CHARTER SECTION 15 EQUALITY RIGHTS

The McLachlin Court’s First Decade

The Honourable Justice Lynn SmithSupreme Court of British Columbia

June 2009

Three Central Questions

• Three central questions– How to make the comparisons inherent in s. 15

analysis?• Who to compare with whom, and with respect to

what?

– What counts as “discrimination”?• Unintended effects?

• Positive obligations on government?

– Where does the burden of justification lie and when are possible justifications considered?

Four Phases

• 1989-95 – “substantive equality”

– Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143; Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296; Schachter,

[1992] 2 S.C.R. 679

• 1995 trilogy – differences of opinion– Egan, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; Miron, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418; Thibaudeau,

[1995] 2 S.C.R. 627

• Interim period – Eldridge, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624; Vriend, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493; Benner,

[1997] 1 S.C.R. 358

• 1999 - 2008 -- attempted synthesis– Law, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497

The Last Decade

• Chief Justice McLachlin appointed January, 2000

• McLachlin Court’s first decade coincides with its attempts to assimilate and apply the Lawguidelines

• R. v. Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 …. may mark the beginning of the next phase

Main Developments Since 2000

• Application of the Law guidelines proved less than straightforward, brought mixed reviews

• S. 15(2) jurisprudence launched

• Lovelace, 2000 SCC 37; Kapp

• Poverty likely not an analogous ground (Gosselin, 2002 SCC 84)

• Occupation not an analogous ground (Baier, 2007 SCC 31)

• Limited application of s. 15 in context of health care (Auton, 2004 SCC 78)

Main Developments Since 2000

• Emphasized the necessity for a “benefit” afforded by the law (Auton)

• Applied comparator analysis flexibly (Martin, 2003 SCC 54)

• Developed (in benefits cases) framework for choice of comparators (Hodge, 2004 SCC 65)

• Distinction on an enumerated or well-established analogous ground not necessarily an infringement (Auton; CFCYF, 2004 SCC 4; Gosselin, 2002 SCC 84)

Main Developments Since 2000

• Continued application of criteria from Corbiere, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, for the recognition of analogous grounds (Baier)

• Left open the scope of the role for s. 1

• Allowed a s. 1 defence on the basis of cost (NAPE, 2004 SCC 66)

• In Kapp, signalled pending change

Application of the Law Guidelines

• Law case marked achievement of consensus on a set of complex issues

• Main points of criticism from commentators:

–S. 15 analysis more complex than necessary

Application of the Law Guidelines

• Main points of criticism from commentators

– Focus on “dignity” makes analysis subjective, outcomes unpredictable

– Additional requirement (Auton) to show “benefit under the law” adds to complexity and indeterminacy

Application of the Law Guidelines

• Main points of criticism from commentators

– Comparator analysis revives “similarly situated” test

– As applied, the analytical framework leaves no meaningful role for s. 1, in effect reversing the burden of justification

– Overall, the approach has been ineffective in achieving the underlying purpose of s. 15

Outcomes in Cases

• 19 cases since 2000

–13 - no infringement of s. 15 found

–4 - infringement but justified under s. 1

–2 - infringement not justified under s. 1

• 1 - remedy granted (Martin)

• 1 – limited remedy since retroactive relief unwarranted (Hislop, 2007 SCC 10)

Grounds

• 19 cases since 2000

– Disability – 3

– Sexual orientation – 3

– Race/aboriginal origin – 3

– Age – 2

– Marital status – 2

– Sex – 2

– Citizenship – 1

– Other analogous ground – 3

R. v. Kapp

• Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy pilot sales program held not to infringe s. 15(1)– because an affirmative action program under s.

15(2)• Departed from Lovelace, giving s. 15(2) exemptive force

– Dissent by Bastarache J.

• S. 25 would bar the constitutional challenge – But s. 25 not absolute, since s. 28 provides for gender equality

“notwithstanding any thing in this Charter)

– Set up provisional analytical framework for 15(2) analysis

R. v. Kapp

• Comments by the majority– Re-emphasis on Andrews, as the template for the

Court’s commitment to “substantive equality”

– Different and complementary roles for s. 15(1) and s. 15(2)• Preventing and combatting discrimination

– Two-step test for s. 15(1) infringement• said to be in substance the same as the three-step test

in Law

Law Test for Discrimination… [A] court that is called upon to determine a discrimination

claim under s. 15(1) should make the following three broad inquiries:

First, does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the claimant's already disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics? …

Second, was the claimant subject to differential treatment on the basis of one or more of the enumerated and analogous grounds?

And third, does the differential treatment discriminate in a substantive sense, by bringing into play the purpose of s. 15(1) of the Charter in remedying such ills as prejudice, stereotyping, and historical disadvantage? The second and third inquiries are concerned with whether the differential treatment constitutes discrimination in the substantive sense intended by s. 15(1).

Iacobucci J., Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, at para. 39.

Law… [L]e tribunal appelé à décider s’il y a eu discrimination au sens du

par. 15(1) devrait se poser les trois grandes questions suivantes.

Premièrement, la loi contestée a) établit-elle une distinction formelle entre le demandeur et d’autres personnes en raison d’une ou de plusieurs caractéristiques personnelles, ou b) omet-elle de tenir compte de la situation défavorisée dans laquelle le demandeur se trouve déjà dans la société canadienne, créant ainsi une différence de traitement réelle entre celui-ci et d’autres personnes en raison d’une ou de plusieurs caractéristiques personnelles?

Deuxièmement, le demandeur a-t-il subi un traitement différent en raison d’un ou de plusieurs des motifs énumérés ou des motifs analogues?

Et, troisièmement, la différence de traitement était-elle réellement discriminatoire, faisant ainsi intervenir l’objet du par. 15(1) de la Charte pour remédier à des fléaux comme les préjugés, les stéréotypes et le désavantage historique? Les deuxième et troisième questions servent à déterminer si la différence de traitement constitue de la discrimination réelle au sens du par. 15(1).

Iacobucci J., Law c. Canada (Ministre de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration),[1999] 1 R.C.S. 497, au para. 39

Kapp Test for Discrimination

The template in Andrews, as further developed in a series

of cases culminating in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, established in essence a two-part test for showing discrimination under s. 15(1):

(1) Does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground?

(2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping?

These were divided, in Law, into three steps, but in our view the test is, in substance, the same.

McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J., R. v. Kapp, 2008 SCC 4, at para. 17.

KappLe modèle établi dans l’arrêt Andrews, qui a été explicitédans une série de décisions ayant abouti à l’arrêt Law c. Canada (Ministre de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration), [1999] 1 R.C.S. 497, établissait essentiellement un critère à deux volets devant être utilisé pour démontrer l’existence de discrimination au sens du par. 15(1) : (1)La loi crée-t-elle une distinction fondée sur un motif

énuméré ou analogue? (2)(2) La distinction crée-t-elle un désavantage par la

perpétuation d’un préjugé ou l’application de stéréotypes?

Il était question de trois volets dans l’arrêt Law, mais nous estimons que le critère est essentiellement le même.

La juge en chef McLachlin et la juge Abella, R. c. Kapp, 2008 CSC 41, au para. 17.

R. v. Kapp

• Casts doubt on the future of:

– Impact on human dignity as part of legal test

– Formalistic comparator analysis

– Emphasis on the “four contextual factors” in Law

• May require finding of “disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping”