RIGHTS UNDER THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE

MIRANDA DOCTRINE; THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL CANNOT BE CLAIMED DURING INDENTIFICATION IN POLICE LINE-UP.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMESTUZO, et al.[G.R. No. 104383, July 12, 2001]

KAPUNAN, J:FACTS: On February 26, 1991, four days after a reported robbery with multiple rape, a group of policemen together with accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a suspect, went to the handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City where accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking for a certain "Mario" and "searched the first and second floors of the building. Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, "Niloloko lang yata tayo ng taong ito" and "Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino." It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon.

Thereafter, Bagas was arrested and made to board the police vehicle together with accused Ampatin. They were brought to the Urduja Police Station in Kalookan City and placed under detention together with the other two accused, Amestuzo and Viñas.

When the complainants arrived, accused-appellant was brought out, instructed to turn to the left and then to the right and he was asked to talk. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused Amestuzo and Viñas. Accused-appellant answered in the negative. The policemen told the complainants that accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped when one of the policemen intervened.

Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court committed a serious error when it deprived him of his constitutional right to be represented by a lawyer during his investigation. His singular presentation to the complainants for identification without the benefit of counsel, accused-appellant avers, is a flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative to be assisted by counsel to which he was entitled from the moment he was arrested by the police and placed on detention. He maintains that the identification was a critical stage of prosecution at which he was as much entitled to the aid of counsel as during the trial proper.

ISSUES:(1) Whether or not appellant’s right to counsel was violated.(2) Whether or not there was a valid out-of-court identification of appellant to the complainants.

HELD:(1) NO. Herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when he was presented for Identification by the complainants because the same was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing that during this identification by the complainants, the police investigators sought to elicit any admission

or confession from accused-appellant. In fact, records show that the police did not at all talk to accused-appellant when he was presented before the complainants. The alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his conviction. In the present case, there is no such confession or extrajudicial admission.(2) YES. The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by complainants in the police station appears to have been improperly suggestive. Even before complainants had the opportunity to view accused-appellant face-to-face when he was brought out of the detention cell to be presented to them for identification, the police made an announcement that he was one of the suspects in the crime and that he was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of culprits.

MIRANDA DOCTRINE; THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ATTACHES ONLY UPON THE START OF CRIMINAL CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.

ESTELITO REMOLONA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION[G.R. No. 137473, August 2, 2001]

PUNO, J:FACTS: Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a teacher in Kiborosa Elementary School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, the District Supervisor of Infanta inquired about Nery’s Civil Service eligibility who purportedly got a rating of 81.25%. Mr. America also disclosed that he received information that Nery was campaigning for a fee of 8,000 pesos per examinee for a passing mark in the board examination for teachers.

It was eventually revealed that Nery Remolona’s name did not appear in the passing and failing examinees and that the exam no. 061285 as indicated in her report of rating belonged to a certain Marlou Madelo who got a rating of 65%.

Estelito Remolona in his written statement of facts said that he met a certain Atty. Salupadin in a bus, who offered to help his wife obtain eligibility for a fee of 3,000 pesos. Mr. America however, informed Nery that there was no vacancy when she presented her rating report, so Estelito went to Lucena to complain that America asked for money in exchange for the appointment of his wife, and that from 1986-1988, America was able to receive 6 checks at 2,600 pesos each plus bonus of Nery Remolona. Remolona admitted that he was responsible for the fake eligibility and that his wife had no knowledge thereof.

On recommendation of Regional Director Amilhasan of the Civil Service, the CSC found the spouses guilty of dishonesty and imposed a penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. On Motion For Reconsideration, only Nery was exonerated and reinstated.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and denied the motion for reconsideration and new trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of due process as the extra-judicial admission allegedly signed by him was in blank form and that he was not assisted by counsel.

HELD: NO. Right to Counsel is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken in custody. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. The exclusionary rule under Paragraph 2, Section 12 applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not those made in an administrative investigation.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; A SEARCHING INQUIRY MUST FOCUS ON THE VOLUNTARINESS AND THE FULL COMPREHENSION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARANZADO[G.R. Nos. 132442-44, September 24, 2001]

DAVIDE, C.J:FACTS: ZENY was born on 19 November 1984 in Sto. Nino, South Cotabato. Her parents were BERNARDINO and Lourdes Gerongani. At about midnight of 7 March 1997, she was sleeping with her sisters and younger brother in their house at Poblacion, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat, when the knocking at the door of their room awakened her. When she opened the door, her father immediately slapped her and demanded to know why she locked the door. Then, BERNARDINO asked her daughter: "Can I touch your vagina?" Repulsed by the suggestion, ZENY refused, only to find just as quickly that her father had poked a knife at her neck. BERNARDINO thereafter pulled ZENY's hair, forcibly held her down the floor and boxed her stomach. Recognizing the weakness of his daughter, he undressed her; and while choking her he imposed his lechery. He was obstinate to her daughter's pleas for mercy and compassion. He warned her not to tell anyone of the deed or he would kill her. He then stood up, dressed up and left the daughter to her weeping. Unsatisfied with that single act of carnality, BERNARDINO repeated the assault, twice on the honor and chastity of ZENY about midnight of 10 March 1997.

Upon arraignment on 19 May 1997, BERNARDINO, assisted by his counsel Atty. Balo, entered a plea of not guilty in each case. On 20 October 1997, BERNARDINO, through his counsel Atty. Balo, moved to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty in each of the three cases and to substitute the same upon re-arraignment with pleas of guilty. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was accorded with due process.

HELD: NO. The Court found that the trial court failed, albeit regrettably, to observe the rigid and severe constitutional mandate on due process, more particularly the demands of Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SECTION 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.

As pointed by the OSG, the Supreme Court had already outlined how compliance with said rule, where an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, should be attained by the trial court, thus:

1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences of his plea;

2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and precise degree of his culpability, and

3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.There is no debate that the trial court had persuasively observed the second

command of the rule by directing the prosecution to adduce evidence to determine the exact culpability of the accused, taking into account the presence of other possible aggravating or mitigating circumstances. On the first requirement, it bears to note that a searching inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea so that the plea of guilty can be truly said to be based on a free and informed judgment. While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," it would be well for the court to do the following:1. Ascertain from the accused himself

a.) how he was brought into the custody of the law;b.) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial

and preliminary investigations; andc.) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the

investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters.

2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.

3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions.

5. Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to supply missing details of significance.

First, the questions were framed in English. The record of such inquiry is bereft of any indication that the trial court attempted to ascertain whether BERNARDINO was well-versed in the English language; neither does it reveal any information about his personality profile which could "provide contributory insights for a proper verdict in the case." Nor does the record of the searching inquiry shed light on matters concerning his apprehension, detention and prior investigation. An examination of the records, however, disclosed that BERNARDINO signed a "Waiver" whereby he waived his right to a preliminary investigation. Such waiver was attested to by the Municipal Jail Warden, but there was nothing that would indicate that he was assisted by a competent counsel at the time.

Second, while Atty. Balo manifested that after he conferred with BERNARDINO the latter intimated that he was ready to withdraw his former plea of guilty, it is not clear whether the former explained to the latter the implications of a plea of guilty.

Third, during the searching inquiry, the trial judge and BERNARDINO kept mentioning about the "three cases filed" or "crimes charged" against the latter. BERNARDINO even hoisted, as one of the reasons why he committed the crimes, the fact that he had a very big problem because his house was burned. To ensure that he fully understood the nature of the crimes filed against him to which he pleaded guilty, the court should have at least asked him to recount what he exactly did.

People vs. Ayson,7 July 1989,

The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing. It must be claimed. Accordingly, it can be waived, expressly or impliedly, by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.

“Miranda rights” exist only in custodial interrogations. Hence, Ramos’ voluntary answers and his note may be admitted as evidence.*Action for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to annul the orders of RTC Judge Ayson declaring as inadmissible evidence 2 documents – one, the note sent by the accused to his superiors offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities and the other, the record of the administrative proceedings conducted against him by his employer, PAL, for having been made without the accused being advised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel.

Accused Felipe Ramos was a PAL employee assigned at the latter’s Baguio Ticket Office. As a result of an audit of his accountabilities, it came to light that he was involved in irregularities on the sale of PAL tickets. He was notified by PAL Management of an investigation to be conducted on this matter in accordance with PAL’s Code of Conduct and Discipline and the company’s CBA with the union.

One day before the scheduled investigation, Ramos submitted a handwritten note to his superiors signifying his intention to settle his accountabilities. This note is one of 2 documents which Judge Ayson ordered excluded during Ramos’s trial for estafa. The other is the record of the investigation conducted by PAL during which the “accused was informed of the audit findings, he admitted that he indeed misused the proceeds of the tickets, although he had planned on paying back the money, he expressed his willingness to settle his obligation and he offered a compromise whereby he promised to pay the amount in a staggered basis.”. It would appear that no compromise agreement was reached because 2 months after the investigation, an information was filed against Ramos for estafa for misappropriating the total amount of P76,700.65 in ticket sales. It was during the trial of this case before the sala of Judge Ayson, that the issue of the inadmissibility of the 2 documents adverted to above arose.

*ISSUE : WON the written note of the accused which he submitted to his superiors accepting responsibility for the irregularities as well as the record of the administrative investigation conducted against him are admissible evidence in his subsequent criminal trial.

HOLDING : YES.

RATIO : Section 20, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution deals with 2 sets of rights : the right against self- incrimination and the so-called ‘Miranda’ rights of suspects (right to silence and to counsel and the right to be informed of such rights).

The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing. It must be claimed. Accordingly, it can be waived, expressly or impliedly, by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.

As regards the ‘Miranda’ rights of the accused, these exist only in custodial interrogations. i.e., “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant was”. As Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation prior to or during the administrative inquiry, he cannot thus invoke these constitutional rights.

Ramos had voluntarily answered questions during the administrative investigation and he in fact agreed that the proceedings should be recorded. Likewise, the note he sent to his superiors offering to compromise his liabilities was a free and spontaneous act on his part. Said the SC, “they may not be excluded on the ground that that the so-called ‘Miranda’ rights had not been accorded to Ramos.”

RULING : Writ of certiorari granted. Documents in question admitted as evidence.

People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)             It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section, namely:              1) the right against self-incrimination  i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself  set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution,  and             2) the right of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense."              Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The rights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III. 

People v. Duero, 105 SCRA 379

Inasmuch as the prosecution in this case failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence.*NATURE: Automatic review of the decision convicting Duero of robbery w/ homicide.

FACTS: Sunday PM, Oct 24, 1976, Fausta Duero, an octogenarian housekeeper living alone, was killed in her house located at Barrio Banguit, Cabatuan, Iloilo.

She sustained 2 gaping wounds on the right cheek, 2 on the neck, another on the right shoulder and a bruise on the cheek. A piece of wire was tied around her neck. A scythe was sticking in her neck.

The crime was discovered in PM the next day by the bgy captain. Noticing that the windows of the old woman's house had not been opened, he asked the grandson of the old woman, to peep through the bedroom window.

When Olmos informed bgy Cpt. that the old woman's things were scattered in the bedroom, he requested Olmos to inform his uncle, Salvador Duero, a son of the old woman, to come to the house. Salvador found that money and pieces of jewelry were missing. A mallet was found on the floor near the victim's body.

No eyewitness testified as to the commission of the offense. The principal evidence of the prosecution is the testimony of Lt Lujan, chief of police of Cabatuan corroborated by circumstantial evidence from witnesses.

Lujan declared that Severino voluntarily confessed to him that he committed the crime but refused to sign a confession. Patrolman Alag also heard him confess & that it was he who induced the commission of the crime. Patrolman Tormon declared at the prelim exam, Duero knew that Fausta had money bec Fausta's daughter Mauring repaid her P1K.

Tormon said that Severino met Fausta at a store in the morning of Oct 23, 1976. Fausta was willing to lend Severino P100.

Another witness testified that Severino told him that he would rob Fausta. Another one said he saw Severino near the stairs at around 6 pm. Severino was calling the old woman. *ISSUE: WON TC erred in convicting Duero on the basis of his oral confession to the police station commander.

HELD: YES. Severino repudiated his alleged oral confession and even claimed that he was maltreated by the police.

As alibi, Severino testified that he was in his house when the crime was perpetrated. His wife, neighbor and friends, confirmed his alibi.

SolGen agrees w/ counsel de oficio's contention that Severino's oral confession is inadmissible in evidence by reason of Art IV Consti:

"SEC 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."

All the foregoing provisions are new except the first sentence, regarding the right against self-incrimination (nemo tenetur seipsum accusare), (1935 Consti), now revised or expanded in sec 20.

The new provisions in sec 20, Art IV 1973 Consti were adopted from the ruling in Miranda vs. Arizona w/c specifies the ff. procedural safeguards for in-custody interrogation of accused persons:

"Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an atty. (must be clear & unequivocal)

"The defendant may waive these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily knowingly and intelligently.

As restated by Chief Justice Warren in the Miranda case:

"For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it ¾ the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.

"More important, such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere . . .

"Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it . . .

"The warning must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it . . .

"An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. Failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person who most needs counsel.

"If the interrogation continues w/o presence of an atty and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the govt to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel . . .

"An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an atty followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver . . .

In the Miranda case, the Federal Supreme Court made it clear that what is prohibited is the "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements w/o full warnings of constitutional rights."

The Miranda ruling does not mean that the police should stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime. It does not affect volunteered statements of guilt by persons not in police custody.

Chief Justice Warren's summary of the procedural safeguards for persons in police custody where the interrogation is regarded as the commencement already of the trial or adversary system:

"Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.

Inasmuch as the prosecution in this case failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence.

After discarding Duero's oral confession, circumstantial evidence against him is not adequate for his conviction. His acquittal follows as a matter of course.

RULING: Acquitted.

People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516

The presumption is against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel. A curt “Opo” is insufficient to constitute a waiver. *Jara, Vergara, and Bernadas were all sentenced to death for robbery with homicide. Jara was also sentenced to death in the companion case of parricide. They robbed and killed Amparo Bantigue and Luisa Jara using a hammer and a pair of scissors while both were sound asleep in the bedroom they shared. The accused took with them a piggy bank and a Buddha bank. The victims were found the next morning by their employees. The accused gave extra-judicial confessions without the assistance of counsel.*The presumption is against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel. The stereotyped advice found in practically all extrajudicial confession to which police investigators type together with a curt “Opo” is insufficient to constitute a waiver—its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of the right is missing.

People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986) F:         Appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide for the killing and robbery of Ampara vda. de Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of the appellants were found guilty of homicide for the killing on the same date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the husband of the deceased, was found guilty of parricide. Two of the appellants, Raymundo Vergara and Bernardo Bernadas, made extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as the mastermind. The confessions were taken while the two were held incommunicado in the presence of five policemen and after two weeks of detention.  HELD:  The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated assumed the nature of a legal form or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificial style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently,  the prosecution must prove with strong, convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case.

Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294

PD 1886 compelled the witnesses to speak under pain of contempt. Their testimonies should not be used against them pursuant to the Immunity portion of PD 1886.

The right against self-incrimation may be invoked in any proceeding where a person is under investigation for the commission of an offense. Agrava Board is one such proceeding.

The evidence is not admissible because the right of the respondents against self-incrimination was violated when they were not informed of their rights before giving their testimonies before the Agrava Board.*On August 21, 1983, Benigno S Aquino Jr was killed in the MIA tarmac. To determine facts and circumstances surrounding the killings, a fact-finding board was created known as the Agrava Board via PD 1886. Pursuant to powers vested in the Board, they proceeded with the investigation and interviewed quite a number of witnesses, some of whom were the respondents in this case. Upon termination of the investigation, reports were submitted to then President Marcos and charges were subsequently filed. All accused, including respondents in this case pleaded not guilty.

In the course of the trial the prosecution marked and offered as its evidence the individual testimonies of private respondents before the Agrava Board. Private respondents objected to the admission of said evidence.

Prosecution represented by TANODBAYAN argues that said testimonies are admissible against respondents because of the latter’s failure to invoke before the Agrava Board right to immunity provided for in PD 1886, and such failure to claim said right amounted to a waiver.

Respondents contend, on the other hand, that notwithstanding failure to invoke privilege against self-incrimination, evidence cannot be used because of Sec 5 of PD 1886.

PD 1886, SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.

They contend that without the immunity provided for by 2nd sentence of PD 1886 Sec 5 the legal compulsion imposed by the first sentence will be violative of the right against self-incrimination.*ISSUES:

WON right against self-incrimination can be invoked in proceedings which are not custodial in nature.

WON the evidence is admissible by the reason that respondents did not invoke right against self-incrimination.

HELD:

The right against self-incrimation may be invoked in any proceeding where a person is under investigation for the commission of an offense. Agrava Board is one such proceeding.

The evidence is not admissible because the right of the respondents against self-incrimination was violated when they were not informed of their rights before giving their testimonies before the Agrava Board.

RATIO:

Right against self-incrimination may be invoked before the Agrava board

There was no categorical statement in the constitution which says that the right to self-incrimination applies only to persons under custodial investigation. There has been no pronouncement in any case of jurisprudence since Consti 1973 that a person similarly undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense, if not detained, is not entitled to the constitutional admonition mandated by said Section 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights.

The fact that the framers of the Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having it inserted between the words "under" and investigation", as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person " goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine.

Neither does the use of the word "confession" in the last sentence of said Section 20, Article 4 connote the idea that it applies only to police investigation, for although the word "confession" is used, the protection covers not only "confessions" but also "admissions" made in violation of this section. They are inadmissible against the source of the confession or admission and against third person.

The Agrava Board was created in response to a public clamor for an impartial and independent body to conduct an investigation. Although referred to and designated as a mere fact finding board, it is in truth and in fact an entity whose main task is to determine the person or persons criminally responsible for the killing. This is implicit from the PD1886 provision granting the board power to initiate the filing of a proper complaint.

The transcript of the proceedings in the Agrava board showed that the Board evinced purposes other than merely eliciting and determining the so-called surrounding facts and circumstances of the assassination. It would not be far-fetched to conclude that respondents were called to the stand to determine their probable involvement in the crime being investigated. Yet they have not been informed or at the very least even warned while so testifying, even at that particular stage of their testimonies, of their right to remain silent and that any statement given by them may be used against them.

Respondents did not lose their constitutional rights simply because the investigation was by the Agrava Board and not by any police investigator, officer or agency, when facts showed that the Board was in fact very similar to a criminal proceeding.

Also this right or privilege came from the US Constitution but when it was adopted here, the term criminal proceedings was removed giving more credence to the claim that the right may be invoked not only in proceedings of criminal nature.

Court not fully convinced that right was voluntarily waived.

Court said that compulsion as it is understood does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements.

In the case of Louis J. Lefkowitz v. Russel Turley" citing Garrity vs. New Jersey the Court held that in the context of threats of removal from office, the act of responding to interrogation was not voluntary and was not an effective waiver of the privilege against self- incrimination.

In Cabal vs. Kapunan court said, it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.

If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by him, hang on the balance.

Effect of absence of claim to the availability to private respondents of the immunity provided for in Section 5, P.D. 1886

Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. "Transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates.

Sec 5 of PD 1886 falls within the ambit of the first type of immunity statutes. It merely grants immunity from use but not immunity from being criminally prosecuted. In the face of the risk of being prosecuted, fairplay would dictate that respondents would have to be informed of their right to remain silent. Failure to inform them of such right under the pretense that they are not entitled to it (because such proceeding is not custodial nor criminal as the prosecution argues) would be violative of their right and such admissions or statements made under such situation cannot be admitted.

Also for the petitioner to deny the respondents immunity granted in Sec 5 because they did not invoke privilege against self-incrimination would be an absurd application of the concept of immunity. Under PD 1886, witnesses are compelled to answer any questions because under Sec 4 anyone refusing to testify can be held in direct or indirect contempt and may be penalized. The witness then, is compelled to answer and cannot invoke right to remain silent. Such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. Under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results the private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the witness.

GALMAN vs. PAMARAN

Cuevas, J. 08/30/85

FACTS:

After the death of Ninoy, Marcos issued PD 1886, creating the Agrava Fact-Finding Board to investigate on the tragedy. The statute gave the board broad powers, among them :

Sec. 4 The Board may hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and impose appropriate penalties.

A person guilty...including...refusal to be sworn or to answeras a witness or to subscribe to an affidavit or disposition when lawfully required to do so may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by the Board.

Sec. 5 No person shall be excused from attending and testifying...on the ground that his testimony or evidence required of him may to incriminate him...but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual son

testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment fro perjury committed in so testifying...

Sec 12. The findings...shall be made public. Should it warrant the prosecution of any person, the Board may initiate the filing of the proper complaint with the appropriate gov't agency.

Among those who were called in by the Board were private respondents Gen. Fabian Ver and Maj. Gen. Prospero Olivas. Eventually two reports came out of the Agrava Board and both were presented to Marcos; the majority report by board chair Justice Agrava and the minority report authored by 4 others. They were turned over to the Tanodbayan, who filed two informations for murder (for the death of Ninoy, another for Rolando Galman, the other dead person on the tarmac who was supposedly a Communist hitman) with the Sandiganbayan against private respondents herein charged as accesories, with several principals & 1 accomplice.

In the course of the trial, the prosecuting Tanodbayan marked and offered as part of their evidence the individual testimonies of the private respondents before the Agrava board, to which the respondents objected. The Sandiganbayan resolved to admit all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies in view of he immunity given by PD 1886.

Petitioners: (Saturnina & Reynaldo Galman, Tanodbayan)1. said testimonies are admissible because the respondents failed to invoke before the Agrava Board the immunity granted by PD18862. non-invocation of privilege constitutes a valid waiver. 3. right against self-incrimination functions only criminal cases

Repondents (Sandiganbayan, Ver, Olivas et.al)1. evidences cannot be used against them as mandated by Sec 5 PD18862. without the immunity provided for in the 2nd clause of Sec 5, the legal compulsion imposed by the 1st clause of the same Sec would be unconstitutional for being violative of the right against self incrimination.

ISSUE/HELD: w/n the testimonies of the respondents before the Board are admissible as evidence - NO

RATIO: Though designated as a fact-finding commission, the Agrava board was for all intents and purposes an entity charged with the determination of the person/s criminally responsible so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. In the course of the investigation it is but natural that those who are suspected of the commission of the crime are to be called in. And when suspects are summoned & called to testify, they are not merely "sheding

light' on the incident, they are in fact undergoing investigation (the crim law definition, which in this case can be analogized to a prelim investigation). Therefore, they are supposed to be read their rights (remain silent, etc) and are supposed to afford themselves the full protection of the law, which includes the right against self incrimination. In this case, because of PD 1886 compelling respondents to testify on pain of contempt, that option has effectively been eliminated. However, the rights of the accused, being constitutional rights, cannot be set aside. Their act of continuing to testify before the board cannot be accepted as a valid waiver of the right to remain silent, because in the first place they had no option to do so. The contempt power of the Board acted as a form of compulsion. Lefkowitz v NJ. The right against self-incrimination is not limited to criminal cases, for it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of te proceedings that controls. Cabal v Kapunan.The Court continues to rule that the private respondents were not merely denied of the afore-mentioned rights but more broadly the right to due process. While it is true that Sec 5 of PD 1886 provides some sort of immunity, analyzed closely, it will be shown that it is a form of "use immunity" (prohibiting the use of the witness' compelled testimony & its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness) but it grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-incrimination. This the Court said is contrary to due process, as they were not appraised of their rights and also because such a "confession/testimony" is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule in Sec20, Art 4 of the Consti. In order to save PD 1886 from unconstitutionality, the Court held that in view of the potent sanction found in Sec4 of the said law on the refusal, the compelled testimonies are deemed immunized by Sec 5 of the same.

Petition dismissed.

Makasiar, C.J. concurring: There can be no implied waiver of the right against self incrimination. Also, because of the nature of the proceedings, the invitations to testify handed out by the Agrava board are effectively subpoenas, hence it takes the nature of a criminal proceeding. the respondents were under the impression it was not, thus they were not fully appraised of their rights. (Escolin, Dela Fuente, Alampay hold essentially a similar view)

Concepcion, concurring: testimony cannot be used in any subsequent proceeding. (Plana holds a similar view)

Teehankee, dissent: It is wrong to exclude totally and absolutely inadmissible the testimonies of teh private respondents. The right against self-incrimination in proceedings other than criminal is considered an option of refusal to answer, not a prohibition of inquiry. Thus, it must be invoked at the proper time (according to him, the proper time was during the testimony to the board); a person summoned to testify cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline to appear as a witness, and no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling for a criminating answer is asked. Gonzales v Sec of Labor. Nor were the respondents in a criminal trial, they were ordinary witnesses. An ordinary witness before the Board could not invoke the right to silence and refuse to take the witness stand. Their right & privilege (which is not self-executory/automatic ipso jure) was, while testifying, whether voluntary or by subpoena, to invoke the privilege and refuse to answer as and when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded. Failure to invoke this personal privilege automatically results in loss ipso facto.

            In Gamboa v. Cruz, the accused was arrested, w/o a warrant, for vagrancy.  He was taken to police precint no. 2 in Mla.  The next day, he was included in a police line-up of 5 detainees and was pointed to by the complainant as a complanion of the main suspect on the basis of w/c the accused was ordered to stay and sit in front of the complainant, while the latter was interrogated.  The accused was then charged w/ robbery.  The accused moved to dismiss the case against him on the ground that he had been denied the assistance of counsel during the line-up.  His motion was denied.  Hence, this petition for certiorari.    HELD:  The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an interrogation, when the police officer starts to ask questions designed to elicit info. and/ or confessions or admissions from the accused.  As the police line-up in this case was not part of the custodial inquest, the petitioner was not entitled to counsel xxx.

Gamboa v. Cruz  June 27, 1988 Police line-up not part of custodial inquest F:         Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy in Manila. The following day, he was included in a police line-up and was identified as one of the suspects in a robbery case. He was later charged with robbery and charged. He moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without the assistance of counsel, was unconstitutional.  HELD:  The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. VV. 

In Harris v. US, it was held that although a confession obtained w/o complying w/ the Miranda rule was inadmissible for the purpose of establishing in chief the confessor's guilt, it may

nevertheless be presented in evidence to impeach his credit.  Petitioner, as a def., in a prosecution for selling heroin, claimed that what he had sold to a police officer was baking powder, as part of the scheme to defraud the purchaser xxx  The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation w/ prior inconsistent utterance Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)             In this case, Harris was arrested for twice selling heroin to an undercover police agent.  He confessed to the crime during the police interrogation, but the confession was uncounselled, and so it was held as inadmissible in evidence.  But when Harris took the witness stand, he testified that what he sold was baking powder in order to defraud the police agent.  The SC allowed the prosecution to introduce the uncounselled statment to show that he was lying.             In justifying the admission of the testimony, Justice Burger  said  that it is one thing to say that the government cannot  make an affirmative use of the evidence unlawfully obtained, and quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which the evidence in the possession   of the government was obtained to his own advantage, providing himself with a shield against perjury and the contradiction of his untruths.             The reason, continued the  Court is that the shield provided by the Miranda rights cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.

            In New York v. Quarles, the SC created a "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule. xxx.  "There is public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted in evidence."  It held that the warnings were not themselves Constitutional rights but merely "prophylactic" measures to insure the right against self-incrimination.  The Court noted the cost imposed on the public by the rule, namely, that the giving of warnings might deter suspects from answering questions and this might lead in turn to fewer convictions.  It then ruled that the social cost is higher when the giving of warnings might deter suspects from answering questions than are necessary to avert an immediate threat to public safety.  When answers are not actually coerced, this social cost outweights the need for Miranda safeguards.  In such exigent circumstances, police officers must not be made to choose bet. giving the warnings at the risk that public safety will be endangered and withholding the warnings at the risk that probative evidence will be excluded. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).             In the case, the Court excused the giving of the Miranda warning because the public safety required that the weapon had to be located before it could be used by the accused against those in the supermarket. 

            The criticism hurled against this ruling is that while the police may be justified in forcing the assailant to say where the weapon is located, he is not justified to present this in evidence in the subsequent criminal prosecution. 

Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966).Author:- Libby

STATEMENT OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a conviction for kidnapping and rape.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: Miranda (D) was arrested and taken to the police station where officers questioned him for two hours. D signed a confession. The confession stated that it was made voluntarily and that D had full knowledge of his legal rights. D's confession was used against him at trial and over D's objection. D was convicted of rape and kidnapping. The state supreme court affirmed the conviction. D appealed.

LEGAL ISSUE: Must law enforcement officials inform an accused of his constitutional rights? Are statements obtained from an individual subjected to custodial police interrogation admissible if he has not been notified of his privilege under the 5th Amendment not to be compelled to incriminate himself?

HOLDING: Incriminating statements made by an individual are only admissible if the following safeguards have been taken; and/or, when a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom, the following warnings must be given: he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law; that he has the right to have an attorney present; and if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him.

REASONING: (Warren, C.J.) Yes. When a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom, the following warnings must be given: he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law; that he has the right to have an attorney present; and if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him. The fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination is jeopardized when a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom. Once these warnings have been given, a person may knowingly and intelligently waive his rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. No evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against a person unless the prosecution has shown that the person had been informed of his rights. If a person indicates a desire to remain silent or have an attorney present at any time during questioning, the interrogation must cease or cease until an attorney is p! resent. The admissibility of volunteered confessions or statements is not affected by this decision. If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney, the state has a heavy burden to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege. A valid waiver is not presumed simply from silence. Warnings are a judicial prophylactic to protect the fundamental right against compelled self-incrimination because of the oppressive nature of station house questioning. This case does

not hamper police officers in investigating crime because general on-the-scene questioning is not affected. Conviction reversed.

Brief Fact Summary. The defendants offered incriminating evidence during police interrogations without prior notification of their rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (the “Constitution”).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Government authorities need to inform individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights prior to an interrogation following an arrest.

Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (”Supreme Court”) consolidated four separate cases with issues regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained during police interrogations.The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (”Mr. Miranda”), was arrested for kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda was an immigrant, and although the officers did not notify Mr. Miranda of his rights, he signed a confession after two hours of investigation. The signed statement included a statement that Mr. Miranda was aware of his rights.The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (”Mr. Vignera”), was arrested for robbery. Mr. Vignera orally admitted to the robbery to the first officer after the arrest, and he was held in detention for eight hours before he made an admission to an assistant district attorney. There was no evidence that he was notified of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (”Mr. Westover”), was arrested for two robberies. Mr. Westover was questioned over fourteen hours by local police, and then was handed to Federal Bureau of Investigation (”FBI”) agents, who were able to get signed confessions from Mr. Westover. The authorities did not notify Mr. Westover of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (”Mr. Stewart”), was arrested, along with members of his family (although there was no evidence of any wrongdoing by his family) for a series of purse snatches. There was no evidence that Mr. Stewart was notified of his rights. After nine interrogations, Mr. Stewart admitted to the crimes.Issue. Whether the government is required to notify the arrested defendants of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights against self-incrimination before they interrogate the defendants?Held. The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, specifically: their right to remain silent; an explanation that anything they say could be used against them in court; their right to counsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if necessary. Without this notification, anything admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will not be admissible in court.

Dissent. Justice Tom Clark (”J. Clark”) argued that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution would apply to interrogations. There is not enough evidence to demonstrate a need to apply a new rule as the majority finds here.The second dissent written by Justice John Harlan (”J. Harlan”) also argues that the Due Process Clauses should apply. J. Harlan further argues that the Fifth Amendment rule against self-incrimination was never intended to forbid any and all pressures against self-incrimination.Justice Byron White (”J. White”) argued that there is no historical support for broadening the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution to include the rights that the majority extends in their decision. The majority is making new law with their holding.

Discussion. The majority notes that once an individual chooses to remain silent or asks to first see an attorney, any interrogation should cease. Further, the individual has the right to stop the interrogation at any time, and the government will not be allowed to argue for an exception to the notification rule.

Constitutional Law II - Book 2005 - People vs. Albofera [GR L-69377, 20 July 1987]

People vs. Albofera [GR L-69377, 20 July 1987]

En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 13 concur

Facts: Sometime in June or July 1980, at about 4:30 p.m., Rodrigo Esma was tending his onion farm located in Upper Bagong Silang, Managa, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, near the place of Romeo Lawi-an, when Alexander Albofera called him and informed him they would run after somebody. Esma acceded. Together, Albofera and Esma proceeded at once to the house of Lawi-an. There Lawi-an told Albofera that the forester was around making a list of people engaged in “caingin.” Whereupon, Albofera asked Esma to join him in going after the forester. The two were able to overtake the forester, a certain Teodoro Carancio, at the lower portion of the road. Carancio was taken to the house of Lawi-an where several persons were already gathered, among whom were Lawi-an, a certain alias Jun, Boy Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan. Once inside and seated, Albofera began questioning Carancio about his purpose in the place. Carancio replied that he was there to inspect the “caingin” as a forester. Albofera, Romeo Lawi-an, alias Jun, Boy Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan decided to bring Carancio to the forest some 200 meters away from Lawi-an’s house. Esma did not join the group but remained in the house of Lawi-an. Not long after the group returned to Lawi-an’s house, but without Carancio. Albofera’s hands, as well as alias Jun’s hands were bloodied. After washing their hands, Albofera warned everyone, particularly Esma, against revealing or saying anything to any person or the military. The following day,

at about 9:00 a.m., Efren Sisneros was at his farm when Lawi-an and Jun Menez passed by and called him. When Sisneros got near the two, Lawi-an told him that the forester was already killed and warned him not to reveal this matter to anybody otherwise he would be killed. The threat to his life caused Sisneros to be cautious in not reporting at once the matter to the authorities. However, in June 1981, Sisneros finally reported the killing of that forester to his brother Margarito, a CHDF member in Bansalan. Sisneros asked that his identity be kept secret in the meantime pending the arrest of Albofera and Lawi-an. The police authorities arrested Albofera on 2 July 1981. Romeo Lawi-an was subsequently arrested on 4 July 1981. Also in July, 1981, the two, shortly after their arrest, led the police authorities to the place in Bagong Silang where they buried the slain forester, specifically in a hilly portion near the forest where the trees were not quite big besides a coffee plantation, where the authorities dug and recovered the cadaver. On 2 July 1981, Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge, stating therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered the “arrest” of Carancio which sentenced the latter to die by stabbing. In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented a letter written in the Visayan dialect by Alexander Albofera, while under detention, to witness Rodrigo Esma several days before the latter testified on 20 October 1982. After trial, the the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Digos, Davao del Sur, in Criminal Case 184, found the circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt of both Albofera and Lawi-an for murder, sentenced them to death, and ordered them to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P35,000.00 “by way of moral as well as actual damages” in its Decision of 5 October 1984. Hence, the mandatory review.

Issue: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy.

Held: Section 4, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (substantially reproduced in Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution) implements another Constitutional provision on the security of a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Albofera stated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability.

SANCHEZ vs. DEMETRIOU

G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

FACTS:

On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.

Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.

At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by the witnesses, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila. A warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez.

The respondent prosecutors thereafter filed with the RTC-Laguna seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.

ISSUE: Whether a defect is present in the seven informations filed against the petitioner and his co-defendants.

RATIO: NONE

The petitioner avers that the seven informations charging seven separate are absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times. But this argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise: Where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed.

It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that: Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various offenses. Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the Revised Penal Code.

The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape.

The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.

It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed seven times, but the informations do not make such a suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDINO DOMANTAY, @ "JUNIOR OTOT," accused-appellant.

FACTS: Appellant, 29 years old, was charged with rape with homicide for the death of Jennifer Domantay, a 6-year old girl whose body was found in a bamboo grove with 38 stab wounds at the back and whose hymen was completely lacerated on the right side, though found fully clothed in blue shorts and white shirt. The trial court found appellant guilty as charged and was sentenced to death.

Conviction was based primarily on the testimonies of SPO1 Espinoza and Celso Manuel, a radio reporter. SPO1 Espinoza testified that appellant confessed to the killing of Jennifer and disclosed to him the location of the bayonet used which was submitted as evidence for the prosecution. According to him, appellant waived assistance of counsel but the waiver was not put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. On the other hand, Manuel declared that appellant, in an interview, admitted the brutal killing of Jennifer; that he was just outside the cell when he interviewed appellant accompanied by his uncle inside the jail, that the nearest policemen were about 2-3 meters from him and that no lawyer assisted appellant during the interview. Also presented as a witness was Dr. Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the NBI, who testified that it was possible that the lacerations on the victim could have been caused by something blunt other than the male organ.

ISSUE: W/N the two confessions made before SPO1 Espinoza and Manuel which appellant claimed to have been obtained from him were admissible.

HELD: The right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation can be waived only in writing and with assistance of counsel and that confessions or admissions obtained in violation thereof are inadmissible in evidence. However, this prohibition does not apply to confessions or admissions made to private individuals, such as radio reporters.

For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17, 1996, he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, §12 (1) of the Constitution applied to him. . . . But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree."

However, the SC agreed with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant's confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. In People v. Andan, the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime during interviews with the media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave his answers without the assistance of counsel, this Court said: [A]ppellant's [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.

Amion v Chiongson 301 SCRA 614 (January 22, 1999)Facts: This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the respondent judge for ignorance of the law and oppression for vehemently insisting of appointing the accused-appellant counsel de officio despite the appellant’s opposition because he has his own counsel of choice in the person of Atty. Depasucat. However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat did not appear in court which prompted respondent judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to represent the accused stating on record that his representation is without prejudice to the appearance of the accused own counsel. This was done in order to avoid delay of the trial since the complainant already expressed frustration on the so many postponement of the hearing.

Issue: Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his own choice as asserted by the accused in the case at bar.

Held: The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent judge devoid of merit. An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation  rather than one who is the accused in a

criminal prosecution. Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It was the strategic machination of delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave rise to the need of appointing him counsel de officio by the court as delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to speedy disposition of a case and causes delay in the administration of justice. 

Constitutional Law II - Book 2005 - Olaez vs. People of the Philippines [GR 78347-49, 9 November 1987]Olaez vs. People of the Philippines [GR 78347-49, 9 November 1987]First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur

Facts: Adolfo Olaes and Linda M. Cruz were charged for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Olaes and Cruz filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, challenging the admission by Judge Alicia L. Santos (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73) of evidence seized by virtue of an allegedly invalid search warrant and of an extrajudicial confession taken from them without according them the right to assistance of counsel; and thus seek to restrain further proceedings in the criminal case against them and ask that they be acquitted with the setting aside of the questioned orders (the facts do not provide the disposition of the said orders). Olaes and Cruz claim that the search warrant issued by the judge is unconstitutional because it does not indicate the specific offense they are supposed to have committed. There is, therefore, according to them, no valid finding of probable cause as a justification for the issuance of the said warrant in conformity with the Bill of Rights.

Issue: Whether the lack of specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act renders the caption vague, and negate the claim that the specific offense was committed to serve as basis for the finding of probable cause.

Held: No. The search warrant issued does not come under the strictures of the Stonehill doctrine. While in the case cited, there was a bare reference to the laws in general, without any specification of the particular sections thereof that were alleged to have been violated out of the hundreds of prohibitions contained in such codifications, there is no similar ambiguity herein. While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with “Violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Acts of 1972,” it is clearly recited in the text thereof that “There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias ‘Debie’ and alias ‘Baby’ of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their possession and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above.” Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not

pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the “place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”