Assignment No. 12

Case Digests in SCARP AND SPECPRO

Submitted by Christopher G. Halnin

To Atty. Christian “Kit” Villasis

1. VICENTE TAN vs. CITY OF DAVAO G.R. No. L-44347

September 29, 1988

FACTS:

Dominga Garcia died intestate in 1955. She left in the Philippines a 1,966-square-meter lot

on Claveria Street, Townsite of Davao, District of Davao, registered in her name. Since her

departure for China with her family, neither she, nor her husband, nor any of their children

has returned to the Philippines to claim the lot.

Dominga's adoptive parent, Cornelia Pizarro, died in May 1936. In 1948, her nephew,

Ramon Pizarro, occupied a part of Dominga's property and collected the rentals from the

owners of other houses occupying the land. Another nephew of Cornelia, Segundo Reyes, in

a burst of civic spirit, informed the Solicitor General about the property. The City Fiscal and

NBI agents, Antonio Gonzaga and Felix Valencia, investigated Segundo Reyes, Ramon

Pizarro and Aurelio Pizarro regarding the whereabouts of Dominga Garcia, Tan Seng, and

their children.

During the investigation, Ramon Pizarro alleged that Vicenta Tan, daughter of Dominga, was

married and living in Bacolod City, but he did not know her exact address. Aurelio Pizarro,

on the other hand, controverted that statement because as far as he knew, Vicenta Tan left for

China with her mother and brothers in 1923.

On September 12, 1962, the City of Davao filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of

Davao, Branch I (Special Civil Case No. 1220) to declare Dominga Garcia's land escheated

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in its favor. It alleged that Dominga Garcia and her children are presumed to be dead and

since Dominga Garcia left no heir person by law entitled to inherit her estate, the same

should be escheated pursuant to Rule 92 of the Rules of Court.

The court set the petition for hearing and directed the City to caused the publication of its

petition in a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Davao, and in the

Official Gazette, once a week for six (6) consecutive weeks.

Ramon Pizarro opposed the escheat petition on the ground that courts are not authorized to

declare that a person is presumed to be dead and that Dominga Garcia's being in Red China is

not a sufficient ground to deprive her of her property by escheat proceedings. On June 15,

1966, Pizarro filed a motion to dismiss the escheat petition, but he withdrew his motion three

days later.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a municipality, the City of Davao, has personality to file an escheat petition?

HELD:

The Court held in the affirmative. With respect to the argument that only the Republic of the

Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General, may file the escheat petition under Section

1, Rule 91 of the Revised (1964) Rules of Court, the Appellate Court correctly ruled that the

case did not come under Rule 91 because the petition was filed on September 12,1962, when

the applicable rule was still Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court which provided:

Sec. 1. When and by whom, petition filed.—When a person dies intestate, seized of

real or personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heirs or person by law entitled

to the same, the municipality or city where the deceased last resided, if he resided in

the Philippines, or the municipality or city in which he had estate if he resided out of

the Philippines, may file a petition in the court of first instance of the province setting

forth the facts, and praying that the estate of the deceased be declared escheated.

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Rule 91 of the Revised rules of Court, which provides that only the Republic of the

Philippines, through the Solicitor General, may commence escheat proceedings, did not take

effect until January 1, 1964. Although the escheat proceedings were still pending then, the

Revised Rules of Court could not be applied to the petition because to do so would work

injustice to the City of Davao. Rule 144 of the 1964 Rules of Court contains this "saving"

clause:

These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1964. They shall govern all cases brought after

they take effect, and also all further proceedings in cases pending, except to the extent that in

the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in

which event the former procedure shall apply.

2. RCBC vs. Hi-Tri Development G.R. No. 192413

June 13, 2012

FACTS:

Before the Court is a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Rizal

Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) against respondents Hi-Tri Development

Corporation (Hi-Tri) and Luz R. Bakunawa (Bakunawa). Petitioner seeks to appeal from the

26 November 2009 Decision and 27 May 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals

(CA),1 which reversed and set aside the 19 May 2008 Decision and 3 November 2008 Order

of the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. 06-244. The case before the

RTC involved the Complaint for Escheat filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic)

pursuant to Act No. 3936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 679 (P.D. 679), against

certain deposits, credits, and unclaimed balances held by the branches of various banks in the

Philippines. The trial court declared the amounts, subject of the special proceedings,

escheated to the Republic and ordered them deposited with the Treasurer of the Philippines

(Treasurer) and credited in favor of the Republic. The assailed RTC judgments included an

unclaimed balance in the amount of P 1,019,514.29, maintained by RCBC in its Ermita

Business Center branch.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the Republic?

HELD:

The Court held in the negative. An ordinary check refers to a bill of exchange drawn by a

depositor (drawer) on a bank (drawee), requesting the latter to pay a person named therein

(payee) or to the order of the payee or to the bearer, a named sum of money. The issuance of

the check does not of itself operate as an assignment of any part of the funds in the bank to

the credit of the drawer. Here, the bank becomes liable only after it accepts or certifies the

check. After the check is accepted for payment, the bank would then debit the amount to be

paid to the holder of the check from the account of the depositor-drawer.

There are checks of a special type called manager’s or cashier’s checks. These are bills of

exchange drawn by the bank’s manager or cashier, in the name of the bank, against the bank

itself. Typically, a manager’s or a cashier’s check is procured from the bank by allocating a

particular amount of funds to be debited from the depositor’s account or by directly paying or

depositing to the bank the value of the check to be drawn. Since the bank issues the check in

its name, with itself as the drawee, the check is deemed accepted in advance. Ordinarily, the

check becomes the primary obligation of the issuing bank and constitutes its written promise

to pay upon demand.

Nevertheless, the mere issuance of a manager’s check does not ipso facto work as an

automatic transfer of funds to the account of the payee. In case the procurer of the manager’s

or cashier’s check retains custody of the instrument, does not tender it to the intended payee,

or fails to make an effective delivery, we find the following provision on undelivered

instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Law applicable:

Sec. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. – Every contract on a negotiable

instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the

purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties and as regards a

remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to be effectual,

must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing,

accepting, or indorsing, as the case may be; and, in such case, the delivery may be

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shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose

of transferring the property in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the

hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so

as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And where the instrument is

no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and

intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved.

Petitioner acknowledges that the Manager’s Check was procured by respondents, and that the

amount to be paid for the check would be sourced from the deposit account of Hi-Tri. When

Rosmil did not accept the Manager’s Check offered by respondents, the latter retained

custody of the instrument instead of cancelling it. As the Manager’s Check neither went to

the hands of Rosmil nor was it further negotiated to other persons, the instrument remained

undelivered. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that respondents retained custody of the

instrument.

Since there was no delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment did not occur.

An order to debit the account of respondents was never made. In fact, petitioner confirms that

the Manager’s Check was never negotiated or presented for payment to its Ermita Branch,

and that the allocated fund is still held by the bank. As a result, the assigned fund is deemed

to remain part of the account of Hi-Tri, which procured the Manager’s Check. The doctrine

that the deposit represented by a manager’s check automatically passes to the payee is

inapplicable, because the instrument – although accepted in advance – remains undelivered.

Hence, respondents should have been informed that the deposit had been left inactive for

more than 10 years, and that it may be subjected to escheat proceedings if left unclaimed.

After a careful review of the RTC records, we find that it is no longer necessary to remand

the case for hearing to determine whether the claim of respondents was valid. There was no

contention that they were the procurers of the Manager’s Check. It is undisputed that there

was no effective delivery of the check, rendering the instrument incomplete. In addition, we

have already settled that respondents retained ownership of the funds. As it is obvious from

their foregoing actions that they have not abandoned their claim over the fund, we rule that

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the allocated deposit, subject of the Manager’s Check, should be excluded from the escheat

proceedings. We reiterate our pronouncement that the objective of escheat proceedings is

state forfeiture of unclaimed balances. We further note that there is nothing in the records

that would show that the OSG appealed the assailed CA judgments. We take this failure to

appeal as an indication of disinterest in pursuing the escheat proceedings in favor of the

Republic.

3. Republic vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 143483

January 2002

FACTS:

For more than 3 decades, private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around personal

domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During Ms.

Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent Solano

was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close relative was available to

tend to her needs. In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins

executed in her favor 2 deeds of donation involving 2 parcels of land. Private respondent

alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be found. While the

deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of

Elizabeth Hankins before the RTC of Pasay City. During the proceedings, a motion for

intervention was filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio

Regosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that they

miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in question. Since it was

established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent

Hankins, the lower court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic

of the Philippines. In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found

the deeds of donation she had been looking for a long time. In view of this development,

respondent Amada Solano filed on 28 January 1997 a petition before the CA for the

annulment of the lower court's decision. CA granted her petition.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject lands should be subject of escheat proceedings?

HELD:

Yes. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by

virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who

dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the

state to forestall an open invitation to self-service by the first comers. Since escheat is one of

the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and

limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by which

the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is

imposed within which such action must be brought.

In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim within 5 years

from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or

if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting

the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever. In the instant petitionmore or less 7

years passed when private respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of

a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA. Obviously, private respondent's belated

assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against recovery. A judgment in

escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive against

all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are not parties or

privies thereto.

4. DIVINO vs. HILARIO, 62 Phil 926

G.R. No. L-44658            

January 24, 1936

FACTS:

In the CFI of Davao, Tan Kui Sing began the intestate of the deceased Tan Chayand asked

that while his properties are yet unknown, a special administrator be appointed to represent

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the deceased in the appeal. The court then appointed AngLiongto and stated that the deceased

leftP5,000 in cash in the possession of the Philippine Foreign Trading and Co. and P390 as

rents. The court then ordered that the notice of trial be published in the newspaper but such

publication was not made. After trial, the lower court ordered that the funds be escheated in

favor of the municipality of Guianga. Petitioner however alleged that the minor nephew and

niece of the deceased are entitled to the funds as heirs.

ISSUE:

WON the subject funds may be escheated in favor of the municipality of Guianga.

HELD:

The SC decided in favor of the petitioner. The SC said that Sections 750 and 752 of the Code

of Civil Procedure, applicable to case, provide as follows:

SEC. 750. Procedure when persons dies intestate without heirs. — When a person dies

intestate, seized of real or personal by law entitled to the same, the president and municipal

council of the municipality where the deceased last resided, if he was an inhabitant of these

Islands, or of the municipality in which he had estate, if he resided out of the Islands, may, on

behalf of the municipality, file a petition with the Court of First Instance of the province for

an inquisition in the premises; the court shall thereupon appoint a time and place of hearing,

and deciding on such petition, cause a notice thereof to be published in some newspaper of

general circulation in the province of which the deceased was last an inhabitant, if within the

Philippine Islands, and if not, in some newspaper of general circulation in the province in

which he had estate. The notice shall recite the substance of the facts and request set forth in

the petition, the time and place at which persons claiming the estate may appear and be heard

before the court, and shall be published at least six weeks successively, the last of which

publications shall be at least six weeks before the time appointed by the court to make

inquisition.

In the case under consideration, the procedure fixed by section 750 has neither been followed

nor complied with, wherefore, we hold that the respondent judge and the Court of First

Instance of Davao did not acquire jurisdiction either to take cognizance of the escheat case or

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to promulgate the order of August 24, 1935, whereby the sum of P5,000 was escheated or

adjudicated the municipality of Guianga. No petition was filed either by the required

publication made which was the essential step which should have conferred jurisdiction.

Therefore, the subject funds in this case should not be escheated in favor of the municipality

for non compliance of the requirement set by the rules.

5. REPUBLIC vs. PNB

G.R. No. L-16106            

December 30, 1961

FACTS:

The Republic filed before the CFI of Manila a complaint for escheat of certain unclaimed

bank deposits under the provisions of Act 3936 against several banks including private

respondent First National City Bank of New York. It is alleged that pursuant to Sec. 2 of said

Act defendant forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines a statement under oath of their

respective managing officials of all the credits and deposits held by them in favor of persons

to be dead or who have not made further deposits or withdrawals during the period of 10

years or more. First National Bank claimed that it has included in their report certain amounts

which are not credits or deposits within the contemplation of Act No. 3936. The lower court

held that manager’s check or cashier’s check and demand drafts as those which the defendant

wants excluded from the complaint come within the purview of Act No. 3936 but not the

telegraphic transfer payment which orders are different category.

ISSUE:

WON the amounts claimed by defendant to be excluded from Act No. 3936 may be

escheated in favor of the Republic?

HELD:

The SC stated that since it is admitted that the demand drafts herein involved have not been

presented either for acceptance or for payment, the inevitable consequence is that the

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appellee bank never had any chance of accepting or rejecting them. Verily, appellee bank

never became a debtor of the payee concerned and as such the aforesaid drafts cannot be

considered as credits subject to escheat within the meaning of the law.

However, a demand draft is very different from a cashier's or manager's cheek, contrary to

appellant's pretense, for it has been held that the latter is a primary obligation of the bank

which issues it and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand. A cashier's check is a

check of the bank's cashier on his or another bank. It is in effect a bill of exchange drawn by

a bank on itself and accepted in advance by the act of issuance.

A demand draft is not therefore of the same category as a cashier's check which should come

within the purview of the law.

The case, however, is different with regard to telegraphic payment order. It is said that as the

transaction is for the establishment of a telegraphic or cable transfer the agreement to remit

creates a contractual obligation as has been termed a purchase and sale transaction. The

purchaser of a telegraphic transfer upon making payment completes the transaction insofar as

he is concerned, though insofar as the remitting bank is concerned the contract is executory

until the credit is established. The SC agreed with the following comment the Solicitor

General: "This is so because the drawer bank was already paid the value of the telegraphic

transfer payment order. In the particular cases under consideration it appears in the books of

the defendant bank that the amounts represented by the telegraphic payment orders appear in

the names of the respective payees. If the latter choose to demand payment of their

telegraphic transfers at the time the same was received by the defendant bank, there could be

no question that this bank would have to pay them. Now, the question is, if the payees decide

to have their money remain for sometime in the defendant bank, can the latter maintain that

the ownership of said telegraphic payment orders is now with the drawer bank? The latter

was already paid the value of the telegraphic payment orders otherwise it would not have

transmitted the same to the defendant bank. Hence, it is absurd to say that the drawer banks

are still the owners of said telegraphic payment orders."

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Therefore the items representing telegraphic transfer orders shpuld be escheated in favor of

the Republic.

6. REPUBLIC vs. CFI OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-30381

August 30, 1988

FACTS:

Pursuant to Uncalimed Balance Law (ACT No. 3936) private respondent forwarded to the

Treasurer of the Philsseparate statements under oath by their respective managing officers of

all deposits and credits held by them in favor, or in the names of such depositors or creditors

known to be dead, or who have not been heard from, or who have not made further deposits

or withdrawals during the preceding ten years or more. Upon receipt of these sworn

statements, the Treasurer of the Philippines caused the same to be published in two

newspapers of general circulation. The Republic then instituted before the CFI of Manila a

complaint for escheat against private respondent. The lower court decided in favor of

respondent.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Pres. Roxas Rural Bank is a real party in interest in the escheat proceedings?

Whether or not Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on venue, likewise,

governs escheat proceedings instituted by the Republic in the Court of First Instance of

Manila?

HELD:

The SC denied the petition and stated that Section 3 of Act No. 3936 provides that Whenever

the Attorney General shall be informed of such unclaimed balances, he shall commence an

action or actions in the name of the People of the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of

the province where the bank is located, in which shall be joined as parties the bank and such

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creditors or depositors. All or any member of such creditors or depositors or banks, may be

included in one action.

A "real party in interest" has been defined as the party who would be benefitted or injured by

the judgment of the suit or the party entitled to avail of the suit. There can be no doubt that

private respondent bank falls under this definition for the escheat of the dormant deposits in

favor of the government would necessarily deprive said bank of the use of such deposits. It is

in this sense that it stands to be "injured by the judgment of the suit;" and it is for this reason

that Section 3 of Act No. 3936 specifically provides that the bank shall be joined as a party in

the action for escheat.

As to the second issue, suffice it to say that Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of

Court cannot govern escheat proceedings principally because said section refers to personal

actions. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem which must be brought in the province or city

where the rem in this case the dormant deposits, is located.

Hence, the petition filed by the Republic must fail.

7. MABANAG vs. REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF QC

G.R. No. 153142              

March 29, 2010

FACTS:

The Coronels executed a document of “receipt of down payment” in favor of private

respondent Ramona Alcaraz upon the receipt of P50,000 as a down payment for the sale of

their inherited house and lot in QC. It was agreed upon that the Coronels would execute a

deed of absolute sale immediately upon the transfer of the TCT to the name of the Coronels

because the same was still named to their father. However, the Coronels sold the said

property to herein petitioner for a higher price than that of Ramona. As a result, respondents

filed a case for specific performance and caused the annotation of lispendens over the

property. RTC ruled in favor of respondents and cancelled the TCT in the name of petitioner.

CA affirmed.Hence, the appeal.

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ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in sustaining the registration by the Registrar of Deeds of the deed of

absolute sale despite the lack of indication of the citizenship of the buyer of the subject

property?

HELD:

SC denied the petition. The SC said that it should also be pointed out that the petitioner was

not the proper party to challenge Ramona’s qualifications to acquire land.

 

Under Section 7, Batas PambansaBlg. 185, the Solicitor General or his representative shall

institute escheat proceedings against its violators. Although the law does not categorically

state that only the Government, through the Solicitor General, may attack the title of an alien

transferee of land, it is nonetheless correct to hold that only the Government, through the

Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to

acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship. This limitation is based on the fact that the

violation is committed against the State, not against any individual; and that in the event that

the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the

State, not to the previous owner or any other individual.

Herein, even assuming that Ramona was legally disqualified from owning the subject

property, the decision that voids or annuls their right of ownership over the subject land will

not inure to the benefit of the petitioner. Instead, the subject property will be escheated in

favor of the State in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 185.

8. THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET AL., vs. COLEGIO

DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL., 65 Phil 318

G.R. No. L-45460            

February 25, 1938

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court which denied the petition for escheat filed by

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the said petitioners, with the costs against the latter. This case was commenced in the said by

a petition filed by the petitioners in behalf of the municipality of San Pedro, Province of

Laguna, wherein they claim the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa by the right of escheat.

ISSUE:

W/N COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL. may be parties to the case? Yes.

W/N the land is proper subject of escheat? No.

HELD:

The sworn petition which gave rise to the proceeding is based upon the provisions of section

750 and 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the English text of which reads:

SEC. 750. Procedure when person dies intestate without heirs. — When a person dies

intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines Islands, leaving no heir or

person by law entitled to the same, the president and municipal council of the municipality

where the deceased last resided, if he was an inhabitant of these Islands, or of the

municipality in which he had estate, if he resided out of the Islands, may, on behalf of the

municipality, the file a petition with the Court of First Instance of the province for an

inquisition in the premises…

SEC. 751. Decree of the court in such case. — If, at the time appointed for the that purpose,

the court that the person died intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Islands,

leaving no heirs or person entitled to the same and no sufficient cause is shown to the

contrary, the court shall order and decree that the estate of the deceased in these Islands, after

the payment of just debts and charges, shall escheat…

Escheat, under sections 750 and 751, is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property

of a deceased person become the property of the State upon his death without leaving any

will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action contemplated by section 1 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, but a special proceeding in accordance with the said section. The proceeding, as

provided by section 750, should be commenced by petition and not by complaint. In a special

proceeding for escheat under section 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive

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interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought

to be escheated is likewise and interest and necessary party and may appear and oppose the

petition for escheat. In the present case the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young

appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa; and the

former because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he

claim to be the lessee thereof under a contract legality entered with the former.

According to the allegations of the petition, the petitioners base their right to the escheat

upon the fact that thetemporal properties of the Father of the Society of Jesus, among them,

the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, were confiscated by order of the King of Spain and

passed from then on to the Crown of Spain. If the hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,, which is

the only property sought to be escheated and adjudicated to the municipality of San Pedro,

has already passed to the ownership of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is evident

that the petitioners cannot claim that the same be escheated to the said municipality, because

it is no longer the case of real property owned by a deceased person who has not left any

heirs or person who may legality claim it, these being the conditions required by section 750

and without which a petition for escheat should not lie from the moment the hacienda was

confiscated by the Kingdom of Spain, the same ceased to be the property of the children of

Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the Colegio de San Jose or the Jesuit Father, and became the

property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines by virtue of the transfer under the Treaty

of Paris, alleged in the petition.

9. CAWIS vs. CERILLES

G.R. No. 170207              

April 19, 2010

FACTS:

This case involves the reversion sale of a public land located in Holy Ghost Hills

Subdivision, Baguio City. The said parcel of land with an area of 1,333 sq.m. was sold to

Jose Andrada by virtue of the Public Land Act. However, petitioners, claiming to be the

actual occupants, protested the sales patent awarded to Andrada.

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Sometime in 1987, private respondent Ma. Edeliza S. Peralta (Peralta) purchased Lot No. 47

from Andrada. On 28 October 1987, the Deputy Public Land Inspector, in his final report of

investigation, found that neither Andrada nor Peralta had constructed a residential house on

the lot, which was required in the Order of Award and set as a condition precedent for the

issuance of the sales patent. Apparently, it was Vicente Cawis, one of the petitioners, who

had built a house on Lot No. 47.

On 13 November 1987, Sales Patent No. 1319 was nonetheless transferred to Peralta. On 8

September 1998, petitioners filed a complaint before the trial court alleging fraud, deceit, and

misrepresentation in the issuance of the sales patent and the original certificate of title over

Lot No. 47. They claimed they had interest in the lot as qualified beneficiaries of R.A. No.

6099 who met the conditions prescribed in R.A. No. 730. They argued that upon the

enactment of R.A. No. 6099, Andrada’s sales patent was deemed cancelled and revoked in

their favor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not has the personality to file a complaint for the reversion to the Government of

lands of the public domain or improvements thereon?

HELD:

The Court held in the negative. At the outset, we must point out that petitioners’ complaint

questioning the validity of the sales patent and the original certificate of title over Lot No. 47

is, in reality, a reversion suit. The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the

cancellation of the certificate of title and the resulting reversion of the land covered by the

title to the State. This is why an action for reversion is oftentimes designated as an annulment

suit or a cancellation suit.

Coming now to the first issue, Section 101 of the Public Land Act clearly states:

SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public

domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the

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officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the

Philippines.

Even assuming that private respondent indeed acquired title to Lot No. 47 in bad faith, only

the State can institute reversion proceedings, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act

and our ruling in Alvarico v. Sola. Private persons may not bring an action for reversion or

any action which would have the effect of canceling a land patent and the corresponding

certificate of title issued on the basis of the patent, such that the land covered thereby will

again form part of the public domain. Only the OSG or the officer acting in his stead may do

so. Since the title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter

between the grantor and the grantee.

10. ALAMAYRI vs. PABALE

G.R. No. 151243

April 30, 2008

FACTS:

Almayri petitions the court for the setting aside of the CA decision. Cesnando Fernando,

representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corp filed an action for Specific Performance with

Damages (Civil Case) against Nelly Nave who owns a parcel of land which the former

alleged was the subject of a 'Kasunduan ng Pagbibilihan'. However, Nave allegedly reneged

on their agreement when she refused to accept the partial payment of Fernando. The said lot

was instead sold to the Pabale siblings. Subsequently, the civil proceedings were suspended

by virtue of a guardianship proceedings. In June 1988, Nave was declared therein to be

incompetent. The lower court declared the nullity of the two sale agreements on the ground

that Nave was found incompetent since 1980. The Pabale siblings intervened. The Court of

Appeals granted the appeals of both Fernando and the Pabale siblings and upheld the validity

of the Deed of Sale executed by Nelly Nave dated February 20,  1984. Hence this petition.

Petitioner alleged that since Nave was judicially determined to be an incompetent, all

contracts that she subsequently entered into should be declared null and void.

17

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of incompetency constitutes res judicata?

HELD:

The Court held in the negative. There was no identity of parties and issues between the

special proceeding on the guardianship of Nave and the civil case. The decision on the

former on her incompetency should not therefore bar by conclusiveness of judgement the

finding in the latter case (civil case) that Nave was competent and had capacity when she

entered into the contract of sale over the subject lot in favor of the Pabale siblings.

Herein, the Court expounded on the difference between the two rules on res judicata,

namely; 1) bar by previous judgment, and 2) conclusiveness of judgement. Bar by

previous judgement means that the judgement in the first case will bar the second case due to

the identity of parties, subject-matter, and cause of action. While a bar by virtue

of conclusiveness of judgement bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question

already settled in a previous case. Hence, even of there is identity of parties, but no identity

of causes of action, the first judgement can be conclusive only as to the those matters actually

controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved.

11. ABAD vs. BIASON

G.R. No. 191993

December 5, 2012

FACTS:

On March 19, 2007, petitioner Eduardo Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the

person and properties of Maura B. Abad with the RTC, Dagupan City. In support thereof,

Abad alleged that he maintains residence at No. 14 B St. Paul Street, Horseshoe Village,

Quezon City and that he is Maura’s nephew. He averred that Maura, who is single, more than

ninety (90) years old and a resident of Rizal Street, Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in

dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due to her advanced

18

age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take care of herself and her

properties unassisted thus becoming an easy prey of deceit and exploitation.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC gave due course to the same

and scheduled it for hearing. When the petition was called for hearing on April 27, 2007,

nobody entered an opposition and Abad was allowed to present evidence ex parte. After

Abad formally offered his evidence and the case was submitted for decision, Atty. Gabriel

Magno filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, together with an Opposition-in-Intervention.

Subsequently, on June 14, 2007, Leonardo Biason (Biason) filed a Motion for Leave to File

Opposition to the Petition and attached therewith his Opposition to the Appointment of

Eduardo Abad as Guardian of the Person and Properties of Maura B. Abad. Specifically,

Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he was not notified of the

pendency of the petition for the appointment of the latter’s guardian. He vehemently opposed

the appointment of Abad as Maura’s guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties as

such since he resides in Quezon City while Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan,

Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed as Maura’s guardian since he was previously

granted by the latter with a power of attorney to manage her properties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death

of either the guardian or the ward?

HELD:

The Court held in the affirmative. In his petition, Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA

Decision dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which dismissed his

appeal from the Decision dated September 26, 2007 of the RTC and denied his motion for

reconsideration, respectively. Basically, he was challenging Biason’s qualifications and the

procedure by which the RTC appointed him as guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s

demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the

petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily

terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death

19

rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie

between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its

disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief.

12. HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG vs. SY

G.R. No. 114217

October 13, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioners Jose, Julian and Oscar are children of the deceased Sy Bang from his first

marriage. Other petitioners include Zenaida and Ma. Emma who are the wife and child of

Jose. Respondents Rosauro and eight others are children of Sy Bang from his second

marriage with his surviving spouse respondent Rosita Ferrera -Sy.

Sy Bang died intestate in 1971 and in an out-of-court conference, the children of both

marriages divided upon themselves the control and management of Sy Bang’s various

businesses. Certain controversies arose which prompted respondent Rolando to file a

Complaint of Partition against the petitioners. Rosita Ferrera-Sy also filed a motion for

payment of widow’s allowance. From the time of Sy Bang’s death until the filing of the

motion in 1996, she claimed she was not given any widow’s allowance. She cited Rule 83(3)

of the RoC.

Petitioners argued that Rule 83(3) is granted only during the settlement of the estate and such

“allowance” shall be taken from the “common mass of property” during liquidation. Since

this case is a special civil action for partition under Rule 69, Rosita is not entitled to any

widow’s allowance. The Court granted Rosita’s motion for payment of widow’s allowance.

Petitioners argued that Rosita had already executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay waiving any

claims against the petitioners in exchange of a parcel of land and 1 million pesos.

Respondents countered that Rosita was no longer in full possession of her mental faculties

when she signed the waiver. Petitioners also argued that under Rule 83(3) a widow’s

allowance can only be paid in an estate proceeding. Even if the case for partition be

20

considered as estate proceedings, only the trial court hearing the partition case had exclusive

jurisdiction to execute the payment of the allowance.

In the meantime, Respondents filed a joint petition for the guardianship of Rosita Ferrer-Sy

where Rosauro Sy, who sought to be named special guardian, filed before the guardianship

court a motion to order the deposit of the widow’s allowance. The Court ruled in favor of the

deposit of the widow’s allowance. The petitioners all failed to comply with the ruling. They

were all found guilty of contempt of court.

The petitioners, who are now Zenaida and Emma, argued that they should not be made to pay

the allowance as they did not have any participation in the management of the businesses of

Sy Bang. Also, the said allowance must come from the estate of Sy Bang and not from Jose

or any of the latter’s heirs. They also asked that the Court should equally divide the liability

for the widow’s allowance between the children of the first and second marriages. They also

raised the issue of the validity of Rosita’s marriage to Sy Bang. They claimed that the

documents proving such were falsified.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Guardianship court has exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit

of the widow’s allowance?

Whether or not the respondents are also liable for the payment of the widow’s allowance as

heirs of Sy Bang?

HELD:

The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited jurisdiction. It had no jurisdiction

to enforce payment of the widow’s allowance. The “court” cited in Rule 83 (3) is the court

hearing the settlement of the estate and it is this court which has jurisdiction over the

properties of the estate, to the exclusion of all the other courts. In a cited case, the court said

that the Guardianship Court may order the delivery of the property of the ward to the

21

guardian only if the property clearly belongs to the ward or if the title has been judicially

decided.

The widow’s allowance is chargeable to the estate of Sy Bang and since petitioners are the

one holding the properties belonging to Sy Bang, they should pay for the allowance.

In order to effect a partition of properties (so that the other children may be made liable), the

issue of ownership or co-ownership must be first resolved in the action for partition. In the

settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:

(1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the

widow, and estate tax have been paid; or

(2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a

bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations

within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those

obligations.

That the full extent of Sy Bang’s estate has not yet been determined is no excuse from

complying with court’s order on this issue. Properties of the estate have already been

identified, i.e. those in the names of petitioners, thus these properties should be made to

answer for the widow’s allowance of Rosita. In any case, the mount Rosita receives for

support will be deducted from her share of the estate.

In view of the delay caused by the petitioners in paying for the allowance, they are ordered to

pay the court treble the costs.

13. OROPESA vs. OROPESA

G.R. No. 184528              

April 25, 2012

FACTS:

22

This is a petition for review (Rule 45), CA affirmed the order by RTC Paranaque dismissed

Nilo’s petition for guardianship over the properties of his father (widower). Nilo alleged that

his father was:- afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over 10 years already

having suffered a stroke in 2003- that his judgment and memory were impaired and such has

been evident after his hospitalization.- that even before his stroke, he was observed to have

had lapses on memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property.- due

to his age and medical condition, he cannot w/out outside aid, manage his property wisely

and become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly his

GF (Luisa Agamata).

RTC: nilo failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Oropesa is incompetent

to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, Gen’s demurrer to evidence is

granted, and the case is dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is considered an incompetent person as defined under Sec 2, Rule

92 of the ROC who should be placed under guardianship?

HELD:

The Court held in the negative. Sec 2: Incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of

civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to

read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and

persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other

similar causes, cannot

without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming an easy

prey for the deceit and exploitation. Finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored

on clear and definite evidence. Nilo lacks material evidence to support his claims that his

father is incompetent due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition. The only

medical document presented “report of neuropsychological screening proves that he is indeed

competent to run his personal affairs.

14. CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

23

G.R. No. 162421

August 31, 2007

FACTS:

Sometime in 1964, Rurfino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel of land in Southern Leyte to

his wife, Saturnina and six children, namely, Bonifacio, Francisco, Alberto, Albino, Lenora,

and Rito. On 1971, the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold the

property to Dr. Corrompido with a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. On 1972, prior

to the redemption of the property, Alberto died leaving behind his wife and son, Nelson,

herein petitioner.

Sometime later and within the redemption period, the said brothers and their mother, in lieu

of Alberto, tendered their payment to Dr. Corrompido. Subsequently, Saturnina, and her four

children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the said land to Spouses Feliano. It

was provided in the deed of sale that the shares of Nelson and Rito, being minor at the time

of the sale, will be held in trust by the vendee and will paid upon them reaching the age of

21.

In 1986, Rito received the sum of 1,143 pesos from the Spouses Feliano representing his

share from the proceeds of the sale of the property. It was only in 1988, that Nelson learned

of the sale from his uncle, Rito. He signified his intention to redeem the property in 1993 but

it was only in 1995 that he filed a complaint for redemption against the Spouses Feliano. The

respondent Spouses averred that the petitioners are estopped from denying the sale since: (1)

Rito already received his share; and (2) Nelson, failed to tender the total amount of the

redemption price.

The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of Spouses Feliano on the ground that Nelson was

no longer entitled to the property since, his right was subrogated by Saturnina upon the death

of his father, Alberto. It also alleged that Rito had no more right to redeem since Saturnina,

being his legal guardian at the time of the sale was properly vested with the right to alienate

the same.

24

The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court stating that the sale made by

Saturnina in behalf of Rito and Nelson were unenforceable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale made by a legal guardian (Saturnina) in behalf of the minors were

binding upon them?

HELD:

With regard to the share of Rito, the contract of sale was valid. Under Section 1, Rule 96 “A

guardian shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of

his estate, or the management of the estate only. x x x” Indeed, the legal guardian only has

the plenary power of administration of the minor’s property. It does not include the power of

alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of

petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal

authority to do so. Accordingly, the contract as to the share of Rito was unenforceable.

However, when he received the proceeds of the sale, he effectively ratified it. This act of

ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.

With respect to petitioner Nelson, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time

of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians; rather it

was his mother who if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his share in the

property. Consequently, petitioner Nelson retained ownership over their undivided share in

the said property. However, Nelson can no longer redeem the property since the thirty day

redemption period has expired and thus he remains as co-owner of the property with the

Spouses Feliano.

15. VANCIL vs. BELMES

GR No. 132223 (358 SCRA 707)

June 19, 2001

FACTS: 

25

Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the

United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his

lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife,

Helen G. Belmes.

Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court of

Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and

Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only 6

years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the petition that the minors

are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their

father’s death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.

Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for hearing after a 3-

consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily.

On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over

the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.

On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an

opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a

similar petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the Regional

Trial Court of Pagadian City.

Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for the

Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural

mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at

Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing; that the

petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed

Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being

a naturalized American citizen.

26

On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes’

motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and

instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such

guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a

reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mother and not the grandmother of minor Vincent should be his

guardian?

HELD: 

The Court held in the affirmative. The natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right

over that of petitioner to be hisguardian.

Article 211 of the Family Code provides:

“Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons

of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless

there is a judicialorder to the contrary.”

Being the natural mother of the minor Vincent, she has the corresponding natural and legal

right to be in her custody. Petitioner‘s claim to bethe guardian of said minor can only be

realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code,

thus:

Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority

shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent.

Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only incase

of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is verymuch

alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove,

in asserting her right to be the minor‘s guardian, respondent‘s unsuitability.

27

Petitioner asserts this based on the allegation that Valerie was raped several times by the a

live in partner. However this case pertains to Vincent and is thus not directly attestable to that

fact. Moreover the  status as U.S.resident, her old age and her conviction of libel in the

country deem her unlikely to be able to execute the duties of a guardian (has not been in RP

since 87‘). Moreover courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the

jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.

16. VILLANUEVA-MIJARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 108921

April 12, 2000

FACTS:

Felipe owned a parcel of land and upon his death, ownership of the land was transferred to

his children.

Pedro, one of the children of Felipe got his share equivalent to one-sixth (1/6) of the property

and had it declared under his name.

The remaining undivided portion of the land was held in trust by Leon for his co-heirs.

During Leon’s lifetime, his co-heirs made several seasonable and lawful demands upon him

to subdivide and partition the property, but for one reason or another, no subdivision took

place.

After the death of Leon, private respondents discovered that the shares of four of the heirs of

Felipe, was purchased by Leon as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. It also came to light that

Leon had executed a sale and partition of the property in favor of his own children, herein

petitioners. By virtue of such Deed of Partition, private respondents had succeeded in

obtaining Original Certificate of Title, petitioners managed to secure separate and

independent titles over their pro-indiviso shares in their respective names.

28

Private respondents then filed a case for partition with annulment of documents and/or

reconveyance and damages with the Regional Trial Court. Private respondents contended that

the sale in favor of Leon was fraudulently obtained through machinations and false pretenses.

Thus, the subsequent sale of the lot by Leon to his children was null and void despite the

OCT in his favor.

Petitioners, for their part, claimed that the sale by Simplicio, Fausta, Nicolasa, and Maria

Baltazar was a valid sale; that private respondent Procerfina even signed as an instrumental

witness to the Deed of Sale; that Maria Baltazar, widow of Benito, as administrator of her

husband’s estate, had the right to sell the undivided share of Benito; that the basis for the

issuance of the OCT in Land Registration Case was the sale by his co-heirs to Leon; that the

order of default issued in Land Registration Case was against the whole world; that

prescription had set in since they had been in possession of the property in the concept of

owners thereof up to the present; and that private respondents were estopped since no trust

relationship existed between the litigants.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision, declaring "the defendants the legal

owners of the property in question in accordance with the individual titles issued to them."

The trial court also declared plaintiffs’ action already barred by res judicata.

Dissatisfied, herein private respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

On appeal, the private respondents conceded the right of Simplicio, Nicolasa, and Fausta to

sell their respective shares but disputed the authority of Maria Baltazar to convey any portion

of her late husband’s estate, since the latter was his capital and did not form part of the

conjugal property.

Later respondent appellate court rendered its decision, reversing the appealed judgment.

29

Appellants Procerfina Villanueva, Prosperidad Villanueva, Ramon Villanueva and Rosa

Villanueva are adjudged rightful co-owners pro indiviso of an undivided one-sixth (1/6)

portion of the property litigated, as heirs of their late father, Benito Villanueva;

Conformably, the parties concerned are required to agree on a project of partition; otherwise,

should they fail to do so within a reasonable time, any interested party may seek relief from

the trial court a quo.

The Court of Appeals ruled that under the Old Civil Code and applicable jurisprudence,

Maria Baltazar had no authority to sell the portion of her late husband’s share inherited by

her then minor children since she had not been appointed their guardian. Respondent court

likewise declared that as far as private respondents Procerfina, Prosperidad, Ramon and

Rosa, were concerned, the Deed of Sale was "unenforceable."

Respondent appellate court also ruled that the prescription period had not run in favor of

Leon since private respondents had always known that Leon was the administrator of the

estate. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in failing to declare action by the private

respondents to recover the property in question barred by laches, estoppel, prescription, and

res judicata?

HELD:

Petitioners citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, contend that the action of the private respondents

was already barred by laches.

Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the

presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. Its

essential elements are:

30

1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to

the situation complained of;

2) delay in asserting complainant’s right after he had knowledge of the defendant’s

conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue;

3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would

assert the right on which he bases his suit; and

4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.

In Chavez v. Bonto-Perez, the court said there is no absolute rule on what constitutes laches.

It is a creation of equity and applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one’s

rights but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly

inequitable situation. The question of laches, we said, is addressed to the sound discretion of

the court and each case must be decided according to its particular circumstances.

At the time of signing of the Deed of Sale, private respondents Procerfina, Prosperidad,

Ramon and Rosa were minors. They could not be faulted for their failure to file a case to

recover their inheritance from their uncle Leon, since up to the age of majority, they believed

and considered Leon their co-heir and administrator. It was only later, that they became

aware of the actionable betrayal by their uncle. Upon learning of their uncle’s actions, they

filed an action for recovery. Hence, the doctrine of stale demands formulated in Tijam cannot

be applied here. They did not sleep on their rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion. Under

the circumstances of the instant case, the court does not think that respondent appellate court

erred in considering private respondents’ action. The action was not too late.

Furthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an implied trust was created by operation of law

between Felipe’s children and Leon, their uncle, as far as the 1/6 share of Felipe. Leon’s

fraudulent titling of Felipe’s 1/6 share was a betrayal of that implied trust.

Petitioners aver that the failure of Maria Baltazar’s children in bringing their action in 1969

when they had reached the age of majority meant that they had impliedly ratified the Deed of

Sale and are now estopped to assail the same. They erroneously relied on Asiatic Integrated

Corporation v. Alikpala. In that case, payments made by Asiatic pursuant to the terms of the

31

contract accrued to the benefit of the City without protest on the part of the municipal board,

such that the Board already acquiesced to the validation of the contract. In the instant case,

there is no implied ratification, no benefit accruing to the children of Maria Baltazar.

Neither is the action barred by prescription. In Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals and Sta.

Ana, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the court held that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of

land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference

being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title

of the property. Here the questioned Deed of Sale was registered only in 1971. Private

respondents filed their complaint in 1975, hence well within the prescriptive period.

Petitioners assert that the disputed property is registered. Relying on Cachero v. Marzan, and

Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where the court held that a land registration case is an

action in rem binding upon the whole world, and considering that the private respondents

failed to object to the registration of the realty in question, then res judicata had set in. True,

but notwithstanding the binding effect of the land registration case upon the private

respondents, the latter are not deprived of a remedy. While a review of the decree of

registration is no longer available after the expiration of the one-year period from entry

thereof, an equitable remedy is still available. Those wrongfully deprived of their property

may initiate an action for reconveyance of the property.

The petition is denied for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals is

affirmed.

17. ERIC JONATHAN YU vs. CAROLINE T. YU

G.R. No. 164915

March 10, 2006

FACTS:

Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before CA alleging that his estranged

wife Caroline Yu unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child Bianca.

32

Subsequently, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and

dissolution of the absolute community of property. The petition included a prayer for the

award to her of the sole custody of Bianca and for the fixing of schedule of petitioner’s

visiting rights "subject only to the final and executor  judgment of the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the WHC is available to determine the custodial rights of parents over their

children?

HELD:

The Court held in the negative. Articles 49 and 50 of the Family Code provides that the issue

on the custody of the spouse’s common children is deemed pleaded in the declaration of

nullity case. Hence, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be availed of by either spouse. Pursuant

to the aforementioned provisions, it is the court who shall determine the custody of the

common children in the case for declaration of nullity of marriage.

18. PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO

G.R. Nos. 154994 and 156254

June 28, 2005

FACTS:

Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of

his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4

year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his

school when she left him.

The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to

appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care

for the child as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child.

Another witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian

relations.

33

The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the

custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a

compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother?

HELD:

Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental

authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take into

account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,

unless the parent chosen is unfit.”

No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds

compelling reasons to order otherwise.”

This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing

provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of

the Civil Code, w/c reads:

“Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter

welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of

age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such measure.”

19. Lahom vs. Sibulo

G.R. No. 143989  

July 14, 2003

FACTS:

A childless couple adopted  the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the

trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the

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name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to

rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of

her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use

Sibulo in all his dealing and activities.  Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No.

8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a

decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).

These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and

concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree

of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition

there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic

Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in

the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the

adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code"

(Section 19).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the

effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action

prescribed?

HELD:

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the

commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law

governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of

RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By

then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil

Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption

decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer

be pursued.

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Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to

the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose

the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right

within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested

right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a

present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a

"vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a

present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary

state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not

naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a

privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best

interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the

right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation.

Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it

has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid

reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child,

like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from

having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

20. REYES vs. SOTERO

G.R. No. 167405

February 16, 2006

FACTS: 

Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and

settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising

who died intestate. Respondent claims that real and personal properties were allegedly in the

possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.

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Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of

Lising and the latter’s husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the

only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the

certification of her adoption from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree

was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification issued by the

clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.

Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast

on Petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain “badges of fraud.”

The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the

petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos

spouse since, “imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its

authenticity under a cloud of doubt.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of

irregularities?

HELD:

The Court held in the negative. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence

other than those which she had already presented before the trial court.

An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public records,

the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the

status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the court which rendered

the judgment.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a

public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications

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issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s

adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie

evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of

petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by

sufficient evidence. Mere “imputations of irregularities” will not cast a “cloud of doubt” on

the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to

the contrary is offered.

21. REYES vs. MAURICIO

G.R. No. 175080

November 24, 2010

FACTS:

Eugenio owns a parcel of land in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan. Librada Mauricio and her daughter

Leonida Mauricio (Leonida) filed a complaint before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan

alleging that they’re the legal heirs of Godofredo Mauricio who was the lawful and registered

tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land. That from 1936

until his death in 1994, Godofredo had been working on the subject land and introduced

improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other

permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means,

Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28

September 1994 to eject respondents from the subject property, and had the same notarized.

Librada never appeared before the Notary Public becaue she was illiterate and the contents of

the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her and that Eugenio took undue advantage of

the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the

execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent, and that Eugenio had been

employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the subject property.

Leonida and Librada prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order

for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject

property. According to Eugenio,Godofredo’s occupation of the subject premises was based

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on the former’s mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy

agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. Provincial Adjudicator

said thatGodofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving spouse,

should have peaceful possession of the land. According to DARAB,Mauricios are former

tenants of Spouses Reyes. CA affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB. On

appeal, Leonida’s legal standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio. Eugenio submitted

that the complaint was rendered moot with the death of Librada, Godofredo’s sole

compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada,

thus, not a legal heir.

ISSUE:

WON Eugenio can question the filiation of Leonida in a case regarding land dispute?

HELD:

The Court held in the negative. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.

Civilists Tolentino said and from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the

legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in

another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly

impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which

provides: “The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made

by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.”

This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this

view, because they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action can be brought

only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.

22. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. AGUAS

G.R. No. 165546            

February 27, 2006

FACTS:

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Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on

December 8, 1996. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS

for death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was

likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Her claim

for monthly pension was settled on February 13, 1997. However, Pablo’s sister contested

Rosanna’s claim alleging that Rosanna abandoned the family abode more than six years

before Pablo’s death and lived with another man, Romeo. She also presented a marriage

certificate between Romeo and Rosanna showing that the two were married in 1990. As a

result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension. SSS

denied Rosanna’s request to resume the payment of their pensions. She was advised to refund

to the SSS within 30 days the amount of P10,350 representing the total death benefits

released to her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to August 1997 at P1,150.00 per month.

The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary, it appearing that

she had contracted marriage with Romeo dela Peña during the subsistence of her marriage to

Pablo. The SSC concluded that Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo prior to

his death because of her act of adultery. As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even if her birth

certificate was signed by Pablo as her father, there was more compelling evidence that Jeylnn

was not his legitimate child. The SSC deduced from the records that Jeylnn was the daughter

of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the SSS. The

CA relied on the birth certificate of Jeylnn showing that she was the child of the deceased.

According to the appellate court, for judicial purposes, this record was binding upon the

parties, including the SSS. The entries made in public documents may only be challenged

through adversarial proceedings in courts of law, and may not be altered by mere testimonies

of witnesses to the contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found no evidence to show that she

ceased to receive support from Pablo before he died. Rosanna’s alleged affair with Romeo

dela Peña was not properly proven. In any case, even if Rosanna married Romeo dela Peña

during her marriage to Pablo, the same would have been a void marriage; it would not have

ipso facto made her not dependent for support upon Pablo and negate the presumption that,

as the surviving spouse, she is entitled to support from her husband.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not Rosanna and Jeylnn are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the

death of Pablo?

HELD:

Only the child, Jeylnn, is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.

Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature

of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing

that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were

married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December

8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.

It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born

during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary,

she must prove that she was "the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the

employee." The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she

is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support. In this

case, Rosanna presented proof to show that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a

copy of their marriage certificate which was verified with the civil register by petitioner. But

whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on Pablo at

the time of his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are obliged to

support each other, but whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other is

something that has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone.

The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her

husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing

to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together

at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband

for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.

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Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a

primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death,

she was still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately.

23. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA

GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311

March 31, 2005

FACTS:

Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga

Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using

her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her

adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changedto Garcia, her mother’s

surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the

Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be

allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower

court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or

jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his

middle name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name

when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father?

HELD:

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The Court held in the affirmative. One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is

deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article

189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.

Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the

rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the

right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of

the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom

that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the

father.

24. LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 164948

June 27, 2006

FACTS:

Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of US, a Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam filed

a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene

Dizon Ramos. Minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, Landingin´s brother and

Amelia Ramos.

In her petition, Landingin alleged that when her brother Manuel died the children were left to

the custody of their paternal grandmother and their biological mother Amelia, who went to

Italy, re-married and now has children by her second marriage and no longer communicated

with her children nor with her in-laws from the time she left until the institution of the

adoption;

That the minors are being financially supported by Landingin and her children and relatives

abroad;

When Maria Ramos, the paternal grandmother died, petitioner desires to adopt the children.

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Court ordered DSWD to conduct a study mandated by Art. 34 of PD 603, and to submit a

report not later than the date set for the initial hearing of the petition. OSG entered its

appearance through City Prosecutor. Since her petition as unopposed, petitioner was allowed

to present her evidence ex parte.

DSWD submitted a report recommending that Minors are eligible for adoption. However,

petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of

Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary

evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.

Court granted the petition for adoption in favor of Landingin.

OSG appealed due to lack of consent from the Biological Mother, Petitioner´s children as

required by the law and for failure to establish that Landingin is in a position to support the

proposed adoptees.

CA reversed the order of RTC for failure to adduce in evidence the necessary documents to

grant the adoption. Landingin filed MR but was denied. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Landingin is entitled to adopt the minors without written consent of their

biological mother;

2. Whether the affidavit of consent executed by Landingin´s children sufficiently

complies with the law;

HELD:

1. NO. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of

the decree of adoption. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552 known as the Domestic

Adoption Act of 1998, stated the requirement of consent and notice to the biological

parents of the adoptee. Purpose of such is to protect the natural parental relationship

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from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to

safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

Further, Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents

cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will

suffice. Landingin ailed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint

Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which

she, likewise, failed to prove.

2. NO. The joint written consent of petitioner’s children was notarized in Guam, USA; for it

to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country it

needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103. Hence, the alleged written consent of

petitioner’s legitimate children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best

be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by

anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the

signature or handwriting of the makers.

25. In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim

GR No. 168992-93

May 21, 2009

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were

childless.  Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as

shown by a certification of DSWD.  The spouses registered the children making it appears as

if they were the parents.  Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died.  She then married an American

Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000.  Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing

of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.  In

2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial

court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and

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seven months old.  Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their

consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt?

HELD:

The Court held in the negative. Petition was denied.  The time the petitions were filed,

petitioner had already remarried.  Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances

which was not present in the case at bar.  In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly

exercised parental authority.  The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of

husband and wife is mandatory.  This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental

authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but

natural to require spouses to adopt jointly.  The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not

suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen.  He

must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552.  The requirements on residency

and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to

Sec 7.  Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.  It includes

caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of

their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

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