Secular and Religious Ngos in Algeria

7/29/2019 Secular and Religious Ngos in Algeria

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The civility & un-civility of the relations

between secular and religious NGOs in

Algeria

Dr. Francesco CavatortaSchool of Law and Government

Dublin City UniversityandCentre for Contemporary Middle East Studies

University of Southern Denmark

E-mail: [email protected]

Paper prepared for the BRISMES Workshop Liberation, Domination, Expression:

Micro-political processes, University of St Andrews 8-9 February 2009. Please do not

quote without authors permission.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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Introduction

In one of the first thorough examinations of civil society activism in the Arab

world conducted under the direction of Richard Norton, John Entelis (1996), writing on

Algeria, argued that without a well developed civil society , it is difficult, if not

impossible, to have an atmosphere supportive of democracy. This view is quite typical

of the positive normative connotations that civil society enjoyed at the height of

democratization studies. The linkage between civil society and democracy has been

particularly strong within the liberal tradition and democratic theory in general postulates

that civil society forms the bedrock of good democratic governance (Browers, 2006).

When attempting to analyse the reasons for the absence of democracy in the

Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is not surprising to find that one of the most

popular explanations has to do with the variable civil society. This has given rise to a

number of approaches to the study of civil society in the Arab world, which have

diverging and at times conflicting assumptions, but also share the preoccupation of

linking their approach to the wider democratization literature. More recently, this is

changing due to larger problems with the democratization literature from both a

theoretical and empirical perspective and changes in the conceptualisation of civil society

itself. This paper builds on this recent work and questions the validity of approaching

civil society activism in the MENA within the inflexible paradigm of democratization

and with a normative definition of civil society. Rather, this study analyses the reality of

such activism with all its nuances and divisions and de-links it from the democratization

literature and its normative take on civil society. This does not mean that such study does

not have implications for the processes of regime change that are taking place in the

region, but it argues equally forcefully that such processes might not go into the direction

of political pluralism and might on the contrary be ways in which a different type of

political authoritarianism is constructed. The first part of the paper is a general

discussion of the state of the literature on civil society in the Arab world, while the

second part, building on Jamals (2007) theoretical framework examines civil society

activism in North Africa questioning some widely held assumptions about civility and

incivility.


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Civil society and democratization in the Arab world

In an article for the Journal of Democracy in 2000, Laith Kubba proclaimed that

the awakening of civil society in the Arab world would be the decisive factor in

challenging the authoritarian regimes in the region and eventually lead the Arabs to the

promised land of democratisation. This belief in the positive role of civil society

activism stemmed from three factors. First and foremost was the quasi-natural acceptance

of the theoretical assumption that civil society activism is per se conducive to

democratisation where authoritarian exists and to the maintenance of democracy where

democracy already exists. Second, the historical experience of the 1980s and early 1990s

processes of democratisation seemed to prove the assumption correct, as the cases of

Eastern Europe and Latin America are very rarely analysed without mentioning the

importance that civil society had in restoring democracy in both regions. In fact, Eastern

Europe and Latin America can in a sense claim ownership of the revival of the civil

society idea in the 1980s. (Glasius et al., 2004:3). Finally, the majority of the countries

in the Arab world had seen the emergence of a significant number of civil society

organisations engaged in the promotion of very diverse issues ranging from human rights

to governmental accountability and from business transparency to environmental

protection (Howe, 2005).

The paradigm of transition to democracy and how the move from authoritarian to

democratic governance occurs had always had an in-built teleology and rigidity, whereby

the process just needed to get started to almost inevitably end with the instauration of

democracy even if there were bumps and setbacks on the road. More recently however

some scholarship on democratisation has begun to re-consider many of the assumptions

of the transition paradigm. First and foremost critics of the transition paradigm

concentrated their attention on the reality of world politics and began to argue that when

one applies democratic criteria in a strict manner, only a handful countries actually

managed to make a successful transition to a system of government that is truly liberal

and democratic. Accordingly, on an imagined continuum the vast majority of countries

are stuck between rigid authoritarianism on the one hand and democracy on the other.

The novelty of a number of recent analyses (Brumberg, 2002; Volpi, 2005; Hinnebusch,

2006) is that these political systems, rather than being transient, are examined as if they


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were permanent arrangements. It follows that they should be studied in their own right

without the expectation that they will fully move to the democratic stage. Thus, there is

today a literature arguing that the whole transition paradigm should be abandoned

because its assumptions are no longer valid in interpreting the current reality. The main

problem according to Carothers (2002:7) is that no small amount of teleology is implicit

in the transition paradigm and that scholars and policy-makers alike should reassess the

validity of the supposed sequence leading countries out of authoritarian rule and towards

democratic governance (Carothers, 2007). The re-evaluation of the transition paradigm in

terms of the sequence that supposedly characterises transitions has an impact not only on

the stages and outcome of processes of democratisation, but has profound implications

for political actors central to such processes, including civil society groups and their role.

It is therefore unsurprising that the whole concept and practical application of civil

society in the context of democratisation has also undergone a profound re-examination.

Within democratic theory the assumption that civil society is per se a positive

development leading to democratic governance or to the strengthening of democratic rule

where it already exists has come under severe criticism (Encarnacion, 2006). In addition,

the experiences of Eastern Europe and Latin America have been empirically re-evaluated

and a degree of scepticism has emerged regarding the actual importance of civil society

activism in the transitions to democracy in both regions (Tempest, 1997). Finally, the

explosion of civil society activism in the Arab world itself has met with considerable

scepticism from regional experts (Langohr, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2000; Cavatorta and

Elananza, 2008). These wider debates have had a profound influence on the study of civil

society in the region, which presents three main approaches regarding the state and

importance of civil society in the Arab World, both as an explanatory variable and a

policy-making tool.

The first view, following the traditional normative definition of the concept, treats

it as being exclusively a liberal one and argues that in the region such civil society is very

weak and therefore unable to pressure the regime into making democratic reforms

(Abootalebi, 1998; Yom, 2005). This school of thought, building on the assumption that

the concept of civil society is an inherently Western one (Gellner, 1994), argues that it is

very difficult for civil society to strongly emerge in a cultural setting that operates


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according to different values. In the aftermath of the colonial period, civil society was

entirely subsumed to the nationalist project which required a high degree of social unity

and cohesion and therefore aligned to the position of the authoritarian leaders of the

nationalist struggle (Pratt, 2007). Once the project of post independence modernisation

failed to deliver economic success, international equality and domestic social progress,

civil society began to raise its head again and to turn against the ruling elites. The

problem is that such dissent did and still does not coalesce, according to this first school

of thought. This does not mean that liberal civil society activism is absent in the Arab

world, but the activism, both social and political, of the Islamist movements overshadows

it. The pre-eminence of Islamism is due to its ability of re-energising the modernisation

impetus through religious precepts and symbolism. It follows that while the new liberal

civil society actors sharply criticise the authoritarianism of the political system in the

name of what are considered to be Western values, the dominant Islamist alternative

largely proposes the same corporatist arrangements of the past, although underpinned by

a different ideological referent, which is much easier to understand and appreciate for

Arab citizens. Islamism proposes a catch-all discourse that replaces secular nationalism

with a religious one, which is appealing to broad sections of the population irrespective

of their social and individual status. The project of political Islam is a totalising one

because it simply re-frames the conceptual categories which the previous national

consensus was built on in religious terms. In addition, Islamist groups and associations

are practically able to demonstrate that their ideological references are concrete in so far

as they provide for the welfare of citizens as much as the early nationalist elites were able

to do immediately after independence. Through their networks of social activism,

Islamists are able to offer a glimpse of the promise of the continuation of non-Western

modernisation that ruling elites betrayed. This view of civil society activism can

contribute to explain the absence of meaningful alternatives to the current regimes in

power, although it is admittedly based on an ideal type categorisation of associations

into Islamist and secular/liberal. In conclusion, the first school of thought postulates that,

based on a strict liberal definition of civil society, there are only very few liberal-

democratic civil society organisations that promote and defend democratic values and

Arab states are able to dismantle or co-opt them with relative ease. The weakness of Arab


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civil society is therefore assumed to be a great obstacle to democratisation and political

change. Within this approach, it emerges quite clearly that the liberal/secular groups

represent the civility of democracy and the part of society that the donor community and

the West in general should be interacting with and support, while the Islamists represent

the incivility of a new authoritarianism.

The second view, following the revisionist approach, conceptualises civil society

in neutral terms and refuses to assume that the concept has positive connotations. The

argument is that civil society as a whole does not have per se any normative liberal-

democratic traits and does not necessarily promote liberal values. This means that what

matters are the groups that make up civil society and, more importantly, what are the

values they subscribe to. The assumption here is that civil society can be strong and

uncivil at the same time (Kopecky and Mudde, 2003). Accordingly, at closer inspection,

Arab civil society emerges as being rather strong and active because it displays a

significant number of groups and associations that operate autonomously from the state

and attempt to influence the political system, while, at the same time, trying to keep it in

check. For instance, Berman (2003) argues that civil society activism is strong,

particularly in a context where states are quite weak, lack popular legitimacy and are on

the retreat from the public sphere. Thus, while the state still retains a strong hold on

Arab citizens, an increasing number of activities, including the provision of social

services, have fallen to private and autonomous organisations of civil society.

Accordingly the region is replete with domestic political activism (Singerman, 2004:

149) which is not based on political parties, but on civil society organisations. The picture

that emerges is therefore one of a strong civil society, which is, however, wholly unsuited

to promote democracy and human rights because the main groups and associations within

civil society are Islamist. The assumption that Berman makes about civil society in the

Arab world is that it is an uncivil one because Islamist associations dominate it and the

ethos of Islamist organisations is by nature un-democratic and illiberal. Once again,

Islamism is equated to incivility, which dominates society, while the civility of the

liberals is marginalised.

The third view suggests that civil society has indeed been strengthening over the

last decade, with a significant surge in the numbers of organisations being created. This is


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empirically confirmed in a number of studies on Arab countries (Howe, 2005; Sater,

2007). However, this is not necessarily a sign that the ruling elites are losing control of

their own society. Quite the contrary is true, as many civil society organisations are

largely creations of the state itself, while others are either beholden to the state or fully

co-opted. This generates an artificial civil society where, at best, autonomy of action is

really limited and, at worst, it is an instrument for ruling regimes to keep a very close eye

on social developments and issues in order to better pre-empt opposition (Wiktorowicz,

2000). In this context, the concept of civil society entirely loses its normative value.

What distinguishes this approach to civil society from the previous ones is that it treats

both liberal and Islamist movements as part of the problem for the absence of a

meaningfully democratic civil activism. Rather than considering liberal civil society as

the beacon of enlightenment in the region and, by implication, conceiving of Islamist

organisations as the forces of darkness, it attempts to explain civil activism through an

analysis of the authoritarian constraints in place, which force all civil society

organisations to make a significant amount of compromises with the authorities, leading

therefore the majority of them to work and, indirectly, accept the current system of rule.

This approach is quite different from the previous ones in so far as it does not make a

clear-cut division between the incivility of Islamists and the civility of liberal/secular

organisations. In fact, this approach places in the same category of non-autonomous civil

society and therefore unable to produce political change.

This argument is quite interesting and it has a degree of empirical validity because

it is beyond doubt that many civil society groups are indeed creation of the ruling

regimes. However, arguing that the Arab world does not have autonomous groups

operating at civil society level does not reflect the reality, as the Arab state, due to

external and domestic constraints, has had to change considerably, allowing for the

formation of associations and groups independent from it. The argument of this study is

that not only authoritarian constraints shape the dynamics of civil society differently from

the ones that characterise civil society in established democracies, but that framing all

this within the logic of democratization and therefore point to civil actor wanting

democracy and uncivil ones not wanting it is misplaced. With a different starting


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assumption, the analysis of civil society activism in the region might be close to what the

reality is and not how it should be.

Civil society under authoritarian constraints

In her study of civil society dynamics in the Arab world, Jamal specifically

analyses how they lead to reinforce authoritarian rule and how an increase in trust and

social capital has reverse effects on attitudes towards democracy. Jamal argues that

associational life in authoritarian contexts is distinctively different from the one in

established democracies. The dynamics that are produced in the relationships between

authoritarian regimes and civil society organizations are fundamentally different despite

the fact that similar trends, such as the increase in interpersonal trust among association

members, exist in both authoritarian and democratic contexts. The argument is that the

authoritarian constraints the regime put in place make it necessary for associations to

decide which side they are on. If the association wants to achieve some of its objectives,

it will have to play by the rules of the authoritarian regime. Thus, it is only through

corrupt networks of patronage that the association will be able to satisfy the basic needs

of its members and achieve its goals because only the regime can deliver the goods.

These networks however reinforce the central role of the authoritarian regime because

they strengthen non-democratic access to decision-makers. Paradoxically, social capital

increases within these pro-regime associations because their members, by playing within

the constraints provided, can be reasonably certain of positive outcomes for the group,

which then has no interest in dismantling such networks in favour of fairer and more

democratic ways of access to decision-makers because this would diminish their benefits.

The opposite is also true and anti-regime organisations, which do not utilise or do not

have patronage networks available to them, have lower levels of social capital because of

their more democratic values, which do not allow them to obtain the same level of

benefits. The pro and anti-regime labels are probably more effective than the Islamist and

secular/liberal ones because they better capture the personalistic nature of many these

networks, which at times are much more significant than ideological differences. Jamal

does not write off the difficult work of many autonomous anti-regime organisations, but

civil society in the end does not produce democratisation because authoritarian dynamics


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provide a very rigid structure of incentives for associational life and do not permit the

emergence of democratic attitudes.

While Jamalss study is a much welcome contribution, it is also concerned with

the issue of democratization. The problem with this preoccupation is that the autonomous

civil society groups active in the Arab world might not share the same preoccupation with

democracy and democratization that Western scholars and practitioners have. When one

examines what individual associations within civil society do, it emerges quite clearly

that they have a very specific mission, usually contained in their mission statement,

concerning the promotion or defense of a rather narrow and specific issue. The work of

the organisation is therefore aimed principally at satisfying the interests of the members

on that issue, which might or might not coincide with the enhancement of democracy in

the country. This is true for secular and liberal groups, but also for Islamist ones, which

are usually seen as opponents of the regime a priori while this might not really be the

case, particularly when they area charitable organizations (Clark, 204). Sweeping

generalisations about the role for civil society are therefore misplaced and easy

categorizations should not be attempted. Civil society groups in the Arab world operate in

what they perceive to be normal conditions and therefore attempt to achieve their goals

by working within the given system, independently from the ideological persuasion they

or the majority of the members might have. This makes civil society relations normal and

normalised. The struggles they have with each other for influence over a certain issue

reflect the same ones that we find in established democracies. The competition over

limited funds is similar to the competition that we have in democracies where funding

sources are also limited. The linkages and networks they build in their cooperative efforts

also reflect a normal development when examined in broader context. When it comes to

relations with the ruling regime, a degree of normality is also present. At times, some

groups will have the ear of the government, while other groups are marginalised and

have no access. This is again quite the standard in established democracies as well where

changes of government always reflect in changes at the social level on who dictates the

agenda emanating from society.1

1 For example, with the recent change in the US administration, we suddenly have pro-choice groups being

much more influential that in the past when pro-life groups dominated the agenda.


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In conclusion, if we exclude that an increase in civil society activism is always

pro-democracy and that civil society associations cannot be easily divided into civil and

uncivil ones, the picture that might emerge from the MENA might be different from the

one we imagine and closer to the political reality of groups having to operate within a

pseudo-democratic system.

Algeria: preliminary findings

The case of Algeria is quite an interesting one to examine because here we find a

strong military in a power struggle with its civilian counterparts over the control of the

leverages of power (Mortimer, 2006) within a context of political liberalisation. It is also

in Algeria where we find both a strong secular civil society imbued with the concept of

laicit and a strong Islamist current. In addition, politics and civil society activism are

taking place in post-conflict situation where the role of political violence is still

significant. From an analytical point of view, North Africa and Algeria in particular have

represented for at least two decades the area where perceived secular civility battled with

Islamist incivility. French language scholarship on Algeria is a testimony to this

dominant interpretation. It follows that notions of civility and incivility have

characterised discussions about civil society dynamics, as Islamism is per se considered

to be uncivil and highly problematic given the secular nature of that should be at the heart

of governing any society. Despite some scepticism emerging within French scholarship

about the role of civil society in democratization (Ferri, 2003), Algerian secular civil

society is believed to be not only a rampart against Islamism, but also a powerful force

for change.

At a closer look however, a much more complex and nuanced picture emerges,

particularly when one takes into account the institutional and, more importantly, the legal

constraints that exist in Algeria when it comes to regulate freedom of association. Before

the democratisation period of the late 1980s and early 1990s, freedom of association was

severely restricted. The 1964 decree regulating this matter stated that prefects ( walis)

should impede the formation of associations that, under the guise of social, cultural or

artistic activities, tend to pursue political ends that undermine the internal and external


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security of the State.2 This gave considerable leeway to the state to close down any

possible avenue of dissent. Cultural associations with an anti-regime agenda did emerge

in the early 1980s among the Berber minority, but it was not until the passing of Law 90-

31 in December 1990 that Algeria saw an explosion of civil society activism. At the time

a number of organisations dealing with all sorts to issues and activities were created and

began to carry out their activism with a significant degree of autonomy as the ruling elites

seemed indeed intent on liberalizing the countrys society and political system. Thus,

associations dealing with previously sensitive topics such as human rights, national

identity, development and the environment were created. Law 90-31 still regulates

freedom of association in Algeria, but in a radically changed political environment its

provisions seem now very restrictive. In addition, the emergency law which has been in

place since 1992 allows the state to override the other decrees in place if they are deemed

to be in conflict with the requirements of the emergency law. Specifically, Law 90-31

requires that associations cannot be set up before having acquired the permit to operate

and fulfilled all the administrative formalities. The application for authorisation is

however not a formality and it is by no means a guarantee that the authorisation will be

given. In addition an association cannot begin to operate before having been wholly

regularized. Such regularization consists of three steps: a) a declaration of incorporation

has to be presented to the authorities; b) within 90 days the association has to be issued

with a receipt of registration; and c) publication of the notification of incorporation in a

national newspaper. There are a number of reasons that the state utilizes to reject the

registration of associations because the law has a provision whereby associations whose

work is deemed to be detrimental to the interests of the struggle for national liberation

are not registered and therefore cannot operate. The problem with such a wide scope for

interpretation of this provision is that it leaves a huge amount of discretionary power to

government officials in the Ministry of Interior. In addition to this, associations are

mandated by the authorities to incorporate elements that have to be included in the

statues. This, together with the obligation for the association to also submit a huge

number of documents, makes the administrative procedures cumbersome and difficult.

2 See http://www.euromedrights.net/pages/440/page/language/1
http://www.euromedrights.net/pages/440/page/language/1http://www.euromedrights.net/pages/440/page/language/1


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Associations that see their registration rejected have no recourse and the state does not

have to motivate its rejection. Once an association has been duly registered and can

therefore begin its work, interference from the state does not cease because their work is

monitored quite strictly, particularly in cases where the issues that the association is

involved in are sensitive or controversial. The government can for instance require the

courts to suspend or disband an organisation if the association is deemed to be breaking

the law or not upholding the statute. De facto interference from the authorities also

undermines the day to day running of organisations as they might be infiltrated by

security services. A strict monitoring of members also takes place as the law mandates

that associations supply information about individual members to the authorities and this

has a negative effect on recruitment of new members because people might be afraid of

being monitored in their private activities. This sort of interference is permitted because

of the emergency law. When it comes to public meetings the same emergency law for

instance overrides the provisions of Law 90-31 and no public event can be held without

the prior authorisation of the Ministry of Interior and the prefect. Finally, when it comes

to funding and controlling how funds are employed, the authorities have again a high

degree of discretionary powers to monitor and eventually punish associations. Strict

monitoring of how funds are collected and spent occurs very regularly and it is mandated

by the law that associations inform the authorities of any funds they receive. When it

comes to foreign funding, associations that wish to receive donations from foreign

organizations must obtain prior authorization from the government, supply information

on the donors and the amounts involved and show that these funds will be used to pursue

the stated objectives of the association.3 When Law 90-31 was first passed it generated a

significant amount of enthusiasm because it permitted the creation of organisations of all

sorts from cultural to environmental and from human rights to sport. This indicated a

genuine attempt by the state to follow through on its promise of liberalisation. Given the

liberal political context at the time, it is no surprise that a significant number of

organisations were created and that the state did not see fit to make registration difficult.

The changed nature of the political system and the general political environment

due to the military coup, the civil war and the current war on terror has made the

3 Seehttp://www.euromedrights.net/pages/440/page/language/1
http://www.euromedrights.net/pages/440/page/language/1http://www.euromedrights.net/pages/440/page/language/1http://www.euromedrights.net/pages/440/page/language/1http://www.euromedrights.net/pages/440/page/language/1


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implementation of Law 90-31 more restrictive than it was originally intended to be. If

one also adds that the emergency law overrides some of the provisions of Law 90-31, it

can be concluded that civil society associations in Algeria face a very restrictive legal

environment. The overbearing presence of the security services on civil society activism

is both de jure and de facto and it prevents civil society to grow and to be a wholly

autonomous force for change. Thus, the environment within which civil society operates

is quite different from the one in established democracies, but the objectives of the civil

society groups are the same: satisfy the needs of the members and pursue activities that

fulfil the mandate and objectives they have. What becomes important therefore is how

organizations manage to achieve such objectives and this where the assumption that civil

society as a force for democratization fails the empirical test and where the lines between

civility and incivility are blurred. One of the most significant issues for civil society in

Algeria is the fate of the disappeared and the help that should be provided to the victims

of political violence. It is therefore not surprising that there are a number of organizations

dealing with this specific issue despite the fact that this is a controversial issue for the

regime. The civil society dynamics on this issue are quite paradigmatic of the complexity

of activism in Algeria and its influence of the political system. The Organisation

Nationale des Familles des Victimes du Terrorisme (ONFVT) was established in 1993 to

provide moral, financial and legal assistance of families of the victims of terrorism.

Specifically, the association has established a cell of psychological support for victims

families, it supports victims offspring in their education and professional endeavours and

it organises conferences and seminars where the issue of how to deal with the

consequences of terrorism is discussed. The organisation also lobbies the government to

confer a special status for the victims of terrorism. This organisation, as mentioned

above, stands out among the ones dealing with the issue of families of victims of

terrorism because of its good relationship with the government and in particular for its

support for the Presidents controversial National Reconciliation Charter. While similar

associations, as we will see, were very sceptical of the charter or outright opposed to it

because it guaranteed a general amnesty to perpetrators of crimes, the ONFVT was very

much in favour of it. The association sis secular and quite close to the government, but it

has faced the opposition of other equally secular organisations opposed to the Charter,


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but with the similar objective of helping the families of victims and disappeared. The

Collectif Bnet Fathma NSoumer, for instance, was established with the objective of

providing legal, psychological and administrative assistance to women and children who

are the direct or indirect victims of terrorism and political violence. The organisation has

no organic relationship and much like the larger human rights groups in Algeria it was

opposed to the Charter.

Somoud is a similar group and was established in Algiers in 1996 with the

objective of defending the rights of the victims families, providing them with the

necessary guidance, legal and social support. The families of the victims of terrorism are

the main constituency of reference and the organisation tries to influence political actors

to try to make this issue central to the political debate. The group has relations of

friendship and partnership with political parties such as FFS, RCD, RND, Islah and FNA,

but not with the government. Raising awareness through press conferences, seminars and

access to media is a crucial part of their work and it is this public aspect that upsets the

government. The collectif des familles de disparu(e)s en Algrie was established in 1998

and its has the specificity of being both French and Algerian. It is dedicated to

accompanying and advising families of missing persons; educating and training officials

on human rights; formulating complaints; lobbying for truth and justice and fight against

impunity. It is this particular stance that put the organisation on a collision course with

the authorities at the time when President Bouteflika was pushing through his national

reconciliation law, to which the collectifwas opposed on the ground that it did not reveal

anything about the fate of the disappeared, it granted a blanket amnesty to perpetrators

and only provided some financial compensation to families of victims but no justice.

The collectiftried to influence the public debate and to have access to policy-makers and

were keen on engaging in dialogue with the public authorities, but numerous invitations

and requests for meetings with the President and members of cabinet went unanswered.

However, the collectif held a number of meetings with the president of the states

CNCPPDH (la Commission nationale consultative de promotion et de protection des

droits de lhomme) Mr. Farouk Ksentini, as well as with various representatives of

political parties. This testifies to the importance of the issue and to the personal links that

members of the organisation have, but it also indicates that on such an issue the


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government was not ready to engage with civil society. Accordingly, the associations

work was disrupted on a number of occasions. The authorities have systematically

refused to grant a legal status to disappeared people committees; the office in Algiers

has to relocate every year as a result of the pressure put by the authorities on the owners

of the premises the collectifrents and members of staff in Algiers have had to deal with

threats, arrests and harassment during demonstrations, especially those organised against

the peace and reconciliation charter. The lawyers of the families of the disappeared also

face judiciary harassment.Despite facing such difficulties, the collectifis able to organisenumerous events where the issue of the disappeared can be publicly tackled. Thisorganisation is obviously very different from the ONFVT and represents the other side of

the debate regarding eth disappeared and the victims of political violence.

Djazairouna was established in Blida in 1996 with the objective of providing

social, legal and psychological support for the families of the victims of terrorism. It was

founded by the families of the victims who were assassinated or kidnapped as well as of

those who managed to survive terrorist attacks. The members of the association are all

victims of terrorism in the Blida prefecture and in order to become members they need to

have a certificate from the security services attesting to their status as victims. Since its

creation, the association has delivered material, moral, psychological and administrative

support to over 200 victims every year. In political terms the association works for the

arrest and trial of the Islamist terrorists who committed and ordered the acts of terrorism

that plagued the Blida prefecture during the civil conflict. It also pushes for the

promulgation of a statute for the victims of terrorism. This political position places them

at odds with the regime and with the law of national reconciliation passed by the

government, which grants a full amnesty to both Islamist fighters and members of the

security forces. The association is very much opposed to what the director terms the

occultation of justice by impunity and to pursue its objectives, the association organizes

illegal sit-ins and demonstrations calling on the authorities to honour their duties

regarding remembrance, truth and justice. This is the reason why the association does not

receive any public funding for its work and is barely tolerated by the authorities. Ms.

Nacera Dutour, whose son disappeared a number of years ago when he was taken by the

security forces, represents SOS Disparus that is vaguely Islamist and whose objective


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is to find out the truth about those who disappeared at the hands of the state. The

association has similar objectives and mandate to the other more secular ones. An

examination of the activism of these different organizations within this topic leads to a

number of interesting observations. First of all, there is an interesting cooperative trend

between organisations with a different ethos or nature. Thus, we have organisations such

as Our Algeria, which was founded specifically with the objective of providing support

to the victims of Islamist violence, cooperating and sharing the same scepticism towards

the reconciliation charter with organisations such as SOS Disparus, which was founded to

support the victims of state violence (Christiansen, 2006). Secondly, within the same

camp, we find competitive dynamics. For instance within the loosely labelled

secular/liberal camp we have organisations supporting quite strongly the reconciliation

charter clashing with those groups with a similar ethos that considered it a whitewash.

Thus, the paradox is that Ali Benhadj, who argued strongly, in the only interview

of the last 13 years, against the law of national reconciliation takes the same side as the

Algerian League for Human Rights (LADDH) and Somoud, which is linked to the Kabyle

parties. Benhadj asserted how dare they speak of national reconciliation when we have

been living under emergency law for the last 14 years?4; this line of thinking finds the

agreement of many in the civil society sectors who are liberal secular and would not have

much in common with Benhadj. Finally, all organisations attempt to use the same

channels and hold similar activities to see their most preferred outcome implemented.

This largely involves lobbying the government and using personal contacts to do that.

Even organisations claiming that they have a poor relationship with the authorities and

are harassed by them are ultimately dependent on access to them because without it their

activities and impact are even more limited.

All this has important repercussions on how one analyses civil society dynamics

in Algeria. The first significant point to be made is about the civility/incivility dichotomy,

which seems to lose its power and meaning in this case. If we assume that the struggle to

reject the Charter was a battle for civility, we then have to accept that Islamism in this

case belongs to the sphere of civility because of its defense of basic human rights.

Conversely, we would have to argue that some sectors of the so-called liberal and secular

4Le Monde, April 4th 2006, p. 3.


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civil society are quite uncivil as the defended and promoted a whitewash of the crimes

committed during the war. One could say that the organisations in favour of the charter

are part of the civil society created by the ruling regime to give the impression of

pluralism and this might be in a sense correct, but we should also take into account the

possibility that such organisations do represent legitimately a sector of society on this

issue. In addition, the organisations that were against the charter were allowed to organise

demonstrations and receive funds from abroad from their activities. Does this hinder their

independence and autonomy from the ruling elites? This leads to a second important

point which has to do with the divisions that exist within civil society. This cannot be

easily divided into a liberal/secular sector that is inevitably pro-democracy and pro-

human rights and into an Islamist sector that is obscurantiste. The lines are much more

blurred and the issue of the families of the disappeared and victims of terrorism is one

area where these divisions disappear. Sharp dividing lines between laicit and Islamism

might resurface in other contexts, such as womens rights, but they are not a permanent

feature of activism. A final point is that the evidence from Algeria confirms Jamals

theoretical assumption about civil society activism actually strengthening authoritarian

rule. This occurs because all organisations are very aware of the constraints they operate

in and as much as they dislike the ruling regime, they also need it to achieve some o fits

objectives. Most organisations are single issue orientated and therefore to be effective

they need to show results on that issue, which is only possible by not shutting down all

avenues of communication with the regime. This is true for both Islamist charitable

organisations (Clark, 2004) and secular ones as the Algerian case demonstrate.

The most significant finding of the study is however not that civil society activism

might not promote democracy. The relevance of the study is that it concludes that

democratisation is not a priority of civil society. Individual members and activists might

be personally interested in and committed to democratisation, but the organisations are

not necessarily reflecting these individuals commitment. This is because there seems to

be the widespread realisation that the political system within which they are operating is

not a transient one and if it is not then it needs to be dealt with if at least some of the

objectives of the organisations are to be achieved.


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Secular and Religious Ngos in Algeria

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