,searchingforanycluethatcoulddetermineifthereweremoreterroristshiding.

Upon realising that no progress was being made, the NSG and Air Forcedecidedtoburndownthebuildingandsmoke-out—iftheyweresittinginside—terrorists.Byevening,thebuildingwasguttedandasNSGmenenteredtheshellof thebarracks, stench inside theburntdownbarrackswasunbearableasBrigGangulyremembers(seePlates9and10).

Forensicexpertswerecalledintofigureoutifindeedtherewereanyhumanremainsintheburntdownbuilding.Asitturnedout,inabsenceofanybonesorteeth, itcouldn’tbeestablishedif therehadbeenmore thantwoterrorists.The

NIAthereforestucktoitsfindingeveninthechargesheetthatfourterroristshadenteredIndiaandwerefinallyeliminated.

By evening, a combination of heavy fire and incendiary material hadcompletelyguttedthebuilding,bringingtoanendthesagathathadbegunontheafternoonof1JanuarywiththemeetingintheNSA’soffice.

As forensic andNIA (National InvestigationAgency) teams arrived on thescene,itwasclear,India’ssecuritymanagersledbytheredoubtableAjitDovalhad averted an audacious attack planned and executed by the JeM with fullsupportoftheISI.

Looking back, nearly a year and a half after thePathankot operations, it isagreedbytheexpertsthatallthecriticismheapedonthosewhohadhandledtheresponse, was based on misinformation, incorrect assumptions, and in somecases,deliberatemischief.

One of the main points of criticism was: How could terrorists enter thePathankot base when the NSA and his intelligence team claimed they hadadvanceintelligence?

TIMELYDECISIONSAVEDTHEDAYThefactis:duetothefluidtacticalsituation—theexactlocationoftheterroristswas unknown, and it was uncertain whether they had already entered the airbase. Therefore, it was decided that it would be prudent to first secure vitalassetsandthefamilieslivingonbase.Over10,000civiliansanddependentsofairforcepersonnelstayinsidetheairbase.Duetothisfactorandthecriticalityof time, itwould have been counter-productive to first secure the long 25 kmouterperimeteroftheairbase.Themainfocuswasonprotectingaircraft,radars,anti-aircraftbatteries,andammunition/POLdumps,etc.

ThenDefenceMinisterManoharParrikarwiththeMillitarytopbrassandNSGofficersatPathankot

ThesecondprioritywastoprotectvitalinstallationsandassetsinandaroundPathankot. The army alone has over 25 big and small installations—includingAsia’slargestcantonmentatMamun—inthevicinity.Allofthemneededtobesecured.

A chorus of criticismblamedDoval for apparentmicro-management of theoperation,butastheprecedingparagraphsreveal,theon-groundoperationswerecarriedoutunderthedirectionsofthemilitarycommanderspresentonthescene.Of course, he was monitoring the situation, but as all the operationalcommanderswouldtestify,Dovalwasnotbreathingdowntheirnecksasmanywouldhaveusbelieve.

As I wrote in a column for the Outlook in the wake of the Pathankotoperations: ‘Contrary to reports, after the initial planningdone inhis roomonJanuary1withtheArmyandAirForceChiefs,theoverallcoordinationwaslefttotheCommander-in-ChiefoftheWesternAirCommand.WhileIfeeltheanti-terror operation was clinically executed, the government failed to win theperception battle because it failed to communicate the correct and essentialinformation about the anti-terror operation in time. Absence of quick factualinformation led to much uninformed reporting, creating an impression thatDovalhadside-linedtheArmy,rushedintheNSG,andcontrolledtheoperationfromDelhi.’

EvenasthePrimeMinistervisitedthePathankotairbase(seePlate11)daysafter the mopping up operations were over and he was briefed in detail, one

question that took precedence in citizens’ minds at the end of it was: CanPathankotbecountedasasuccessfulcounterterroristoperation?

Yes,forthefollowingreasons:

Thesecurityapparatuswasabletocollectandcollateoperationalintelligencethatwasaccurateandactionable.Lessthananhourwastakentoassesstheintelligenceinputs,prepareanactionplan,andoperationalisecounterterrorforces.ActualmobilisationanddeploymentofforcesandactionondecisionstakeninrecordtimethatincludedquickmobilisationbytheArmy,movementofAirMarshalSBDeo,AOC-in-CWesternAirCommandtoPathankotwithGarudCommandos,deploymentofArmytroopsinandaroundPathankotunderthesupervisionofLtGenKJSingh,WesternArmyCommandermovementofNSG,movementofbombdisposalsquads,andcasspirsarmour/mineprotectionvehicles.Nocollateraldamagewascausedandnoneofthe10,000personnel,including3,000inadjacentfamilyquarters,sufferedcasualtiesdespiteheavyfiringandexplosions.Thesecurityforcessufferedonlyonecasualtyinactualcombat,theGarudCommando,CorporalGursewakSingh.Finally,notoneaircraftwasdamagedordestroyed,whichwasthemainpurposeoftheaudaciousattackthathadperhapsbeenplannedmonthsinadvance.

LESSONSLEARNT,SOMEQUESTIONUNANSWEREDEvery operation—even if successful—hasmany takeaways. But before listingout the lessons learnt, it is instructive to compare similar attacks that haveoccurredinIndia’sneighbourhoodinthepastdecade.

SRILANKAOPS

DestructionatPNSMehran

On25March2007,a25-memberLTTEBlackTigerteamincludingthreefemaleswaitedinacoconutestate,atnorthernendofAnuradhapuraairbase,wheretherunwayextensionworkwasinprogress.TheBlacktigersworecrumpledcamouflageuniforms,hadhaircutshort,spokeSinhalaandworeexplosiveladen‘suicide’beltsaroundtheirwaist.Theyhadanassortmentofweapons,includingChinesebuiltT-56assaultrifles,RussianmadeAK-47kalashnikovs,CzechAutomaticpistols,LightAnti-tankweapons,RPGwithlaunchers,LMGs,Chinesemadehandgrenades,1EDs.Theyhadwalkie-talkies,satellitephones,mobilesphones,medicalkits,chocolatesandaflagofLTTE.Ataround0300hours,theguerillascrawledtowardsthechainlinkperimeterfence.Theycutalargeholeandcreptinonebyone,fouroftheBlacktigersremainedoutside.Then21ofthemdividedintotwogroups.Afewfeetawayfromtheouterfence,withinthebasethereisasimilarprotectivefencemadeofconcertinawirerunningparalleltothefirstnet.Inbetweenthesetwonetsisasmallerelectricallychargednet.Theelectrifiednetwasapparentlynotconnectedto

theelectricitysupply.ThetwogroupsenteredtheinnerperimeteroftheAFbasefromtwodifferentdirectionstowardsnorthofthebase.TheSLAFsoldiersnearthethreeperimeterbunkerswere‘mostprobablyasleep’astheydidnotprovideanyresistancetomovingLTTEcadres.Thefirstteamcomprising14cadrestaskedtoneutralisethebunkersreachedthehelicopterhangararea,whiletheotherswaitedtoenterintothefixedwinghangersanddestroythem.Thetwoteamsthenstartedindiscriminatefiringtoneutralisethebunkersanddamagethefixedandrotarywingaircraft.Thetimewasalmost0320hours.Theentireairbasenowknewthattheywereunderattack.Theentirebasewasputonredalert.ThecommunicationlinesbetweenAnuradhapuraandColombowerebusy.TheintruderstookcontrolofAntiAircraftgunandneutralisedcommunication,radarandAnti-aircraftgunpositions.TheguerillasinformedtheirhandlersatVannithattheywereincontrolofthebase.Around0410hourstheradarsystemsatVavuniyaandBadarnaikeInternationalAirportinKatunayakecapturedmovementoftwounidentifiedflyingobjects.ThetwoaircraftreachedAnuradhapura,droppedthreebombsandreturnedtowardsKillinochchi.ABell212waslaunchedtointerceptanddestroythetwoLTTEaircraftwhichcrashed15kmshortofAnuradhapuraprobablyduetohitbygroundtroops.Heavyconfrontationcontinued.SixLTTEcadreshadcapturedtwobunkersandfiredattroopswhileothersdestroyedaircraftsonebyone.A40membereliteteamofSriLankanSpecialForceswasairinductedintwowavesfromVavuniya.TheyweresuccessfulinlocatingandcompletelyannihilatingtheBlackTigerunitwithinafewhours.TheLTTEmembershoweverblewupthreehelicopters,twofixed-wingaircraft—oneofthematrainer—andthreeunmanneddrones.

AircraftdestroyedbyLTTE

ATTACKONPAKISTANIAIRBASEOn22May2011,severalarmedterroristsattackedPNSMehran,oneofthemostdenselypopulatednavalbaseslocatedinKarachi.AccordingtoPakistan’sthenInteriorMinisterRehmanMalik,fourtosixarmedmilitantsusedladderstoclimbthenavalbase,triggeringafiercegunbattleandaseriesofexplosions.Oneoftheattackerswasbelievedtohaveblownhimselfup,whilebodiesofthreeotherswerefound.Moreover,twoattackershadmanagedtoescape.AccordingtoMalik,themilitants,ofTehrik-i-TalibanPakistan(TTP),invadedthebasefromthreedifferentpointsadjacenttoKarachi’sresidentialareas.Theattackandoperationlasted17hours.Tensecuritypersonnelwerekilledintheattack.TwoUS-manufacturedP-3COrionsurveillanceplanes,werealsodestroyedduringtheattack.Justoverayearlater,on16August2012,eightheavilyarmedpersonnellaunchedanattackonPakistanAirForce’s(PAF)MinhasAirbaselocatedinKamra(Attock)inPunjab.Again,theTTPclaimedtheresponsibilityfortheattackanddamagedoneoftheUS-suppliedSaab2000Eriyeplaneanddamagedtwoothers.

ATTACKOFUSAIRBASEINAFGHANISTAN

ATTACKOFUSAIRBASEINAFGHANISTANIn2012again,USforcesinAfghanistan,withalltheirhigh-techequipmentandattentiontodetailandhighgradeperimetersecuritycouldnotpreventanattackonUSAirForceCampBastionandthedestructionofsixUSHarrierjets.The14SeptemberattackkilledaUSMarineCorpsOfficerandonesoldier,andwounded16othersbesidessignificantdamagetootheraircraft,vehiclesandinfrastructure.FourteenTalibanattackerswereeliminated.ThereviewofsecurityhoweverrevealedthatthearrangementsformanningoftheguardtowersaroundtheperimeterofCampBastionwerenotadequatetodetectorstoptheattack.

Plate1:PMNarendraModiwithleadersofSouthAsiannationsafterhisswearing-inonMay2014

Plate2:AbigdrawinNewYork:AttheMadisonSquareGarden

Plate3:SatelliteimagesoftwoofthecampshitbyIndianSpecialForcesinPoKDhuhada(top)andKhaled

Plate4:StealthySilhouette:AParaCommandoinactioninoneofthesurgicalstrikes

Plate5:Keepingahawk’seye:Thesurveillanceteam

Plate6:TheroutetakenbyfourterroristsinthePathankotattack

Plate7:FromSialkottoPathankot:ThedistancetraversedbytheJeMterrorists

Plate8:ThelayoutofPathankotAirbase;Notetheareawhereterroristsentered

Plate9:Theguttedbuilding

Plate10:NSGinactioninPathankot(aboveandbelow)

Plate11:PMModi,NSADoval,AirChiefArupRahaandArmyChiefDalbirbeingbriefedatPathankot

Plate12:Thelocationofthe73-dayfaceoffbetweenIndianandChinesesoldiers

atthetri-junctionofIndia-ChinaandBhutan

USaircraftdestroyedatCampBastion,Afghanistan

By comparison, in Pathankot, all air andmissile assets were protected, allfamiliesandcivilianswerekeptoutofharm’swayandattackerswereeliminatedinreasonabletime.

Therearesomeunansweredquestionsthough.Forinstance:

1. OnequestionregardingtheroleofPunjabPoliceofficer,SPSalwinderSinghwhowasostensiblywaylaidbytheterrorists,istroublesome.ThereisnoclarityonwhattheSPwasdoingatnightinavillageneartheborderpointwherethefourterroristshadcrossedoverintoIndia.Hehadnojurisdictioninthearea,sowhathewasdoingtherehasneverbeenfullyexplained.Moreover,afterSalwinderSinghwasletoffbytheterrorists(whywasheallowedtogo?),howlongdidittakehimtoinformhissuperiorsisnotclear.IfhehadinformedimmediatelyandhadthePunjabPolicealertedeverypostandbarricadeaboutthesuspiciousmovementofthefourterrorists,theycouldeasilyhavebeeninterceptedbeforethey

enteredthePathankotbase.2. Whydidtheterroristswaitfornearly24hoursbeforelaunchingtheattack

despitethefactthattheyhadalreadylandedinthearea?Wastheresomelargerplanthatfailedtotakeoff?HadthefourPakistanisnotwaitedandlaunchedanattackonthemorningof1January,theconsequencesmighthavebeendisastroussincetheIAFbasedidnothaveenoughdefenders.

In the final analysis, a combination of luck and capability (of interceptingsuspicious communication) and the quick decision to deploy forces at variousbasessavedtheday.HadtheNSAnotdecidedtomovequicklytogetallthetopsecuritymanagersonboardandpressintoactionacordinatedplaninlittleoveranhour,theoutcomeoftheattackonPathankotairbasewouldhaveresultedinmayhemofunprecedentedproportions.

Pathankotwas not the first example of proactive approach. Swift decision-makingoftheModigovernmentwasfirstevidentinJune2015whenitorderedquickretaliationagainstnorth-eastmilitantsbasedinMyanmar.

ABDUCTIONOFSALWINDERSINGHANDOTHERS

PathankotDistrictPolicehadregisteredcasevideFIRNo.01/2016dated01.01.2016,atPoliceStationNarotJaimalSingh,u/s364,365,367,368,397,398,419,171IPCand25ArmsAct,onthecomplaintofthevictim,SalwinderSingh,SP,thatheandhistwootherfellowpassengers,wereabductedalongwithhisvehicle,MahindraXUV500,fromKolianMorhatabout2300hourson31December2015nightbyunknownpersonswhiletheywerereturningfromvillageTalur.

TheaccusedpersonswerewearingarmyuniformandcarryingAK-47riflesandbackpacks.Theyforciblygotinsidethevehicleandtookcontrolofit.Theydumpedthecomplainantandoneofthefellowpassengersinaforestarea.Latertheterroriststriedtokilloneofthepassengers,byslittinghisthroatandabandonedhimandthevehicleatvillageAkalgarh.

Investigationintothepresentcase,videRC03/2016/NIA/DLI,revealedthatthisactwasalsocommittedbythesamegroupofterroristswhilethey

thatthisactwasalsocommittedbythesamegroupofterroristswhiletheywereproceedingtoexecutetheterrorattackattheAirForceStation,Pathankot.

Investigationfurtherdisclosedthaton31December2015night,afterabandoningthedamagedlnnovavehicleofIkagarSinghataservicestationatKolianMorh,districtPathankot,theterroristshidinthenearbysugarcanefieldsandwaitedforavehicletocome.TheterroriststhenhijackedaMahindraXUVvehiclebearingRegn.No.PB02BW0313ofSalwinderSingh,S.P.,fromKolianMorh,districtPathankotandmovedtowardstheAirForceStation,Pathankot.Theterroristspushedthethreeoccupantsinsidethevehicleandtookcontrolofthevehicle.Oneofthevictimswaspushedtotherearseatwhiletheothertwo,werepushedinthelegspacebetweenthefrontandthemiddleseats.Oneterroristwasinthedriver’sseat,theotherintheco-driver’sseat,whilethethirdonesatinthemiddleseatandthefourthoneoccupiedtherearseat.

Theterrorists,further,snatchedthemobilephonesofthevictims,andusedthemobilephonenumbertocommunicatewiththeirhandler,KashifJanandseniorleaders/operativesoftheJeMinPakistanonfourPakistannumbers.

ThephonenumberwasthesamewhichwascontactedusingthephoneofIkagarSingh.

Aftersometime,theterroriststied,blindfoldedanddumpedSalwinderSinghandhiscookMadanGopal,atanabandonedplaceinaforestareanearvillage,GulpurSimli,districtPathankot,onwaytotheAirForceStation,Pathankot.However,theterroriststookthethirdvictim,i.e.RajeshVerma,alongwiththem.Thedumpedvictimsmanagedtountiethemselvesandrushedtothenearbyvillage,GulpurSimli,onfootforhelp.SalwinderSinghthencalledupGurdaspurPoliceControlRoomat0252hoursandalsoinformedSSP,Gurdaspur,abouttheincidentat0321hours.

Theterrorists,onlearningfromRajeshVermathatSalwinderSinghwasapoliceofficerinformedtheirhandlerwhodirectedthemtogobackandlookforhim.SinceSalwinderSinghandMadanGopalhadalreadyleftthespot,theterroristsresumedtheirjourneytotheAirForceStation.

spot,theterroristsresumedtheirjourneytotheAirForceStation.(ExtractedfromNIAchargesheet)

D

CHAPTER5

STRIKINGHARDINMYANMAR

ate: 5 June 2015, a day after a group of north-east militants hadambushed and killed 18 soldiers of an Infantry battalion of the Indian

armyinChandeldistrictofManipur,borderingMyanmar.Location:Operations(Ops)Room,57DivisionalHQ,Leimakong,inImphal,

Manipur.ArmyChiefGenDalbirSinghhad flown in fromDelhi.LtGenMMSRai,

then the Eastern Army Commander, and Lt Gen Bipin Rawat, the GeneralOfficer Commanding (GoC) of 3 Corps at that time (he later succeeded GenDalbir Singh as Chief), and a couple of representatives from the IntelligenceBureau and the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), India’s externalintelligencegatheringagency,werepartoftheconference.

TheconferencewastodecideonwhenandwheretostrikeagainstthegroupofmilitantswhohadcarriedouttheambushontheArmyconvoy.Thetopbrassapart,thereweretwoothers—theCommandingOfficerof21Para(SF)unitandhis second in command—sitting around the table. Theywould be the ones tofinallyexecutetheplanthatwasbeingformulatedatthatpoint.

Infact,GenRawatremembershavingorderedanimmediateretaliatoryactionbydispatchingateamof21Para(SF)—permanentlybasedinthenorth-east—inhotpursuitofthegroupthathadkilledtheArmysoldiers.Hewas,however,told

toholdonbecause theCentrewantedabigger,demonstrableaction. Inawaytherefore,theSpecialForceswerealreadyprimedandraringtogo.

TheMyanmarraidheroes:21Para(SF)troops(filephoto)

Thepreviousday’s ambushhadbeenoneof theworst in thenorth-east forseveralyears.Agroupofmilitantshadkilled18 soldiersof aDogra regimentbattalion.ThemilitantfactionwasledbyamiddlelevelinsurgentleaderoftheNationalSocialistCouncilofNagaland(NSCN-K),oneoffourfactionsofNagamilitants then active in the north-east. TheNSCN(K), led by SSKhaplang, aBurmese Naga, had walked out of a ceasefire with the Government of Indiasomemonthsbeforethisambushtookplace.IthadteamedupwithacoupleofothermilitantgroupsinManipurliketheKYKLandPLA.

As the news of the ruthless attack on the Army convoy came in, HomeMinister Rajnath Singh convened a meeting in Delhi attended by DefenceMinisterManoharParrikar,NSADovalandArmyChiefGenDalbirSingh.Hehad ordered strongest retaliation possible. The NSA had also briefed PrimeMinisterModi. Modi had tweeted: ‘Today’s mindless violence inManipur isverydistressing.Ibowtoeachandeverysoldierwhohassacrificedhislifeforthenation.’

Parrikar,barelysevenmonthsintohishighprofilejobasdefenceministerofthecountry,wasvisiblydisturbed. ‘Iwasbesidemyselfwith rage.Howcould

anyonegetawaywithkillingoursoldiers?Iaskedmyself,’herecalled.‘AswewentinforthemeetingatRajnathji’soffice,ItoldtheArmyChiefthismustnotgounpunished,’addedParrikar.

Atthemeeting,theHomeMinistertoodemandedaquickretaliation,buttheprofessionals in the room—Doval and Gen Dalbir—counselled patience. TheNSA assured effective action, however, at a time and place that would becarefullychosen.GenDalbirsaidhewouldpersonallygotoImphal,takestockofthesituation,discusswiththelocalformationcommander(theGOC3Corps),andthenorderastrike.

ThethenArmyChiefknewtheareawellsincehehadbeentheGOC3CorpsinanottoodistantpastandhadusedtheSpecialForcesforsmall,pin-pointedraidsagainstmilitantcampsalongtheIndia-Myanmarborder.However, inthisinstance, the retaliationhad tobe larger in scaleandmoreeffective.Thus, theArmyChiefwasnotwillingtoberushedintoahastyreaction.

He also knew that a team of 21 Para (SF)werewaiting inDelhi to take aspecial flight to South Sudan since they had been selected to go on the UNdeployment.Withoutamoment’shesitation,theArmyChieforderedthemtogetback to base in the North-east. ‘The UN deployment could wait I reckoned.Theirfirsttaskistoconductspecialoperations.Tothecreditoftheteam,noonecomplained.Onthecontrary,theysawthisasachancetoprovethemselvesonhomeground,’GenDalbirrecalls.HehimselfwassupposedtoflytoLondontoparticipate in week-long celebrations to mark the 200th anniversary of theGorkha regiment in theBritishArmy. ‘Themoment I heard of the ambush, Iaskedmystafftotelltheorganisersofmyinabilitytoattend.TheMEAandeventheRM(RakshaMantriorDefenceMinister)saiddon’tcancel.Postponeit.Soeventuallyweputthatvisitonhold,’GenDalbiradded.

Less than 12 hours after that high level meeting at the Home Minister’soffice,theArmyChiefwasnowconferringwithhisEasternArmyCommanderand the GoC 3 Corps at the Leimakong Cantonment. As themembers of theconferencedeliberatedupontheoptions,itbecameclearthattheSpecialForceswillhave tohit twocampsacross theborder inMyanmar.Oneof themwasalargecamp,withacapacitytoharbourovertwohundredcadres,whiletheother

wasnormallyusedtoshelterbetween50to60militantsofdifferentgroups.Thebiggercamphadalreadybeenundersurveillanceforsometime.AsGenRawatrecalled, ‘In our contingency planning at 3 Corps, we already had all therequiredcoordinatesanddetailsofthebiggercamp.Theonlyissuewas:itwasinsideMyanmar.A call needed to be taken ifwewere prepared to cross intoanothercountry’sterritoryandattackthecamp.’

That decision took some time since several factors had to be considered.Myanmar,afterall, isafriendlycountry.Was it feasible tokeep theMyanmargovernment and its Army in the loop? Would Myanmar agree to such anoperation?Thesequestionsneededquickanswers.Finally,afterseveral roundsofconsultationsamongstall thestakeholders (MinistryofExternalAffairs, theArmy,andtheNSA),itwasdecidedthatthelargecampwouldbethetargetofahit. It was left to the NSA and the MEA to handle the communication withMyanmar.NewspaperreportslatersuggestedthattheMyanmargovernmenthadbeenbroughtonboardatthehighestlevelbeforeIndianSpecialForcescrossedintoMyanmarterritory.1

Back at the crucial meeting in the Operations Room of 57 Division, theparticipantswereengagedinfirmingupaplan.

Remembers the Special Forces officer who eventually led the main raid:‘Duringdiscussions,weweretoldthatthegovernmentwantedtosendamessage“thatifyouhitushere,wecanhitwhereverwewant.”’

Sincetimewasshort,theplanninghadtobedonequickly.Initially,theArmyHQproposalwastohittheactualperpetratorsofthe4Juneattack.Theircampwasamong the two to three targets thathadbeenselected.But intelligenceonthatparticularcampwassketchy.Thebiggercamp,whereallthegroupshousedtheir cadres together and trained them, had been under surveillance for quitesometime.SoGenDalbir,inconsultationwiththeEasternArmyCommander,theCorpsCommander,andtheSFteamleader,decidedtohitthebiggercamp.Apartfromthebiggercamp,asmaller‘transit’campwasalsotoberaided.ThesecondcampwasacrossNoklakinNagaland.

Thetargetsdecided,thenextquestiontobeansweredwashowsooncouldtheoperation be launched? The SF officers said they needed at least forty-eight

hourstoprepare.Thetopbrassagreed.Inthemeantime,theSouthSudan-boundteamhadmadeitswaybacktoImphalonanIAFC-130Herculestransportplaneby5Juneevening.Asoneofthemjoked,‘insteadofgoingabroadbyair,wearegoingtogointoanothercountry(Myanmar)onfoot!’

Thetoughtarget:Themilitantcamp(circled)waslocatedonaridge10kminsideMyanmar

Another challenge was to keep the planning and execution of the raidconfidential. Therefore, communication on open lineswas completely banned.The Corps Commander (Gen Rawat) had decided to coordinate with the SFteams himself, or through his senior Staff Officers, in order to minimiseinformation outflow. All other officers—the sector commanders and so on—werekeptoutof the loop to ensure the securityof information.Everyonewastold not to ask questions about themovement of SF troops. The preparationswereunderwayfrom6June.Thecountdownhadbegun.

Armedand ready,oneSF team travelled toUkhrul town,considered thedefacto headquarters of another militant faction NSCN I-M, which has been in

ceasefiremodewiththeGovernmentofIndiasinceAugust1997.Goingpastthetown, thevehiclescarrying theSpecialForcesboys,mostof themdrawnfromdifferent parts of the north-east, reached Phaiko, the last village before theinternationalborderbeganwithMyanmar.AstheteamenteredtheAssamRiflescamplocatednearby,acoupleofKukijawans(Kukiisoneamongthenumeroustribesinthenorth-east)changedintocivilianclothesandwentintothevillagetopick up any information they could get. The villagers had not seen anymovement fromthemilitants.ThevillagerswereneithersuspiciousnorhostiletotheSpecialForcesjawanssincetheywereusedtotheseteamsoperatingalongtheborder.

Nextmorning,8June,the50-strongSpecialForcesteambeganitsjourneyonfoot towards the international border, about 20 km away. As they trekkedthroughthethickjungleamidstintensehumidity,theteam,ledbyanofficerwhoalso belonged to the region, suddenly came across a group of Myanmaresehunterslookingforgame.Theyhadabouteighthunterdogswiththemtoo.ThehunterswereassurprisedastheSpecialForcestroopswhentheyhadcomefacetoface.

NowtheSpecialForcesteamhadobviouslynotfactoredinthiscomplication.AsthejawansroundedthemupandaskedquestionsaboutmilitantcampsfurtherdeepinsidetheMyanmarterritory,theteamleaderhadtocomeupwithaplantodealwiththem.

Leaving the hunters on the loose was not an option, so the young officersimplydecidedtocarrythemalong.‘Theywerebetteroffbeingwithusratherthanon theirown,’he remembers thinking.Thatof coursemeant someof thealreadylimitedmanpowerbeingdivertedtoguardthem.‘Ihadnootheroptionsincekillingthemwasoutofthequestion,’theteamleaderrecalls.Inhindsight,the hunters’ knowledge of the terrain, and some information about the campsandthebehaviourofmilitantsintheareathattheypossessedactuallyhelpedtheSpecialForcestofinetunethefinalplan.

Bylateafternoonon8June, the teamwasaboutfivekilometresawayfromthe big militant camp. The hunters now refused to go any further since theyfearedfortheirlives.AsscoutsoftheSpecialForces(theoperativeswhostage

forward, ahead of others, to survey the area) went nearer, they spotted theassortmentofsmallandbighutsandshedsonaridgeatadistance.Thescoutscamebackandreportedtotheteamleaderthattheirtaskwasgoingtobetoughsincetheonlywaytoreachthelocationundetectedwastoclimbthesheercliffandthenattackbeforeretracingthesamerouteback.

Asnightfell,theteamleaderhadtotakeacallonhowbesttogetnearertothe camp and accordingly determine the most opportune time to launch theassault.The troopsdecided to restafterwhathadbeenagruelling,almostdaylongmarch throughan insectandmosquito infested forest.Theofficer,on theotherhand,conferredwithhisJCOsandstarteddividingmanpowerforthetaskahead.‘Thebasicdrillsareofcoursecommonbuteachassignmentisnewandunique.Wehadtotakeintoaccountthefactthatwewerealreadyonforeignsoilandthatourteamwasmostlikelyoutnumberedinstrengthsinceourintelligencehad suggested that therewereat least150militants in that campandwewerejust50innumber,’recountedtheteamleader.

Sotheofficerdecidedtogowiththeoriginalideaofhittingtwoorthreemainbuildings to inflict maximum casualties and make a quick return withoutbothering to count the dead.He divided the team into two parts. One sectioncarriedheavycalibreweapons,whiletheotherhalfcarriedlightweapons.

Bymidnightof8June,theentireteam,sanstwosoldiersleftbehindtoguardthecaptivehunters,hadstagedforwardandlodgeditselfatthebaseofthesteepcliff(ata70degreeincline)thatrosesome600metresstraightup.TheSpecialForcessoldiersheardfiringandagroupofmilitantsapproachingtheedgeofthecliff.The soldiers, their facesdarkenedbyblackpaint,dressed in camouflage,lay absolutely still; the big challenge for themwas not to panic and open firefirst.

‘Willwe be detectedwell beforewe can get to the target?’many of themthought. The officer however, was dead sure that the militants did not havedefinitive information about any Special Forces movement, but were on aroutinepatrolandgenerallytakingprecautionarystepstoprotectthecamp.Andsureenougharound2AM,themilitantsseemedtorelaxastheystartedsingingsongs.Gradually, the voices faded.Thepatrol hadpresumably returned to the

camp. The soldiers down below also sat down to conserve their energy.Nowtheyhadtowaitforthefirstlightbeforeclimbingthecliffandrushingtowardsthetarget.

Atdawn,thefirstgroupofSpecialForcessoldiersslowlystartedclimbingupthesteepridge.Othersfollowedinawell-practiseddrill.Stealthily,theymovedforward,spreadingthemselvesinasemi–circleandrushingtowardsthetarget.

As luck would have it, as the soldiers neared the camp, they realised thelookoutsentriesattheentrancecompoundhadlefttheirpostsfortheirmorningablutions!TheSFtroopsreachedthecompoundfencewithoutbeingchallenged.Eachsoldier tookup thepre-decidedpositionand let looseaheavybarrageoffire from their automatic weapons and rocket launchers, and lobbed handgrenades.For the first fifteenminutes, the occupants of the camp—mostwereeither asleep or just about waking up—could not fathomwhat had happened.‘Therewasnoretaliationinthefirstfifteenminutes.Thatiswhenwekilledmostof them and caused huge damage to their thatched houses and barracks,’ theofficerrecalled.

Soon the others, living in the second and third tiers of the large camp,regrouped and started retaliating with whatever weapons they could lay theirhands on from behind well-fortified positions. ‘That’s when I decided to fallback.Since thesurpriseelementhadbeen lostby then, ithadbecomedifficultforustostayon,’saidtheteamleader.Itwastimetobeginthereturnjourney.The soldiers regrouped and then retraced their way back in a well-rehearsedmanoeuvre.‘Ourinstructionswereclear:Don’tstoptocountthedead.Inflictasmany casualties as you can and return. No proof, no photos are needed, theCorpsCommanderhadtoldus,’recountedtheteamleader.

The trek backwasn’t easy.As the sun rose, it became unbearably hot andhumid in the tropical forest.More than the heat, it was the possibility of themilitants or soldiersof theBurmeseArmygiving thema chasewhich loomedlargeintheirmind.SotheSpecialForcesteam,despitetheexhaustion,walkedbackbriskly.TheydidnotstopuntiltheyhadcrossedoverintoIndianterritoryaroundnoon.Thehunterswerestillundercaptivity.Theywerereleasedwithasternwarningnottospeakoftheepisodeunderanycondition.Theteamleader

commented, ‘Wewere sure theywouldnotutter aword since their lifewouldhavebeenindangeriftheyrevealedtheirordeal.’

‘The moment we were inside India, I called our Corps Commander (GenRawat), who was monitoring the progress of our raid in the Ops Room atLeimakong. He just said, well done, and asked us to come back on thehelicopters that had beenkept ready to transport us back to the headquarters,’saidtheteamleader.

The moment the helicopters took off, Lt Gen Rawat called the ArmyCommander and the Army Chief to give them the good news. Gen DalbirimmediatelyinformedtheDefenceMinisterandtheNSA,whointurnconveyedthenewstothePrimeMinister.By1600hours,newshadfilteredoutthatIndiahadcarriedoutaSpecialForcesraidinsideMyanmarinretaliationofthekillingof18IndianArmysoldiersjustaweekprior.

Sohowdeepdidyougo,IaskedtheSpecialForcesteamleader.‘Oheasilyeight to tenkilometres,’he replied.Andhowmanymilitantswouldhavebeenkilled in the raid, I probed further. ‘As I said, we did not stop to count thecasualties,butourestimateiswewouldhaveeasilyeliminatedatleast65to70ofthemwhichwaslaterconfirmedbycross-bordersourceslivinginthevicinityofthecamp,’theteamleaderrevealed.

Meanwhile, the second teamwhich had targeted the smaller campoppositeNoklakalsoreachedtheareaarounddawn.However,themilitantshadvacateditfearingretaliationfromtheIndianarmyfollowingthe4Juneambush.Thus,thatteamhadtoreturnemptyhanded.

NosoonerhadtheyoungofficerandhisteamreachedtheCantonmentontheoutskirts of Imphal, than he got a call from the Defence Minister whocongratulatedhimonajobwelldone.

Meanwhile, back inDelhi, theMoDand theMEA in consultationwith thePMOdecidedtomakeapublicannouncementofthenewsoftheprecisestrike.

TheDGMOreadoutabriefstatementtoannouncethesuccessfulraidjustintimeforprimetimenewsbulletinstotakeuptheissuefordiscussion.

At Leimakong, Gen Rawat was waiting. As soon as the force commandercame back, Defence Minister Parrikar called and congratulated the officer

personally.GenSuhag,whohadpostponedhistriptotheUK,meanwhilereceivedacall

fromthePMOtogoaheadwithhisUKvisit.‘Itelephonedmywifetotellherthatwehavetoleavelaterthatnight.Shewasnothappy.‘‘HowcanIbereadyatsuchshortnotice?’’sheasked,butweeventuallytookthelatenightflighttoreach in time to participate in the celebrations of the 200th anniversary of theGorkha regiment. Althoughwemissed the dinner hosted by theQueen at theBuckinghampalace,’GenSuhagrecallswithamusement.

Later thatweek,selectfewsoldiersfromthe teamwhichhadconducted thesuccessful strike,were flown intoDelhi and taken to the PMO tomeet PrimeMinisterModi.ThePrimeMinisterlaudedtheircourageandpraisedthemforataskwell done. In the subsequentweeks, the designated teamwent ahead fortheirUNdeploymentinSouthSudan.

A fortnight later, NSA Doval and foreign secretary Jaishankar visitedMyanmar and met with the top political and military leadership to furthercoordinatesecuritycooperationbetweenthetwocountries.BothreachedouttotheMyanmareseandironedoutanywrinklesthatmayhaveemergedfollowingtheIndianSpecialForcesraidintheMyanmareseterritoryon9Junethatyear.

Myanmar-based Mizzima News reported, ‘The Indian delegation has alsosharedwithMyanmarspecificdetailsonapproximately25anti-India insurgentcampsinitsterritoryalongthe1,643kmborderwithIndia.

TheIndianstrikeonmilitantcampsearlierthismonthseemstohavehadthedesiredeffecton insurgentgroups. ‘Wehaveconfirmedreports that insurgentshave moved out of camps, particularly from Taga and across the Manipurborder,astheyfearmorereprisalsfromtheIndianside,’saidaseniorofficial.

Although the main purpose of the visit was to seek cooperation fromMyanmar on anti-India groups not being allowed to set up camps east of theChindwin river, the high-powered delegation met Myanmar’s top politicalleadership,includingPresidentTheinSeinandMyanmar’smilitarycommanderSeniorGeneralMinAungHlaing,toassuageanyhardfeelingsinNayPyiDawoverthe9Juneoperations.

Bothsideshavedecidedtoinitiatebettercoordinationonoperationsalongthe

border.ItisunderstoodthatNayPyiDawwaspeevedwithIndianmediaoutletsreportingthatthestrikewascarriedoutdeepinsideMyanmarterritory.’2

Whateverthefalloutoftheoperation,threestandoutaspectsoftheoperationhave beenmore or less forgotten.One, the swift response by the top politicalleadership in giving a go-ahead for a counter-offensive. And three, the India-Myanmar military cooperation that allowed the forces to cross over and raidmilitantcampsinsidethatcountry.

Prime Minister Modi, Home Minister Rajnath Singh, Defence MinisterParrikarandNSADovalwerequicktoseekactionagainsttheperpetratorsofthe4Juneambush.Oncethepoliticalbackingwasforthcoming,theArmychoseitsbestforcetrainedforcounterinsurgencyandjunglewarfare,the21Para(SpecialForces), based in Jorhat and directly reporting to the Eastern Command.Nicknamed Waghnakh (Tiger’s Claw)—the unit was originally 21 MarathaLightInfantrybattalionbeforebeingfullyconvertedintoaPara(SF)battalion—after Chattrapati Shivaji’s famous act of killing Afzal Khan by using thewaghnakh, the21Para(SF)were taskedtohit the twocampslocatednotveryfarfromtheborder.

Asdetailsbeguntoemerge,MyanmaracknowledgedIndia’soperation:ZawHtay,directoroftheofficeofMyanmarPresidentTheinSein,confirmedtoTheWall Street Journal a day after the raid that Indian troops had entered hiscountry. He said that there was ‘coordination and cooperation’ between theIndian troops andMyanmar’s armed forces based in the area of the raids, butaddedthatnoMyanmarsoldiersweredirectlyinvolved.‘Wewillneveralloworsupport insurgents, whether [they are] against Myanmar or against ourneighbouringcountries,’3MrZawHtayadded.

Nowcamethemostcrucialphase: thebattleofperception.Thegovernmentneeded to send multiple messages to different constituencies withoutcompromisingonoperationalandtacticaldetails.

At one level, it had to signal the change inmindset at the highest level inresponding toprovocativeacts suchas theambushon theArmy thatkilled18soldierson4June.Ontheotherhand, India’sadversariesneeded toknowthatthereisacosttopayifthecountry’sinterestsareharmed.

TheDGMO read out a statement, ‘The IndianArmy engaged two separategroupsofinsurgentsalongtheIndo-Myanmarborderattwolocations,alongtheNagaland and Manipur borders. Significant casualties have been inflicted onthem.As a consequence, threats to our civilian population and security forceswere averted.’ No other details were shared. Neither was any footage orphotographs.Butitwasenoughtosendasignaltonorth-eastinsurgentsthattheywerenolongersafeevenoutsidetheboundariesofIndia.

However, the Army statement by itself would not have satiated the hugemediademandformoreinformation.Sothejuniorinformationandbroadcastingminister, Rajyavardhan Rathore—note that it was neither defence ministerManohar Parrikar nor homeministerRajnath Singh—a formerArmyColonel,was instructed to give interviews to television channels. The intentionwas tosendalargerpoliticalmessage:Indiawillnotwastetimeinorderingretribution,ifprovoked.

At that time, no one, includingme, could even imagine that theMyanmarraidswouldserveasa templateforsimilarstrikes insidePoK.Oneman—thenDefence Minister Manohar Parrikar—was however perceptive enough tounderstandthatPrimeMinisterModiwouldnothesitatetoseekasimilaractiononthewesternFrontinacrunchsituation.‘IwasveryrestlessonthenightwhenourSpecialForcesteamwentintoMyanmar.Iwasanxiousuntiltheboyscameback,’Parrikartoldme.Thenextdayhowever,lookingbackattheentireweek—fromthetimewhenthenewofthedeathsof18soldierscameinuntilthegoodnewsof the successful surgical strikeson themilitants campwas conveyed tohim—ParrikarrealisedthePrimeMinistermaydemandsimilaractioninPoK.‘Irealised the Special Forces needed to be used selectively and effectively andasked for a reporton their equipment status, shortagesand requirements,’ saidParrikar.Subsequenteventshaveprovedhishunchright.

TheMyanmarraidset theball rollingforpro-activepolicy inIndia’sbid tostrengthenbothitsinternalandexternalsecurity.

A

CHAPTER6

INTERNALSECURITY:CHALLENGESREMAIN

lthough foreign policy successes have been in the limelight when itcomes to counting the Modi government’s successes so far, the

considerable improvements in the internal security situation has gone mostlyunnoticed. Except the episodic ups and downs in J&K, the rest of India hasremainedfreeofbigterroristattacksandlarge-scaleriotsthatperiodicallyshakeIndia. In J&K,Pakistanhas continued towage a proxywar and create unrest,especiallyafterthecoalitiongovernmentofthelocalPeoples’DemocraticParty(PDP)andtheBJPcametopowerinthestate.

In theMaoist affected areas,mostly spread over 10 states in central India,episodic setbacks apart, the government’s long-term, two-pronged strategyappears to be succeeding with lower violence levels, higher arrests, andeliminationof thecadresof theCPI(Maoists) in thepast threeyears.The tidehad started turning in favour of thegovernment forces in 2014, but pickeduppacein2015and2016(seetable),accordingtofiguresavailableontheMinistryofHomeAffairs(MHA)website.

TheMaoists have been steadily pushed into a corner as government forcesmake incremental gains in different states. With their backs to the wall, theMaoists havemounted desperate attacks on the security forces inBastar, longregarded as the stronghold of the CPI (Maoist). In April 2017 for instance,

Maoists killed 25 CRPF jawans in an ambush in Chhattisgarh. Occasionalsetbacksnotwithstanding, thecampaignagainstLWEorLeftWingExtremism(officialeseforMaoist-ledinsurgency)hasbeensuccessful inregainingcontrolofareasearlierunderthetotalswayoftheMaoists.Withover100,000CentralArmedPoliceForces (CAPFs)—CRPF,SSB,CISF,BSFand ITBP—deployedin ten states affected by LWE, the Centre is lending a strong hand to stategovernmentsincombatingMaoistinsurgency.However,thefighthastobeledby state governments, not just on the security front, but also in implementingsocio-economicpoliciesmeantforthepeople’swelfare.TheMinistryofHomeAffairsunderRajnathSinghhascombinedthehardpowerofthesecurityforceswith the soft tools of development, fine-tuning an approach that had begun in2012-13.Theresultsaregraduallybecomingvisible.

ComparativeImportantParametersofMaoistViolenceduring2010to2017(upto15August2017)S.No. Parameters 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 20152016 2017

(upto15.08.2017)A. No.ofincidents 2213 1760 1415 1136 1091 10891048 554

B.

Civilianskilled(Outofwhich‘PoliceInformers’killed)

720323

469218

301134

282113

22291

17195

213123

11363

C. No.ofSecurityForceskilled 285 142 114 115 88 59 65 69

D. No.ofSFsinjured NA 177 189 170 183 159 145 107

E. No.ofencounterswithpolice 272 223 216 218 221 247 328 147

F.No.ofattacksonpolice(includinglandmines)

230 131 135 143 155 118 111 55

G.

No.ofcadrekilled(duringencountersaswellasattacksonpolice)

172 99 74 100 63 89 222 76

H. No.ofcadrearrested 2916 2030 1901 1397 1696 1668 1840 1116

I. No.ofcadresurrendered 266 394 445 282 676 570 1442 489

J. Totalno.ofarmssnatched 256 67 55 89 58 18 3 34

K. Totalno.ofarmsrecovered 642 636 591 628 548 724 800 374

L. Armstrainingcampsheld 94 84 53 27 34 18 20 12

M. NoofJanAdalatsheld 75 97 62 63 54 41 21 12

Source:MinistryofHomeAffairs,GoI.

CRPFjawansinactioninChhattisgarh

Reviewing the campaign, India’s Home Minister Rajnath Singh told ameeting of the Chief Ministers of the affected states in May 2017: ‘UnifiedCoordinationandCommand isneededon theLWEfront.Alongwithstrategiccommand,unifiedcommandisalsorequiredattheoperationslevel.LWEcadresare constantly trying to inflict losseson security forces toboost themoraleof

their cadres. Today, we need to consider whether to react only after theoccurrenceofanyincidentorweshouldbemoreproactive,’hesaid.‘WeneedtouseUAVs,PTZcameras,GPStracking, thermal imaging,radarandsatelliteimages.There isneed tochalkout a specific actionplan for each theatrewithshort term,mediumtermand longtermstrategiesclearlydefined,’hesaid.MrSingh also underlined need for choking the financial resources of the LWEcadresandgroups.1

The Home Minister, effectively No. 2 in the Modi government, told theassembledChiefMinistersandofficialsthathewantedtheanti-Maoiststrategiesto revolve around short, medium, and long term policies at different levels.‘Thereisneedtofindasolutionforthisproblemandthestrategyisavailable.’2

Heencapsulatedthestrategyintheword‘SAMADHAN’whichmeans:

1. S–SmartLeadership2. A–AggressiveStrategy3. M–MotivationandTraining4. A–ActionableIntelligence5. D–DashboardBasedKPIs(KeyPerformanceIndicators)andKRAs(Key

ResultAreas)6. H–HarnessingTechnology7. A–ActionplanforeachTheatre8. N–NoaccesstoFinancing

HomeMinisterRajnathSinghatareviewmeetingonLWE

Foryears,successivegovernmentshaveidentifiedlackofroadsinremoteanddistantunderdevelopedareasofLWE-affectedstates.Soby31July2017,underRoad Requirement Plan-I (RRP-I), the construction of 4,447 km roads wascompleted out of the 5,422 km road that had been envisaged in the Plan.Building on the success of these plans, the MHA informed a ParliamentaryCommittee thatanewplan,RoadConnectivityProjectforLWEaffectedareas(RRPII), has been approvedwhich envisages the construction of 5,412 km ofroadsand126bridgesin44districtsofLWEaffectedStatesatanestimatedcostof Rs 11,725 crores. Roads apart, the government has been pressing stategovernments toopenupjobavenuesfor thelocal tribalpopulation.Oneof theways to create jobs in backward areas is to raise special police battalionsexclusivelymannedbylocals.AccordingtotheHomeMinister,743ScheduledTribes candidates from four most affected LWE districts of Chhattisgarh—Bijapur,Dantewada,NarayanpurandSukma—havebeenrecruitedin‘BastariyaBattallion’ in order to enhance local representation in Security Forces. MoreKendriyaVidyalayasandSkillDevelopmentCentreshavealsobeenopened inLWE affected districts in the past three years. Over 1,800 new branch post

offices,405bankbranchesand818ATMshavealsoopened in35mostLWEaffecteddistrictsinthelasttwoyears,theHomeMinistertoldtheparliament.3

HomeMinisterRajnathSinghwithNSAAjitDovalataninternalsecurityreviewmeeting

AsthesecurityforcesestablishdominanceoverincreasingareasoferstwhileLWEstrongholds,effortstowardscivilconsolidationhavealsoincreased.MHAofficialssay the implementationof theschemeforFortifiedPoliceStationsforconstruction/strengtheningof400PoliceStationsintenLWEaffectedStatesisnownearcompletion,withover350policestationsmodernisedandfortified.

TheMaoists are certainly on the run in their erstwhile strongholds, but theCentreandStategovernmentswillhavetocontinuewiththeireffortstoachievelastingpeaceandsecurity,andgainfullcontroloverMaoistinsurgency,whichformer Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once described as the country’s‘greatestsecuritythreat’.

TheotherbiginternalsecuritychallengeinIndiaistheeverpresentdangerofradicalisation,especiallyamongMuslimyouths.Since2012,thefatalattractionofDaesh theworldover (alsoknownas the IslamicStateof IraqandSyriaorISIS)hastravelledtoIndia.SeveralyouthinthecitiesandsmalltownsinIndiahave been lured by the seductive ideology which ISIS propagates. Online

radicalisationhasbeenontherise.Therehavebeenextensivewarningsinthemediaaboutthisnewphenomenon

since2014,butinreality,ithasnotmanifestedtotheextentfearedbyobservers,thanks to preventive arrests and constant vigil of the law enforcement andintelligenceagencies.TheDaeshthreat,whileeverpresent,taperedoffinIndiain 2017.Only 132Daesh operatives from India are known to have had someaffiliationtotheoutfit.Thisisrelativelyasmallnumbercomparedtotheinroadsmade by ISIS in Europe, West Asia, other parts of South Asia, and evenAustralia.ManyoftheISISoperativeshaveturnedouttobeformermembersofsome terrorist and radical outfits such as Indian Mujahideen and StudentsIslamicMovementofIndia(SIMI).Over70percentof thesehaveeitherbeenarrested or intercepted before they could travel to Syria or Iraq, which is atestimonyinitselftothevigilanceoftheIndianagencies.Significantly,manyofthe ISIS Indian members were radicalised while living and working in Gulfcountries for a prolonged period of time. These areminuscule numbers giventhatIndiaishometo175millionMuslims.

However,thethreatofISISwillnotdisappearinahurrysincemanyMuslimyouthswill continue to nurse real and imagined grievances against the Indianstate.Thelawenforcershavedoneacommendablejobsofartokeepthethreatundercheck,buttheywillhavetobeonguardtoensurethatthedangerofISISspreading itswings in India under some other garb isminimised, as correctlyassessed by Dhruva Jaishankar and Sara Perlangeli of Brookings India. In anewspaperarticle,theBrookingsIndiascholarsobserve,‘AsISISisdefeatedasa state—a self-proclaimed Caliphate with defined territory and a military—itcouldverywellmorphintoaglobalnetwork,akin toal-Qaida.Thispresentsanew kind of challenge for India and the world. Without unnecessarilyexaggerating the threat, details available in public about IS recruitment andpropagandacanbeavaluablewayofanticipatingitsfuturechallengetoIndia’snationalsecurity.’4

Significantly, the Government informed the Rajya Sabha (Upper House ofIndia’sParliament)on9March2016thatCentralandStateagencieshadarrested46 Pakistani ISI agents between 2013 and 2016. Furthermore, according to

partialdatacompiledbysatp.org,atleast159ISImoduleshavebeenneutralisedacross the country between 2004 and 24 April 2016, indicating Pakistan’ssustainedeffortsatsubversionanddestabilisation.Therefore,theproxiestrained,equipped,nurtured,andharbouredbyPakistancontinuetobethemainsourceofdangerfromIslamistterrorism.

It’sworthrememberingthattheonlytwomajorterroristattacksoutsideJ&K—thePathankotattack in January2016and thestrikeon theDinanagarpolicestationadjacenttoGurdaspurinJuly2015—wereexecutedbyPakistan-backed,Kashmir-orientedgroupsinPunjab.

Both these attacks exposed worrying vulnerabilities in the Punjab policeforce.Asdetailedinanotherchapterinthisbook,onlyproactivemeasuresatthehighest levels saved the day in Pathankot, but the overall coordinationmechanism between different central and state police forces continues to be acauseofworry.

J&K:LONG-TERMCHALLENGEThe situation in J&K, in a way India’s festering wound for decades, haswitnessedextremeswingsbetween2014and2017.AsModitookchargeofthegovernment in the summer of 2014, his invitation to the then Pakistan PrimeMinisterNawazSharifforhisoath-takingceremonywasseenasthenewPrimeMinister’sdesire toextendahandof friendship toPakistan. Itwasas ifModiwantedtostartwithacleanslatewithPakistan.HopewasintheairinthefirstcoupleofmonthsoftheModigovernment’sascensiontopower.

Withinacoupleofmonthshowever,theillusionsofanynormalrelationshipwith Pakistan were shattered when the Pakistani Army broke the informalunderstanding on the Line of Control (LoC) and made repeated ceasefireviolationsinJuly2014.The‘deepestablishment’inRawalpindiwasclearlynotcomfortablewithanylikelynormalisationinitsfraughtrelationshipwithIndia.

NewDelhi, in themeantime,hadtakenan‘in-principle’decisiontobreakadecade-old convention of allowing a bunch of separatist leaders from JammuandKashmir,collectivelyknownastheHurriyatleadership,tobepartofIndia-

Pakistandialogueprocess.ThiswasinformallyconveyedtoPakistan.However,incleardefianceofthatrequest,thePakistanHighCommissioninDelhiinvitedtheHurriyat leadershipfor talkson theeveof thescheduledForeignSecretaryLeveltalksbetweenthetwocountries.NewDelhidecidedtodrawtheredline.Itcancelled the Foreign Secretary level talks without any hesitation, leavingPakistanstunnedandtheHurriyatleadershipsearchingforrelevance.TheModigovernment hadmade it clear that itwanted the dialoguewith Pakistan to bestrictlybilateral.

The relationship nose-dived from thereon. A backlash from Pakistan wasinevitable. In the latter half of 2014, the LoC and the International Borderbetween the two sides heated up with frequent ceasefire violations from thePakistani side, resulting in the displacement of civilian population along theborder. India retaliated inkindandwith ferocious fireassaultnotwitnessed inyearsontheInternationalBorder.In2014,officialdataindicatesthattherewere430ceasefireviolationsalongtheInternationalBorder,thebulkofitafterIndiahadcancelled theforeignsecretary level talks.Bycomparison, in2013, theIBhadwitnessedonly148ceasefireviolations.

It was clear that the Pakistani Army, which controls and calibrates theKashmir policy with India rather than the civilian government, was unhappywithModi’sascenttopower.TheclergyinPakistan,alongwiththeArmy,haveforlongregardedtheBharatiyaJanataParty(BJP)asinimicaltoitsinterestsandthereforethe‘Mulla-Military’complexwasunlikelytosanctionanypeaceeffortattemptedbytheciviliangovernmentinPakistan.

For a year after the cancellation of the Foreign Secretary level talks, thefreezeinrelationscontinueduntilModiandSharifmetontheside-linesof theShanghaiCooperationOrganisation(SCO)atUfainRussiainJuly2015,muchto the surprise of hardliners on both sides. The much-publicised meetingbetween the two Prime Ministers appeared to signal a breakthrough. A jointstatement included five points: (i) a meeting would be held in New Delhibetween the two National Security Advisers (NSA) to discuss all the issueslinkedtoterrorism;(ii)anearlymeetingoftheDirectorsGeneraloftheBorderSecurity Force and the Pakistan Rangers followed by that of the Directors

GeneralMilitaryOperations(DGMO);(iii)thedecisiontoreleasefishermenineachother’scustody,alongwith theirboats,withinaperiodof15days; (iv)amechanism for facilitating religious tourism; (v) and both sides agreeing todiscusswaysandmeanstoexpeditetheMumbaicasetrial,includingadditionalinformationlikeprovidingvoicesamples.

The declaration created a mini storm in Pakistan since there had been noexplicit mention of Kashmir, yet terrorism had been very much on the table.HawksinPakistanwereupinarmsoverwhattheycalledadeliberateoversight.Some of them went to the extent of describing the joint statement as beingdrafted in South Block (India’s seat of power). Seeds of failure were thusembeddedinthejointstatementitself.

However, hardliners in India were unable to fathom the exact reason whyIndiaagreedtobreaktheice.ForPakistan,thecompulsiontoreachoutstemmedfromitsdesiretoensurePrimeMinisterModi’spresenceattheSAARCsummit,slatedtohavebeenheldlaterthatyearinthecountry.ForModi,thereasonwasmoresubstantial.Havingassumedpoweronthebackofadecisivemandate,hewanted to utilise the strong base he had created domestically to secure peacewith Pakistan so that his government could concentrate on ensuring rapideconomicdevelopment.

As anticipated, within a month of the Ufa declaration, the resumption ofdialogue was stalled. India objected to Pakistan’s insistence on arranging ameetingbetweenits thenNSASartazAzizandtheKashmiriseparatistsbeforeAzizcouldmeetDovalinDelhi.ThetalkscollapsedasAzizchosenottotravelto New Delhi. The Mint newspaper reported: ‘Technically, it was Pakistan’s“expansion” of the agenda for the talks—well beyond what had been agreeduponatUfa—thatkilledthetalks.IslamabadwanteditsNSAtomeetleadersofthe secessionist All-Parties Hurriyat Conference before meeting NSA AjitDoval. In addition, it wanted to discuss Jammu and Kashmir at the meeting.BothwereunacceptabletoIndiaandinspiteofrepeatedentreatiesnottodoso,Pakistanpersistedandthatspelledtheendofthetalks.’5

PrimeMinisterModiandNawazSharif:TryingtobreakthedeadlockatParisinJune2015

TheprocesswentintodeepfreezeuntilModiandSharifmetonceagainattheUnitedNations Climate Change Conference. Building on a brief encounter inParisandcomingtosomekindofpersonalunderstanding,ModisurprisedpeopleinSouthAsiabymakinganimpromptustopoveratLahoreonhiswaybackfromKabul on 25December 2015—Nawaz Sharif ’s birthday—trying to break themould.

However, the Prime Minister had clearly underestimated the PakistaniArmy’s resolve not to let any peace building succeed between India andPakistan.Within aweek of the surprise detour byModi, terrorists of Jaish-e-Mohammad(JeM)attackedthePathankotairforcebaseon1-2January2016toblowawayanychancesofrapprochementbetweenthetwosides.

TheIndo-Pakbonhomiewasmovingtoowellandtoofastforthelikingofthe

ISI/military establishment. Post-Pathankot too, there were several incidents inthe first six months of 2016 which convinced the Modi government that thehostile elements within the Pakistani establishment were determined to createconditionsthatwouldeventuallyderailtheprocessofpoliticalengagement.Theprocesswaspaused,butnottotallycalledoffpost-Pathankot.

On8July2016,BurhanWaniwaseliminated.TheeliminationoftheyoungHizbul Mujahideen leader from Tral, who had captured the imagination ofdisgruntledyoungmindsinKashmir,witnessedthebeginningofanewphaseinKashmir’s counterinsurgency operations. His burial procession attracted hugecrowds,leadingtolawandorderproblems.Duringthefirstweekitself,agitatorsstarted confronting the security forces with intense stone pelting, leading topolicefiringanddeathsand injuries, including theblindingofscoresofyoungpeople. Each morning, groups of young agitators started coming out, somespontaneously,mostunderduress, inpre-designatedareasdeterminedbyafewPakistaniandlocalactivistsactingunderinstructionsfromtheirhandlersacrossthe borders. For six months, it seemed as if it was a free for all in Kashmirvalley.

Significantly, no one disputed whether Burhan Wani was a terrorist, orquestionedthegenuinenessoftheencounter,bothwereindisputablefacts.Whatwas being described by themedia as an ‘uprising’ was instigated andmicro-managed from thePakistani side, largely confined to the five rural districts insouthKashmir.

In the entire phase that spannedover nearly threemonths, according to theCRPF, over 90 civilian agitators were killed and nearly 12,000 injured inapproximately 200 violent incidents. The forces however maintained majorrestraint,reflectedinthefactthatover2580CRPFjawanswereinjuredintheseincidents,122ofthemseriously.

CRPFjawansfacingtheireofKashmiriagitators

Itwasa testing timeforsecurity forces,especially the Indianarmy, leadingthe counterinsurgencyoperations inKashmir for over twodecades.Trained tokill,theArmywasbeingcalledtoshowrestraintinthefaceofmassivecrowds.ThesituationdeterioratedtosuchanextentthatArmyChiefGenBipinRawat—whohadtakenoverinasurprisechoicebythegovernmenton1January2017—hadtoissueatoughstatementwarningtroublemakersinKashmirtodesistfromobstructingoperationsbyhistroopsorelsefacetheconsequences.

Therewas one section—and I don’twant to call them intellectuals—whichpayslipservicetothearmybutinrealitystandsagainsteverythingthatthearmyseeks to protect and defend. This group variously dubbed the Army Chief ’sremarkasan‘intemperatestatement’,‘belligerentstand’,and‘declarationofwaragainst Kashmiri youth.’ This group of people have sought to create animpression that the Army Chief had ordered his troops to kill and maimindiscriminately. This was nothing but deliberate distortion of an emphaticassertionbyaprofessionalentrustedwiththesecurityofthecountry.

However, Gen Rawat’s unambiguous stand acted as a much neededconfidence booster for the troops—young officers and soldiers at the cuttingedge—whowereoftenleftwonderingiftheyweredoingtherightandnecessary

thingincombatingtheterrorists,manytimespayingwiththeirlives.InthewakeoftheeliminationofBurhanWani,andthesubsequentturmoilin

the Kashmir valley, abetted in no small measure by the Pakistani deep statethroughthesupportoftheselfishandself-centredseparatistleaders,politicshaddominatedthediscourseonJ&K.Itwasconvenientlyforgottenthatirrespectiveofhisorigin(asaKashmiriyouth),BurhanWaniwasafterallaterroristwhosedayswere numbered once he had taken up arms against the Indian state. Hiskillinginanencounterwiththesecurityforcesshouldhavebeentreatedasjustthat—neutralisation of a terrorist. Instead, a narrative was sought to be built,blamingthesecurityforcesfordoingtheirjobanddoingitprofessionally.

MajLeetulGogoi

Months of unrest following Burhan Wani’s death often hampered themovementofsecurityforces,disruptedtheirlogisticschainanddisturbedawelllaid out security grid. The Army can take the setbacks in its stride and learnlessons from them. However, what demoralises the soldiers are the barelyconcealedbarbsfromill-informedcriticswhodonothavethefaintestideaaboutthedifficultiesandconstraintsunderwhichthetroopshavebeenoperatingintheunendingwarinJ&Kforoveraquartercenturynow.NoArmyintheworldhas

maintainedtherelentlesstempoofoperationsastheIndianArmyhasdonesince1990.

It is to thecreditof IndianArmyleadershipover theyears that troopshaveretainedthehighestdegreeofmotivationdespitemountingodds.

However, the unwarranted criticism about strategy and tactics, and thecontemptthatsomeofourprominentopinion-makershadheldagainsttheArmyhadbeguntoaffectthesoldiersontheground.Aslighthesitationhadbeguntocreepintotheirapproachincounterinsurgencyandcounter-terroristsoperations.Fortunately,theArmyChief’sstatementandhisopensupporttoanofficer,MajLeetul Gogoi who had used his presence of mind in saving several civilianofficers by tying a protestor in front of his jeep6 would have removed anylingeringdoubtsthesoldiersmayhavehadaboutthenecessityoftheirjobandboostedthemoralenoend.

On another level, the warning by the Army Chief to those hinderingoperationsand thesupportextended tohimby thepolitical leadershipoverhisstand sent the rightmessage to those fishing inKashmir’s troubledwaters. In2017alone,motivatedandre-energisedsecurityforces,includingtheJammuandKashmirPolice,haveeliminatedmore terrorists than in thepreviousyears.ByendofAugust,thenumberofterroristskilledinpin-pointedoperationswasover140. The security forces have reclaimed their dominance after six months ofconsistent and accurate intelligence-based operations, justifying New Delhi’sapproach towardsJ&K:Peace first,politicaloutreach later.Even thoughmanycriticsof thegovernmenthad taken it to task for its ‘takenoprisoners’policywhichhadbeeninoperationinthesecondhalfof2016.

The relentless counterinsurgency operations were coupled with a muchneeded crackdown on the Hurriyat leadership and their proxies who werefuellingterrorbyusingthehawalarouteandbenamiproperties,toreceivefundsfrom their Pakistani backers and other dubious sources. The NationalInvestigations Agency (NIA) initiated investigations against the Hurriyatmembers. In what is clearly a departure from past practice of shielding andmollycoddling the Hurriyat leadership, the NIA’s raids on the Hurriyatleadership caught the terrorist-enablers by surprise. The arrestedHurriyat foot

soldiers(sixfromSrinagar,onefromDelhi)areadmittedlynotthebigfish,butit’sastart.Moreover,thecrackdownisasignaltothetopHurriyatleadershiptonottaketheCentreforgranted.TheNIAcaseshavedemonstratedthewilloftheCentreandnowmustbefollowedupvigorously.

NotedcommentatorMinhazMerchantwrote:‘Ittookamajorpolicychangeby the Centre to end soft-pedalling the Hurriyat. Since the crackdown onseparatistsbytheNationalInvestigationAgency(NIA),severalHurriyatleadersare in jail. The NIA estimates that the family of the head of the Hurriyat’shardline faction, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, owns 14 properties in Kashmir andDelhi valued at over Rs 150 crore. These include a prime seven-acre land inSopore,Baramulla.’

TheGeelanifamilyhasdonewellforitselfoutoftheterrorfinancingthroughhawala and benami transactions from Pakistan. The properties owned by theGeelanis include an educational institution, residences and agricultural land inKashmirandflatsinDelhi.7

Goingbeyondtheimmediatehowever,theCentreandtheStategovernmentswill have to build on the tactical gains made in 2017 and look at the largerpicturetoensureabetterfutureforthepeopleoftheentirestateofJammuandKashmir(thatincludesJammuandLadakh),andnotgetboggeddownwiththeconcernsofahandfulof leaders,politicians,businessmen,and theirsupportersintheKashmirvalleyalone.

Therehavebeensuggestions that theCentremust reachout to theyouthofKashmir.Perhapsthetimehascometodojustthatandignoretheusualsuspects,but before that the youth must begin to understand the difference betweenmindlessprotestsandlegitimatedemands.Kashmiriparentsmustalsobegintoaskthequestion:Whyallowtheyoungtobeusedasasmokescreenforpoliticalobjectives?

That said the state government must start delivering on basic governanceissues.ByAugust2017,insurgencyandviolencewerebroughtunderreasonablecontrol in theKashmirValley,promptingPrimeMinisterModi to reachout totheordinaryKashmirisevenwhilehevowedtocontinuetocrackdownonthetrouble makers. In his Independence Day address from the Red Fort on 15

August2017,Modisaid:‘Nagaalise,nagolise,parivartanhogagalelagaanese...samasyasuljhegiharKashmirikogalelaganese’(Kashmirproblemcannotberesolvedbyeitherbulletsorbyabuses;itcanonlyberesolvedbyembracingKashmiris), referring to the on-going violence in the Kashmir valley. Only ahandful of separatists, he said, were resorting to ‘various tactics’ to createproblems in the state.But the government is committed tomakingKashmir aparadiseonceagain,saidthePrimeMinister.Makingitclear that therewillbenosoftnesstowardsterrorism,headdedthatIndia’ssecurityisatoppriorityforthegovernment,andthesurgicalstrikehadunderscoredthisbelief.

In light of the relative success in managing the internal security situation,MHAofficials and security professionals stress on the need to have sustainedefforts to bring the situation under complete control. ‘There are too manyintangibles and gaps right now in our approach to internal security.Our basicpolicingneeds totaloverhauland lesspolitical interference frompoliticians,’aservingsecuritypractitionercommented,notwillingtocomeonrecordbecauseofhissensitiveappointment.Heisright.Foryears,policereformshavebeenputon the backburner. Consensus continues to elude political parties on how toimplementthereformsandbecauseofthecountry’sfederalstructure,theCentrehasalimitedroleinensuringlawandorder.

Assatp.org comments: ‘Indeed,while the immediatechallengeof terrorismand insurgency has receded across the country and across the ideologicalspectrum, theconflictpotential in India remainshigh,and isoftenexacerbatedbystatepolicyandpartisanpolitics.Crucially,firstresponders,theStatePoliceForces, aswell asmostCentralSFs and the intelligence apparatus, remain ill-equipped, poorly-trained and under-strength. Despite enormous emphasis,particularlyaftertheMumbai26/11attacksin2008,technologicalcapabilitiesofPolice, Intelligence and specialised CT Forces remain poor. Critical projectssuch as the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS),National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) and GPS-based surveillance of seavessels,amongothers,havebeenfitfullyfunded,andimplemented,asaresultofwhichthecumulativeimpactoflimitedcapacityaugmentationoncapabilitiestosecurethenationhas,atbest,beenmarginal.Furthermore,arisingdemographic

burden, resource crises, growing unemployment, and adherence to a growthmodelthathaslimitedpotentialtoaddresstheaspirationsoftheoverwhelmingmassofpeople,continuouslyexacerbates tensions, leaving thecountryripeforthepickingforneworresurgentmovementsofviolence.’8

Modi’sNational Security teammust pay heed to the signs that are evidentevenas it can take satisfaction inhavingkept the situationunder tight controlacross the country, which allows Prime Minister Modi to meet the biggerchallengefromIndia’sbiggestadversary,China.

I

CHAPTER8

RE-ENGAGINGWITHTHEMIDDLEEAST

fNarendraModi’sresoundingelectoralvictoryin the2014generalelectionwasunexpectedformany,hisfocusonrecalibratingandrejuvenatingIndia’s

foreign policy has surely come as a major surprise to the world. For hisinauguration, his decision to invite leaders of eight countries in theneighbourhood, including the Prime Minister of Pakistan, came as a shock.However,many strategic analystswould have dismissed it as a one-offmove.Andnoonewouldhaveblamedthemforit.ItwasnotexpectedthatModiwouldhaveanyinterestinforeignpolicymatters,consideringhisbackground,havinggoverned thewestern IndianstateofGujarat for12yearsbeforebecoming thePrimeMinisterofIndia.

However, one of his most trusted team members, NSA Ajit Doval has adifferent take on Modi’s interest in international relations. ‘Contrary to whatmanypeoplethink,PrimeMinisterModihadaverydeepunderstandingof theinterplay of power in the international arena. Even before assuming office inMay 2014, he had visited a large number of countries and built a network ofpersonal relationships at various levels that included politicians, people inbusiness and trade,members of the IndianDiaspora, aswell as scientists andprofessionals in various fields. A keen observer, Modi closely followed thetrends in international relations, possible areas of cooperation with other

countries,andtheirrelevancetoIndiainthelargergeo-strategiccontext,’1Dovaltoldme.

AccordingtotheNSA,India’snationalsecurityisanimportantingredientofthePrimeMinister’svisionforIndiaandcentraltohisthinkingandinteractions.His experience in Gujarat of leveraging his external goodwill to attractinvestmentsalsocameinhandy.DovalsaysthePrimeMinisterstronglybelievesthatifIndiahastounleashitspotentialpowerandconvertthispotentialintorealpower,ithastoensurepeace,stability,andsecuritywithinthecountryandintheneighbourhood.

As noted analyst Cleo Paskalwrote in an article in 2015: ‘Modi began byopenlyconsolidatingIndia’sregionalbase...thephotosoftheSAARCleaderstogetheronthedaistowelcomeIndia’snewPrimeMinisternotonlyshowedtotheregion,butalsototheworld,that‘Indiaisback,’andthatModi’sIndiawasgoingtobeverydifferentthantheonetheworldhadseeninrecentdecades.’2

SinceDayOne, all his decisions have been focussed on achieving stabilityandpeace in the region. It is anothermatter thatneitherPakistannorChina—bothknownandoldadversaries in the region—have reciprocatedModi’shandoffriendship.Threeyearsintohistenure,thePrimeMinisterhowevercontinuestoraisethebarhigherintherealmofinternationalrelations.Hisoutreachtothemiddle-eastandtheCentralAsianRepublicsarebutsmallexamples.TheIndianOcean initiative, the renewed focus on the neighbours in the Indian sub-continent,South-EastAsia,andmoststrikingly,hisvisitstoAmerica,standoutasexamplesofoutstandingachievementsinModi’sforeignpolicy.

Admittedly,allPrimeMinistersinthepasthavedrivenIndia’sforeignpolicy,leaving the executionof the policy to theMinistry ofExternalAffairs (MEA)andExternalAffairsMinisters.

However, no other Prime Minister, with perhaps the exception of IndiraGandhi, had used personal goodwill and charisma in achieving foreign policyobjectives asModi hasmanaged to do.As one of his senior-most colleagues,FinanceMinisterArunJaitleyremarked:‘Inthefast-changingmulti-polarworldto which India is intricately connected, no Indian leader has shown suchremarkable understanding to simplify an otherwise complex situation. By

surveying, responding and where possible, moulding the internationalenvironment,PrimeMinisterModiisfindinganswerstothequestionsofIndia’snationalinterests.’3

As is well known by now, Modi is perhaps the most frequently travelledPrimeMinisterinrecentyears.Whatisremarkablehoweverishisfocusontheimmediate and strategic neighbourhood. Comparative figures show that ModihasvisitedSouth-East andCentralAsian countries themost in the threeyearsthat he has been in office. Similarly, in keeping with his neighbourhood firstpolicy, thePrimeMinistermade20 trips toSouthAsiannations.ButwhathassurprisedforeignpolicywatchersisModi’sfocusontheIslamiccountriesoftheMiddle East. Almost everyone expected him to visit Israel immediately afterassumingofficebut in a craftymove, thePrimeMinisteropted tovisit all theothermajorplayersintheregion—UAE,SaudiArabia,QatarandIran—beforebecoming the first Indian PrimeMinister to visit Israel in July 2017. In fact,available data indicates thatModi has alreadymade half a dozen trips to theMiddleEastinlessthan40monthsthathehasbeenPrimeMinister.Bycontrast,DrManmohanSinghmanagedtovisittheMiddleEastonlythriceinhis10-yearlongtenure!

OneillustrationofModi’spersonalinterestinstartingunexpectedinitiativesdatesbacktoJuly2015.

Thatday,AirIndiaOne,thePrimeMinister’sspecialaircraftwasonitswaytoTurkmenistanfromUfainRussia.

Modi had just finished an importantmeetingwith his Pakistani counterpartNawazSharifonthesidelinesoftheShanghaiCooperationOrganisation(SCO)summit.ThetwoPrimeMinistershadagreedtoinstituteadialoguemechanismatthelevelofNationalSecurityAdvisers(NSAs)ofthetwocountries,amongacoupleof other important decisions to buildmutual confidence. Itwasquite afeatherinthePM’scaptogetShariftoagreeonthenewmechanism,especiallyafter India-Pakistan tieshadhita roadblockover India’s insistenceonkeepingtheKashmirseparatistsoutofthebilateraldialogue.

Moreover, for the first time, New Delhi had managed to keep any overtreference to Kashmir out of the joint statement and instead succeeded in

including ‘talks on terrorism’, in the final text. BothModi and Doval shouldhavebeenhappytohavebrokenthedeadlock.

ButthePrimeMinister’smindwasalreadyworkingonanotheroutreach.‘ThePMwas satisfiedwith themeeting (with Sharif), but hewas thinking

ahead.AswemadeourwaytoTurkmenistan,hementionedtheneedtoimproveourtieswithcountriesintheMiddleEast.‘‘Whydon’twemakespecialeffortsto reach out to important people in that region’’,’ Doval remembers ModisuggestingtohimontheflighttoAshgabat(capitalofTurkmenistan).4

ThePrimeMinisterfelt,Dovalrecalls,IndiawasnotdoingenoughtoengageleadersoftheGulfcountries.‘WehavealargeIndianDiasporathere,theregionis vital for our energy security and the developments there impact our geo-stratatigic interests. Besides, there is great scope of economic coopertion, asIndiaenjoystheadvantageofoldhistorictiesandgeographicalproximity.But,wedon’tseemtohavemadeconcertedeffortstodeveloprapportwiththerulersthere,’thePrimeMinistermentionedtohisNationalSecurityAdviser.

Doval had come to realise in the previous one year that they had spentworkingtogetherthatasuggestionfromthePrimeMinisterwaslikeaninformaldirective. Moreover, his operational mind was quick to comprehend the highpotentialandimportofthePrimeMinister’sdirective.AssoonastheylandedinAshgabat,DovalandJaishankar,alreadyawareoftheimportanceoftheregionto India’s internal and external security challenges, quickly set up the visit torebootNewDelhi’s outreach to theGulf countries. TheNSAwanted to carrypersonalmessagesfromModitothemoversandshakersintheregion.

The PM’s whirlwind tour of the Central Asian Republics ended with hismeetingsinTajikistanon13July(thevisittotheCARsitselfwasinmanywayssignificant).AirIndiaOnebeganitsjourneybacktoDelhi,butDovalwasnotonthe return flight. He was on his way to Dubai, exploring the possibility ofoperationalisingthePrimeMinister’svisionontheground.

‘The PrimeMinister was determined to take our relationswith theMiddleEasttoamuchhigherlevelandwillingtoinvesthisowngoodwillandenergytoachievethat,’saysaMinistryofExternalAffairsofficial.Thesecretivemissionwas so low profile that even the IndianMission inUAEwas unaware of the

NSAcominginandgoingoutof theUAE.OnlySJaishankar,India’sForeignSecretarywasintheloop.Whattranspiredattheirmeetingisnotapartofpublicknowledge.Doval alsomade quiet trips to other capitals in the region,CharuKasturireportedforTheTelegraphinSeptember2015.5AndthatishowoneofIndia'smostsuccessfulforeignpolicyinitiativesundertheModigovernmentwasconceivedandrolledout.

Sureenough,injustoveramonthafterDoval’ssecretparleyswiththeDubaiPrince,PrimeMinisterModibecamethefirstIndianPrimeMinisterinover34yearstovisittheUAE,kick-startinganewphaseinIndia’srelationshipwiththeGulfcountries.

PrimeMinisterModiwithUAE’sleader

As the Prime Minister remarked in his pre-departure statement at Delhi,‘UAEisavaluedpartner,andtheextentofourtiesindicatethevibrantrelationsIndia andUAE enjoy-India is UAE’s 2nd largest trading partner andUAE isIndia’s 3rd largest trade partner. There are over 2.5million Indianswho havemade UAE their home. They have contributed immensely to the progress ofUAEandalsogivenbacktoIndiaoneveryoccasion.IndiaandUAEarecloselyconnectedbeitviaairorthroughthesea.

‘Duringmyvisit,Iseektoenhancecooperationinenergyandtrade,andwilltalktoinvestorsonwhyIndiaisanattractivedestinationforinvestments.Iamcertainmyvisitwillboostpeople-to-peopletiesbetweenournations.’6

Modi had correctly assessed that India’s regional, economic, andincreasingly,securityinterests,arecloselyinterlinkedwitheventsintheMiddle

East,andmoreparticularlywiththeGulf.‘Sofar,likewithotherGulfStates,India’srelationswithUAEhavefocused

almostexclusivelyoncommercialmatters.Inthefuture,Indiawillneedtotakeamorestrategicapproach,’observedDrKadiraPethiyagoda,avisitingFellowinAsia-MiddleEastRelationsat theBrookingsDohaCentre,whowasquotedbytheGulfNewsonthedayModiarrivedinAbuDhabi.7

ThathechoseUAEforhisfirstvisit to theMiddleEastandnotIsraelafteropenly acknowledging his affinity to the latter surprisedmany, but doing theunexpected has been the hallmark of the Modi decision-making style. HerealisedthattheEmirateshosts2.6millionIndianworkers,whichconstitutes30percentofthepopulation,makingIndiansthelargestnationalitygroup.Clearly,theexpatsprovidedDelhiastrategicadvantageinbilateralrelations.

To be fair,Modi’s predecessor,DrManmohanSingh had also spoken of a‘Look West’ policy, and cited the importance of the Middle East in India’senergysecurity.DuringthesecondtermoftheUPA,theideaofa‘LookWest’policy surfaced once again, butwith very little productive outcome.Dr Singheventually failed to translate his wish into action. He barely travelled to theMiddleEastduringhis10-yearstintatthehelmofaffairs.HevisitedEgyptandIranbecausetheywerehostingNon-Alignedsummits.DrSingh’sonlybilateralvisitswere toSaudiArabia,Oman,andQatar.Asmentionedearlier,noIndianPrimeMinisterhadvisitedtheUAEforoverthreedecadesuntilModidecidedtostarthisMiddleEastengagementwithanoutreachtoAbuDhabi.

As Nicolas Blarel, an assistant professor of international relations at theInstitute of Political Science at Leiden University noted in a piece entitled‘Recalibrating India’sMiddleEastPolicy’, ‘the reality is that theMiddleEastwas not an important policy priority for theModi government during its firstyearinoffice.InspiteofModi’simportantdiplomaticactivism,whichledhimtovisitmorethantwenty-fivecountriesinhisfirstfourteenmonthsinoffice,hedidnotstopover inanyof theregion’scapitals.Thischanged inAugust2015whenhechosetotraveltotheUnitedArabEmirates,andnotIsrael,ashisfirstdestinationintheMiddleEast.Thattrip,alongwiththeApril2016visittoSaudiArabia, demonstrated that there are various long-term and more immediate

factorsthatcanaccountforarenewedfocustowardstheGulf.’8

ModiwithIndianworkersinUAE

Theinitiativehasstartedearningrichdividends.ThePrincepaidareturnvisitto India in 2016.Hewas also theChiefGuest at theRepublicDay parade in2017.TheonlyotherGulfdignitary tobegiven thehonourofbeing the chiefguestattheRepublicdaywastheSaudiKingin2006.

While the big ticket items are witnessing a surge, expatriates see smallgestures like the UAE allotting land for building a temple for the IndiancommunityinAbuDhabiasabigbreakthrough.

There was of course the bigger picture. As Khaleej Times, a leadingnewspaperintheGulfnotedinitseditorialinAugust2015,‘TheUAEcangainfromrapidstridesmadebyIndiainspaceandsoftwareasitseekstogrowintoaknowledge economy.The IndianPrimeMinister is keen that theUAE investsmore inhis country—in sectors like tourism, infrastructure, tourismand retail.‘‘Prosperity should be shared’’, is themantra.UAE companies can, therefore,‘‘Make in India’’ and Indian firms can ‘‘Make in the UAE’’. There areopportunitiestogrowtogetherandjointinvestmentspropelthepowerhouses.Inthisregard,thetwocountrieshaveagreedtosetupajoint$75billioninvestmentfundtoboostinfrastructureprojects.’

Economic cooperation apart, both India and UAE agreed to step up theirpartnership in countering extremism and radicalisation. The joint statement attheendofModi’svisitreflectedthenewpragmatismthatmarkstherelationship.Itwassignificantonatleastthreecounts.One,itwentbeyondtheusualenergyandeconomiccooperationandelevatedtherelationshiptoastrategiclevel.Two,it concentrated, in large measure, on security cooperation (dialogue betweenNationalSecurityAdviserseverysixmonths),andthree,alsomentioneddefenceandmaritimecooperation.

That the joint statement called on all countries to dismantle the terrorisminfrastructurewheretheyexistandbringperpetratorsofterrorismtojusticewassignificant, especially since Pakistan is the unnamed country in this commonstance.Therefore,while the twocountriescondemnedothercountrieswhousereligiontojustifyterrorism,orsupportandsponsorsuchactivitiesagainstothers,India and theUAE decided to coordinate efforts to counter radicalisation andmisuseofreligionbygroupswithintheirownpurview.

More importantly,Modi’soutreach to theblue-collar skilledworkers in theUAE—2.6million in number—sent the rightmessage. His visit to the Indianworkers’campinAbuDhabiandthecommunityaddressinDubaiwasmeanttoinvokeprideinIndia.

As a result of thehigh level visit, someof the lingeringdisputeshave alsobeenresolvedquickly.Forexample,withQatar,Indiahada25-yearcontractforbuyingLNG.SignedbetweenPetronetandRasGas,Indiawasnothonouringthetermsofthecontractbecauseofthelowerpricesofgasinothermarkets.WhenIndia did not buy its quota of 7.5million tonnes in 2015, RasGas imposed apenalty of $1.5 billion. During Prime Minister Modi’s visit, the issue wasresolvedwithRasGasagreeingtowaivethepenaltyandslashtheLNGpriceto$6-7permmBtufrom$12-13mmBtuinkeepingwiththedipinglobalprice.Itwas seen as a significant diplomatic success for India and an indication of itsgrowing prestige in the Gulf. Similarly, recognising India’s quest to build‘strategicoilreserves,’UAE,SaudiArabiaandIranhaveagreedtosupplycrudeoilforthestrategicreservefacilityatMangalore.

PrimeMinisterModivisitsTCSallwomenITandITESCentreinRiyadh

Animportanttrilateralinitiative:TheIndia–Iran–AfghanistanagreementatChabahar

Modi’s visit to the UAE also went further than mere bean counting. ItwidenedIndia’sacceptanceintheregionasarisingpowerandallowedgreaterengagementwiththeMiddleEast.FollowinghisUAEsojourn,ModihasvisitedallmajorcountriesintheregionincludingTurkey(14–16November2015forG-20summit),SaudiArabia(2–3April2016), Iran(22–23May2016)andQatar(4–5June,2016).AsseniordiplomatandIndia’sformerHighCommissionertoPakistan,G Parthasarathy points out: ‘We are the only power in theworld tohavethebestofrelationswithallmajorpowerstoourwest.Andintheprocess,Modi has by-passed Pakistan. In the Islamic world, he has rendered PakistanimpotentbyhisextraordinaryoutreachtotheIslamicworld.

Moving forward, India’s vital interests and the changing regional dynamicswill require it to deepen relations with all important actors in the region,preserving its careful balancing act while stepping up to play a more activeregionalrole.’9

With Iran, India’s strategicpartnershipwitnessedan importantdevelopmentwith the signing of the Chabahar port agreement. Moreover, India signed atrilateral transit agreement with Iran and Afghanistan for the Chabahar port,underlining its importancenotonly forbilateral trade,but also its significanceforIndianinterestsinAfghanistanandCentralAsia.

Speaking at the signing ceremony,Modi underlined the importance of theChabaharportandthetrilateralagreement:‘TheAgreementontheestablishmentofaTrilateralTransportandTransitCorridorsignedveryrecentlycanalterthecourseofhistoryinthisregion.Itisanewfoundationofconvergencebetweenour three nations. The corridor would spur unhindered flow of commercethroughout the region. Inflow of capital and technology could lead to newindustrial infrastructure in Chabahar. This would include gas based fertilizerplants,petrochemicals,pharmaceuticalsandIT.ThekeyarteriesofthecorridorwouldpassthroughtheChabaharportofIran.Itsverylocationatthemouthofthe Gulf of Oman, is of great strategic significance. Afghanistan will get anassured,effective,andfriendlierroutetotradewiththerestoftheworld...Inmyvision, thefullspectrumofconnectivityagendabetweenIran,AfghanistanandIndia should span: from culture to commerce; from traditions to technology;fromInvestmentstoIT;fromservicestostrategy;andfrompeopletopolitics.’

GiventherisingtideofterrorismanduseofGulfcountriesassafehavensbysomeof thefugitives, Indiahasworkedtowardenhancingsecuritycooperationand intelligence-sharingwith the Gulf States and beyond. India signedMoUswith financial intelligence units of SaudiArabia andQatar to countermoney-launderingandterrorfinancing.AsapaperonIndia’spolicytowardstheMiddleEastnoted,‘ThisdefenceandcounterterrorismcooperationwiththeGulfstatespartly continues the policies of previous UPA governments. The strategicpartnership signed with Saudi Arabia in 2010 included robust anti-terrorcooperationmeasures.Additionally,SaudiArabia’s2012deportationof Indian

terrorist Sayed Zabiuddin Ansari, also known as Abu Jundal and who wasinvolved in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, had already signalled awillingness to increase counterterrorism cooperation, even if doing so clashedwithPakistaniinterests.Similarly,theUAEhasdeportedinthelastthreeyearsvariousoperativesfromtheIndianMujahideen,anIndianterrorgroupwithcloselinkstoLashkar-e-Taiba.’

AroundthetimewhentheModigovernmenttookover,theISISphenomenonhadcreatedanintenseturmoilacrosstheworld,particularlyintheMiddleEastandAfricancountries.ThoughISISisnowonthebackfootafterbeingdrivenoutofitsstrongholdsinnorthernIraqandSyria,threatofisolatedanddispersedattacks from some of the remaining 21,000 foreign fighters in their homecountriesloomslarge.

TheGulf region, home to nearly 70 lakh people of Indian origin could nothave remained unscathed from the ISIS phenomenon. Under thesecircumstances, theModigovernment tookproactiveandconcertedmeasures torescueitskidnappedandtrappednationalsabroad.Theeffortsweremonitoredatthehighestpoliticallevels.Thecombinedeffortsensuredthesafetyandsecurityof a large number of Indian citizens abroad, who have greatly contributedtowards deepening tieswith the Islamicworld.NSADoval personally led theinitiativeswiththehelpofsomeofhisofficialswithextensivetiesintheMiddleEast.10

When asked about his role,Doval confirmed that he did travel to Iraq andotherMiddleEastcountries.ThethenChiefMinisterofKeralaOomanChandi,whohadknownDovalforoverfourdecadeshadprofoundlythankedhimforhisroleinrescuingnursesandotherMalayaleedetaineesfromtheclutchesofISIS.HowtherescueoperationwasexecutedandISISallowedthenursestobetakenfrom their captivity will remain a mystery till the NSA decides to reveal all.Peoplewhoknowhimassertheneverwill.

‘The Prime Minister was very clear about one thing: No effort should bespared to extricate Indians from difficult situations anywhere in the world,’Doval told me. Except the disappearance of some Indians in Mosul thathappenedinJune2014,whenthenewgovernmentwasjustsettlingdown,Indian

liveshavebeensavedinallothercases.Allthiswasduetothetimelycollectionof operational intelligence, quick and effective interventionby the intelligenceagencies and improved security cooperation.Thiswas in sharp contrast to thetragic fate of thousands of others that have fallen victim to ISIS’ brutalexecutions.ManyofficersofIndia'sintelligencecommunitygavecreditforittothe high professional credibility in the global intelligence community that theNSAenjoysononehandanddedicatedhardworkandcommitmentof formerRAWchiefRajinderKhannaontheother.

Since June 2014, 55 Indian nationals, trapped and kidnapped by dreadedterrorist groups like ISIS, were rescued from their clutches in Iraq, Libya,Nigeria,SouthSudanandAfghanistan.

Additionally,theconcertedoperationsofIndianintelligenceagenciesresultedin the deportation of several terrorists, their sympathisers and recruitersassociated with the ISIS, anti-India Jihadi groups, and insurgent groups. Thedevelopment of real-time and precise intelligence in tracking anti-Indiaelements, living under various assumed identities and frequently shifting theirplaces of residence, was an uphill task. Synergised efforts with foreignintelligence agencies helped in unearthing these cells. Since 2014, Indianintelligence operatives, with the help of Gulf countries, have pre-emptedpotential attacks by detecting over 20 Indians associated with ISIS modules,havingthemarrestedanddeportedfromdifferentcountriesintheGulfregion.

PMModiandIsraeliPMNethanyahuatademonstrationofamobileseawaterdesalinationunitinIsrael

Andyet,as in thepast,IndiahastobalanceitsrelationswithdifferentGulfactors.Thegovernmenthasbeencareful.SowhileModivisitedSaudiArabia,healsomadetripstoIran,theSaudiKingdom’sarchrivals,andIsrael.However,itisinterestingtonotethatModivisitedIsraelafterhavingmadehistripstoallother key players in the region. Indeed, his government hosted thePalestinianPresidentinDelhibeforeModiembarkedforTelAviv,breakingataboothathadheldbacksuccessiveIndianPrimeMinisters fromgoing to Israelalthoughfulldiplomatic relations were established a quarter century ago. As DhruvaJaishankar, Fellow, Foreign Policy at Brookings India, noted: ‘Even as Indiaattemptsto‘ActEast’,itisincreasingly‘ThinkingWest’...And,notwithstandingModi’s decision to skip Ramallah, New Delhi has discovered that a betterrelationshipwith Israel doesnotnecessarilymean that it shoulddistance itselffromPalestine. The recent visit to India ofMahmoudAbbas, President of thePalestinianNationalAuthority,wasampledemonstrationofthis.’11

So, as the United States, under President Trump, rethinks its Middle Eaststrategies,Modi-ledIndiaismakingincreasingforaysintheregion,balancingitstieswithallthemajorplayers,andrenderingtheoldnotionineffectualthatNewDelhihastochoosesidesinthequagmirethatistheMiddleEast.

I

CHAPTER9

DEFENCE:GOODSTART,MUCHTODO

nthethreeyearsplusthatModihasbeenIndia’sPrimeMinister,peoplehavecometoexpecttheunexpectedfromhim.Andthat'sexactlywhathedidon3

September2017.

Bigshoestofill:NirmalaSitharamantakesoverasDefenceMinisterfromArun

Jaitley

Thatday,twohoursbeforehewastoleavefortheBRICSsummitinChinaandmoreimportantlymeetChinesePresidentXiJingpinginabilateralmeeting,Modi was at the Rahtrapati Bhawan to witness the oath taking ceremony ofnewly inducted ministers. All eyes were however on the newly elevatedministersinhiscabinet.FourofthebetterperformingMinistersofState(MoS’)—PiyushGoyal,DharmendraPradhan,NirmalaSitharamanandMukhtarAbbasNaqvi—werebeingpromotedtofullCabinetrank.Thatwasn’tasurprise.Whatcame as a bolt from the blue howeverwas the appointment of Sitharaman asIndia’sfirstfulltimewomandefenceminister!

PMchairsCombinedCommandersConferenceonboardINSVikramadityaatSea(15December2015)

Not a single political analyst had anticipated or predicted that Sitharamanwould get the defence portfolio, considered one of the big four ministries—Home,Finance,ExternalAffairsbeingtheotherthree.ThiswasasunexpectedaspluckingManoharParrikaroutofGoainNovember2014.ParrikarhoweverhadadecadelongrecordasChiefMinisterbehindhim.Sitharamanontheotherhand,wasarelativelynewentranttotheBJP,butclearlyshehasimpressedthePrime Minister by her efficiency and quiet determination in tackling trickyissues in the Commerce and industry portfolio that she held before beingelevatedasDefenceMinister.

Sitharamanhashertaskcutout.India’ssecuritychallengesaremountingandthearmed forcesare inneedof severalurgentdecisionsand reforms.Shewillhavetohit thegroundrunning.Parrikarduringhis28-monthtenureasdefenceminister had brought a fresh approach to several legacymatters and resolvedmanyknottyissues.

He and then Jaitley, have prepared the ground for Sitharaman to build onseveralfar-reachingintiatives.

Despite frequent changes (first Jaitley, then Parrikar and again Jaitley asdefenceministermeansSitharamanisthefourthincumbentinthehotseatinlessthanfouryears)atthetop,itmustbesaidthatmeasurestobreaktheshacklesofthepastandshedthelegendaryhesitationindecisiveaction—elevatedtoanartformduringCongress’AKAntony’s long tenureasDefenceMinisterbetween2006 and 2014—have been taken, thanks to the clear directives of the PrimeMinister.

The PrimeMinister beganwell by articulating his vision for India’s armedforces. He wanted the military to be ready for future wars; to modernisethemselves,tobecomeleanerandmakemoreefficientuseoflimitedresources.HisspeechattheCombinedCommandersconferenceinDecember2015—heldonboardINSVikramaditya,breakingthetraditionofalwayshostingit inDelhi—held out the hope that major reforms in ushering in the much-neededintegrationofthethreeservicesandappointingaChiefofDefenceStaff(CDS),oratleastaPermanentChairmanChiefsofStaffCommitteewouldberealised.The PrimeMinister told top commanders, ‘Above all, we look to our ArmedForcestoprepareforthefuture.And,itcannotbeachievedbydoingmoreofthesame, or preparing perspective plans based on outdated doctrines anddisconnectedfromfinancialrealities.

‘In thecourseof thepastyear, Ihaveseenprogress,butIalsofeel thatourforces and our government need to domore to reform their beliefs, doctrines,objectivesandstrategies.Wemustdefineouraimsandour instrumentsfor thechangingworld.’

‘At a timewhenmajor powers are reducing their forces and relymore ontechnology,wearestillconstantlyseekingtoexpandthesizeofourforces.’

‘Modernisation and expansion of forces at the same time is a difficult andunnecessarygoal.’

‘We need forces that are agile, mobile and driven by technology, not justhumanvalour.’

‘Weneedcapabilities towinswiftwars, forwewillnothave the luxuryoflong drawn battles. We must re-examine our assumptions that keep massivefundslockedupininventories.’

‘Asoursecurityhorizonsandresponsibilitiesextendbeyondourshoresandborders,wemustprepareourforcesforrangeandmobility.’

‘Wemust fully incorporate the power of digital networks and space assetsintoourcapabilities.Equally,wemustbepreparedtodefendthem,fortheywillbethefirsttargetsofouradversaries.’

‘And,networksmustbeseamlessandintegratedacrossagenciesandforces,andareprecise,clearandquickinresponse.’

‘WehavebeenslowtoreformthestructuresofourArmedForces.Weshouldshortenthetooth-to-tailratio.’

‘And,weshouldpromotejointnessacrosseverylevelofourArmedForces.Weweardifferentcolours,butweservethesamecauseandbearthesameflag.Jointnessatthetopisaneedthatislongoverdue.’

‘Senior military leaders must have experience of tri-service commands,experience in technology – driven environment and exposure to the fullspectrumofchallenges–fromterrorismtostrategic.’

‘Weneedmilitarycommanderswhonotonlyleadbrilliantlyinthefield,butare also thought leaders who guide our forces and security systems into thefuture.’1

Muchtomysurprisehowever,manyofthepointsModimade,arestillaworkinprogress.

Moreover,whyheallowedManoharParrikar—whowashisunexpectedyetcorrect choice in the first place—to go back to Goa in March 2017 is alsointriguingtosaytheleast.

Tobefair,ArunJaitley,thePrimeMinister’s‘go-to’manhassteppedinboththetimes—forsixmonthsbeforeParrikarwasbroughtinfromGoain2014and

nowagainin2017.That said, the Prime Minister has been instrumental in taking some bold

measuresindefence.Veryearly inhis tenure,Modimadedefencecentral tohis ‘Make in India’

initiative.SpeakingattheAeroIndiashowinFebruary2015,hesetoutabroadroadmapfortheMoD.‘Ourdefenceindustryinprivatesectorisstillsmall.Butitalreadyemploysthousandsofpeople.Thisisdespitethefactthatnearly60percentofourdefenceequipmentcontinuestobeimported.And,wearespendingtens of billions of dollars on acquisitions from abroad. There are studies thatshowthatevena20to25percentreductioninimportscoulddirectlycreateanadditional100,000to120,000highlyskilledjobsinIndia.Ifwecouldraisethepercentageofdomesticprocurementfrom40percentto70percentinthenextfive years, we would double the output in our defence industry. Imagine theimpact in terms of jobs created directly and in the relatedmanufacturing andservices sector! Think of the spin-off benefits on other sectors in terms ofadvanced materials and technologies! That is why we are focusing ondevelopingIndia’sdefenceindustrywithasenseofmission.

ThePMandParrikaratAeroIndia2015

‘This is why it is at the heart of our Make in India programme. We arereformingourdefenceprocurementpoliciesandprocedures.Therewouldbeaclear preference for equipment manufactured in India. Our procurementprocedureswill ensure simplicity, accountabilityand speedydecisionmaking,’thePrimeMinistertoldtheassembledaudienceoftopdefenceexecutivesfromaround theworld,andofficials,vendorsandsmallerplayers in India’sdefencesector, in Bangalore.2 To achieve the objectives that he had listed, the PrimeMinistercouldnothavepickedabettercandidatethanManoharParrikar.

To my mind, Parrikar’s technical background (an engineer from IIT,Bombay)andsharpintellectnotonlyallowedhimtograspthecomplexitiesoftheimportantministry,butalsoenabledhimtoputhisownstamponthedailyfunctioning of the MoD. Undoubtedly, there were slip-ups and someembarrassments,butthosecanprobablybeattributedtowell-entrenchedvestedinterests who tried to undermine his authority. For instance, when ParrikarworkeddiligentlytoarriveatadefinitivefigureforgrantingtheOneRankOnePension (OROP) to India’s two million plus defence veterans, some civilservants—becauseoftheirtraditionalantipathytowardsthemilitary—dugtheirheelsinandultimatelyvitiatedtheprocess,leavingParrikartoholdthecan.ThegovernmentinthebargainlostagooddealofgoodwillithadearnedbygrantingtheOROP.Ultimately, the government could not overcome the bureaucracy’sresistanceresultinginalessthandesirableimplementationoftheOROP.

IremembermeetingParrikarforthefirsttimeinFebruary2015(beforethat,Ihad only heard of him as an unusual politician).One of the questions he hadwas,‘What,inyourview,isthebiggestchallengehere(intheMoD)?’

Atfirst,duetomylackoffamiliaritywithhim,Ihadthoughtofplayingsafeandgivena standard reply, ‘It is a large, sensitive and importantministry andthereforenoteasytounderstandquickly.’

However,hiseasymannerencouragedmetobebolderandcommentfurther:‘Yourgreatestchallengewillbethestatusquomindset,whichpervadesthecivilandmilitarybureaucracy.Everyonewilltellyouthatsuchandsuchthingcannotbe done because there is no precedent to it. If you can overcome that trend,maybethenyouwillmakeabigstart.’

IcannotjudgeifParrikartookthatinput(notadvice)seriously,butwhoeverIhavecomeacrosssincethen—whetherintheServicesorinthedefenceindustry—swore by Parrikar’s efforts to re-energise the MoD and create greateraccountability. This in itself is a big change because at the best of times, theMoDisalumberinggiant,slowtostirandact.

TheMoDisnotonlyentrustedwiththedefenceofthecountry,butitisalsotheadministrativemachinery for India’snearly15 lakhmilitarypersonnel (theArmy,Navy,AirForceandCoastGuard).

Italsohasoneofthelargestbudgetsinthegovernment.Forinstancein2017-18,ithasbeenallocatedRs359,854crores($53.5billion).

Critics have quibbled over the comparatively low increase in the defencebudgetin2017-18.Butthatistheleastoftheproblemsthattheministryfaces.

ThemoreimportantchallengesforSouthBlockhavebeenreducingtimelinesfor acquisitions,better andoptimumutilisationof available resources, creatingan atmosphere of greater accountability and transparency in the MoD’sfunctioning, and making sure the most critical voids in India’s defencepreparednessaremadeupinquicktime.

Parrikar set out to achieve all that but the MoD saw to it that the PrimeMinister’sMake in India initiative receives the necessary impetus in defenceproduction. Critics may point to the dismal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)figurestodebunktheMakeinIndiainitiative.However,thereisanotherwaytolookatit.ManyIndiancompaniesarenowgettingmorecontracts.Forinstance,theCapitalexpenditureonprocurementofdefenceequipmentbythreeServicesfromIndianvendorshas increased fromRs31575Crores (47percentof totalprocurement value) in 2013-14 to Rs 41873 Crores (60.5 per cent of totalprocurementvalue)in2016-17.Inthelastthreefinancialyears,i.e.2014-15to2016-17,theGovernmenthasaccordedAcceptanceofNecessity(AoN)for145proposalsworthRs3,99,800croresapproximately,outofwhich103proposalsworth Rs 2,46,400 crores approximately have been approved under ‘Buy(Indian-IDDM)’, ‘Buy (Indian)’, ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’ and ‘Make’categoriesofcapitalacquisition.3

In fact,promulgationof theDefenceProcurementPolicy-2016was the first

step towards making fundamental changes in the way weapons platforms areacquired in India. The Buy IDDM (Indigenously Designed, Developed andManufactured)category,introducedinDPP-2016,nowgetsthetopmostpriorityamong six categories that constitute the new DPP, which is the guidingdocumentforalldefencepurchasesinIndia.

In effect, this means all those Indian companies which have the ability todesign and develop their products indigenously will get first preference fromnowonwardinmostpurchasesthatthethreearmedforcesundertake.

UnderthenewcategoryforIDDMequipment,itwillbemandatoryfor40percentofthecontenttobesourcedlocally.

DPP-2016 contains a number of fresh ideas designed to accelerate defenceacquisitions, while encouraging indigenous companies under the flagshipprogrammeofMakeinIndia.

Forinstance,inordertocutdowndelays,theDPPhenceforthmandatesthatallAcceptancesofNecessityforaparticularplatformwillbevalidonlyforonlysix months, as opposed to the twelvemonth deadline that it earlier had.Moreover,noAONwillbenotifieduntil it isaccompaniedbya finalisedRFP(RequestforProposalordetailedtender).

Inessence,thiseliminatesoneintermediatestagesincenotifyinganRFPafteranAON used to be inordinately delayed. Thereafter, prioritisation of projectswas the first step.Defenceacquisitionsareexpensiveandsincevery littlewaspurchasedintheUPAIIregime,thebacklogjustaddedtotheproblem.

Theresultofareviewofproposedprojectsmadeoverthepreviousfiveyearsfoundthatthebureaucracyintheministry—bothcivilandmilitary—wassittingonsome400-oddbigandsmallprojects,whichwerecriticaltothethreearmedforces.

A thorough review revealed that nearly one-third of the 400-odd projectswerenowirrelevant.Hence,theywerediscarded.

About50projectswereacceleratedsincetheywereofcriticalimportance.Next, important schemes across the three services that needed immediate

fundingandimplementationwereidentified.The effect of the spring cleaning is now visible. According to information

giventotheParliament,thenumberandvalueofcontractsisshowingahealthy,positiveupwardtrend.

In2014-15forinstance,18contractsworthRs11,261.72croresweresignedwithforeignvendors.In2015-16,only17contractsweresignedbuttheirvaluewent up to Rs 29,171.75 crores and in 201617, it shot up to a healthy Rs81,129.62croresfor23contracts.TheforeigncompaniesaremainlyfromUSA,Russia,Israel,UK,Germany,FranceandSweden.4

Thiswasnotaneasyfeattoachieve.As Sudhansu Mohanty, who worked as Controller General of Defence

Accounts and then as Financial Adviser, Defence Services, wrote in thisperceptive piece on the website, The Wire, on Parrikar: ‘He was a hands-onministerlikenoother.Hewasquick,butbehindhisquickdecision-makinglayamindthathadreflectedlongandhardoncrucialaspectsoftheissue.Hewasabrainiacwhowould dissect procurement cases, and expatiate at length on theprosandconsintheDefenceAcquisitionCouncil(DAC)meetingsasifhewasslowlypeelingofflayersofanonion.Buthegrantedeveryofficialtheirrightofsay,nomatterhowmuchhedisagreedwiththem.Heknewhiseverymovewasunderthemediascannerandtheubiquitousdefencelobby,buthewasfirmandopeninhisconviction.

‘But more than anything that I saw during my tenure was when the newdefence procurement procedure (DPP) was a work-inprogress. Of the manydiscussionswehadinmeetings,includingintheDAC,themeetingofeight-tenseniorofficersoftheministryandservicesheadquartersthatParrikarcalledforustohammerouttheDPPclausesisetchedinmymemory.Themeetingwentonforagoodsixhours.Whattomymindstillringsloudisthenewconceptofevaluationthathebroughttoplayonthe‘essentialandenhanced’parametersinthe services qualitative requirements granting nuances to the progressive,pragmaticwayforsinglevendorsituationsintheDPP.5

However, the biggest achievement of the Modi-Parrikar combine was tobreak the logjamthathadensued in theprocess toacquirenewfighter jets fortheIndianAirForce.ThepreviousUPAregimehadtieditselfinknotsovertheprocurement process and left behind amess for theModi government to deal

with.Parrikar,withfullsupportfromPrimeMinisterModi,spentaconsiderableamountoftimeindevisingawayoutoftheimpasse,andfinallycameupwithwhatultimatelyturnedouttobeawin-winoutcomeforeveryone.

The process wasn’t as simple as it sounds though. It was tortuous andinordinately long. To understand the background, it is essential to go back intime,toaperiodexactlyadecadeago.

THETORTUOUSMMRCASAGAThecompetitiontoacquire126MediumMultiRoleCombatAircraft(MMRCA)for the IndianAir Force began in 2007, after the government agreedwith theIAFthatitneededtoreplacetheageingfleetofMiGaircraft.

Six companies across theworldwere issued the tender papers. Theywere:EADS from Germany, manufacturers of the Eurofighter Typhoon; LockheedMartin(makersoftheF-16s)andBoeing(F18aircraft)fromtheUSA;Sweden’sSAAB (makers of Gripen); Dassault Aviation from France (the Rafalemanufacturers);andRussia’sRosoboronExport(MiG-35).

Indiawaslookingfor18aircrafttobeboughtofftheshelfand108weretobemanufactured inIndia(witha localpartner, in thiscase, itwassupposed tobethe state-ownedHindustanAeronauticsLtd).The requiredmaintenance, repairand overhaul facilities were to be set up locally. TheMMRCA contract wasvariously described as ‘mother of all deals’, ‘most complex defence contract,’andsooninthemediareports.Anditindeedwas.

According toofficialdocuments that Ihadachance toread in2012-13, theMoD had in 2011, benchmarked the Total Cost ofAcquisition at Rs 163,403crores. This, it must be pointed out, was different from the total cost ofdeliverablesinthe126MMRCAcontract,whichwasbenchmarkedbytheMoDatRs69,456crores,excludingtheoffsetloadingcost,estimatedtobeanywherebetweenRs2,530crorestoRs5,060crores.

All of this came after the six companies had submitted their techno-commercial bids in April 2008, followed by nearly eleven months of fieldevaluation trial (FET) held in the heat of the Rajasthan desert during peaksummer months and in extreme cold conditions in the high altitude zone ofLadakh.The trialswerecompleted inMay2010.TheevaluationcommitteeoftheIAFshortlistedtwoaircraft—theEurofighterTyphoonandtheRafaleaircraftfielded by Dassault Aviation (DA)—and forwarded the recommendation toDefence Minister AK Antony. Antony took almost a year to accept therecommendation. It was already 2011.After prolonged internal discussions in

two sub-committees (the Technical Oversight Committee-TOC and theTechnical Offset Evaluation Committee-TOEC), a Contract NegotiationsCommittee (CNC)were formed inApril2011.BySeptemberof thatyear, theCNC had arrived at the benchmarking cost after applying escalation rates byaveragingsimpleyear-on-yearescalation.

But it was not before July 2012, that the CNC activated four Sub-Committees, the ‘Maintenance’, ‘Offset’, and ‘ToT and ‘Contract’ Sub-Committees.

For thenext twoyears,negotiationsonTransferofTechnology,Offset andMaintenancewentonataleisurelypace.However,certainaspectsrelatedtotheLicenseManufactureof108aircraft in IndiawithHALas the leadproductionagencycouldnotbefinalised.MajordifferencesarosewithregardtothematterofManHours thatwouldberequiredtoproducetheaircraft fromkits inIndiaandwhowould take the responsibility for the entire lot of 126 aircraft.WhileDA maintained that 31 Million Man Hours that it had proposed should besufficienttoproduce108RafaleaircraftinIndia,HALwasaskingforamark-upofManHoursby2.7times.

This point became the bone of contention between the government and theFrenchmanufacturer.

Moreover, in theunderstandingof theMoD,thecompanythathademergedas the winner in the bid—Dassault Aviation—would have to sign a singlecontractwiththeIndiangovernment.TheFrenchCompanywouldthenneedtohave back-to-back contractswithHAL and other Indian ProductionAgencies.DassaultAviationwouldalsoberesponsibleforthedeliveryofthecomplete126aircraft to IAF and the single point responsibility for this contract restedwithDassault Aviation because the RFP was issued to them. At that stage, therepresentativesofDassaultAviationagreedtodotheirbestinordertomeetallrequirementsoftheprojectasenvisagedintheRFP.

However,DassaultAviationdidnotfulfil thecommitmentgivenin thefirstmeeting and there was an impasse in the matter of the responsibility fordelivering108aircrafttobemanufacturedinIndia.Anotherhurdlecameuponthe point of work share of HAL. Dassault Aviation was asked to submit a

‘ResponsibilityMatrix’,clearlydefiningtheroleandresponsibilityofDassaultAviationandHAL.The‘ResponsibilityMatrix’wastofacilitateaback-to-backcontractofDassaultAviationwithHAL.However,theCNCwasunabletomovethe negotiations forward since the interpretation of those two fundamentalaspectsofthecasebytheFrenchCompanywasnotinlinewiththetermsoftheoriginaltermsinthetender.

The UPA government, under the overly cautious AK Antony, instead ofimposingadeadlinefortheFrenchmanufacturertocomplywiththetermsoftheRFP, dragged its feet and allowed Dassault Aviation to get away withobfuscation.Moreover,inanunusualmove,AntonyinstructedMoDofficialstobringthefilebacktohimafterconcludingtheCNCtore-examinetheintegrityoftheprocessbeforeproceedingtofinalisethecontract,creatingconfusionanddoubtinthemindsoftheofficialswhowerenegotiatingwiththemanufacturer.

Evenastalksreachedacompletestandstill,thegovernmentchangedinDelhi.Asthenewpoliticalleadershipwasbriefedabouttheimpasse,MoDofficials

were told by the PMO and Jaitley to try and break the deadlock as soon aspossiblesincetheIAF’sfleetoffighteraircraftwasdepletingalarmingly.

Thus, during ameeting of CNC on 25 September 2014,Dassault Aviationwasdirected toprovide commitment on these two issueswithin tendays.TheCompanydemurred.Asnoresponsewasreceivedfromtheirend,anotherletterdated31October2014wassenttothemseekingrequisitecommitmentwithinaweek. In their response dated 7 November 2014, Dassault Aviation did notprovidetheconfirmationssoughtbytheCNC.

On10November2014,ParrikartookoverasDefenceMinister.Whilebeingbriefed about the major pending projects and contracts, he realised that theMMRCA contract wasn’t going anywhere. Yet he wanted to give the Frenchcompanysufficienttimetocomplywiththetermsofthetender.

InDecember2014, theFrenchDefenceMinisterwasvisitingDelhi, and aswasexpected,heraisedtheissueoftheconclusionofcontractnegotiationsintheMMRCA case with Parrikar. The latter told him that the conclusion of thecontracthadbeenhelduponaccountofthevendornotconfirmingcompliancetothetermsoftheRFP.ThiswasfollowedupbyaformalletterfromParrikarto

theFrenchDefenceMinister stating that itwouldbe reallyuseful forDassaultAviationtoconfirmcompliancewiththetermsoftheRFPandthetermsofthebidsubmittedbythemattheearliest.Itwasfurthermentionedintheletterthatthe negotiations can be carried forward and concluded thereafter if DassaultAviationcouldbeasked todeputea fullyempoweredrepresentative todiscussnon-stopwithCNC.

AnotherdiscussionwiththedelegationofDassaultAviationwasheldon12February 2015. A clarification was sought from Dassault Aviation towardsconfirmation of compliance to the terms of the RFP and terms of the bidsubmittedbythemspecifically.Thetwocrucialpoints,(i)theconsolidatedManHours(MH)basedonwhichDassaultAviationhadbeendeclaredL-1wouldbethe samemanhours required for licensemanufactureof108Rafale aircraft inIndia,and(ii)DassaultAviationastheSellerunderthecontractfor126aircraftfor the IAF will undertake necessary contractual obligations as per RFPrequirements.

TherepresentativesofDassaultAviationreiteratedtheirstandonbothissuesandstatedthatwhileDassaultAviationwillberesponsibleonlyfordeliveryof18 aircraft in a flyaway condition, they will not take ownership for the 108aircrafttobemanufacturedbyHALastheLocalProductionAgency(LPA).OntheissueregardingManHours,theDassaultAviationrepresentativestatedthatthe company’s stand has always been consistent with their previously statedposition. The representativewas of the view that theManHours indicated intheir proposal correspond to the related tasks performed in French Industrialcondition.HealsomentionedthatonlyHALbeingtheLeadProductionAgencycantalkabout thefactorofmultiplication tobeapplied to theseManHours toconvert the same to the Man Hours required for license production of 108aircraft in India. Clearly, Dassault Aviation was using the loophole in theoriginaltermsofthetendertogetawaywithshirkingitsresponsibilitytowardsthequalityofthe108jetstobemanufacturedinIndia.

ExasperatedattheobduracyshownbytheFrenchcompany,MoDissuedanultimatum on 20 March 2015, asking it to fulfill the commitment to andconfirmationof the twoaspectsmentionedabove, ‘failingwhichMoDmaybe

constrainedtowithdrawtheRFPissued’.However,DassaultAviation, in its response dated 24March 2015, did not

committothetwoaspectsmentionedabove.Instead,theFrenchCompanystatedthattheirestimateofconsolidatedManHoursistobeusedbyHALtoprepareitsownquotationwithrespecttothecompletionofits(HAL’s)tasksundertheMMRCA. TheMoD realised that applying a factor of 2.7 on theManHoursquotedbybothDassaultAviationandEADS(thecompanythathadquotedthesecondlowestprice),theTotalCostofAcquisition(TCA)asofNovember2011wouldundergoamaterialchange,totheextentthatDassaultAviationwouldnolongerremainL1vendor(lowestbidder),andwouldinsteadbecomeL2vendor.

AstheCNCmemberstookthemattertoParrikar,herealisedtheprocesshadbeenconvolutedtosuchanextentthatitwouldhavebeenimpossibletotakeitforward.Nevertheless,heknewfromtheIAFbriefingsthattherewasnotimetolose in acquiring fighter jets. The number of effective squadrons was rapidlygoing down. The IAF leadership also told him that theywere happywith theRafale’sperformanceandwouldratherhavethefighterinitsfleetthanscoutforotheroptions.ParrikarrealisedthatconductingasecondroundofMMRCAkindof competitionwould take an enormous amount of time and effort.Hence, hetook thematter to the PrimeMinister and briefed him about the necessity ofprocuringthefighterinadifferentmanner.Atthesametime,ParrikartoldModiitwouldbelegallyuntenabletogothroughwiththeMMRCAcontractsincetheprocesshadbecomecompletelyvitiatedthankstoAntony’sindecisivenessandacrucialoversightintheoriginaltermsofthecontract.

Under the circumstances, there was no alternative but to withdraw theoriginal tender, Parrikar told Modi, since the CVC (Central VigilanceCommission) guidelines provide that negotiations cannot be held with thecompetitorwhohascomesecondinthecontract(L2vendorinofficialese).ThedefenceministersuggestedthattheonlywayleftwastoscrapthetenderandbuyaminimumnumberofRafalejetsofftheshelftofillacriticalgapintheIAF’sinventory.ThePrimeMinisteragreedanddecidedtotalktotheFrenchPresidentabout such a possibility duringhis upcomingvisit toParis inApril 2015.TheCabinetCommitteeonSecurity(CCS)alsogaveitsapprovaltothenewproposal

before Modi left for Paris on 9 April 2015. Parrikar left for Goa that samemorning,promptinglatercommentsfromuninformedcommentatorsthathewasnotintheloopaboutPrimeMinisterModi’ssubsequentannouncementinParis.

Thatevening,alertedbyasourceaboutthepossibilityofIndiascrappingtheMMRCAtenderandgoinginforoff-the-shelfpurchaseofRafalejets,Iscoopedthe story on my blog News Warrior (www.nitinagokhale.blogspot.in), tenminutestomidnighton9April,almost22hoursbeforeModi’sannouncementinParis, of India deciding to buy Rafale jets off the shelf. However, I got thenumbers wrong. My report said India would buy 63 Rafale directly fromDassaultAviation.6

Once the Prime Minister's delegation landed in Paris, it was left to NSADovalandPMOofficialstonegotiatewiththeFrenchontheroadmapaheadtobuy the Rafales off the shelf. It took them almost the entire day to agree onscrappingtheMMRCAprocessandcometoanunderstandingontheminimumnumbersthatIndiacouldprocure.

Eventually, Prime Minister Modi announced in Paris that India wouldpurchase36aircraft.ShishirGuptaof theHindustanTimeswasmoreaccurate(asfarasnumberswereconcerned).7

India’s decision, announced at a joint PressConference betweenModi andthethenFrenchPresidentFrancoiseHollandeon10April2015,tookeveryonebysurprise,butunderthecircumstances,thePrimeMinisterhadchosenthebestpossiblesolution.

PrimeMinisterModiwiththethenPresidentofFrance,FrançoisHollande

Oncethein-principledecisionwastaken,itwaslefttoParrikarandhisteamin the MoD to negotiate the eventual price for buying the 36 jets. Theirconfidence bolstered by thePMO, theParrikar-ledMoDdrove a hard bargainwiththeFrench.Butitwasn’tuntilanother15monthslater—inSeptember2016—that India finallysigned thecontractandgot thestate-of-the-art fightersatacompetitiveprice.

36RAFALEVS126MMRCAPACKAGECOMPARISON

As the contract was signed, the inevitable comparisons in terms of costs thatIndiawas paying for the 36 jets and the 126 planeswhich the countrywouldhavesupposedlyboughtundertheMMRCAdealbegan.

The final negotiated price for 36 Rafale package, along with initialconsignmentofweapons,Performance-basedLogistics(PBL),simulatorsalongwith annualmaintenance, and associated equipment and serviceswas fixed at7,890millionEuros.TheaverageunitcostofRafaleaircraft thusturnedouttobe91.7millionEuros(goingbytheEuro-to-rupeeconversionrateatthetimeof

signingthecontract, itmeanteachaircraftwouldcostRs688.30croreandnotRs 1,500 or Rs 1,700 crore quoted by some analysts). In any case, officialsinvolvedinthenitty-grittyofthenegotiationspointedoutthatthepackagecostof126MMRCAand36Rafalecannotbedirectlycomparedtoworkoutperunitcost as the deliverables in the two cases were quite different. Obviously, theCCS,briefed indetailabout theabsolutenecessityofprocuring theRafale jetsfortheIAFandthecostcomparisons,didnothesitateforamomenttocleartheproposal,asParrikarremembers.‘Imustgivefullcredittothenegotiatingteamfor having diligentlyworked out all the details to get a good bargain, and thePrimeMinister’stotaltrustinus,’Parrikartoldme.

DefenceMinistersofFranceandIndiasigntheagreementonRafale

What the former defence minister doesn’t mention however is his ownsteadfastbeliefthatthecosthadtobenegotiatedtoIndia’sadvantage.AseniorIAFofficial, involved in thehardbargainwith theFrench, recalls: ‘ItwasMrParrikarwhobackedustothehiltandevenheldfirminthefaceoftremendouspressureappliedbytheFrenchwhentheirPresident(FrancoisHollande)wasinDelhi as the Chief Guest for the Republic Day Parade in January 2016. Mr

Hollandewas keen to sign theMoU, inclusive of the finalisedprice,with ourPrimeMinisterwhileinDelhi.Wenegotiatedthroughthenightuntil1600hours,butthepriceMrParrikarthoughtwasstillhigh.So,hetookthemattertothePMand requested him to sign theMoUwithoutmentioning the final price,whichModi promptly did.On 26 January 2016, India andFrance signed aMoU forIndia tobuy36Rafale fighter jets.Newspapers reports thenextdaysaid the9billiondollardealwouldtakesometimetobefinalised.’8

Ittookanothereightmonthsforthecontracttobesigned.Theteamdroveahard bargain and obtained a hefty discount. As I wrote on my website,www.bharatshakti.in: ‘The MoD-IAF negotiating team extracted manyconcessionsanddiscountstoarriveatapricethatisalmost750millionlessthanwhat was being quoted by the French side in January 2016, when thecommercial negotiations had gathered pace, almost seven months after PrimeMinisterNarendraModiannounced India’s intention tobuy36Rafalesoff theshelffromFranceduringhistriptoParisinApril2015.’

‘Tobringdownthecost, theIndianteamaskedFrenchofficials tocalculatethedealonactualcost(priceasontoday)plusEuropeanInflationIndices(whichvaries like stockmarkets and is currently around 1 per cent per annum). TheMoDhasalsocapped theEuropeanInflation Indices toamaximumof3.5percent a year. In otherwords, if inflation indices go down (chances of it goingdownaremore,lookingatthecurrentsituationofEuropeanmarkets),Indiawillhavetopayless.Evenifitgoesup,Indiawillnotpaymorethanthe3.5percentincrease.’

Asmy explanatorypiece onwww.BharatShakti.in pointedout: ‘In the nowscrapped process for buying 126 Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft(MMRCA), confusion reigned supreme in calculating the cost of the contract.After the French Dassault Aviation—makers of the Rafale Jet—had emergedwinners,theUPAgovernmentagreedwithFrenchofficialstocalculatethepriceon the fixed cost formula that allowed the company to include an additionalpriceof3.9percentInflationIndicesfromday1ofthedeal.So,hadIndiagoneaheadwith theUPA deal and the European Inflation Indices had fallen (as itindeedhas), Indiawould have endeduppaying an additional cost of Inflation

Indices(@3.9percent)whichhadalreadybeenaddedattheinitialnegotiationstage.’9

Apartfromthelowerprice,theRafalesthattheIAFoperatewillalsohaveaweaponsuitemuchsuperiortotheonesproposedintheearliercase.Theywillinclude Air to Air weapons METEOR Beyond Visual Range Missiles withranges more than 150 Km, MICA-RF Beyond Visual Range Missiles withrangesmorethan80kmandMICA-IRCloseCombatMissileswithrangesmorethan60km.TheAir-GroundweaponsincludeSCALPmissileswitharangeinexcessof300km.TheinductionofMETEORandSCALPmissileswillprovideasignificantcapabilityedgetotheIAFoverIndia’sadversaries.

The Rafale for IAF will have 13 India Specific Enhancement (ISE)capabilitieswhicharenotpresentintheRafaleaircraftbeingoperatedbyothercountries.ThreecapabilitiespertaintoRadarenhancementswhichwillprovideIAF with better long range capability. One of the specific capabilities beingacquired is theHelmetMountedDisplay (HMD) throughwhich the IAFpilotswill be able counter many threats simultaneously. Another very significantcapability enhancement is the ability to start and operate from ‘HighAltitudeAirfields’.The36RafaleaircraftaretobedeliveredtotheIAFwithin67monthsafterthesigningoftheInter-GovernmentAgreement.Thisdeliveryscheduleisbetter than the delivery schedule proposed earlier by the French side by fivemonths.

Nevertheless, buying the aircraft is only the first step. After the initialpurchase, the realmeasure of the effectiveness of any aircraft is in the speedwithwhich it can be repaired and ‘turned around’, that is readied for anothermission themoment it returns tobase. In that respect, the IAFcouldnothavenegotiatedabetterdeal.

IntheMMRCAcase,theinitialPBLsupportwastobeforfiveyearsforonesquadron. In the case of the 36 Rafale, the PBL is for five years for twosquadrons, along with an additional contractual commitment of another twoyearswiththebaseyearpriceskeptintact.Inthepreviouslyproposedcontract,the computation of PBL performance had considered cannibalisation ofcomponentsfromunserviceableaircraft.TheIndiansidewasabletoremovethis

clausewithoutanyadditionalcost.ThePBLAgreementnowstipulatesthatthecompanywillensurethataminimumof75percentofthefleetwillalwaysbeavailable for operations. Moreover, the Rafale has a lower turnaround timecompared to other fighter aircraft available. The Rafale aircraft can do fivesortiesinadayincontrasttoothertwin-enginefighteraircraftavailable,whichhaveasortiegenerationrateofthreeperday.

TheRafalewasthebiggestofthecomplicatedcasesthattheMoDresolved,but thereareothercrucialpiecesofequipment that Indianeedsandquicklyatthat.Therefore,allthehurdlesinthepurchaseofartilleryguns(M-777howitzersfrom theUS), attack andmedium lift helicopters for theArmy (Chinook andApachehelicoptersfromtheUS),frigatesandminecounter-measurevesselsfortheNavy,andAkashmissilesfortheAirForce,wereremovedindoublequicktime.

These measures had to be prioritised due to the previous government’snegligenceeveninthecaseofbasicrequirements.ThepreviousComptrollerandAuditorGeneralreporttabledinParliamentmadeforgrimreading.

‘Stockingofammunitionevenat‘‘minimumacceptablerisk level’’wasnotensured,asavailabilityofammunitionasofMarch2013wasbelowthislevelinrespectof125outofatotalof170typesofammunition,’thereportstated.

Also, for 50 per cent of the total types of ammunition, the holding was‘critical’—insufficientforeven10daysoffighting,thereportadded.

Thishasnowbeencorrectedbymakingsurethatammunitionfor10daysofintensefightingisalwaysinstock.Oncethatobjectiveisachieved,theministrywill look into the further replenishment of stocks. The delegated financialpowersforthevice-chiefsofthethreeServicesandarmycommandershavebeenenhancedtoallowspeedierpurchases.

This isabigchange in thenotoriouslyslowandopaquefunctioning,whichhashistoricallybesiegedtheMoD.

Inanothermajordecision, thegovernmentopenedupthedefencesectorforFDI, allowing49per centFDI through the automatic route andup to 100percentFDIonacase-to-casebasis.

Also, the restrictions on what was ‘state-of-the-art technology’ have been

reduced to ‘modern technology’. This would increase the number of defencecompaniesinvestinginIndia.

The procurement andmodernisation of the three services apart, the biggestdecision by the Modi government was to grant the One Rank One Pensionscheme—a40-year-olddemandoftheveterans.Althoughtherehavebeensomevoices of disgruntlement on the issue, the fact is, this government showed thenecessary political will and resolve to find a solution to a 40-year old mess.PrimeMinisterModi alsomakes it apoint tovisit soldiers in remote frontiersandcelebratefestivalslikeDiwaliwiththem(seePlate18).

Remembers Lt Gen KJ Singh, then the Western Army Commander, ‘MrModi's attention to detail is amazing. He came to visit soldiers during oneDiwali. He visited two war memorials, one at Ferozpure and the other atHussainiwala.Atbothplaces,hewantedtoknowthedetailsofthebattlesfoughtthere.Evenwhenweorganisedthe1965Warexhibition,hewantedustoreachout to the common people and let them knowmore about the exploits of oursoldiers.’

On theeveofDiwali2016,concernedabout thenormal livesof soldiers inIndiaModilaunchedacampaignwhereinpeopleacrossthecountrycouldsendtheirwishesandmessagestosoldiersforDiwali,whoaremilesawayfromhomeand their families,protecting thepeopleof thisnation sowecancelebrate thefestivalinpeace.

‘Isentmy#Sandesh2Soldiers.Youcouldalsodothesame.Yourwisheswillcertainlymakeourforcesveryhappy,’hetweeted.ThePMalsosharedavideoinwhichhesaid‘weshouldmakeoursoldiersfromtheArmy,Navy,AirForce,CentralReservePoliceForce(CRPF),BorderSecurityForce(BSF),feelthatwearegratefulforwhattheydoforus,’saidModi.

According to data available with the PMO, over 3.5 lakh messages werereceived fromdifferent people and7.5 lakh tweetswerenoticed following thePM’sappeal.

AsRichard(Rick)Rossow,senioradvisorandWadhwaniChairinUS-IndiaPolicy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies inWashingtonDCobserves,‘Onthedefencefront,theModigovernmentseemsto

have put its imprint on three priority initiatives. First, freeing up the privatesector, including augmenting foreign equity limits. Second, introducing One-Rank,One-Pension (OROP).And third, revising India’sDefense ProcurementPolicy (DPP).Theprocurementprocess still seems torturously slow,andotherwidelyanticipated decisions like creating a ‘‘joint chiefs’’ role, remain on thehorizon—goodinitiativesforthereminderofMr.Modi’sfirstterm,orperhaps,forapotentialsecondterminoffice.’

However, inspiteof theModigovernment’sgoodintentions,a toxic legacyleftbehindbyadecadeandmoreoflethargyandtimidityunderAKAntony,itwill take sustained efforts to ensure that the MoD effectively discharges itsdutiestowardssecuringthenation.

Throughvariousmeasuresandfocusedattention,thethreearmedforcesandthe notoriously slow and inefficient Defence Research and DevelopmentOrganisation (DRDO) have also been spurred into action to improve theirperformance.

STRENGTHENINGMISSILEPOWERPolicychangesinacquisitionandprocurementapart,theModigovernmenthasconsciouslyrefocuseditsattentionondefencediplomacyandself-sufficiencyinindigenouslydevelopingandmanufacturingmissiles.OneofthevisiblesuccessstoriesfortheDefenceResearchandDevelopmentOrganisation(DRDO)inthepast twenty years has been its Integrated Guided Missile DevelopmentProgramme (IGMDP), an initiative of APJ Abdul Kalam, who went on tobecomeIndia’s11thPresident.

The success is all themore creditable when seen in the context of severaltechnological sanctions that had been imposed byWestern countries on India,following the1998nuclear tests. Indiahadbuilt itsmissileson thebasisof itsowntechnologicalstrength,unlikePakistan,which iscompletelydependentonothercountries(seePlate20).

Like its predecessor, the current government has also provided the muchneeded thrust for the strategic defence programmes. In fact, given thedeteriorating situation with China and continuing tensions with Pakistan, thegovernment has speeded up the effort to attain self-sufficiency in Missilesystems and technologies. These include navigation, control and guidancesystems seekers, propulsion and materials which have been developedindigenously. Today, India has the capability to develop any kind of missilesystem with indigenous technology, through full support from the domesticdefence industry. Dr G. Satheesh Reddy, Scientific Adviser to the RakshaMantri,whoisalsotheDirectorGeneralofMissilesandStrategicSystems,isoftheopinion that India isnowcapableofproducingseveralhundredmissilesofdifferent types inayear, thanks to thegovernment’semphasison theMake inIndiaprogramme in thedefence sector,particularlywith reference toMissiles.He further reveals that funding has increased substantially for both R&D inmissiles and their production, along with increasing participation from theprivatesector.

In fact, it is based on the success of the indigenous missile production

initiatives that for the first time the government is encouraging the export ofmissiles to friendly countries for their self-defence, a right step towards thenation becoming economically prosperous and politically powerful. AlthoughIndiahas‘nofirstuse’policy in thenucleardomain, ithasdevelopedastrongsuit of strategicweapons.While the long range strategicmissilesAgni1, 2, 3and4havebeenalreadyinductedintotheservices,Agni5witharangeofover5,000kmisnowreadyforinduction.ThoughneitherDrReddynorothersintheknow are willing to talk about the development of India’s nuclear triad,information available in public domain suggests that India’s nuclear-capableunderwater missile systems are well on their way to be fully developed andinductedintotheNavysoonerthananyoneexpects.

BALLISTICMISSILEDEFENCE(BMD)Given that both China and Pakistan ostensibly have hostile attitudes towardsIndia,andbothpossessmissilescapableofhittingkeytargetslikebigcitiesandcriticalinfrastructureassetsinIndia,NewDelhihasforyearssoughttoestablisha Ballistic Missile Defence system. Such that any incoming threat can beinterceptedeitherattheboost(launch)point,mid-course(flightthroughspace),orterminalphase(duringatmosphericdescent).

The BMD is a two-tier fully automated system that comprises overlappingnetwork of early warning and tracking radars, reliable command and controlposts,aswellaslandandsea-basedbatteriesofadvancedinterceptormissiles.

DRDOtesteditsfirstinterceptormissilein2006.Sincethen,atleastadozentestshavebeencarriedout,threeofwhichhavefailed.Thepreviousgovernmenthad given a deadline of 2014 to operationalise the BMD for Delhi by 2014.However, theDRDOfailedtomeet thedeadline.After thecurrentgovernmenttookover,DRDOwasdirectedtorectifytheshortcomingsandgetthesysteminplace.Hence, after a coupleofyearsof extensive rectification, two successivetests were carried out in February andMarch of 2017. In February 2017, theexoatmosphericPDV(PrithviDefenceVehicle)interceptormissiledirectlyhitaballistic targetanddestroyeditatanaltitudeofabout100km.InMarch2017,

the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) endo-atmospheric interceptor missiledestroyed the incoming ballistic target at an altitude of about 15 km withpinpoint accuracy. This achievement has put India in the elite league of fournations—US,Russia,IsraelandChina—whichhavethecapabilitytoneutraliseballisticmissiletargetsatbothendoandexoatmosphericaltitudes.

The BMD apart, the DRDO has undertaken several new projects to boostIndia’s defensive, as well as offensive capabilities. These include: The QuickReaction Surface to Air Missile (QRSAM), Smart Anti-Airfield System(SAAW),AstraBeyondVisualRangeAir-to-AirMissile System (BVRAAM)andGuidedBombs.

TheQRSAMfocuseson theenhancedcapability tosearchand track targetsonthemove,witharangeofaround30km.DRDOscientistssaythesystemhasan on the move 360 degree all round coverage, giving it a rapid scan andneutralisationcapabilityagainstanincomingthreat.

Meanwhile,theDRDOclaimsthattheIndianAirForce’s(IAF)searchforabeyond visual range capability in air-to-air combat has been fulfilledwith thedevelopmentoftheAstraBVRAAM.TheAstramissilehasarangeof80to110kmandiscapableofbeingfiredfromtheIAF’sfrontlinefighterssuchastheSu-30.Aftercompletingaseriesofsuccessful trials in2015-16anddemonstratingrepeat performance in engaging live targets under various aircraft flightconditions,theAstramissilehasbolsteredtheconfidenceoftheuser,remarktheDRDOscientistsandIAFtestpilotsalike.ThegovernmenthassincethengivenclearanceforlimitedseriesproductionofthemissiletobeinductedintotheIAF.

DRDO’smostsuccessfulprogrammeisinmissiles

In another development, theDRDOhas developedwinged andnon-wingedguidedbombstoprovidelongstandoffcapabilityfortacticalemploymentbytheIAF.Bothbombshavebeendevelopedformultiplerolesandmultipleplatformapplications. A series of trials conducted during 2015-16 from Su-30 aircrafthaveprovedtobevery

accuratefortheintendedrangebetween30and90km.Bothglidebombsarenowreadyforproduction.

TheDRDOhasalsodevelopedaSmartAntiAirfieldWeapon(SAAW)tobeused against enemy airfields. The air launched weapon was recently releasedfrom a Jaguar aircraft. During theDecember 2016 trials, it reached the targetwithaccuracy.TheDRDOnowexpectsthe125kgSAAWweapontobeavitalpartoftheIAF’sarsenal.

Meanwhile,theDRDO’spreviousprogrammesofdevelopingSurfacetoAirMissiles(SAMsystems)isstillontrack.IthasmuchtodowiththerequirementofreplacingthecostlyimportedarsenalofSAMsalreadyoperatedbytheIndianarmedforces.Workingfromfirstprinciples, theDRDOhasbeensuccessful indevelopingafullyfunctionalSAMsystem,theAkashMissileSystemthatboastsof a complex network of sensors, data links and a fire control system. Thesystem is capableof effectively engaging avarietyof airborne threats through

realtimedecisionmaking.‘The Akash missile, a medium range SAM, has successfully entered

production stage in the last three years,with total support and encouragementfromthepresentpolitical leadership,’ theDrSatheeshReddysaid.Thesystemhas been inducted into the IndianAir Force and IndianArmy post successfuluser trials in April 2016. It has paved the way for self-reliance in defencesystems with a considerable amount of indigenous content sourced from theIndianindustry.FollowingthesuccessofAkash,thegovernmenthasnowgiventhego-aheadforinductionofmoresquadronsintotheIAFtoreplacetheexistingimportedSAMs.ThedecisiontoinductmoreregimentsofAkashintotheIndianArmywillmeanmoregrowthandopportunityforindigenousdefenceindustries.

Medium rangeSurface toAirmissilewith a rangeof70kmandveryhighmanevouring capability has been deployed by DRDO in collaboration withIsrael.BoththeNavalandAirforceversionshavebeentestedagainstmultiplescenariosoflivetargets.Now,thegovernmenthassanctionedMRSAMprojectforIndianArmyalsoatabout17,000crores.

ThereareacoupleofothersuccessstoriesthattheDRDOcanbejustifiablyproudof.Takeforinstance,theGuidedPinakasystem.TheDRDOhasupgradedthemultibarrelrocketlaunchsystemwithacontrolandguidancesystem,givingitbothpinpointaccuracyandanincreasedrangeof90km.TheupgradedPinakasystem’s effectiveness was successfully demonstrated during the flight testsconductedinJanuary2017.Theupgradedsystemwillmeanonesuchrocketcanachievetheobjectiveinplaceofseveralunguidedrockets.

Similarly, the fire and forget Nag and HeliNa ATGM (Antitank GuidedMissiles)addsamuchneededoperationalsuperioritytotheanti-tankcapabilitiesof the Indian Army. The 3rd generation ATGM Nag has been provensuccessfully this year. The IIR seeker technologies have been improvised tomeet the complete requirements including the range. Target acquistion by theseeker and missile range were demonstrated during the the trials from theAdvancedLightHelicopter (ALH) inJune2014.Afterseveralsuch trials, it isnowcertain that the largeanti-tankmissile requirementsof thecountrycanbemetindigenously.

INDIANNAVYONAROLLWhiletheIndianArmyisbyfarthebiggestofthethreearmedforces,inviewofChina’sincreasingforaysintotheIndianOceanandtheBayofBengaloverthepast decade, the role of the Indian Navy has increased in India’s strategicdecision-making.And foronce, thegovernment isputting itsmoneywhere itsmouthis.Since2014, theModigovernmenthasmovedswiftlytopluggapsinIndia’smaritimesectorandpushedthenavytodomorebilateralexercisesandsend additional ships for overseas deployment in comparison to previousgovernments.

For instance, there were seven overseas deployments, OperationalTurnarounds (OTS) and surveillance of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) forfriendly countries such as Mauritius, Seychelles and Maldives in 2014. Thatnumberquicklydoubledin2015and2016.

NewDelhihasalsoreachedouttotheIndianOceanlittoralstates,allocatedmore resources for bilateral and multilateral naval exercises and finalised thedevelopment of two islands for future Indianmilitary bases in the smaller butstrategically located countries—Mauritius and Seychelles—besides bolsteringthedevelopmentofmilitaryandcivil infrastructureof its island territories, theAndamanandLakshadweepislands.

InMarch2015,PrimeMinisterModidecidedtoundertakeathree-nationtouroftheIndianOceancountriesstartingwithSriLankaandthentoMauritiusandSeychelles. The intention was to further strengthen India’s long-standing tieswithallthethreecountries,butinalittleknownfactatthattime,Modi’steamhadalsodecidedtofinalisetheleaseoftwoislands—oneeachinSeychellesandMauritius—that had been under negotiation for some years. Located in theWestern Indian Ocean, these small islands are now being developed withrequiredinfrastructureneededfornavalshipstransitingthroughthewatersofthewestern Indian Ocean. This is part of India’s plan to help the Indian Oceanlittoralsinstrengtheningtheirmaritimedomainawarenesscapabilities.

DuringtheModivisit—againafirstbyanIndianPrimeMinisterinmorethan

three decades—four agreements, including one on maritime security, weresigned.

India and Seychelles also declared that India will be leasing AssumptionIsland,oneofthe115islandsthatcomprisetheSeychelles.Itisanuninhabitedisland,nearthenorthernendoftheMozambiqueChannel(seemap).Alongwiththe Suez Canal, the Mozambique Channel is one of the two main routes forshipping between the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans. Naval observers havenotedthatNewDelhi’splansintheWesternIndianOceanareinresponsetotheincreasingChineseforaysintotheIndianOceanandhiringDjiboutiasthePLANavy’sfirstoverseasmilitarybase(seePlate19).

Modi also inaugurated the first of the eight Coastal Surveillance RadarSystems (CSRS) that India is setting up. Soon after Modi’s visit, the IndianNavy began survey and preliminary work on the island. Later the SeychellesPresident revealed thedetails in amedia interview.President JamesMichelofthe Seychelles told The Hindu: ‘This is a joint project between India andSeychelles involvingour twoDefenceForcesinenhancingourmutualsecurityalongourwesternseaboard.Seychellesisabsolutelycommittedtotheproject.’10

InMauritiustoo,Indiaalreadyhasafoothold.BoththesecurityadviserandtheheadoftheMauritianNavy/CoastGuardhavebeenIndianNavalofficersfordecades, India had for long resisted basing Indian Military hardware on theIsland.Thatisabouttochange.

‘Modi’svisittoMauritiusincludedanannouncementthatIndiawillupgradeairfield and port facilities at North Agalega Island, located some 1000 kmnortheast of Madagascar, for use by the Indian military. This has long beendiscussed, but never acted upon. Using Agalega as a staging point willsubstantially help India’s maritime reconnaissance efforts throughout thewestern Indian Ocean,’ wrote a naval expert, immediately after the PrimeMinister’svisit.11DrDavidBrewster,workingwith theStrategic andDefenceStudies Centre at the Australian National University, where he specialises inSouthAsianandIndianOceanstrategicaffairs,observesthat‘India’smovesalsoreflectaninstinctiveviewamongmanyinDelhithatiftheIndianOceanisnotactuallyIndia’sOcean,theninanidealworlditoughttobe.’

The Indian Navy is accordingly gearing up for the upcoming strategiccompetition with the PLA Navy. Several new plans—from speeding upinfrastructurebuildinginAndamanandLakshwadeepislandstoacquiringmoreassetsandinductingmorepersonnel—arenowtakingoff(seeAppendixII).

India’sannualjointnavalexercisewiththeUnitedStates—ExerciseMalabar—isnowofficiallyatrilateralonewithJapanjoiningthemanoeuvreinthe2017edition. India’s signing the LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum ofAgreement) in August 2016, after years of hesitation, was a breakthroughmoment in Indo-USmilitary ties.On thediscussion table forat least11years,the previous government was unwilling to take the plunge for fear of beingbranded ‘pro-US’, but Prime Minister Modi and his national security teamappears to have overcome the hesitation and signalled an unequivocal shifttowards a greater defence, especially maritime, cooperation with the UnitedStatesanditsallies(seePlate18).

TheLEMOA, specificallydrawnup for India, takes careofmanyconcernsthatcriticshavehadabouttheUSgainingaccesstoIndianNavalbasesandtheAmericansusingIndianfacilitiestolaunchawarintheregion,dismissingthemasunfounded.APressrelease issuedby theIndianMinistryofDefencestates:‘LEMOAisafacilitatingagreementthatestablishesbasicterms,conditions,andproceduresfor reciprocalprovisionofLogisticSupport,Supplies,andServicesbetweenthearmedforcesofIndiaandtheUnitedStates.’

Contrary toapprehensionsexpressedbycriticsabout the intrusivenatureofthepact,theLEMOAdoesnotauthoriseestablishmentofanybasesorprovideforbasingarrangements.Neitherdoes theagreementcreateanyobligationsforeitherIndiaortheUStocarryoutanyjointactivity.

TheCongress andLeft parties had their reservations though.TheCongresssaiditwill jeopardiseIndia’snational,geopoliticsandstrategic interests,whiletheCPI(M)stressedit‘hascompromisedonIndiansovereigntyandsurrendereditsstrategicautonomy’.

TheModigovernmenthoweverdecidedtoovercomethehesitationandwentaheadwiththesigningoftheLEMOA,whichitinsistsisanenablingagreementandnotawarpact.

Growingnavalcooperation:Indian,USandJapanesenavalpersonnelduringexerciseMalabarin2017

DefenceMinistryofficialspointoutthatthetermsintheagreementareveryclearonthiscount.‘Logisticssupportforanyothercooperativeeffortsshallonlybeprovidedonacase-by-casebasisthroughpriormutualconsentoftheParties,consistentwiththeirrespectivelaws,regulationsandpolicies,’saidapartofthemediastatementinAugust2016.

Partof the reason togoaheadandclinch theLEMOAisalsoperhapsNewDelhi’swayofsignallingtoBeijingthatIndiaiswillingtogofurtherthanithasgonesofar,inmaintainingabalanceofpowerinAsiaanddisallowingChinaafree run in the geopolitics of the continent. In that context a tailor-madeagreementforIndia, thedilutedLSA,nowcalledtheLEMOA,isjust therightmessagetoChinaintheon-goingtussleforinfluenceinAsia.

The clarifications notwithstanding, the implementation of LEMOA will bewatchedkeenlyby long-time India allyRussia.Moscowhasbeenwaryof theincreasingIndia-USbonhomieforthepastdecade.Consequently,ithasmadeits

displeasure clear at being displaced as India’s primary military hardwaresupplierbytheUSanumberoftimes.Howitwillreacttothenewdevelopmentwillbeamatterofinterestwithinthecountryandtotherestoftheworld.

AsIhadwritteninthewakeofthesigningoftheagreement,‘Theupswinginthe defence ties has been the centre-piece of improved India-US relationship.WithLEMOAithasgoneupastep.’12

PrimeMinisterModi has donewell to ensure a turnaround in theway thedefenceministryfunctions,butmanycriticalvoidsneedtobemadeupquicklyandthemilitarymadeagileandreadyforfuturewars,ashehimselfsaidtothetop brass onboard INS Vikramaditya. That should be his major task in theremaining time that he has in the current term and a second one IF he winsanother,thelikelihoodofwhichseemalmostcertainasofSeptember2017.

J

CHAPTER10

HARNESSINGSPACE

Date:30June2014Place:SatelliteLaunchCentre,Sriharikota

ustamonthintooffice,PrimeMinisterNarendraModihadtravelledtotheISRO(IndianSpaceResearchOrganisation)facilitytowitnessthelaunchof

thePSLV-C23satellite.Inhisspeechafterthesuccessfullaunch,ModipraisedtheISROscientistsfortheir

stellar work and then stunned them into momentary silence by posing achallenge. ‘Today, I ask our Space community to take up the challenge ofdevelopingaSAARCSatellitethatwecandedicatetoourneighbourhood,asagiftfromIndia.Asatellitethatprovidesafullrangeofapplicationsandservicestoallourneighbours.Ialsoaskyoutoenlargethefootprintofoursatellite-basednavigationsystem,tocoverallofSouthAsia.’

ThePrimeMinisteraddressingISROscientists

Initially, theassembled scientistsdidnotknowwhat to say. ‘Wehadneverdonesuchathing,’remembersanoldISROhand.Modireinforcedthisideafivemonthslater,speakinginKathmanduattheSAARCSummiton26November.Hesaid, ‘India’sgiftofa satellite for theSAARCregionwillbenefitusall inareas like education, telemedicine, disaster response, resource management,weatherforecastingandcommunication.’

In less than three years after the Prime Minister challenged the ISROscientists,theycameupwiththeanswer.On5May2017,theSAARCSatellite’waslaunchedfromSriharikota,openinganewchapterinspacediplomacy.

The 2,230 kg GSAT-9 is a Geostationary Communication Satellite.Communication services from itwill be sharedwith five neighbours (Bhutan,Nepal,SriLanka,Bangladesh,andMaldives). Itwillhelp tomeet thegrowingtelecommunications and broadcasting needs of the region. All participatingnationswillhaveaccesstoatleastonetransponderusingwhichtheycantelecasttheir own programming. The countries will develop their own ground-levelinfrastructure. The satellite is expected to provide communication channelsbetweencountriesforbetterdisastermanagement.Afghanistanisalsoexpected

tojointhegroupsoon.AsascientistinISROsays,‘Forsmallercountries,thisisadreamcometrue.Toleaseatransponder,alotofmoneyhastobespent.Buthere India has gifted them a permanent asset.’ Apart from the obvious use(telecommunication, broadcasting), leaders of these six countries can havesecurededicatedone-ononecommunication through theVSATfacility that thesatelliteprovides, explained ISROofficials.The leaders can alsohave avideoconference between themselves if they so wished, thanks to the South Asiasatellite.

Inaway,bydedicatingaseparatesatellitefortheneighbourhood,ModihastakenhisfavouritethemeofSabkaSaath,SabkaVikas,beyondIndia’sphysicalboundaries.Anearlyexampleofhelpingneighbours throughsatellitescameinNepal.InAugust2014,amassivelandslideblockedSunKoshiriverinNorthernNepal indicating thepossible formationofa lake.Thiscreated flood threat forseveralvillagesdownstreaminBihar(seephotos).

LocationmapoftheNepal–landslideonriverSunKoshi

ISROimmediatelyswungintoaction,acquiredtheimagesandinconsultationwith India’s National Disaster Relief Agency (NDMA), ascertained the exactlocation of the landslide, computed the extent of debris due to landslide andcamewith a solution for controlled release of blocked water slowly, avertingpossibleflashfloodsinBihar.ThisoperationwasmadepossiblebecauseISROnow coordinates closely with Inter-Ministerial Group for Emergency

Management at the Centre. IMEG helped coordinate the relief operations inNepalandlaterinSeptember2014inSrinagartoo.

Butthat’snotall.

LandslideonSunkoshiRiver,Nepal(AsseenfromResourcesat-2LISSIVMXacquiredon5August2014)

AsISROChairmanKKiranKumarseesit,‘WhileISROhasalwaysbeenapace-setterinspaceapplications,PrimeMinisterModiandNSAAjitDovalhavespurred us into taking our technology a step further.’He cites the example of‘Islandmapping’programmelaunchedin2015.

ApparentlyinoneofthemeetingsinthePMOsometimeinJune2015,Modiasked the number of islands that India possesses. As officials from MHAscrambled to get the exact figures fromSurvey of India, some officials in thePMO itself tried to add up the number by getting the figures from stategovernmentsandthecensusrecords.Butthefiguresvariedwidely.Itwasclearthattherecordswereoldandhadnotbeenupdatedforyears.

That’s when NSADoval turned to ISRO. He asked ISRO chairman KiranKumarifthespaceagencycouldhelpmapandcollectdatainrespectofalltheIndian Islands. Kiran Kumar was quick to say yes. Remembers PGDiwakar,currently Scientific Secretary to the ISROChairman: ‘Iwas then in-charge ofRemote Sensing Applications at NRSC. The Chairman asked me to devise aquickmethodtomaptheislandsaroundIndia’svastcoastline.’Hegotdowntowork immediately with a hand-picked team. ‘We were asked to not justdetermine thenumbersbutalso lookat theirexact status,distributionandarea(oftheislands).WewereparticularlytoldtorecheckthestatusoftheislandsthatwereontheSurveyofIndialistfromtheBritishdays.Thefearwasthatsomeofthemwould have gone underwaterwhile someotherswould have sprung up,’Diwakar recalls.As the space agency completed its survey, it cameupwith anumberthatwasinvariancewiththosealreadyintherecords.Officially,Indianowhas1382islandsagainst1150and1238thatexistedwithdifferentagencies.

Theunspokenapprehensionbehind theexercisewas thepossibilityofsomeremote, uninhibited island in Andaman-Nicobar territory or aroundLakshadweep or even in the Sundarbans being illegally occupied! Securityagencies were aware of how arms smugglers had used a remote island inAndamanin1998tolandalargeconsignmentofarmsmeantforBurmeserebelsand tried to transport it across theBayofBengal tobedelivered inMyanmar.Theagencieshadfoiledtheattemptinawell-coordinatedplanunderOperationLeechinFebruary1998.Nearly20yearslater,thelikelihoodofanuninhibitedisland being occupied by forces aligned to India’s adversaries has increasedmanifold.Theexercisethushadstrategicimplicationstoo.

Once the number was determined, the ISRO team developed an IslandInformationSystemthathasover30attributes(seefigure).ThePrimeMinisterwasbriefedaboutthesysteminOctober2016.Sincethen,theNITIAayog,stategovernmentsandotherministrieshavestarteddrawingupdevelopmentplansfor10selectedislands,fiveeachinAndamanandLakshadweep.

The Island Information System apart, ISRO has successfully launchedCARTOSAT 2 Series of satellites that can provide submeter images (spatialresolution of 65 cm) for monitoring purposes. ISRO is also building on

capabilitiestoacquireimagesfromasfaras36,000kmupinthespaceandyetgive a resolution of about 55 cm, at frequent intervals, empowering Indiansecurity agencies like the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO)andotherintelligencearmstomonitorrealtimeactivitiesofIndia’sadversaries.

AttributesofLongIsland

Such a capability would also help in effective monitoring of major nationaldisastersinthecountry.TheSpecialProjectsDivisiondealingwithallstrategicrequirements of the armed forces and intelligence agencies has beenreinvigorated. A senior scientist in charge of the Division works in closecoordination with the Deputy National Security Adviser to meet all theirrequirementsinquickesttimepossible.ISRO’sassetsarenowusedforvariousstrategic,securityanddefencepurposes.Someofthedataacquiredbythespaceagency is so classified that only a handful can access it. Suffice it to say thatISRO’s data acquisition has helped Indian armed forces in some of theiroperationsinthepastfewyears.

ISROhasinfactbeencontinuouslylaunchingaseriesofsatellites,mainlyforcartographicpurposes.CalledtheCartosatseries,thesesatellitesaremainlyusedforcartographicmappingoftheearth.Hence,theyareusefulfordualpurposes—militaryaswellascivil.ThroughtheCartosat2seriesofsatellitesprogrammefor instance, ISRO is helping derive 1×4000 scale maps for better urbanplanning. As Kiran Kumar says, ‘the beauty of this technology is that it iscontinuously available. One can take an image today, one can take an imageagain,15dayslater,compareandmonitortheprogressofaproject,abuildingorwhateverelse.Withtwo-timedata,saybetween2007and2017,wecancalculatethe difference in height of a given building through stereo imaging and three-dimensional mapping and calculations to establish building heights, miningrelatedworksorevennewconstructions.’

KKasturirangan, former chairman of ISRO, says ‘The space agency has aformidable suit of technologies and all are suitably deployed with each useragencyutilisingtheassetstotheirbestadvantage.’

Sowhilehighresolutionimagingsatellitecanhelpinurbanplanning,itcanalso monitor terrorist camps across the border. Kasturirangan says a satelliteimagedoesnotdistinguishbetweenfriendandfoe,theinterpretationrestswiththeusers.

Kiran Kumar says, ‘The Indian space agency will not be found lacking inhelpingsecureIndia’snationalinterestsnowandinfuture.’

Speakingaboutthecapabilitiesofthisultra-sharpsatellite,Kumarsaid,‘TheCartosat2 serieshasauniquecapabilityof capturinga1-minutevideo,whichdespiteitsenormousspeedof37kmasecond,isabletofocusatasinglepointforaminute.’

Inaddition,therearethreeotherearthimagingsatellitesCartosat-1,Cartosat-2 andResourcesat-2,whichprovide top class imageryduringday time.Goingfurther,ISROseekstodevelopsatellites thathavearesolutionof25cmintheverynearfuture.

Former ISRO chairman GMadhavan Nair says even China does not havesuchhighresolutionsatellites,thebestChinahasisabout5-mresolution.

Nair says ‘India invested heavily in space imaging technology and is now

reaping the benefits.’1 Nair says that right now, India relies heavily on usingThuraya handsets for satellite telephony but he hopes very soon the DefenceResearchandDevelopmentOrganisation(DRDO)willbeabletodeliverIndianhandsetsthatarecompatiblewiththecountry’sGSAT-6satellite.

InfactNairinsiststhatintheupcomingGSAT6-A,satellitetelephonyshouldbemadethebiggercomponent.

Whileunderstandablymuchoftheresourcesarefocusedonland,sinceIndiahas hostile neighbours both on its western and eastern fronts. ISRO has notforgotten the deep blue oceans that surround India and the need for theirprotectionaswell.Onaspecificdemandby theIndianNavy, theIndianspacescientistshavealreadydeployedasatellite theNavycalls ‘Rukmini’.This isadedicatedcommunicationssatellitewhichhelpstheIndianNavytalktoitsshipswhentheyarebeyondthevisualrange,inasecuremode.

Asaseniorsecuritymanagersummeditup:‘NowISROhasgotstrategicallyalignedtoIndia’ssecurityrequirements,thankstotheEye-in-the-Sky.Earlier,itwaslargelytechnologicallyfocused.’

Anotherfeather inISRO’scapis theIndianNationalRegionalNavigationalSystem, meant for creating India’s own GPS facility. Having put up aconstellationofsevensatelliteswhichcoversIndiaandtheneighbourhood—upto1500kmtotheeastandwestofIndia’sshores—ISROhascreatedapowerfulsystemwhichisusedforseveralimportanttasksincludingcreatingIndia’sownGPS system. This constellation of seven satellites was named as ‘NavIC’(NavigationIndianConstellation)byPrimeMinisterModianddedicatedtotheNationontheoccasionofthesuccessfullaunchofIRNSS-1G,theseventhandlastsatelliteofNavIC.NavicinSanskritisincidentally,asailor.

NavIC–BeingTestedwithFishermenusingIndigenousReceiver

All the satelliteswill bevisible at all times in the Indian region.While thefirstof theseriesof satelliteswas launched inJuly2013, the rest sixwereputintospacebetween2014and2016.ISROspentRs1,420croresonbuildingandsettingupthesevenNavICsatellitesintheorbit.Regardedasaprecisesystem,comparable toUS’sGPS,NavIC is capable of providing position accuracy ofabout10metres.Indiahasthusbecomeoneamongstahandfulofcountries, tohaveitsownGPS.IRNSSorNavICwillprovidetwotypesofservices,namely,Standard Positioning Service (SPS) which is provided to all the users, andRestricted Service (RS), which is an encrypted service provided only to theauthorised users. The indigenous system is already up and providing servicesthat are being tested and used by a few applications. Says an ISRO official:‘From 2018, we need not depend on US GPS at all.’ It’s a major strategicadvantage.

AppFeatures

BasedontheIndianGPSsystem,ISROhastiedupwithIndiancompanies—underMakeinIndiaprojects—formanufactureofachipset.Oncethechipsareproduced, they can be used for a variety of purposes, from security to simpleroad navigation in the civilian sector. Several trials have taken place of late.NavIChasstartedsupportingthefishermanincoastalareas.SaysKiranKumar,‘the first application (of NavIC) which we have devised is given through amobileApp,abasicmobile.Once installedand linked to theNavICDevice,afisherman in say Gujarat or in Tamil Nadu will get important services, likePotentialFishingZones(PFZ)informationforhimtonavigatetothatpointforfishing;Weather alert like thunders storms and an automatic alert if his boatapproaches international maritime boundary. Otherwise, on high seas, it isdifficult tomake out where the Indian area ends and other country’s begins.’

Given the frequency of arrests of Indian fishermen inPakistani or SriLankanwaters,NavICmustcomeasabigrelieftothefishermencommunity.

ISROhasalreadydevelopednecessaryAppsonformobileplatformsthatwillallow fishermen to download potential fishing zones in the area, before theylaunchtheboatintothesea.ExplainsDiwakar:‘Here,whatwedoisweusethesea surface temperature and chlorophyll information, which comes from thesatellitedata,Oceansat-2 isusedhere, andbothare integrated todetermineanareawhichwouldhaveaschooloffish,thataroundthislat-long,thefishermenneed notwaste time in searching for fish as he can follow thePFZmaps andreachtherightplaceforassuredfish-catch.’This is infact thefirstapplicationbasedonNavIC,whichisalreadyinfieldtrialphase.

Oncetriedandtested,thechipsetmayevenbecomeanintegralpartofeverymobile handset in India to provide accurateGPS to everyone, ISRO scientistsnowsay.TherearemultipleapplicationsforwhichNavICmaycometobeused.

However, ISRO’smandate goesmuchbeyond just helping India’s strategicsector.ChairmanKiranKumarsaysthescopeandworkofISROhasexpandedmanifold since the Modi government has taken charge in 2014. In fact, theChairmanofISROsaysunder thisgovernment, thenumberofministriesusingISROdatahasgoneupmanifold.‘Fromabout10-12ministriesinthepast,wenow have 58 ministries, including the tribal welfare ministry (which onewouldn’t have thoughtwould have any use of our data) that have a dedicatedlinktoourdata.That’sahugedifference.’

For instance, the SmartCities&AtalMission forRejuvenation andUrbanTransformation (AMRUT) projects that the government has launched. ISROprovides65cmdata,1×4,000scalemaps, tourbanplanners forconsistentandcontinuous planning and monitoring. ISRO’s technology now gives a three-dimensionimageryallowingurbanplannerstorecordprogressofaconstructionsite. Project managers can now map the progress of various constructionactivitiesbycomparingearlierimageswiththelatestonesatacentralplace,onadashboard.ISRO’sabilitytomappotentialgroundwaterzones,provideacreageand production ofmajor cropswell before harvest,monitor encroachments inforest in addition tomapping andmonitoring forest reserves, assess quality of

land (whether it is fallow, awasteland or fertile), gives a handy tool to townplanners.Theycannowplan tomakeoptimumutilisationofwater,electricity,and energy since the entire three dimensional viewof the proposed townor acityinprogressisavailable.Onceanewcitycomesup,manyofitsbasiccivicfunctions can be controlled, managed and utilised through a central system,thankstoISRO’stechnology.

Says Diwakar, ‘If I am a town planner, I would like to optimally utiliseresources in a cost effective manner, let us say, the water, electricity andsewerage systems. I wouldn’t like to waste the precious water. So I cancompletelycontrolthroughICTtechnologiesonhowtodistributethewaterinacity. Through the computerised mechanism one can release the water to aparticular area for a particular time, auto shut-off and close it since now oneknows amount of water the population is going to consume. Similarly, withsewagesystem,trafficmanagementandsolarplants.’

ISROscientistssay their technologygivesan integratedperspectiveand theability to modify outcomes as and when required. For instance, they caneffectivelydotrafficmanagementbyusingICTbecausethecontrolroomhasthefull picture and ability to monitor the amount of load on a given road andidentify choke points during different hours. Near real-time monitoring andmakingreal-timeprojectionshelpsinbetterurbanmanagement,thanksagaintoISRO’sassets.Andatnights thecontrol roomcanevenmanagestreet lightingandcontrolenergyconsumptionofaparticularareabasedontrafficanduseofpublic places. The control room manager can switch on/switch off or evenreduce the illumination for a certain area if there’s no traffic, say after 12midnight.Inshort,theCentralcontrolroomconceptinasmartcitycanliterallymanage and monitor all the basic amenities and facilities which are used bycommon citizens daily. Yet another possibility of using ‘Internet of Things(IOT)’, intermixedwithspace technologyhelps inbettermanagementofsmartcities.Thecapital ofChattisgarh—NayaRaipur—that ismarching towards thesmartcityprogrammeisoneoftheuniqueexamplesofmarryingurbanplanningwithspacetechnology,ISROscientistpointout.

NayaRaipurSmartCityplatform

AMRUT is another example where urban bodies (municipal corporations,city councils) will be able to use geospatial technology for planning. Forexample,urbanplannerscangetthefullpictureattheclickofamouseaboutthedrainagesituation,existingpipelines,allowingthemtocheckifspaceexistsfornewpipelinestobelaid,etc.TheauthoritiescanalsotakeacomprehensivelookatthegreencoveravailableinanurbansettingwithISRO’sEyeintheSkyanddecideaccordinglywhichareas to leaveout for construction,which toallot incasethelandisfoundtobefalloworisawastelandwithnohopeofbeingusedforagriculturalpurposes.

Sowasn’tthisbeingdoneearlier,IasktheISROscientists.‘Notatthislevelorwithsomuchofcoordination,’saidoneoftheminreply.Normally,itusedtotakefourtofiveyearsfortownplannerstofinalisethecityplansorevenupdatethem but now, working in close coordination with Ministry of UrbanDevelopmenttheprocessismuchfasterthanbefore.

The Ministry has modified the entire documentation with respect to townplanning, they have evolved new guidelines that use space and geospatialtechnology,sonowtheentireurbanplanningstartswithageospatialbasemap.It is a base map given by the high resolution satellite pictures. The satellite

pictures combinedwith the existingmaps gives full information on elevation,typeofland—wastelandoraproductiveland—toenablefasterplanning.Atthemoment,about500AMRUTtownsandcitieshavebeentakenupandtheyhavesoughtISRO’shelp.Havingtastedsuccess,theauthoritiesnowwanttousethetechnologyforall4,041citiesinthefuture.

ExplainsDiwakar: ‘This is a procedurewe’ve put together.A client serversystemhasbeendesignedtobeusedbytheMoUD.Alltheserviceswillbe‘‘e’’enabled services. All of them—water and waste management, traffic system,electricity grids, housing numbers—can be brought under one roof andmonitored on a dashboard.We are for exampleworkingwithNayaRaipur tomakeitoneofthefirstmodernsmartcitiesinthecountry.Themodelshouldbeamenabletobeemulatedthroughoutthecountry.’

Planningsmartcitiesapart,ISROiscontributinginmountingsurveillanceongas pipelines, geo-tagging all the post offices in the country, helping tourismdepartments to come up with a real-time information monitoring system andcollectingdataformunicipalcorporations.Theinformationofall1.55lakhpostoffices in the country—including their location, status of road connectivity toeachoneofthemandeventheservicesprovidedbythem—isnowavailableatone place, that is Bhuvan Geo Portal. Moreover the 3Dimensional imagingcapability that ISRO now has, enables municipal authorities to monitor andcomparedataonbuildingheights.Forexample,simply lookingataresidentialbuilding’s3Dimagefrom2010and2017—thecivicauthoritiescancalculatethenumberofstoriesaddedtoabuildingandaccordinglycomeupwithanestimateofhousetaxtheycancollect.

Similarly, for agriculture sector, satellite imagery was used earlier too butoverthepastthreeyears,theuseofISROsatelliteshasgoneupmanifold.Saysascientist: ‘Our technology now enables the agriculture department to estimategrainproductionmuchbeforetheharvest.Earlierweusedtomonitorabouteightcrops,nowthecounthasgoneupto11andalsohelpingtheministrywithSoilHealthCardprograminthecountry,inadditiontotheCropInsuranceschemetohelp the farming community.Moreover,we have also included horticulture inthis monitoring. The most important change however is the use of ISRO

technology to assess damage to crops in drought hit areas or places that getexcessive rains or flooding. This way the government’s crop insuranceprogramme gets implemented in double quick time. We are actually able toprovidealmost real timedata toenable theagriculturedepartment inassessingtheneedforcropinsurance.’

Even the water resources ministry uses space technology much more thanbefore. Thanks to the new synergy, the Ministry now gets the water spreadinformation in all water bodies and reservoirs on a bi-weekly basis, saysDiwakar.Every15daysweget thepictureof surfacewaterbody in theentirecountry,headds.ThiskindofdataisautomaticallyprocessedandpublishedonISRO portal. Telangana and Andhra Pradesh States have launched a majorprogramme on water resources management using our technology and theadvantageofsuchbi-weeklydataonwaterfromspace.

ISRO’sachievementsarealreadyformidable,butwithgrowinguseofspacefordefenceandcommercialpurposes, its role isbound to increaseand itmustthereforestrivetoremainaheadofthecurvebyinvitingIndia’sprivatesectortoforge a beneficial partnership. As Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, senior fellowand head, Nuclear & Space Policy Initiative, at the Observer ResearchFoundation says, ‘Indiahas a sizeable and talentedprivate sector thatmustbebroughtintomaximisethecapacitytomanufactureaswellaslaunchsatellites.ISROmightneed todo abit of handholding in thebeginningbutwith a littlehelp,theIndianprivatesectorcancontributetoIndia’sspacegrowthstoryinaneffectivemanner.’2Increasingprivatesectorparticipationapart,ISROwillneedto remain focusedon India’sdefenceandstrategic requirements in thecomingyears and contributemuchmore than before in securing India through preciseapplication of its capabilities even as it continues to attain new heights incommercialapplicationofspaceassets.

M

CHAPTER11

SECURINGTHECYBERDOMAIN

30July2012

orethan700millionpeopleinIndiawereleftwithoutpowerinwhatisnowknownastheworld’sworstblackout.

TwentyoutofIndia’s28stateswerehitbypowercuts,alongwiththecapital,NewDelhi.Threeofthecountry’sfiveelectricitygridsfailedatlunchtimethatswelteringJulyafternoon.Asengineersstruggledforhours to fix theproblem,hundreds of trains stoppedmoving on the tracks, leaving passengers strandedoverthousandsofmilesfromKashmirinthenorthtoAssaminthenortheast.

As a consequence of this massive power failure, traffic lights went out,causingjamsinanumberofcities,suchasNewDelhiandKolkata.Thecountrysweltered in the scorching summer heat and drivers honked their horns evenmore impatiently than usual. In some states, the power cut left hundreds ofminerstrappedundergroundforhourswhentheirliftsbrokedown.

Later on, after weeks of thorough enquiry, several agencies including thePower Grid Corporation of India, the Intelligence Bureau, and the NationalTechnicalResearchOrganisation (NTRO)came to theconclusion that thegridcollapse was simply because of some states overdrawing power and not theresultofasabotage,oracyber-attack,asithadbeeninitiallyfearedtobe.

Five years down the line, systems to prevent a grid collapse due tooverdrawing of power have been put in place, minimising the possibility offailure,butthedangerofcyber-attackshasincreasedexponentially.

FiguresgivenbythegovernmentinParliamentrevealtheseriousnessofthecyberattacks.InSeptember2014,theRajyaSabhawasinformedbytheMinistryof Communication that in the decade between 2004 and 2014, the number ofattacksrecordedeveryyearrangedfrom23,254;552,1237,2565,8266,10315,13301, 22060, 71780 to 96383. The security incidents included phishing,scanning, spam, malicious code, website intrusions, etc., as reported to theIndianComputerEmergencyResponseTeam(CERT-In).

During the years 2009 to 2014 (till September) a total number of 11831,20701, 21699, 27605, 28481 and 14151 Indianwebsiteswere also hacked byvarioushackergroupsspreadworldwide,Parliamentwasinformed.

Sincethen,thepossibilityofcyberterroristscripplingIndia’sgrowingdigitalinfrastructurehasonlyincreasedexponentially.

Chancesofsabotageapart,sinceNovember2016,India’scyberinfrastructurehasbeentestedlikeneverbefore.WeeksafterPrimeMinisterModiannouncedthedecisiontodemonetisethe500and1,000rupeenotes,digitaltransactionsinthecountryhavedoubledinnotime.

Inanycase,PMModihadunderlined thedigitisationofIndiaasoneofhistop priorities. However, he was also aware that increased dependence on thecyberspace had serious concomitant dangers. Within his first few weeks ofheading the government, even before putting into place his digitisationprogramme, one of the first tasks that he undertook was to ask the NationalSecurityAdviserAjitDovaltocompletelyrevamptheCyberSecuritystructureinthecountryandbuildastate-of-the-artinfrastructure.Doval,awareofthehighthreatsthatthecyberspaceposed,immediatelysetupacoreteamandinstructedittocomeupwithaplan.

Accordingly, a new arrangement was established in the National SecurityCouncilSecretariat,theoutfitthatworksdirectlyunderDoval.Aneminentcybersecurityexpert,DrGulshanRai,whowasappointedasthefirstNationalCyberSecurityCoordinator inApril2015 reports toDoval through theDeputyNSA,

Dr Arvind Gupta. Thus, the protection of this critical infrastructure has beendirectlybroughtunderthecontrolofthePrimeMinister’sOffice(PMO).

DrRaiisaneminentscientistwhohasmorethantwodecadesofexperienceofworkinginthecyberdomain.Hisremitincludescoordinationofthepoliciesand its implementation by different departments and organisations, includingthoseintheprivatesectorandtheacademia.

DrGulsanRai

Prior to this appointment, Rai was Director-General Computer EmergencyResponse Team (CERT) at the Department of Electronics and InformationTechnology(DeitY).

HealsoheadstheE-SecurityandCyberLawdivisionintheUnionMinistryofCommunicationsandInformationTechnology.WithanMTechandPhDandvastexperienceinthefieldsofe-commerce,cyberlaws,andcybersecurityformorethantwodecades,RaiwasanaturalchoicetobecometheNationalCyberSecurityCoordinator.

Rai’sjobistoregularlyreviewthecybersecuritystructureswithstakeholderMinistries and Departments, as well as other important organisations in thepublic andprivate sector.Raihas evolveda regular feedback system from thebanks,insurancesectorandstockexchanges,aswellasothercriticalsectorslikepower,aviation,andtransport.

With the rapidgrowth in internet usage, the chances of sabotageof India’sdigital infrastructure have also increased exponentially. Hence, while a smallbeginninghadalreadybeenmadeinsecuringIndia’scriticaldigitalarchitecturearound 2013, a more focussed attention to firewall the Critical Information

Infrastructures(CIIs)beganinJanuary2014.Rai,whowasalreadyworkingwiththepreviousNSA,ShivShankarMenon,

had helped set up a National Critical Information Infrastructure ProtectionCentre (NCIIPC), created under Section 70A of the Information TechnologyAct,2000(amendedin2008),throughagazettenotificationon16January2014months before the Modi government came to power. Based in New Delhi,NCIIPC was designated as the National Nodal Agency in respect of CriticalInformationInfrastructureProtection.

NCIIPCbroadlyidentifiedthefollowingas‘CriticalSectors’:

Power&EnergyBanking,FinancialInstitutionsandInsuranceInformationandCommunicationTechnologyTransportationGovernment(exceptthoseundertheMinistryofDefence)StrategicPublicEnterprisesStatesandUnionTerritories

BuildingonthemodestbeginningmadetowardstheendofthepreviousUPAregime,thecurrentgovernmenthasmovedfasttobuildonthebasicmodel.AsRaiobserves,‘TheModigovernmentrightlybelievesthatsecurityoftechnologyand cyber infrastructure is of paramount importance. The government hasthereforerecognisedthatcybersecurityisastrategicdomain’.

Cyber infrastructure and information technology and telecommunicationsystems(ICT)providethemajordrivetowardstheperformanceandproductivityof almost every activity and service in the physical world. Banking, energy,hospitals, businesses, education, and social affairs rely heavily on their onlinepresence.More Indians are nowdependent on the digital space for their dailyneeds, whether it is for banking, communication, or simply for ordering theirdailyneedsandnecessities.

PrimeMinisterModi’s twoflagshipprogrammes, ‘Digital India’and‘Makein India’, aim to transform India into a digitally empowered society andknowledge economy. Make in India aims to facilitate investment, foster

innovation, enhance skill development, protect intellectual property and buildbest-in-classmanufacturinginfrastructure.

The Prime Minister has time and again emphasised that together, theseinitiatives will strengthen the brain and brawn of the country, leading to aprosperousandhealthyIndia. It isobvious that industriesandenterprisesmustflourishinordertoachievesuccessintheseinitiatives.However,industriesandenterprises canprosperonly if they take careofpeople, processes, technologyand management of the infrastructure. The higher involvement of technologysignalsthepresenceofadeeprelationshipwithcyberspaceandalltheproblemspresentinsucharelationship.

For instance,according toRai,dailydigitalbanking transactionshavemorethandoubledfromabout0.8billionbeforedemonetisation, toabout1.7billiondigitaltransactionseverydaynowandrising.ThatisonlyoneindicationofthegrowingrelianceondigitalinfrastructureinIndia.Anditisthisincreaseinusagethathasraisedthefearofthreatstothesystem.

Inthecomingyears,thenumberofonlinetransactionswillgrowasthedigitalmediumisfurtherintegratedandembeddedintoIndia’ssocialfabric,educationsystems, and in the industry and business infrastructure. India today hasmorethan450millioninternetusers,makingitthesecondlargestcountryintheworldintermsofinternetusers.By2020,thecountryislikelytohaveoveronebillioninternet users. Protecting the internet highways and cyber space that ordinaryIndians use, has now therefore become as critical as defending our physicalborders.

With information flowing across the boundaries of different administrative,governance, and legal systems, which are in turn connected to a variety ofnetworksaroundtheworld,itisagiventhatthegovernmenthastoputinplacerobuststructuresthatprotectpersonalinformationandfundsandassets,aswellaseconomicandnationalsecurity.

However,changeisnoteasytoimplement.Increasing use of the cyber domain has resulted in the creation of new

commercial,professionalandsocialparadigms.Ithasalsogivenrisetoaseriesof new security risks and hitherto unknown legal and technical problems that

needtobeaddressedwithafreshapproach.Therefore,oneofthefirstdecisionsthattheModigovernmenttookafterMay

2014wastoimplementarobustNationalCyberSecurityAssuranceFrameworkforgovernanceincyberspace.Theassurancebroadlycomprises14elements.

They include: creation and strengthening of National Watch and AlertSystem, protection of critical information infrastructure, capacity developmentandskillupgrade, infrastructure for testingproductsmeant tobeused incybersecurity, the supply chain, evolving best practices for different disciplines ofindustry, creating a legal framework, and promote cyber diplomacy andinternational cooperation, to mention just a few. However, ensuring cybersecurity requires a massive coordinated effort. The National Security CouncilSecretariat (NSCS)hassincebeendesignatedas thenodalorganisation for theeffectivecoordinationofthekeyinitiativestakenbytheMinistries/DepartmentsinthegovernmentforimplementationofNationalCyberSecurityFramework.

Some key steps that have been undertaken over the past couple of yearsinclude:

FormationofaNationalInformationBoardAppointmentofaNationalCyberSecurityCoordinatorAllocationofaseparatefundfortechnologydevelopmentaswellasResearch&DevelopmentCreationofskilledmanpowerforthesectorandImprovinginternationalcooperationandcyberdiplomacy

NATIONALINFORMATIONBOARDTheNationalInformationBoardischairedbytheNationalSecurityAdvisorandcomprises theCabinet Secretary, Finance Secretary,Defence Secretary,HomeSecretary and chiefs of Defence forces, secretaries of the Ministries ofInformation Technology and Department of Telecommunication. The Boardregularly reviews the implementation of theNationalCyber Framework alongwithstakeholderMinistriesandDepartmentsandotheragencieswithaviewtoformulate policy measures that can overcome the constraints and difficulties

facedintheimplementationofthecyberframework.HowhardRai’s job as protector-in-chief of India’s cyber domain is canbe

gaugedfromthenumberofattacksthatIndia’sdigitalinfrastructurefacesdaily.Forinstance,inaweek’stime—from27February2017to3March2017—therewere0.19millionuniqueintrusionattemptsintoIndia’scyberdomain.Inimicalcyber attackers keepmaking thousandsof attempts to disrupt, hack, crash anddestroy India’s cyber domain each day. They are a mix of organised groups,inspired or backed by India’s adversaries, professional cyber thieves and spyagenciesofdifferentcountries.

The attempt is not only to try and cripple the day to day functioning, nowincreasinglydependentontheinter-connectedcyberdomainsacrossthecountry,but also to steal vital secrets about India’s atomic programme, missiledevelopmentanddefenceinstallations.Giventhecriticalimportanceofkeepingthe cyber sector secure, the National Information Board and National CyberSecurityCoordinatorhavebeenregularlyconductingreviewsofimplementationof the cyber security framework and cyber policies of key critical informationinfrastructure.

Suchasystemofchecksisacontinuousprocessandongoingwork,sinceonesingleattackcancripplethekeyelementsofthecountry’sdailyactivities.TakeforinstancetheexampleofEstonia,a tinycountry,formerlypartof theSovietRepublic, which can be relevant to us. In 2007, it faced one of the mostdebilitatingattacksinmoderntimes.Anonymoushackers,suspectedtobebasedin Russia, launched a massive cyber-attack on its information systems andbroughtcriticalinfrastructuresectors,suchasbankingandpower,toagrindinghalt.Fordays,chaosreignedinEstonia.Systemsrefusedtore-startandATMsrefusedtodispensecash,asthefinancialarchitecture,basedonmillionsoflinesof code, had crashed. The attack, known in technical terms as a DeliberateDenialofService(DDoS),provedwhatcyber-attackscouldachievewithoutanykineticforce.

Thenewcybersecurityapparatusthereforenowregularlychecksandreviewsdigitalsecurityarchitectureofvitalprojectsandorganisations.Thosereviewedinclude UIDAI, GSTN, Passport, Income-tax, Customs, Railways, Stock

Exchanges, Banks, both public and private, telecom companies, companiesengaged in generation, transmission and distribution of power, oil and gassystems, refineries and other process-driven industries. A detailed audit ofsystems of all the critical sectors has been conducted with respect to theirrobustnesstowithstandattacks,gapshavebeenidentifiedandstepsinitiatedtofillthosegapsandwithaviewtoenhancethesecurityposturesofthecyberandICTinfrastructureinthecountry.

The mounting challenge to India’s cyber infrastructure has necessitatedavailability of skilled manpower. The implementation of the National CyberAssurance Framework requires, according to an assessment done in 2015,around500,000cybersecurityprofessionalstorolloutasecurenetwork.Inlessthantwoyearssincethen,afreshestimatehasconcludedthatIndianowneedsalmostdouble thenumber thought tobesufficient in2015!Thishashappenedbecause of widespread digitisation. Programmes have been initiated in closecoordinationwith the academia and industryoperators for skill upgradeof theexistingITmanpoweratcertificate,diplomaanddegreelevels.

Oncethegovernmenthaddecidedthatcybersecurityisastrategicdomain,itwentoutofitswaytosupportthesector.AsustainablefundofRs1000croreshas been set up for encouraging Technology and Research & Developmentrelating to cyber security. The fund is being used to develop new, indigenousproductsthatcanhelpinkeepingthecriticaldigitalinfrastructureofthecountryfree from inimical intrusions. The fund is administered and monitored by aCommitteeheadedbytheNSA.‘Itsupportsinnovativeandoriginalproposalsinthegovernmentandprivatesectorsforthedevelopmentofthetechnology.TheHighPoweredCommitteehasfosteredandstrengthenedtheconceptofpublic-privatepartnership, an important component in theareaof cyber security.Thefocusistoleveragethetalentsandresourcesavailableanywhereinthecountry,includingstartupcompanies,fordevelopmentofthetechnologiesthatarecrucialforthegrowthoftheeconomy,nationalsecurity,andsocialdevelopmentinthecountry,’asRaitoldme.

Specialised courses on cyber security have been initiated in 35 academicinstitutions across the country at post-graduate (M Tech) as well as graduate

level(BTech).InstitutionsliketheIndianInstituteofTechnology(IIT),IndianComputer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), Indian Institute of Science(IISc)andNCIIPCarenowregularlyorganisingshortdurationprogrammesandworkshops for skill upgrade in different cutting edge areas of cyber security.More thanone lakhpersonnel havebeen skilled and employed in the industryandthegovernmentsince2014.

Training and education apart, another dimension of the growing cybersecurity architecture is India’s efforts to forge international partnerships. Thegovernmenthasadopteda focussedapproach forcooperationwithnationsandgovernments to address challenges of cyber security, particularly to exchangeinformation related to security incidents, law enforcement cooperation,developingcybernormsandinternationallegalframework.

Without wide-ranging cooperation, it is virtually impossible to police orregulate the vast and largely anonymous cyber space. Fortunately, almost allcountries in the world, because of such unique features of cyber space, arefocussingoninternationalcooperationanddebatinginmyriadinternationalforafortheevolutionofasystemandframeworkforcooperation.

Rai says India has been participating very actively and has contributedsignificantly in all the international fora, including World Summit onInformation Society (WSIS), United Nations Government Group of Experts(UNGGE) andmigration of lANA transaction to the ICANN (an organisationmanagingInternetintheworld).IndiaisinfactamemberofUNGGE-IVthatiscurrently in session. This gives India a chance to be part of the internationalalliance that sets rules for theworldwideweb.Of late, India has signed cybersecurity agreementswith theUSA andRussian Federation to cooperate on allissues emerging in cyber space, including exchange of information, both forcyberincidentsandcrimes,researchanddevelopment,andcyberdiplomacy.

Significantly,India’seffortsatsecuringitscyberdomainisbeingrecognisedbyglobalbodies.AreportinearlyJuly2017rankedIndiaahigh23rdoutof165nations in a global index thatmeasures the commitment of nations across theworldtocybersecurity.

The second Global Cyber security Index (GCI), released by the UN

telecommunicationsagency,InternationalTelecommunicationUnion(ITU),saidonly about half of all countries have a cyber security strategy or are in theprocessofdevelopingoneandurgedmorecountriestoconsidernationalpoliciestoprotectagainstcybercrime.Indiaisranked23rdontheindexwithascoreof0.683 and has been listed in the “maturing” category, which refers to 77countries that have developed complex commitments to cyber security andengageincybersecurityprogrammesandinitiatives.

TheindexhasbeentoppedbySingaporewitha0.925score.Thereportsaidabout38percentofcountrieshaveapublishedcybersecurity

strategy and an additional 12 per cent of governments are in the process ofdevelopingone.

Theagencysaidmoreeffortisneededinthiscriticalarea,particularlysinceitconveysthatgovernmentsconsiderdigitalriskstobeahighpriority.

‘Cybersecurityisanecosystemwherelaws,organisations,skills,cooperationandtechnicalimplementationneedtobeinharmonytobemosteffective,’statedthereport,addingthatcybersecurityis‘becomingmoreandmorerelevantinthemindsofcountries’decisionmakers.’1

Thetop10mostcommittedcountriestocybersecurityareSingapore,UnitedStates, Malaysia, Oman, Estonia, Mauritius, Australia, Georgia, France andCanada.Russiaisranked11th.

In conclusion it must be said that India has tried to keep pace with thegrowingdemandsonitscybersecurityarchitecturebut itneedstoworkhardersincemoreandmore segmentsof India’s societyare likely tobegoingonlineandthreatstoIndia’scyberdomainwillonlymultiplywithtime.

NOTES

CHAPTER1

1.Modi’sWorld:expandingIndia’sSphereofinfluence:CRajaMohan,HarperCollins,2015.2.Inconversationwiththeauthor.3.FromtheModiDoctrine:NewParadigmsinIndia’sForeignPolicy;WisdomTree,NewDelhi,2015.4.Interviewwiththeauthor.5.http://southasiamonitor.org/news/will-modi-s-disruptive-approach-to-foreign-policy-pay-off-/sl/245236.Inconversationwiththeauthor.7.http://www.rsu.ac.in/about-us/vision-and-mission.aspx

CHAPTER2

1. Nidhi Razdan (NDTV): Is there a possibility at all that the government would look at the option ofextending this (cross-border strikes) toother frontiers? Is this amessage thatyouare sending toothercountrieslikePakistan?Rathore:Itisundoubtedlyamessagetoallcountriesthatharbourany(terror)intentionsbeitonthewestorthespecificcountrywewentinnow.(http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/jul/01/surgical-strikes-no-one-challenged-rajyavardhan-singh-rathore-as-manohar-parrikar-claims-1623069--1.html)

2. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/rajyavardhan-rathore-strikes-too-message-to-pakistan-56inchrocks/

3.http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/pak-says-dont-daydream-were-not-myanmar/4.http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-dna-exclusive-gen-vk-singh-tells-pm-some-hard-truths-16682835. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/government-empowers-army-to-procure-weaponry-for-short-intense-wars/articleshow/59565523.cms

6. http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/01/18/exclusive-india-has-just-bought-3-billion-worth-of-emergency-w_a_21657451/

7. http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/uri-uri-attack-jawans-killed-kashmir-attack-pm-narendramodi-india-pakistan-relation-3037925/

CHAPTER3

1.http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/surgical-strike-indian-army-loc-uri-attack-pakistan/1/781369.html2. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pakistan-border-terror-camps-surgical-strikes-kashmir-loc-indian-army-jihadist-3065975/

3.https://www.dawn.com/news/12870084.https://plus.credit-suisse.com/researchplus/ravDocView?docid=WpTdQi5. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/munir-saami-surgical-strikes-pakistan-uri-attack-indian-army-pok/1/791406.html

CHAPTER5

1. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/cross-border-operations-how-mea-helped-set-stage-for-strike/

2. http://www.burmanet.org/news/2015/06/25/mizzima-indias-operation-in-myanmar-forces-rebels-to-flee-camp/

3.https://www.wsj.com/articles/indian-army-attacks-militant-camps-in-myanmar-1433927858

CHAPTER6

1. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/rajnath-singh-on-combating-left-wing-extremism-in-states/article18408523.ece

2.http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=1616253. http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/rajnath-for-samadhan-to-control-security-situation-in-lwe-affected-states-117082900990_1.html

4. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/assessing-the-islamic-state-threat-to-india-it-is-a-serious-but-manageable-challenge/

5.http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/jabROfjG3JXNqyR7XgCm0H/Indias-tough-line-with-Pakistan.html6. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/by-tying-stone-pelter-to-jeep-i-saved-many-lives-major-leetul-gogoi/articleshow/58808622.cms

7.http://www.thenorthlines.com/modi-government-must-keep-promise-break-hurriyat/8.http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/index.html

CHAPTER7

1.http://www.dailyo.in/politics/doklam-standoff-chinese-media-india-china-bhutan/story/1/19293.html2. http://www.firstpost.com/india/india-china-border-row-resonates-in-parliament-sushma-swaraj-says-new-delhi-capable-of-defending-itselfagainst-beijing-3833697.html

3. http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/28893/Press_Statement_on_Doklam_disengagement_understanding

4.http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1487932.shtml5.AtdBRICSleaders'informalgathering@HamburghostedbyChina,PM@narendramodiandPresidentXihadaconversationonarangeofissues:MEAspokesperson

6. ‘Is ityour territory?’China’s statecouncillorYangJiechibluntlyaskednational securityadviserAKDovalonthepresenceofIndiantroopsatDoklamasthetwometon27JulyinBeijingtomakethefirstdiplomaticstabatresolvingtheconfrontationoverthestrategicallycrucialpatch.The sharp poser reflected theChinese intransigence over changing the status quo at the trijunction ofBhutan,India,andChinabybuildingaroadthroughwhatIndiaconsiderstobeBhutaneseterritory.ThetoughnessfailedtofazeDoval,who,accordingtosourceshere,islearnedtohaverespondedthatthepoint of contention was not China’s territory either as it had been claimed by Bhutan. ‘Does everydisputed territory become China’s by default?’ sources quoted the NSA as having replied.(http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/aggression-to-agreement-the-inside-story-of-the-doklam-deal/articleshow/60283770.cms)

7. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/nsa-ajit-doval-yang-jiechi-doklam-brics-china-russia-india/1/1012618.html

8. http://www.catchnews.com/international-news/how-the-doklam-withdrawal-was-carefully-choreographed-79756.html

9. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/09/06/commentary/world-commentary/chinas-troublesome-civil-military-relations/#.WbDm2sgjHIU

10.https://jamestown.org/program/chinese-analysts-interpret-modis-newindia/11. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/01/modi-goes-to-japan-takes-an-indirect-swipe-at-china/?utm_term=.6fd826577f25

12. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/NSG-membership-for-India-unlikely-this-year/article16668236.ece

13.https://worldview.stratfor.com/analysis/46-billion-tie-binds-china-and-pakistan14. http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28463/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_a_query_on_participation_of_India_in_OBORBRI_Forum

CHAPTER8

1.Interviewwiththeauthor2.CleoPascalinTheModiDoctrine3.ArunJaitleyForewordinTheModiDoctrine4.Interviewwiththeauthor5.https://www.telegraphindia.com/1150907/jsp/frontpage/story_41200.jsp6.Departurestatements,PMindia.in7. http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/india-pm-narendramodi-begins-historic-visit-to-uae-1.1567527

8.http://carnegieindia.org/2016/04/15/recalibrating-india-s-middle-east-policy-pub-633449.Interviewwiththeauthor10.http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-doval-went-on-secret-mission-to-iraq/article6187353.ece11.https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/even-as-india-attempts-to-act-east-it-is-thinking-west/

CHAPTER9

1.http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=1332652. http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/full-text-of-address-by-prime-minister-modi-at-aero-india-2015/article6908293.ece

3.http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=1696174.http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=1696135.https://thewire.in/117425/manohar-parrikar-could-have-been-a-great-defence-minister/6.http://nitinagokhale.blogspot.in/2015/04/big-breakthrough-in-rafale-deal-likely.html7. http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/with-modi-arriving-in-paris-india-and-france-set-to-push-rafale-deal/story-EhBUiizCh4Ch6N7xI8wVpI.html

8. http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/india-france-ink-mou-on-purchase-of-rafale-fighter-jets/story-ZsPUSprczZkNf2OlSMrKBN.html

9.http://bharatshakti.in/how-indian-negotiators-brought-down-the-price-of-rafale-jets%E2%80%8B/10. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/seychelles-committed-to-indian-naval-base/article8022404.ece

11.http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/03/18/india_building_a_sphere_of_influence_in_the_indian_ocean_107772.html

12.http://bharatshakti.in/lemoa-an-enabling-agreement-not-a-war-pact/

CHAPTER10

1. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/isro-in-service-of-the-indian-soldier-indian-war-machine/articleshow/54638711.cms

2. http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/8O1fCl2ouwmcM8ZydZeJtI/Isro-has-impressed-now-for-policy-innovation.html

CHAPTER11

1.http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/GCI_heatmap.aspx

APPENDIXI

NATIONALINVESTIGATIONAGENCYMINISTRYOF

HOMEAFFAIRSGOVERNMENTOFINDIA,NEWDELHI–110001

CHARGESHEET(UnderSection173CrPC)

INTHEHONOURABLENIASPECIALCOURTMOHALI

State(NIA)v/sMaulanaMasoodAzhar(A-1)andOthers

1. NameofthePoliceStation NationalInvestigationAgency NewDelhi FIRNo. RC-03/2016/NIA/DLI Year 2016 Date 04.01.20162. ChargeSheetNo. 11/2016 Date 19-12-16

SECTIONSOFLAW

Sections120B,121,121A,302,307,364,365,367,368,397 IPC;Sections16,18,20,23,38UnlawfulActivities(Prevention)Act,1967;Section25ArmsAct,1959; Section 3(b) Explosive Substances Act, 1908; Section 4 Prevention ofDestructiontoPublicPropertyAct.

InfiltrationintotheIndianTerritoryInvestigation further revealed that the four heavily armed terrorists infiltratedinto the Indian territory on 30 December 2015 from Pakistan, after illegallycrossing the lndo-Pak international border through the forest area near theSimbal Border Outpost of the Border Security Force. Empty food packetsmanufacturedinPakistanandotherfoodarticlesfromPakistanwererecoveredfrom the forest area near the SimbalBorderOutpost of theBSF. The date ofmanufacture of themilk packetswas 16November 2015.TwowitnesseswhohadearlierattendedtrainingcampsofJeM,alsoidentifiedthemilkcreampacketmade in Pakistan, stating that similar ‘Malai’ packetsmanufactured byNestlePakistan Ltd, 308,UpperMall, Lahore, were given to them by their handlerswhiletheywerebeingsenttoJ&Ktocarryoutterrorattacks.UnidentifiedshoeprintswerealsonoticedinthenearbyfieldsinBamiyalvillagewhichisclosetothe Simbal Border Outpost of the BSF. Further, the audio intercept of theconversationofoneofthefourterrorists,withalady,whomheaddressesashismother, also revealed that the four of them had infiltrated into the Indianterritoryforcarryingout the instant terror.Ataround0400hourson1January2016, the terrorists reached the village Akalgarh near the Air Force Station,Pathankot.TheytiedRajeshVermaandbrutallyslithisthroatwithanintentiontokillhimandabandonedhimandthevehicleinthefieldsataround0400hours.The terrorists, thereafter,moved towards theAir Force Station, Pathankot, onfoot.Meanwhile,thevictimmanagedtountiehimselfandrushedtothenearbyvillage,Akalgarh, forhelp.TheFIRof thecase, therecoveryfromthevehicleand the statements of the victims clearly establish the chain of events and thecomplicityoftheslainterrorists.

Aspertheforensicreport,theDNAprofileofthegeneticmaterialliftedfrom

theRedBullcanrecoveredfromtheMahindraXUVvehiclematchedwiththatofoneofthedeceasedterrorists.TheDNAprofileofthegeneticmaterialliftedfromthedaggerrecoveredfromthepossessionofanotherterroristmatchedwiththatofthevictims.Similarly,theDNAprofileofthegeneticmaterialliftedfromthehandleofthedaggermatchedwiththatofanotherterrorist.Thenylonroperecovered from the perimeter wall of the Air Force Stationmatched with theroperecoveredfromtheMahindraXUVvehicle.TheseatbeltoftheMahindraXUVwascutandusedtotieoneofthevictims.Aspertheforensicreport,theseatbeltpiecesrecoveredfromtheforestarea,wheretheterroristshaddumpedSalvinderSinghandhis cook,MadanGopal,matchedwith the remaining seatbeltpiecesoftheMahindraXUVvehicle.Onewalkie-talkiesetbelongingtotheterrorists and one slip written in English were recovered from the MahindraXUVvehicle.

The terrorists had left that slip inwhich it waswritten, Jaish EMuhamadZindabadTanghdarselekarSambaKathuaRajbaghAurdefhitakAfzalguroShadeedKayJannisarTumkomeltayrahege.lnshaAllah.A.G.S.25-12-1511.Two500rupeesIndiancurrencynotestakenbytheterroristsfromthewalletofthevictimwerealsorecoveredfromthebodyoftheterrorists.TheiPhoneofoneof the victims, which was snatched by the terrorists was recovered from the‘nallah’neartheperimeterwallinsidetheAirForceStationwheretheterroristshadhiddenbeforecarryingouttheterroristattack.

The Truecaller names for all the numbers with which the terroristscommunicated reveal thatall thesenumbersbelong toPakistan.TheCallDataRecords of the snatched mobile phones revealed that the terrorists werecontinuously communicating over phone with their handler, Kashif Jan, andother senior operatives of the Jaish-e-Mohammad in Pakistan during theexecutionoftheterroristattack.Asperthedatacollectedasevidence,whentheterroristswereontheirwaytotheAirForceStation,ataround0331hourson1January 2016, they received a call from the Pakistani mobile number. Theanalysisofthesaidcallestablishedthatthecaller,whohadcalledfromPakistan,appeared to be a senior member of the Jaish-e-Mohammad directing theattackers, the latter respectfully addressing him as ‘Ustadji’. The recorded

conversationrevealedthattheyhaddiscusseddetailsabouttheplannedroute,therouteactuallybeingtaken,andanalternateplantoattackapolicestationincaseofextraordinarydelayinreachingPathankot.Thepersonwhohadmadethecallalso reassured, motivated and encouraged the terrorists to accomplish theplannedterroristattack.Theterroristskeptseekinginstructionsfromthe'Ustadji'andseniorleaders/operativesoftheJaish-e-MohammadinPakistanallthetime.InvestigationrevealedthatthenumberwasassociatedwithKashifJan.

AttackattheAirForceStationPathankotInvestigation revealed that after abandoning the Mahindra XUV vehicle, theterrorists moved to the western side of the Air Force Station on foot. Theterrorists forced their entry into theAir ForceStation, Pathankot, after cuttingthewirefencingoverthewesternsideoftheperimeterwallandthencrosseditand entered the airbase on 1 January 2016, early in the morning. As per theforensic report, the marks of the cutting tool recovered from the terroristsmatched with the marks on the cut fencing wire. Also, the climbing roperecovered from the perimeter wall matched with the rope recovered from theMahindraXUVvehicle.Agloveandawoollencap,similartothoserecoveredfrom the terrorists, were recovered entangled with the wire fencing over theperimeterwall. Further thereweremarks of climbing over the eucalyptus treejustoutsidetheperimeterwallpanelandalsoontheothersideoftheperimeterwall.

Investigation revealed that after getting inside the Air Force Station, theterroristshidthemselvesinsidethenallahandthedilapidatedMESStoreshedstill the time theyhad launched theassault.Asper the forensic report, theshoeprints lifted from the nallah matched with the shoes of a terrorist. Also theiPhoneofoneofthevictims,whichwassnatchedawaybytheterroristsandusedto communicatewith thehandlers and senior leaders/operativesof the Jaish-e-Mohammad,wasrecoveredfromthenallah.Furtherthereweresignsofforcedentry into theMESStoresshedas itsdoorwasbrokenandthefencewirewascutormanipulatedatmanyplaces.

InterceptsofCallsbetweentheTerroristsandPakistanNumbers

InterceptsofCallsbetweentheTerroristsandPakistanNumbersInvestigationrevealedthatwhiletheterroristswerehidinginsidetheAirForcestation,atabout0840hourson1January2016,oneof theterrorists, identifiedby thename ‘Nasir’, tried calling thePakistan telephonenumber (redacted) inPakistanusingthesnatchedIndianmobilenumberbutcouldnotconverse.Thenameof theuser of thePakistanphonenumber isKhayamBhatti@KhayamRasool@BabarBhatti.Herunsalocalmerchandiseshop(kirana)shopinRum,Sialkot,Pakistan.MostofthenumbersinthecontactlistofthispersonbelongtoPakistanwhichshowsthattheuser,KhayamBhatti,isanativeofPakistan.HeisalsoaddressedasBabarduringtheconversationbetweenNasirandtheladyontheothersidewhomheaddressesashismother.

Investigation further revealed that, at about 0920 hours on 1 January 2016,the terrorist, Nasir, called the Pakistan telephone number, using the snatchedIndianmobile. In thisconversation, the terrorist,Nasir,disclosed thenamesofhisotherthreeassociatesasMajor,AbuBakarandUmar.

Thenagainat0922hourson1January2016,theterrorist,Nasir,calledupthePakistannumberandexpressedhisdesiretothepersonontheothersidetotalktoa ladywhomheaddressedashismother.Theperson took thephone toherandNasirtalkedtoherindetailforaround18minutes.Nasirtoldtheladythattheyhad infiltrated into the Indian territoryat ‘dobaje’onWednesday (whichwas 30 December 2015). He further told her that he had killed two personsreferring to the deceased lkagar Singh and the injured victim (RajeshVerma)whosethroatwasslitbytheterroristbuthappenedtosurvive.Healsospoketohisbrother/cousinwhoisreferredtobythenameBabar,andtoanotherpersonwhoisreferredtobythenameMunna.Whilespeakingtotheladyaddressedashismother,Nasiraskedhertorecordhisconversationonthemobileset.Duringhisconversationwithher,Nasirmentionedaboutone‘Ustad’whowassupposedtocometoherwithhis‘Wasihat’afterhisdeath.Nasiralsoaskedhertohosta‘dawat’(feast)forhis‘derawalafriends’afterhisdeath.Theterrorist,Nasir,hadalso taken the names of some of the members in his family/ relatives, viz.,Mudassir, Mariyam, Altamash, in the conversation. Nasir also disclosed that

they were hiding inside the Air Force Station (referred to as Camp inconversation) andwaiting to carry out the terror attackwhichwas part of thelarger conspiracy of the Jaish-e-Mohammad and its operatives to wage waragainsttheGovernmentofIndia...

The statements of the witnesses, recoveries from the scenes of crime, andmaterial and documentary evidence establish that the terrorists carried out theterroristattackattheAirForceStation,Pathankot,killingandinjuringinnocentpersonsanddestroyingpublicproperty.

Duringthecourseofinvestigation,itwasestablishedthattheterroristswereheavilyarmedwithsophisticatedweaponsandexplosivedevices.Thescientificevidences gathered during the investigation established that lkagar Singh wasmurderedbythesameterroristswhoattackedtheAirForceStation,Pathankot.ItwasalsoestablishedthatSalvinderSingh,andhisco-passengerswereabductedby four terrorists. They used his vehicle to reach a village near theAir Forcestation.Theterroristsevenwoundedoneofthepassengersverybadly,withtheintentiontokill,buthemiraculouslysurvived.Oral,documentaryandscientificevidencesuchastheDNAprofilingreportshasestablishedthepresenceoffourterroristsatthesceneofcrime.

TheexpertopinionofCFSL,regardingthecharred/burntmass,havingpiecesof clothes and parts of a pitthu-bag, which were recovered from a residentialbillet, by the armed forces, was inconclusive, as far as revealing anyone’sidentity,age,origin,ornumberofpersonsisconcerned.Asperthereport‘TheseburntmassmaterialsbelongtoHumanMale.Itcouldnotbepossibletoestablishtheidentityofburntmaleremainsasunderreference’.Duetotheabsenceofanyrecovered arms from the aforementioned billet, its residential nature and theinconclusiveDNAanalysisreportofthecharredmass,thepresenceofanyotherterroristcouldnotbeestablishedtilldateandhencetheinvestigationregardingthisaspectiscontinuingundersection173(8)ofCrPC.

APPENDIXII

INDIANNAVY:CAPABILITYBUILDING,OVERSEASDEPLOYMENTSANDFUTUREPLANSINS Sardar Patel. An Indian Naval base at Porbandar, INS Sardar Patel, wascommissionedoninMay2015.

INSVajrakoshwascommissionedinSeptember2015.Theunitislocatedatapproximately 25 km from Naval Base Karwar and spread over an area ofapproximately 580 acres.The primary aimof the unit is to enable delivery ofmissiles to ships on the Western Seaboard and establishing state of the arttesting/maintenancefacilitiesfornewgenerationmissiles.

INS Vishwakarma was commissioned as a training establishment inNovember 2015. The establishment is the alma mater of Naval ArchitectOfficers, Shipwright Officers, HA sailors and civilian design officers/staff ofconstructorcadreoftheIN.Onanaverage,theunitundertakestrainingofabout35officersand260sailorsinayear.

An Indian Naval base, INS Karna was commissioned by the Chief of theNaval Staff at Visakhapatnam on in July 2016. INS Karna will serve as theoperationalbasefortheMarineCommandosontheEastCoast.

TwoNavalDetachments (NAVDET)atAndroth andBitra inLakshwadeepareintheprocessofbeingsetup.AForwardOperatingBase(FOB)atTuticorinhas been sanctioned. Operational Turn Round (OTR) Bases at Kamorta andCampbellBayhavebeengivenasanctioninApril2016.OTRPortatDicilipur.The ‘Go-ahead’sanction forconsultancywasaccorded inMarch2016and thepreparationofDPRisinprogress.

ForAndaman&NicobarCommand

ForAndaman&NicobarCommandRenewed impetus has been accorded to creation of Marine infrastructureespecially in A & N Islands. Approval of MoD has been obtained for thefollowingMarineInfrastructurecases:i. SanctionforConstructionofWetBasinandRefitJettyatNSRYPortBlair.ii. SanctionforJettyExtensionforberthingFDN-IIatNSRY(PortBlair)

CapitalAcquisitionContractsIndianNavyhassigned68capitalacquisitioncontractswithIndianandForeignvendors,amountingtoRs71,820.20croressinceMay2014.Themajorcontractsinclude procurement of seven P-17A Frigates, 22 Harpoon missiles, MLU ofKamov 28 helicopters, four P81 Boeing Aircraft, 12 Dorniers for CoastalSecurity, 16 Advanced Light Helicopters, Deep Submergence Rescue VesselsandaugmentationofRepairFacilitiesatNavalDockyards.

ImportantOperationsSearchandRescueOperationofMissingMalaysianAircraft.MalaysianAirlinesAircraftMH370was reported tobemissingon thenight of 7-8March2014,during the transit from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. The search and rescueoperationby the INwasundertaken (OperationSahayata) from13 to17April2014 by INS Kumbhir, Kesari and Saryu. Operation Haystack for the sameincidentwasundertakenbyINSSaryu,BangaramandBattimalvfrom19to26April 2014. P-81maritime surveillance aircraft of the Indian Navy were alsodeployedforsearchoperations.

The IN is continuously deploying one ship in Gulf of Aden on antipiracypatroldutiessinceOctober2008.TheINshipescortsmerchantshipsthroughthe490nmlongInternationallyRecommendedTransitCorridor(IRTC).Sofar,63IN ships have been deployed on antipiracy patrol duties. These have safelyescorted3,348merchantshipsmannedbynearly24,500seafarers.NoshipunderescortbytheINhaseverbeenhijacked.

AssistancetoMaldives–OpNeer.On5December2014,Maldivesreportedanacuteshortageofwaterintheislandcountryduetoafireincontrolpanelandcablingofthegeneratorsupplytothedistillationplants.INSSukanya,whichwasdeployedatsea,wasdivertedtoproceedtoMaleandINSDeepaksailedfromMumbaiwith800tonnesofwater.INSSukanyaarrivedMaleon5Decemberwith70tonnesofwaterpriortodepartingon7December.INSDeepakremainedinMaleforweekandprovided2016tonnesoffreshwatertotheMaldivianauthorities.EvacuationofIndianNationalsfromYemen:OpRahat.AsaconsequenceofthevolatilesecuritysituationinYemeninMarch2015,theGovernmentofIndiaissuedanadvisoryforIndiannationalstoleaveYemen.ThiswasfollowedbyadecisiontoevacuateIndiansfromYemen.InthewakeoftheGovernment’sdecision,INshipsMumbai,TarkashandSumitra,weredeployedforOpRahatfrom30Marchto19April2015.Duringtheoperation,theshipsundertooknineevacuationsfromthreeports

inYemen,viz.Aden,HodeidahandAshShi’hr.TheevacueesweretransportedtoDjiboutiforonwardpassagetoIndiabyIAF/AirIndiaaircraftandmerchantvesselsKavarattiandCorals.Atotalof3,074personnel,including1,783Indiansand1,291foreignnationalswereevacuatedbyINshipsfromYemen.

OverseasDeploymentsa. OpCapella.INSMysorewasdeployedinthePersianGulffromendJune

toJuly2014andwasonstandbyundertakeevacuationofpersonnelfromIraq.

b. EasternFleetOSD.INshipsShakti,RanvijayandShivalikweredeployedintheSouthChinaSea,SeaofJapanandWesternPacificOceaninJuly-August2014.Theshipsundertooktwomajorexercises,viz.,INDRA14withtheRussianNavyandinMalabar2014withtheUSNavy.

c. EasternFleetOverseasDeployment(OSD).INshipsSatpura,Kamorta,RanvirandShaktiweredeployedinSouthChinaSea,SeaofJapanandJavaSeainMayandJune15.TheIndianNavyparticipatedinSIMBEX-15intheSouthChinaSeawiththeSingaporeNavyandalsocarriedoutPASSEXwiththenaviesofIndonesia,Australia,ThailandandCambodia.

d. WesternFleetOSD.INshipsDeepak,Mumbai,TalwarandTegweredeployedintheSouthernIndianOceaninOctober-November2014andvisitedAntisiranana,Mombasa,Dar-es-Salem,Simon’sTown,CapeTown,PortLouis,StDenis,PortVictoriaandNacaladuringtheOSD.

e. OSDofTrainingSquadron.INshipsof1stTrainingSquadronvisitedAbuDhabiandMuscataspartoftrainingforseacadets.

f. WesternFleetOverseasDeployment(OSD).INshipsDelhi,Deepak,TabarandTrishulweredeployedtoPersianGulfaspartofWesternFleetOSDinSeptember2015.Inaddition,INshipsBeasandBetwaundertookadeploymenttoIraninAugust-September2015.

g. OSDofTrainingSquadron.INshipsof1stTrainingSquadron(1TrainingShips)visitedIndonesia,Singapore,Malaysia,Bangladesh,SriLankainMarch2015and,MauritiusandSeychellesfromSeptembertoNovember2016aspartofseatrainingofcadets.DuringthevisitofoneTrainingShiptoMauritius,INSSujataalsoparticipatedintheexercise.

Cyclone‘Roanu’hadcausedwidespreadfloods,damageandlossoflifeinSriLanka. The Sri Lankan Government requested for flood relief related HADR

storesfromIndianGovernment.Inresponsetotherequest,INshipsSutlejandSunaynaweredeployedforfloodreliefoperationatColombofrom21to23May2016. In addition to transfer of relief and medical stores, the ships alsoconductedamedicalcamp.

HydrographicSurveyforForeignCountriesIndianNavalHydrographic ships and surveyunits have assisted the followingcountries since 2014 for undertaking survey of various ports, approaches toharbours,etc.,basedonrequestsreceivedfromthehostgovernments:a. Mombassa,Kenya.b. Dar-es-Salem&Zanzibar,Tanzania.c. Sittwe,Myanmar.d. PortVictoria,Seychelles.e. PortLouis,Mauritius.

Assistance in Hydrography. In addition to the assistance provided inHydrographic surveys, IN also trains officers and sailors of foreign navies/concernedorganisationsinhydrographyrelatedsubjectsattheNavalInstituteofHydrography,Goa.

MaterialAssistancetoVietnamPeoplesNavy(VPN)An IN Technical Team was deputed to Vietnam in November 2015 forundertaking defect rectification of various VPN equipment based on requestfromthehostGovernment. Inaddition, trainingonyardprocesses,upkeepandmaintenance of ship-borne systems was also conducted for VPN personnel.Further,inaccordancewithCompositeTrainingPlan(CTP),119personnelfromVietnamPeople’sNavyhavebeen trainedatNavalDockyard,Visakhapatnam,INS Eksila, INS Kalinga and Naval Armament Depot, Visakhapatnam indifferentgroups.

ProvisionofAdvanceLightHelicopter(ALH)INhasprovidedoneALHtoMaldivesinApril2016.TheaircraftisdeployedatKadhdhoo island in South CentralMaldives and being extensively tasked formedicalevacuation,searchandrescueandotherhumanitariantasks.

FastInterceptorBoatsIndiahasdelivered11FastInterceptorBoats(FIBs)toMauritiusCoastGuardinMarch2016.ThecraftwerebuiltbyM/sGSLunderIndianNavy’ssupervision.

DeliveryofMauritiusCoastGuardShipThe first of the twoWater Jet Fast P Vessel built by Goa Shipyard LimitedMauritiusCoastGuard,wasdeliveredin16September.Constructionoftheship,named‘Victory’,wasoverseenbytheIndianNavy.

FireAssistanceatAntsiranana,MadagascarA major fire broke out at Ambilobe, Madagascar in September 2016 whichaffected more than 5,000 people. Based on a request received from the hostGovernment, teams from INS Trikhand were deployed to render timelyassistance by donating victualling stores, medical and surgicalmaterial to thelocalcivilauthorities.

MarineInfrastructureTheIndianNavyisplayingakeyroleinthecreationofmarineinfrastructureinthefollowingcountries:a. Mauritius.OneofficerhasbeenpostedatMauritiusfordevelopingMarine

infrastructure/JettysinceJanuary2016.b. Seychelles.OneofficerisbeingdeputedtoSeychellesaspartoftheteam

forinfrastructuredevelopmentandpresentlyattachedtoE-in-CBranch.c. Maldives.INrepresentativesvisitedMaldivesinJulyandOctober2016as

partofMoDdelegationfordiscussionsondevelopmentofmarineinfrastructure.

Between 2014 and 2017, IN has deputed Mobile Training Teams toMauritius, Sri Lanka,Oman,Bangladesh,Myanmar, andMaldives. IN is alsoexploringfeasibilityofdeputingsimilarteamstoUAE,Tanzania,andQatar.

Courtesy:IndianNavy